Academia.eduAcademia.edu

The Problem of Inclusion in Deliberative Environmental Valuation

2017, Environmental Values

The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences i...

Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     The Problem of Inclusion in Deliberative Environmental Valuation Andres Vargas, Alex Lo, Michael Howes, Nicholas Rohde Abstract The idea of inclusive collective decision making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation that are commonly used in economics have been criticized because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low income earners who do not have a capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasizes argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and pre-requisites but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognizes differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation and so is better equipped to improve, but not guarantee, inclusion. Keywords: Deliberative monetary valuation, Inclusion, Democracy, Environmental valuation, Communicative rationality Introduction In environmental decision making, public participation is increasingly being promoted as a way to enhance the legitimacy of decisions. Neoclassical economists believe that stated preference valuation approaches, such as the contingent valuation method 1     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     (CVM), can provide opportunities for public participation by allowing representatives from the affected population to evaluate public decisions and select the best options for them. This is regarded as crucial for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of environmental cost benefit analysis (ECBA) (OECD 2006: 35). ECBA, in general terms, provides information about whether a policy change is likely to improve social welfare, defined as the aggregation of individual welfare. ECBA’s core activity is the estimation of monetary values for environmental changes, in many cases through techniques such as the CVM, which employ surveys to describe a hypothetical buying situation in order to ask respondents their maximum willingness to pay for a change in the level of provision of the environmental good (Bockstael and Freeman III 2005). From a political perspective ECBA resembles the aggregative model of democracy according to which a democratic decision represents the most widely and strongly held preferences (Elster 1997; O'Neill, Holland, and Light 2008). On this account a democratic process must allow for the expression of competing preferences and requires a fair method for adding them (Young 2000). ECBA fails in both respects. First because precludes the expression of preferences that are not in accordance with ECBA’s rationale, e.g. lexicographic preferences; and second, because the aggregation method is not fair as long as the intensity to which a preference can be expressed is contingent upon individual’s income (Gowdy 2004; Wegner and Pascual 2011). Ecological economists have therefore proposed alternative valuation methods grounded on the theories of deliberative democracy. They argue that deliberative procedures can enhance the democratic legitimacy and procedural justice of collective decisions regarding the environment (Lo 2011; Wilson and Howarth 2002; Randhir and Shriver 2009; Söderbaum and Brown 2010). 2     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) is one of these alternative valuation methods (Niemeyer and Spash 2001). processes, DMV asks Through a combination of political and economic participants to state, individually or collectively, their willingness to pay (WTP) after going through a group discussion process (Spash 2007, 2008). The problem, however, is that despite being participatory, DMV does not guarantee democratically better outcomes. A key criterion of democratic legitimacy is the degree to which those affected by a decision have been included in deliberation. According to Young (2000), there are two forms of exclusion: external and internal. External exclusion occurs when individuals or groups who intend to participate are left out of the forum. Internal exclusion occurs when individuals lack the effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to the forum. Proponents of deliberative valuation have made reference to this later type of exclusion as the “ability to say” (O'Neill and Spash 2000). The capacity and confidence of citizens to speak and to be heard are unevenly distributed across the sample of participants due to variations in education level and ability to use formal languages (Spash 2007: 694). Deliberative valuation proponents have relied on the procedures of debate and discussion to secure equal and free participation, but fail to adequately address the democratic limitation of rational argumentation. This paper argues that procedures designed to give equal footing to participants but unattended to variations in communicative competence severely compromise people´s ability to say and ultimately the democratic legitimacy of valuation. This paper reviews the conceptual and empirical DMV literature and analyze it in light of the internal exclusion problem. In the next section, the basis of the deliberative valuation alternative is briefly discussed. Section 3 develops the “ability to say” issue 3     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     in order to critically review the theoretical and empirical DMV literature in section 4. The final section concludes. 1. The DMV Project In addressing environmental conflicts an important observation is that decisions are shaped in the context of an uneven distribution of wealth, power and voice (O'Neill, Holland, and Light 2008). But how and to what degree these distorting factors shape a decision is contingent upon the chosen decision-making processes that determine whose interests are to count and to what extent (Vatn and Bromley 1994). While the standard approach to CVM and ECBA presupposes that economics is about efficiency and politics about equity (Atkinson and Mourato 2008) deliberative approaches, by contrast, do not pretend to separate economics from politics. Rather equity and efficiency are expected to be simultaneously addressed by deliberators. In the deliberative settings proposed by Brown, Peterson, and Tonn (1995); Ward (1999), participating citizens do not represent specific interests but take into account the interests and values of other stakeholders. Similarly, drawing on Rawls´s Theory of Justice (1971), Wilson and Howarth (2002) assert that a fair deliberative valuation process will produce a fair outcome. Following a different line of argument, Sagoff (1998) contends that when making a collective decision individuals act as citizens who express their opinions about what we ought to do as society rather than private consumer preferences. Deliberative approaches should therefore be used to evaluate options for managing the environment because they put the individuals in the appropriate social context and discourage selfinterested consumer perspectives (Jacobs 1997; Vatn 2005, 2009b, a; Soma and Vatn 2010). 