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The Problem of Inclusion in Deliberative Environmental Valuation
Andres Vargas, Alex Lo, Michael Howes, Nicholas Rohde
Abstract
The idea of inclusive collective decision making is important in establishing
democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference
methods of valuation that are commonly used in economics have been criticized
because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low income earners who do
not have a capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to
overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review two
deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is grounded on the idea
of rational discourse that emphasizes argument at the expense of other
communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and
pre-requisites but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of
argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and
rhetorical speech and therefore admits alternative forms of communication.
This approach recognizes differences in the communicative capacities and practices
of those who take part in deliberation and so is better equipped to improve, but not
guarantee, inclusion.
Keywords: Deliberative monetary valuation, Inclusion, Democracy, Environmental
valuation, Communicative rationality
Introduction
In environmental decision making, public participation is increasingly being promoted
as a way to enhance the legitimacy of decisions. Neoclassical economists believe that
stated preference valuation approaches, such as the contingent valuation method
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(CVM), can provide opportunities for public participation by allowing representatives
from the affected population to evaluate public decisions and select the best options for
them. This is regarded as crucial for enhancing the democratic legitimacy of
environmental cost benefit analysis (ECBA) (OECD 2006: 35).
ECBA, in general terms, provides information about whether a policy change is likely
to improve social welfare, defined as the aggregation of individual welfare. ECBA’s
core activity is the estimation of monetary values for environmental changes, in many
cases through techniques such as the CVM, which employ surveys to describe a
hypothetical buying situation in order to ask respondents their maximum willingness to
pay for a change in the level of provision of the environmental good (Bockstael and
Freeman III 2005).
From a political perspective ECBA resembles the aggregative model of democracy
according to which a democratic decision represents the most widely and strongly held
preferences (Elster 1997; O'Neill, Holland, and Light 2008). On this account a
democratic process must
allow for the expression of competing preferences and
requires a fair method for adding them (Young 2000). ECBA fails in both respects. First
because precludes the expression of preferences that are not in accordance with ECBA’s
rationale, e.g. lexicographic preferences; and second, because the aggregation method is
not fair as long as the intensity to which a preference can be expressed is contingent
upon individual’s income (Gowdy 2004; Wegner and Pascual 2011).
Ecological economists have therefore proposed alternative valuation methods grounded
on the theories of deliberative democracy. They argue that deliberative procedures can
enhance the democratic legitimacy and procedural justice of collective decisions
regarding the environment (Lo 2011; Wilson and Howarth 2002; Randhir and Shriver
2009; Söderbaum and Brown 2010).
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Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) is one of these alternative valuation methods
(Niemeyer and Spash 2001).
processes, DMV asks
Through a combination of political and economic
participants to state, individually or collectively, their
willingness to pay (WTP) after going through a group discussion process (Spash 2007,
2008). The problem, however, is that despite being participatory, DMV does not
guarantee democratically better outcomes. A key criterion of democratic legitimacy is
the degree to which those affected by a decision have been included in deliberation.
According to Young (2000), there are two forms of exclusion: external and internal.
External exclusion occurs when individuals or groups who intend to participate are left
out of the forum. Internal exclusion occurs when individuals lack the effective
opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to the forum.
Proponents of deliberative valuation have made reference to this later type of exclusion
as the “ability to say” (O'Neill and Spash 2000). The capacity and confidence of citizens
to speak and to be heard are unevenly distributed across the sample of participants due
to variations in education level and ability to use formal languages (Spash 2007: 694).
Deliberative valuation proponents have relied on the procedures of debate and
discussion to secure equal and free participation, but fail to adequately address the
democratic limitation of rational argumentation. This paper argues that procedures
designed to give equal footing to participants but unattended to variations in
communicative competence severely compromise people´s ability to say and ultimately
the democratic legitimacy of valuation.
This paper reviews the conceptual and empirical DMV literature and analyze it in light
of the internal exclusion problem. In the next section, the basis of the deliberative
valuation alternative is briefly discussed. Section 3 develops the “ability to say” issue
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in order to critically review the theoretical and empirical DMV literature in section 4.
The final section concludes.
1.
