Military Strategy Bibliography

Looking back on the evolution of strategy since the fall of Napoleon it is possible to discern two fundamental schools of thought concerning the ending of wars. While most obvious after 1815, the seeds of both schools were sown long before the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Of these two schools of thought, the second is actually much older than the first in both theory and practice, but it only gained real theoretical coherence as a response to the former. The first school of thought asserts that, in Douglas MacArthur's words, there is no substitute for victory. In practice this victory is achieved through decisive battle, frequently with no consideration for cost and, if the decisive battle isn't, leaves believers intellectually stranded. Such eventualities give impetus to the advocates of the second school, who typically see limited or even no utility in the sorts of pursuits required by clear-cut victory. While less intellectually monolithic than the school of victory due to the myriad of ways war and war termination may be moderated, there is a certain continuity through all the different facets of this school due to its main function as opposition to the school of victory. The development of both schools of thought will be traced from their theoretical progenitors through to the present day, examining both evolution of theory and actual practice. The important concept of strategic effect will be introduced, which with rare exceptions has historically been omitted by both theorists and practitioners.

A decade after 9/11, the new generation of U.S. officers continues to postpone -or altogether shun -assignments to the various war colleges in favor of a second, third, or fourth deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. As Major-General Robert Scales, the former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, put it in 2010, Throughout the services officers are avoiding attendance in schools, and school lengths are being shortened. The Army's full-term staff college is now attended by fewer and fewer officers. The best and brightest are avoiding the war colleges in favor of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average age of war college students has increased from 41 to 45, making this institution a preparation for retirement rather than a launching platform for strategic leadership… Sadly, atrophy has gripped the school house, and what was once the shining light of progressivism has become an intellectual backwater, lagging far behind the corporate and civilian institutions of higher learning. 1

Intelligence and National Security, 2019

Despite the enduring interest in the written work of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) there appears to be shortage of studies focusing specifically on what he had to say about the matter of civilians or non-combatants in war. After extensive consultation with primary and secondary sources this dissertation will argue that Clausewitz wrote a lot more on this subject than is commonly acknowledged. He was aware that civilian suffering was not simply an accidental by-product of war but also the result of deliberate strategic intent to compel an enemy to do one’s will. Clausewitz did not endorse such methods because he had a moral and theoretical preference for decisive battles between conventional armed forces. He tended to dismiss violence against civilian persons and property as morally wrong, militarily ineffective and politically counter-productive.

Why are democracies unusually successful in war? We find that superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western cultural background are largely responsible. These traits correlate positively with democracy, and account for democracy’s apparent effectiveness bonus. This is either good news or bad news for democratic effectiveness theorists. Many believe that democracy causes these traits. If so, our findings strengthen democratic effectiveness theory by explicating its causal mechanism. But others see democracy as a consequence rather than a cause of such traits. If so, our findings challenge the thesis by identifying alternative causes of the effectiveness bonus previously attributed to democracy. Either way, the results show a powerful effect for unit level variables in military performance. In the process, these same results sharpen our understanding of military effectiveness in general, and the relationship between military performance and regime type in particular.

Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy -which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents' will… Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita -still awaiting exploration, and understanding. --B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954) As countless observers have pointed out, the American-Chinese rivalry in the early 21 st century bears more than a passing resemblance to the Anglo-German antagonism that led to World War I. In these conditions, it is not surprising if a consensus has emerged, among International Relations (IR) academics, around the proposition that the U.S.-China relation is bound to be the most important bilateral relation in the coming decades.

