Can South Asia Share Its Rivers?

“[D]isputes have deepened to the extent that water is seen as inherently a source of conflict rather than productivity or cooperation.” Can South Asia Share Its Rivers? GARETH PRICE AND SONALI MITTRA for joint management. Moreover, it has led to a rather irrational perception that water belongs to individuals, communities, or states, and is to be used at their discretion. This fundamental notion runs deep within the conflict between different states in India over the sharing of river waters. River sharing between neighboring countries is also seen as a zero-sum game. Volumetric divisions of the river waters flowing between India and Pakistan, and between India and Bangladesh, are far removed from the actual demand for and use of water on either side of the border, leading to conflict. Over the years, these disputes have deepened to the extent that water is seen as inherently a source of conflict rather than productivity or cooperation. While there is an agreement between India and Pakistan regarding each of their shared rivers, there is no agreement on tangential issues, such as groundwater extraction, which can affect the other country. India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, but have an agreement for just one of them. Likewise, only three agreements are in place for the many rivers that Nepal and India share. Emerging issues—most notably climate change—are not covered by any of these agreements. Regional water-governance institutions have arisen in response to conflict. Both the IWT, signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, and the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh resulted from a series of negotiations to resolve clashes over water rights. The disputes were distinct, given the different political relationships between India and its downstream neighbors, but both treaties reflected similar values and perceptions of the rivers. These values influenced the negotiators’ approach toward river management, including the distribution of water between the countries, as well as the conflict-resolution and risk-management mechanisms included in the treaties. GARETH PRICE is a senior research fellow at Chatham House in London. SONALI MITTRA is an associate fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. 148 Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 T he shared rivers of South Asia have a troubled past and a worrying future. The supply of water delivered by the region’s river systems will be subject to the impact of climate change. Unless agricultural practices change dramatically, rising demand could strain the water supply as new industries emerge, urbanization accelerates, and the population dependent on the rivers increases. More than 200 million people currently depend on the Indus River, and around 650 million people on the Ganges-Brahamaputra-Meghna river system. The population reliant on these waters has more than doubled over the past 40 years. While population growth is slowing, the region’s prospects looks precarious unless new approaches are adopted. Some river-sharing agreements, notably the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan, are generally seen as successful, but they are not irrevocable. Water—and control over it— is increasingly talked about as part of a country’s foreign-policy tool kit. Rivers are also associated with the region’s rich cultural and religious heritage. Perceptions of their central role in the lives of nations have shaped the policy and politics of water sharing in the region. Many people across South Asia conceive of their rivers as divine and inexhaustible natural resources beyond the control and management of humans. The Ganges, for instance, is worshipped as a goddess and several key pilgrimage sites are situated along its banks. Despite increasing levels of pollution and declining or more erratic water flows, the river continues to hold great spiritual significance. However, this has failed to translate into or encourage efficient practices and policies Can South Asia Share Its Rivers? • 149 Committee described it as the “world’s most successful water treaty.” Under the IWT’s mechanisms for dispute resolution, in the event one party claims that the treaty has been breached, the Permanent Indus Commission, which includes one commissioner from each country, tries to resolve the issue. If the disagreement persists, the case is referred to a “neuDIVIDING THE INDUS tral expert” or a court of arbitration created in The Indus River is of critical importance for consultation with both governments and/or the both India and Pakistan. According to some estiWorld Bank. Two annexes to the treaty provide a mates it irrigates more than 95 percent of Pakicomprehensive list of the rules and procedures to stan’s agricultural land. Much potential hydrobe followed by the neutral expert and the court of power remains untapped, providing an attractive arbitration. The necessary qualifications for commissionoption to meet Pakistan’s energy needs. The Indus ers, the procedures for their appointment, and flows through India’s breadbasket states of Punjab their role are clearly specified in the IWT. They and Haryana. In addition to agriculture, India deare usually high-ranking hydro-engineers who pends on the Indus and its tributaries to meet its have some experience working for government. own energy needs, though 54 percent of its poThe commissioners face political pressures and tential remains untapped, according to the Central occasionally media outrage for giving technical Water Commission. opinions that contradict popular sentiment in Brokered by the World Bank, the IWT has been described as akin to a divorce their home countries. In the settlement. The treaty allocates most extreme case, the comthe western tributary rivers of missioner Jamat Ali Shah sufAcross South Asia, the Indus—the Indus itself, fered the wrath of anti-Indian water management Jhelum, and Chenab—to Pakielements in Pakistan who acis generally poor. stan and the eastern rivers—the cused him of allowing India to Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—to India. “steal” Pakistan’s water by not Dividing the