The 2020 Year Ahead Report

2019: #YearAhead2020 REPORT 2020: The Year Ahead 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE DECEMBER 2019 2020: The Year Ahead Report Edited by Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui Contributors Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui Ravale Mohydin Michael Arnold Metin Mustafa Başbay Serkan Birgel Mamoon Alabbasi Arnaud Mafille Photo Credit Çağla Demirbaş Anadolu Agency Images Design Erhan Ağırgöl TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC / USA www.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this report represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 #YearAhead2020 Contents 06 Contributors 07 Introduction: The Year Ahead: Wars, Uprisings, and Economic Woes 08 Turkey’s Defence Capabilities 12 Peace in Cyprus: Will this time be different? If not, must the show go on? 15 Saudi Arabia: The Challenges Ahead Remain Significant 18 The Kashmir Dispute in 2020: Is There a Future for Minorities in India? 20 The Afghan Peace Process: Will the United States Withdraw in 2020? 22 Iraq’s Chronic Problems Likely to Continue in 2020 24 Sahel: Towards Escalation or Negotiations? 26 Algeria: The Year of Living Dangerously 28 Lebanon’s Political and Economic Crises 31 France: A Game at which Two Can Play? 34 The US Economy: Is a Recession Coming? 36 US Presidential Elections : Four More Years for Trump? 5 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 Contributors Dr Tarek Cherkaoui Dr Tarek Cherkaoui is the manager of TRT World Research Centre. He is the author of The News Media at War: The Clash of Western and Arab Networks in the Middle East (I B Tauris, 2017). Dr. Cherkaoui holds a PhD in Media and Communications Studies from the Auckland University of Technology. His broader research themes include public diplomacy, international broadcasting, news framing and mediamilitary relations – specifically within a Middle Eastern context. Ravale Mohydin Ravale Mohydin is a researcher at TRT World Research Centre. With graduate degrees from Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania, her research interests include South Asian affairs, the political economy of media, public diplomacy, media and conflict, and the political effects of entertainment media. Michael Arnold Michael Arnold is a researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He holds a BA in Military and Diplomatic History from the University of Calgary, and a MA in Islamic Studies. He is currently a PhD candidate at the American University of Beirut. His research interests include the modern Arab and Middle East history and the history of Islamic thought. M. Metin Basbay M. Metin Basbay is a researcher at TRT World Research Centre. His research mostly focuses on economic policy in the context of underdeveloped and developing countries. He holds a BA in Economics and a BA in Sociology, both from Bogazici University and is currently a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the University of Cambridge, where he also completed his MPhil in Economics. 6 Dr Serkan Birgel Serkan Birgel is a researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He holds a PhD from the School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, and a Master’s degree in Geopolitics, Territory and Security from King’s College London. His research interests include geopolitics and the natural resource / energy nexus – with particular emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean region. Arnaud Mafille Arnaud Mafille is a researcher, investigator and curriculum manager for CAGE, a UK-based advocacy organisation. He holds an LLM in International law from the University of Bristol and a Master’s degree in Public Law and Political Science from the University of Montesquieu Bordeaux IV. His research interests include issues related to the Global War on Terror and the rule of law. Mamoon Alabbasi Mamoon Alabbasi is Deputy Managing Editor and Online Editor at The Arab Weekly, and former Opinions and News Editor at the Middle East Eye. He has been actively working in the field of journalism since 2005 and holds a Master’s degree in Applied Linguistics. In addition to appearing on news and current affairs programmes to provide analysis and commentary, his op-eds, reports, and reviews have been published by numerous media outlets and publications. 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 Introduction The Year Ahead: Wars, Uprisings, and Economic Woes I n December 2018, TRT World Research Centre published its first year ahead report. While forecasting is a notoriously challenging exercise, last year’s report had some notable successes. For instance, the report judged that 2019 would be a pivotal year for the Eastern Mediterranean. This has especially proven to be the case in light of the discovery of local natural gas reserves, which has become a source of tension in the region. One of the main sources of growing tensions has been the tit-for-tat politics played by regional actors, particularly as there seems to be a growing effort to isolate Turkey and develop the region’s resources without consideration for Turkey’s interests. In the same way, the report anticipated an eventful year for Libya. In light of Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to seize the capital and topple the UN-backed Government of National Accord, in 2019 the country descended deeper into the Abyss, helped along the way by international support for the leader of the self-styled Libyan National Army from France, the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others, notably Russia. So far, Haftar’s efforts have failed to dislodge the internationally recognised Tripoli-based government who enjoys the backing of Turkey. The publication also emphasised the importance of 2019 for Algeria. The past year has indeed been an eventful year for the country with the removal of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika from office. Since then, waves of protests have been taking place as large numbers of continue to regularly take the streets. The regime has so far managed to cling onto power, however, its grip has been weakened and its legitimacy has been eroded. In a similar vein, the report highlighted the increased likelihood of Turkish military intervention in Northern Syria, which began on 9 October 2019 in the form of “Operation Peace Spring.” The publication also underscored the opportunities offered by the US-Taliban talks to resolve the long-standing conflict in Afghanistan, with negotiations being the only way out – a course of action that has been given more currency given the revelations made in the Afghanistan papers. In addition, the 2019 Year Ahead report projected the disastrous impact of the US policy of “maximum pressure” against Iran. This year’s report focuses on themes and hotspots that are likely to feature in the news cycle more frequently than others. For instance, Iraq, Lebanon, and Algeria will continue to experience political, economic and social upheaval as they move through their respective political transitions. The political establishments have so far sought to wait out the protests while resorting to repression and various divide-and-rule tactics, however, outcomes remain uncertain. Similarly, developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, Saudi Arabia, Kashmir, the Sahel Region, as well as other issues, will be examined and analysed with forecasts provided regarding their potential trajectories. 2020: The Year Ahead focuses on twelve key events and flashpoints across the globe to watch out for as the year unfolds. Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui Manager of the TRT World Research Centre 7 #YearAhead2020 Turkey 2020: The Year Ahead Dr Serkan Birgel (Emin Mengüarslan - Anadolu Agency) Turkey’s Defence Capabilities D ecades in the making, Turkey’s defence industry has recorded impressive progress to date, with even further developments expected. This article reviews some of the most important achievements thus far and charts the progress Turkey expects to achieve in the future. The contemporary international environment has recently been described by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres as an era of greater “anxiety, uncertainty and unpredictability across the world”. Together with a backyard plagued by bouts of instability, unrest, civil war, and proxy battles, Turkey finds itself in the midst of a series of tumultuous regional events. This is the context against which Turkey ambitiously seeks to enhance its defence capabilities and selfsufficiency. These developments also come amidst recent tensions with suppliers that Turkey has traditionally relied upon in the past. 8 Where possible, Turkey has sought to deepen defence partnerships in order to enhance its capabilities while simultaneously seeking to advance its own domestic defence industry. Turkey is now thought to meet up to 65-70% of the current needs of the Turkish Armed Forces from domestic production, a far cry from the 20% mark in the early 2000s. Total Turkish defence spending increased by 65% from 2009 to 2018, reaching a figure of $19.58 billion. To put this into perspective, Turkey now ranks 15th in the world in terms of military expenditures. However, the sum spent is a far cry from the expenditures from countries such as the US, China. Turkish defence industry exports have also expanded, recording a 37.7% increase from January-September compared to last year at a value of $1.9 billion dollars in 2019, as opposed to the $1.3 billion recorded in 2018. In April this year, the total defence and civil aerospace export market reached $2.35 billion. While the previously defined 2023 target of $25 billion worth of defence and 2020: The Year Ahead civil aerospace exports may be overly ambitious, there is no doubt that significant progress has been made towards Turkey becoming a significant defence exporter in its own right. The potential economic benefits are no doubt present, as are an array of economic and political concerns that Turkey must surmount as it seeks to take its place as a global leader in the defence-related field. With bold ambitions, the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) – tied in 2017 to the office of the Presidency from the Defence Ministry as a symbol of the sector’s importance – announced in early 2019 its aim to make the “Turkish defence industry 100 percent independent by 2053, increase its export capacity to $50 billion, and have at least 10 Turkish defence companies among the 100 biggest companies in the world”. Currently, Turkey has four companies on that list. Turkey shares a 911 km border with Syria. Over the last eight and a half years, the catastrophe that has been the Syrian war has caused alarm in Ankara and has compelled the Turkish Armed Forces to accelerate its existing modernisation efforts and to strengthen its overall capacity to deal effectively with a range of sophisticated adversaries in the field, particularly well-equipped and battlehardened non-state actors that have demonstrated their prowess in modern asymmetric warfare. The war in Syria presented an urgent need for enhanced air-defence capabilities. Unable to negotiate a guaranteed purchase of U.S. Patriot missiles without resistance from Congress (the latter of which has hindered exports to NATO-ally Turkey in the past, including both drones and frigates), and without the possibility of future technology cooperation, Turkey ultimately choose the S-400 air defence #YearAhead2020 missile system that would fulfil both its immediate and short-term requirements and interest in longer-term technology transfers. Ultimately, Turkey seeks to develop its own range of air defence capabilities. Having very recently completed testing, the HISAR-A low-altitude and short-range air defence system, together with its enhanced variant, the HISAR-O (expected later in 2022-2023), constitute Turkey’s first indigenous air and anti-missile system. The HISAR-O is expected to enter serial production in 2021. Beyond the HISAR family, Turkey also seeks to develop its own tactical ballistic missile as part of the Bora programme. In May 2019, the Bora missile was battle-tested in Operation Claw, Turkey’s a counter-terrorism campaign targeting the PKK in northern Iraq. In terms of tank warfare, Turkey has initiated a number of parallel programmes aimed at modernising its existing fleet as well as introducing a modern third-generation battle tank, the Altay, named after Army Gen. Fahrettin Altay, commander of the Fifth Cavalry Corps during the Turkish War of Independence. The Altay is meant to eventually replace Turkey’s current fleet of Leopard 2 and variously modernised M60/M48 tanks. With the first prototype unveiled in 2011, Altay T1s are expected to enter the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) inventory within the next two years, whilst a fully indigenous and further enhanced version is expected within four. The first Altay tank is set to be acquired by the Turkish Army sometime in 2020. The proliferation and heavy use of anti-tank weapons alongside intensified urban warfare in Syria, including in Turkey’s fight against ISIS/Daesh and the YPG/PKK, have all been of particular for Turkey’s generals. Various Turkish tanks have already incorporated the PULAT Active Protection Systems against anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) T-129 ATAK helicopters perform at Turkey’s largest technology and aerospace event TEKNOFEST Istanbul. (Muhammed Enes Yıldırım - AA) 9 2020: The Year Ahead Turkey #YearAhead2020 The first Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed UAV lands at Gecitkale Airport in the eastern coastal city of Magusa (Famagusta) in The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on December 16, 2019. (Muhammed Enes Yıldırım - AA) threats. Another prominent area of Turkish progress slated to continue is in the world of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Turkey has long sought advanced UAV capabilities from its Western allies to deploy in its fight against the PKK terrorist organisation. The U.S. Congress blocked the sale of Predator and Reaper drones to Turkey in 2011 (despite Pentagon’s efforts), citing tense relations between Turkey and Israel following the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey’s criticism of Israel’s 2008 incursion into Gaza, as well as other historical points of tension members of Congress had demonised Turkey for such as the long-standing Cyprus dispute. Before relations soured, Turkey had in fact leased 10 unmanned Heron drones from Israel in 2004. Turkey has since ended dependence on foreign UAVs. In operation since 2015, the Bayraktar TB-2 is Turkey’s first armed drone, with the Anka-S serving as its surveillance drone, both of which have been key to Turkey’s fight against terrorism. With this development, Turkey became one of six countries in the world to produce armed UAVs. Turkey has also successfully exported TB-2’s to Ukraine, and an advanced version of the platform is currently completing final trials and is expected to enter into service in 2020. The TF-X or MMU ((Milli Muharip Ucak; National Combat Aircraft) is an ambitious project as per Turkey’s quest to replace its fleet of various F-16C/D’s and F-4E 2020s, the latter of which are at the end of their service lives. The initial design and development contract between the-then Undersecretariat for Defence Industries 10 (SSM) of the Ministry of Defence and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) was signed in 2016. A full-scale mock-up TF-X was recently unveiled at the 2019 Paris Air Show, and the head of the SSB, Ismail Demir, has also stated that the shape of the aircraft is now ‘clear’. Even though Turkey still intends to procure the F-35 to operate in unison with the TF-X, the F-35 controversy has highlighted the need for Turkey to press ahead with an indigenous fighter. The timetable for final procurement of the aircraft is understandably susceptible to change at such an early stage, but there are indications that the Turkish Air Force intends to acquire in bulk what will be a twin-engine, fifth-generation fighter aircraft by 2031. Though the timetable for the first flight had been scheduled for 2023, the centenary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the date is not yet concrete. Though Turkey has already garnered a depth of experience in subsystem production for advanced fighter aircraft such as the F-35 and has previously engaged BAE Systems of the U.K for technical assistance at an earlier stage of the TF-X project, it is still a very new market entrant. Significant challenges are expected, especially as it concerns the fighter’s engines. Beyond the HURKUS (a singleengine, turboprop basic trainer and light attack aircraft produced by TAI), Turkey has never before produced a jet fighter or trainer aircraft. Still, in 2018, Turkey set-up the TR MOTOR company which aims to produce an indigenous engine for the aircraft. Reportedly, Turkey is open to international collaboration for both the development and procurement of the TF-X. To this end, reports of external interest in the TF-X have also emerged. 