The Battle of Yorktown

Ministry of Defence The World Turned Upside Down RMYO16 Battlefield Tour, Yorktown, 2017 Corps Tutor 6/19/2017  Contents Introduction 1 The 'Why': Britain, France and the United States at War 1776-1783. 3 The Cause: Unjust Rebellion, or Tyrannical Rule? 3 Military Strength 4 International Influences 4 Internal Unity and Discord 4 Realities of War 5 Nationalism and Ideology 5 Economy 5 Personalities 5 The 'How': The road to Yorktown 7 Rule Britannia? 7 Colonial Despair 8 French Hopes 9 The Problem: Jan 1781 11 Clinton 11 Washington 11 Rochambeau 11 Situational Update: July-Aug 1781 13 British Forces. 13 Allied Forces 13 Strategic COA 13 Preliminaries 15 British Forces 15 Allied Forces 15 Ground 15 Course of the Campaign 16 Analysis and Evaluation: British Positions. 18 Analysis and Evaluation: Allied Positions. 18 The Siege Begins 19 Notes Pages 23 Works Cited I  "Those who don't know history are destined to repeat it." Edmund Burke, 1729-1797 "History is a vast early warning system." Norman Cousins, 1915-1990 Introduction Battlefield tours are nothing new. Great commanders are known to have programmed Staff Rides as a means of educating their aides and subordinates; Caesar took his legates to view the battlefields of Alexander and Hannibal during his campaigns. Carl von Clausewitz noted that the best generals were not just practitioners of war, but students of it too. Gen ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis echoed TE Lawrence when he said that after 5,000 years of human experience we have no excuse for fighting poorly. History is a repository of knowledge that, if plumbed and exploited correctly, can prevent us having to re-learn old lessons. Learning on the battlefield is costly in terms of both blood and treasure; how many graves, as Mattis expounded, have been filled as a consequence of arrogant dismissal of the past? Young, A. History: A neglected discipline? The Naval Review, Vol.104 no.1, (2016). pp.39-43. History, though, is not a panacea. It is not a means to all ends and it cannot provide us with a simple methodology to solve all the issues that rise to meet us. History is not neat; it is not an equation of Cause + Effect = Result. There are too many variables. Nor is it just 'a corpus of ascertained facts' or the personal perspective of great men: it is more than names and dates and the subjective musings of individuals writing for their own id. Carr, E H. What is History? Penguin, London, (1964), pp.7-14. For military professionals British history provides a deep evidential seam. The problem this presents is that one can un-earth support for almost any argument. History's utility is not in what but rather how it teaches us: a method of objective, critical analysis transferable across all disciplines. Its etymology derives from historia, 'research' or 'understanding'. By using it Herodotus tells us he was writing to preserve the memory 'of what men have done'. Thucydides goes further, writing for 'those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past, and which (human nature being what it is) will...be repeated in the future'. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R Warner, London, (1954), p.48 Research and understanding will prevent us repeating mistakes, although the remarkable trinity of Reason, Passion and Chance may disagree. Clausewitz, C von. On War, ed. & trans. Howard, M. & Paret, P. Everyman's Library, New York, (1993). p.101 Whilst the character of war evolves its nature is constant; War is still 'an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will', a 'continuation of politik with the admixture of other means'. It is still subject to the same frictions; the enemy, logistics, populace, terrain and climate all pose challenges that the commander must first comprehend and then neutralise to his, or her, own advantage. Ibid, pp.83-150. The dialogue between past and present is fundamental to understanding the world in which we live and work. For the military, this is even more important given that we operate at the boundaries between worlds: between the sea and the land, the haves-and-have-not's, the religious and secular, the democratic and despotic. Understanding the demarcation between those zones, either physical or socially constructed, is key to operations. General Mackay and Cdr Tatham's 2009 paper 'Behavioural Conflict' opens with the assertion that: ...future campaigns will need to focus on altering the behaviours of others, either in advance - and therefore deterring conflict - or as a coupled component in the process of combat and post combat operations ... [As such] success in battle will demand as much understanding of social psychology, culture and economics as it does military art and science. Each of the elements picked out by Mackay and Tatham are part of the rich tapestry of human experience. That experience, like our own, is past: it is historic. It is no coincidence that the greatest military personages have not only been voracious digesters of history, but have also written it: Thucydides, Caesar, Grant and Slim. Kiszely, J. The relevance of History to the military profession: the British view. The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession, ed. Murray & Sinnreich, Cambridge University Press, (2006). pp. 23-33. Had Bush and Blair understood the true complexities of the boundaries and fault lines in Iraqi society beyond Saddam Hussein's 'evil' nature, the outcome may have been different. Conversation with Prof George Joffe, Department of Politics and