Wisdom and the Rabbis

Wisdom and the Rabbis Ari Mermelstein Abstract: Rabbinic wisdom materials betray the influence of Israelite and Greco-Roman wisdom on the one hand and the rabbinic system of law and values on the other. This chapter considers both the familiar and distinctive dimensions of rabbinic wisdom and focuses particularly on the place of wisdom within, and its contribution to, a rabbinic worldview. In addressing this issue, the chapter surveys the major wisdom works in rabbinic literature, the definition and scope of “wisdom” in the rabbinic corpus, and the reception of important earlier wisdom compositions in rabbinic literature. Introduction The literary legacy of the late antique rabbis is as diverse as it is large. Though especially associated with halakhah and biblical interpretation, the rabbinic corpus also features texts that resemble biblical and Second Temple “wisdom” literature. This chapter will consider that material through both diachronic and synchronic lenses and will explore the rabbinic perspectives on wisdom, their relationship with the larger network of rabbinic values, and their impact on rabbinic attitudes toward other forms of wisdom and earlier wisdom literature. The trajectory from the biblical books generally regarded as “wisdom” literature— Proverbs, Qoheleth, and Job—through late antique rabbinic literature is not linear. Biblical wisdom books left their imprint on material as diverse as the Dead Sea text 4QInstruction, the Hebrew Wisdom of Ben Sira, and the Wisdom of Solomon, composed in Greek. While the wisdom material in rabbinic literature is reminiscent of earlier wisdom literature in certain respects, there is much material that, in both form and substance, sets it apart. The sections of rabbinic literature usually classified as “wisdom” are likewise distinctive in relation to the other works produced by late antique rabbis. The literary style of wisdom is 1 neither that of law nor of midrash, and its substance tends more toward the ethical than the legal. Scholars justifiably highlight these areas of difference but often overlook degrees of similarity in the process. Scholars of biblical wisdom literature who question the existence of a wisdom “tradition” have cautioned against a facile distinction between law and wisdom, and the same observation holds true for rabbinic texts (Kynes 2015). Rabbinic wisdom materials thus elude simple description and classification in relation to both earlier and contemporaneous literature. By examining the form and substance of rabbinic wisdom, the scope and definition of wisdom in rabbinic literature, and the reception of biblical and Second Temple wisdom by late antique rabbis, this chapter considers the complex and multifaceted nature of rabbinic wisdom. It seeks to address one overarching question: what, exactly, is the place of wisdom within a rabbinic worldview? Tractate Avot Based on considerations of form and substance, several works within the rabbinic corpus can be classified as wisdom literature. The earliest and most prominent of these is the mishnaic tractate Avot (Lerner 1987a, 267–72). This composition begins by describing a chain of transmission that extends back to Sinai, through the prophets, and down to the Men of the Great Assembly, the last of whom, Simeon the Righteous, is the first sage to whom Avot attributes a wisdom teaching (Herr 1979; Davies 1984; Boyarin 2003). From there, the opening two chapters trace the transmission of Torah, teacher to student, down through the students of R. Yoḥanan b. Zakkai in the aftermath of the destruction of the Second Temple. Chapters three and four, on the other hand, are arranged chronologically by generations of sages rather than by the teacher-disciple relationship (Tropper 2004, 24). Chapter five consists of anonymous statements comprising 2 numerical lists. Chapter six, known as Qinyan Torah (“the acquisition of Torah”) was added at a later point (Lerner 1987b, 273–74). A critical edition of Avot is included in Sharvit 2004. The date of the book’s redaction is contested. Many scholars assume that Avot was redacted contemporaneously with the rest of the Mishnah, in which case “the question of the origin and date of Aboth is … in some respects only one part of the larger question of the origin and date of the Mishnah” (Herford 1925, 2), likely at the beginning of the third century C.E. A smaller number of scholars date the redaction of Avot to the generation following the redaction of the Mishnah (Frankel 1859, 216) or even to the beginning of the fourth century (Guttmann 1950; Stemberger 1996). In order to appreciate Avot as wisdom literature, it is necessary to situate it within three contexts: earlier wisdom literature, especially Proverbs and Ben Sira; rabbinic literature, especially the Mishnah; and Greco-Roman literature. Avot and Earlier Wisdom Literature Generally speaking, the Talmud’s characterization of Avot as facilitating piety captures the thrust of its contents (b. B. Qam. 30a). Much of this piety approximates that of Proverbs and other works in biblical and Second Temple literature: a man should not socialize excessively with women (Avot 1:5), should distance himself from evil neighbors (1:7), should not become overly friendly with the ruling authorities (1:10; 2:3), and should be slow to anger (2:10). The themes of justice (1:8), determinations about which “paths” in life are worth pursuing (2:1), reflections upon death (3:1), and virtue as its own reward (1:3) echo the major concerns of biblical wisdom literature (Gottlieb 1990). In addition to shared themes, Avot betrays the influence of earlier wisdom literature in its vocabulary and style, including proverbs, riddles, dialogue, metaphor, and tripartite 3 and numerical sayings (Gottlieb 1990; Melamed 1986, 212–52; Tropper 2004, 62–85). In fact, the statement assigned to Samuel the Younger in Avot 4:19 is simply an unattributed quotation of Prov 24:17–18. More remarkable than the similarities between Avot and biblical wisdom, however, are the differences. The value of Torah study (1:15) and the ramifications of refraining from it (3:5) are ubiquitous themes in Avot (Gottlieb 1990, 161–62). The objective of Torah study is not solely to acquire wisdom but also to receive reward (3:2). In particular, study enables a person to acquire a portion in the world to come (2:7). Conversely, neglecting Torah study results in punishment— according to one extreme formulation, one who forgets even one teaching deserves capital punishment (3:8)! And in spite of the similarities between Avot and biblical wisdom, nominal forms of ḥokhmah (“wisdom”) appear only five times in Avot (2:8; 3:9, 13, 17, 18); the word “Torah” is featured far more prominently. The relationship between Avot and earlier wisdom literature such as Proverbs can be appreciated by considering the range of topics treated by biblical wisdom literature: “Self-evident intuitions about mastering life for human betterment, gropings after life’s secrets with regard to innocent suffering, grappling with finitude, and quest for truth concealed in the created order and manifested in a feminine persona” (Crenshaw 2010, 12). Avot evinces an interest in many of these areas, but with several important differences from earlier wisdom. First, the quest for truth is not manifested in a feminine persona but rather in the Torah. In fact, Avot seems to avoid the feminine persona in biblical wisdom literature, invoking Prov 4:2, rather than Prov 8:22, as the basis for the belief in the Torah’s