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 Turkey’s first indigenous Air to Air Missile System GOKTUG during Turkey’s largest technology and aerospace event TEKNOFEST Istanbul, on September 17, 2019. (Muhammed Enes Yıldırım - AA) The T129 Tactical Reconnaissance and Attack Helicopter (ATAK) is a prominent success story, especially in Turkey’s fight against the PKK/YPG and DAESH terrorist organisations. A product of TAI’s successful partnership with Italy’s AgustaWestland, 53 of these twinseat, twin-engine attack helicopters with integrated Turkish avionics, weapons systems, and other modifications have been delivered to the TSK thus far. A more advanced and ‘heavy-class’ version of the ATAK, dubbed the ‘ATAK Phase 2’, begun maiden flights in November 2019 and is set to begin entering the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces in the second half of 2020. Expected one year ahead of schedule in 2021, the TCG Anadolu is an amphibious assault ship that can also be configured as a light aircraft carrier. Built locally and with a local content ratio of 68%, what will be Turkey’s largest warship is slated to be delivered to the Turkish Naval Forces by the end of 2020. TCG Anadolu is modelled upon Spain’s Juan Carlos I - its weapons systems will be supplied by Turkish defence giants Aselsan and Havelsan and will be able to carry F-35B fighter aircraft if issues related to F-35 exports to Turkey are resolved. Visitors look on Turkish ‘Aselsan A.S.’ stand during the XVI International specialized exhibition “Arms and Security - 2019” in Kiev, Ukraine, on October 08, 2019. The international exhibition, which attracts a large number of security and military professionals held in Kyiv from 8 to 11 October 2019. (Vladimir Shtanko - Anadolu Agency) 11 #YearAhead2020 Turkey 2020: The Year Ahead Dr Serkan Birgel (Celal Güneş - Anadolu Agency) Peace in Cyprus: Will this time be different? If not, must the show go on? T hough history has bared witness to decades of challenging inter-communal negotiations between the Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot communities (the first formal negotiations having occurred in Beirut, 1968), a modicum of hope that things could change never seems to be completely out of sight. The latest iteration of the thus-far failed settlement talks occurred in the form of a five-party conference held in Crans Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017. An earlier bout of 18-month talks in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, again came to an inconclusive impasse by November 2016. Though formal settlement talks have remained frozen, an intermittent dialogue has been maintained between the two sides. The latest move occurred on the 25th of November when TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı held a tripartite meeting in Berlin with his Greek-Cypriot counterpart Nicos Anastasiadis and United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. In a statement released by the UN shortly after, the latter expressed commitment to exploring the possibility of an “[…] informal five-plus-UN1 meeting at an appropriate stage. It is acknowledged that this time must be different”. Meanwhile, President Akıncı stated that the process was 1 Inclusive of the so-called Guarantor Powers (Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom). 12 now ‘back on track’ and that a phased, rather than open-ended process, would now be followed. His Greek-Cypriot counterpart reasserted that though a positive step had been made, certain preconditions had to be met for substantive talks to resume. However, despite these positive steps, significant challenges remain. There are certain hallmarks of the Cyprus Problem, features of the peace process, and contemporary controversies in the region, that without resolution render the resumption of the peace process difficult. Since the collapse of formal negotiations, the UN has steadily engaged in shuttle diplomacy to bring the sides back to the table. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Jane Holl Lute was appointed as the U.N. Secretary General’s temporary special consultant to the Cyprus Problem in June 2018. Since then, there have been efforts to avert the failures of the past with the formation of a new set of ‘terms of reference’ that would form the basis of a new round of talks. These terms of reference would encapsulate past convergences between the two sides, incorporate a framework proposed by Guterres in the Crans Montana talks, and put forward roadmap for resumed talks. This process itself has also been inconclusive and is reminiscent of a similar months-long process 2020: The Year Ahead taken to produce the so-called ‘Joint Declaration’ produced before negotiations between the-then TRNC President Derviş Eroğlu and his Greek-Cypriot counterpart Anastasiadis could have occurred in 2014. The Joint Declaration was reaffirmed in the latest meeting in Berlin alongside Guterres’ framework, though the terms of reference remain unsolved as of yet. Though optimism seems to never be thoroughly eliminated by the decades-long and seemingly intractable settlement talks, it is often confronted by the realities of 55 years of political, and 45 years of geographical separation, a largely ‘comfortable’ division with intercommunal cooperation advancing without a formal settlement and large-scale revision to the power-sharing status-quo, and a peace process that is governed by the principle of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. The latest in the insightful series of U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on Cyprus published in April 2019, retains the assessment that as it stands, “the longsought bizonal, bicommunal, federal solution for the island has remained elusive and may no longer be attainable”, and that “a final settlement for Cyprus remains elusive”. Recent poll results from the European Social Survey (ESS) also suggest that given the choice, most Greek-Cypriots favour a unified state rather than a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, the latter of which has been the basic formula for a solution for at least the last four decades as crystallised in the 1977 ‘High Level Agreements’ between Rauf Raif Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios. From the survey sample, 27% of GreekCypriots favour outright a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF), while 57.2% prefer outright a ‘unified state’. At the same time, 65% of Greek-Cypriots are in favour of, and or neither against nor in favour but could tolerate if necessary the BBF. However, given the choice, 73.6% of Greek-Cypriots responded either in favour of, and neither against nor in favour but would tolerate if necessary a ‘unitary’ state. 35% are against the bi-zonal bi-communal federation, whilst 27.4% are against a unitary state. Still, reports suggest that support for the BBF has increased over the last two years. The survey seems not to have been extended, or results from a similar survey have yet to emerge for the TurkishCypriot community. Perhaps the best indicator for any outlook for the future of the talks and the resolution of the Cyprus Problem is the affective climate and atmosphere of the negotiations. Before the Berlin meeting, SecretaryGeneral Guterres asserted that the “prospects for a resumption of the negotiations are uncertain at this time”. The most prominent path to generate #YearAhead2020 the positive atmosphere needed for the negotiations is the abatement of what has been over the last decade an overwhelmingly negative source of political controversy: the on-going process to develop natural gas resources off the Cypriot coast and the appropriation of this process for political gain. Though political rhetoric had emphatically prophesied the encounter of offshore natural gas as a potential ‘catalyst for peace’, what has occurred to date has been anything but. During the 2008-2012 negotiations, Turkey commissioned its first foray in the area in the form of the aging Piri Reis survey vessel. Turkey’s move then did not cause the kind of uproar that has been witnessed in the Greek-Cypriot and international community over the last few years and crucially, the development did not lead to collapse of the negotiations of the time. What has changed now is that the stakes are higher in terms of: the level of commercial exploitation activity, the magnitude of resources said to exist thus far, the exploration capabilities of Turkey, the incendiary rhetoric that has sought to ostracise Turkey from the region, fallout between Turkey and countries such as Egypt, Israel, and the US as well as certain EU member-states, all of which has increased the hostile atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead of shunning Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey in a form of crude geopolitical strong-arming, a more inclusive process must be promoted that gives due attention to the legitimate concerns of both Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey, and incentivises all sides to work towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the island. Secretary General Guterres has also expressed growing concern over developments on the natural gas issue, and has called for all An aerial photo shows Turkish-flagged drill ship Yavuz’ continue offshore drilling operations accompanied by a Turkish battleship west of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea on July 11, 2019. (Turkish National Defence Ministry/ Handout-Anadolu Agency) 13 #YearAhead2020 Turkey 2020: The Year Ahead Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Donmez (R) views Turkey’s drillship ‘Yavuz’ operating in the Mediterranean Sea from a helicopter on August 07, 2019. (Celal Güneş - Anadolu Agency) relevant parties to exercise restraint, to avoid further escalation, and to defuse tensions. Without the ability to compartmentaliseaway the kind of fluctuations that seem to persist in the world of international geopolitics, there is a very real danger that sight of the ultimate goal in Cyprus will be lost lost or latent tensions will be capitalised on as a form of ‘carrot and stick’ for negotiations. This will not enable the kind of conducive win-win atmosphere for the talks to progress successfully, and settle the decades-long dispute. Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General Barth Eide’s words still ring true: “the hydrocarbon crisis is in essence an illustration of the deep disagreements that lie behind the whole understanding of what the Cyprus Problem is. A lot of these issues are issues because of the division of the island, and will actually evaporate once a solution is found because they are expressions of the division”. The necessary diplomatic tools and political imagination must be exercised to bring all relevant stakeholders together. If the resumption of the talks has become dependent upon the cessation of all exploration activities, the latter seems to be an unlikely eventuality as things stand. In tandem, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots are not likely to abandon their rights in the region, and will continue to protest again the appropriation of either the process or proceeds from the natural gas development process as a pressure campaign in the negotiations. The Turkish government has recently declared its intention to procure a third drillship, and that five new wells would be drilled within 2020. Though a successful, win-win resolution of the Cyprus Problem is in every stakeholder’s interest, whatever happens in the near future, it is perhaps worth recounting a sombre response encountered by TRNC President Akıncı in dialogue in the 1990’s with a-then UN Special Representative: It is therefore all the more crucial to break this bond and divert focus away from the natural gas development process and towards the peace process. The settlement talks must not be held hostage to a series of pre-conditions over secondary issues that derive from the Cyprus Problem itself. In terms of the natural gas issue, former 14 “During the 1990s, at a reception, I approached the then special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus and asked him how the negotiations were going. ‘Not at all well,’ he replied. I persisted with my questions and asked him if this meant we would not have a settlement. ‘No, it will never happen,’ he said, prompting me to ask him why the talks were continuing. His response shocked me. ‘Because the show must go on.’” 2020: The Year Ahead Saudi Arabia #YearAhead2020 (Bandar Algaloud - Anadolu Agency) Dr Tarek Cherkaoui Saudi Arabia: The Challenges Ahead Remain Significant S audi Arabia faces considerable challenges ahead. The aggressive policies pursued by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) have backfired in a myriad of ways. Geopolitically, the kingdom’s clout has been running thin. In Yemen, MBS promised to crush the Houthis in three weeks back in 2015. Now, with the Yemen war exposing some of the fundamental weaknesses in the Saudi armed forces and their inability to handle a conflict of this scale, the Saudis have been intensifying their talks with the Houthis to negotiate a ceasefire. Riyadh’s four-year war in Yemen has been a moral failure and a strategic blunder. At least one hundred thousand people have died, the majority of which have been civilians. Serious blows were dealt by the Houthis on Saudi forces and their allies and the conflict has transformed the former into a more dangerous fighting force with closer links to Iran – an all-round unhappy ending for Saudi Arabia. The surprise attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities back in September 2019 prompted severe criticism of Saudi air defences. At the cost of billions of dollars, they failed to down any of the 18 drones and/or seven