4     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Whether these deliberative principles could make sense of monetary valuation, however, is contested. Sagoff (1998) for instance, accepts monetary valuation on the basis that WTP figures may be reinterpreted as a fair share, not welfare losses or gains. For Vatn (2009b) monetary assessments and deliberation seem to be incompatible because they are based on conflicting assumptions about the process of valuation. While deliberation induces a social rationality, monetary valuation is thought to privilege an individualist rationality which presupposes value commensurability (Vatn 2009a). Drawing on critical theory Lo (2014); (Lo and Spash 2013) argue that deliberation and monetary valuation are in tension as long as they are premised upon competing moral theories (consequentialist vs. deontological, for example). They thus proposed to conceptualize deliberation as a second order theory whose purpose is to structure the dispute among the claims of conflicting first order theories (e.g. consequentialist, deontological). Accordingly, the monetary outcome of a deliberation is not a priori defined so as to represent a market exchange, but on the contrary its meaning is left open to post-deliberative interpretation. This implies, however, that monetary values are no longer an economic but a political construct. 2. Ability to say and internal exclusion The “ability to pay” argument exposes the problem of CVM in excluding individuals on the basis of income. The same argument can be used to articulate the issue of deliberative exclusion due to the uneven distribution of citizen´s capacities, and confidence, to both speak and to be heard (O'Neill and Spash 2000; Spash 2007). Following Young (2000) we distinguish internal from external exclusion and build on this to present a conceptualization of the “ability to say” in terms of Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach. 5     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     a. Deliberative exclusion Deliberation is exclusive to the extent that the asymmetries of power and resources present in society prevent some voices from public participation (O'Neill, Holland, and Light 2008). External exclusion occurs because powerful actors can use their political and economic resources to strategically manipulate a deliberative process to silence certain perspectives or legitimize political agendas (Niemeyer and Spash 2001; O'Hara 1996; O'Neill 2007). Internal exclusion is less apparent because it occurs within deliberation. People are internally excluded because they lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others. According to Young (2000) the source of internal exclusion are the exacting standards of political communication required by the deliberative ideal with its assumption that deliberation is both culturally neutral and universal in character; but as she asserts “it actually carries the rhetorical nuances of particular situated social positions and relations” (Young 2000: 63). A deliberative setting that privileges argument is more likely to be influenced by society´s structural inequalities which “inhibit the political participation of some citizens with formally equal rights at the same time that they relatively empower others”(Young 2000: 34) Theories of deliberation grounded on Habermas´s Theory of Communicative Action (1984) or Rawls´s public reason (2005) utilise an idea of deliberation that is restricted to rational argumentation. Other forms of communication, like rhetoric and narrative, are treated with suspicion as they are considered strategic in nature. According to them is only through the impersonal force of argument that autonomous and free citizens should reach an agreement. For Young (2000) argument is necessary if public discussion is to produce just and wise decisions, but she thinks there are reasons to be suspicious of argument. 6     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     First, it requires shared premises and conceptual frameworks for framing the issues. Those needs, interests and sufferings of injustice that cannot be expressed according to shared premises within these shared discursive frameworks are excluded (Young 2000: 37). Second, it assumes norms of “articulateness”. Spoken expression that follows the structure of well-formed written speech, speech framed as straightforward assertion, that is formal and general and that proceeds from premises to conclusions in an orderly fashion is privileged over other modes of expression. According to Young these norms of “articulateness” are culturally specific and “those who exhibit such articulate qualities of expression are usually socially privileged” (Young 2000: 39). Third, norms of deliberation that privilege speech which is dispassionate and disembodied presuppose an opposition between reason an emotion that devaluates forms of expression used by marginalized groups and minorities (Young 2000: 39). Hence, a more inclusive deliberative framework should welcome alternative forms of communication (e.g. greeting, rhetoric and narrative) to further understanding among deliberators not sharing the same background conditions. Alternative modes of communication are not substitutes for argument but important complements. In Young´s own words “Greeting, I claim, precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons in discussion that aim to reach understanding. If parties do not recognize and acknowledge one another, they will not listen to arguments. Rhetoric always accompanies argument, by situating the argument for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone. Narratives sometimes are important parts of larger arguments, and sometimes enable understanding across difference in the absence of shared premises that arguments need in order to begin” (Young 2000: 79). The aim, besides justification, is to establish credibility, to create empathy, to trigger a sense of injustice and to draw the attention of the audience to one’s claims and experiences (Mansbridge et al. 2010). Empirical evidence from small group deliberation 7     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     shows that non-argumentative forms of communication are used by deliberators to build a common informational base and to critically analyze information (Black 2012: 67); to foster understanding (Black 2008; Dryzek and Lo 2014); to question and to challenge experts (Walmsley 2009); to build trust and sincerity (Ryfe 2006); to justify arguments (Steiner 2012); and, to represent new interests and identities (Polletta and Lee 2006). Polletta and Lee (2006) found that women are more likely to use narrative and that a minority perspective claim is more likely to be advanced using narrative that other type of claims. With regards to participation, the evidence from jury studies and deliberative mini-publics indicates that those who tend to have greater presence in deliberation are those with higher educational and income levels, males, and people with better occupational status (Siu and Stanisevski 2012; Siu 2009; Steiner 2012). The empirical evidence suggests that non-argumentative communication is not exclusively used by minorities and marginalized groups, that participation is partially related to social and economic variables, and that non-argumentative forms are often compatible with, and helpful for, the deliberative model ideals. This lends support to the position that a normative DMV framework should avoid reducing communication to a procedural condition for meeting its ideals. Rather, what is important is to distinguish communicative acts aimed at reaching understanding and cooperation from those intended to strategically manipulate others. This differentiation “cannot be made by means of a distinction between purely rational and merely rhetorical speech” (Young 2000: 66) but requires the application of critical standards to all forms of communication. Communication should be non-coercive, it should connect particular interests to some general principles, and it should involve an effort to communicate in terms that others can accept (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010a). 