International Relations, Cambridge University, 20 Oct 2015. Murray and Sinnreich blame this tendency by politicians to ignore the past as a 'brake on their ambitions'. Planners would have done well to consider the British defeat at Maiwand in Helmand province; Pashtu narative history remebered this all too clearly. Given that militaries and navies spend the majority of their time preparing for war it is prudent to study past conflict. Studying history, then, is necessary on three counts. Stearns, P. Why Study History? American Historical Association, (1998). First, in order to understand people and the societies in which they live. Human experience does not occur in a laboratory; it is messy and dependent on the vagaries of the external environment and the whims of individuals. All logic is dependent on the rationality of the actor, something that cannot be taken for granted and is most often only viewable in retrospect. Secondly, and closely related, historical study aids in discerning constants and changes in society and environment, and the reasons for them: the constant nature of war from its evolving character. Sometimes there is a definite, single recent cause for change; more often, it is gradual and incremental with numerous differing factors. Identifying these trends abets our ability to shape our own present to influence the unknown future. Finally, it is a cognitive skill-set that underpins our ability to analyse vast streams of information. Assessing evidence, the validity of different interpreations and the effects of actors and changes upon the world all stem from these skills. Yorktown, whilst remembered as a defining moment in American history, is largely forgotten in the annals of British military history. As a defeat, it is seen as the nadir of the first British empire and is overshadowed by the later victories of the Napoleonic era. As future Officers nothing is more valuable than learning lessons in peacetime rather than in the heat of battle. As future Royal Marines, a thorough understanding of the challenges operating at the seams between land and sea (and latterly air too), is fundamental to knowing your business. Yorktown is an ideal exemplar of the key concepts that define maritime operations and doctrine. Fundamentally, though, it offers an opportunity to examine human behaviour and to understand the challenges faced by commanders so that we, as avid students and future practitioners, may be better placed to deal with our own futures. Let us not make the same mistakes our forbears did; better hurt pride than bloody injury.  The 'Why': Britain, France and the United States at War 1776-1783. To understand the tactical decisions undertaken by commanders in war, one must first be conversant with the why. '[P]olitics' so Clausewitz tells us, '...is the womb in which war develops'. Clausewitz, C von. Op cit, (1993). p.83, p.173. In either Realist or Liberal case For more on International Relations theory, see Wilkinson, P. International Relations: A Very Short Introduction¸ Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. causes of war are found in 'human behaviour' through 'social organisation'. Nye, J. Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention, in eds Rotberg, R. Rabb, T. The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1998), p.3. At whichever level, it is consensus or conflict in the relationship between people(s) that results in war or peace. Blainey, G. The Causes of War, Free Press, New York, (1988). pp.291-295. Ultimately, as with all politik, war is a matter of choice based upon the importance attached to certain goals and objectives by societies. That importance depends upon the situation and the actors at play within it. Young, A. Actors, States and the Causes of War, The Naval Review, Vol.104 no.4, (2016), pp.385-388. Local and regional Politics, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental (PESTLE) factors all play a part in the decision making cycle, and these provide some analytical insight. Blainey argues that the decision for war or peace rests on seven inter-related reason: Blainey, G. Op cit. p.293. Military strength and the ability to apply that strength in the theatre of war. Predictions of how outside nations will behave if war occurs. Perceptions of internal unity or discord, both domestic and international. Knowledge or forgetfulness of reality of war. Nationalism and ideology. State of the economy and its ability to sustain war. The personality and the experience of decision makers. Each of these will inform the decision making process and the direction of state assets in the quest of achieving the object. These provide a framework for us to analyse the behaviour of those deciding what method best suits their purpose: whether to pursue their objectives by peaceful, diplomatic discourse, or to take up arms and force a conclusion. The Cause: Unjust Rebellion, or Tyrannical Rule? Depending upon viewpoint, historians will fall into one of two camps. The common view of American independence is as the consequence of ill-conceived meddling in Colonial affairs by Tories in England. Patterson, E. Gill, N. The Declaration of the United Colonies: America's Just War Statement, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol.14 no.1, (2015). pp.7-34. More recently, revisionists have pointed to the costs of Empire and colonial legislature's refusal to share the burden; typically, and American taxpayer paid just 1/50th of their English counterparts. Hibbert, C. Redcoats and Rebels, Paladin, London, (1991). pp.xviii-xix. Whichever the case, the causes of conflict between Patriot colonists and the Royal forces and their Loyalist supporters, ultimately derives from misperception. To the independent minded Patriots, the burden of taxation without perceived representation in Parliament was unjust; to the fair-minded gentry and legislature in London, financing of national debt and administrative costs incurred through defending those colonies should be shared by the whole imperial project, not only those at its centre. Shy, J. The American Colonies in War and Revolution, 1748 - 1783, in Marshall, P. ed. Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol.II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1998). pp.307-324. When only one side was willing to make concessions (notably Parliament, in favour of the Colonists, but only to a point), it was axiomatic that a line would have to be drawn. Frazer, G. The American Revolution: Not a Just War, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol.14 no.1, (Frazer 2015). pp.35-56. That line was reached in 1775 when the Massachusetts militia began to openly arm and train for war. General Gage, Commander in Chief of British North America, felt he had no choice but to destroy the colonials' caches of weapons and supplies. By marching on Concord and Lexington with sufficient force to meet any opposition, but not to crush it, he did enough to force a crisis and too little to resolve it. For decision makers in both Britain and the Colonies, decisions were predicated on divergent predictions according to Blainey's seven factors. Military Strength At the outset of war, Britain undoubtedly held the advantages of a standing regular army and navy. Further, this could be mobilised through an efficient and centralised command structure. This was offset by the distance from that administrative centre to the theatre; the Atlantic ocean both contained the problem to a distant shore and made access to it troublesome. Moreover, the empire had numerous theatres to consider. Strengthening forces in the Thirteen Colonies meant stripping defences from Canada, India, the West Indies or the home territories, all of which came with distinct risks. These issues were reversed for the Colonials: dependent upon irregular, independent militias with no clear chain of command; no naval strength capable of meeting the Royal Navy; and no central administration capable of directing the war effort or raising funds. However, this was a war within their territorial confines; whatever resources could be mobilised would have almost immediate effect. International Influences Britain was diplomatically isolated in 1775. By humiliating France and Spain a decade earlier she had united the Bourbon monarchies in enmity. In supporting Frederick the Great she had earned Russian and Austrian indifference at best, hostility at worst, and through establishing a heavy handed maritime dominance she had estranged the Dutch Republic and other Northern European powers. It was therefore unlikely for any European nation to support Britain's war effort. Conversely, American Patriots found sympathetic ears, if only for potential personal gain at British expense, amongst European monarchs. Incidentally, few of those monarchs actively supported democratic evolution; revolutions were a direct threat to their own stability. Internal Unity and Discord Within parliament and Britain as a whole, there was a sizeable majority in favour of forcing Colonial obedience. However, the Whig opposition, although in the minority, repeatedly called for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and undermined the government at every opportunity. The population as a whole maintained a healthy support for the war throughout the period. Despite propaganda to the contrary, there was no unanimity in the justness of the Patriot cause; the populace was split perhaps 60:40 in favour, but this depended upon region, class, occupation etc. The New England colonies were most vociferously in favour of independence, the Carolinas less so. That all eventually voted to support the rebellion was less a matter of choice than one of expediency. These divisions would become more apparent as the war progressed. Both sides, therefore, felt confident that if they mobilised enough support at home, and undermined the base of the other, that they stood a good chance in forcing the issue to a favourable conclusion. Realities of War The costs of war prayed most readily upon parliament and Lord North's government. Dealing with the financial consequences of the Seven Years War (1755-1763) had precipitated the current crisis, and government was reluctant to put the military on a wartime establishment for just this reason. The Patriots had no such qualms, as the previous war had been fought primarily in Canada and the American interior at Crown expense; the assemblies and populace in general had little exposure to its realities. Nationalism and Ideology As alluded to, the 'justness' of the cause acted as a singular rallying cry for Patriots, whilst a sense of 'Englishness' and duty to the mother country pervaded Loyalists in the Colonies. In Britain as a whole, such ideology was largely absent. Whilst individuals supported the actions of the Crown and deplored American rebellion, there is little evidence of national identity being invoked. Rather, the legal and moral obligation to defend the rights, privileges and responsibilities of the State were central tenets. Economy Britain's great strength in the 18th Century was its ability