The DMV Project
In addressing environmental conflicts an important observation is that decisions are
shaped in the context of an uneven distribution of wealth, power and voice (O'Neill,
Holland, and Light 2008). But how and to what degree these distorting factors shape a
decision is contingent upon the chosen decision-making processes that determine whose
interests are to count and to what extent (Vatn and Bromley 1994).
While the standard approach to CVM and ECBA presupposes that economics is about
efficiency and politics about equity (Atkinson and Mourato 2008) deliberative
approaches, by contrast, do not pretend to separate economics from politics. Rather
equity and efficiency are expected to be simultaneously addressed by deliberators. In
the deliberative settings proposed by Brown, Peterson, and Tonn (1995); Ward (1999),
participating citizens do not represent specific interests but take into account the
interests and values of other stakeholders. Similarly, drawing on Rawls´s Theory of
Justice (1971), Wilson and Howarth (2002) assert that a fair deliberative valuation
process will produce a fair outcome.
Following a different line of argument, Sagoff (1998) contends that when making a
collective decision individuals act as citizens who express their opinions about what we
ought to do as society rather than private consumer preferences.
Deliberative
approaches should therefore be used to evaluate options for managing the environment
because they put the individuals in the appropriate social context and discourage selfinterested consumer perspectives (Jacobs 1997; Vatn 2005, 2009b, a; Soma and Vatn
2010).
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Whether these deliberative principles could make sense of monetary valuation,
however, is contested. Sagoff (1998) for instance, accepts monetary valuation on the
basis that WTP figures may be reinterpreted as a fair share, not welfare losses or gains.
For Vatn (2009b) monetary assessments and deliberation seem to be incompatible
because they are based on conflicting assumptions about the process of valuation. While
deliberation induces a social rationality, monetary valuation is thought to privilege an
individualist rationality which presupposes value commensurability (Vatn 2009a).
Drawing on critical theory Lo (2014); (Lo and Spash 2013) argue that deliberation and
monetary valuation are in tension as long as they are premised upon competing moral
theories (consequentialist vs. deontological, for example). They thus proposed to
conceptualize deliberation as a second order theory whose purpose is to structure the
dispute among the claims of conflicting first order theories (e.g. consequentialist,
deontological). Accordingly, the monetary outcome of a deliberation is not a priori
defined so as to represent a market exchange, but on the contrary its meaning is left
open to post-deliberative interpretation. This implies, however, that monetary values are
no longer an economic but a political construct.
2. Ability to say and internal exclusion
The “ability to pay” argument exposes the problem of CVM in excluding individuals on
the basis of income. The same argument can be used to articulate the issue of
deliberative exclusion due to the uneven distribution of citizen´s capacities, and
confidence, to both speak and to be heard (O'Neill and Spash 2000; Spash 2007).
Following Young (2000) we distinguish internal from external exclusion and build on
this to present a conceptualization of the “ability to say” in terms of Sen’s (1999)
capabilities approach.
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a. Deliberative exclusion
Deliberation is exclusive to the extent that the asymmetries of power and resources
present in society prevent some voices from public participation (O'Neill, Holland, and
Light 2008). External exclusion occurs because powerful actors can use their political
and economic resources to strategically manipulate a deliberative process to silence
certain perspectives or legitimize political agendas (Niemeyer and Spash 2001; O'Hara
1996; O'Neill 2007).
Internal exclusion is less apparent because it occurs within deliberation. People are
internally excluded because they lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of
others. According to Young (2000) the source of internal exclusion are the exacting
standards of political communication required by the deliberative ideal with its
assumption that deliberation is both culturally neutral and universal in character; but as
she asserts
“it actually carries the rhetorical nuances of particular situated social
positions and relations” (Young 2000: 63). A deliberative setting that privileges
argument is more likely to be influenced by society´s structural inequalities which
“inhibit the political participation of some citizens with formally equal rights at the
same time that they relatively empower others”(Young 2000: 34)
Theories of deliberation grounded on Habermas´s Theory of Communicative Action
(1984) or Rawls´s public reason (2005) utilise an idea of deliberation that is restricted
to rational argumentation. Other forms of communication, like rhetoric and narrative,
are treated with suspicion as they are considered strategic in nature. According to them
is only through the impersonal force of argument that autonomous and free citizens
should reach an agreement. For Young (2000)
argument is necessary if public
discussion is to produce just and wise decisions, but she thinks there are reasons to be
suspicious of argument.