8     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     A deliberative framework that admits alternative forms of communication has also better prospects for being relevant in different contexts. By not being predisposed to particular ways of expressing and reasoning it is better equipped, though not fully capable, than its rationalistic counterpart for encompassing what Martínez-Alier (2002) labels the multiple languages of valuation (e.g. livelihoods, sacredness, rights) that underlie ecological distribution conflicts. This is so because idea of languages refers not only to the multiplicity of values that are at stake in an ecological conflict but also to the ways in which people around the world express those judgements, not all of them articulable in rationalistic terms (Ward et al. 2003). Moreover, alternative forms of communication are especially valuable for expressing claims of injustice which cannot be articulated within the prevailing normative discourse but that demand a new one (Young 2000). The problem of reconstructing the views of some to fit the dominant paradigm is illustrated by Tanasescu (2015), who shows how in the Ecuadorian case of the rights of nature the use of the pre-defined normative language of rights and nature, in combination with the use of the indigenous as a symbol of harmonious living with and within nature1, contributed to advance the interests of nature advocates while adding to the long history of denying indigenous agency. Taken all together we can say that a deliberative valuation framework predisposed to argumentation imposes an undue burden on deliberators for their competence to participate in deliberation is conditioned by their capacity to reason in a particular way. But if reasoning is a capacity expressed in different ways in various cultural contexts (Mercier 2011), then a broader concept of political communication does not contradict deliberation’s rationality aims while allowing for a DMV framework better suited for accommodating social differences and recognising the cultural specificity of                                                                                                                           1  This  image  of  the  indigenous  is  in  itself  a  Western  construction,  which  is  in  fact  misleading  and   oversimplifying  (see  the  Pristine  Myth  in  Miller,  2007.)   9     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     deliberative practices. A less rigid notion of communicative competence is thus needed. This is further explored in what follows. b. Advancing inclusion in the forum Under the capability approach, individual advantage is judged by a person’s capability to do things she or he has reason to value. The focus is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that (Sen 2009: 229). These beings and doings are called functionings. Being communicatively competent is a key functioning for deliberation. The degree of communicative competence in deliberation depends on both the presence of resources (e.g. schooling) necessary for this capability, and the extent to which these resources can be converted into a functioning. Sen (1999) distinguishes different sources of variation between resources and the advantages individuals get from them. First, personal heterogeneities (e.g. physical conditions, cognitive and non-cognitive skills) influence how a person can convert a resource into a functioning. For instance, if a person has cognitive disabilities, schooling will be of limited help. Second, social factors shape the context in which the individual employs his or her resources and abilities, and makes choices. Those factors could operate at the societal level, like public educational arrangements, or at the smaller scale of the micro-political interaction of deliberation, such as norms favoring specific modes of communication or admissible forms of knowledge. Third2, relational perspectives are those factors that influence how the individual understands his or her relative position in society, like social norms and conventions that define gender roles or discriminating practices. Based on the above we can show more clearly the central role that communication plays in advancing inclusion. We can start by seeing communication as a social factor.                                                                                                                           2  Sen  (1999)  also  includes  environmental  diversities  (e.g.  climate  and  location)  and  distribution  within   the  family.  These  are  beyond  the  scope  of  our  analysis.   10     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Accepted forms of communication in deliberation are part of the social context in which a participant has the opportunity to influence others. By defining how the individual is expected to communicate in a deliberation what it is to be a communicatively competent actor is also defined. Consequently, the advantages the individual can get from the resources he or she commands are conditioned by what counts as deliberative communication. What kind of communication counts as deliberative could be exogenous, as in deliberation theories grounded on Habermas´s (1984) and Rawls´s public use of reason (2005), or endogenous to the actual deliberative practice, i.e. internally derived from the communicative practices of those who take part in deliberation. In the first case of exogenous definition, the individual´s communicative competence is judged according to their capacity to raise and challenge validity claims by means of reasoned argumentation. On this account an individual becomes a better deliberator by acquiring those resources which can improve his/her argumentative performance. Hence the call for institutions that correct for disparities and that guarantee that each citizen has the capacity to participate in deliberation (Knight and Johnson 1997; Bohman 1997). The problem with this formulation is that deliberation is conditioned to the future realization of some ideal conditions at the social level. Current inequalities of resources and power are not addressed, and deliberation does not play a role in counterbalancing them. In the second case of endogenous definition, communicative competence is not set in advance but emerges from the interaction between the communicative practices of those who deliberate and their personal characteristics and resources. There is no predisposition to a particular form of communication, rather individuals employ those 11     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     that better suits them. The only procedural pre-requisite that deliberation demands is an open mind in a spirit of reciprocity (Dryzek 2000; Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007). Deliberation does not then have to wait until resource inequalities are redressed and does not purport to erase difference but to recognize it, which means that it is attuned to those relational factors that shape how deliberation occurs in a given socio-cultural context. Relational factors are also key to the achievement of communicative competence. If there is a social norm that women are not allowed to appear in public with men, for example, then it becomes difficult or even impossible for women to use the resource (e.g. schooling) to enable the communicative functioning in a deliberative setting that does not take that norm into account. This, however, should not be interpreted as an uncritical acceptance of social norms but as a recognition of their presence. The challenge then is to identify those practices that reinforce social