cruise missiles reportedly involved, both of which are relatively slow-flying targets. This does not come as a surprise, however, considering that the several Patriot air-defence systems available were mobilised to protect royal palaces instead of the strategic oil assets. The attacks degraded a considerable part of the kingdom’s oil production capacity – roughly 50 per cent – and caused a production loss of 1.3 million barrels per day. This was not only a major economic loss but also a major political affront for Riyadh, bringing its military might into disrepute. To make matters worse, Riyadh expected a strong American response against Iran after the Abqaiq attacks – especially when they presented the attack as an assault on the world’s energy supply. However, such a response did not materialise. This undermined the aura of invincibility that MBS has tried to convey inside the kingdom and beyond by mirroring his close connection with President Trump. The fact that the US administration remained largely indifferent to a series of escalations reportedly engineered by Iran throughout the summer of 2019 was interpreted throughout the Gulf as a sign of disengagement by the US from the region, or, at the very least, that it was recalcitrant when it came to using hard power. These developments prompted the Saudis and the UAE to backpedal on a series of dossiers. For instance, two years after imposing a blockade on Qatar, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now reversing course, toning down their hostility against Doha. Their main aim is to open a new chapter in relations, which, at best, means that some sort of ‘cold peace’ is going to carry the day in the short term. In a similar vein, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have re-established contact with Tehran, backtracking from 15 #YearAhead2020 Saudi Arabia 2020: The Year Ahead People inspect wreckages of collapsed building after an air strike in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a on November 11, 2017. The Saudi-led military coalition carried out two air strikes on the defence ministry in Yemen’s rebel-held capital Sanaa. (Mohammed Hamoud - Anadolu Agency) their previous warmongering stance. Economically, the Saudi leadership is also facing a series of setbacks. MBS built a large part of his vision 2030 upon the premise that Aramco would be privatised, ergo providing the funds for the required reforms. Beyond making headlines, though, this highly aspirational vision has been a mirage thus far. The flotation of Saudi Aramco stock has been a failure after two years of PR hype and extensive promises to investors. The Aramco IPO has encountered some serious criticism, ranging from its overestimated valuation to the governance of the company and its lack of checks and balances. In addition, MBS removed Khalid al-Falih, who has a long track record in the energy industry, as both energy minister and chairman of Aramco. This decision, which was purportedly due to Al Falih’s lack of enthusiasm for the Aramco IPO and disagreement on some superfluous acquisitions, entrenched the opinion that MBS is the one dictating Aramco’s decisions rather than any business interests. Such a state of affairs has alienated international investors even further. The risks have been compounded by the Abqaiq drone attacks on Aramco refineries, and other geopolitical uncertainties in the region, which present considerable risks to shareholders and generate an unstable financial model. By contrast, shares in BP, Shell, Chevron, and Exxon offer higher dividend yields and much more stability and consistency for investors. In the grand scheme of things, the IPO failure also signals the end of Riyadh’s supremacy over the oil market. Since 2014, Riyadh has no longer been able to dictate terms. MBS has lost the price war he waged against shale oil producers in the United States, causing a price collapse that has been detrimental to all producing countries. 16 After much fanfare on the international scene, the Saudis decided to cancel all the IPO presentations abroad and the expectations for a large scale IPO have been scaled back. The valuation has been lowered to $1.7 trillion with only 1.5% to 2% of the capital set to be transferred to the private sector. Furthermore, shares are only available for the Saudi market. This flotation has raised other red flags as the IPO is now seen by many as effectively being an additional tax. Wealthy Saudis who were detained at the Ritz-Carlton in 2017 have reportedly requested to buy Aramco shares to prove their loyalty. Saudi banks have been asked to offer loans at attractive rates to their clients to encourage them to buy shares. Moreover, the authorized debt ceilings have even been raised particularly for the occasion, and locals can now borrow up to twice the amount of their initial contribution. It is no secret that the Saudi economy is not in great shape, being in contraction since 2017. While some reports do foresee a 1.7% expansion in 2020, this figure is doubtful, especially with the global demand for oil slowing down and the Abqaiq attacks affecting Saudi oil reserves. In the meantime, MBS has been tapping into the sovereign fund to finance his aggressive policies in Yemen and elsewhere. Even so, budget deficits are increasing each year, amplified with lacklustre oil prices (a barrel of Brent crude is currently priced at $63). The budget deficit was around $36 billion in 2018 and is expected to expand to $50 billion in 2020. Unemployment among Saudi nationals is also rife, and all the “bread and circus” activities produced by the Saudi General Entertainment Authority have not succeeded in alleviating the misery of growing sections of the Saudi population. MBS initially imposed higher fees for employing foreign labour to stimulate local employment. However, this step has not been welcomed by the business community. In September, the cabinet reversed course 2020: The Year Ahead and waived the fees for five years in the manufacturing sector, which employs 645,000 migrants, 10% of the total foreign workforce. The concession was a sign that many Saudi firms are unable to turn a profit with the costlier local labour. As a result, there is growing discontent in the country. In October 2019, Reuters reported that members of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family and business elite expressed frustration with the leadership of MBS following the largest-ever attack on the kingdom’s oil infrastructure. The fact that MBS is the Minister of Defence and his brother is deputy Defence Minister was not lost on the population. Already a dissident Saudi prince, who was given asylum in Germany in 2013, has called on the royal family to depose King Salman and take over the country. In addition, Saudi Twitter feeds increasingly criticise the General Entertainment Authority, which organises events deemed insensitive to the local culture. For instance, while many families lost their loved ones fighting in Yemen, Turki Al-Sheikh, the Head of the Entertainment Authority, called the members of the armed forces to attend the dance and singing events. This has angered many people in the kingdom, for whom MBS and his entourage have lost touch with the realities of the country. Economically, 2020 is going to be a challenging year for the Saudi monarchy. With the failure of the international flotation of the Aramco IPO, there is the distinct possibility that Vision 2030 is going to flameout. The multiple foreign policy failures, combined with heavy-handed repression and a steep economic slowdown, will pave the way for serious upheavals within Saudi Arabia. #YearAhead2020 Internationally, the recent announcement of the death sentences handed down to five suspects in the Khashoggi murder once again triggered an international outcry. It was clear that the ruling was merely aimed at whitewashing MBS and his close aides while punishing low-level perpetrators. Such a verdict goes against substantial incriminating evidence and reports produced by the CIA and UN experts. This affair will continue to tarnish the Saudi state reputation for years to come. Internally, since 2015, MBS has eroded his support base within the royal family by alienating several elders and putting others under house arrest. Similarly, the religious establishment, which has been historically instrumental in securing the legitimacy of the monarchy, was deprived of its authority and several religious leaders were put in detention. In 2019, MBS moved against several tribes (e.g. Ghamed, Mutair, Otaiba, Shammar, ‘Anazah) which were loyal to the royal family and played a pivotal role within the security apparatus. These tribes recently saw many of their privileges revoked. Following the mysterious assassination of the bodyguard of King Salman, Abdul Aziz al-Fagham, a respected figure within the Mutair tribe, another leader of the prominent Otaiba tribe, Faisal bin Sultan bin Humaid, was placed in indefinite solitary confinement. Prospects in 2020 are bleak for Saudi Arabia. The erosion of tribal loyalty is a high-security risk; tribal allegiances constitute the last safety net for the kingdom. After years of tinkering, failure to respect the delicate societal balances may well constitute the final nail in the coffin of Mohammed bin Salman’s ambition to become king. In sum, concerns about the stability of the kingdom are higher now that they have been in 50 years. Fire and smoke rise after Saudi warplanes bombed weapon storage sites held by the Houthis the Yemeni capital Sanaa on May 11, 2015. (Mohammed Hamoud - Anadolu Agency) 17 #YearAhead2020 Kashmir 2020: The Year Ahead Ravale Mohydin (Faisal Khan - Anadolu Agency) The Kashmir Dispute in 2020: Is There a Future for Minorities in India? F ebruary 2019 witnessed an attack in Kashmir which killed at least 40 Indian troops in Pulwama, Indian Administered Kashmir - the deadliest to take place since an insurgency against Indian rule in Kashmir began three decades ago. Pakistan and India have fought two wars over the region, the entirety of which is claimed by both but controlled in part only. After both countries went to war in 1947 immediately following independence, the United Nations Security Council facilitated a ceasefire line that eventually became known as the Line of Control (LoC). Kashmiris in Indian Administered Kashmir were subsequently granted special rights enshrined within the Indian Constitution itself under Article 370. In August, fresh off a landslide re-election, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi acted on one of his major campaign promises and revoked Article 370. The article had allowed Kashmir a certain amount of autonomy; its own constitution, a separate flag and a degree of legislative freedom. Article 35A, part of Article 370, defined “permanent residents” of the state and provide special rights and privileges to those permanent residents, including the right to own land. 18 Freedom of speech, movement and congregation were taken away from more than 8 million Kashmiris overnight. A communication blackout ensued that has still not been fully lifted. Reports of human rights violations including lack of access to adequate healthcare, forced disappearances and imprisonment have made international headlines and prominent Kashmiri leaders have been put under house arrest. While international media outlets provided coverage and brought to life an issue not often covered in the international press, despite increasing violence in recent years, the United Nations Security Council failed to agree on a joint statement to condemn India’s actions. While speaking at the 2019 United Nations General Assembly, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan articulated how the deteriorating situation in Kashmir could lead to increased radicalisation and violence... He implored world powers not to ignore Indian actions for the sake of economic opportunity and of the dire consequences of escalation, including the possibility of direct confrontation between India and Pakistan: “If a conventional war starts, anything could happen. But supposing a country seven times smaller than its neighbour is faced with a choice: either you surrender or you fight for your 2020: The Year Ahead freedom till death. We will fight and when a nuclear-armed country fights to the end it will have consequences far beyond the borders, it will have consequences for the world”. With tensions continuing to escalate, the possibility of another large-scale attack against Indian forces remains a distinct possibility despite the 600 000 strong Indian security force operating in the valley. As Prime Minister Imran Khan stated, an attack, such as was witnessed in Pulwama, would not be taken lightly by either the Indian or the Pakistani administrations. Pakistan will be keen to limit such attacks as it does not want a military confrontation, given its focus on economic recovery, lukewarm international support on the issue and the current government’s consistently peace-oriented diplomatic stance. A potential provocation by India is also unlikely considering 2020 is not a major election year and military adventurism, as well as anti-Pakistan rhetoric, are not likely to colour political narratives in the country, which seem to be shifting to domestic provocations against the country’s minority groups. However, at the same time, India’s economy is undergoing a significant slowdown. The Narendra Modi-led BJP government came to power twice on the basis of Hindu nationalism and the promise of economic reform. As the economy suffers, the BJP government’s modus operandi may include a further tightening of restrictions in Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in India. It is reasonable to assume that the Indian government will not lift restrictions in the coming year, as it cannot afford to look ‘weak’ in the eyes of its supporters. It is a well-known fact that the religious polarisation following the 2002 Gujurat riots which saw mob-violence directed towards the state’s Muslim population,, while he was Chief Minister, was central to Modi’s electoral fortunes a few months later. This is also linked with inconsistent international pressure on the Indian government to honour the basic human rights of Kashmiris, if not the special rights guaranteed by both the United Nations and the Indian Constitution when it comes to Kashmiris in Indian Administered Kashmir. President Trump joining Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a rally in Houston before the 2019 UNGA was nothing less than an endorsement of Indian actions regardless of what the US State Department tweets in support of protection of human rights in Kashmir. Another factor that may influence how the international community, most notably the US, approaches the Kashmir issue are the ongoing Afghan peace talks. Even though US-Taliban talks were suspended in September 2019, President Trump made a surprise announcement of their resumption while on a surprise visit to Afghanistan in November. Furthermore, many analysts believe that they will come to sort kind of resolution prior to the 2020 US Presidential election. If indeed this proves to be the case, Pakistan’s successful engagement with the Taliban could be rewarded by US support on the Kashmir issue. A late July 2019 meeting between Prime Minister Imran Khan and US President Donald Trump gave some indications in this regard when President Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute despite India’s insistence on it being