The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions

The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions 83 Kåre Fuglseth The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions Some Insights from Husserlian Phenomenology and NonEthnocentric Definitions for Religious Education in a Multicultural Situation The life-world and religion The concept of a life-world («Lebenswelt») is a notion that has been developed and applied by several scholars in many areas and in multiple ways. In sociological theory, the life-world as a basic concept has been employed by scholars of different schools, from sociology of knowledge by Berger and Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) in particular, but also Marxist inspired everyday-life sociology (Lefebvre, 1968). In Germany the sociologist Herbert Knoblauch (2005) has further developed this phenomenological basis into a systematic presentation of the sociology of knowledge. Several efforts have been undertaken by Heimbrock and other German scholars of religious education (Failing, Heimbrock & Lotz, 2001; Heimbrock, 2001, 1998). Max van Manen has used the perspective in relation to the study of teacher reflection among several other purposes (van Manen, 1991, 1997). Arnim Kaiser has also developed principles and methods for studying educational matters from within the life-world perspective that I find promising (Kaiser, 1990). The life-world perspectives also has a firm Nordic basis in educational theory (Bengtsson, 1998, 1999; Bengtsson & Kroksmark 1994, p. 208). Bengtsson (1999, p. 9–10) demonstrates the variety of uses of the word life-world, both within and outside the phenomenological frames of theory. This article proposes some new paths to applying a life-world perspective in relation to the study of religious education. The perspective has been employed in empirical and theoretical studies in sociology of religion, but not in relation to religious education yet. One reason for this lack of interest by scholars in educational fields is the radical bracketing of the world that all phenomenological analyses demand and in this bracketing the religions of the world are also put aside, a fact that is indeed not promising for a study religions or for the actual teaching of religion. However, there is one central element of phenomenological philosophy that is promising for an applied use. Above all the perspective suggests a wide functional and radically non-ethnocentric definition of religion. As Bengtsson, I am only concerned with the phenomenological based use of a perspective constituted by the notion. It is not that other ways are irrelevant, but my aim here is to focus on one theory especially, to demonstrate its fruitfulness in the theorising of education in general and in relation to our common and specific challenges in state schooled concerning multiculturalism and education in particular. Generally, all life-world-theories concern in one or another way the move from the natural attitude to more sophisticated knowledge, such as to theories of the lifeworld itself and, in fact, all abstract analysis. The main methodological point of 84 Kåre Fuglseth departure for seeing the life-world and the things themselves, to borrow an expression from Husserl («zu den Sachen selbst»),1 is through a radical phenomenological reduction. In relation to institutionalised religion, this means that we cannot include answers to such questions as the existence of a god. The perspective calls for a strict methodological agnosticism. Then, how is it possible to employ the life-world perspective in studies of religious education? Is there anything at all that can be called religion or religiosity in the life-world? Is there anything here that may be seen as a starting point for theorising the teaching and learning of religions, institutionalised or not? In order to study the implications of this perspective vis-à-vis religion, we shall have to take a further look into the life-world theory as explained by philosophical phenomenology and phenomenologically based sociology. Husserlian point of departure Nearly 70 years after Husserl’s formulation of the notion in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Husserl, 1962)2 it is perhaps no longer possible to look upon the life-world perspective as a new perspective, but it is still by and large un-discovered and un-applied in many areas. Like Bengtsson (1999), Luckmann (1990a; 1990b) has suggested to see the life-world as a research program. In accordance with Luckmann, but in opposition to Bengtsson, I am deliberately using phenomenological notions like essence, eidos, reduction, structures and transcendental notions, but not in an ahistorical sense, a sense quite in accordance with the use by the later Husserl himself. There are now two almost complete different ways of understanding Husserl: a fundamentalist one (i.e. in relation to Husserl’s philosophy as forming a secure basis for true knowledge), often focusing on the early Husserl and disregarding the Krisis and the later manuscripts, and a non-fundamentalist one, focusing on insights gained through the final edition of Krisis, the rest of the Husserliana-series and the unpublished manuscripts. The Danish phenomenologist Dan Zahavi has, convincingly I think, argued in favour of the latter one, leading us to see Husserl as the main anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian way of philosophising in the 20th century (cf. Føllesdal, 1993; Føllesdal & Walløe, 2000; Zahavi, 2001a, 2001b; Zahavi 2003). The rediscovery of Husserl in the wake of the Husserliana-series and studies of the non-published manuscripts, indicates that Husserl had come far in reflecting on intersubjectivity, including religion (Zahavi, 2003). There can therefore no longer be seen a major difference in perspective between Husserl and philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, Schütz and Luckmann. Husserl became in the end a socialphilosopher. The influence on the study of religion within this perspective is seen today in the sociology of knowledge by some German scholars (Knoblauch, 2003, 2005). In order to properly grasp the life-world perspective I suggest that scholars basing on 1 2 In his book Logische Untersuchungen (Husserl 1984:10). First published in 1936, but this notion and similar notions like the «life of the natural attitude» were used by Husserl much earlier, cf. Bengtsson 1991. The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions 85 a phenomenological perspective in one way or the other follow the routes back to the later Husserl and his interests in intersubjective transcendence. The life-world theory as a shift of paradigm By the notion life-world Husserl wanted to coin a central insight in his philosophy (Husserl, 1962). The world referred to is the pre-theoretical, non-problematic world established in our taken-for-granted attitude, it is the life in and of our natural attitude – where, for instance, songs are songs (the thing itself) and not sound impressions or sound waves. The crisis discussed by Husserl is the tendency of natural sciences in particular to neglect that all understanding is based upon the life-world. When they are made absolute, we are alienated from the life-world. One problem in studying the notion in the writings of Husserl is its ambiguities. It is a matter of fact that Husserl did use it in different ways (Zahavi, 2003) and it is also a fact that it since then has been developed in different ways, particularly within philosophy and the social science (Bengtsson, 1998, 1999; Bergmann, 1981). One should differ between the life-world and the everyday life. Life-world is according to Schütz «the world of daily life which the wide-awake, grown-up man who acts in it and upon it amidst his fellow-man experiences within the natural attitude as a reality» (Schutz, 1962).3 According to Schütz, we live in a multiple of realities where the everyday life only forms one part. The life-world is central in all of them, but the everyday life is nevertheless the paramount reality. Luckmann (1990a, p. 9) characterises the invention of the notion life-world by Husserl as nothing less than a shift of paradigm in the human sciences. If the notion is accepted as a shift of paradigm, no human studies can manage without it, it is only a question of how to employ this insight. I would not claim that the approach would be fruitful in all area of educational research, but in relation to an essential issue such as defining religion in a multicultural world, I am arguing that is of vital interest with its universal way of grasping religion. We may use the difference between an ontological and a transcendental notion of the life-world in order to explain a difference implied by the notion (Zahavi, 2003). All phenomenological analyses are analyses on a general or eidetic level (invariants or essences) and a transcendental level, the level of generalised invariants such as the role of «body», «horizon», «time», «intersubjectivity», «generativity», «historicity», «normality» etc. as constituting factors of reality. The insights gained on the transcendental level is, however, also historical according to Husserl in the Krisis. They are naturally highly general and may be employed as a vague matrix only, not able to enlighten everything in the mundane world. General theories or proto-theories such as the life-world theory have only a relatively weak explanatory power in empirical studies and must be taken further down the road with what Luckmann has described in sociology as «die objektiven Eigenschaften geschichtlicher sozialer Wirklichkeiten» (Luckmann, 1990a, p. 12) i.e. the objective characteristics in historical and social contexts. 3 The life-world theory by Habermas is partly inspired by Schütz and Luckmann (Habermas 1995) but has another focus (as in opposition to the systems). Several scholars have been discusses the life-world (Grathoff 1989; Mathiesen 1983; Welter 1986). 