injustices from those normatively promising (Sass and Dryzek 2014). Finally, personal heterogeneities (e.g. cognitive and non-cognitive skills, physical conditions) play a fundamental role. First, significant inequalities in resources raise the possibility for those better positioned to exercise political domination. This, however, does not imply that resource equality guarantees political equality in the forum. Individuals differ in their ability to convert resources into communicative competence. Second, personal heterogeneities imply that the compensation needed to redress disadvantages vary across individuals and also that even with compensations disadvantages cannot be fully “corrected” (Sen 1999). In other words, full equality in communicative competence is unachievable. From the above discussion it is clear that: i) political equality and inclusion are not reducible to resource distributions; and, ii) communicative norms play a key role in improving inclusion in the presence of an uneven distribution of resources and 12     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     capabilities. Although redressing resource inequality is desirable, it should not be seen as a prerequisite of deliberation. Rather, what should be recognized is the two-way relationship between the rules of, and conditions for, deliberation and the participatory capabilities of the public. Public policies can enhance people´s capabilities and the rules of deliberation can be sensitive to those capabilities, but also the direction of public policy and the rules governing deliberation can be influenced by the use of participatory capabilities by the public. 3. Inclusion in Deliberative Valuation O'Neill and Spash (2000) and Spash (2007) recognizes the risk of exclusion that unequal communicative competence entails and suggests that: “Exclusion is dealt with more explicitly by political processes, and confidence and trust in the structure and conduct of the process are recognized as highly important features. Thus, dominance by one interest is to be avoided and silent parties are to be encouraged to have their say” (Spash 2007: 694). This observation points to the importance of deliberation’s procedural character, though no further elaboration is presented. In what follows we organize the theoretical DMV literature by means of a distinction between classical and expansive deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2010) in order to explore how they address the internal exclusion issue. a. Classical deliberation Classical deliberation is rooted in the Kantian ideal of the public use of reason, as exhibited by Habermas (1984) and Rawls (2005). On this account deliberation “implies a systematic process wherein actors tell the truth, justify their positions extensively and are willing to yield to the force of the better argument” (Bächtiger et al. 2010: 33). The ultimate goal is to reach consensus. The focus is on deliberative intent and it relies on a 13     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     sharp distinction between the uses of language that aim at convergence through reason and those that are strategic in nature (O'Neill 2002: 253). For Rawls, the concepts of reason, standards of correctness, and criteria for justification are necessary if inquiry is to be free and public, otherwise there is no reasoning but rhetoric (Rawls 2005: 220). Similarly, Habermas (1984) distinguishes speech acts that reveal the speaker´s intention, illocutionary, from those that produce an effect upon the hearer, perlocutionary. While the former makes a speech act self-sufficient the later depends on a context of purposive action. It may be strategically motivated if it is not declared or if it is brought about by deceptive speech acts (Habermas 1984: 291; 1998: 202). Communicative action can only arise from illocutionary aims. For DMV theorists falling into this category, deliberation is akin to a process of reasoned argumentation, which means that they rely on strategies different to communicative standards to secure inclusion in the forum. DMV theories influenced by liberal political ideas, for example, envisage deliberation as the space where impartial and objective collective decisions are made (Brown, Peterson, and Tonn 1995; Wilson and Howarth 2002; Howarth and Wilson 2006). For Brown, Peterson, and Tonn (1995) this is the case if citizen´s are to act as agents of society. Only capable citizens can be appointed as juries. They should be reasonable, free of any personal conflict of interest, free of mental or emotional disability, and possess an adequate level of maturity, intelligence and education (Brown, Peterson, and Tonn 1995: 255-256). On this account the freedom and equality of those fairly situated for conceiving the fair terms of social cooperation is achieved by prescribing the qualities that a reasonable citizen must meet. Brown´s deliberative framework achieves inclusion through the exclusion of those less able to reason. Like Rawls, they see the 14     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     public use of reason as a privilege of a few, even a solitary thinker can do the job (Dryzek 2000: 15). Wilson and Howarth (2002) for their part present Rawls’ original position as a “useful model of what we should strive to mirror in value-articulating institutions”(Wilson and Howarth 2002: 433) if legitimate and fair outcomes are to be produced. To put into practice these normative ideals Wilson and Howarth (2002: 435) define social fairness in terms of a deliberative forum that: i) Protects participants from uncompensated harms; and, ii) Ensures that participants have a common set of rights or capabilities. Social equity stresses the need for ex-ante equality and freedom, which would be realized ex-post if the deliberative procedure is fair. A fair procedure is one in which: i) there are not access restrictions to deliberation; ii) participants are allowed to influence the agenda; iii) to introduce their own assessment of an ecosystem service; iv) to express their own attitudes, needs and preferences; v) coercion is absent; and, vi) the goal is to reach a consensus value among participants. To secure inclusion in the forum Wilson and Howarth (2002) do not exclude outright those less capable but stipulate resource and capability equality, and lay down the conditions for the free and un-coerced exercise of reason. Yet, their solution remains unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, inclusive deliberation is contingent upon the realization of ideal conditions of equality while current ones remain unattended. Second, the call for a common set of capabilities losses its force if we do not pay attention to the communicative norms that regulate deliberation. As we argued in Section 2.b equality in communicative competence, although unachievable, is advanced through changes that come from within deliberation, not only through external institutional changes. 