International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 11 (2011) 57–85
doi:10.1093/irap/lcq016 Advance Access published on 8 October 2010
Timo Kivimäki
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen,
Øster Farimagsgade 5, PO Box 2099, DK-1014
Copenhagen K, Denmark
E-mail:
[email protected]
Received 2 October 2009; Accepted 12 August 2010
Abstract
East Asia has experienced a drastic decline in incidences of warfare and
has had exceptionally low levels of battle deaths after 1979. However,
East Asian peace had already begun in 1967 inside ASEAN. Is it possible
that East Asian peace began in ASEAN and spread to the rest of East Asia?
This is the question that this article aims to tackle by showing the association between a reasonable and plausible explanation, the ASEAN Way,
and East Asian peace after 1979. The argument about the role of the
ASEAN approach in the pacification of East Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of frequency of conflicts, numbers of battle deaths
and conflict termination. In this kind of examination, it seems that the
recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to those of ASEAN
after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts was also very similar.
1 Introduction
East Asia has experienced a drastic decline in incidences of warfare and
has had exceptionally low levels of battle deaths after 1979 (Svensson,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 11 No. 1
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East Asian relative peace and
the ASEAN Way
58 Timo Kivimäki
2 Argument
By tracing the origins of a regional phenomenon to its local roots, we
may attempt to understand the prevailing cause and effect factors. Is it
possible that East Asian peace began in ASEAN and spread, like a
1
All the battle death data in this article stem from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data
v.4-2008, 1946–2007 (version 2.0), (see Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Harbom et al., 2008).
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2008; Kivimäki, 2009a; Svensson and Lingren, 2009; Tønnesson, 2009).
Almost regardless of the indicator, those countries of the subcontinent
whose capital cities are in East Asia, including current ASEAN
members China (and Taiwan and Hong Kong), Japan, Mongolia, and
the two Koreas, have had less conflict between states and within states
after 1979, and even less after the last inter-state war ended between
Vietnam and China in 1988. The decline in battle deaths1 was marked,
especially with regard to inter-state conflicts (99.5% reduction in average
annual battle deaths in the time-span from 1980 to 2005, compared with
the period 1946–79). In addition, with the exception of the Philippines,
there was also a modest (39.6%) decline in intra-state conflict fatalities.
Not only were the levels of battle deaths down by 98%, but there was
also a drastic reduction in levels of one-sided conflict (conflicts in which
the other side is not armed, for example, authoritarian killings during
the Cultural Revolution), non-state conflict (conflicts in which the state
is not a party, such as the many episodes of fighting between Shan and
Pa-o in Northeastern Burma), and criminal mortalities after 1979
(Kivimäki, 2010a). This is what I mean by East Asian peace.
However, East Asian peace had already begun in 1967 inside
ASEAN. While ASEAN was initially unable to create peace in all of
Southeast Asia, let alone East Asia, it seems that its members have
experienced less war after joining the association. In this article,
‘ASEAN peace’ refers to the absence of conflicts (interstate and intrastate) within the area that at each point in time belonged to ASEAN.
Originally, this meant just a part of Southeast Asia – Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore – while eventually,
since 1997, it came to encompass all of Southeast Asia. By Southeast
Asia, I then mean the ten countries that are currently members of
ASEAN.
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 59
2
For this observation in East Asian Context, Kivimäki (2010b); The same observation in
ASEAN Context, see, Kivimäki (2008). The fact that US power does not correlate with
peacefulness, does not rule out the likely possibility that positive relations between East
Asian (and ASEAN) countries, especially China, with the United States has contributed
crucially to East Asian Peace.
3
Philosophers have different ideas about the primacy of these two elements. The fact that
this article focuses on the correlative aspect does not mean that I support the line, which
says that explanation requires first and foremost the revealing of the correlative regularity
between elements of social systems.
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positive disease, to the rest of East Asia? It seems from the symptoms
(the end of inter-state war, decline in intra-state conflict, greater decline
in conflict casualties than in militarized disputes, inability to resolve conflicts) that the ASEAN disease could provide a diagnosis for the peacefulness of East Asia since 1979. Taken that we have so far only had
grand theories about peaceful structures in liberal democracies (Russett,
1993), capitalist countries (McDonald, 2009), and between authoritarian
one-party states (Fjelde, 2010), the inter- and intra-state peace of
ASEAN and East Asian countries is especially interesting when we take
into account the diversity of polities, economic systems, and cultures.
Also the fact that, contrary to liberal theory (Gleditsch, 2008), ASEAN
peace started within the context of a decade-long decline in objective
interdependence (Kivimäki, 2001), and that, unlike in Western Europe,
US power does not seem to be correlated with increasing peace in
ASEAN or East Asia (in fact, it is negatively correlated with the security
of US allies!),2 the possibility that East Asian and ASEAN peace will
form a new model of peace seems interesting.
This article argues that the two processes of pacification (in ASEAN
and in East Asia) are interlinked, and that the ASEAN approach to
security that has spread to all of East Asia is associated with greater
peace on the entire subcontinent. A full explanation of this requires both
a disclosure of the correlative relationship between the ASEAN approach
in East Asia and its pacific outcome and an explanation of the mechanism by which the ASEAN Way produces a certain profile of pacification,
both in East Asia and in ASEAN.3 However, this article aims only at
revealing the correlative relationship between plausible causes and
effects. The intention is simply to prove that East Asia has adopted an
approach that we call ‘the ASEAN Way’, and that also its security developments after that have been similar to those within ASEAN. This,
however, is not yet sufficient to prove the nature of the association
60 Timo Kivimäki
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between an approach and the subsequent changes in the security profile.
Further research that is outside of the scope of this article will be needed
to reveal the contribution of each of the elements of ‘the ASEAN Way’
to East Asian peace. However, before looking at mechanisms of how
cause produces effect, the kind of research that this article represents is
needed. If one does not first reveal the correlations between cause and
effect, one can end up explaining mechanisms that only link cause and
effect in exceptional cases.