86 Kåre Fuglseth Proto-pedagogy of Religious Education The theory of the life-world may in this way be seen as a main methodological principle for the essential task in all teaching, particularly on introductory or basic levels. If understanding is based on the natural attitude, then teaching and learning is as well. At least, there are reasons to believe that there is a certain correspondence between them. Theories about the life-world would then also form a proto-theory in pedagogy. One example is the idea of the claimed structures of the life-world, an idea that has further pedagogical relevance, particular in relation to the notion of horizon (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 52). «What is taken for granted within the prevailing life-worldly situation is surrounded by uncertainty» Schütz says (1973. p. 9), and «there is co-given a horizon which is indeterminate», although it is experienced as capable of explication. In relation to subjective time, Husserl describes the unity of the stream of consciousness as continuous retention and protention, i.e. a «looking» forward and a «looking» backwards: «Every actual lived experience necessarily carries a horizon of the past and a horizon of the future» (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 52). The stock of previous knowledge serves as the reference schemes with typifications that is constituted by the «and-so-forth» idealisation and the ideality of «I-can-always-do-it-again» according to the notions used by Husserl (Schutz & Luckmann 1973, p. 7). Such theories may then be taken as arranging frames or a meta-language that is found relevant for the participants and derived from these basic structures of the life-world. The study of teaching and learning from within the life-world perspective has much the same aims as Luckmann (1990b) prescribes for sociology: we may start where phenomenology ends by analysing the dialectic, causal and functional connections or relations of teaching in their historical context. Theoretically, then, the historical context, the empirical information gathered, the researcher and these structures may then be consciously merged in a hermeneutic circle. Transcendence and Religiosity The study of teaching of mathematics has an obvious project in reflecting the process from the natural attitude of students to the abstract world of numbers, figures and theorems. Likewise, the study of the teaching of natural sciences has probably much to learn from the analysis of how we move from the life-world perspective to the theoretical level. In the teaching of religion, the project is not so obvious since religion is mostly defined in substantial ways referring to institutionalised religions with specific theories and practices, a religious world with which not many children are familiar today in Western Europe. As stated above, the introduction of the analysis of a life-world also includes a reduction in relation to theories of the empirical world, a move that should be looked upon as an expansion rather than as a reduction. In the first round we shall have to put in parenthesis the question of the existence of God and all definitions of religion, not to say the definition of true religion. On the generalised or eidetic level we are not studying different institutions, but institutions generally. There The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions 87 have been some theological efforts to study theology from a similar phenomenological perspective; the theology of Knud Løgstrup is the most famous Lutheran example (cf. Jensen, 2007; Løgstrup, 1995). 4 My aim is not theological in this sense, but related to sociology and religious education. In phenomenological based sociology the most interesting features in this connection seems to be the theory of transcendence. The theory points to the fact that we co-experience several phenomena all the time in a process called apperception. Without this feature the world would become meaningless to us. Thus, the experience of transcendence is closely linked to the concept of boundaries and of horizons. In relation to these theories Luckmann (1967, 1991, p. 164ff, 2004) has developed ideas that he discovered while working on the non-published manuscripts of Alfred Schütz about the connection between the Husserlian notion of apperception and religion in a sociological perspective. The main point in this theory is built upon the fact that as human beings we constantly transcend our biological nature. This leads Luckmann to a wide and functional definition of religion in the tradition from Durkheim. The function he sees as religious is connected to the development of individual human beings in and by society in general. To become a human being is a transcending experience and religiosity is looked upon as genuinely human. Religions always contain it, without being reduced to it. The process of becoming a Self may turn into an organised religion according to functional definitions of religion, but not necessarily. This functional definition is particularly valuable in today’s post-secular and multi religious society. Already early in the 1960ties, Luckmann claimed that the thesis of an expanding secularism in Western countries was incorrect, a fatal analytic error, not because he thought people would start going to church again, but because religiosity will show up somewhere, also in new solutions involving substantial ideas of a supernatural reality and holy kosmoi. Modern religion is individualistic, private, fragmented and eclectic, and often organised in alternative ways and in specialised groups. Nevertheless, if we want to understand the phenomenon generally, we will have to start to study the subjectivity or with an egolocial approach, in what Luckmann says is the anthropological conditions of religion (condition humana). Luckmann further uses notions derived from Husserl and Schütz to say that there are in the life-world three levels of transcendence: «kleinen, mittleren» and «grossen Transzendenzen», i.e. small, middle and great transcendences (Luckmann, 1991, p. 168). The small transcendence may be explained by the co-experience of every perception: we see the front of a physical object, but perceive also its backside without actual seeing it (or touching it). We constantly transcend our perceptions both in time and space in our daily life. The second or middle level also draws on daily life experience or the intersubjective social life. We find for instance the expected perception in future, e.g. people we know and that we expect to see soon. The inner thoughts of our fellows can only be reached by signs, e.g. in language. 