15     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Ward (1999) too sees deliberation as a place where impartial judgements are made. He appeals to Harsanyi´s (1955) extended preferences as a regulative ideal. Individuals formulate their ethical preferences by putting themselves in the shoes of various subjects. On this account deliberating citizens: “are not asked to express their own personal evaluations but their judgements about what environmental quality is worth for society as a whole” (Ward 1999: 79). Once individuals have adopted the right positional perspective they engage in a process of reasoned argumentation regulated by an ideal of communicative rationality that demands full equality in communicative competence (Ward 1999: 81). On Ward´s (1999) formulation the problem of internal exclusion could be addressed by selecting adequate representatives, after all, Harsanyi’s extended preferences means that the juror empathetically project himself into the position of the other subject (Adler 2014). So, as Brown and colleagues, Ward´s framework could achieve inclusion through the exclusion of the less able. Another strand of the literature adopts a communitarian oriented perspective to present deliberation as the right institutional context for making decisions about the environment. In deliberation individuals are able to perform their citizens’ role of defining and protecting the common good from a “We” perspective (Sagoff 1998; Vatn 2005: 129; 2009a). It relies on Habermas´ communicative action (1984) to regulate the reason-giving process. Communication is to develop appropriate norms. This is communicative action built on social (“We”) rationality. “Communicative action is about reasoning together over which solutions should be sought and testing arguments concerning which norms or behavioral rules should be supported in the specific social setting” (Vatn 2009b: 2209). 16     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Deliberation is thus instrumental in positioning individuals into the correct evaluative attitude, one in which the environment is evaluated using the right principles. The issue of inclusion is therefore limited to being able to engage in argumentation about what norms supports community´s shared values. But, if participants are not capable enough to do so then: “the institutional challenge in this case is whether one should create specific rules that help secure the defined rights of these groups in the deliberative process, respectively let them choose to be represented by advocates” (Vatn 2009b: 2213). Yet, as we have already discussed, without revising deliberation´s communicative norms these solutions are unsatisfactory. Procedural rules alone assume that individuals are equally capable to communicate, which also means that a representation devise envisaged on this presumption runs the risk of achieving inclusion through discriminatory conditions of admissibility. b. Expansive deliberation According to Mansbridge et al. (2010): “Contemporary deliberative theorists have moved away from the language of “reason”, with its Enlightenment overtones of a unitary knowable entity, to a focus on mutual justification” (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 67), which could be achieved through communication forms other than argument (Dryzek and Hendriks 2012) . Agreement founded on mutual justification is possible because citizens are regulated by the principle of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) and, according to Bächtiger et al. (2010), it weakens the truthfulness and sincerity requirements of the classical ideal. It is important to note that an expanded version of deliberation does not require the complete abandonment of Habermas´s ideas. Rather, the concepts of communicative action and rationality are still used but decoupled from the sharp distinction between rational and rhetorical speech. Lo and Spash (2013), for instance, conceptualize 17     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     deliberation as a Habermasian discourse, in which: “differently situated individuals are engaged in a dialogue in an effort to search for common understandings exclusively by offering arguments that could induce reflective assent on the basis of their merits” (Lo and Spash 2013: 782). Citizens are not instructed or expected to subscribe to a particular moral belief or to perform a defined role, but to respect and to recognize each other´s ethical perspectives. In this framework values should be articulated “by focusing on the fabric of conversation and the psychodynamic between individuals” (Lo and Spash 2013: 15), therefore it is by analyzing the use and structure of language that value expressions should be interpreted. Despite the emphasis on argumentation the approach is kept open to other communicative strategies. This is more clearly stated by Lo (2013) where the emphasis is on the role that communication plays in bringing about cooperation in situations of moral disagreement. “Cooperative action is rational to the extent that our differently reasoned interests or perspectives can be generalized to make sense of one another. Generalization connects one point to another without displacing it. Cooperative action that is communicatively coordinated through a creative search for generalizable interests does not require expansion or reduction of one or more discourses” (Lo 2013: 87). A discourse is presented as a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions and capabilities (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). Discourses could then be expressed and contested through a wide range of communicative strategies. What is important is that the particular ideas, concepts, facts and values embedded in a discourse be challenged, revised and synthesized. If this is so, then collective decisions are to be informed by reflective preferences. Moreover, it is through contestation that manipulation and coercion could be averted (Dryzek 2000: 76). 18     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     By admitting a wider range of communicative strategies this alternative, expansive deliberation, is better equipped to respond to the internal exclusion challenge. Deliberation aims are not tightly tied to particular forms of communication, rather it focuses on the role that communication plays while at the same time recognizes that any kind of communication could be coercive. Coercion and manipulation are not ruled out so deliberation can occur, on the contrary it is through deliberation that those risks are minimized. (TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) So far we have argued that an expansive view of deliberation is more inclusive, yet the nuances of what is that which is included deserves a further discussion, particularly given that the idea of inclusion is intertwined with the larger issue of representation, which poses the challenge of how to generate a decision making process that is recognized as legitimate by those necessarily excluded from the process itself (Davies, Blackstock, and Rauschmayer 2005). So what is to be represented, and hence included in deliberation, individuals or discourses? Here we concur with Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010b) in that discursive representation also represents persons insofar as individuals are multifaceted selves constituted by discourses and who can reflect across the discourses they engage. This view does not undermine the argument we have laid out so far given that discourses must be articulated by someone in the deliberative forum. Inclusion thus is about discourses as well as the persons who articulate them in the forum. Yet, the absence of internal exclusion does not necessarily means that all 19     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     discourses have found their way onto the forum for some of them could have been excluded at other stages of the decision making process (Schouten, Leroy, and Glasbergen 2012). This, however, is a risk faced by any deliberative approach given the systemic influences of context and power in the larger structures of democratic decision making (Bickerstaff and Walker 2005). 