to mobilise its economy for war. It is estimated that the Customs and Excise employed more tax collectors and officials than the Anglican church did priests! An efficient tax base, global market for industrial output and a well-found Bank of England meant that parliament was able to borrow vast sums of money with relative ease at low rates of interest. No other state had such easy access to credit. Trade was the lifeblood of the economy, and Britain dominated commerce to the Americas, East and West Indies, and the Mediterranean. The Thirteen Colonies were predominantly a resource rich economy based upon single crops (rice and tobacco) in the south, and raw materials and finished bulk goods in the north. The principal markets for export of these goods was Britain and her other territories. French, Spanish and other markets operated under strict monopolies, and were therefore closed to outsiders. Further, there was no central authority to set, collect or administrate taxes within the Colonies; the war was being fought to prevent such an imposition. Thus whilst the American economy was relatively strong in 1774, there was little chance that it could sustain a protracted conflict. Personalities George III, King of Great Britain, was ill-served by his ministers during this period. Tories Lord North (Prime Minister) and Lord Germain (Secretary of State for the American Department) were extremely limited in their abilities and capabilities; the latter, for eg, had been cashiered from the army and forbidden from holding any sort of military role ever again owing to his incompetence. Lord North's singular claim was to be unobjectionable to the House of Commons; hardly a ringing endorsement. Lack of strong, central authority was further compounded by the numerous feuds that would erupt between military commanders, and the differing political outlooks between commanders and government. The Howe brothers, for example (General and Admiral respectively) were known Whigs who sympathised with American grievances, thus they failed to press their advantages in the early years of the war. By contrast, the chief personages in the Patriot cause were not divided. George Washington was accepted as the Commander in Chief. Whilst Congress at times appointed poor field commanders, in general they left the strategic planning and direction of the war effort to Washington and his most trusted lieutenants. The unified and resolute command that this afforded the Patriots was decisive in the long run.  The 'How': The road to Yorktown By 1781, the war had effectively morphed into a pan-continental, global war with the Colonies representing but one small, but no less important, part of a larger whole. The hostile entry of France, Spain and the Dutch Republic, and the League of Armed Neutrality formed by Northern European powers, meant that the Royal Navy no longer had unfettered sea control in the North Atlantic Withington, J. Britain’s 20 Worst Military Disasters, Spellmount, Stroud, (2011). p.73. and access to Baltic trade, the source of its ship stores. Rodger, N. The Wooden World, WW Norton & Co., New York, (1988). Scarce resources now had to be distributed between distant theatres; possessions in the Mediterranean, India, West Indies required defending, as did the British mainland; there were abortive French attempts to seize the Channel Islands in 1779 and 1780. For the Allied forces, Britain’s overstretch thus presented them with opportunity. France and Spain viewed the prospect of reversing earlier defeats and concessions; the Dutch too sought to overturn British trade dominance by challenging for North Atlantic suzerainty. However, if the global picture was one of Allied ascendance, the reverse was true in the American colonies. Rule Britannia? Lord George Germain was justified in thinking 1781 would be a year of military promise: “So very contemptible is the Rebel Force now in all parts and so vast is our superiority everywhere that no resistance…can materially obstruct the Progress of the King’s Army”. Lord George Germain in Miller, N. Sea of Glory, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, (1974). p.456. Whilst the £12million per annum cost of the war resulted in tax rises, it was a strain the exchequer could afford, but only just; trade and commerce had been hit hard by the loss of export markets, privateering, and the entrance of European powers into hostilities. Benn, C. Marston, D. Wars that forged a Nation, Osprey, Oxford, (2006). p.175 British command in the Colonies was effectively split between General Sir Henry Clinton (as Commander in Chief and Land Component Commander) and Admiral Thomas Graves (Maritime Component Commander). However, of import was the poor relationship between Clinton, his political masters, and his subordinate General Charles Cornwallis. The latter was effectively undermining Clinton and had the tacit support of Lords’ North and Germain to wage his own aggressive campaign in the south, contrary to Clinton's orders. This breakdown in the relationship between Clinton and Cornwallis would prove pivotal in the coming year. The situation was further compromised by the lack of unity in government; Germain had operational control of the North American theatre, but was deliberately distancing his campaign planning from, and politically undermining, Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty. Internecine rivalry fundamentally weakened strategic planning. Clinton had three priorities as CinC. First was the protection of the valuable Sugar Plantations in the