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First, it requires shared premises and conceptual frameworks for framing the issues.
Those needs, interests and sufferings of injustice that cannot be expressed according to
shared premises within these shared discursive frameworks are excluded (Young 2000:
37). Second, it assumes norms of “articulateness”. Spoken expression that follows the
structure of well-formed written speech, speech framed as straightforward assertion, that
is formal and general and that proceeds from premises to conclusions in an orderly
fashion is privileged over other modes of expression. According to Young these norms
of “articulateness” are culturally specific and “those who exhibit such articulate
qualities of expression are usually socially privileged” (Young 2000: 39). Third, norms
of deliberation that privilege speech which is dispassionate and disembodied presuppose
an opposition between reason an emotion that devaluates forms of expression used by
marginalized groups and minorities (Young 2000: 39).
Hence, a more inclusive deliberative framework should welcome alternative forms of
communication (e.g. greeting, rhetoric and narrative) to further understanding among
deliberators not sharing the same background conditions. Alternative modes of
communication are not substitutes for argument but important complements. In Young´s
own words
“Greeting, I claim, precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons in discussion
that aim to reach understanding. If parties do not recognize and acknowledge one
another, they will not listen to arguments. Rhetoric always accompanies
argument, by situating the argument for a particular audience and giving it
embodied style and tone. Narratives sometimes are important parts of larger
arguments, and sometimes enable understanding across difference in the absence
of shared premises that arguments need in order to begin” (Young 2000: 79).
The aim, besides justification, is to establish credibility, to create empathy, to trigger a
sense of injustice and to draw the attention of the audience to one’s claims and
experiences (Mansbridge et al. 2010). Empirical evidence from small group deliberation
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shows that non-argumentative forms of communication are used by deliberators to build
a common informational base and to critically analyze information (Black 2012: 67); to
foster understanding (Black 2008; Dryzek and Lo 2014); to question and to challenge
experts (Walmsley 2009); to build trust and sincerity (Ryfe 2006); to justify arguments
(Steiner 2012); and, to represent new interests and identities (Polletta and Lee 2006).
Polletta and Lee (2006) found that women are more likely to use narrative and that a
minority perspective claim is more likely to be advanced using narrative that other type
of claims. With regards to participation, the evidence from jury studies and deliberative
mini-publics indicates that those who tend to have greater presence in deliberation are
those with higher educational and income levels, males, and people with better
occupational status (Siu and Stanisevski 2012; Siu 2009; Steiner 2012).
The empirical evidence suggests that non-argumentative communication is not
exclusively used by minorities and marginalized groups, that participation is partially
related to social and economic variables, and that non-argumentative forms are often
compatible with, and helpful for, the deliberative model ideals. This lends support to the
position that a normative DMV framework should avoid reducing communication to a
procedural condition for meeting its ideals. Rather, what is important is to distinguish
communicative acts aimed at reaching understanding and cooperation from those
intended to strategically manipulate others. This differentiation “cannot be made by
means of a distinction between purely rational and merely rhetorical speech” (Young
2000: 66) but requires the application of critical standards to all forms of
communication. Communication should be non-coercive, it should connect particular
interests to some general principles, and it should involve an effort to communicate in
terms that others can accept (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010a).
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A deliberative framework that admits alternative forms of communication has also
better prospects for being relevant in different contexts. By not being predisposed to
particular ways of expressing and reasoning it is better equipped, though not fully
capable, than its rationalistic counterpart for encompassing what Martínez-Alier (2002)
labels the multiple languages of valuation (e.g. livelihoods, sacredness, rights) that
underlie ecological distribution conflicts. This is so because idea of languages refers
not only to the multiplicity of values that are at stake in an ecological conflict but also to
the ways in which people around the world express those judgements, not all of them
articulable in rationalistic terms (Ward et al. 2003). Moreover, alternative forms of
communication are especially valuable for expressing claims of injustice which cannot
be articulated within the prevailing normative discourse but that demand a new one
(Young 2000). The problem of reconstructing the views of some to fit the dominant
paradigm is illustrated by Tanasescu (2015), who shows how in the Ecuadorian case of
the rights of nature the use of the pre-defined normative language of rights and nature,
in combination with the use of the indigenous as a symbol of harmonious living with
and within nature1, contributed to advance the interests of nature advocates while
adding to the long history of denying indigenous agency.