Thus, this article lays the foundation for an investigation that will also
conduct historical analysis and process tracing to reveal the mechanism
by which the ASEAN Way produces peace in East Asia. However, so far
we will settle for showing the association between a reasonable and
plausible explanation, the ASEAN Way, and East Asian peace: this
article will not explain the mechanism of the association between the
ASEAN Way and East Asian peace, or even claim a causal relationship.
One has to be careful, though, with what is argued in this article. It is
not claimed here that East Asian or ASEAN peace would necessarily be
durable or stable. East Asia might indeed be ‘ripe for rivalry’ as Fridberg
(1994) suggests. While the number of casualties in ASEAN and in East
Asia has declined drastically, and development in the area has been very
different from that in the rest of the world, one could still imagine a war
in Korea or Taiwan that would change the situation drastically.
It is not claimed here that ASEAN as an organization or an actor is
the cause of East Asian pacification, but simply that an approach that we
call the ASEAN Way was common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East
Asia and was correlated with success in the prevention of conflict. One
could say that the approach, or elements of it – such as the focus on
development rather than revolution – caused the establishment of
ASEAN, rather than the other way around. This would not be an argument against my claims in this article. Furthermore, the successful East
Asian approach could have spread to East Asia without an agent to disseminate it, in a manner essentially similar to that by which Axelrod and
Keohane (Keohane, 1983; Axelrod, 1984, 1986) imagine that all peaceful
collaborative cooperation in regimes spreads; that is, through the influence of a successful model. Yet, the reason for East Asia’s turning to the
ASEAN Way could just as well have been something else. It could have
been the success of newly industrialized countries, the time span since
decolonization, the fact that radicalism lost its steam after the immediate
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 61
4
UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2.1, 1946–2007, at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/
UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm. See Kreutz (2010).
5
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data v.4-2008, 1946–2007 (version 2.0), codebook.
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post-colonial times of the 1960s, the fact that regional power struggles
between Japan and China prevented both from leading the East Asian
regionalism and thus left space for the ASEAN Way, or many other
matters.
The ASEAN Way could therefore be the trend itself, or it could be a
symptom of another trend, and East Asia’s and Southeast Asia’s turning
to similar orientations could have been caused by a third factor. The
only thing I will establish in this article is that an orientation that is
often called the ASEAN Way was adopted by East Asia just before the
area became pacific, and that the type of success in conflict prevention
was strikingly similar to the success that ASEAN states had experienced
after adopting the ASEAN Way. Why East Asia (or the ASEAN
countries for that matter) adopted the ASEAN is not in focus here. This
belongs to a research program aimed at verification of the correlative
relations.
The argument about the role of the ASEAN approach in the pacification of East Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of frequency
of conflicts, numbers of battle deaths, and conflict termination,4 which,
in this article, are all based on the Uppsala conflict data. Conflict,
according to this data, is defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between
two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths.’5 The concept of conflict termination in
the data focuses on at least one year of non-activity – or more specifically, the point in time at which the conflict ceases to be registered in the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data. This data will be used to show the
similarities between the East Asian and ASEAN approaches to conflicts
and the similarities in the outcomes of these approaches. Both the
approaches and the outcomes will be contrasted with approaches and
outcomes: (i) before ASEAN members joined ASEAN; (ii) in East Asia
before 1979; and (iii) approaches outside East Asia. This is to rule out
the possibility that Asian approaches were there already at the time of
war and instability, as well as the possibility that ASEAN and East
62 Timo Kivimäki
3 The ASEAN Way
The ASEAN Way is not totally unique in all of its elements. However,
despite standard references to common diplomatic principles, the core
elements are different from security orientations of other areas. I have
shown the difference between the East Asian/ASEAN approach and the
Western principles used elsewhere (Kivimäki, 2009b) there is an ongoing
debate on whether the East Asian approach actually mainly reflects
Chinese strategic tradition or regional culture instead of the ASEAN
Way.6 In this chapter I will define into measurable components the orientation that we call the ASEAN Way and its reflections on the profile of
security. This way the claim of an association between the ASEAN Way
and positive security developments can be made verifiable. Later I will
show that it is exactly those principles that are generally known as the
ASEAN Way that have spread to East Asia.
According to the ASEAN declaration of 1967 (ASEAN, 1967),
ASEAN’s two main goals are economic development (growth, cultural
development and social progress) and regional peace and stability. While
this sounds very trivial, the developmentalist undertone of the declaration clearly contradicted the earlier revolutionary approach of some of
the countries in the region, most distinctively Indonesia. It also
6
The former claim is made by Kang (2007) and the latter by Shambaugh (2004/2005).
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Asian pacifications are just global trends that cannot be explained from
the point of view of East Asia’s own approaches.
I will first define what we mean by the ASEAN Way, and then operationalize it (by defining it into measurable components). Then I will
look at statistics of conflict and conflict termination in East Asia and
ASEAN and see whether the pattern defined by ASEAN documents,
declarations, and praxis as the ASEAN Way can be found in East Asia,
and whether this way is somehow unique to the area. Then we will
compare the outcomes of this approach in East Asia and ASEAN, and
compare the outcomes to other areas where the ASEAN Way was not
adopted. Finally we take a look at alternative explanations of East Asian
peace and see whether, instead of the ASEAN Way, the phenomenon
could be explained from outside the subcontinent, thus making references to subjective approaches in the region unnecessary.
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 63
7
ASEAN elitism during its first decades is best revealed by statements of the New ASEAN
leaders who want to contrast the old elitist ASEAN with the New ASEAN. For example,
Indonesia’s president Susilo Bambang Yudhyonon has gone public in saying that ‘We have
to listen to them [ people] and that is actually the spirit of the ASEAN charter, where
ASEAN should show that it is no longer elitist but cares for not only matters of government but also civil matters in all ASEAN nations,’ cited in Abdussalam (2009). For the
concept of human security, see Kaldor and Glasius (2006).