West Indies whose economic value exceeded the rebellious Colonies’. Second, the defence of those areas still under Loyalist control, predominantly the coastal, urban centres of New York, Savannah (Georgia) and Charleston (Carolinas). Third, raiding the American interior and disrupting logistical support to Washington’s Continental regulars in the field. To undertake all these tasks, Clinton had a force of approximately 32,000 troops at his disposal, of which perhaps 27,000 were fit for duty. Mackesy, P. The War for America, University of Nebraska Press, London, (1993). pp.339. In reality, he could concentrate perhaps 14,000 for offensive operations, but only by stripping garrisons in Charleston, New York and elsewhere. The much vaunted prospect of southern Loyalist support had failed to materialise as those with pro-British sentiment either defended their existing property or emigrated. Scott, D. Leviathan, Harper Press, London, (2013). pp.452-455. Instead, in the Carolinas Cornwallis found his dwindling army in a battle of attrition with an almost inexhaustible guerrilla enemy supplied from Virginia. Benn, C. Marston, D. Op cit. pp.160-167. In June 1781, Cornwallis held perhaps half the field strength of 7,000 troops. The Royal Navy was stretched thin between the Caribbean, North America, English Channel and the Indies. Spain and France posed credible threats to both the British mainland and overseas territories Rodger, N. The Command of the Ocean, Penguin, London, (2005). p.343.; the Royal Navy's 103 battleships had to contend with the 126-strong Franco-Spanish fleet. Harding, R. Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830, Routledge, London, (2003). p.244. In the Americas, Graves could muster maybe 20 ships of the line. Moreover, much of the traditional blockading forces had to be concentrated as convoy escorts; the entirety of the British war effort had to be transported across the Atlantic Rodger, N. Op cit, (2005). pp.331-333. and were vulnerable to American privateers and frigate captains. Harding, R. Op cit, p.240. Unlike her rivals, Britain could no longer rely on dockyard support in the Americas to refit and resupply; these resources were largely in revolutionary hands. Further, whilst the American seaboard was vulnerable to amphibious raids, demonstrations and assaults, the Royal Navy could not project power into the hinterland. Callwell, C. Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, (1996, first published 1905). pp.237-241. What it could do was starve the Colonies of war materiel, the vast majority of which had to be sourced from allies in Europe. Harding, R. Op cit, pp.240-241. Of great import to the RN was establishing a secure deep-water harbour from which to dominate the entire eastern seaboard; New York was too exposed as an anchorage. Colonial Despair For George Washington, January 1781 was a gloomy prospect: “I see nothing before us but accumulating distress. We have been half our time without provisions and are like to continue so. We have no magazines, no money to form them, and in a little time we shall have no men.” George Washington in Miller, N. Op cit. p.456. In April his pessimism was even greater, writing to his French allies "We are at the end of our tether. Now or never, our deliverance must come...Send us troops, ships and money." Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.322. In South Carolina General Gates had been comprehensively beaten at the battle of Camden, whilst the eminent Patriot Benedict Arnold had attempted to betray West Point to the British, proving the revolution's fragility. Vickery, P. Washington: A Legacy of Leadership, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, (2010). pp.190-194. Continental troops from Pennsylvania and New Jersey were in a state of mutiny, demanding back-pay and discharges on grounds of time-served. Miller, N. Op cit. p.457. Rampant inflation and the depredations of British raids into Virginia and the Carolinas, and the curtailment of trade, further eroded the war effort. Seymour, W. The Price of Folly, Brassey’s, London, (1995). pp.145-167. Massachusetts, where the war began, was bankrupted by the failed Penobscot expedition Hibbert, C. Op cit. pp.254-255. For a fictionalised account, read Bernard Cornwell's The Fort., and between them Congress and the individual Colonies had issued over $400m in just over five years. Benn, C. Marston, D. Op cit. p.175. Washington's principal difficulty lay in mustering domestic support. That same spirit of independence that had precipitated the conflict crippled the war effort; individual colonies were loathe to raise taxes for Congress, Lardas, M. George Washington, Osprey, Oxford, (2011). pp.41-42. and recruits for the Continental army were notoriously difficult to come by as parochial militias soaked up manpower. Wells, P. The American War of Independence, University of London Press, London, (1967). pp.167-168. The war in the north, Washington's principal theatre of operations and his obsession Boatner, M. Encyclopaedia of the American Revolution, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, (1994). p.1230. , was at a standstill. Scott, D. Op cit. p.454. Greene was unable to decisively defeat British forces in the Carolinas Mackesey, P. Op cit. pp.404-407., although their continual defeats served in Cornwallis' attrition and convinced him to strike north into Virginia in direct disobedience of Clinton. Scott, D. Op cit. p.454. Lafayette and Steuben's use of Virginia as a depot for supply and training had been curtailed by