six rivers between objecting to India’s constructhe two countries and defining water rights proved tion of the Nimoo Bazgo Hydropower Project, difficult. At the time of Partition in 1947, the newwhich was finished in 2009. Eventually he fled ly independent nations signed an Inter-Dominion Pakistan and sought asylum in Canada. So far the IWT has survived three wars and nuAccord whereby Pakistan agreed to pay compensamerous political standoffs, but disputes over water tion to India for releasing water from the Indus. rights and the construction of hydropower instalNegotiations on a bilateral agreement continued lations are intensifying. Pakistan is challenging for a decade as both sides remained adamant about several Indian hydropower projects, primarily in seeking maximum control over the Indus and its relation to the technical design of the plants. Istributaries, though the needs of the two countries lamabad’s skepticism regarding India’s plans stems differed in scale and intensity. from its fear that the projects could reduce or dePakistan’s insistence that water should be allolay the flow of water into Pakistan. Such fears are cated in accordance with historical usage was unheightened given that some Indian commentators acceptable to India, which also refused to pay for and politicians have called for New Delhi to use the construction of canals and storage to make up water as a means of punishing Pakistan. The IWT for Pakistan’s loss of water from the eastern rivers. remains a success for now, but its ability to withUltimately, World Bank arbitration led to a new stand future threats of scarcity, climate change, formula for allocating the waters and offered the and geopolitical tensions is in doubt. option of external financing to break the deadlock. The World Bank’s solution prioritized engineering DEMANDS ON THE GANGES and economics as a means of sidelining political The Ganges is part of one of the largest rivdifferences. The technical provisions of the treaty er systems in the world, the Ganges-Meghnaare generally regarded as being highly effective. As Brahmaptura basin, which covers an area of 1.7 recently as 2011, the US Senate Foreign Relations Are the current river-sharing institutions resilient enough to withstand the uncertainties of climate change and the socio-political disruptions expected to accompany it? How can they be improved? Answering these questions requires examining the narratives ingrained in the conflicts over transboundary rivers in South Asia. Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 150 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2017 Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 million square kilometers. The catchment area change. Finally, the treaty lacks adequate disputeof the Ganges is divided between India (79 perresolution or arbitration mechanisms. cent), Nepal (14 percent), Bangladesh (4 perAfter the signing of the Ganges treaty, attention cent), and China (3 percent). The basin supports turned to another of the shared rivers, the Teesta, the livelihoods of more than 600 million people. but thus far no agreement concerning that river With Nepal and China upstream and Bangladesh has been signed. Although the two governments downstream, India is in the middle (though the came close to an agreement in 2011, it was scupbulk of the catchment lies in India itself). While pered by the state government of West Bengal, geographically this could be considered advanwhich argued that the proposed allocation of watageous, politically it is complex. Water sharing ter to Bangladesh would undermine its own needs. among countries with varying degrees of depenIndia’s agreements with upstream Nepal differ dence on the rivers and major economic and milfrom those with downstream Bangladesh. Rather itary asymmetries poses major challenges, yet the than volume-based sharing of river flows, they countries of the basin have reached some agreehave focused on potential sharing of benefits from ments over the Ganges and its tributaries. hydro projects, in both irrigation and electricWhen India and Bangladesh signed the Ganges ity generation. The Kosi River, a tributary of the Waters Treaty in 1996, it was a culmination of alGanges known as the “sorrow of Bihar,” is prone most three decades of negotiations. Their dispute to flooding and frequently shifts course, regularover water dates back to when Bangladesh was still ly causing loss of property, livelihoods, and even part of Pakistan. The tension began when India lives. India proposed building the Sapta Kosi High explored the possibility of building the Farakka Dam Multipurpose Project after the devastating Barrage; construction started in 1961 and the proj2008 floods in Bihar, and said it would bear the ect was completed in 1975. By full cost of the project. In rediverting water from the Ganturn, Nepal was to receive royges, it allowed India to de-silt alties from India for the power River sharing between the port of Kolkata (then still generated by the project, and neighboring countries is known as Calcutta) but also both countries would benefit seen as a zero-sum game. threatened to reduce water flow from improved irrigation and into Bangladesh. flood control. However, they After Bangladesh became indisagreed on the division of dependent in 1971, India and Bangladesh set up a the benefits. Nepal felt that India would gain far Joint River Commission to discuss all their shared more from the deal, while India presented itself rivers. However, the Ganges was specifically exas a “big brother” helping its smaller neighbor by cluded from the early discussions. Unlike the Perdeveloping water resources and mitigating flood manent Indus Commission, this panel was neither damage. Several studies warned of the project’s ena dispute-resolution mechanism nor was it bound vironmental impact and the likely scale of human by any treaty clause. Bangladesh appealed to the displacement it would cause. These warnings reinUnited Nations to settle the dispute. A short-term forced the political stalemate, given the absence of agreement was signed the following year, though any mitigation strategy to offset the damage. it expired after just five years. China