resolved bilaterally only a bilateral issue in the context of a meeting centred around the ongoing Afghan Peace Process. The coming year will present Kashmiri Muslims in Indian Administered Kashmir with the option of either resisting or accepting a new political reality. Part of this includes opening up of opportunities to non-Kashmiris to buy land and set up businesses in the valley. While there is a chance this may lead to improved #YearAhead2020 economic opportunity for Kashmiris, there is also significant concern that these measures are merely a cover for a programme of social engineering and demographic change. Given the many forms of resistance thus far witnessed in the Kashmir Valley, ranging from letting apples – the region’s most lucrative export – rot on trees to grenade attacks in universities, the Kashmir Valley will most likely face instability and increasing violence despite attempts by the Indian government to portray normalcy. This was apparent when an Indian government-sponsored Jammu and Kashmir Investor Summit scheduled for October 2019 was postponed to 2020 due to lack of participants and preparedness. It would not be surprising if this event is further postponed as a favourable investment climate remains elusive. It is clear that, instead of integration in the Indian federation, the decision of the BJP to upend the Indian Constitution without consulting Kashmiris represents a blatant disregard for their rights and preferences, leading to acetic resentment, further alienation from New Delhi and increasing incidents of violence caused by a pressure cooker situation. The Narendra Modi-led BJP government is not helping soothe Kashmiri Muslim fears, especially given their intention to implement a nationwide citizenship count expected to render millions of Muslims stateless (a similar one has already taken place in Assam that excluded nearly 2 million Bengali-origin people, mostly Muslims) as well as the controversial Citizen Amendment Act passed in December. Such a state of affairs has been compounded by the controversial Ayodhya verdict that granted Hindus the right to build a temple where the Babri Mosque once stood. As Indian economic growth slows and corruption scandals involving government officials erupt, Bollywood actors regularly photographed with BJP leadership now appear in movies depicting Muslim kings of the past as ‘evil’. 2020 does not bode well for Kashmiris or any other Muslim community in India. Female protesters throw stones during clashes with Indian police in Srinagar,Kashmir on October 29, 2019. Protest and clashes were reported from many areas of Kashmir following the visit of group 27 European Lawmakers to the Kashmir valley.The delagation will access the situation across Kashmir after Indian government revoked Article 370 of its constitution which granted Kashmir autonomy. (Faisal Khan - AA) 19 #YearAhead2020 Afghanistan 2020: The Year Ahead Ravale Mohydin (Haroon Sabawoon - Anadolu Agency) The Afghan Peace Process: Will the United States Withdraw in 2020? O n September 9th, 2019, US President Donald Trump declared peace talks with the Taliban “dead” following an attack in Afghanistan’s capital Kabul which killed a dozen people, including a US soldier. The negotiations were widely expected to eventually lead to intra-Afghanistan peace talks and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had even begun to prepare for by selecting a negotiation team. The attack put a sudden end to rounds of US-Taliban negotiations that had taken place since October 2017 in Qatar, under the auspices of chief negotiator and former US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. There were concerns that the Taliban would seek to disrupt the September 28th Afghan Presidential elections, which they had reportedly hoped to postpone in case of a deal with the US and the establishment of an interim government with their participation. Although the elections were held as scheduled, election-related violence went on to claim 85 lives. Following a nearly threemonth delay and under a cloud of fraud allegations, in late December, preliminary results were announced that show that current president, Ashraf Ghani, is on course to secure a second five-year term with 50.65 per cent of the vote. Following the announcement, the team of leading contender, and Afghanistan’s 20 Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah announced that they would not recognise the results and would lodge a complaint with the Independent Electoral Commission. While the Taliban appear to present a united front, a fragmented and contested Afghan government does not bode well for the US in terms of adding to their negotiating power with the Taliban. Nor does it lend any credibility to the US ‘nation-building project’ that the war in Afghanistan morphed into. It especially doesn’t help that voter turnout during this year’s presidential election was the lowest on record, raising concerns over whether the results could be seen as a comprehensive representation of the interests of the Afghan people. With 2020 being a presidential election year in the US, it should be noted that all candidates have expressed their intention to end the US military presence in Afghanistan. Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders and Joseph Biden – front runner Democratic candidates – have even said they would pull out combat troops even if there is no agreement with the Taliban. Withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan was also one of President Trump’s signature campaign promises. On October 30th, a twelve-member delegation from the Afghan Taliban political office in Doha arrived in Pakistan’s capital 2020: The Year Ahead Islamabad at the invitation of the Pakistani government, the firstever visit of a Taliban delegation since the group established their political office in Qatar in 2013. Zalmay Khalilzad and his team had already arrived in Islamabad prior to the arrival of the Taliban delegation. According to Anadolu Agency, a senior Pakistani foreign ministry official confirmed ‘at least one meeting’ between Khalilzad and the Taliban delegation, “to discuss different ways to resume the talks.” Within a month of these meetings, President Trump announced with his usual bravado that the talks would resume: “The Taliban wants to make a deal - we’ll see if they make a deal. If they do, they do and if they don’t, they don’t and that’s fine.” #YearAhead2020 MOSCOW, RUSSIA - FEBRUARY 06: Head of the Political Office of the Taliban Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanakzai (front L) and related special representatives gather after peace talks on the Moscow format at the President Hotel in Moscow, Russia on February 6, 2019. The Taliban representatives met a number of nongovernment Afghan politicians in the Russian capital for the landmark peace talks.. (Sefa Karacan - AA) A planned prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the Afghan government was announced by President Ghani on November 12, seen by the Afghan government as a key move in securing direct talks with the Taliban. In the eyes of the US, when it came to resuming talks with the Taliban, the ‘something extra’ was provided in the form of an exchange of American hostages and Taliban prisoners that was apparently facilitated by the Afghan government. It seems as though the prisoner swap was an effort on behalf of the US to make it appear that the Taliban is talking to the Afghan government and that the effort was beginning to bear fruit. This confirmed both the resolve of the Taliban and the current US administration’s desire to - at the very least - give the impression of US disengagement in the lead up to the 2020 US Presidential election. The US administration has reportedly outlined a four-step peace plan taking into consideration the realities on the ground as well as US near term goals, the first being US troop withdrawal, and second a commitment from the Taliban to ensure that no attacks against US interests are conducted from Afghan soil. The US has already quietly reduced the number of US troops in Afghanistan by 2,000 over the last year despite there being no deal with the Taliban. President Trump appears keen to honour one of his campaign promises related to US troop withdrawal, particularly as we enter an election year. However, as witnessed from the resulting backlash and criticism in the case of sudden US troop withdrawal from Syria, President Trump may seek to implement a more gradual disengagement. During Trump’s recent surprise visit to the country, the fact that President Trump President Ghani had to meet his American counterpart alone, at odd hours, at an American military base of ill-repute for detention and torture of prisoners in his own country speaks volumes of his perceived importance by the US in their plans for Afghanistan. Furthermore, President Trump reportedly wrote to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan for his help in the USTaliban talks, given Pakistan’s reported influence over the Taliban. Finally, an intra-Afghan dialogue to be hosted by the Norwegian government to negotiate a political settlement that includes all Afghan stakeholders, including the government and the Taliban, remains a significant challenge with no immediate prospects for success. Past data on civilian deaths in Afghanistan clearly outlines the terrible human cost Afghans have had to pay over the years. Furthermore, the Taliban control the same amount of territory now, if not more, as compared to 2001. That, along with the fact that US-backed Afghan security forces are understaffed, limited in technological capacity, lack training and suffer from systemic corruption, underscores the urgent need for a significant US commitment in terms of security personnel and funding. The current US administration does not appear to be forthcoming on this front. However, a complete US withdrawal remains unlikely in 2020. Security and economic considerations entail that the US military presence will likely continue in some capacity even after a withdrawal agreement has been finalised. Trump’s fondness for stopping what he calls “endless wars” has long rankled the US foreign policy establishment who have demonstrated an arguably ill-conceived commitment to US overseas operations, particularly when they relate to the so-called ‘War on Terror’. This could translate into internal resistance to any planned withdrawal Furthermore, opium production skyrocketed from between 2001 and 2019. According to research by Julien Mercille, ‘most commentary glosses over Washington’s large share of responsibility for this dramatic expansion while magnifying the Taliban’s role, which available data indicates is relatively minor’, highlighting ‘American complicity in trafficking’. Additionally, Afghanistan may be home to more than $1 trillion worth of mineral reserves that are very valuable components of many of the US’ most advanced weapons. These issues should not be discounted as potential factors that may modify the US approach to peace talks and its planned withdrawal. 21 #YearAhead2020 Iraq 2020: The Year Ahead Mamoon Alabbasi (Murtadha Sudani - Anadolu Agency) Iraq’s Chronic Problems Likely to Continue in 2020 raq’s anti-government protesters, who took to the streets on October 1st, succeeded in toppling Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi in two months. However, their calls for an end to corruption, more job opportunities and better basic services are not likely to be answered anytime soon. In fact, the country is likely to face in 2020 a similar set of challenges that it did the years before. I The first challenge is selecting a new prime minister who can implement the promises that his predecessors have failed to deliver. The current make up of parliament – based on the results of the May 2018 elections –failed to produce a ruling coalition. The two biggest blocs in parliament are the Saairun Alliance, led by nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Fatah Alliance led by pro-Iran militia leader Hadi Al-Amiri. After each of the rival alliances failed to secure the backing of 165 lawmakers in the 329-seats legislative body needed to form a government, they agreed on a consensus candidate: Abdul-Mahdi. Now they must restart the tedious process of agreeing on another candidate who is likely to be just as weak as Abdul-Mahdi as he will not have the backing of a cohesive parliamentary bloc. Furthermore, the new PM will face the challenge of trying to balance the wishes of the two rival alliances that nominated him. The new candidate will most likely serve in a caretaker capacity, further restricting his powers, until new elections are held. 22 Holding elections, however, will itself be another challenge. Electoral reform is among the demands of protesters, who see the electoral system as being rigged in favour of the existing dominant parties. Although parliament is currently working on a bill to ensure a fairer election mechanism, observers are not expecting a breakthrough. This would, after all, mean that the sitting lawmakers would be voting to effectively reduce the influence of their own parties. However, continued protests coupled with international pressure could result in parliament passing some electoral reforms, which would, therefore, ease tensions over this issue until the next scheduled elections. It is worthwhile to note that many people have been taking to the streets in recent years specifically because they do not believe elections in Iraq are free and fair. There have been numerous calls for a shakeup of the country’s electoral commission, with protesters mocking the word ‘independent’ in its official name: the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). That lack of trust is one of the reasons that Iraq’s 2018 elections witnessed its lowest voter turnout since 2005 (official figures cited 44.5%, but Iraq analysts said the real number is likely to be lower). The doubts of the boycotters were not misplaced. That election witnessed widespread cases of fraud, according to the government’s own investigation, leading parliament to order a partial manual recount and suspend the work of the IHEC. That was further complicated when a fire 2020: The Year Ahead ripped through the country’s largest ballot warehouse ahead of the recount. The controversy over electoral fraud allegations appears to have led Sadr and Amiri, who were competitors during the election campaign, to close ranks in the face of parliament’s legitimacy crisis. When holding elections in 2020, the Iraqi government would not only need to avoid the last voting blunder, it would also need to convince voters – ahead of polling day – that upcoming elections would be different this time around. Half measures would delay, not prevent, another flare-up over the legitimacy of the government. Demonstrators have been increasingly vocal in demanding the curbing of Iranian influence in Iraq. While public sympathy towards Iran from Iraq’s Arab Shia community has been sharply decreasing, Tehran still has the ears of Iraqi politicians across the spectrum. There is a class of politicians, militia leaders and clerics who are vocally pro-Iranian and are likely to remain so, even if it undermines stability in the country. Most of those figures can be found in the Fatah alliance. There is also the class of politicians who, witnessing the increasing public distrust of Iran in Shia communities over the past two years, have rebranded themselves from pro-Iranian to Iraqi