The Russo Ukrainian War and the art of Opportunism

nr 2 april/juni 2019 The Russo-Ukrainian War and the art of opportunism by Ilmari Käihkö titel: Ukraine and the Art of Strategy författare: Lawrence Freedman förlag: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019 sagt om ryssland för ett och två tredjedels Putin to the position of an expert strategist sekel sedan: ”The policy and practice of the who had mastered this new kind of “hybrid” Russian government has always been to warfare. With seemingly unlimited ambition push forward its encroachments as fast and and following the logic Lord Palmerston as far as the apathy and want of firmness of warned about, Putin was perceived to stop other governments would allow it to go, but only when pushed back. Some went as far as always to stop and retire when it met with to describe the situation as a new Cold War. decided resistance and then to wait for the The fears were most profoundly felt in the next favourable opportunity to make another small countries bordering Russia and gave new life to discussions whether national spring on its intended victim.” This assessment offers a succinct summa- defence has been neglected within the EU rization of how Russia has been viewed by and NATO. This is the context where the new book observers for a rather long time. Penned by Lord Palmerston after the Crimean crisis in by Lawrence Freedman – Emeritus Professor 1850s, the assessment appears little changed of War Studies at King’s College London in 2019, five years after Russia occupied and – makes its mark. Ukraine and the Art of annexed the peninsula from Ukraine. This Strategy offers a level-headed analysis of the second Crimean crisis was a rude wakeup call conflict in Ukraine that began in November for the West. Russia was not only prepared 2013, and which soon escalated into a war to use military force to resolve international that continues at the time of writing. Based on three blog posts later expanded crises and violate international law by annexing territory, but to do so in a way that into longer articles, the short volume has combined traditional military means with a four chapters. The first one focuses on strategic theory. This chapter introduces several variety of non-military ones. The apparent Russian successes against key concepts – such as crisis management, Ukraine during 2014 led to widespread views deterrence and limited war – necessary to that elevated the Russian president Vladimir understand the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The 166 litteratur second chapter offers the background to of a coherent strategy. Not only does this the conflict, and describes the protests that mean that Russia is equaled to a monolith led to the fall of the Yanukovych regime in directed by one man with a nefarious plan, February 2014. The third chapter covers the the idea of hybrid warfare also makes war occupation and annexation of Crimea, and ubiquitous. Considering that the Russian the subsequent War in Donbas, and reaches forays in Ukraine directly led to its dipto mid-2015. The fourth chapter investigates lomatic and economic isolation and huge the subsequent shifting of the international reputational costs, it appears too early to context. This chapter accounts for the effects call out Putin a winner. of the War in Syria, the electoral victory of Freedman thus offers an interesting inDonald Trump and cyber and information terjection into what often appears a field operations to the Russo-Ukrainian War. The dominated by voices which argue that the conclusions end in bullet points that summa- response of the West to Russian aggression rize the lessons from of Ukraine for overall has been too cautious. Considering that policy responses in democracies are ultimately based strategic theory and practice. Ukraine and the Art of Strategy reads like on public opinion – which in this case has not a case study application of some of the rele- pushed for a tougher stance – shaping this vant aspects of Freedman’s earlier magnum opinion becomes crucial. Emphasizing the opus Strategy: A History. Freedman’s prose danger posed by Putin is one way to escalate is enjoyable as always, and his arguments the level of threat, and to unite domestic convincing. In his analysis, Freedman sees opinion against an external threat. At the the gains of the Russian actions as lacklus- same time, one wonders whether this is not tre as best. He finds little evidence for the exactly what Putin is busy with in order to notion of Putin as a master puppeteer. On prop his unstable domestic support. the contrary, the Russian president has acted Mirroring its own dread of popular unrest reactively and opportunistically. Little sug- into other states, Russia seeks to divide other gests that Putin’s decisions were based on societies. This expands the Russian threat strategic analysis. When the war commenced, to the West from a mere military dimension its ends and the means employed were rather to include the domestic sphere. Subversion traditional: the conflict was about territo- – for instance in the form of support to pory, and capturing it depended on superior litical extremists, troll factories and election force. Not surprisingly, following the pub- interference – poses dilemmas for democralication of Freedman’s work in March 2019 cies. With armed forces focused on external the Russian chief of the General Staff, Army threats and seemingly apolitical use of milGeneral Valery Gerasimov, stated that “the itary power, it is unclear what role they are main substance of [Russia’s] military strategy to play against inherently political actions is preparation for war using primarily the beyond their usual comfort zone. Neither can democratic societies be protected by Armed Forces.” Elsewhere Freedman has