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contradicted the approaches of those Southeast Asian countries that did
not join ASEAN, as well as the approaches of many other developing
countries in the revolutionary 1960s. ASEAN practice has verified that
these two objectives, economic development and regional stability, were
the main goals of the organization. The latter objective was previously
interpreted in an elitist manner almost identical with the stability of the
regimes themselves, while after the democratization of much of
Southeast Asia, peace and stability have attained new meanings, some of
them now coming closer to the concept of human security.7
The principles of the ASEAN Declaration were further elaborated
upon by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. The
emphasis on non-interference was clear, as the three first principles out
of the six somehow related to the principle. According to the TAC,
ASEAN principles are the following: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of
all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from
external interference, subversion, or coercion; non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful
means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective
cooperation among the regimes. Instead of intervening in problems and
supporting conflicting parties against each other, the ASEAN approach
has been to allow states to deal with their problems, even if this is done
by means of violent repression. According to Singapore’s former Foreign
Minister S. Jayakumar, ‘ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this
principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict
has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of
ASEAN . . . Let us maintain it in the twenty-first century.’ (Jayakumar,
1997).
There is qualitative research available on the impact on the level of
political action of the principle of non-interference, and even if the desirability of this principle and the recent interpretations of it are under
64 Timo Kivimäki
8
For a view that the principle will survive political practice, see, for example, Ramcharan
(2000). For view that it is about to, and should, change, see Hourn (2000). Both scholars
accept the fact that non-interference has been an important principle that has also in
reality guided the working of ASEAN countries.
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debate, scholars are relatively unanimous in agreeing that during the first
decades of ASEAN, the principle managed to translate into reality.8
ASEAN is still unanimous about the minimum conditions of noninterference: ASEAN countries should not use troops to support rebels
or other countries that are in conflict with the government of another
ASEAN state. Before the ASEAN declaration such support was
common, as exemplified by the Malaysian confrontation and several
colonial and post-colonial struggles.
If one looks at conflict statistics, it is clear that the tendency to hesitate in taking a stance in favor of rebels in another country’s internal
conflict has been translated into actual reality: there has not been a
single case of one ASEAN country using troops to support an organization fighting the government of another ASEAN country. Out of 139
conflict dyads (years of conflict between two conflicting parties) between
ASEAN countries and their domestic challengers, there has not been a
single dyad where another ASEAN country has supported the rebel side
with troops. While there are no reliable statistics on economic support to
rebels, it seems that aside from Malaysia’s safe haven for Pattani and
Aceh rebels, and probable Indonesian safe havens for Pattani, Moro
Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayaaf Group soldiers, there have
been no clear cases of either voluntary economic or political support for
rebels fighting an ASEAN government. It seems that, in addition to not
supporting rebels in other ASEAN countries, ASEAN countries have
not even been eager to support rebels in countries outside of ASEAN.
Original members of ASEAN have not, for example, participated in
Burma’s conflicts with its ethnic and political opposition. This explains
Burma/Myanmar has been able to focus on its domestic enemy (in its
267 conflict dyads) without the fear of external involvement. Before
joining ASEAN, current ASEAN countries had supported insurgents in
29 Southeast Asian conflict dyads. The support by US allies of counterrevolutionaries in Indochina is a prominent example registered also by
the Uppsala data, but the Indonesian military action against Malaysia
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 65
9
President Fidel Ramos, quoted by Soedjati (1994, p. 49).
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soon after the Azhari revolt of December 1962 should also be seen as an
example of support of insurgents of fellow Southeast Asian regimes.
In promoting peace and stability, the strategy of ASEAN has not been
to address problems head-on. To use Deutsch et al. (1955) terms,
ASEAN has an element of a ‘no-war community’, which, rather than
resolving conflicts, just avoids them. The long Jakarta Process related to
the management of disputed territories in the South China Sea exemplifies this very well, as this process contributed to the avoidance of war,
but it did not even try to resolve the sovereignty disputes. However, this
does not necessarily mean that ASEAN would not aim at the permanent
end of war from the Southeast Asian side (as the original concept of a
‘no-war community’ assumes), but instead, cooperation for long-term
peace has focused on building the constructs that unite the nations, so
that interests for peace would permanently become stronger than interests of war. Acharya tried to prove the utility of ASEAN as an emerging
security community, not simply as a myopic ‘no-war community’
(Acharya, 2000). However, I would maintain that Acharya’s argument
did not consider all options. Even though a ‘simple, no-war community’
might not seem durable, a community that does not resolve disputes can
also transform conflict structures and thereby permanently remove the
risk of wars. This is the type of security community I see in ASEAN.
The fact that ASEAN fails to resolve conflicts while still addressing longterm needs of conflict transformation was acknowledged even by Leifer,
who did not otherwise see a lot of value in ASEAN (Leifer, 1996). Thus,
instead of conflict resolution, the focus of this approach has been to ‘try
to build up something that unites us, and cope [note: not resolve, but
cope] with all the problems that separate us.’9 According to Narine
(2002, p. 31) and Askandar et al. (2002, pp. 21–42), conflicts are dealt
with by postponing difficult issues (such as territorial disputes) and compartmentalizing issues so that they do not hamper diplomacy and trade.
Furthermore, the ASEAN Way aims at downplaying, by means of disallowing public debate, the divisive issues for the sake of harmony. This
approach of not getting involved in difficult issues resonates with the
approach of not getting involved in other countries’ wars.