moderates. These include members of the al-Hikma movement, led by Ammar al-Hakim. They are now criticised for failing to object to abuses reportedly carried out by pro-Iranian militias against protesters, and are often seen as quiet supporters of Tehran. Finally, there are the Iraqi politicians who present themselves as Iraqi patriots that act independently of Iran’s wishes. These include Sadr, however, there is a limit to the cleric’s ability to resist Iranian pressure. There is little indication that the behaviour of the aforementioned politicians will drastically change in 2020. Iran’s influence has also extended to some politicians from Iraq’s Arab Sunni community, including Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi. Tehran has sought to establish channels with these figures via Iraq’s Shia militia leaders following the war on the Islamic State (IS) in the Sunni-dominated areas of the country. These ties are likely to continue, however, there are other Sunni politicians who – being critical of Iran – prefer to foster ties with Sadr or with former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Often underreported is the extent of Iranian influence on Kurdish #YearAhead2020 parties in Iraq’s semi-autonomous northern region, particularly on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) also enjoys good relations with Tehran, however, their dealings are mostly kept away from the public eye. Good relations between Turkey and the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has made Kurdish politicians who are loyal to the Barzani family less reliant on Iran but that should not be understood as being representative of cooling of ties with Tehran. KDP leaders are less likely to be publically supportive of Iran in the face of US pressure against Tehran as they seek to present themselves as Washington’s allies. There have also been recent reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to strengthen their ties with the KRG. The KRG-controlled region itself witnessed anti-corruption demonstrations against regional politicians in 2017 and 2018, which were subsequently crushed. There was no appetite for disgruntled Iraqi Kurds to risk the wrath of the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan this year, however, all the ingredients for mass discontent are there. A resumption of protests is not out of the question in 2020. The chances of any meaningful change happening in the region, however, are very slim. Small Iraqi Kurdish parties accuse the KDP and PUK of using illegitimate means to maintain a hold of power: election fraud, use of the budget (which comes from Baghdad) to pay for loyalties, intimidation as well as job offers via the Peshmerga (the KDP and PUK are effectively the only two political Kurdish parties which have their own militias), silencing of journalists/dissident and the restriction of the Speaker of Parliament which led to the suspension of Iraqi Kurdistan’s legislative body in 2015 (the last accusation is mainly levelled at the KDP). There is no evidence to suggest that a change in the power balance among Kurdish parries is going to take place anytime soon. Anti-corruption politicians in Baghdad are unlikely to interfere in internal KRG matters. They will want to form alliances with the dominant Iraqi Kurdish parties. Baghdad parliamentarians may pass general anti-corruption laws that overlook loopholes in the Kurdish-majority region. The differences between Baghdad and Erbil are likely to be over budget issues or the status of the multiethnic province of Kirkuk, but not on how the dominant Iraqi Kurdish parties run the KRG. People celebrate after Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi said he would submit his resignation to parliament on November 29, 2019. Iraq has been rocked by mass protests since early October against poor living conditions and corruption. (Murtadha Sudani - Anadolu Agency) Residents of the Sunnimajority areas are likely to continue to have problems with some of their communities’ own representatives in parliament – also accused of corruption. More worryingly, government disregard for the suffering of people in that region will threaten the security of the country as a whole. Though far from their former strength, groups such as Daesh are waiting for the opportunity to make a comeback. 23 2020: The Year Ahead Sahel #YearAhead2020 Arnaud Mafille (ECPAD/ABACAPRESS.COM - Anadolu Agency) Sahel: Towards Escalation or Negotiations? I n 2012, a coalition of armed insurgents linked to AlQaeda took control of northern Mali. In reaction, France, the former colonial power, announced the beginning of Operation Serval to retake control of the region. Since then, the Malian army has mounted several operations under the auspices of the French Operation Barkhane launched in 2014. Despite the deployment of 4,500 French soldiers, 14,000 soldiers acting as part of the UN’s stabilisation mission (MINUSMA), and several battalions from neighbouring countries under the G5 joint mission, military efforts have proven to be counter-productive. While the Al-Qaeda linked insurgents left the major cities they controlled, they actually extended their reach beyond their initial territory in North Mali, launching numerous attacks in including in the capital Bamako, between 2015 and 2018. The insurgency spilt over into central Mali where Katiba Macina, led by Amadou Koufa, effectively took control of large swathes of lands, acting as the de facto local authority. Large-scale attacks were also launched outside Mali, most notably in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, and on Niger’s border. The military intervention has also re-ignited and fuelled ethnic tensions in the region with the rise of self-styled “auto-defence militias” who say they took security into their own hands because the government had failed to adequately protect them. This culminated in the massacre of hundreds of civilians, predominantly 24 Fulani tribesmen, at the hands of the Dogon and Bambara militias who accused them of sympathising with Katiba Macina. Several observers have pointed to the role of the Malian government, or at least some of its members, in the financing and logistical support of these militias. Two other pro-Malian Tuareg militias (who fought alongside French troops), were also accused by the UN of massacring 143 civilians in the region of Menaka. The use of ethnicbased militias in counterinsurgency is not a new phenomenon in the country and has proven disastrous in the past. Meanwhile, the once-divided Al-Qaeda linked groups announced their merger into one entity in 2017: Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa alMuslimin (JNIM). They proclaimed their allegiance to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib, Ayman Al Zawahiri, the amir of Al Qaeda Central and Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban leader of the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The gathering of some of the most wanted men in the world to announce the merger was itself a symbolic defeat for the security forces of the region. The line-up also, highlighted the deep local roots and ethnic diversity of the movement. Beside Iyad Ag Ghaly, a historical figure of the Tuareg insurgency appointed as the group’s amir, appeared Amadou Koufa, a charismatic Fulani preacher and leader, and Hassan al Ansari, from the Arab Lahmar clan, highlighted. To this day, JNIM remains the most significant force in the region. Another actor emerged on the scene in 2016, when Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted the pledge of allegiance of a 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 splinter group led by Abul Walid Al Sahrawi. While the group does not benefit from the same anchorage among local communities as JNIM, it has mounted deadly attacks that killed several US soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers at Tongo Tongo in the province of Tillabéry, as well as dozens of attacks against Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops, militias like the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA), and Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). So far, the military actions led by weak regional states and their foreign sponsors (led by France) have not only failed to end the insurgency but have arguably fuelled instability in the region. Most importantly, they have wholly failed to address the grievances underpinning the insurgency. The grievances include widespread resentment of state officials’ corruption, feelings of victimisation related to the government’s resource management and the shrinkage of pastoral land. These grievances are reflected in the two primary aspirations of JNIM, namely a profound change in Mali’s state institutions through the establishment of ‘Islamic governance’ and a radical transformation of its foreign relations with western powers. While these demands are non-negotiable for the group, all channels of discussion are not closed. As recently as early 2019, Katiba Macina, in particular, has shown willingness to engage in negotiations with the government to swap prisoners. Residents, aid groups and religious scholars have also successfully engaged the group to discuss local issues, humanitarian access and religious doctrine. Further dialogue is made difficult by the lack of trust between insurgents and state interlocutors who they perceived as French agents. In 2018, Amadou Koufa stated: “We want you to understand: we can talk to each other and you can negotiate with us. ... [But] we know that you come to gather information on our positions, our manpower, our weapons and our mode of command. This is the mission that France has entrusted you with”. A year before, he had already stated that: “If you want dialogue, go discuss it with our amir, Iyad ag Ghaly. He is our guide. He is Malian. It is undeniable. If you want peace, go talk with him; otherwise, you won’t have peace, not on this earth or in the hereafter”. The call for dialogue is also growing among civil society actors. In April 2017, hundreds of delegates from across Mali’s ten regions attended a National Conference to promote peace in the country. In their final report, they urged the Malian government to engage in dialogue with Iyad Ag Ghaly. The obstacles to dialogue, however, remain substantial. Firstly, JNIM has been designated as a terrorist group and has international links. Secondly, much of the Malian elite refuses to engage the insurgents, fearing this would give them legitimacy and place them in a position to discuss details of alleged corruption. Thirdly, the obstacles to negotiations are external, with Western powers, most notably France and the United States, having adopted a staunch anti-negotiations position. French President Emmanuel Macron pays his respect to a coffin during the national tribute ceremony to the 13 French soldiers who died in a helicopter collision in Mali at Invalides monument in Paris, France on December 02, 2019. (Mustafa Yalçın - Anadolu Agency) undermine stability. During the NATO summit, held in Brussels on the 20th of November 2019, President Macron issued an ultimatum to African countries to clarify their support for the French military presence. He demanded that West African leaders address growing anti-French sentiment across the region if they wanted France’s armed forces to continue operations against insurgents. This is an important development, which reveals how unpopular the French presence in the Sahel has become. This ultimatum comes following the death of 13 French soldiers after the collision of their helicopters. This incident led to increasing opposition in France regarding operations in the Sahel region. In parallel, Russia has taken steps to get involved in the region. In October 2019, at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, the Acting-President of the G5 Sahel called on Russia for an enhanced strategic partnership. In their view, Russia’s participation could boost their position in the fight against terrorism. However, given Russia’s track record in Syria, any Russian involvement may only bring further instability and chaos. The most likely scenario for the year ahead is that the opportunities for dialogue and reforms will not be pursued by the Malian government; an attitude encouraged by foreign powers. The region is likely to experience long years of conflict similar to Afghanistan and Somalia where non-state armed groups face off against a dysfunctional and largely foreign-backed government. The involvement of neighbouring countries will also likely lead to an escalation of insurgent activity in those countries. Exactions committed by state security forces and “auto-defence militias” are likely to exacerbate the sense of injustice that feeds the insurgency, creating a deeper gap in society. Lessons could be learnt from the US experience in Afghanistan where the Trump administration is now negotiating with the Taliban, which has similar demands as the insurgents in the Sahel. Furthermore, JNIM regards itself as ultimately under the authority of the Taliban. If the United States is able and willing to negotiate with the Taliban, obstacles to dialogue with an affiliate should not be regarded as insurmountable. The French position is unpopular and there has been a growing feeling in the region that France’s counter-insurgency operations 25 2020: The Year Ahead Algeria #YearAhead2020 (Farouk Batiche - Anadolu Agency) Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui Algeria: The Year of Living Dangerously I n 2020, Algeria will be bracing itself for another critical juncture. The past year has been an eventful year for the country with the removal of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika from office. Bouteflika’s downfall occurred after vast waves of protests took hold of much of Algeria. Every Friday, since 22 February 2019, Algerians have taken to the streets in their millions to demonstrate. The Hirak (or movement in Arabic) is the term associated with these recurrent protests and is the outcome of decades of structural injustice and cyclical tensions. Even though this movement is leaderless for now, the involvement of youth, as well as people from all genders, ages, and occupations makes it very difficult for the elites to co-opt it. Moreover, the demonstrators want a total break with the past; hence, the slogan ‘Yetnaḥāw gā’ (They shall all be removed) is widely chanted. They also chant ‘civil state not a military state.’ Others demand a ‘second independence’ (the first independence took place against the French colonial power back in 1962). Nevertheless, the demonstrators have stuck to nonviolent means and have managed to mobilise diverse sectors of the population, such as Islamists, nationalists, and regionalists. While the Hirak has no formal structure, it has achieved some considerable, albeit mostly tactical, victories. It twice forced a postponement of Algeria’s presidential election and has pushed the 26 military establishment to some costly political errors, not least the organisation of the presidential elections on 12 December 2019, which witnessed an abysmally low voter turnout amidst allegations of massive fraud. These elections saw the victory of Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who obtained 58% of votes in the first round. While official numbers show the abstention rate was close to 60%, independent observers believe it was much higher. Following the poll, the Hirak marched in the streets again, demanding genuine reforms and proclaiming the illegitimacy of President Tebboune. Thousands of students, lecturers, and citizens demonstrated in Algiers on 17 December 2019, against the president-elect, refusing his offer of dialogue. These marches took place the same day the Constitutional Council announced the official results of the elections. From the regime’s vantage point, these elections constitute the closing of a tumultuous chapter and the beginning of a new one, in which the intention of establishing a dialogue features high on the agenda. Officials boast that the government did not resort to large-scale violence. In addition, the army showed little appetite to instigate a coup d’état. This situation contrasts with what happened in 1992 when the military stopped the second round of the country’s democratic elections, which witnessed the success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party. Back then, the putsch provoked deadly repression, which lasted until 2004. During that period, the military 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 engaged in an eradication campaign not only to neutralise FIS and its associates but also to terrorise the Algerian population. deficit of $5.22 billion for 2019. As a result of these figures, the state has frozen all major infrastructure projects. Even when establishing such parallels, the bare minimum has been regarded as too little too late for the regime to win the hearts and minds of the people. Recently, such lack of statecraft has had some severe consequences. Firstly, it exposed a leadership deficiency. This factor was somewhat known, given the insistence of the regime to present Bouteflika as a presidential candidate even while he was incapacitated for several years and obviously incapable of leading the country. Still, the Hirak obliged Algeria’s military leaders, who have usually pulled the strings from behind the scenes since the 1960s, to come to the fore with dire outcomes. For instance, the successive speeches by the head of the armed forces, the late Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah, uncovered a man with little gravitas and oratory skills. His speeches were old school, monotonous, and lacked any substance, which alienated people even further. Incidentally, his untimely death on December 23, 2019, threw another spanner in the works for the regime as a more hawkish leader, General Said Chengriha, the new acting chief of staff, gained in importance. If this were not enough, oil prices have been falling throughout 2019. This factor caused a sharp fall in the overall energy export revenue, which accounts for 60% of the state budget and 94% of total export earnings. Consequently, Algeria’s finance minister recently warned that foreign reserves, which amounted to $200bn in 2014, might drop to $50bn by the end of 2020. In the meantime, the Algerian regime passed a new hydrocarbons legislation that is meant to attract more foreign investment. The upper house of parliament upheld this law in late November 2019. However, it has attracted a fair share of criticism by activists and energy professionals alike. In parallel, military leaders continue to alternate the carrot with the stick, resorting to targeted repression, detaining numerous activists, and journalists. When this approach also failed to discourage the popular protests, the interior minister branded critics of the electoral process as “traitors, mercenaries, homosexuals”. Secondly, the regime adopted the same playbook used by other authoritarian rulers across the region by actively resisting any proposed reforms, trying to outwait the protests, and using ‘divide and conquer’ tactics. These endeavours were, for the most part, unsuccessful. Attempts were made to sow discord in the ranks of the movement. This was done by singling out and demonising the Kabyle region. This plan backfired, and demonstrators across the country began chanting ‘khawa khawa’ (brothers brothers). Additional tactics consisted of over-emphasising the “threat” of the foreign interventions to inhibit the desire of the masses for change and to establish roadblocks to ban non-residents of Algiers from visiting the city, thus affecting the size of the protests. However, in the absence of any genuine political roadmap for reform from the regime, these manoeuvres achieved very little and have exacerbated the frustrations of the citizenry, who continue to march against the government. In the upcoming year, concerns vis-a-vis the long-term and definitive transition to democracy, the primacy of the civilian political leadership over the military, and the rule of law have become acute. The popular movement has reached a critical threshold that now challenges the entire political status-quo. In order to keep up the same level of mobilisation and to progress to the next level, the Hirak would need to structure itself from the ground up. Precariously, such a process entails real dangers and acts as a double-edged sword since this could lead to the neutralisation or co-optation of its emerging leaders. The regime could also exploit the contradictions and drive a wedge between the grassroots and their leaders. On the other hand, the economic constraints will oblige the government to bite the bullet and seek assistance from international banks to finance imports and the deficit of the Algerian State. This will mean going deep into a vicious cycle of debt, low growth, and high unemployment. This could potentially drag the country into more rounds of upheaval and push the military to impose their authority directly if things get out of control. As succinctly articulated by former British Prime Minister David Cameron regarding Britain in 2010: “The political system is broken, the economy is broken and so is society. That is why people are so depressed about the state of our country.” This statement seems more suited at present for Algeria, which will face another challenging year ahead. Thirdly, the regime’s strategic communications have failed to persuade the masses that the presidential election is the best course of action. After months of an intensive and multi-layered news blitzkrieg via many platforms, including television, print media, and social media, combined with considerable support from foreign countries (especially the United Arab Emirates), most people remained entrenched in their support for the Hirak and this was reflected in the poor voter turnout. Unlike President Bouteflika, the current rulers are unable to buy social peace. The economy is declining and the state coffers are empty. Algeria will post a budget deficit of 7.2% of GDP for 2020, or $12.6 billion. The deficit of the Algerian state was 6.9% in 2019. Moreover, it posted a trade Recently-deceased Algerian Army Chief Gaid Salah (Mohamed Basher Zamry - Anadolu Agency) 27 2020: The Year Ahead Lebanon #YearAhead2020 Michael Arnold (Mahmut Geldi - Anadolu Agency) Lebanon’s Political and Economic Crises 2 020 promises to be a year of instability for Lebanon as the interrelated political and economic crises continue to play out. While the country is known for its unstable political environment, in 2020, it will become increasingly clear that the political dynamics in the country are not the same as those of the past. The multi-sectarian popular uprising that broke out across the country in late 2019 has altered the political landscape in the country in a way not seen since the emergence of the rival March 8th and March 14th blocs in the wake of the 2006 assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Perhaps the only positive note in an otherwise gloomy 2020 forecast is that the multi-sectarian protest movement that emerged as a significant political force in October is set to increase its political influence in 2020. This is despite attempts to undermine it either through attempts to paint the movement as being responsible for worsening the country’s economic crisis or through attempts by established parties through what can best be labelled as an effort to re-sectarianize the political space in the country. If there is one thing that activists, analysts, observers and representatives of the traditional political class seem to have implicitly agreed on, it is that a deep shift has taken place, and, as a result, the country is now sailing in uncharted political waters. 28 As a result, traditional frameworks through which Lebanon’s political dynamics have been previously analysed must be adjusted. While developments in the country will remain fluid through 2020, there remains a strong chance that if a government can indeed be formed under the Premiership of former Education Minister and university professor Hassan Diab, it will manage to not only survive through 2020, but may even have some success in pushing through at least a minimal level of reforms. A number of analyses have advanced the idea that that the nomination of Diab is ultimately a joint Hezbollah-Hariri ploy to ensure Hariri’s return to the Prime Minister’s chair. This analysis, however, represents a reading of Lebanese politics based largely on the March 8th - March 14th dichotomy that is arguably no longer sufficient for understanding political developments in the country. In response to the political earthquake the protest movement has proven to be, the calculus of established parties has shifted. Those who have advanced this reading hold that Diab will be seen - both locally and internationally - as being too close to the March 8th bloc (and therefore Hezbollah), leading to two mutually reinforcing consequences. Firstly, The ‘Sunni street’ will feel they are not represented in the new government, leading to potential sectarian unrest. This narrative will be pushed by Hariri and his Future Movement, who have retained the support of Dar al-Fatwa, Lebanon’s highest Sunni institution, in an effort to maintain their 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 Protestors burn tires to block roads heading to the city center during a protest against increasingly difficult living conditions, at Martyrs’ Square in Beirut, Lebanon on September 29, 2019. (Hussam Chbaro - Anadolu Agency) already weakened support. Secondly, the international community, particularly the members of the International Support Group for Lebanon, will also see the new government as being too close to Hezbollah and will consequently view the government as not being able to bring stability to the country, particularly in Future Movement supporters continue to agitate. Both of these would serve to undermine the popular uprising through a re-sectarianizing of the issues, thus giving credence to the idea that the established parties are the only ones that can guide Lebanon through the crisis. It would also put forward Hariri as the only figure capable of taking the economic reigns in the country and the only one preventing a Hezbollah takeover. At the same time, he would fall back into the role of providing the government cover for Western and Gulf concerns regarding Hezbollah. While it is true that Hezbollah has wanted Hariri to come back from the beginning (they strongly opposed his October 29th resignation), they, and their allies, were not in agreement with his stated conditions, namely the formation of a non-political cabinet led by Hariri. Under the country’s shifting political dynamic, it does not make sense for Hezbollah to go through all of these theatrics just to bring Hariri back. For one, he lacks credibility with the street, a calculus that no party can afford not consider at this point. Furthermore, he clearly does not have the support of his traditional political allies, namely Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party and, more importantly, his main Christian ally, Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces (LF) let alone the confidence of Saudi Arabia and the United States, traditional supporters of Hariri and his Future Movement. There is no doubt that Hariri will remain a significant political figure and will be ready and waiting to come back into the picture should the circumstances present themselves. However, given the circumstances, there is reason to believe that Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement will try to move forward with Diab in the Prime Minister’s chair. Diab as PM presents the traditional March 8th parties, most notably Hezbollah, with a potentially low risk - high reward opportunity. For Hezbollah, it is a chance to demonstrate its political credibility and show that it is more than an armed group and an Iranian proxy. Most importantly, it gives the chance for Hezbollah to push a reform agenda (albeit from behind the scenes) that Hariri and the previous government could not accomplish. It also gives the party the opportunity to show that it, unlike the other parties, is willing to compromise. Hezbollah has less of a direct stake in Lebanon’s financial sector than others. This could make them more willing to hold to account those bankers and officials who earned massive profits from the financial engineering schemes. The fact that through their political alliance they possess a parliamentary majority makes it all the more likely that a selective ‘reform’ agenda could be undertaken. The prospects of succeeding are arguably aided by the fact that the newly emerging political dynamic means the old political calculus of ensuring everyone gets their share of the pie no longer carries the same weight that it once did. There has been an unspoken agreement for some time between Hariri’s Future Movement and Hezbollah, namely that Future is responsible for economic affairs while Hezbollah is responsible for security. It has now become clear that Hariri’s economic approach has failed. With people in Lebanon desperate for measures to be taken that could improve their day-to-day situation, a Hezbollahbacked Diab-led government has the opportunity to score points where Hariri has failed. While the bar for success is arguably low, there remains the possibility that Lebanon’s economic situation has gone past the point of no return as it relates to the lifespan any new government might have to address some of the more pressing issues. Rather than being a theatrical ploy to bring Hariri back into the PMs chair, the nomination of Diab may represent a new strategy; namely, 29 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 to bring in a primarily ‘technocratic’ government - thereby subduing some of the popular anger and international concerns - that is not controlled or influenced by Hariri. The party’s slow move away from Hariri as their sole option may also be related to the perception, following the December 11th meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon, that the countries party to the conference are increasingly involved in trying to engender a situation whereby a new authority would emerge in Lebanon to the detriment of Hezbollah. While there remain many unknowns, the opposition to all figures associated with the country’s political class will remain strong through 2020 and beyond, particularly in what promises to be a long lead up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2022. Economy On the economic front, Lebanon will continue to face tremendous challenges, some which may take years to overcome even under the most ideal scenario. 