4. Empirical DMV The inclusion issue has also received some attention in the empirical DMV literature, where authors agree in that it is important to regulate discussion in order to: avoid someone leading the arguments, to allow the natural flow of ideas, to counter participants’ toward strategic behavior, to facilitate group consensus and prevent false or forced consensus, and to secure that participants have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome (Álvarez-Farizo, Gil, and Howard 2009; Macmillan et al. 2002; James and Blamey 2005; Kenyon, Hanley, and Nevin 2001). These authors thus have great confidence in in the capacity of the moderator to induce a “good” deliberative behavior and little trust in the self-regulative capacity of deliberation. However, as Aldred and Jacobs (2000) report, moderators although necessary are not neutral and thus they remain sceptic on the possibility of construing a neutral deliberative process. For Curato, Niemeyer, and Dryzek (2013) points out non-neutrality is not a problem as long as it does not impede the exchange of critical discourses. With regards to how people communicate and interact during a deliberative valuation exercise, the evidence, though scant, does not lend support to classic deliberation. Aldred and Jacobs (2000) found that jurors assessed experts on the basis of their credibility and not in terms of the information they provided, a finding which goes against the Habermasian account of rationality that informs their normative model. Dryzek and Lo (2014) on their part showed how rhetoric allowed climate change 20     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     deniers and others to accept that particular green-house mitigation measures were acceptable policy choices. In terms of the practical implications for conducting a DMV exercise the discussion we have presented highlights the importance of the rules of engagement that regulate the communicative interchange. We think that these rules should not be imposed by the researchers but agreed upon by the participants in order to give them ownership of the process (Hobson and Niemeyer 2012). In a similar vein we do not think that participants should be required to perform a particular role or adopt a particular attitude, as done for example by Soma and Vatn (2010) and Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne (2010). The facilitator is another important aspect. His role must be operational rather than substantive. That is, limited to keep the group within the agenda of activities - not to be confused with the agenda of topics for discussion- without encouraging a particular deliberative behavior. As long as facilitation is not intrusive, i.e. impartial, it can promote equality of opportunity for meaningful participation. Another alternative is to use techniques, e.g. nominal group, that promote an orderly and equitable discussion, see for instance Dietz, Stern, and Dan (2009). In any case, it is important to recognize that although these measures can be used to foster participation they can also constraint discussion and prevent the critical engagement across participants. 5. Conclusion Achieving inclusion in deliberation is important for the democratic legitimacy of collective decisions regarding the environment. Advocates of deliberation for environmental valuation have recognized the risk of exclusion that the uneven distribution of communicative competence entails, but the focus on the procedures and 21     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     pre-requisites under which a deliberative forum occurs, while at the same time adhering to a rationalistic idea of communication, have prevented them from successfully addressing the issue. A DMV framework that aspires to be more democratic than the standard ECBA approach should not cling onto a rational discourse ideal for it risks to exclude those voices which cannot express their claims in a pre-defined rationalistic way. A normative DMV framework that involves more flexible forms of communication and which is more interested in the outcomes of communication than communicative intent has better prospects for fostering inclusion in the forum, although it cannot fully guarantee it. Institutional changes aimed at securing that deliberation occurs under conditions of equality are important, yet not a prerequisite. The argument presented here does not intend to downplay the importance of redressing inequalities. What it says is that it should not, however, be set as a necessary condition for deliberation. Notwithstanding DMV capacity to make valuation more democratic, it must be recognized that it is just a part of a larger decision-making structure influenced by systemic forces of power and context which may exclude some interests and discourses from being discussed during a deliberation. Although this limits the democratic potential of DMV it does not, however, renders it irrelevant. Rather, it points to the need of thinking in terms of a deliberative system of environmental governance and the role that DMV plays in it. Acknowledgments This work would not be possible without the financial and personnel support of the Strategic Area Program on Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services and Well-Being of Universidad del Norte, Colombia. Additional funding was provided by the School of 22     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Environment at Griffith University, Australia. Funding sources had no role in any of the stages of this study. References Adler,   Matthew   D.   2014.   ‘Extended   preferences   and   interpersonal   comparisons:   a   new   account’.   Economics   and   Philosophy   30:   123-­‐162.   doi:   doi:10.1017/S0266267114000133.   Aldred,   J.   and   M.   Jacobs.   2000.   ‘Citizens   and   wetlands:   evaluating   the   Ely   citizens'   jury’.   Ecological  Economics  34:  217-­‐232.  doi:  10.1016/s0921-­‐8009(00)00159-­‐2.   Álvarez-­‐Farizo,   Begoña,   José   M.   Gil   and   B.   J.   Howard.   2009.   ‘Impacts   from   restoration   strategies:   Assessment   through   valuation   workshops’.   Ecological   Economics   68:   787-­‐ 797.  doi:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.012.   Atkinson,   Giles   and   Susana   Mourato.   2008.   ‘Environmental   Cost-­‐Benefit   Analysis’.   Annual   Review   of   Environment   and   Resources   33:   317-­‐344.   doi:   10.1146/annurev.environ.33.020107.112927.   Bächtiger,   André,   Simon   Niemeyer,   Michael   Neblo,   Marco   R.   Steenbergen   and   Jürg   Steiner.   2010.   ‘Disentangling   Diversity   in   Deliberative   Democracy:   Competing   Theories,   Their   Blind   Spots   and   Complementarities*’.   Journal   of   Political   Philosophy   18:   32-­‐63.   doi:   10.1111/j.1467-­‐9760.2009.00342.x.   Bickerstaff,   Karen   and   Gordon   Walker.   2005.   ‘Shared   Visions,   Unholy   Alliances:   Power,   Governance  and  Deliberative  Processes  in  Local  Transport  Planning’.  Urban  Studies  42:   2123-­‐2144.  doi:  http://usj.sagepub.com/content/by/year.   Black,   Laura   W.   2008.   ‘Deliberation,   Storytelling,   and   Dialogic   Moments’.   Communication   Theory  18:  93-­‐116.  doi:  10.1111/j.1468-­‐2885.2007.00315.x.   Black,   Laura   W.   2012.   ‘How   People   Communicate   During   Deliebrative   Events’.   In   Tina   Nabatchi   et   al.   (eds),   Democracy   in   Motion:   Evaluating   the   Practice   and   Impact   of   Deliberative   Civic  Engagement.  New  York:  Oxford  University  Press.   Bockstael,   Nancy   E.   and   A.   Myrick   Freeman   III.   2005.   ‘Chapter   12   Welfare   Theory   and   Valuation’.  In  Mler  Karl-­‐Gran  and  R.  Vincent  Jeffrey  (eds),  Handbook  of  Environmental   Economics,  pp.517-­‐570.  