also faulted the framing everyone who disagrees a Russian buzzword “hybrid warfare” for at least in- stooge or a “useful idiot”. directly contributing to Putin’s fearsome Despite the bleak prospects, Freedman reputation. The notion of hybrid warfare points out that Russia is not the Soviet Union. suggests that each and every act, no matter Russia is in a much weaker position than how ad hoc or improvised, forms a part Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russia 167 nr 2 april/juni 2019 also lacks global reach and ideological leader- where it had to choose between the EU or ship. Here another interpretation of Russia’s Russia’s alternative, the Eurasian Customs actions in Ukraine arises. In order to protect Union (ECU). Freedman criticizes the EU for its interests, Russia had no other means “napping”, if not daydreaming. It was caught than to resort to force. While force enabled by surprise when in November 2013 President occupation of Crimea and parts of eastern Yanukovych left an Association Agreement Ukraine, in the long run the soft power of with the EU unsigned, opting for the ECU the West may still compare favourably. As (and Russia’s unparalleled offer of a $15 Freedman (p. 147) assesses Russia, “in the billion loan and reduced gas prices) instead. end it was a minor economic power that Equally surprising was the popular rehad allowed its insecurities to lead it into action to Yanukovych’s decision. While behaviour that could hurt its adversaries many Ukrainians perceived the EU as the without doing much for the aspirations and only way to end political stagnation and the needs of the Russian people.” support for the EU was three times higher Of all Russia’s adversaries in recent times, than that for the ECU, the initial protests it is Ukrainians that have suffered most. To were limited. When Yanukovych sent riot make things worse, Freedman seems to sug- police to violently disperse the protestors gest that this hurt was not only avoidable, but in Kyiv on 30 November, the protests were also largely unnecessary. The role Ukraine already dwindling. Yet this act of unforeseen has played as a victim and adversary has at state brutality in the history of independent times been forgotten in the analysis of the Ukraine inflamed the political situation. The Russo-Ukrainian War. To date it has been escalation brought hundreds of thousands more common to speak over the head of the to the streets of several Ukrainian cities. Ukrainians, and to frame the conflict as one The protests continued until mid-February 2014, when around a hundred protestors between Russia and the West. While basing his arguments on secondary and a dozen police offers had been killed sources, Freedman pays unusual attention in clashes and sniper fire. The outrage led to the Ukrainian side of the conflict. Even if to an agreement for settlement of political crisis in Ukraine, signed on 21 February. Ukraine is the smallest of the relevant actors involved and much of the interesting action Envisaging a transfer of power by the end takes place elsewhere, the inherently inter- of the year, the transfer of power became active nature of strategy alone means that necessary mere days later, as Yanukovych Ukraine cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the fled to Russia. After Yanukovych’s flight, the Ukrainian book leaves much room to develop strategic analysis of Ukraine. Freedman’s view corre- state was in shambles. Political uncertainty sponds with one held by many who fought led to fear. This fear contributed to polarizain this war, and questions the existence of tion between those who had supported the revolution, and those who were against it. Ukrainian strategy altogether. Freedman well narrates the origins of the Russia supported the latter views, explainconflict in Ukraine, paying particular atten- ing the fall of Yanukovych as a violent coup tion to the EU and the International Monetary d’état supported by the West. According to Fund. Neither had perceived Ukraine as a Freedman, it was here Putin acted without great prize. Especially the EU bore responsi- proper understanding of the situation or strategy. There is no evidence that policy bility for leading Ukraine into a crossroads 168 litteratur goals were determined, or analysis conducted for this can again be found in insufficient before the “polite little green men” – un- strategic thinking. It is plausible to assume marked Russian soldiers – captured official that the Russian objective in Ukraine was buildings in Sevastopol in Crimea. In fact, and continues to be maintaining leverage. new pro-Russian Crimean elites prodded This aim is in contradiction with annexaRussia to annex Crimea: the revolution had tion of Donbas into Russia, which would evoked fears of violent unrest, which seces- leave the rest of Ukraine to join both the sion could help to prevent. While secession EU and NATO. Scarce popular support alenjoyed considerable local support, the new so made the prospect of governing Donbas Crimean elites also worried that Crimea – let alone other parts of Ukraine with even might end up yet another internationally less pro-Russian sentiment – an expensive unrecognized entity, surviving on Kremlin’s undertaking not worth the cost. mercy. These worries soon evaporated. As During the summer of 2014, the Ukrainian the Ukrainian military did little to intervene, volunteer militias and military began to make Russia continued with the annexation. gains against the poorly led and coordinated After the annexation of Crimea, many separatists. This led to Russian escalation in Russian activists involved in the process the form of increased support to separatists, moved on to eastern Ukraine. Yet Donbas which in turn illustrated the importance of was not Crimea. There was not only less