2020 may see the country gain access to funds pledged by the International Support Group for Lebanon if the new government can begin enacting necessary reforms. However, with the IMF predicting poverty levels to rise to 50 per cent - a figure that reflects pre-crisis projection - businesses continuing to close or lay off employees and the state on the verge of bankruptcy, economic prospects for 2020 do not look very bright. While the country is in desperate need of international financial assistance, no country will be willing to step forward until the makeup of a new government capable of carrying out reforms is achieved. In December, caretaker Lebanese Finance Minister Ali Hasan Khalil announced that that the country’s fiscal deficit for 2019 would be much larger than expected due primarily to contraction in the country’s GDP. Furthermore, government revenues are projected to be 40 per cent less than anticipated. Public debt is expected to rise to 155 per cent of GDP by the end of 2019, according to the IMF Report. Furthermore, gross public debt reached $87.1 billion at the end of October. Significantly, diplomatic sources have been quietly speaking about the potential of up to $6 billion worth of deposits from the Gulf into the Lebanese treasury. However, this will only materialise following the formation of a cabinet that meets the required specifications. The US and its Gulf allies will likely seek to maintain their influence through these and other related means, however, with the potential of a Hezbollah dominated government without cover from Hariri and his Future Movement, the strings attached to these funds are likely to be more stringent if they are forthcoming at all. As part of its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran, the US has been relentless in seeking to cut sources of funding to Hezbollah, deploying a host of sanctions as well as using funding assistance to the Lebanese Army as leverage. Currently, there seem to be two schools of thought in Washington regarding how to approach the situation in Lebanon vis-a-vis Hezbollah. On the one hand, one way of thinking seeks to pressure the Lebanese state by withholding financial aid in order to squeeze Hezbollah, while the other sees the funding of the Lebanese Army in particular, as the most effective means of ensuring a relative balance of forces in the country and securing US interests in the face of not only of Iranian designs but also increasing Russian penetration into the region. 30 Prime Minister-designate Hassan Diab, holds a press conference after meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun (not seen) at Baabda Palace in Beirut, Lebanon on December 19, 2019. (LEBANESE PRESIDENCY / HANDOUT - Anadolu Agency) The dollar liquidity crisis the country continues to face will come to ahead in 2020 as importers will effectively run out of available dollars to pay for goods from abroad, including essentials such as fuel, foodstuffs and medical equipment. While these issues are likely to be addressed in the short term by way of an injection of foreign capital, in the long run the fiscal situation and the liquidity crisis - and its consequences - will only be brought under control via taxation and spending reforms and a monetary policy that considers social consequences by focusing, on issues such as price stability. Perhaps one of the most significant challenges for 2020 and beyond will be to restore confidence in the country’s financial sector. In the coming year, banks will have a near-impossible time convincing Lebanese ex-pats, once the major source of foreign currency deposits, to continue to trust their money to Lebanese banks. The inability to maintain the flow of US dollar deposits into the country will ultimately affect the ability of the Lebanese Central Bank (BDL) to maintain the peg of the Lebanese Lira. While the official rate will likely remain at the peg level (approximately 1500 LBP/USD) through at least the first half of 2020, it will continue to lose value in the unofficial exchange market as the amount of available dollars in the country continue to dwindle. One possible side effect of this could be a boom in real estate. Investors, unable to withdraw their bank deposits in hard currency, may be tempted by the prospect of channelling what have effectively become useless dollars outside of Lebanon into the country’s real estate market. With banks continuing to severely restrict access to money, arbitrary price increases, layoffs and the beginnings of what could prove to be an acute shortage of essential commodities, the situation is likely to worsen over the coming months. A spate of recent suicides in the country are demonstrative of the fact that the system is crushing people’s dignity. #YearAhead2020 France 2020: The Year Ahead Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui (Julien Mattia - Anadolu Agency) France: A Game at which Two Can Play? 2 020 may be a turbulent year for France with multiple factors playing a role. Most significantly, these include social unrest and France’s declining international position. The former has given rise to the Yellow Vests, or Gilets Jaunes, a political movement that has brought together the economically marginalised in France to seek concessions from the political elite. Drawing hundreds of thousands of protesters at its peak, the Yellow Vest movement has capitalised on the social unrest in France arising from financial insecurity and inequality. It has built a national profile from the grassroots with only two main prerequisites: feeling discontent with the established economic order and possessing a yellow vest. The former is prevalent, and the latter is easily accessible as it is by law carried by every driver in France. The overall economic situation in France has fuelled the discontent felt by the protesters, who hail overwhelmingly from the working and middle classes. High unemployment has had significant costs to individuals and society as a whole, increasing financial hardships and personal grievances. France has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Europe, and the established economic order has been regarded as one of the leading causes. With a portion of the unemployed lacking the necessary skills to be employed, the education system has only served to crystallise the lack of social mobility amongst citizens who are referred to as the ‘left-behind’. Socioeconomic background plays a substantial role in educational outcomes and career choice in France, with systemic inequalities preventing upward social mobility. France’s neoliberal economic policies have also led to stagnating incomes. While the top-income earners have been getting richer over the last few decades, the lowest earners have seen their purchasing power decrease. This deep-rooted inequality has been a core driver of social unrest, with people likewise feeling overburdened with taxes. France’s high-tax, low-growth economy has contributed to the rise of populism, and some voters feel alienated by the neoliberal policies that have caused paychecks to dwindle and bills to increase. The government’s top-down political program lead by Macron has only added insult to injury. It has served to solidify the disconnect between the leaders and the people, reversing the democratic dynamic of who’s who with respect to the servants and the masters. His first action was to repeal the Wealth Solidarity Tax, or L’impôt de solidarité sur la fortune, a widely unpopular move – particularly when combined with Macron’s background as a banker. Policies that seem to disproportionately affect the working and middles classes, such as the fuel tax which sparked the Yellow Vest movement, has earned Macron a lower approval rating than US President Donald 31 2020: The Year Ahead Trump. His decision to celebrate the police and armed forces has also caused widespread consternation in France, particularly in light of the many accounts of police brutality and overuse of force. Nevertheless, the Yellow Vests have won concessions from Macron’s government, with one member of the ruling party calling its effects an ‘earthquake’ for some cities. Whether more concessions are forthcoming is uncertain. The offered concessions include wage increases, tax cuts, and initiating a country-wide debate called ‘Le Grand Débat’ on how to move forward vis-à-vis the government’s policy agenda. With respect to the latter, it has so far been unproductive with one magazine depicting Macron in a local discussion with a speech bubble saying, “I came to hear you listen to me.” His elitist attitude has not gone down well with voters, who see him as out-of-touch. How he acts moving forward remains to be seen, with mixed signals as to if he is revising his agenda or just rearranging it in light of unexpected pushback. Furthermore, it is notable that France’s issues go beyond the domestic, as its international stock arguably continues to decrease. Turkey’s President Erdogan said that President Macron was in a state of ‘brain death’ after his comments on NATO that were similarly not well-received by President Trump who labelled them as ‘nasty’. The French envoy to Mali was also recently expelled, being given 24 hours to leave and labelled as ‘persona non grata’. For all intents and purposes, France’s geopolitical position has been ineffective in places ranging from Syria to the Sahel, where France has been largely ineffective in leading a regional counter-terrorism campaign. There has been no progress since it entered the region in 2013, and the anti-insurgent operation has led to the deaths of 41 French soldiers, 13 of which came in a single helicopter accident in November 2019. Additionally, the France-led G5 Sahel bloc has been ineffective, and while France has been asking EU countries to send troops for support, only Estonia has so far agreed to send up to 50 soldiers. #YearAhead2020 Looking ahead to 2020, the foundations of future developments have been built. France is currently engulfed in protests and strikes, this time after an unpopular proposal from Macron to reform the pension system. His government argues that the system is confusing and inefficient, while workers say it is a plain attempt at making them work longer for less. How this opposition will affect the upcoming year is multifaceted. If the government backs down, like Chirac’s government in 1995 after four weeks of crippling strikes, then protests will subside relatively swiftly. If the government continues on this path, like Prime Minister Phillipe recently indicated, then France will need to brace itself for continued discontent. This protest has the potential to evolve, and workers are aware of their leverage. They are using various tools to try to make the government concede, such as the reported cutting off electricity to nearly 100,000 homes by French union activists. The Yellow Vest movement, currently suffering from an identity crisis, will continue into 2020 as a potent anti-establishment force – but perhaps not in its usual form. While initially consisting mainly of working and middle-class individuals protesting a fuel tax, it is now a movement that acts as an umbrella for many disaffected segments of society such as unemployed youth and the socially marginalised. This ideologically diverse grouping has the potential to grow next year, but it is unlikely to reach the levels it attained in 2018. The class struggle, however, will linger and the establishment as a whole is the target, with other issues such as globalisation and centralisation in Paris being of concern. The Yellow Vests are leaderless, and every indication is that they will remain so. Their ideology, while disparate at the individual level, has a common theme of distrust of government. This suggests that this movement will feel invigorated by other initiatives targeting class disparity, as displayed by their participation in the protests against pension system reform. Nevertheless, France’s economy is currently outpacing its neighbours. It depends more heavily on services than exports, People attend the 20th week of Yellow vest demonstrations in Paris, France on March 30, 2019. (Julien Mattia - Anadolu Agency) 32 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 EPA-EFE/IAN LANGSDON - Anadolu Ajansı making it relatively insulating it from global trade currents. France’s GDP is forecasted to grow at a Euro-area high of 1.2 per cent next year – yet, its debt is also nearing 100 per cent of GDP, making it vulnerable to any potential economic shocks or market pressures in the coming months. The unemployment rate, while declining, will remain substantively high – more than double that of Germany. Lower-skilled workers will still find good jobs with steady incomes hard to come by, as root causes of a flawed education system and inferior access to training are unlikely to be addressed. Labour market reforms have additionally made it easier to hire and fire employees, which has been both a bane and a boon depending on whom you ask. For the Yellow Vests, these reforms are being done with a pro-business agenda that has marginalised many. Labelled as necessary and pro-growth by establishment figures, those who struggle to make ends meet conversely feel left behind. Next year, France’s decreasing position in the world will look similar to where it is now. With a new policy of improving its relations with Russia, it recently held a summit with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. President Macron also visited China in November, two months after German Chancellor Merkel. These advances suggest national interests remain pre-eminent and can be worthwhile considering its position elsewhere. Attempting to gain leverage in Syria, supporting the Libyan warlord Haftar against the international community, and seeking international assistance in the Sahel have been - at best - fruitless initiatives. It is evident that Macron will display the same scepticism in the future of NATO and the current EU enlargement process, believing the international system needs a shake-up. Whether France will be followed in these causes remains to be seen. Macron’s remarks on NATO were poorly received by counterparts, and Germany has already neglected demands for structural reforms to the EU. France has much to address entering the new decade. It has an economy that, while stable, has room for improvement after marginalising many. The Yellow Vest movement has captured some of the grievances held by those left behind, and their discontent will not subside in the coming year with Macron promising not to capitulate on his neoliberal reform project. With both sides wrangling, it is a game at which two can play. The solidarity behind the Yellow Vest movement is what created optimism amongst its ranks for a better future. Still, Macron seems to have a different concept of an ideal France – one with the same insecurities but with strict anti-riot legislation. Placing the Yellow Vest movement in a wider framework, it can also potentially encourage similar initiatives in other EU countries, with neoliberal policies having a negative impact across Europe. A characteristic shared with globalisation, France has a declining position in the world, which signs indicate will continue. Its ineffective foreign policy and geopolitical ambitions have yet to bear fruit. Overall, President Macron has much to do in the year ahead, facing pressing issues all over the national and international policy agenda. Macron’s approach to multilateralism will also be notable in 2020. 