Taken all together we can say that a deliberative valuation framework predisposed to
argumentation imposes an undue burden on deliberators for their competence to
participate in deliberation is conditioned by their capacity to reason in a particular way.
But if reasoning is a capacity expressed in different ways in various cultural contexts
(Mercier 2011), then a broader concept of political communication does not contradict
deliberation’s rationality aims while allowing for a DMV framework better suited for
accommodating social differences and recognising the cultural specificity of
1
This
image
of
the
indigenous
is
in
itself
a
Western
construction,
which
is
in
fact
misleading
and
oversimplifying
(see
the
Pristine
Myth
in
Miller,
2007.)
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deliberative practices. A less rigid notion of communicative competence is thus needed.
This is further explored in what follows.
b.
Advancing inclusion in the forum
Under the capability approach, individual advantage is judged by a person’s capability
to do things she or he has reason to value. The focus is on the freedom that a person
actually has to do this or be that (Sen 2009: 229). These beings and doings are called
functionings. Being communicatively competent is a key functioning for deliberation.
The degree of communicative competence in deliberation depends on both the presence
of resources (e.g. schooling) necessary for this capability, and the extent to which these
resources can be converted into a functioning.
Sen (1999) distinguishes different
sources of variation between resources and the advantages individuals get from them.
First, personal heterogeneities (e.g. physical conditions, cognitive and non-cognitive
skills) influence how a person can convert a resource into a functioning. For instance, if
a person has cognitive disabilities, schooling will be of limited help. Second, social
factors shape the context in which the individual employs his or her resources and
abilities, and makes choices. Those factors could operate at the societal level, like public
educational arrangements, or at the smaller scale of the micro-political interaction of
deliberation, such as norms favoring specific modes of communication or admissible
forms of knowledge. Third2, relational perspectives are those factors that influence how
the individual understands his or her relative position in society, like social norms and
conventions that define gender roles or discriminating practices.
Based on the above we can show more clearly the central role that communication plays
in advancing inclusion. We can start by seeing communication as a social factor.
2
Sen
(1999)
also
includes
environmental
diversities
(e.g.
climate
and
location)
and
distribution
within
the
family.
These
are
beyond
the
scope
of
our
analysis.
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Accepted forms of communication in deliberation are part of the social context in which
a participant has the opportunity to influence others. By defining how the individual is
expected to communicate in a deliberation what it is to be a communicatively competent
actor is also defined. Consequently, the advantages the individual can get from the
resources he or she commands are conditioned by what counts as deliberative
communication. What kind of communication counts as deliberative could be
exogenous, as in deliberation theories grounded on Habermas´s (1984) and Rawls´s
public use of reason (2005), or endogenous to the actual deliberative practice, i.e.
internally derived from the communicative practices of those who take part in
deliberation.
In the first case of exogenous definition, the individual´s communicative competence is
judged according to their capacity to raise and challenge validity claims by means of
reasoned argumentation. On this account an individual becomes a better deliberator by
acquiring those resources which can improve his/her argumentative performance. Hence
the call for institutions that correct for disparities and that guarantee that each citizen
has the capacity to participate in deliberation (Knight and Johnson 1997; Bohman
1997). The problem with this formulation is that deliberation is conditioned to the future
realization of some ideal conditions at the social level. Current inequalities of resources
and power are not addressed, and deliberation does not play a role in counterbalancing
them.
In the second case of endogenous definition, communicative competence is not set in
advance but emerges from the interaction between the communicative practices of those
who deliberate and their personal characteristics and resources. There is no
predisposition to a particular form of communication, rather individuals employ those
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that better suits them. The only procedural pre-requisite that deliberation demands is an
open mind in a spirit of reciprocity (Dryzek 2000; Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007).
Deliberation does not then have to wait until resource inequalities are redressed and
does not purport to erase difference but to recognize it, which means that it is attuned to
those relational factors that shape how deliberation occurs in a given socio-cultural
context.