Elsevier.   Bohman,   James.   1997.   ‘Deliberative   Democracy   and   Effective   Social   Freedom:   Capabilities,   Resources  and  Opportunities’.  In  James  Bohman  and  William  Regh  (eds),  Deliberative   Democracy:  Essays  on  Reason  and  Politics.  The  MIT  Press.   Brown,  Thomas  C.,  George  L.  Peterson  and  Bruce  E.  Tonn.  1995.  ‘The  Values  Jury  to  Aid  Natural   Resource  Decisions’.  Land  Economics  71:  250-­‐260.  doi:  10.2307/3146505.   Curato,   Nicole,   Simon   Niemeyer   and   John   S.   Dryzek.   2013.   ‘Appreciative   and   contestatory   inquiry  in  deliberative  forums:  can  group  hugs  be  dangerous?’.   Critical  Policy  Studies  7:   1-­‐17.  doi:  10.1080/19460171.2012.758595.   Davies,   Ben   B,   Kirsty   Blackstock   and   Felix   Rauschmayer.   2005.   ‘‘Recruitment’,   ‘Composition’,   and  ‘Mandate’  Issues  in  Deliberative  Processes:  Should  we  Focus  on  Arguments  Rather   than   Individuals?’.   Environment   and   Planning   C:   Government   and   Policy   23:   599-­‐615.   doi:  10.1068/c04112s.   Dietz,   Thomas,   Paul   C.   Stern   and   Amy   Dan.   2009.   ‘How   Deliberation   Affects   Stated   Willingness   to  Pay  for  Mitigation  of  Carbon  Dioxide  Emissions:  An  Experiment’.  Land  Economics  85:   329-­‐347.  doi:  10.3368/le.85.2.329.   Dryzek,   John   S.   2000.   Delibertive   Democracy   and   Beyond:   Liberals,   Critics,   Contestations:   Oxford  University  Press.   23     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Dryzek,   John   S.   and   Carolyn   M.   Hendriks.   2012.   ‘Fostering   deliberation   in   the   forum   and   beyond’.   In   Frank   Fischer   and   Herbert   Gottweis   (eds),   The   Argumentative   Turn   Revisited.  Public  Policy  as  Communicative  Practice.  Duke  University  Press.   Dryzek,   John   S.   and   Alex   Y.   Lo.   2014.   ‘Reason   and   rhetoric   in   climate   communication’.   Environmental  Politics  24:  1-­‐16.  doi:  10.1080/09644016.2014.961273.   Dryzek,   John   S.   and   Simon   Niemeyer.   2008.   ‘Discursive   Representation’.   American   Political   Science  Review  102:  481-­‐493.  doi:  doi:10.1017/S0003055408080325.   Dryzek,  John  S.  and  Simon  Niemeyer.  2010a.  ‘Deliberative  Turns’.  In  John  S.  Dryzek  and  Simon   Niemeyer   (eds),   Foundations   and   Frontiers   of   Deliberative   Governance.   Oxford   University  Press.   Dryzek,  John  S.  and  Simon  Niemeyer.  2010b.  ‘Representation’.  In  Foundations  and  frontiers  of   deliberative  governance.  Oxford  University  Press.   Elster,   Jon.   1997.   ‘The   market   and   the   forum:   three   varieties   of   political   theory’.   In   James   Bohman   and   William   Regh   (eds),   Deliberative   democracy.   Essays   on   reason   and   politics.  The  MIT  Press.   Gowdy,   John   M.   2004.   ‘The   Revolution   in   Welfare   Economics   and   Its   Implications   for   Environmental   Valuation   and   Policy’.   Land   Economics   80:   239-­‐257.   doi:   10.3368/le.80.2.239.   Grönlund,   Kimmo,   Maija   Setälä   and   Kaisa   Herne.   2010.   ‘Deliberation   and   civic   virtue:   lessons   from   a   citizen   deliberation   experiment’.   European   Political   Science   Review   2:   95-­‐117.   doi:  doi:10.1017/S1755773909990245.   Gutmann,   Amy   and   Dennis   Thompson.   2004.   Why   Deliberative   Democracy?:   Princenton   University  Press.   Habermas,   Jürgen.   1984.   The   Theory   of   Communictive   Action.   Volume   1.   Reason   and   the   Rationalization  of  Society:  Bacon  Press.   Habermas,  Jürgen.  1998.  On  the  pragmatics  of  communication:  The  MIT  Press.   Harsanyi,  John  C.  1955.  ‘Cardinal  Welfare,  Individualistic  Ethics,  and  Interpersonal  Comparisons   of  Utility’.  Journal  of  Political  Economy  63:  309-­‐321.  doi:  10.2307/1827128.   Hobson,   Kersty   and   Simon   Niemeyer.   2012.   ‘“What   sceptics   believe”:   The   effects   of   information   and   deliberation   on   climate   change   scepticism’.   Public   Understanding   of   Science.  doi:  10.1177/0963662511430459.   Howarth,   R.   B.   and   M.   A.   Wilson.   2006.   ‘A   theoretical   approach   to   deliberative   valuation:   Aggregation  by  mutual  consent’.  Land  Economics  82:  1-­‐16.   Jacobs,  M.  1997.  ‘Environmental  valuation,  deliberative  democracy  and  public  decision  making   institutions’.  In  J.  Foster  (ed.),  Valuing  nature?  :  Routledge.   James,  Rosemary  F.  and  Rusell  K.  Blamey.  2005.  ‘Deliberation  and  economic  valuation:  national   park   management’.   In   Michael   Getzner   et   al.   (eds),   Alternative   for   Environmental   Valuation,  pp.225-­‐243.  London:  Routledge.   Kenyon,  Wendy,  Nick  Hanley  and  Ceara  Nevin.  2001.  ‘Citizens'  juries:  an  aid  to  environmental   valuation?’.  Environment  and  Planning  C  19:  557-­‐566.   Knight,   Jack   and   James   Johnson.   1997.   ‘What   Sort   of   Equality   Does   Deliberative   Democracy   Requires?’.  In  James  Bohman  and  William  Regh  (eds),  Deliberative  Democracy:  Essays   on  Reason  and  Politics.  The  MIT  Press.   Lo,  Alex  Y.  2014.  ‘More  or  Less  Pluralistic?  A  Typology  of  Remedial  and  Alternative  Perspectives   on  the  Monetary  Valuation  of  the  Environment’.  Environmental  Values  23:  253-­‐274.   Lo,   Alex   Y.   2011.   ‘Analysis   and   democracy:   the   antecedents   of   the   deliberative   approach   of   ecosystems   valuation’.   Environment   and   Planning   C-­‐Government   and   Policy   29:   958-­‐ 974.  doi:  10.1068/c1083.   Lo,   Alex   Y.   2013.   ‘Agreeing   to   pay   under   value   disagreement:   Reconceptualizing   preference   transformation  in  terms  of  pluralism  with  evidence  from  small-­‐group  deliberations  on   climate  change’.  Ecological  Economics  87:  84-­‐94.  doi:  10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.014.   24     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Lo,   Alex   Y.   and   Clive   L.   Spash.   2013.   ‘Deliberative   monetary   valuation:   In   search   of   a   democratic   and   value   plural   approach   to   environmental   policy’.   Journal   of   Economic   Surveys  27:  768-­‐789.  doi:  10.1111/j.1467-­‐6419.2011.00718.x.   Macmillan,   Douglas   C.,   Lorna   Philip,   Nick   Hanley   and   Begona   Alvarez-­‐Farizo.   2002.   ‘Valuing   the   non-­‐market  benefits  of  wild  goose  conservation:  a  comparison  of  interview  and  group   based   approaches’.   Ecological   Economics   43:   49-­‐59.   doi:   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0921-­‐8009(02)00182-­‐9.   Mansbridge,  Jane,  James  Bohman,  Simone  Chambers,  David  Estlund,  Andreas  Føllesdal,  Archon   Fung,   Cristina   Lafont,   Bernard   Manin   and   José   luis   Martí.   2010.   ‘The   Place   of   Self-­‐ Interest   and   the   Role   of   Power   in   Deliberative   Democracy*’.   Journal   of   Political   Philosophy  18:  64-­‐100.  doi:  10.1111/j.1467-­‐9760.2009.00344.x.   Martínez-­‐Alier,   Joan.   2002.   The   environmentalism   of   the   poor:   A   study   of   ecological   conflicts   and  valuation:  Edward  Elgar.   Mercier,   Hugo.   2011.   ‘On   the   universality   of   argumentative   reasoning’.   Journal   of   Cognition   and  Culture  11:  85-­‐113.   Miller,   Shawn   William.   2007.   An   Environmental   History   of   Latin   America:   Cambridge   University   Press.   Niemeyer,   Simon   and   John   S.   Dryzek.   2007.   ‘The   Ends   of   Deliberation:   Meta-­‐consensus   and   Inter-­‐subjective  Rationality  as  Ideal  Outcomes’.  