33 United States of America 2020: The Year Ahead Mustafa Metin Başbay #YearAhead2020 (Mohammed Elshamy - Anadolu Agency) The US Economy: Is a Recession Coming? A number of analysts are quite pessimistic about the prospects of the American economy in 2020. This may be surprising, given that the US economy seems to the untrained eye at least, to be doing just fine. The Unemployment rate is at record lows, and there is no sign of any serious slowdown in growth. Why then, do so many economists expect a recession in 2020? First, some analysts claim that the current favourable business environment will be short-lived, as it was originally triggered by the Trump administration’s fiscal stimulus package. One of the first things the Trump administration did in office was to drop the tax rates for the rich and expand government spending. Consequently, the budget deficit has increased. However, as investors bought into this euphoria, it also supported growth and employment. Recently, President Trump said he is considering further tax cuts for boosting the economy. However, the problem with such fiscal stimuli is that their effects do not usually lead to sustainable growth but rather to ‘bubbles’. They last for a while and then go bust, and when they do go bust, they cause even deeper problems than that would have occurred in the first place. Secondly, ten years after the 2008 global financial crisis which has witnessed the second-longest period of expansion in American 34 history, a recession seems to be expected by market observers in any case. A period of economic expansion is almost always followed by a recession, where another cycle of boom-and-bust begins. This is the nature of a typical business cycle. Though business cycles are not determinist processes and, according to some economists, there is actually nothing inevitable about them, they still seem to be the rule rather than the exception in modern economies. Economists have offered various reasons for this pattern, but we do not really know why they happen or when they happen, except that they usually do. Third, the on-going trade war with China puts extra pressure on American industries. As the possibility of a trade war arguably continues to be a serious risk, a lot of investment decisions have been put on hold. Furthermore, the extra tax burden on Chinese imports increases production costs for American firms, while restrictions on technology exports to Chinese producers are affecting the exports. Of course, this is nothing compared to the potential effects of a full-fledged economic war between China and the US, however, it has already shown signs of impeding growth. Forth, other major economies are currently experiencing slow growth which directly affects the American economy. In particular, the UN’s trade and development body UNCTAD in its 2019 report said that 2020 may see the weakest growth record in a decade and the risk of a synchronized global recession is high. 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 China, Germany, Japan, the UK and others have all reported a slow-down in growth, with forecasts signalling continued suppressed growth-rates in major economies. The Brexit process creates uncertainties about the Euromarket altogether while trade wars disrupt supply chains around the world. This is likely to affect the US economy eventually through both supply and demand relations. There is some good news. The yield curve, a closely watched recession alarm, recently stopped flashing. The yield curve basically shows the gap between the returns on 10-year and 3-month American Treasury bonds. Normally, this should be positive because long-term assets are riskier The New York Stock Exchange. As of last year, the total market price of trading stocks were worth and thus pay more than short-term more than $21 Trillion, the largest trade volume in the world. ( Atılgan Özdil - Anadolu Agency ) assets. When the gap flattens or, even worse, turns negative, it is taken as still sits on an enormous amount of public debt it accumulated at a sign of a potential recession, as it the time. By January 2019, US government debt was around $22 indicates that investors see troubles ahead and wants to stay on trillion; that is 105% of the GDP, compared to only 64% prior to the the safe side with short-term bonds. Every recession in the past 2008 crisis. Such levels of public debt have not been seen since 60 years has happened after it was signalled by the yield curve, the Second World War. case of recession, the US government’s although it has also predicted recessions that did not materialise. fiscal capacity to fight back is therefore limited. After the Trump administration’s tax cuts, the prospects for US public debt looks When earlier this year the uncertainty over the China-US trade even worse. dispute simmered and the yields in American bond market bottomed, the inverted yield curve started flashing, signalling Furthermore, the Fed’s policy rate is very close to hitting the lower a potential recession. But, as more optimistic news started to bound, which economists say reflects a situation where economic come from the negotiation process between China and the US, e activities remain stagnant, despite very low-interest rates. This has the situation seems to have somewhat improved. Accordingly, by placed the Fed in a situation where it also does not have the tools at October, the yield curve once again turned positive. It seems that its disposal needed to counter the next recession. The Fed dropped as long as the parties stay at the table, the markets will continue the policy rate to the minimum following the 2008 crisis and started pricing optimism. increasing it in 2017 after very low-interest rates prevailed for years. The plan was to unload billions worth of securities and bonds and Another positive force is decreasing interest rates. In the last few gradually increase the rate to a range between 3-3.5% in 2019, so months, first, the European Central Bank (ECB), then the Federal this unprecedented monetary experiment may end and everything Reserve (Fed), and finally a number of other central banks around can go back to normal until the next recession hits. But things did the world have reduced their policy rates. Lower interest rates give not go as planned. a boost to the markets because they reduce the cost of borrowing for both the investors and consumers. This wave of interest rate After growing worries that the US economy may fall back into reductions has also possibly contributed to the normalisation of the recession, the Fed was forced to reduce interest rates once again. yields. It lowered the rate back to the range of 2-2.25% by the end of July. Therefore, despite being good news in the short-run, decreasing However, investors and economists have both indicated that interest rates may be problematic from a long-run perspective. We the economy is still not in the clear. Nouriel Roubini, ] said the do not really know what the Fed is going to do if the next recession US is nowhere near the safe zone, and that investor optimism is hits before the Fed and other major central banks have a chance to unfounded. According to Roubini, China and the US are far from increase the rates. reaching a final deal, and it is more likely that the current negotiation process will end with a crash rather than reconciliation. Roubini Overall, it is fair to say that 2020 comes with great risks for the expects an escalation in the trade dispute after 2020 American American economy. US-China trade tensions and an ongoing elections. Roubini’s approach may sound too pessimistic, however, synchronized growth slow-down in other major economies are the he is not the only one. main sources of increased risk. The prolonged expansion since the last crisis seems to be based on shaky grounds like the oneA very worrying issue about the coming recession is that neither the off fiscal stimulus package of the Trump administration. What is US government nor the Fed has the policy arsenal they had prior to most worrying is that neither the government nor the Fed, have the the 2008 financial crisis. In fact, most advanced economies could necessary policy tools to fight the next recession, if or when it hits. not even fully recover from the 2008 crisis. The US government 35 United States of America 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 (Eva Marie Uzcategui T. - Anadolu Agency) Michael Arnold US Presidential Elections : Four More Years for Trump? T he word ‘impeachment’ has been floating around the American political ether almost since day one of the Trump presidency. In late 2019, the question of whether Trump has finally been answered. On December 19th, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to formally impeach Donald Trump for obstruction of Congress and abuse of power related to his dealings with Ukraine. This marked just the third time an American president has been impeached, setting up a likely January trial in the US Senate. So far, all indications are that Trump will survive the Senate proceedings, as Republicans have doubled down on their support since the impeachment proceedings began, meaning that Trump will indeed be running for re-election in 2020. In 2020, the world will once again be subjected to the strangely grotesque, yet fascinating display that is American presidential electoral politics. With Donald Trump seemingly besieged from all sides, the already bizarre display promises to be an eccentric and dramatic piece of political theatre. The question on everyone’s mind is, will the impeachment issue have any impact on the 2020 presidential race? While the world seems to expect that the American people will, and indeed should, 36 cast the bellicose president aside, the reality of American political dynamics may prove to be more than the Democrats can overcome. This is particularly the case in light of what seems to be an understandable, yet potentially misguided strategy focused on impeachment and related issues. Generally speaking, these types of complex legal and political issues turn out to have little impact on electoral campaigns which tend to focus on so-called ‘bread and butter issues’. They also have little effect on shifting what is an already entrenched public opinion, particularly when the end result is effectively pre-determined. What Democrats have succeeded in doing is corralling everyone who was already anti-trump, into the pro-impeachment camp. In spite of the impeachment, in spite of the scandals, accusations of ties with white supremacists and foreign policy debacles, all signs indicate that there is a high likelihood that Donald Trump is set to return to the White House for four more years There are several reasons for this, much of which have to do with the fact that American politics have become so predictably polarized in recent years that electoral success often comes down to the voting behaviour of key demographics in a handful of states and electoral districts. Polling suggests that voters in key swing state electoral districts are not interested in making impeachment an election issue. In 2020: The Year Ahead #YearAhead2020 the context of an election year, impeachment as an electoral strategy may backfire for the Democrats, particularly as it has engendered an even more polarized political environment than other options the party may have had, such as censure. The spectacle of a Senate trial has the potential to harm Democratic chances in three key ways. Firstly, Senate Republicans will ensure that Trump’s accomplishments and what they see as his bright spots are highlighted alongside the inevitable airing of his dirty laundry. Furthermore, since the impeachment issue hinges on Trump’s dealings in Ukraine, much of the conversation in the Senate promises to revolve around both Joe Biden, currently the Democratic front-runner, and his son Hunter. This is likely to hurt Biden and the Democrats more than Trump, particularly as the Democrats remain fiercely divided over who they will choose to represent them on the presidential ticket come November. Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders delivers a speech during his first presidential campaign rally at Brooklyn College in New York, United States, March 2, 2019. (Atılgan Özdil - Anadolu Agency) Secondly, the trial - likely to take place over the course of six to eight weeks beginning in January - will require that key Democratic Senators including Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren, Cory Booker and Amy Klobuchar, currently on the campaign trail, to return to Washington DC at a key juncture of the campaign. Thirdly, the Democrats seem to be enamoured with the more liberalleft leaning elements within their party, with leading candidates all trying to demonstrate their ‘progressive credentials’. While some of the more populist-oriented proposals such as universal health care coverage, basic income, debt relief for university students, among a host of others, have the potential to gain traction among key electoral demographics, the focus on impeachment and Trump’s ‘character issues’ will take away from those conversations. Democratic strategists trying to link the Ukraine affair to the daily concerns of many Americans will find that their messages being lost in translation. In effect, the impeachment issue may prove to be more of a curse than a blessing for Democrats as it represents a potentially significant opportunity cost. By turning their attention to impeachment and Trump’s presidential suitability, Democrats are taking resources away from efforts to push key issues such as health care, wages, labour issues - notably the fact that the Manufacturing Index in the US continues to drop month after month - where Trump is particularly vulnerable. Focusing on Trump’s belligerent behaviour and corruption is not the winning strategy that some Democrats may think it is. Key analyses of US voting patterns suggest that the 2020 presidential election will come down to several key battleground states - namely Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Florida and approximately ten counties within these and a handful of other states. In the end, it is all about mobilizing key demographics. In 2020, one of the key determining factors will be voting patterns of middle and working-class white women. This is not to say that the Democrats ability to mobilize African American and Hispanic voters is not an important factor to consider. This is all the more important in light of documented cases of voter suppression tactics deployed by Republicans including intimidation of minority voters, curbs on voter registration and election security issues. Republicans have been hesitant to spend money securing electronic voting systems, which does not bode well 2020 in light of the fact that foreign - notably Russian - meddling reportedly focused on African American voters in particular. A key demographic that voted strongly for Obama in 2008 and 2012 - namely white women - seems to have been the decisive factor in Trump’s 2016 narrow victory over Hillary Clinton. How did Trump manage to attract this key group of voters? Without oversimplifying American political dynamics and the impact of the sophisticated electoral machines deployed vby both parties, Trump managed to attract white middle and working-class women because he spoke about issues that mattered to them. Obama was successful largely because he did the same thing. By focusing on impeachment and character issues the Democrats are shooting themselves in the foot. For better or worse, barring unforeseen circumstances, the world is likely going to have to learn to deal with President Donald Trump for another four years. 37