preexistence (3:14). The quest for truth is likewise not conducted by reflecting on the created order but rather by attending to the teachings of rabbinic sages. In that regard, the chain of transmission in Avot 1:1 functions 4 as the source, or at least a basis, of wisdom. The quest to “master life for human betterment” is the most salient link between Avot and wisdom literature, yet Avot provides a distinctive definition of “human betterment”: a Torah-oriented life, in its broadest sense, as defined and lived by the rabbinic sages. In associating the Torah and commandments with wisdom, Avot is much closer to the worldview of the Wisdom of Ben Sira (for more on this book, see the essay by Gregory).1 Ben Sira often connects wisdom with observance of the commandments, and he famously links wisdom and Torah in ch. 24. Chapters 44–50 in Ben Sira, like the opening chapters of Avot, trace the passage of wisdom through history (Mermelstein 2014, 58–80). As in Avot, Jewish history becomes a factor in the transmission of wisdom in Ben Sira, though, in Ben Sira, the figure of Wisdom’s journey begins at creation rather than at Sinai. That distinction points to a more fundamental difference between Avot and Ben Sira: in Ben Sira, Torah is a development, albeit the supreme form, of universal wisdom (Mermelstein 2014, 16–51). Aside from the explicit statement in Sirach 24 that links the Wisdom figure of Proverbs 8 with Torah, there are few traces of this equation elsewhere in Ben Sira.2 In addition, Ben Sira associates wisdom with observance of the commandments without speaking of reward for that observance. On the other hand, Torah and wisdom seem inextricably linked in Avot; there is no indication that Avot associates Torah with universal wisdom in any way. The rabbinic tradition of wisdom originated with Sinaitic revelation rather than at creation. Given the similarities to and differences from earlier wisdom literature, Avot can be described as a “collection of wisdom sayings organized to establish the authority of a continuous and coherent group of teachers and teachings and centered around the major emphases of that 5 group, Torah and Torah study” (Saldarini 1982, 21). Wisdom, Torah, and rabbinic values are intimately bound together. Avot and Rabbinic Literature Yet Avot is not completely at home in rabbinic literature either. The chain of transmission with which Avot begins and the total absence of dispute set this tractate apart from the rest of the mishnaic corpus (Steinmetz 2002, 68–78). Many of the rabbis quoted in Avot are either seldom or never quoted elsewhere in rabbinic literature (Schremer 2015, 297). Aphorisms of the type attested in Avot are found throughout rabbinic literature, but Avot is the only mishnaic tractate that contains no legal material. Finally, Avot is not cited frequently in the talmudim, leading some scholars to propose that it did not occupy a prominent place within the world of the rabbis (Stemberger 1996, 526). The exceptional aspects of Avot have led several scholars to interpret it as a polemical, or at least ideologically-tinged, text. Adiel Schremer (2015) argues that Avot was produced by a school associated with R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus, the paradigmatic rabbinic outcast (cf. Gilat 1984).3 In line with R. Eliezer’s reputation as a traditionalist, Avot introduces the chain of transmission in order to argue that the entire rabbinic tradition is of Sinaitic origin.4 In a slightly different direction, Devora Steinmetz suggests that the choices to focus on wisdom materials, omit disputes, attribute statements to many obscure rabbis (including several well-known dissidents), and open the tractate with the chain of transmission are meant to project the vision of a community that is “neither fragmented by dispute nor forced to expel dissident members” (2002, 88). The ethical principles communicated by wisdom materials become the domain which unifies the community: anyone who subscribes to principles such as fear of sin and primacy of Torah study can maintain her/his 6 standing within the group (Steinmetz 2002, 72–73). This wisdom text thus becomes a counterpoint to the rest of the mishnaic corpus, which is replete with dispute and dissent. At the very least, the relationship between Avot and the rest of the Mishnah demonstrates the problem with the traditional opposition between law and wisdom. Many of the tradents in Avot are known from elsewhere in rabbinic literature (Gottlieb 1990, 163). The editor of Avot, by turning to wisdom materials, delineates a roadmap for human flourishing and a view of the good life in general which focuses on the rabbinic lifestyle and the teachings of its authorized sages. Even traditional, universalistic wisdom themes such as justice and divine goodness are presented in Avot in the service of rabbinic authority and life. Both the chain of transmission and the tractate’s contents serve to cement rabbinic authority. According to Tropper (2004, 48), the chain “offers a blanket justification for the tannaitic interpretative project as a whole.” The content of Avot likewise supports the rabbinic worldview; for the tractate’s editor, “the ideal rabbinic Jew behaves righteously, studies the Torah as interpreted by the rabbis, and fulfills its commandments, since he believes that this way of life saves him from sorrow, secures him everlasting rewards and, most importantly, stems from the will of God” (Tropper 2004, 49). Avot may have been transmitted to a different demographic or in a different setting than rabbinic law, making the study of rabbinic wisdom a complement to engagement with halakhah. 5 The truism that, in rabbinic literature, wisdom comes to be identified with Torah is accurate. However, Avot demonstrates that the relationship between wisdom and Torah is more complicated than that: wisdom becomes a medium through which the rabbis present Torah as the centerpiece of a fulfilling and good life. Avot and Greco-Roman Literature 7 Both in style and substance, Avot bears a striking resemblance to literature from the wider Greco-Roman world. Avot can be described as a mishnaic tractate in the spirit of biblical wisdom using Greco-Roman literary conventions, especially of literature produced by Greco-Roman schools. To fully appreciate this exceptional text, we must therefore turn not only to biblical and rabbinic literature but also to literature produced by the ambient culture. Sayings collections such as Avot are attested elsewhere in antiquity (Saldarini 1982, 19– 21). The literature produced by these schools coupled chains of transmission to sayings and stories, thus grounding its teaching in an authoritative line. Avot thus portrays “Judaism as a school, and the appeal is made to the listeners to become students of Torah” (Saldarini 1982, 77). The parallels between Avot and roughly contemporaneous works by Philostratus and Diogenes Laertius are especially revealing. All three compositions record the history of an intellectual tradition that was transmitted from master to disciple in a scholastic setting (Tropper 2004, 136–56). The chain of transmission in Avot 1:1 and the subsequent description of that transmission through the first two chapters of the tractate bears a striking resemblance to the genre of Greco-Roman succession lists, which for centuries, beginning in the second century B.C.E., was the “medium for writing the history of an intellectual discipline” (Tropper 2004, 163). The chain of tradition also bears a striking resemblance to a rhetorical form, the “transmissional sorite,” found among Greco-Roman philosophical schools during the first centuries C.E. (Fischel 1973). Likewise, a collection of aphoristic sayings attributed to individual sages resembles closely the Greek literary form known as the chreia, “a pointed saying … defined by its explicit attribution to a particular person” (Tropper 2004, 180). Scholars have also invoked gnomai, collections of pithy maxims, as a Greco-Roman parallel to Avot (Lerner 1987b, 263). 