Relational factors are also key to the achievement of communicative
competence. If there is a social norm that women are not allowed to appear in public
with men, for example, then it becomes difficult or even impossible for women to use
the resource (e.g. schooling) to enable the communicative functioning in a deliberative
setting that does not take that norm into account. This, however, should not be
interpreted as an uncritical acceptance of social norms but as a recognition of their
presence. The challenge then is to identify those practices that reinforce social injustices
from those normatively promising (Sass and Dryzek 2014).
Finally, personal heterogeneities (e.g. cognitive and non-cognitive skills, physical
conditions) play a fundamental role. First, significant inequalities in resources raise the
possibility for those better positioned to exercise political domination. This, however,
does not imply that resource equality guarantees political equality in the forum.
Individuals differ in their ability to convert resources into communicative competence.
Second, personal heterogeneities imply that the compensation needed to redress
disadvantages vary across individuals and also that even with compensations
disadvantages cannot be fully “corrected” (Sen 1999). In other words, full equality in
communicative competence is unachievable.
From the above discussion it is clear that: i) political equality and inclusion are not
reducible to resource distributions; and, ii) communicative norms play a key role in
improving inclusion in the presence of an uneven distribution of resources and
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capabilities. Although redressing resource inequality is desirable, it should not be seen
as a prerequisite of deliberation. Rather, what should be recognized is the two-way
relationship between the rules of, and conditions for, deliberation and the participatory
capabilities of the public. Public policies can enhance people´s capabilities and the rules
of deliberation can be sensitive to those capabilities, but also the direction of public
policy and the rules governing deliberation can be influenced by the use of participatory
capabilities by the public.
3. Inclusion in Deliberative Valuation
O'Neill and Spash (2000) and Spash (2007) recognizes the risk of exclusion that
unequal communicative competence entails and suggests that:
“Exclusion is dealt with more explicitly by political processes, and confidence and
trust in the structure and conduct of the process are recognized as highly
important features. Thus, dominance by one interest is to be avoided and silent
parties are to be encouraged to have their say” (Spash 2007: 694).
This observation points to the importance of deliberation’s procedural character, though
no further elaboration is presented. In what follows we organize the theoretical DMV
literature by means of a distinction between classical and expansive deliberation
(Bächtiger et al. 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2010) in order to explore how they address the
internal exclusion issue.
a. Classical deliberation
Classical deliberation is rooted in the Kantian ideal of the public use of reason, as
exhibited by Habermas (1984) and Rawls (2005). On this account deliberation “implies
a systematic process wherein actors tell the truth, justify their positions extensively and
are willing to yield to the force of the better argument” (Bächtiger et al. 2010: 33). The
ultimate goal is to reach consensus. The focus is on deliberative intent and it relies on a
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sharp distinction between the uses of language that aim at convergence through reason
and those that are strategic in nature (O'Neill 2002: 253).
For Rawls, the concepts of reason, standards of correctness, and criteria for justification
are necessary if inquiry is to be free and public, otherwise there is no reasoning but
rhetoric (Rawls 2005: 220). Similarly, Habermas (1984) distinguishes speech acts that
reveal the speaker´s intention, illocutionary, from those that produce an effect upon the
hearer, perlocutionary. While the former makes a speech act self-sufficient the later
depends on a context of purposive action. It may be strategically motivated if it is not
declared or if it is brought about by deceptive speech acts (Habermas 1984: 291; 1998:
202). Communicative action can only arise from illocutionary aims. For DMV theorists
falling into this category, deliberation is akin to a process of reasoned argumentation,
which means that they rely on strategies different to communicative standards to secure
inclusion in the forum.
DMV theories influenced by liberal political ideas, for example, envisage deliberation
as the space where impartial and objective collective decisions are made (Brown,
Peterson, and Tonn 1995; Wilson and Howarth 2002; Howarth and Wilson 2006). For
Brown, Peterson, and Tonn (1995) this is the case if citizen´s are to act as agents of
society. Only capable citizens can be appointed as juries. They should be reasonable,
free of any personal conflict of interest, free of mental or emotional disability, and
possess an adequate level of maturity, intelligence and education (Brown, Peterson, and
Tonn 1995: 255-256). On this account the freedom and equality of those fairly situated
for conceiving the fair terms of social cooperation is achieved by prescribing the
qualities that a reasonable citizen must meet. Brown´s deliberative framework achieves
inclusion through the exclusion of those less able to reason. Like Rawls, they see the
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public use of reason as a privilege of a few, even a solitary thinker can do the job
(Dryzek 2000: 15).