Again, the approach of not focusing on disputes and problems, but
instead just working for common interests is clearly reflected in the
66 Timo Kivimäki
10 This peculiarity in the East Asian context has been revealed by Svensson (2008).
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ASEAN peace-making record. The number of cases in which conflict
has been terminated is low – only 18 – because of the difficulty in tackling these conflicts. Less than 13% of the conflicts in ASEAN have been
terminated, whereas the global figure is almost double that (21%).
However, the special character of the ASEAN Way and the effort to shy
away from divisive political disputes shows in the rarity of peace agreements.10 Only once has a conflict been ended by a peace agreement
(Aceh Memorandum of Understanding in 2005), while globally, 14% of
terminated conflicts end in a peace agreement. The share of peace agreements dropped from 14% (seven successful peace agreements) to 6%
( just one) with Southeast Asian countries joining ASEAN. The numerable efforts to resolve the Malaysian Confrontation by inviting external
help and explicitly focusing on the disputes in talks of Manila (July to
August 1963), Bangkok (February 1964), and Tokyo (June 1964) clearly
demonstrate that the Southeast Asian tendency of not focusing on divisive issues did not exist before the emergence of ASEAN. In the ASEAN
Way, conflicts are terminated without settling the divisive political disputes. The dominant manner of terminating conflicts within ASEAN
clearly does not involve any focus on the conflict as such (not even a ceasefire), but simply allows the conflict to fizzle away by means of inaction.
Over three-quarters (14 out of 18) of terminated ASEAN conflicts end
this way, thus testifying to the effectiveness of tackling conflicts indirectly
by not directly touching upon any of the conflict-causing issues.
Indonesia’s conflict episodes with separatist Acehnese and Papuans
before the Henry Dunant Centre and Helsinki Process in Aceh were all
terminated this way, as were many of those conflicts in Myanmar involving ethnic minorities (many of these were episodes with Karen groups,
for instance) which did not end in ceasefires. Less than half (22 out of 49)
of Southeast Asia’s conflicts were terminated in this way before nations
joined ASEAN, but within ASEAN, this form of conflict termination
became prominent.
Instead of focusing on head-on disputes, ASEAN countries have
focused on building conditions of order and peace. The common
ASEAN commitment to economic development, ‘ASEAN developmentalism’, is often mentioned as the main tool in constructing a harmonious
ASEAN community of nations. This was not the case before ASEAN.
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 67
1. Conflict fatalities might have declined because economic roots of
intra-state conflicts were now dealt with by means of development.
2. Inter-state conflict declined as states no longer needed to seek legitimacy from explansionist and adventurist revolution.
3. Focus on development might have created a sense of positive interdependence that positively affected the relations between states and
peoples.13
Consensual decision-making involving maximum efforts to save face for
everybody involved characterizes ASEAN’s diplomatic approach. This
can be done in (a) lengthy negotiations and (b) quiet, (c) non-legalistic,
(d) personal (e) confidence-building aimed at (f ) gradual down-playing
and prevention (or sometimes resolution) of disputes (g) by means that
can be accepted unanimously, (h) using the principle of the lowest
common denominator.14 The idea of seeking consensus, no matter how
watered-down and no matter how much time and personal persuasion it
takes, overrules any attempt at majority decision-making.
All this is reflected in conflict statistics in the disappearance of conflict
terminations by victory. Since the ASEAN Way is about avoiding loss of
11 Sukarno’s Independence Speech in 1963, cited in Djiwandono (1996, p. 49).
12 For the view that developmentalism still is important in ASEAN and in East Asia, see
Beeson (2008). For an opposing view, see Dittmer (2007).
13 Developmentalism did not necessarily mean objective development or interdependence. It
seems that at least the Philippines and Myanmar have not developed as fast as the rest of
the world during their membership in ASEAN, while new members of Indochina developed faster before than after joining ASEAN. Calculations are based on World Bank
annual World Development Indicators database.
14 On (a), see Snitwongse (1998, p. 184), Kurus (1995, p. 406), and Busse (1999); on (b), see
Busse (1999); Soesastro (1995). On (c), see Soesastro (1995); on (d) and (e), see Simon
(1998, pp. 2–3), Amer (1998, p. 39), Soesastro (1995); Caballero-Anthony (1998, p. 58), on
(f ) and (g), Snitwongse (1998, p. 185), Caballero-Anthony (1998, p. 60); Busse (1999); and
on (h), see Snitwongse (1998, p. 184).
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According to President Sukarno, for example, ‘Indonesian people can
take everything for the sake of revolution’.11 After the establishment of
ASEAN, Indonesia’s new president, General Suharto, silenced any
voices advocating policies that did not serve economic development. This
economic emphasis quickly became the founding principle of the new
ASEAN cooperation.12 Developmentalism has three kinds of plausible
conflict effects:
68 Timo Kivimäki
1. Conflicts are managed by honoring the sovereignty and noninterference of other ASEAN countries. This is reflected in the reality
of the ASEAN approach of avoiding support to rebels in conflict with
other ASEAN governments. This is unique compared with the situation in the pre-ASEAN period and in other parts of the world.
2. The formula for ASEAN peace has been based on a strategy that
does not focus on conflict issues. This has been reflected in low levels
of conflict termination and a high share of conflicts being terminated
by no visible action, and a low share of conflicts terminated by peace
agreements. This, too, is unique when compared with pre-ASEAN
times and to other parts of the world.
3. Downplaying conflict the ASEAN Way is a developmentalist
approach. This element of the ASEAN Way is reflected in public discourses emphasizing development. The subjective valuation of economic growth differs from pre-ASEAN periods, as well as from other
parts of the developing world of the 1960s.
4. Finally, the ASEAN diplomatic style avoids situations where one of
the conflicting parties would lose face, and thus it is reflected in a conflict termination record with a low frequency of defeat of one of the
parties.