8 Avot, then, is a product of three different traditions: biblical wisdom literature, rabbinic values, and Greco-Roman literature. Of course, Avot is greater than the sum of its parts. Its editor has produced a distinctive roadmap for a good life, understood as one lived in accordance with rabbinic values and available by submitting to the will of authoritative tradents. Other Wisdom Compositions Although it is the best-known, Avot is not the only example of wisdom literature to emerge from rabbinic circles. Most prominently, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan (=Avot de-Rabbi Natan or ADRN), Derekh Erets Rabbah, and Derekh Erets Zuta, should be classified as works of rabbinic wisdom. Avot de-Rabbi Natan is an expansion of Avot whose base text is different from, shorter than, and in many cases preserves traditions earlier than the mishnaic version of Avot (Finkelstein 1938).6 But the majority of ADRN reads alternately like a midrashic exposition of Avot and a Tosefta-like collection of additional sayings and traditions not preserved or found in Avot (Lerner 1987a, 369). The text’s modern editor, Solomon Schechter (1997), distinguished two recensions of the text, labeled A and B, though more recent scholars have noted that the manuscript tradition is far more complex (Kister 1998, 6–7; Bregman 1983). The dating of ADRN is notoriously complex. It certainly contains much tannaitic material but also a sizable amount of post-tannaitic traditions, with the eventual editing having occurred sometime between the sixth and ninth centuries (Schechter 1997, 26; Kister 1998, 217–20). The ethos of ADRN has been described as “scholastic,” setting out a vision for how members of a circle of disciples should relate to each other, their teacher, and outsiders such as Romans, women, and non-rabbinic Jews (Saldarini 1982; Schofer 2005, 30–41). In contrast to Avot, ADRN does not simply articulate this vision in the form 9 of wisdom statements but illustrates it through numerous narratives about rabbis behaving in accordance with that vision (Schofer 2005, 49–53). Derekh Erets is the subject of two of the so-called “minor tractates,” Derekh Eretṣ Rabbah (DER) and Derekh Erets Zuta (DEZ). The concept of derekh erets refers to “experiences and observations that are universally human, concerning both man himself and his relation with surrounding nature and its laws” (van Loopik 1991, 4). The term was broad enough, however, to also encompass practices of an explicitly Jewish nature (van Loopik 1991, 5). The content and style of DER and DEZ resembles wisdom literature, including Avot, very closely (Krauss 1898, 205; Stemberger 2008, 305–6). Both are composite texts consisting especially of sub-units of pithy maxims edited independently and then combined to create larger tractates (Lerner 1987a, 381–87; Sperber 1990). The contents of DER are highly eclectic, covering topics such as acceptable sexual ethics and practice (ch. 1), correct treatment of sages (4:3), behavior toward one’s host (6:1), behavior at meals (6:6), toilet etiquette (7:6), bathing practices (10:7), habits that promote good health (11:6) and proper manners generally (8:8). This range of practical ethics and advice, however, has an overtly religious dimension: many provisions in DER are modeled upon divine behavior (5:2), or at least upon the conduct of rabbinic sages. The piety outlined in DEZ is explicitly that of the scholar (1:1). In contrast to DER, most of the provisions in DEZ are stated anonymously. Religious themes such as love of Torah (2:6), the importance of Torah study (8:1) and observance (3:4), and the afterlife and divine reward and punishment (4:6) alternate with reflections upon friendship (2:10), measuring one’s speech (3:1), exercising caution in one’s financial relationships (3:8), and death (9:14). The Talmud (b. Ber. 22a) refers to “a chapter of laws (hilkhot) of derekh erets” which R. Judah b. Ilai, a Tanna (early rabbinic teacher) of the mid-second century, taught his students, 10 suggesting that statements such as those found in the Derekh Erets tractates were extant during the tannaitic period, though the final date of redaction of both is likely in the eighth or ninth centuries.7 The reference to these teachings as “laws” is of particular importance. Despite its resemblance to wisdom literature in both form and content, the category of derekh erets is now subsumed under the umbrella of halakhah. Ben Sira first identified wisdom with Torah, but the rabbis extend this association a significant step further. In the form of derekh erets, wisdom has become for the rabbis a virtual halakhic category. The Relationship between Wisdom and Torah In Avot and the Derekh Erets tractates, wisdom both promotes the importance of the rabbinic lifestyle and constitutes a virtual halakhic category within that system. Moreover, Torah is often identified with wisdom in Avot (Rosen-Zvi 2016, 177–78). The locus classicus for this identification in rabbinic literature is the opening pericope of Genesis Rabbah, which, in the spirit of Ben Sira, associates Torah with Prov 8:22–31. Do these developments leave room for forms of wisdom outside of Torah and the rabbinic life? And, if such non-Torah wisdom does exist, may rabbis acquire it? In pursuing these questions, we extend our earlier discussion about the nexus between wisdom and rabbinic values: if rabbinic wisdom was deployed in the service of rabbinic values, could a rabbinic life accommodate forms of wisdom that were either unrelated or even antithetical to those values? Gentile Wisdom Not surprisingly, rabbinic literature lacks a uniform position on whether there is wisdom among the nations. According to one minority perspective, “Four kingdoms ruled Israel, and none 11 of them had a sage nor one with discernment” (Sifre Deut. §304). Rabbinic literature, however, generally admits the existence of non-Jewish forms of wisdom, including domains such as astrology, astronomy, divination, and medicine (Veltri 1998; Labendz 2013, 148). Gentiles can thus achieve the status of a hakham (“wise person”) according to the third century Palestinian Amora (a type of early rabbinic scholar) Rabbi Yoḥanan: “Whoever says something wise, even if he is from the nations of the world, is called a wise man” (b. Meg. 16a). Gentile wisdom is even described as a divine gift: “God established wise men for every single nation that exists in the world to serve it. Not only that, but God also gave them three things: wisdom (hokhmah), discernment (binah), and strength (gevurah)” (Gen. Rab. §89). In areas of non-Jewish wisdom, such as aspects of the physical universe, the rabbis are sometimes willing to defer to the opinion of non-Jews, as in the following text: The Jewish sages say that during the day the sun travels beneath the firmament and, at night, above the firmament. And the sages of the nations of the world say that during the day the sun travels beneath the firmament and, at night, beneath the earth. Rabbi (Yehuda ha-Nasi) said: “And the statement of the sages of the nations of the world appears to be more accurate than our statement.” (b. Pes. 94b) Wisdom is thus not limited to Torah, and non-Jews might possess superior wisdom in certain domains. Not all rabbis, however, are willing to concede the superiority of gentile sages: 12 The Emperor once asked R. Joshua b. Ḥananiah: “How long is the period of gestation and birth of a serpent?”