seaborne raids. Harding, R. Modern Naval History, Bloomsbury, London, (2016). p.103. Despite only being able to field a total force of only 5000-6000 Continental regulars, Washington could rely upon an almost inexhaustible supply of militia. Benn, C. Marston, D. Op cit. p.167. Although these latter were no match for British regulars in open combat, they provided mass around a nucleus of battle-trained conventional troops. Mackesey, P. Op cit. p.404. In 1781, the revolution's centre of gravity lay in Virginia. This was the only state open to Atlantic trade and without a sizeable British garrison, and was the lynchpin between the south and the north. The Chesapeake Bay on Virginia's seaboard dominated the gateway to the Delaware and Philadelphia, seat of the Continental Congress. French Hopes Despite French desires to repay Britain for the humiliation of the Treaty of Paris (that ended the Seven Years War), by 1780 the war had drained what meagre treasury the Ancien Regime could mobilise Scott, D. Op cit. p.454.; so much so that they had even considered suing for peace. Mackesy, P. Op cit. pp.383-385. Indeed, it is argued that the massive French debt accrued as a result of wars between 1755 and 1783 was the principal cause of the French Revolution in 1789. Blanning, T. The Pursuit of Glory, Viking, London, (2007). p.337. For the French, the position in 1781 was a reversal of that faced in 1760. Then, dwindling French-Canadian forces cut-off from their Atlantic supply chain, and with the motherland directly threatened, faced overwhelming odds from British regulars and colonial militias. France could rely on colonial support on land (however meagre), and concentrate superior naval force in the decisive theatre. Harding, R. Op cit. p.241. With the financial situation desperate, French ministers considered 1781 crisis point; they had to force a decision one way or the other. They despatched 5,000 infantry and artillery under Rochambeau to Newport Benn, C. Marston, D. Op cit. p.167., and Admiral de Grasse's fleet of 28 ships of the line to the West Indies. On reaching Newport and meeting his American counterparts, Rochambeau wrote to de Grasse in despair: the revolution was doomed unless the French fleet, and a further 3,000 men of the West Indies garrisons, could be brought to support Generals Lafayette and Steuben in Virginia. Mackesey, P. Op cit. pp.413-424. "Do not count on these people", he wrote. "They have neither money nor credit; their forces exist only momentarily...when they are about to be attacked in their own homes. Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.322. According to these plans, Rochambeau was to reinforce Washington in his desire to assault New York, whilst de Grasse was to secure Virginia from Cornwallis. Wells, P. Op cit. p.175. Further, to buttress flagging American morale Rochambeau was supplied with a war chest of some 6million silver livres to subsidise Washington's army.  The Problem: Jan 1781 Having read the information presented, you are now to ANALYSE the situation as evident in Jan 1781. Focus should be on isolating the individual Political, Economic, Resource and Military (PERM) factors at play. These will then form the Column One basis for your Estimate. Utilising the Q1-3 of the Tactical Estimate, consider the problem faced by both the Allied and British commands. In your syndicates, prepare a 5 min brief on Q1 and Q2 outlining your key deductions and thought processes and an Effects schematic for the North America theatre from both perspectives. Clinton What is the Situation and How Does it affect me? What have I been told to do, and Why? What Effects do I want to have upon the Enemy? Washington What is the Situation and How Does it affect me? What have I been told to do, and Why? What Effects do I want to have upon the Enemy? Rochambeau What is the Situation and How Does it affect me? What have I been told to do, and Why? What Effects do I want to have upon the Enemy? Clinton PERM Factor Consideration Deduction/Effect Q1. Q2. Washington PERM Factor Consideration Deduction Q1. Q2. Rochambeau PERM Factor Consideration Deduction Q1. Q2.  Situational Update: July-Aug 1781 Clinton had intercepted dispatches between Washington and Rochambeau indicating the former's intent to assault New York. Further, these messages stated the precarious state of both French finances and American forces. His policy, therefore, would be to minimise "all risks as much as possible [since] time alone would bring about every success we could wish". Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.323. British Forces. Clinton had approximately 10,500 regular troops in New York, preparing for the expected American assault. Boatner, M. Op cit. p.1230. In Virginia, Cornwallis had amassed approximately 7,000 effectives. Benn, C. Marston, D. Op cit. p.167. Spread in garrisons throughout the Carolinas and Georgia were a further 4,000 troops; mostly Loyalists with a smattering of British Regulars. A further 7,000 or so troops were stationed in Canada defending Quebec and Nova Scotia and ostensibly preparing for a drive down the Hudson to Upper New York. In support, Admiral Graves had a fleet of 6 ships of the line in New York, with Adml Hood expected to arrive in mid-August with a further 14 ships from Antigua. Allied Forces Washington had, in Jul 1781, a vastly improved position. His 4-5,000 strong Main Army of Continental regulars in New York (Colony) had been reinforced by Rochambeau's 5,000 French regulars from Newport. Barras' 8 ships of the line were anchored