15 Indonesia defeated the anti-communist Darul Islam revolt (1959–62) and the separatist
campaign of the “Republic of Southern Maluku’, while Malaya managed to defeat its communist challengers (until year 1960) and the Azhari Revolt (1962). Myanmar defeated the
Mon resistance, and made a ceasefire with the New Mon State Party just before joining
ASEAN, and the Vietnam War ended in the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975.
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face, it rules out forcing ones opponents to capitulate, and this is also
what the statistics show. Not a single victory has been recorded in
ASEAN countries, compared with the situation before joining ASEAN,
when 11 out of 49 terminated conflicts, or 22%, ended in that way.15 To
some extent, the decline of conflict termination by victory conforms to
the global pattern, but at the same time, the global decline is less drastic
and, as a matter of fact, during the past three decades the global share of
conflicts ended by victories has been 22%.
In summary, the ASEAN Way of managing conflicts can be presented
in the following manner:
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 69
4 East Asia and the ASEAN Way
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The four characteristics of the ASEAN Way were also adopted by East
Asian states around 1979. The first of the four characteristics of the
ASEAN Way was the adoption of the Westphalian idea of recognition of
state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference and non-support
for forces fighting governments of other East Asian nations. This change
as a rhetorical principle began in East Asia at the end of the 1970s and
translated into a course of action in which China, especially, gradually
stopped its subversive support to regional communist insurgencies and
the US allies stopped their support against counterrevolutionary groups.
All of the East Asian nations interpreted the agent structure of East
Asian security in a same manner despite power political rivalries, conflicts of interest and ideological differences in domestic approaches.
In East Asia literature, the prominence of the principle of noninterference in East Asian diplomacy is not disputed. The debate is more
one of whether these principles will or should lead inter-state relations in
the future. Acharya’s theories on the emerging East Asian security community do not seem to suggest that this cluster of principles will be
seriously threatened (Acharya, 2004), while according to some, noninterference will not play a central role in future East Asian diplomacy
(Chalermpalanupap, 2009). Yet, regardless of different interpretations of
the role of the non-interference principle, no one seems to be claiming
that the principle of avoiding support with troops to rebels that are fighting against another East Asian government (minimal non-interference)
has been compromised.
If one looks at the change from the viewpoint of conflict statistics, it is
seen that before 1979, East Asian States were engaged in 35 conflict
dyads after the Second World War in which they supported, with military troops, the enemy (domestic or international) of another East Asian
state. China’s support of various communist groups as well as allied
Western support against communist-nationalists, especially in the context
of Indochina wars and the Korean War, was the dominant form of external interference in internal conflicts. However, after 1979 this stopped,
and there was no longer a single dyad in which one East Asian State lent
military support to an enemy of another East Asian state. This cannot
be explained as a global trend, since in the rest of the world, there have
been 27 conflict dyads involving external support for groups fighting a
70 Timo Kivimäki
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government, constituting a decline (from pre-1980 to post-1979 periods)
of only 35%. The total support of military non-interference promoted by
the ASEAN Way seems to characterize post-1979 East Asia, too.
However, until the end of the 1980s, China did sponsor some communist parties in East Asian countries economically and politically. There
are no reliable statistics on this, except for the fact that China’s support
of the Burmese Communist Party contributed to a great deal of conflict
in Burma until 1987. However, after that China ceased this support, and
by the end of the 1980s, neither China nor any other East Asian state
supported any group fighting another East Asian state. Thus, from this
perspective, the approach of East Asia was very similar to that adopted
in Southeast Asia on the establishment of ASEAN.
The principle of non-interference indicated by the statistics of nonsupport for enemies of neighboring countries also had some declaratory
expressions. As in Southeast Asia earlier, the principles of the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation also became central to East Asian diplomacy,
and therefore the formal adoption of the document as the foundation of
ASEAN-led cooperation was not difficult. The close similarity between
the East Asian and Southeast Asian approaches was also emphasized by
the ease with which the ASEAN-based institutions – ASEAN Dialogue
mechanisms, APT, East Asian Summit, ARF, CSCAP, etc. – were
adopted in East Asian diplomacy. While efficient in the prevention of
violent conflict, this common approach and orientation was not particularly suited for the prevention of authoritarian violence in Southeast
Asia or in East Asia, as the experiences of Tiananmen Square in 1989,
transitional violence in Indonesia in 1965–67 and the last years of
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines from 1981 to 1986 testify. Thus,
ASEAN and East Asian profiles of pacification were, in this respect, very
similar. East Asia was not very efficient in resolving conflicts either, as
can be seen in the continuing high number of militarized disputes. The
record of East Asian conflict termination after 1979, therefore, is also
quite similar to that in ASEAN.
The patterns of conflict management in East Asia have also changed
along lines similar to those in ASEAN. Disputes and divisive issues are
not tackled directly. As in the case of ASEAN, slightly more conflicts are
being terminated in post-1979 East Asia than in pre-1979 East Asia. In
addition the new approach to conflict termination is very similar both in
ASEAN and in East Asia. What is surprising is that in neither of these
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 71
16 All of them were in Southeast Asia. However after 1979 peace agreements cannot be found
in those countries that were not yet ASEAN members, whereas before 1979 there were
plenty of peace agreements in those countries.
17 For this development, see, for example, Lo (2001, pp. 253 –264). For analysis that associates
developmentalism with East Asia in a more global investigation, see Robinson and White
(2007). For analysis that argues for the link between East Asian developmentalism and
success in conflict prevention, see Goldsmith (2007).
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areas is conflict terminated by resolving the dispute behind the violence.
Only 3% (one case: Aceh peace agreement) of terminated conflicts has
ended in a peace agreement in post-1979 East Asia, whereas the percentage before 1979 was 16% (7 cases out of 45 terminated conflicts).16 The
‘disappearance of peace agreements’ in East Asia and in ASEAN is
special and cannot be explained away by referring to global trends. It
seems that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a method of terminating conflicts has increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979
averages to post-1979 averages. Clearly, reluctance to focus on politically
divisive issues is common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia.