shares water-level data with India and reThe treaty, signed in 1996, has a duration of cently extended the period for data sharing as a 30 years. While it is seen as a diplomatic success, means of enabling India to control floods. A numthe treaty fails to address several critical concerns. ber of Indian commentators have raised concerns The scale, intensity, and uncertainty of the threats over Chinese dam construction on the Yarlung arising from climate change and geopolitical shifts Tsangpo (the Chinese name for the Brahmapucould not have been anticipated by the negotiatra), warning that these dams could give China tors. Unlike the IWT, the treaty does not even refer “control” over water flows into India. Few, if any, to the possibility of “future cooperation.” It is an have suggested that Chinese dams could facilitate inadequate basis for fostering collective action beflood prevention in India. Some scientific studies tween the two countries to deal with the impendhave observed that most of the water in the Brahing climate crisis. Water quality is declining and maputra comes from rainfall downstream from the riverine ecology is being degraded. The flow of China (although this presumes that the state of water has already diminished as a result of climate Arunachal Pradesh lies within India, which Chi- Can South Asia Share Its Rivers? • 151 na disputes). It seems that concern over Chinese dam-building stems less from its impact on water flows than from alarm over Chinese territorial claims and the fact that a Chinese physical presence is increasingly apparent in parts of Tibet that had for centuries served as a buffer between China and India. SCARCITY NARRATIVES SHARED INTERESTS Water shortages due to overuse, poor rainfall, and unilateral diversions by India feed into the scarcity narrative in the Ganges basin. These factors are not given equal weighting in the bilateral negotiations between India and Bangladesh. For Bangladesh, the main concern is upstream diversion by India. At the same time, Bangladesh faces its own challenges with increasing population and demand. While the per capita availability of water is low in both India and Bangladesh, the latter faces increasingly acute issues of siltation and de- Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 Increased demand stemming from population growth and economic development along with the prospect of reduced supply ratchets up the pressure on water resources. According to the Falkenmark water stress index, India is currently under conditions of “water stress” and Pakistan is “water scarce.” A country is said to be water scarce when the per capita availability of water is less than 1,000 cubic meters per year. Water-stressed countries have slightly greater water availability per person. While this index provides a benchmark for the current water situation, it oversimplifies the issue of scarcity, discounting temporal variability and the spatial distribution of water availability. Most of the rivers in the region are perennial and dependent on monsoons. Maximum river flow occurs between June and December. The remaining months experience a lean flow. Furthermore, precipitation is unevenly distributed across the basin. As a result, the average understates the problem of scarcity. Across South Asia, water management is generally poor: policies allocating water to competing uses—agricultural, industrial, domestic—have been haphazard and primarily beneficial to the agricultural sector. Some sociocultural practices have also restricted marginalized communities’ access to water. For instance, in certain rural areas, lower castes are barred from using wells. The prevailing scarcity narrative focuses on the physical availability of water, ignoring the complexities of distribution. Scarcity is often treated as a technical and managerial problem that justifies building more water-control infrastructure rather than fixing fundamental issues of water usage and consumption. But man-made problems—such as pollution, loss of water in transmission (owing to poor maintenance), wasteful overuse in agriculture, and ill-conceived hydropower and diversion plans—have affected the supply of water as much as natural changes. There is also a Malthusian security-centered narrative predicting that scarcity will drive con- flict. Pakistan fears that India’s plans to develop infrastructure on the rivers are intended to give it control over water flowing into Pakistan. These fears are reinforced by occasional statements by some Indian politicians and commentators calling on New Delhi to do exactly that. Back in 1951, David Lilienthal, a former chairman of the Tennessee River Valley Authority, stoked this anxiety during the early negotiations on the Indus treaty. India’s ability to cut off water to Pakistan, he argued, could cause more devastation than any bomb. The security narrative has been prevalent and exaggerated ever since. A veteran Indian journalist, B.G. Verghese, has argued that a fight for control over the headwaters of the Indus is behind the Kashmir dispute. Many Indian commentators dispute this claim. On average, a hydropower plant takes a minimum of six to eight years to build and costs $2-3 million per megawatt of power production. The cost of technical inputs and production is much higher than the potential benefits from gaining strategic advantage over Pakistan, in the view of these critics. Meanwhile, an ecology-focused narrative is emerging within civil society and among academics. This view, contesting the assumption that the IWT has been a “success,” focuses on the fact that the treaty does not emphasize water conservation or ecological health. As a result, the Indus River is in a dire state. The reduced water flow, owing to diversions, dam construction, inefficient management, and pollution, has adversely affected the riverine ecology. Ecological destruction in the Kashmir Valley, driven by deforestation and overgrazing, has in turn led to river erosion and siltation. Climate change will cause further anxiety over water in the years to come. Yet “water control” infrastructure still dominates river planning and strategies for meeting competing demands. 