safely at Newport defended by Virginia militia. de Grasse reported to Rochambeau on 13 August that he was sailing with 27 ships of the line and 3,000 troops bound for the Chesapeake. However, he made clear that this was only a temporary reinforcement; both ships and men would have to return to the West Indies by late October. Steuben and Lafayette had approximately 2,500 Continentals in Virginia, whilst Greene had another 1,000 in South Carolina. Colonial militias of approx 2-3,000 were active in support of each Continental force, but restricted to their own borders. Strategic COA Utilising your above PERM analysis and the Situational Update, prepare the following for British and Allied forces from the perspective of both Clinton and Washington: Most Dangerous En COA. Most Likely En COA. Prepare your own campaign COA for both British and Allied forces.  Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1: Map showing extent of military operations, 1775-1781 Preliminaries British Forces Cavalry: Tarleton's Legion; Troop of 17th Light Dragoons (incorporated in Tarleton’s Legion), Royal Artillery, Infantry: A composite battalion of Foot Guards (comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Foot Guards); 17th Foot, 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers; 33rd Foot; 43rd Foot; 71st Fraser’s Highlanders; 76th Foot; 80th Foot; Simcoe’s Legion; North Carolina Loyalists; Regiment of de Voit (Anspach); Regiment of de Seybothen (Anspach); Regiment of Prince Hereditary (Hesse); Regiment of von Bose (Hesse). Royal Artillery. Allied Forces Cavalry: 4th Dragoons (Moylan); Armand’s Horse. Infantry: Lauzun’s Legion; Bourbonnois Regiment of Foot; Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment of Foot; Soissonois Regiment of Foot; Agenois Regiment of Foot (each French regiment consisted of two battalions); Lafayette’s Light Infantry; Muhlenburg’s 'Brigade'; Hazen’s Canadian Regiment; 1st New York Regiment; 2nd New York Regiment; 1st New Jersey Regiment; 2nd  New Jersey Regiment; Rhode Island Regiment; 1st Pennsylvania Regiment; 2nd Pennsylvania Regiment; Virginia Regiment; 3rd Maryland Regiment; 4th Maryland Regiment; three brigades of Virginia Militia. French Siege Guns (24pdrs and Mortars), Sappers and Miners. Ground Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 2: Plan of Siege of Yorktown Yorktown lies on the eastern seaboard of Virginia at the mouth of the York river and its confluence with Chesapeake bay. In 1781 it was a modest tobacco port of perhaps 200 houses situated on the cliffs on the river's southern bank. A mile to the north across the river mouth lies Gloucester point; the two conurbations formed a significant harbour. Yorktown and Wormley creeks protected the western and eastern approaches to the town, with a narrow band of flat ground between the two. Both Yorktown and Gloucester Point are on relatively low ground. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 3: French map showing Yorktown topography Course of the Campaign Cornwallis, having received a string of contradictory orders from Clinton in June and July, was finally directed to defend a deep water harbour "in any healthy situation" at either Old Point Comfort or Yorktown. Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.316. Having failed to trap Lafayette, and having concluded that it was the best of a poor choice, Mackesey, P. Op cit. p.412. Cornwallis decided to take up a defensive position at Yorktown. Surveying the site, he wrote to Clinton that he would need at least six weeks to make the position defensible Withington, J. Op cit. p.35., and would require his entire army for the task. HIbbert, C. Op cit. pp.319-321. On 22 August, Cornwallis marched into Gloucester Boatner, M. Op cit. p.1235. and immediately began his entrenchments. Work started on Yorktown a week later Seymour, W. Op cit. p.218., with Cornwallis writing to Clinton that the digging would "be a work of great time and labour, and after all, I fear, [will] not be very strong". Yet, on the 31st August, French ships were spotted at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Mackesey, P. Op cit. p.412. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 4: Map by Lt Hills, 23rd Fusiliers, 1781. Note the line of outer-works in the centre ground. News of de Grasse's sailing for the Cheasapeake arrived on 14 August, finally forcing Washington to abandon his ambitions on New York; he would not be able to assault Clinton's positions without de Grasse's fleet and troops. On 20 August 1781, at Rochambeau's urging, General Washington marched from New York with the joint American and French army. He had only two months in which to achieve such concentration of force, 450miles south, that Cornwallis would be trapped and defeated. Boatner, M. Op cit. p.1235. To do so, he needed to hoodwink Clinton; Washington therefore left his militia and 2,500 Continental regulars to keep up the pretence of preparations for a siege of New York City whilst he marched at the head of 2,500 Continentals and 5,000 French troops. Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.322. So successful was he that it was not until 2 September that Clinton realized he had been duped; Cornwallis received news of Washington's departure on 15th of that month. Seymour, W. Op cit. p.219.  