—He replied to him: “Seven years.” “But did not the Sages of the Athenian school couple [a male serpent with a female] and they gave birth in three years?”—“Those had already been pregnant for four years.” “But did they not have sexual contact?”—“Serpents have sexual intercourse in the same manner as human beings.” “But are not [the sages of Athens] wise men [and surely they must have ascertained the true facts about the serpent]?” “We are wiser than they.” (b. Bekh. 8b–9a) In the continuation of that pericope, R. Joshua travels to Athens to debate with the Athenian sages about the physical universe. Not only did he take an interest in these matters, but he also asserted the supremacy of the rabbis over the sages of other nations. Nevertheless, there is no indication that R. Joshua regarded this knowledge as Torah, only that Jewish knowledge was comprehensive and included forms of wisdom that were outside of Torah proper. Rather, those who possess the wisdom of Torah also enjoy superior wisdom in other domains. Rabbis are hakhamim (“wise men”) in the widest possible sense. On the other hand, some sources discourage Jewish engagement with gentile wisdom entirely: Ben Damah, the son of R. Ishmael’s sister, once asked R. Ishmael: “May one such as I who have studied the whole of the Torah learn Greek wisdom?” He thereupon read to him the following verse: “Let this book of the law not cease from your lips, but recite it day and night (Josh 1:8). Go then and find a time that is neither day nor night and learn then Greek wisdom.” (b. Men. 99b) 13 This source accepts the existence of “Greek wisdom” as an independent category of knowledge but looks askance at Jewish exposure to it.8 There might be wisdom outside of Torah, but it is not a form of wisdom available for Jewish consumption. The requirement to study Torah is allencompassing and therefore does not admit the possibility of studying other forms of knowledge. If, as we saw earlier, the rabbis associated wisdom with the wider network of rabbinic values, forms of wisdom that defied those values could not be part of a rabbinic curriculum. The question posed by Ben Damah to Rabbi Ishmael—“May one such as I who have studied the whole of the Torah learn Greek wisdom?”—is the subject of another rabbinic text: And talk about them (Deut 6:7)—make them primary and not secondary. That your give and take will only be about them. That you do not mix other things in them, like so-and-so. Lest you say: “I have learned the wisdom of Israel, I will proceed to learn the wisdom of the nations,” it teaches, saying, to walk in them (Lev 18:4), and not to leave them. And so it says, let them be for yourself alone (Prov 5:17). And it says, when you walk it will lead you, when you lie down it will guard you, and when you awake it will speak to you (Prov 6:22). When you walk it will lead you: in this world. When you lie down it will guard you: at the time of your death. And when you awake: in the days of the Messiah. It will speak to you: in the world to come. (Sifre Deut. §34) Like the previous source, this one does not deny the existence of wisdom aside from the Torah but rather affirms the need to study Torah exclusively. Jewish wisdom is not simply a discipline that one must learn before progressing to gentile forms of wisdom but rather a brand of knowledge that makes exclusive demands of the Jew, accompanying a person as s/he sleeps, wakes, and walks. In contrast to the prooftext that Rabbi Ishmael offered to Ben Damah forbidding him from studying 14 Greek wisdom, this source draws upon verses from Proverbs that describe the relationship between a Jew and the wisdom of the Torah in more intimate terms (Rosen-Zvi 2016, 173). Non-Jewish wisdom is problematic because it is not Jewish wisdom. For this perspective, there is wisdom outside of Torah, but the rabbinic hakham may not engage in its study. This definition of a hakham as one completely absorbed with the study of Torah is found in the following passage from Sifre Deuteronomy: What is the difference between a wise person (hakham) and a discerning person (navon)? A wise person resembles a rich money changer. When someone brings him [money] to examine, he examines it, and when no one brings him [money] to examine he takes out his own and examines it. A discerning person resembles a poor money changer. When someone brings him [money] to examine he examines it, and when no one brings him [money] to examine he sits waiting anxiously. The hakham, according to this passage, “spends his time absorbed in study for its own sake and not … only when his expertise is sought for a practical application” (Fraade 1990, 427). The sources that forbid one from pursuing other forms of wisdom seem to have in mind this model of a hakham. The sentiment that Torah wisdom stands out as singular and is the unique heritage of the Jews also means that the nations of the world cannot enjoy access to the Torah. Thus, “If one tells you that there is wisdom among the nations, believe it, for it says, I will make the wise vanish from Edom, understanding from Esau’s mount (Obad 1:8). [But if one tells you that] there is Torah, do not believe it” (Lam. Rab. 2:13). Just as (according to the above sources), there is no room for general wisdom in Israel, so too (according to this source), there is no place for Torah among the 15 nations. Other sources describe the relationship between Israel and the Torah in sexual terms, according to which only Israel can have access to Torah (e.g., Sifre Deut. §345). Non-Rabbinic Wisdom The question of whether non-rabbinic Jews can possess a form of wisdom that stands independent of Torah resembles that concerning the existence of gentile wisdom. In more than one hundred instances in the Babylonian Talmud (Pomeranz 2016, 25), rabbis attribute Aramaic proverbs—the classic medium of wisdom extending back to ancient Near Eastern wisdom—to the masses, always introducing the proverb with the same formula: “as people say.”9 In most instances, these proverbs lack religious overtones; their content sometimes resembles closely Aesop’s fables and Greek proverbs more generally (Lieberman 1942, 144–60; Friedman 2003). These popular proverbs are typically quoted as part of a rabbinic discussion in order to elaborate upon or support a rabbinic teaching, often in discussions about biblical passages (e.g., b. Shabb. 