152 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2017 these conflicts flare up, they have an impact on water relations. India’s main security concern with Bangladesh is migration. No one knows how many Bangladeshis live in India, though 15 to 20 million is a common estimate. Indian fears of Bangladeshi immigration would be best addressed by deepening engagement with Bangladesh on water issues. The impact of ongoing processes of siltation, desertification, and climate change in the years to come will be most devastating for those living in coastal communities and along river banks. Increased water flow into Bangladesh would enable more of its people to maintain their livelihoods without migrating. But the security-driven approach focuses on erecting fences, a policy that clearly is failing to prevent population movements from Bangladesh into India. BOTTOM-UP COOPERATION Three dominant narratives shape attitudes toward water in South Asia. The narrative focused on scarcity claims that water is a zero-sum resource, and that in the interest of meeting national development objectives it is imperative for each country to secure as much water as possible. A second narrative places river sharing within the broader ambit of national security, which in turn justifies data secrecy and militarized solutions. And the ecology-based narrative sees a river as an ecosystem demanding joint management by upstream and downstream countries. Recognizing these divergent perspectives will allow for better policy making. While an ecological perspective is vitally important, it would be idealistic to assume it will have primacy in decision making that is more likely to be driven by security and scarcity narratives. Yet the greater the prominence given to ecological concerns, the more likely it is that solutions will be sustainable. Official discussions could be supplemented by a bottom-up approach focusing on the ecological approach. There are a few rare cases of successful transboundary water management that demonstrate how the potential for future conflict could be mitigated. A community-to-community early flood-warning system linking India and Nepal is one such example. Since official channels can be slowed by bureaucratic hurdles, a direct line of communication between the upstream and downstream areas is much more effective. Similarly, both nongovernmental organizations and the governments of India and Bangladesh Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 sertification within the basin because of a deficient flow of water. The upstream Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, for their part, argue that they have insufficient water for irrigation and domestic consumption. They claim that they have been denied their right to water based on their historic use. Attempting to divide the river flow by volume has failed to address key problems in transboundary water management. The Ganges treaty mentions water quality and encourages sustainable water use, but little attention has been paid to these issues in practice. Yet rivers are part of a socio-ecological unit that disregards administrative borders and political divisions. Disruptions in water flow affect the entire riverine environment, including fisheries, hydrological cycles, and ecosystems. The diversion of the river at the Farakka Barrage, poor ecosystem management, and the apparent impact of climate change have adversely affected the Sundarbans, one of the largest deltas in the world. The Ganges joins the Brahmaputra in northern Bangladesh and flows into the Sundarbans and the Bay of Bengal. The Sundarbans is the world’s largest continuous block of mangrove forest, rich in natural resources and ecologically sensitive. The area of the delta is split 60:40 between Bangladesh and India. If joint management is out of the question, then at least policy alignment is imperative to maintain these forests and the integrity of the ecosystem, and to mitigate devastating impacts on hydrological cycles, climate, and the flow of the river. While relations between India and Bangladesh have been strained at times, the two countries are cognizant of these shared interests and have taken some steps to implement water management in the delta. Progress has been slow and cooperation halting given the lack of a long-term agreement and persistent concerns about sovereignty. The political focus has been on facilitating an agreement for the Teesta River rather than deepening engagement in preserving the Sundarbans. Water disputes between India and Bangladesh are less prone to being framed in terms of national security than those between India and Pakistan. A recent exchange of various enclaves in the IndiaBangladesh border region simplified the boundary between the two nations, so there is no outstanding territorial dispute. But security concerns persist over issues such as the use of Bangladeshi territory by northeastern Indian militants. When Can South Asia Share Its Rivers? • 153 Decades of cooperation on South Asian waters have come as a by-product of political division and upheaval rather than through the logic of collective action. Persistent conflicts are further heightened by multiple factors including the riparian countries’ deficits of economic growth and development, terrorism and nationalist movements, and increasing environmental concerns—above all, the threat of climate change. The old riversharing agreements may not be able to withstand these looming stresses. They must be supplemented with alternative approaches. ■ Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/116/789/148/388368/curh_116_789_148.pdf by guest on 10 September 2020 share information and exchange ideas on best practices for managing the Sundarbans, including in the areas of water governance, fisheries management, and increasing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities. Additional economic and social incentives, such as financial aid, training support, and best-practice awards, are needed to enable these efforts to be scaled up and eventually incorporated into official policy. While joint management may be a step too far, these are some encouraging examples of policy alignment between the two governments.