Analysis and Evaluation: British Positions. You are now to conduct your own appraisal for the defence of Yorktown. Consider the following from the British perspective: What is your mission? Which of the Principles of War are most pertinent? Why? How might these be best served? What is the Vital ground a) for your defensive works and b) for future operations? Why? Be prepared to deliver the following: Ground Brief (30 mins preparation time). Back brief Q1-3 (from above) (90mins preparation). Analysis and Evaluation: Allied Positions. Conduct Q1-3 of the Combat Estimate. You represent Gen Washington’s Chief of Staff. Arriving at this position on 20th September, you have been tasked with conducting a forward reconnaissance on Cornwallis’ position at Yorktown and Gloucester. Your General’s intent is to DEFEAT or DESTROY the British army. Be prepared to deliver the following: Ground Brief. Back Brief Questions 1-3.  The Siege Begins Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 5: French naval dispositions, Oct 1781 By the time Cornwallis received this letter, his fate was all but sealed. Barras had sailed for the Capes from Newport on 25th August. Graves had uncharacteristically set off in vigorous pursuit, joining with Hood en route. His surprise on reaching the Chesapeake and discovering, not de Barras' eight ships of the line but de Grasse's 27, was total. It was an indecisive battle followed by days of manoeuvre for advantage on the open sea. Miller, N. Op cit. pp.455-460. Whilst Graves and de Grasse had engaged each other, de Barras had sailed into the Chesapeake with Rochambeau's siege guns. Seymour, W. Op cit. p.218. Outnumbered, outgunned and short of supplies, Graves was forced to retire to New York. Miller, N. Op cit. pp.455-460. Expecting Major-General Clinton to sail from New York with a British relieving force, Seymour, W. Op cit. p.227. Cornwallis decided to remain in Yorktown, rather than return to Charleston both as he had been originally ordered and subsequently intended. Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.317. Having previously shunned a defensive stance for a war of manoeuvre, there are unanswered questions as to why he remained in Yorktown given the approach of the Allied forces. Seymour, W. Op cit. p.218. He had previously wilfully disregarded Clinton's orders, and even remarked that he viewed his superior as an 'unreliable' source of assistance Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.321, yet in September 1781 he rigidly obeyed. Further, unlike his superior, Cornwallis must have had more up-to-date information on the naval situation. Typically, two arguments are made to excuse Cornwallis' uncharacteristic indolence. The first is the sudden appearance of 3,000 French troops from the West Indies, landed by de Grasse, reinforcing Lafayette's Virginian forces, bringing the two forces to parity in regular troops. When combined with the militia, Lafayette had a clear advantage should Cornwallis attempt a breakout; the allies would only need to take a strong defensive position to pin the British in place or force them to risk massive casualties. The second argument was the poor state of Cornwallis' army. By September his 7,000 strong army was reduced through sickness to just 5,500 effectives. Any attempt to escape would result in the abandonment of much needed stores and personnel. Seymour, W. Op cit. pp.218-219. When combined with Clinton's promise of assistance, it is clear that Cornwallis had little choice but to hold his position and hope for the Royal Navy to break through to him. Withington, J. Op cit. p.76. The Americans and French arrived before Yorktown on 28th September 1781, forming a semi-circle around the British entrenchments and putting the British and German troops under siege. Washington began formal siege operations on the eastern side of Yorktown on 30th September and on 9th October were sufficiently close to open an artillery bombardment. Washington fired the first round from 24pdr cannon, heralding a bombardment of over 3,600 roundshot and shell on the first day alone. The effect on the defenders was ruinous. "People were to be seen lying everywhere fatally wounded with heads, arms and legs shot off." Cornwallis was less than sanguine of his chances, writing to Clinton that "with such works on disadvantageous ground, against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope to make a long resistance". Urban, M. Fusiliers, Faber and Faber, London, (2007). pp.274-275. As food ran short former slaves were forced from the town, many dying in no-mans-land. The few remaining horses were slaughtered to eke out the rations; supplies in the town had turned putrid in the August heat. Civilians fled the solid shot striking their homes to take shelter below the cliffs, only to be blown to pieces by mortar shells. Hibbert, C. Op cit. p.328. Whilst Cornwallis suffered in Yorktown, Clinton dined in New York. Having set an original intent to sail on the 5th October with 5,000 men, it was not until mid-October that Graves declared his ships were ready for sea. By then, the battle was all but over. Clinton sailed from New York City on the 19th October with 7,000 troops, and a fleet of 25 ships of the line, a force capable of defeating both de Grasse and Barras, and relieving the beleaguered Cornwallis. That same day, having parleyed with Washington, Cornwallis' army marched out to the field of surrender to the tune 'The World Turned Upside Down'. The siege was over.  Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 6: British plan of the Siege of Yorktown Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 7: Modern interpretation of Defences at Yorktown  Notes Pages    Works Cited Benn, C, and D Marston. 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