62b). In some cases, these folk proverbs are endowed with such authority that they can serve as the basis for challenging a rabbinic statement (e.g., b. B. Metsiʾa 59a), explaining the rationale underlying a rabbinic law (e.g., b. B. Metsiʾa 51a), or even as the source for rabbinic law (b. Yeb. 114b). The rabbis thus recognize and endorse the independent wisdom of the commoner as embodied in folk proverbs. However, some rabbinic sources actually characterize those proverbs as simply restatements of biblical verses. The following passage is illustrative: A certain man used to say: “It is good for a person to hear and be silent. One hundred evils pass him by.” Samuel said to Rav Yehuda: “This is a written verse: To start a quarrel is to open a sluice; [before a dispute flares up, drop it.]” (Prov 17:14). (b. Sanh. 7a) 16 Samuel accepts the wisdom of the proverb but claims that it is unoriginal, having been anticipated by a biblical verse. The pericope proceeds to give another six examples of proverbs recited by “a certain man” that Samuel and, in one instance, Rav Huna, alleged were simply reiterations of a biblical statement (Pomeranz 2016, 30). They do not reject the authentic wisdom of these proverbs, but, at least for Samuel and Rav Huna, the link between Torah and wisdom is so comprehensive as to neutralize all other forms of wisdom. The View of Biblical Wisdom in the Rabbinic Literature The rabbinic understanding of wisdom as oriented toward a rabbinic lifestyle did not only affect the way they viewed competing forms of wisdom but also earlier forms of wisdom—that is, the literary heritage of biblical and Second Temple wisdom literature. Those earlier works, too, were not always consistent with a rabbinic lifestyle. However, while the rabbis could dismiss foreign or non-rabbinic forms of wisdom, they could not similarly dispense with the wisdom of biblical books like Qoheleth and Proverbs. If the rabbis assimilated wisdom into both Torah and the rabbinic lifestyle, how did they view earlier wisdom literature, especially Qoheleth and Proverbs, which do not seem to espouse the same view of wisdom?10 And how did they evaluate the Wisdom of Ben Sira, a book whose outlook on wisdom approximates that of the rabbis and yet is not included in their biblical canon? We turn now to consider the reception of earlier wisdom literature by interpreters who conflated wisdom and Torah and who viewed wisdom through a rabbinic lens. Qoheleth 17 The earliest sources in rabbinic literature do not seem to object to the content of Qoheleth (Hirshman 2001, 88; for more on this book, see the essay in this volume by Grillo). Rather, they question its canonicity because it appears to be human rather than divine wisdom (t. Yad. 2:14). As non-canonical wisdom, however, Qoheleth is no worse than any other book that did not merit inclusion in the canon. Qoheleth thus appears in Tosefta Yadayim on a list of non-canonical works that includes the Gospels, Homer, and the Wisdom of Ben Sira (Herford 1966, 155; but cf. Boyarin 2006, 57–58). Post-tannaitic sources, however, do not debate whether or not Qoheleth should be included in the canon but rather whether it should be taken out of circulation entirely (Leiman 1991, 72– 86).11 The Rabbis identify two problems with the content of Qoheleth: first, its contents are selfcontradictory (b. Shabb. 30b), and second, its contents are religiously offensive (Lev. Rab. §28). The latter is also a type of contradiction, namely between the contents of Qoheleth and those of other biblical books.12 The sources suggest that the heretical overtones of the book were more troubling to the rabbis than its internal contradictions. The rabbis concluded that the skeptical formulation of Qoh 1:3, “What do people gain from all the toil?” does not include “labor in the study of Torah,” because it reads toil rather than toils (Lev. Rab. §28). Once the book could be reconciled with religious norms, the rabbis could more easily resolve its internal contradictions (Dell 1994, 318; Fox 1989, 19). Thus, the rabbis elsewhere assert that the book was not hidden away, despite its apparent self-contradictions, because the book both began in 1:3 and concluded with “words of Torah.” In other words, because the rabbis can now simply presuppose that Qoh 1:3 affirms rabbinic values, they can likewise assume that the book is not truly self-contradictory. 18 Once in the canon, Qoheleth was read alongside and consistent with other canonical works (Halbertal 1997, 24). This does not only mean that the differences between Qoheleth and other biblical books are effaced but also that other texts can be used to reinterpret Qoheleth. Thus, the word “pain” in Qoh 11:10, “Banish anger from your mind, and put away pain from your body,” is taken to refer to Gehinnom, a belief apparently defied by Qoheleth elsewhere but supported here with reference to Prov 16:4 (b. Ned. 22a). The rabbis will also routinely read Qoheleth as referring to individuals elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, with negative statements referring to biblical villains and positive statements alluding to biblical heroes (e.g., Gen. Rab. §93). The effect is to further bridge the gap between Qoheleth and the rest of the canon (Hirshman 1988, 158). As a canonical work, Qoheleth is read as representative of the rabbinic lifestyle. Perhaps the most audacious example of this trend is a statement in Qohelet Rabba that “[a]ll the references to eating and drinking in this book signify Torah and good deeds” (Halbertal 1997, 25). Qoheleth can teach that one should provide material to support rabbinic sages (b. Pes. 53b) and that one who studies Bible, Mishnah, and proper conduct will not sin (m. Qidd. 1:10). Even verses that explicitly condemn wickedness in general can refer narrowly to inappropriate rabbinic behavior. Thus, Qoheleth’s condemnation of the “wicked who do not fear God” whose “days will not lengthen like a shadow” (8:13) refers, according to one rabbinic statement, to those who do not stand in the presence of their teachers (b. Qidd. 33b). In order to produce such readings of Qoheleth, many rabbis offer metaphorical or allegorical interpretations of the text (Hirshman 1988, 158–59). For example, when Qoheleth writes that he “tried cheering myself with wine,” the rabbis take “wine” as referring to “the wine of Torah” (Qoh. Rab. to 2:3). In many other cases, the rabbis interpret the practical advice that is one of the hallmarks of wisdom statements as referring to rabbinic values related to piety and 19 Torah-study. In such cases, it seems that the rabbis presuppose that a canonical work will not simply provide details of practical wisdom—a form of omni-significance. Thus, Qoh 9:8 (“Let your garments always be white; do not let oil be lacking on your head” is taken to mean that a person should repent lest s/he die tomorrow (b. Shabb. 153a). Yet the rabbis did not always identify lofty religious themes in their readings of Qoheleth. The same verse could in fact contain both a rabbinic value and a practical insight. Thus, Qoh 10:18, “Through slothfulness the ceiling sags,” is taken both to mean that the neglect of Torah study leads God to withhold rain (b. Taʿan. 7b) and as anticipating a popular proverb (b. Sanh. 7a). In reading Qoheleth through a rabbinic lens, the rabbis did not necessarily overlook or disregard themes in the book that were not religious in nature. Proverbs While Proverbs does not share Qoheleth’s skeptical outlook on life, it did not avoid controversy entirely. In fact, several sources say that Proverbs was initially taken out of circulation for similar reasons as Qoheleth: it is self-contradictory (e.g., b. Shabb. 