4 Further inquires is required in relation also to existential theology, since they all form part of the phenomenological movement in a broad sense. A further comparison should also be made between Luckmann ethical theories (Bergmann & Luckmann 1999) and Løgstrup (1991). 88 Kåre Fuglseth On the third level we find the transcendences of another nature, a kind of ultimate level. We cannot see or touch these, but we do use them all the time and we do transcend the daily life when we use them. When we meet with other people, the great transcendences are formed in social organisations quite independently of the belief in a god or extra-human powers. This is a general feature for all human beings, a phenomenological essential insight. When the great transcendences are communicated with others, they are reconstructed in social life; they take a linguistic form and are liable to social control and discussions concerning proper interpretations. Language, rituals and symbols are exposing these social constructed transcendences. Experiences outside the daily life build up a stock of extra-ordinary knowledge by which religions may be furnished. In the modern society there are fewer kinds of furniture in the stock, but the total amount is the same as in premodern societies (Luckmann 1991, 2002; cf. Schnettler 2006). These social and anthropological roots of religiosity and religion are arguments in favour of an essential place for religion in the life-world; in fact it constitutes the life-world. We find here the main constituting feature of meaning in the life-world. In religious education and the analysis of it (descriptive and normative) this claim or insight can then be seen and employed in many ways. From Phenomenology to Theories of Teaching and Learning The move from the phenomenological theories to the empirical analysis and actual teaching is a move passing through several general levels. There is no easy way from these phenomenological insights to teaching and there remains much to be done. I shall take a further look into two features that seem appropriate in our present multicultural situation: first, some possible implications of the functional definition of religion, and secondly, the principle of learning where learning is seen as a change or modification of schemes in the life-world and the natural attitude vis-à-vis religiosity. The functional definition of religion seems appropriate for a description of the contents of the present curriculum in the Norwegian schools and pre-schools, KRL, containing both knowledge of Christianity in its universal and local forms, other world-religions, new religious movements, secular world-views, general philosophy and ethics (KRL05, 2005). A main idea in the curriculum KRL is that children must learn about all these and Norwegian Christian traditions in particular to build up an understanding of the present cultural situation and understanding that seems to be a prerequisite for a tolerant attitude. At the same time, in public schools children are supposed to be further socialised into their own tradition as well, or perhaps the lack of it, according to the preferences of the parents—according to basic human rights. This may be seen as an application of the dialectical movement included in all social constitution of knowledge proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1967) where traditions represent an objectivated part of everyday knowledge. This dialectical movement (externalisation, objectivation and internalisation) also resembles the theory of another hermeneutic phenomenologist, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1990). Gadamer not only argues in favour of a necessary hermeneutic circle and the fusion The Life-World and the Teaching of Religions 89 of horizon as a general theory of understanding, necessary for dialogue and criticism. He also claims that it is of extreme importance that the move into the circle starts by reading and recognising the text, mutatis mutandis all social objectivations, the sayings of other persons, the existing traditions etc. One could say, then, that there already exists a correspondence between the life-world perspective and the perspective in the present curriculum, KRL. The functional definition by Luckmann may also be taken further into the principles of teaching in all kind of religious education and also the Norwegian curriculum KRL. The experience of transcendence is what makes meaning possible (i.e. a sociology of meaning); it constitutes meaning in an intersubjective world and it links religion closely to being human. Already institutionalised religions such as Christian churches are not necessarily reduced to anthropology or some other reductionist function. I think, however, that in our present situation with a clearly diverse cultural or religious situation, it is better to study the world with broader