This also testifies to the fact that East Asia has followed the ASEAN
Way in its transformation. The tackling of difficult political issues has
become less important for conflict termination in East Asia as well, just
as had happened previously within ASEAN.
ASEAN’s developmentalist path was eventually adopted by the entire
East Asia about a decade later. The transformation of China into a
developmentalist state after more than a decade of a power battle
between developmentalist and revolutionist forces happened at the time
when Japan and Korea were developing their doctrines of comprehensive
security in the latter half of the 1970s. Economic grievances were explicitly tackled, while revolutionary discourses blaming others for the lack
of economic performance became unpopular. Development became the
prime declared objective and rationale for states, and the rationales of
nationalism and revolution were put in the back seat.17 Subjective focus
on development also translated into impressive objective economic progress with the exception of North Korea, Burma/Myanmar, and the
Philippines.
Finally, it seems that the priority of saving face has also been adopted
from the ASEAN Way by East Asian governments. The effort to defeat
ones enemies no longer belongs to the code of conduct. Instead, efforts
are made to at least try to conceal victory by offering ceasefire
72 Timo Kivimäki
5 Consequences of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN and in
East Asia
The claim that the ASEAN Way may be the reason behind East Asian
pacification seems to be supported by a comparison of East Asian
approaches to security after 1979 and the ASEAN Way. However, the
argument also requires that the consequences of this approach are
similar. Both areas have to be successful, and the profile of their successes has to be similar: they have to be successful in similar issues and
perhaps less successful in other similar issues.
The first issue when looking at the outcomes of East Asian and
ASEAN security approaches is that the similar approaches used by the
original ASEAN members since 1967, the late-comers since 1997 and
East Asia since 1979 have managed to reduce battle deaths and conflicts
causing casualties in both places. In both cases, success has been
measured by ability to avoid conflict escalation, and, to a lesser extent,
by the ability to prevent disputes from turning violent. The success of
the ASEAN Way has definitely not been a question of the ability to
avoid or resolve disputes. As shown in Kivimäki (2008), despite the
reduced number of battle deaths and conflicts, the number of militarized
disputes was not reduced.
In terms of the type of violence, it seems that the ASEAN Way has
especially managed to prevent inter-state conflicts. In the case of
18 Both victories took place in Myanmar, which to some extent has stayed outside the realm
of East Asian Peace.
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agreements to the losing side. While the share of victories out of all conflict terminations East Asia declined from 10 (out of 45) to 3 (out of 34
terminated conflicts)18 after 1979, the pattern was the same, but less
drastic than in ASEAN, where victories disappeared entirely. While this
corresponds to the global pattern to some extent, it is clear that both
East Asia and ASEAN declines were more drastic, and in the end the
share of victories declined to a much lower level than the global one.
While the global share of victories declined to one half, it remains in the
post-1979 situation at 22%, whereas in ASEAN victories had disappeared totally and their share in East Asia is slightly less than 9% (the
share has declined to one-third of what it was before 1980).
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 73
19 It is clear that the Vietnam War has a great influence on the difference between ASEAN
and pre-ASEAN violence. Yet, even if we subtract the effect, not only of the great Vietnam
war from 1965 until the mid-1970s, but of all Vietnamese wars (and there have not been
wars in Vietnam after the country joined ASEAN), the difference would still be great.
Without all Vietnamese conflicts, ASEAN battle deaths have still been reduced to just 35%
compared with the time before the countries joined ASEAN.
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ASEAN, there has been no interstate conflict involving casualties
between two ASEAN members, despite the fact that some ASEAN
members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization. This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially after 1987.
The success of ASEAN peace can be seen in the difference between
conflicts and battle deaths before and after joining the organization. We
can see that the number of battle deaths has not decreased systematically
on joining ASEAN, as both Thailand and the Philippines have had more
battle deaths per year after joining ASEAN. For Thailand, this is
explained by the continuation of the Vietnam War and the instability
which spilled from it over to the Thai side. The decline in conflict fatalities in Thailand was delayed because of that. However, all in all, the
average annual number of casualties ASEAN nations have experienced
compared with what they had earlier is just 6.7%19 (Table 1).
The decrease in battle deaths between ASEAN countries cannot be
seen as a global or a regional trend, but must be seen as something
specific to ASEAN countries. In fact, as Fig. 1 demonstrates, ASEAN is
an exception even in its own area, where the number of battle deaths was
on the rise at the same time that ASEAN countries experienced increasing peace. Dissimilarly, global (excluding East Asia and ASEAN)
numbers of annual battle deaths increased substantially after the establishment of ASEAN as well as after 1979, and did not start to decline
before 1992.
The emergence of the ASEAN Way is also associated with a reduction
in the number of conflict dyads that claim lives. Again, the pattern is not
without exceptions, as Indonesia and the Philippines had more conflicts
after joining than before. Yet the average annual number of conflicts
involving ASEAN countries dropped from 1.2 to 0.5, 45% of the earlier
figure. This is convincing, but not as convincing as the decline in battle
deaths (Table 2).
74 Timo Kivimäki
Table 1 Average annual battle deaths before and after joining ASEAN
Country
Before joining
ASEAN after
independence
or WW2
After joining
ASEAN
Bruneia
4
0
Burma/Myanmar
1452
147
89.9
Cambodia
6706
22
99.7
Indonesia
2322
1740
25.1
Reduction
(as % of the
original no.
of fatalities)
100.0
1274
0
100.0
Malaysia
709
8
98.9
Philippines
429
2439
Singaporeb
5
0
Thailand
69
200
Vietnam
54758
0
ASEAN average
7525
506
2469.1
100.0
2189.4
100.0
93.3
a
Here, Brunei’s existence is already assumed from 1959. This is due to the fact that Brunei
was already party to the Malaysian Confrontation in 1963 –1965, even though it received
formal independence no earlier than 1984.
b
Singapore was also an independent actor with casualties in the Malaysian Confrontation
of 1963– 1965, even though it formally gained independence in 1965 (Turnbull, 1977).
