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Sir-Gottfried and Wilson 1 remark critically that "SSK [sociology of scientific knowledge] accounts often treat only the earliest phases of a scientific development, when the evidence is uncertain, and largely ignore subsequent convincing confirmations". This is true of controversy studies in SSK, but not of one of the books at issue, my own Constructing Quarks 2. There I documented and analysed the history of the establishment of the standard model as the 'new orthodoxy' in elementary particle physics. Ellis 3 makes a similar mistake, and adds that he would "also like [me] to document and compare more thoroughly the rejection by the scientific community of false 'discoveries'". I have published essays on discredited 'discoveries' of magnetic monopoles and isolated quarks, and on the ultimately unsuccessful theoretical arguments that the new particles (the J/psi and so on) were manifestations of quark colour rather than charm (see, for example, ref. 4). The analysis in those essays goes along the same lines as that of Constructing Quarks, and if Ellis wants to dispute it, I will be happy to respond. Capasso 5 is mistaken in asserting that successful technology "validates the specific theories on which it is founded". A machine works because it works, not because of what anybody thinks about it 6. And, as I believe Gottfried and Wilson recognize, Capasso's idea that technology owes everything to prior science is as historically misleading as its inverse. In short, the continuing criticism of science studies in your pages remains wide of its mark.
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2018
Responding to comments on "Imre Lakatos and the Inexhaustible �tom: The Hidden Marxist Roots of History and Philosophy of Science," an argument is made for reviving a missed opportunity for integrating sociological and normative approaches to science. Lakatos' mature philosophy of science, though jettisoning a political commitment to Marxism, retains a dialectical approach developed during his Hungarian career. Through his carefully crafted debate with Feyerabend, Lakatos continued to promote a dialectical approach that offers a useful model for integrating the history of science and normative assessments focused on the viability of approaches that challenge dominant perspectives.
Metascience, 1999
S TAMPED into the physics laboratory are the imprints of the world: cloud chambers drawn from weather stations, armour plating blow-torched out of scrapped warships and bolted into spark chambers, radiation-hardened detector electronics from defence technology, x-ray film turned into cosmic-ray traps. Image and Logic (hereafter I&L) starts not with the symmetries, explanations and predictions of high theory, nor even with the great puzzles and debates of experiment: it begins with the physicality of instruments. Out of such devices it is possible to piece together the changing, contested meanings of the categories of experiment and experimenter. My aim, in an earlier book, How Experiments End, was to clear historical space from the dictates of theory. I wanted to begin a discussion about experiments outside the standard periods defined by the development of theory (quantum mechanics, special relativity, general relativity, and quantum field theory). When experimentalists argued about when and where an experiment had shown something, I registered these debates as historically central-as significant as the much-studied wars between wave and particle pictures of matter. Would statistical argumentation be accepted? Could a simulation count as a demonstration? How would subgroups aggregate their conclusions into a result the group as a whole could endorse? I&L continues How Experiments End and critiques it. It shifts attention again-this time not from the problem complex of high theory to that of experiment, but rather from experimental issues to the instruments and techniques that transect experimental domains. How Experiments End asked: how did competing groups assemble results, handle competition, and consolidate an internal consensus that an effect was real? I&L follows 9 AAHPSSS,
Università di Perugia, 2019
PhD Dissertation in Physics, science communication.
Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, 2022
At first glance, what scientific progress means seems to be a quickly answered question. It is not easy to think of the sciences without progress; sciences and the notion of progress seem identical in general. Describing the nature of scientific progress is an important task that will have practical and theoretical consequences. The approach, which argues that the background on which sciences are based does not have a historical or cultural character following the positivist interpretation, accepts sciences as testing the validity of observation and experiment data to a large extent. On the other hand, the tendency that emphasizes that the complex functioning of the history of science has an indelible mark on scientific theories prefers to build sciences on a historical and social basis. How both major approaches ground the idea of scientific progress profoundly affects both our understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and the way we do science. This paper aims to evaluate scientific progress based on the views of prominent philosophers of science in the twentieth century.
2011
The relationship between science and the philosophy of science is likely to be judged a contested one. Certainly many philosophical debates may seem oblique to the uninitiated (and even then, perhaps still!), whilst recent intellectual debacles have tended to portray philosophers of science in a poor light. During the 1990s, for example, the ‘‘Science Wars’’ erupted over the question of whether scientific theories provided true, objective descriptions of reality, or whether they were simply arbitrary ‘‘constructions,’’ mere mythologies on a par with ancient Greek theogony or medieval magic [1]. There is some truth to such charges, some of it certainly attributable to an unhealthy certain intoxication with trendy theories (like ‘‘relativism’’ and ‘‘constructionism’’). Yet even if those charges are not always justified, and even if the majority of the philosophy of science is informed and responsible, it remains true that philosophers of science who pitch into debates about the scienc...
Physics Today, 1996
In his argumentation against string theory, Woit shows that the problem is at least in part caused by the modern organization of science. We argue that Woit even underestimates the problem, and that the modern organization of science is a serious danger for freedom of science in general. Especially, Woit's proposals, how to change this situation, are not sufficient. The status of a modern scientist has to be seriously changed, toward an independence on external "evaluations".
Science in Context, 1997
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