Wilson and Howarth (2002) for their part present Rawls’ original position as a “useful
model of what we should strive to mirror in value-articulating institutions”(Wilson and
Howarth 2002: 433) if legitimate and fair outcomes are to be produced. To put into
practice these normative ideals Wilson and Howarth (2002: 435) define social fairness
in terms of a deliberative forum that: i) Protects participants from uncompensated
harms; and, ii) Ensures that participants have a common set of rights or capabilities.
Social equity stresses the need for ex-ante equality and freedom, which would be
realized ex-post if the deliberative procedure is fair. A fair procedure is one in which: i)
there are not access restrictions to deliberation; ii) participants are allowed to influence
the agenda; iii) to introduce their own assessment of an ecosystem service; iv) to
express their own attitudes, needs and preferences; v) coercion is absent; and, vi) the
goal is to reach a consensus value among participants.
To secure inclusion in the forum Wilson and Howarth (2002) do not exclude outright
those less capable but stipulate resource and capability equality, and lay down the
conditions for the free and un-coerced exercise of reason. Yet, their solution remains
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, inclusive deliberation is contingent upon the
realization of ideal conditions of equality while current ones remain unattended.
Second, the call for a common set of capabilities losses its force if we do not pay
attention to the communicative norms that regulate deliberation. As we argued in
Section 2.b equality in communicative competence, although unachievable, is advanced
through changes that come from within deliberation, not only through external
institutional changes.
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Ward (1999) too sees deliberation as a place where impartial judgements are made. He
appeals to Harsanyi´s (1955) extended preferences as a regulative ideal. Individuals
formulate their ethical preferences by putting themselves in the shoes of various
subjects. On this account deliberating citizens: “are not asked to express their own
personal evaluations but their judgements about what environmental quality is worth for
society as a whole” (Ward 1999: 79). Once individuals have adopted the right positional
perspective they engage in a process of reasoned argumentation regulated by an ideal of
communicative rationality that demands full equality in communicative competence
(Ward 1999: 81).
On Ward´s (1999) formulation the problem of internal exclusion could be addressed by
selecting adequate representatives, after all, Harsanyi’s extended preferences means that
the juror empathetically project himself into the position of the other subject (Adler
2014). So, as Brown and colleagues, Ward´s framework could achieve inclusion
through the exclusion of the less able.
Another strand of the literature adopts a communitarian oriented perspective to present
deliberation as the right institutional context for making decisions about the
environment. In deliberation individuals are able to perform their citizens’ role of
defining and protecting the common good from a “We” perspective (Sagoff 1998; Vatn
2005: 129; 2009a). It relies on Habermas´ communicative action (1984) to regulate the
reason-giving process. Communication is to develop appropriate norms. This is
communicative action built on social (“We”) rationality. “Communicative action is
about reasoning together over which solutions should be sought and testing arguments
concerning which norms or behavioral rules should be supported in the specific social
setting” (Vatn 2009b: 2209).
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Deliberation is thus instrumental in positioning individuals into the correct evaluative
attitude, one in which the environment is evaluated using the right principles. The issue
of inclusion is therefore limited to being able to engage in argumentation about what
norms supports community´s shared values. But, if participants are not capable enough
to do so then: “the institutional challenge in this case is whether one should create
specific rules that help secure the defined rights of these groups in the deliberative
process, respectively let them choose to be represented by advocates” (Vatn 2009b:
2213). Yet, as we have already discussed, without revising deliberation´s
communicative norms these solutions are unsatisfactory. Procedural rules alone assume
that individuals are equally capable to communicate, which also means that a
representation devise envisaged on this presumption runs the risk of achieving inclusion
through discriminatory conditions of admissibility.
b. Expansive deliberation
According to Mansbridge et al. (2010): “Contemporary deliberative theorists have
moved away from the language of “reason”, with its Enlightenment overtones of a
unitary knowable entity, to a focus on mutual justification” (Mansbridge et al. 2010:
67), which could be achieved through communication forms other than argument
(Dryzek and Hendriks 2012) . Agreement founded on mutual justification is possible
because citizens are regulated by the principle of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson
2004) and, according to Bächtiger et al. (2010), it weakens the truthfulness and sincerity
requirements of the classical ideal.