Moving a number of casualties from Malaysian battle deaths to Brunei and Singapore
does not, naturally, affect the conclusions regarding ASEAN or East Asian battle deaths,
as battle deaths are then simply moved from one ASEAN country to another.
Figure 1 Southeast Asian battle deaths.
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Laos
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 75
Table 2 Number of conflict dyads before and after joining ASEAN
Number of
conflicts per
annum before
membership
Number of
conflicts per
annum after
joining ASEAN
Brunei
0.12
0.00
100.0
Burma/Myanmar
4.33
1.88
66.6
Cambodia
0.84
0.14
83.3
Indonesia
0.57
0.84
247.4
Reduction
(as % of the
original no. of
conflict dyads)
0.53
0.00
100.0
Malaysia
2.18
0.00
100.0
Philippines
1.10
1.87
270.0
Singapore
0.33
0.00
100.0
Thailand
0.71
0.58
18.3
Vietnam
1.10
0.00
100.0
ASEAN average
1.18
0.53
65.0
However, it seems that the most drastic contribution ASEAN has
made in Southeast Asia is to inter-state relations. ASEAN members have
not yet fought a single war, despite the fact that they were often in conflict before their membership (Table 3).
The pattern has been the same in all of East Asia. The fact that battle
deaths fell more drastically than conflicts can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3.
To make the presentation comparable with that of ASEAN peace, we
can also calculate the average numbers of battle deaths for the period
from the Second World War to 1979 and compare it with the average
number of battle deaths from 1980 to 2005.
Table 4 shows that the number of battle deaths dropped rather drastically in all but one East Asian country, the Philippines.20 The average
decrease was even more drastic than that among ASEAN countries. The
average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia after 1979 fell by
98% compared with that before 1979 (while the drop in ASEAN
20 The Philippines is also the one country that has not managed to focus on development as
much as the other original members of ASEAN, and as a result, its development record is
less impressive. Furthermore, the approach of the Philippines has not always downplayed
divisive issues as much as the other countries have. For an analysis of this, see Kivimäki
(2002).
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Laos
76 Timo Kivimäki
Table 3 Inter-state conflict and the ASEAN Way
Conflicts with
future ASEAN member
Conflicts with
ASEAN member
Brunei
4
4
0
Burma/Myanmar
236
0
0
Cambodia
44
18
0
Indonesia
44
4
0
Laos
27
8
0
Malaysia
24
4
0
Philippines
94
11
0
Singapore
4
4
0
Thailand
37
21
0
Vietnam
54
22
0
Figure 2 Battle deaths in East Asia.
countries after membership was ‘just’ 93.3%). At the same time, the
average national number of conflicts after 1979 was 68% of the levels up
until 1979. Thus, common to ASEAN and East Asia was the decrease in
the number of conflicts and the even more drastic decrease in battle
deaths.
While ASEAN’s most spectacular achievement was that of ending
conflicts between member states, the trend was the same in East Asia.
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All conflict
dyads
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 77
There has been only one inter-state war since 1979 in East Asia (China–
Vietnam 1987), with something between 300 and 4000 battle deaths,
whereas before 1979, China was involved in 13 interstate war dyads with
Vietnam, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and India with a total of almost
140,000 battle deaths, and the Koreas fought five war dyads with almost
1.3 million casualties.
The explanation in East Asia is neither a global trend nor a pacification of a greater region (Fig. 4). While East Asian battle deaths dropped
by 98%, the global average of battle deaths excluding the East Asian
figures increased 2.8 times. The number of East Asian battle deaths as a
percentage of the global number clearly shows that East Asia is outstanding in its pacification.21
6 Conclusions
It seems that the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to
those of ASEAN after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts was
also very similar. The ASEAN Way is, indeed, practiced in post-1979
East Asia, and the developments in the realm of security after the adoption of this approach are the same. Thus it seems possible that the origin
of East Asian peace could be found in the collectively shared approaches
21 The reason for presenting East Asian change as a figure and ASEAN change as a table is
because of the fact that different nations joined ASEAN at different times.
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Figure 3 Number of conflict dyads in East Asia.
78 Timo Kivimäki
Table 4 Average annual number of conflicts and battle deaths before and after 1979
Conflicts
China
Battle deaths
Before
1979
After
1979
Decline
(as % of the
original no.
of conflicts)
Before
1979
After
1979
0.53
0.27
49.1
38444
79
Decline
(as % of the
original no.
of fatalities)
99.8
0.15
0.00
100.0
18468
0
100.0
South Korea
0.24
0.00
100.0
19387
0
100.0
Mongolia
0.00
0.00
0
0
Japan
0.00
0.00
0
0
Taiwan
0.12
0.00
100.0
Vietnamsa
1.03
0.27
73.8
182
0
100.0
73132
79
99.9
Cambodia
0.65
0.73
212.9
46241
1019
97.8
Indonesia
0.65
0.85
230.8
2659
254
90.5
Laos
0.65
0.19
70.3
771
12
98.5
Myanmar
4.38
3.31
24.5
1728
646
62.6
Malaysia
0.68
0.04
94.3
455
1
Philippines
0.88
1.85
2109.2
817
1905
124
102
3
0
100.0
3
0
100.0
12651
256
Thailand
0.21
0.35
268.1
Brunei
0.09
0.00
100.0
0.09
0.00
100.0
10.32
7.85
34.0
Singapore
East Asia, Total
99.8
2133.2
28.5
98.0
a
The two Vietnams have been calculated together throughout the period for the sake of
simplicity. Naturally, this does not affect the conclusions on the effectiveness of the
ASEAN Way in East Asia.
and orientations known as the ASEAN Way. There is a need to look at
the various components of the ‘ASEAN Way’ to see whether and how
they cause or contribute to pacification of domestic governance and
foreign relations before one can be sure that similar approaches and
similar outcomes are not a result of intervening phenomena. However,
the correlative relationship is there and the ASEAN Way is associated
with success, also in East Asia. Future research should then prove the
nature of this association and perhaps draw conclusions that could be
generalized.