30b) and contains inappropriate content (ADRN A §1). In both instances, however, the rabbis indicate that later authorities offered interpretations that resolved the difficulties. Once again, a canonical work of wisdom would necessarily have to align with rabbinic values. As a canonical book, Proverbs is read through the lens of rabbinic norms. The rabbis do indeed read Proverbs as wisdom, that is, as containing observations and truths about the world, the nature of human flourishing, and the natural order. However, while the wisdom contained in the biblical book is largely universalistic, the rabbis often read Proverbs in particularistic terms. At the most fundamental level, this reading expresses itself in the consistent equation of wisdom with 20 Torah (e.g., b. Ber. 32b). Naturally, the rabbis also read instances of the word torah in Proverbs as referring not to instruction generally but to rabbinic Torah more specifically (e.g., b. Sukkah 49b). The book’s observations thus concern laws and beliefs consistent with the ideology of rabbinic Judaism. For example, the rabbis take the statement in Prov 30:18, “Three things are beyond me, four I cannot fathom” as a perplexed question by the wise Solomon about the biblical source for the four species on the feast of Tabernacles (Lev. Rab. §30), and Prov 29:21, “A slave pampered from youth will come to a bad end,” refers to the effect of the evil inclination in both this world and the next (b. Sukkah 52b). As in their treatment of Qoheleth, the rabbis do not only read Proverbs in light of their own values but also in light of the larger canon. This process further obscures the broad wisdom themes in Proverbs. For example, many verses are taken by the rabbis as referring to specific biblical characters rather than as general statements of wisdom (e.g., Gen. Rab. §91). In order to read general observations as rabbinic lessons, the rabbis often take the verses out of context. Thus, whereas Prov 7:26, “For many are those she has struck dead, and numerous are her victims,” refers in context to the Strange Woman, the rabbis read the first part of the verse as referring to an unqualified scholar who rendered a halakhic judgment and the latter part of the verse to a qualified scholar who refrained from rendering a judgment—and this in spite of the fact that, grammatically, the verbs require a feminine subject (b. Sotah 22a). In other cases, the rabbis read the text allegorically (e.g., b. Ber. 35b), or else via other creative methods, such as notariqon (understanding a letter of one word as the initial letter of another word; b. ʿErub. 64a). But the rabbis did not always read Proverbs as a particularistic text. Jewish law might depend on an understanding of human nature or society in general, a mainstay of wisdom thought, and for that the rabbis would turn to Proverbs. Thus, they interpreted Prov 14:10, “The heart knows 21 its bitterness,” to conclude that we listen to sick patients who affirm that they need to eat on Yom Kippur even if their doctor disagrees (b. Yoma 83a). In this way, Proverbs is not always approached through a rabbinic lens even if it does generate or at least support rabbinic law. As with Qoheleth, the rabbis did not necessarily overlook or re-interpret passages in Proverbs that are of a practical or non-religious nature. In fact, the rabbis used Proverbs in order to produce their own proverbial wisdom. For example, “Rabbi (Yehuda Ha-Nasi) says: One should never have too many friends in his house, as it is stated: There are friends that one has to his own hurt (Prov 18:24)” (b. Ber. 63a). The Wisdom of Ben Sira The book of Ben Sira, a work at the fringes of the Jewish biblical canon, posed a different sort of problem for the rabbis.13 The rabbis affirm that Ben Sira is not included in the biblical canon (t. Yad. 2:13). Nevertheless, it is clear that the book enjoyed widespread popularity in both rabbinic and non-rabbinic circles (Leiman 1991, 99–102). Indeed, the content of Ben Sira is consistent with rabbinic wisdom statements and is cited frequently in rabbinic literature (Segal 1958, 37–42); several rabbis even take credit for teachings found in the book (m. Avot 4:4; b. Shabb. 11a). There is not an obvious pattern to the subject matter or verses that the rabbis cite, although Tal Ilan (2006) notes that a significant percentage of them concern women. Other subject matter quoted include attitudes toward esoteric knowledge, appropriate social conduct and manners, and hospitality (Labendz 2006, 381). Of course, Ben Sira’s famous identification of wisdom with Torah resembles that found in rabbinic literature, even if the rabbis never quote Sirach 24. Whether the rabbis would be willing to rely upon a non-canonical work as a source of wisdom regardless of its content, however, was an open question. 22 The dominant approach by the rabbis was to use the book selectively. As a non-canonical work, Ben Sira could not fully represent the rabbinic worldview, but it nonetheless contains ideas that resonated with the rabbis. Some sources—especially Palestinian sources—rabbinized Ben Sira (Labendz 2006), neatly distinguishing between biblical and post-biblical wisdom (e.g., y. Hag. 2:1 [77c]). In such cases, Ben Sira is cited as if he were a member of the academy without reference to his book. The rabbis could thus cite “Rabbi Ben Sira” when it suited them without having to endorse his entire book. A similar solution was offered by the Babylonian Amora Rav Yosef (b. Sanh. 100b), who advocated publicizing only those teachings found in the book that are “lofty” or “excellent,” particularly those concerning women and what Rosen-Zvi (2016, 180) labels an “ethic of caution.” The difference between those two selective approaches to Ben Sira is important, however. The first approach apparently believed that wisdom is only authentic or at least acceptable when it emerges from a rabbinic sage. In contrast, the second approach acknowledges the validity of wisdom outside of rabbinic circles provided that its content resonates with a rabbinic outlook. Put differently, the first approach to Ben Sira focused on the book’s authority, while the latter focused on its content. Either way, the rabbis generally objected to those who read Ben Sira as a canonical work rather than to those who would mine it for wise insights.14 Of course, such a solution is potentially dangerous, and other rabbis—Babylonian Amoraim, who encountered Ben Sira at a much later date (Labendz 2006, 361–63)—offered content-based reasons that would prohibit one from reading the book (b. Sanh. 100b). Interestingly, they struggled mightily to isolate problematic material in the composition. Before finally pinpointing the offending passages, the rabbis first considered numerous other passages throughout the book that, they were told, were perfectly acceptable. Ultimately, they honed in on passages in Ben Sira that suggest his book is full of nonsense, including “One who has a passage 23 in his beard, the entire world is unable to overcome him” and “A sparse-bearded man is clever; a thick-bearded man is a fool.”15 The rabbis were not required to reinterpret such passages in a noncanonical work as they were in canonical works such as Qoheleth; if the content of Ben Sira did not comport with a rabbinic outlook, it had no place in a rabbinic curriculum. Our survey of rabbinic treatments of Ben Sira reveals an important point about rabbinic attitudes toward earlier wisdom literature: wisdom works would have to reflect rabbinic values in order to receive the endorsement of the rabbis. Canonical works were necessarily re-interpreted to bring them into alignment with a rabbinic worldview, while non-canonical works received a less charitable reception. Rosen-Zvi (2016, 180) sums up the rabbinic perspective on the non-canonical work of Ben Sira well: “When they reflect on its content, they see mainly differences” from their own set of values and tradition. The rabbis did not shoulder the responsibility of actively transforming the entire book into a rabbinic work. Conclusion The rabbis—in tractates explicitly devoted to wisdom and in comments sprinkled throughout the corpus of rabbinic literature—viewed wisdom as communicating the central components of a good life. In this way, rabbinic wisdom was very traditional. Radically new, however, was the link between wisdom and the rabbinic lifestyle. Wisdom would now shine a light on the rabbis as the authoritative teachers and their values and norms as the keys to human flourishing. The association between wisdom and the rabbinic life meant, for some rabbis, that wisdom could not exist outside of such a life. Some were receptive to non-rabbinic forms of wisdom, but other rabbis distanced themselves from forms of wisdom that could not be reconciled with rabbinic values. On the other hand, the association between wisdom and a rabbinic 24 perspective focused on piety and Torah-study demanded that the rabbis bring into alignment canonical works of wisdom such as Qoheleth and Proverbs with their own set of values. The rabbis were not similarly required to afford a non-canonical work such as Ben Sira the benefit of the doubt, and they seem to use it selectively or not at all. 25 References Bickerman, Elias. 