It is important to note that an expanded version of deliberation does not require the
complete abandonment of Habermas´s ideas. Rather, the concepts of communicative
action and rationality are still used but decoupled from the sharp distinction between
rational and rhetorical speech. Lo and Spash (2013), for instance, conceptualize
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deliberation as a Habermasian discourse, in which: “differently situated individuals are
engaged in a dialogue in an effort to search for common understandings exclusively by
offering arguments that could induce reflective assent on the basis of their merits” (Lo
and Spash 2013: 782).
Citizens are not instructed or expected to subscribe to a
particular moral belief or to perform a defined role, but to respect and to recognize each
other´s ethical perspectives.
In this framework values should be articulated “by focusing on the fabric of
conversation and the psychodynamic between individuals” (Lo and Spash 2013: 15),
therefore it is by analyzing the use and structure of language that value expressions
should be interpreted. Despite the emphasis on argumentation the approach is kept open
to other communicative strategies. This is more clearly stated by Lo (2013) where the
emphasis is on the role that communication plays in bringing about cooperation in
situations of moral disagreement.
“Cooperative action is rational to the extent that our differently reasoned interests or
perspectives can be generalized to make sense of one another. Generalization
connects one point to another without displacing it. Cooperative action that is
communicatively coordinated through a creative search for generalizable interests
does not require expansion or reduction of one or more discourses” (Lo 2013: 87).
A discourse is presented as a set of categories and concepts embodying specific
assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions and capabilities (Dryzek and
Niemeyer 2008). Discourses could then be expressed and contested through a wide
range of communicative strategies. What is important is that the particular ideas,
concepts, facts and values embedded in a discourse be challenged, revised and
synthesized. If this is so, then collective decisions are to be informed by reflective
preferences. Moreover, it is through contestation that manipulation and coercion could
be averted (Dryzek 2000: 76).
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By admitting a wider range of communicative strategies this alternative, expansive
deliberation, is better equipped to respond to the internal exclusion challenge.
Deliberation aims are not tightly tied to particular forms of communication, rather it
focuses on the role that communication plays while at the same time recognizes that any
kind of communication could be coercive. Coercion and manipulation are not ruled out
so deliberation can occur, on the contrary it is through deliberation that those risks are
minimized.
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
So far we have argued that an expansive view of deliberation is more inclusive, yet the
nuances of what is that which is included deserves a further discussion, particularly
given that the idea of inclusion is intertwined with the larger issue of representation,
which poses the challenge of how to generate a decision making process that is
recognized as legitimate by those necessarily excluded from the process itself (Davies,
Blackstock, and Rauschmayer 2005). So what is to be represented, and hence included
in deliberation, individuals or discourses? Here we concur with Dryzek and Niemeyer
(2010b) in that discursive representation also represents persons insofar as individuals
are multifaceted selves constituted by discourses and who can reflect across the
discourses they engage. This view does not undermine the argument we have laid out so
far given that discourses must be articulated by someone in the deliberative forum.
Inclusion thus is about discourses as well as the persons who articulate them in the
forum. Yet, the absence of internal exclusion does not necessarily means that all
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discourses have found their way onto the forum for some of them could have been
excluded at other stages of the decision making process (Schouten, Leroy, and
Glasbergen 2012). This, however, is a risk faced by any deliberative approach given the
systemic influences of context and power in the larger structures of democratic decision
making (Bickerstaff and Walker 2005).