The similarity of the ASEAN and East Asian approaches after 1979
was expressed in the fact that conflicts were managed by honoring the
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North Korea
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 79
sovereignty of other ASEAN countries. This was reflected in noninterference in the internal conflicts of other countries; an element which
can be seen on the levels of declarations, policy practices and outcomes.
Non-interference was a central part of both ASEAN’s founding declarations and of East Asia’s policy declarations after 1979. On the level of
policy output, security-related non-interference could be observed in the
drastic reduction in support given to forces challenging governments.
Second, ASEAN and East Asian approaches are similar in that they do
not focus on conflicting issues. Efforts to play down divisive issues and
avoid divisive declarations are an expression of this similarity on the level of
policy, while the relatively low number of terminated conflicts as well as the
decrease in peace agreements testifies to this on the level of policy outputs.
Both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia emphasize developmentalism
as a means of creating common interests in avoiding war. This, too, can
be seen on the level of declarations that in both areas turned from
anti-colonialist or communist revolutionary ideology to an emphasis on
the priorities of economic development. On the level of policy, this was
reflected in an equally intensive focus in East Asia and in ASEAN on
business and market-friendly foreign policies. On the level of policy
outputs, developmentalism resulted in greater economic growth with
only a few exceptions (some were cases that failed both in development
and in conflict prevention), both in East Asia and in ASEAN.
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Figure 4 East Asian share of global battle deaths.
80 Timo Kivimäki
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Finally, the East Asian and ASEAN similarity in security approaches
was reflected in similar diplomatic codes of non-confrontational treatment of disputes based on personal, informal, quiet diplomacy which
uses plenty of time on the buildup of consensus and refuses to bring divisive issues to the surface, let alone out into the public forum. This similarity could also be verified on various levels using both qualitative and
certain quantitative strategies of testing. Both ASEAN and East Asia
became reluctant to end conflicts by humiliating their enemies with a
military victory. Instead, solutions were sought that would save face for
both conflicting parties.
Believable results of the ASEAN Way were also identified both in
ASEAN and in East Asia: drastic reductions in battle deaths, despite
the smaller reduction in the number of conflicts, could be identified
in both cases; in both cases, pacification especially affected the
relationships between countries in the two pacific areas – East Asia
and ASEAN. While ASEAN conflicts ended completely between
member states (while disputes remained), the tendency was the same
even though the degree was less drastic in East Asia. Clearly, the
striking characteristics of ASEAN pacification could also be detected
in East Asia, and thus, in addition to the security approach, also the
consequences of the approach are the same in East Asia as in
ASEAN. However, although roosters crow the same way in Mexico
as in Thailand – and after that the sun rises in very similar ways –
this does not mean that we can conclude that the roosters’ crowing
causes the sun to rise in both countries. The causal connection
between an approach to security and security itself is perhaps more
plausible than the causal connection between the roosters’ crowing
and the rising of the sun. Also, the fact that different approaches to
security in other areas mostly do produce a different outcome seems
to make the proposition that the ASEAN Way is the reason for East
Asian peace more plausible. Still, a systematic tracing of the process
from approach to peaceful outcome is needed before we can fully
conclude that the ASEAN Way has caused East Asian peace after
1979.
Whether this conclusion has any implications outside the East Asian
and Southeast Asian region remains unresolved. How much the ASEAN
Way could be further emulated is an interesting question that should be
studied. What the ASEAN and East Asian experience shows, at least, is
East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way 81
22 I have looked at the challenges of democratization and the challenge of prosperity to the
ASEAN Way elsewhere (Kivimäki, 2010b).
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that the preference for focusing on problems and trying to solve them is
not the only possible way of avoiding conflict.
It is also possible to successfully tackle security issues by focusing on
positive and commonly shared elements of security and by building
structures of peace rather than expanding divisive issues by putting them
under a magnifying class.
In addition to the question of emulation of the ASEAN Way elsewhere, it would also be important to investigate whether some of the
limitations of the East Asian approach could be remedied by recipes
from outside. It is possible that the inability of ASEAN and the East
Asian approach to tackle difficult issues contributes to the fact that
despite a reduction in battle deaths, a low-level arms race and the
risk of nuclear holocaust continue to haunt the area. Can it also be
that the strict elitist non-interference policy contributes to the difficulty in limiting authoritarian violence and one-sided conflict, both
in ASEAN and in East Asia? Could the ASEAN Way be complemented by something that has already been experienced in the Aceh
Peace Talks: a sensitive tackling of political disputes in a way that
settles some of the remaining political disputes in East Asia?
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the dispute regarding
Taiwan’s status, the disputes over the Korean peninsula and many
others still cast their shadow on East Asian peace and cause risks.
Might it be possible to complement the ASEAN Way by democratic
control over state authority, and thereby to limit authoritarian violence without risking the effective ASEAN control of conflict violence? Finally, since many of the orientations have been originally
fitted into an authoritarian political setting, one could ask whether
or not East Asian or ASEAN peace can survive the democratization
of East Asia. In addition to the authoritarian undertone, the ability
of East Asian countries to focus on development could be challenged
by the emergence of a generation which takes prosperity for granted
and tends to focus on the values of self-expression rather than the
survival-oriented values of developmentalism.22 All of these questions
will be crucial to the security of East Asia, but also to the general
theory of conflict.
82 Timo Kivimäki
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