2007. “The Chain of the Pharisaic Tradition.” In Jewish and Christian History: A New Edition in English Including The God of the Maccabees, Volume One, 528–42. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Trans. from “La Chaîne de la tradition pharisienne.” 1952. Revue Biblique 59: 44–54. 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Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 26 Fraade, Steven D. 1990. “The Early Rabbinic Sage.” In The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East, edited by John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue, 417–36. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns. Frankel, Zacharias. 1859. Introduction to the Mishna. Leipzig: H. Hunger. Hebrew. Friedman, Shamma. 2003. “The Talmudic Proverb in Its Cultural Setting.” Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal 2: 25–82. Hebrew. Gilat, Yitzhak. 1984. R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: A Scholar Outcast. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press. Ginsburg, Christian D. 1970. Coheleth. New York: Ktav. Goering, Greg Schmidt. 2009. Wisdom’s Root Revealed: Ben Sira and the Election of Israel. Leiden: Brill. Gottlieb, Isaac B. 1990. “Pirqe Abot and Biblical Wisdom.” Vetus Testamentum 40: 152–64. Guttmann, Alexander. 1950. “Tractate Abot: Its Place in Rabbinic Literature.” Jewish Quarterly Review 41: 181–93. Halbertal, Moshe. 1997. People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Herford, R. T. 1925. Pirke Aboth: The Tractate ‘Fathers’, from the Mishnah, Commonly Called ‘Sayings of the Fathers’. New York: Jewish Institute of Religion Press. Herford, R. T. 1966. Christianity in Talmud and Midrash. Clifton, N.J.: Reference Book Publishers. Herr, M. D. 1972. “Ecclesiastes Rabbah.” In Encyclopedia Judaica, edited by Cecil Roth, 6.335. 16 vols. Jerusalem: Macmillan. Herr, M. D. 1979. “Continuum in the Chain of Torah Transmission.” Zion 44: 43–56. Hebrew. 27 Hirshman, Marc G. 1983. “Midrash Qohelet Rabbah: Chapters 1–4 Commentary and Introduction.” Ph.D. diss., The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1983. Hebrew. Hirshman, Marc G. 1988. “The Greek Fathers and the Aggada on Ecclesiastes: Formats of Exegesis in Late Antiquity.” Hebrew Union College Annual 59: 137–65. Hirshman, Marc G. 2001. “Qohelet’s Reception and Interpretation in Early Rabbinic Literature.” In Studies in Ancient Midrash, edited by James L. Kugel, 87–99. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ilan, Tal. 2000. “Ben Sira’s Attitude to Women and Its Reception by the Babylonian Talmud.” Jewish Studies 40: 103–11. Hebrew. Kister, Menahem. 1998. Studies in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan: Text, Redaction and Interpretation. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi. Hebrew. Knobel, Peter S. 1991. The Targum of Qohelet: Translated, with a Critical Introduction, Apparatus, and Notes. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press. Krauss, S. 1898. “Le traité talmudique «Déréch Éréç».” Revue des études juives 37: 205–21. Kynes, Will. 2015. “The Modern Scholarly Wisdom Tradition and the Threat of PanSapientialism: A Case Report.” In Was There a Wisdom Tradition? New Prospects in Israelite Wisdom Studies, edited by Mark R. Sneed, 11–38. Atlanta: SBL Press. Labendz, Jenny R. 2006. “The Book of Ben Sira in Rabbinic Literature.” Association for Jewish Studies Review 30: 347–92. Labendz, Jenny R. 2013. Socratic Torah: Non-Jews in Rabbinic Intellectual Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Leiman, Sid Z. 1991. The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence. New Haven: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences. 28 Lerner, M. B. 1987a. “The External Tractates.” In The Literature of the Sages, Part 1, edited by Shmuel Safrai. Van Gorcum: Assen. Lerner, M. B. 1987b. “The Tractate Avot.” In The Literature of the Sages, Part 1, edited by Shmuel Safrai, 263–76. Van Gorcum: Assen. Lieberman, Saul. 1942. Greek in Jewish Palestine: Studies in the Life and Manners of Jewish Palestine in the II-IV Centuries C.E. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Lieberman, Saul. “Notes to Chapter One of Kohelet Rabbah.” In Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem on His Seventieth Birthday by Pupils, Colleagues, and Friends, edited by E. E. Urbach, R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, and Ch. Wirszubski, 163–79. Jerusalem: Magnes. Hebrew. Loopik, Marcus van. 1991. The Ways of the Sages and the Way of the World: The Minor Tractates of the Babylonian Talmud: Derekh ʾEretz Rabbah, Derekh ʾEretz Zuta, Pereq ha-Shalom. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Melamed, E. Z. 1986. Essays in Talmudic Literature. Jerusalem: Magnes. Hebrew. Mermelstein, Ari. 2014. Creation, Covenant, and the Beginnings of Judaism: Reconceiving Historical Time in the Second Temple Period. Leiden: Brill. Pomeranz, Jonathan A. 2016. “‘Seven Pits for the Good Man’: Torah and Popular Wisdom in Rabbinic Babylonia.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 23: 22–46. Rosen-Zvi, Ishay. 2016. “The Wisdom Tradition in Rabbinic Literature and Mishnah Avot.” In Tracing Sapiential Traditions in Ancient Judaism, ed. Hindy Najman, Jean-Sébastien Rey, and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, 172–90. Leiden: Brill. 29 Rubenstein, Jeffrey L. 1999. Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Saldarini, Anthony J. 1982. Scholastic Rabbinism: A Literary Study of the Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan. Chico, CA: Scholars Press. Sandberg, Ruth N. 1999. Rabbinic Views of Qohelet. Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press. Schechter, Solomon. 1997. Avoth de-Rabbi Nathan: Solomon Schechter Edition. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Hebrew. Schiffer, Sinai. 1884. Das Buch Kohelet nach der Auffassung der Weisen des Talmud und Midrasch und der jüdischen Erklärer des Mittelalters: nebst zahlreichen kritischen Noten und einer grössern Abhandlung ueber den Abschluss des alttestamentlichen Kanon und die Abfassungszeit des Buches Kohelet. Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann. Schofer, Jonathan Wyn. 2005. The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Schremer, Adiel. 2015. “Avot Reconsidered: Rethinking Rabbinic Judaism.” Jewish Quarterly Review 105: 287–311. Segal, M. Z. 1958. Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute. Sharvit, Shimon. 