sup- control of force for strategy. The downing port for secession and Russia, but even the of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 with a element of surprise was gone. More prepared Russian BUK surface-to-air missile not only and alarmed by Crimea, Ukrainian patriots cost all the 298 lives on board, but also led mobilized in order to prevent any little green to an international scandal and the intensimen from further violating Ukrainian terri- fication of Western sanctions against Russia. torial sovereignty. Like in Crimea, pro-Rus- The Russian support nevertheless appeared sian activists were bussed in, and given wide insufficient for stopping the Ukrainian comcoverage by Russian journalists. In total, bined forces from recapturing territory. By 11 cities across Eastern Ukraine witnessed August, the separatists faced encirclement, pro-Russian demonstrations. While build- and were only saved by an intervention by ing on domestic political grievances, these Russian regular forces. The battle of Ilovaisk demonstrations enjoyed too little popular saw perhaps 300 dead on the Kyiv side. support to triumph pro-Ukrainian resistance. Facing Russian military and receiving little In early April, a group of armed separatists support from the West, the Kyiv government led by Igor Girkin, a former Russian intelli- had little choice but to seek a ceasefire. According to Freedman, the separatists gence officer, captured the city of Sloviansk. As Freedman notes, it is far from certain that showed little interest in the ceasefire. Perhaps separatists enjoyed significant Russian sup- emboldened by the Russian support, they port before this. As embittered Girkin later soon continued to fight. Yet as Russia did lamented, this support never matched his not escalate its support beyond the increased expectations. He was shocked that Russia Ukrainian military capabilities, the war bedid not repeat the Crimean scenario after the came largely deadlocked after the second separatists had seized territory in Donbas. Minsk agreement in February 2015. None According to Freedman, Russian support of the actors had been defeated, nor did any has been sparse. Ultimately, the explanation of them have a strategy to resolve the con169 nr 2 april/juni 2019 flict. The war reached a “stable equilibrium” where “hurt, while mutual, may also be quite manageable”. Ultimately, “both sides adapted to a conflict without an obvious end” (p. 147). The costs of this war have been huge and continue to accumulate. The Ukrainian economy has suffered enormously, and by the end of 2018, the war had claimed over 13,000 dead. Over 1,5 million remain internally displaced, while the veteran population has surged to 350,000. In addition to the around two million living under Russian rule, just under four million people remain under separatist control. With most official economic links to Ukraine severed, the separatist enclaves rely on Russian support, as well as on their ambiguous status that allows evading regulations and taxation. This status does little to encourage the political rights of the people who remain in these enclaves, nor hopes for peace. As Freedman quotes, the separatist enclaves are just as useful for Russia “like a suitcase without a handle: you can’t use it, but you don’t want to throw it out” (p. 160). No wonder Freedman sees that the Russo-Ukraine conflict is ample in examples of bad strategy. The most important lessons Freedman draws from the conflict are that “it is far easier to start a war than to end one” (p. 182), and that “with limited war you don’t always get what you want” (p. 185). These lessons suggest a changed utility of force. Echoing Rupert Smith’s past work, while capturing territory remains relatively straightforward, force helps little in administration. Here the “hearts and minds” of local populations become central considerations. In the case of Ukraine, this role of the society also limited Russian invasion to parts of Donbas. Another complication is that local support requires local leadership, which comes with their own interests. Control of force is never 170 complete with third parties. While Freedman recognizes the importance of cyber-attacks and social media campaigns, he sees their utility as short-lived. Opponents will adapt, and cyber-attacks can disrupt, not take territory. Ultimately, when conflicts become protracted, much will depend on economy. The policy suggestion from this is clear. Ukraine should now focus on reforms. Whereas the West should support and – if necessary – demand these reforms, it should also keep up pressure on Russia through sanctions. From this perspective, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is of strategic importance to Ukraine: it would not only deprive Ukraine of gas transfer fees worth two percent of its GDP, but also important leverage against Russia. If Russia is as expansionist as thought, it remains in the interests of the West that Russia remains busy in Ukraine and elsewhere. Ultimately, it is in the interests of both Ukraine and the West to keep reminding that the War in Donbas still continues. While Russia may not be as threatening as suggested by those who see Putin as a strategic mastermind, it is still necessary to offer Russia decided resistance to stop it from pushing forward. Uncertain of Russian aims, it is perhaps wise to expect the worst. As counter-measures traditional military means still play a role, although not always the most prominent one. It is also questionable whether these means always matter in the ways traditionally thought. Whatever we may think of strategy in theory and practice, Freedman and the War in Ukraine show that we all still have much to learn. The author is assistant Professor, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University.