Australian Army Occasional Paper - Conflict Theory and Strategy, 2018

Many military professionals and academics outline the importance of military theory and the need to study it. Some, like Colin Gray, even highlight how understanding it allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war. Given these wise words, would it not seem important to know ‘what’ military theory is? Is it not significant to know who has shaped it? How do we, as professionals, tell if something is military theory, or just opinion and conjecture? Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It helps identify what writings further our understanding of war and warfare, and guides professional military education and research for future doctrine and training. This work answers the questions of what military theory is, where it sits within the wider context of the study of conflict, and which theorists are key in defining its body of knowledge. The work first defines what military theory is. Military theory is a field of study that seeks to understand the phenomena of war and its links to wider conflict; and provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination of the knowledge of war and warfare. In other words, military theory is the epistemology of war. This definition highlights that research into military theory is grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry and, much like applied history, must use broad scientific methods – using hypothesis and empirical data based in history; not just a single incident, war or technological advancement – to develop its concepts. Understanding this also provides a guide to test whether a new or modern idea is effective ‘military theory’, or merely ‘military notion’. The definition also indicates that the focus of military theory is the development of first principles knowledge about war and warfare. It is this knowledge that allows planners, commanders and senior decision makers to adapt their know-how of war fighting to changing situations, environments and political objectives. It is also this knowledge that can be enhanced through wider study. The analysis of what military theory is, also demonstrates where military theory fits within wider academic disciplines. Although other humanities disciplines like history can support military theory, its focus on applied theory gives it strong links to other applied social sciences like political science, international relations and economics. These other disciplines overlap with military theory, and provide an avenue to potentially advance military theory’s understanding of power, influence and war’s wider links to conflict. Such links assist in broadening the military theory body of knowledge – a body of knowledge that is not codified, but is instead shaped by foundational theorists. Who these foundation theorists are, or who is most influential, is also answered by this work. By analysing the curriculums of staff colleges around the world, this work has identified the top 20 theorists currently accepted as most influential. The analysis also suggests a normalising of military theory across the globe, including a possible convergence between the conceptual Eastern and Western ways of war. Overall, this work provides a definition for military theory and highlights the key theorists that shape our views on it now and into the future. This is supported with guidance that allows us to test future theories. Understanding what military theory is and who shapes it lays the foundation to allow the profession to debate where future advancements in military theory should focus to best support planners, commanders and senior decision makers.

this new series on ‘Strategy and History’. This book employs the kind of theory meaningful to a social scientist trying to render historical data an evidential base to advance understanding cumulatively. To that end, the work treats its duty to theory building and to respect for historical data with equal gravity and, sometimes, scepticism. Social scientists and historians are wont to compete energetically to demonstrate to each other that they are to be trusted neither when playing at home in their supposedly professional field, nor, far less, when they play away on the road on the other field of dreams. The debate over revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), the Big American Defence Debate of the 1990s, amply rewards the collector of errors. Social-scientific errors are committed by historians, while historical howlers abound in briefings by social scientists and technocrats. Meanwhile, seriously misleading beliefs of a social scientific, technological, and historical kind are commonplace among officials and politicians whose professionalism centres around manipulation of a policy process. A polity requires such professionalism, as Germany demonstrated negatively and repeatedly, but it requires also that the professionals charged with the making of policy and strategy should be educated in relevant historical contexts. The recent American RMA debate generated much more noise than illumination. Quite aside from the problem of contributors who have barely hidden service or industrial interests colouring their arguments, even scholars notably competent as theorydeveloping social scientists or as archival historians are apt to underperform when they wander off their usual patch. One of the purposes of this new book series is to encourage the publication of studies which make an honest and tolerably successful effort to achieve synergy between the two broad disciplines. As the text below comments at suitable junctures, historians and the history they discover characteristically reveal a pull to singularisation, towards seeing events as being unique both in themselves and in context. Social scientists and the theories they invent betray the reverse tendency: no less characteristically they reveal a rush, historians would say a premature rush, to find more general meaning in particular behaviours. Inevitably, social scientists tend to be relatively weak when they boldly go into the zone of historical case studies. For their part, historians typically are far better at writing narrative and analysing unique happenings than they are at genuinely comparative scholarship. An unsurprising result of these parallel déformations professionelles is that the literature of the RMA debate contains some conceptually intriguing social science, and quite solid beginnings in historical study, but the twain scarcely meet and hardly ever in the same piece of work. Whether or not Strategy for Chaos improves the score for joint endeavour readers must judge for themselves.

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British Journal of Political Science, 2011

Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, territorial empire has largely ceased. Most states that can take and hold territory no longer appear eager to do so, while the weak are unable to expand. Have powerful countries become "kinder and gentler," or has something fundamental changed about the logic of empire? We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labor costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilutes imperial advantage. At the same time, economic development has led to a secular decline in the payoffs for appropriating land, minerals, and capital. Once conquest no longer pays for great powers, the systemic imperative to vertically integrate production also becomes archaic.