2004. Tractate Avoth Through the Ages: A Critical Edition, Prolegomena and Appendices. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute. Hebrew. Sperber, Daniel. 1982. Masechet Derech Eretz Zutta and Perek Ha-Shalom. Jerusalem: Tsur-Ot. Hebrew. Sperber, Daniel. 1990. “Manuals of Rabbinic Conduct During the Talmudic and Rabbinic Periods.” In Scholars and Scholarship: The Interaction Between Judaism and Other Cultures, edited by Leo Landman, 9–26. New York: Yeshiva University Press. 30 Steinberger, Yeshaya. 1996. “The Book of Ben Sira and the Prohibition Against Reading It: The Beginning of the Struggle in Acculturation.” Shanah be-Shanah: 430–39. Hebrew. Steinmetz, Devora. 2002. “Distancing and Bringing Near: A New Look at Mishnah Tractates ʿEduyyot and ʾAbot.” Hebrew Union College Annual 73: 49–96. Stemberger, Günter. 1996. “Die innerrabbinische Überlieferung von Mischna Abot.” In Geschichte–Tradition–Reflexion: Festschrift für Martin Hengel zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by Hubert Cancik, Hermann Lichtenberger, and Peter Schäfer, 511–27. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Stemberger, Günter. 2008. “Sages, Scribes, and Seers in Rabbinic Judaism.” In Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sages in the Eastern Mediterranean World, edited by Leo G. Perdue, 295– 319. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Stern, Sacha. 1994. Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings. Leiden: Brill. Tropper, Amram D. 2004. Wisdom, Politics, and Historiography: Tractate Avot in the Context of the Graeco-Roman Near East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Veltri, Giuseppe. 1998. “On the Influence of ‘Greek Wisdom’: Theoretical and Empirical Sciences in Rabbinic Judaism.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 5: 300–17. Wachten, Johannes. 1978. Midrasch-Analyse: Strukturen im Midrasch Qohelet Rabba. Hildesheim: Olms. Wright, Benjamin G. 2008. “B. Sanhedrin 100b and Rabbinic Knowledge of Ben Sira.” In idem, Praise Israel for Wisdom and Instruction: Essays on Ben Sira and Wisdom, the Letter of Aristeas, and the Septuagint, 183–93. Leiden: Brill. Further Reading 31 Kugel, James. 1997. “Wisdom and the Anthological Temper.” Prooftexts 17: 9–32. An important article on the ancient wisdom practice of creating anthologies. Perdue, Leo G. 2008. “Continuing Streams: Rabbinic Wisdom.” In The Sword and the Stylus: An Introduction to Wisdom in the Age of Empires, 388–411. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. A survey of rabbinic literature and its themes against the background of earlier wisdom literature. Viviano, Benedict T. 1978. Study as Worship: Aboth and the New Testament. Leiden: Brill. Comparative analysis of the theme of Torah study as a form of worship in Tractate Avot, pre-rabbinic sources, and the Synoptic Gospels. Biographical Note Ari Mermelstein, Assistant Professor of Bible at Yeshiva University, holds a Ph.D. in Judaic Studies from NYU and a J.D. from NYU Law School. Dr. Mermelstein’s first book, Creation, Covenant, and the Beginnings of Judaism: Reconceiving Historical Time in the Second Temple Period, was published by Brill in 2014. His research spans the Hebrew Bible through rabbinic literature, and he is currently at work on a monograph devoted to the relationship between emotion and power in ancient Judaism. 1 Scholars have noted that Avot 4:4 appears to be based upon Sir 7:17 (Labendz 2006, 348–49). 2 On Sir 1, see Goering 2009, 21–25. 3 The locus classicus for the ban imposed on R. Eliezer is b. B. Meṣiʾa 59b. Though scholars question the historicity of that account (Rubenstein 1999, 34–63), third century Palestinian rabbis took the ban for granted (Schremer 2015, 291 n. 15). 4 For arguments against Schremer’s thesis, see Rosen-Zvi 2016, 188. 5 For the possibility that Avot was intended for young adults as a type of initiation into a rabbinic life, see Tropper (2004, 184). For the possibility that it was transmitted in more informal settings, see Stemberger (2008, 316). B. 32 Berakhot 22a describes the transmission of rabbinic wisdom literature occurring when R. Judah (b. Ilai) was ritually impure and therefore unable to teach rabbinic law. Kister (1998, 123–30) accepts Finkelstein’s basic observation but suggests that variants are often the result of paraphrase, textual corruption, or intentional change. 6 7 On the possibility that much of DEZ 1–4 is of tannaitic origin, see Sperber (1982, 177–78). For a possible early recension of DER, see Lerner 1987a, 387. On the manuscript traditions of DER and DEZ, see van Loopik 1991, 11– 13; Lerner 1987a, 380–81. See m. Sotah 9:14, which prohibits the teaching of “Greek wisdom” to one’s son. Stern (1994, 176), distinguishes between general wisdom, which the rabbis do not generally oppose, and Greek wisdom, which they do oppose. However, the text in Sifre Deuteronomy to be analyzed below addresses the same question of whether one who has mastered Torah may progress to other forms of knowledge but speaks of the “wisdom of the nations” in general. 8 9 Other rabbinic collections quote similar types of folk proverbs, though with different introductory formula; see Friedman 2003. 10 On Qoheleth in rabbinic literature, see, e.g., Sandberg 1999; Ginsburg 1970; Schiffer 1884. On Qoheleth Rabba, a midrashic work that contains much earlier material even though it most likely was edited in the seventh (so Hirshman 1983) or eighth (so Herr 1972) centuries, see Wachten 1978; Hirshman 1983; Hirshman 1988. The interpretations in the other post-talmudic work on Qoheleth, Targum Qohelet, exhibit a “close relationship” with those in Qohelet Rabba (Knobel 1991, 14), likely indicating that they were redacted at approximately the same time (Knobel 1991, 14). 11 On the complications associated with Qoheleth, see Lieberman (1967, 163–69). See Lev. Rab. §28, which notes the contradiction between “Follow the inclination of your heart and the desire of your eyes” (11:9) and “Do not follow the lust of your own heart and your own eyes” (Num 15:39). ADRN A §1 also mentions Qoh 11:9 as the reason that the book was taken out of circulation. However, whereas Lev. Rab. consequently characterizes Qoheleth as “leading toward heresy,” ADRN describes the book as “mere parables.” The tension between these verses is also noted by the Tanna R. Ishmael (Sifre Num. §155) but, consistent with the general tannaitic reticence to criticize the contents of the book, he does not object to the formulation in Qoheleth. 12 13 Scholars have paid particular attention to identifying the form of the book that the rabbis possessed and its relationship to extant versions; see, e.g., Wright 2008. Labendz (2006, 369–79) has suggested distinguishing between Palestinian and Babylonian sources, with the former containing citations of the book much closer to the surviving Hebrew manuscripts. This formulation assumes that R. Akiva’s statement that one who “reads from the external books forfeits one’s place in the world to come” refers to those who treat the book as canonical rather than as a work of wise instruction; see Steinberger 1996, 432–34; Leiman 1991, 92. 14 15 Interestingly, these passages, all quoted in Aramaic, do not appear in any extant manuscript of Ben Sira. This need not mean that the Talmud invented these passages, however; as Wright (2008, 192) notes, these sayings could have been extracted from “popular anthologies” attributed to Ben Sira, expansions of the book that would have been a product of Ben Sira’s authority and popularity. 33