4. Empirical DMV
The inclusion issue has also received some attention in the empirical DMV literature,
where authors agree in that it is important to regulate discussion in order to: avoid
someone leading the arguments, to allow the natural flow of ideas, to counter
participants’ toward strategic behavior, to facilitate group consensus and prevent false
or forced consensus, and to secure that participants have an equal opportunity to
influence the outcome (Álvarez-Farizo, Gil, and Howard 2009; Macmillan et al. 2002;
James and Blamey 2005; Kenyon, Hanley, and Nevin 2001). These authors thus have
great confidence in in the capacity of the moderator to induce a “good” deliberative
behavior and little trust in the self-regulative capacity of deliberation. However, as
Aldred and Jacobs (2000) report, moderators although necessary are not neutral and
thus they remain sceptic on the possibility of construing a neutral deliberative process.
For Curato, Niemeyer, and Dryzek (2013) points out non-neutrality is not a problem as
long as it does not impede the exchange of critical discourses.
With regards to how people communicate and interact during a deliberative valuation
exercise, the evidence, though scant, does not lend support to classic deliberation.
Aldred and Jacobs (2000) found that jurors assessed experts on the basis of their
credibility and not in terms of the information they provided, a finding which goes
against the Habermasian account of rationality that informs their normative model.
Dryzek and Lo (2014) on their part showed how rhetoric allowed climate change
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deniers and others to accept that particular green-house mitigation measures were
acceptable policy choices.
In terms of the practical implications for conducting a DMV exercise the discussion we
have presented highlights the importance of the rules of engagement that regulate the
communicative interchange. We think that these rules should not be imposed by the
researchers but agreed upon by the participants in order to give them ownership of the
process (Hobson and Niemeyer 2012). In a similar vein we do not think that participants
should be required to perform a particular role or adopt a particular attitude, as done for
example by Soma and Vatn (2010) and Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne (2010).
The facilitator is another important aspect. His role must be operational rather than
substantive. That is, limited to keep the group within the agenda of activities - not to be
confused with the agenda of topics for discussion- without encouraging a particular
deliberative behavior. As long as facilitation is not intrusive, i.e. impartial, it can
promote equality of opportunity for meaningful participation. Another alternative is to
use techniques, e.g. nominal group, that promote an orderly and equitable discussion,
see for instance Dietz, Stern, and Dan (2009). In any case, it is important to recognize
that although these measures can be used to foster participation they can also constraint
discussion and prevent the critical engagement across participants.
5. Conclusion
Achieving inclusion in deliberation is important for the democratic legitimacy of
collective decisions regarding the environment. Advocates of deliberation for
environmental valuation have recognized the risk of exclusion that the uneven
distribution of communicative competence entails, but the focus on the procedures and
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pre-requisites under which a deliberative forum occurs, while at the same time adhering
to a rationalistic idea of communication, have prevented them from successfully
addressing the issue. A DMV framework that aspires to be more democratic than the
standard ECBA approach should not cling onto a rational discourse ideal for it risks to
exclude those voices which cannot express their claims in a pre-defined rationalistic
way.
A normative DMV framework that involves more flexible forms of communication and
which is more interested in the outcomes of communication than communicative intent
has better prospects for fostering inclusion in the forum, although it cannot fully
guarantee it. Institutional changes aimed at securing that deliberation occurs under
conditions of equality are important, yet not a prerequisite. The argument presented here
does not intend to downplay the importance of redressing inequalities. What it says is
that it should not, however, be set as a necessary condition for deliberation.
Notwithstanding DMV capacity to make valuation more democratic, it must be
recognized that it is just a part of a larger decision-making structure influenced by
systemic forces of power and context which may exclude some interests and discourses
from being discussed during a deliberation. Although this limits the democratic
potential of DMV it does not, however, renders it irrelevant. Rather, it points to the need
of thinking in terms of a deliberative system of environmental governance and the role
that DMV plays in it.
Acknowledgments
This work would not be possible without the financial and personnel support of the
Strategic Area Program on Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services and Well-Being of
Universidad del Norte, Colombia. Additional funding was provided by the School of
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Environment at Griffith University, Australia. Funding sources had no role in any of the
stages of this study.
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Table 1 Conceptual elements of the two DMV approaches
Classical
Admissible political
Argument
Expanded
Any kind is conditionally
accepted
communication
Dominant a priori
Reasonable persons
Reflective individuals
assumption about
(Rawls)/community
deliberators
members
Ideal participant
Educated, informed
Articulate, informative
Aim of deliberation
Consensus
Justification of value
claims
Source: Adapted from Lo and Spash (2013)
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