Swiss  Political  Science  Review  13:  497-­‐ 526.  doi:  10.1002/j.1662-­‐6370.2007.tb00087.x.   Niemeyer,   Simon   and   Clive   L.   Spash.   2001.   ‘Environmental   valuation   analysis,   public   deliberation,   and   their   pragmatic   syntheses:   a   critical   appraisal’.   Environment   and   Planning  C-­‐Government  and  Policy  19:  567-­‐585.  doi:  10.1068/c9s.   O'Hara,  Sabine  U.  1996.  ‘Discursive  ethics  in  ecosystems  valuation  and  environmental  policy’.   Ecological  Economics  16:  95-­‐107.  doi:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0921-­‐8009(95)00085-­‐ 2.   O'Neill,   John.   2002.   ‘The   Rhetoric   of   Deliberation:   Some   Problems   in   Kantian   Theories   of   Deliberative  Democracy’.  Res  Publica  8:  249-­‐268.  doi:  10.1023/A:1020899224058.   O'Neill,  John.  2007.  Markets,  deliberation  and  environment:  Routledge.   O'Neill,   John,   Alan   Holland   and   Andrew   Light.   2008.   Environmental   values,   Routledge   Intriductions  to  Environment  Series.  London  and  New  York:  Routledge.   O'Neill,  John  and  Clive  L  Spash.  2000.  ‘Conceptions  of  value  in  environmental  decision-­‐making’.   Environmental  Values  9:  521-­‐536.   OECD.  2006.  Cost-­‐Benefit  Analysis  and  the  Environment:  OECD  Publishing.   Polletta,   Francesca   and   John   Lee.   2006.   ‘Is   Telling   Stories   Good   for   Democracy?   Rhetoric   in   Public  Deliberation  after  9/11’.  American  Sociological  Review  71:  699-­‐723.   Randhir,   Timothy   and   Deborah   M.   Shriver.   2009.   ‘Deliberative   valuation   without   prices:   A   multiattribute   prioritization   for   watershed   ecosystem   management’.   Ecological   Economics  68:  3042-­‐3051.  doi:  10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.07.008.   Rawls,  John.  1971.  A  Theory  of  Justice:  Harvard  University  Press.   Rawls,  John.  2005.  Political  Liberalism.  Expanded  Edition:  Columbia  University  Press.   Ryfe,   David   M.   2006.   ‘Narrative   and   Deliberation   in   Small   Group   Forums’.   Journal   of   Applied   Communication  Research  34:  72-­‐93.  doi:  10.1080/00909880500420226.   Sagoff,  M.  1998.  ‘Aggregation  and  deliberation  in  valuing  environmental  public  goods:  A  look   beyond   contingent   pricing’.   Ecological   Economics   24:   213-­‐230.   doi:   10.1016/s0921-­‐ 8009(97)00144-­‐4.   Sass,   Jensen   and   John   S.   Dryzek.   2014.   ‘Deliberative   Cultures’.   Political   Theory   42:   3-­‐25.   doi:   10.1177/0090591713507933.   Schouten,  Greetje,  Pieter  Leroy  and  Pieter  Glasbergen.  2012.  ‘On  the  deliberative  capacity  of   private   multi-­‐stakeholder   governance:   The   Roundtables   on   Responsible   Soy   and   Sustainable   Palm   Oil’.   Ecological   Economics   83:   42-­‐50.   doi:   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.08.007.   25     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk     Sen,  Amartya.  1999.  Development  as  freedom:  Oxford  University  Press.   Sen,  Amartya.  2009.  The  Idea  of  Justice:  Penguin  Books.   Siu,  Alice.  2009.  ‘Look  Who's  Talking:  Deliberation  and  Social  Influence’.  Annual  Meeting  of  the   American  Political  Science  Association,  Toronto,  Canada.   Siu,   Alice   and   Dragan   Stanisevski.   2012.   ‘Deliberation   in   Multicultural   Societies:   Addressing   Inequality,   Exclusion   and   Marginalization’.   In   Tina   Nabatchi   et   al.   (eds),   Demicracy   in   Motion:   Evaluating   the   Practice   and   Impact     of   Deliberative   Civic   Engagement.   New   York:  Oxford  University  Press.   Söderbaum,  Peter  and  Judy  Brown.  2010.  ‘Democratizing  economics’.  Annals  of  the  New  York   Academy  of  Sciences  1185:  179-­‐195.  doi:  10.1111/j.1749-­‐6632.2009.05283.x.   Soma,  Katrine  and  Arild  Vatn.  2010.  ‘Is  there  anything  like  a  citizen?  A  descriptive  analysis  of   instituting   a   citizen's   role   to   represent   social   values   at   the   municipal   level’.   Environmental  Policy  and  Governance  20:  30-­‐43.  doi:  10.1002/eet.529.   Spash,   Clive   L.   2007.   ‘Deliberative   monetary   valuation   (DMV):   Issues   in   combining   economic   and  political  processes  to  value  environmental  change’.  Ecological  Economics  63:  690-­‐ 699.  doi:  10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.02.014.   Spash,   Clive   L.   2008.   ‘Deliberative   monetary   valuation   and   the   evidence   for   a   new   value   theory’.  Land  Economics  84:  469-­‐488.   Steiner,   Jürg.   2012.   The   Foundations   of   Deliberative   Democracy   Empirical   Research   and   Normative  Implications.  New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press.   Tanasescu,   Mihnea.   2015.   ‘Nature   Advocacy   and   the   Indigenous   Symbol’.   Environmental   Values  24:  105-­‐122.  doi:  10.3197/096327115X14183182353863.   Vatn,  Arild.  2005.  Institutions  and  the  Environment:  Edward  Elgar.   Vatn,  Arild.  2009a.  ‘Cooperative  behavior  and  institutions’.  The  Journal  of  Socio-­‐Economics  38:   188-­‐196.  doi:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2008.07.011.   Vatn,   Arild.   2009b.   ‘An   institutional   analysis   of   methods   for   environmental   appraisal’.   Ecological   Economics   68:   2207-­‐2215.   doi:   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.04.005.   Vatn,  Arild  and  Daniel  W.  Bromley.  1994.  ‘Choices  without  Prices  without  Apologies’.  Journal  of   Environmental   Economics   and   Management   26:   129-­‐148.   doi:   http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1994.1008.   Walmsley,   Heather   L.   2009.   ‘Mad   scientists   bend   the   frame   of   biobank   governance   in   British   Columbia’.  Journal  of  Public  Deliberation  5.   Ward,   Hugh.   1999.   ‘Citizens'   juries   and   valuing   the   environment:   A   proposal’.   Environmental   Politics  8:  75-­‐96.  doi:  10.1080/09644019908414462.   Ward,   Hugh,   Aletta   Norval,   Todd   Landman   and   Jules   Pretty.   2003.   ‘Open   Citizens’   Juries   and   the   Politics   of   Sustainability’.   Political   Studies   51:   282-­‐299.   doi:   10.1111/1467-­‐ 9248.00424.   Wegner,   Giulia   and   Unai   Pascual.   2011.   ‘Cost-­‐benefit   analysis   in   the   context   of   ecosystem   services   for   human   well-­‐being:   A   multidisciplinary   critique’.   Global   Environmental   Change  21:  492-­‐504.  doi:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.12.008.   Wilson,   M.   A.   and   R.   B.   Howarth.   2002.   ‘Discourse-­‐based   valuation   of   ecosystem   services:   establishing  fair  outcomes  through  group  deliberation’.  Ecological  Economics  41:  431-­‐ 443.  doi:  10.1016/s0921-­‐8009(02)00092-­‐7.   Young,  Iris  Marion.  2000.  Inclusion  and  Democracy:  Oxford  University  Press.           26     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk                                       Table 1 Conceptual elements of the two DMV approaches Classical Admissible political Argument Expanded Any kind is conditionally accepted communication Dominant a priori Reasonable persons Reflective individuals assumption about (Rawls)/community deliberators members Ideal participant Educated, informed Articulate, informative Aim of deliberation Consensus Justification of value claims Source: Adapted from Lo and Spash (2013) 27     Forthcoming  in  Environmental  Values  ©The  White  Horse  Press  http://www.whpress.co.uk       28