definitions. Substantial definitions of religion tend to be ethnocentric. One example of such a broad definition that fits well into the phenomenological perspective (perhaps unintentionally) is the definition by the French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1993, 2000) who defines religion as a chain of collective memory. If one could say this is a function of all public rituals for instance, the call at the collective memory may also be said to be secular, what Luckmann (1991) calls immanent transcendences. Could this kind of theory also be used to say that teachers need to start with simple experiences of transcendence to explain the religiosity of the traditions that are operating with a transcendent god? It might be that this functional definition may explain some theological expressions related to the image of an invisible god for those students that are unfamiliar with such an image. It might also be that theories related to life-world and functional definitions by themselves may constitute relevant approaches to students on a higher level (level of high-school, college, gymnasium, lycée, etc.). Such questions have to be studied in teaching in a classroom before I would suggest any definite answers. Nevertheless, I do think that a theory about transcendences on different levels and the unavoidable use of great transcendences may form a point of departure for religious education and for questions related to the moral basis of our actions and involvement as well as the principle institutions in a democracy and liberal society. The approach opens up for a study of how all institutions and their intrinsic values are established and socially legitimised. The phenomenon of transcendence may also be taken further to a less abstract level, as Peter Berger suggests in A Rumor of Angels (1970). Berger argues in favour of an idea that our experiences of transcendence come to expression in order, play, hope, damnation and humour. These are prototypical human gestures constituting what he takes to be signals of transcendence (Berger, 1970, p. 52ff). The signals are «phenomena that are to be found within the domain of our “natural” reality but appear to point beyond that reality» (1970, p. 53). The idea is derived from the life-world perspective of course. They stay in a close relationship with Luckmann’s theory of different levels of transcendence and may point out to us where the life-world transcendence find religious expressions that could be transformed to methods of teaching—a teaching based on this kind of social construc- 90 Kåre Fuglseth tivism. Studies of religions education in a multicultural Western liberal state, should further explore the implications of such signals of transcendence for practical teaching procedures. There are, nevertheless, already established a close connections between narrative methods and signals of transcendence, as the theory of the essential importance of narratives generally are also based on the phenomenological life-world perspective (cf. Schapp 1985, 1987). This kind of theorising opens up for a dynamic way of changes of schemes. If we use the analysis of our natural attitude or life-world as a main theoretical principle for the study and prescriptions for teaching and learning, the cognitive principle from Piaget of going from «the known to the unknown» (L97 1996, p. 19, 73) gains a new dimension much in accordance with educational theories in the Vygotsky-tradition. This is a tradition that explores the importance of socio-cultural conditions for teaching and learning, scaffolding, proximal zone, the community in learning etc. (Wertsch 1985, 2002). There are, in addition to this, similarities with the theory of cognitive schemes or structures as Piaget (1961) saw them, schemes that were adopted or reformed through assimilation or accommodation by new experiences. In social constructivist sociology of knowledge such as the one Berger and Luckmann proposed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), one would rather say that we build up structures in our stock of knowledge on the basis of certain expectations or horizons based on the typifications mentioned above (the idealisation of «and so forth» and «I can always do it again»). When operating in the world we build up socially a structure of relevant knowledge (Schütz & Zaner, 1970) of different schemes and typifications. Our expectations are not always reached, and if they change quickly, the scheme «explodes» when we see them in new contexts; we broaden our horizon (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 11). Perhaps this is a main reason for employing a functional definition of religion today as well: the traditional way of looking at religions collapses. We’ll see that as there is no common storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, there is no one specific and essential kind of religious object and no one specific and essential kind of religious act, as James (2002, p. 27) once said (cf. Luckmann, 1991, p. 44). In this way applied phenomenology with its non-ethnocentric definition of religion not only strengthens the argument in favour of religious education in or another form in state schools with multi-cultural situation, but and also indicates how this education should be carried out. References Bengtsson, J. 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