Introduction to Horizons of the Self in Hindu Thought

2019

India has a rich and diverse history of philosophy. The integral understanding of ‘Self’ is often neglected, which is given by Indian philosophy and the western view is more popular. This essay starts with the introduction of main orthodox and heterodox schools of Indian philosophy. Then discussion on six major epistemologies followed by these schools, which follow these epistemologies in-parts or as whole is presented. Further the article looks into an analytical discussion on the concept of ‘self’ as given by these classical Indian schools, especially Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Vedanta and Buddhism in detail. In the conclusion, the answer to the question -What is the comparison and contrast of their views with popular western philosophers such as Locke, Sartre, Hume, Descartes and Kant?, is given.

Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. ‘Self and Not-Self in Indian Philosophy’ in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (eds.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, Volume 4, pp. 2252-2262. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell., 2021

While paying tribute to C.F. Andrews, the person who, attracted by Tagore, settled in Shantiniketan, Bhattacharyya alluded to the relentless struggle of Andrews against evil and injustice in any part of the globe. And all these he wanted to do in the name of religion. Following many of his compatriots like Tagore and Gandhi, Andrews sacrificed his life to end man's alienation and the resulting boredom through non-violence. Non-violence is a fight not against the oppressor as human, but against the evil forces that dominate him. The danger with violence is that it might produce a new cycle of oppression by ending the old one. Tagore, of course, brings in the idea of identification to fight all the varieties of alienation. Bhattacharyya does not forget to mention that on some decisions of Gandhi, Andrews had the honesty to dissent. As for Gandhi, religion and politics intermingle, so is with Andrews. Andrews was more of a 'religious politician'. He left Santiniketan as many New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy on the other, in one point they agree. It is that consciousness is no attribute of the self, but is the self itself. In other words, the self is no substance, if substance is to be distinguished from attributes. If, however, by substance one means a permanent standing entity, the pure consciousness of the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, and the Advaita Vedānta may well be called a substance. For, certainly, as neither an attribute nor an act nor a function, it is a permanent standing entity. Here lies the difference between these philosophers, on the one hand, and Kant, Gentile, and the Vijñānavādi Buddhist, on the other. These latter understand by 'self' pure consciousness as an act; and the Vijñānavādin's ālayavijñāna, though agreeing largely with the Advaita Vedāntin's pure consciousness, is never a standing separate entity, but, even as autonomous, distributes itself among mental states. Some Buddhists deny self altogether, and are content with the series of mental states. Others, mainly of the Vaibhāśika school, do not deny it altogether, but yet take it as wholly indefinite. To the Mādhyamikas, it is neither assertible, nor deniable, nor both assertible and deniable, nor neither of these two. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, the Viśiṣṭādvaita and some other types of Indian philosophy, which are all arranged against the Buddhists in that they admit a standing permanent self as substance, do not, however, equate self with consciousness. The self, according to them, is a substance, to which consciousness belongs either as an attribute or as essence. While the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard consciousness as an accidental attribute of the self, consciousness or knowledge sometime occurring and sometimes not occurring in the self, for the Viśiṣṭādvaita consciousness is an essential feature of the self-the self never failing to be conscious. And for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the self is as much conscious as no conscious, i.e. in part conscious and in part non-conscious. Consciousness and that which has it, are subjective, and so whatever is non-The Mīmāṃsāka themselves do not admit God, though many Dharmaśāstras, and Smṛtis allow it.

Philosophy East and West, 1992

Indian philosophy, like Indian culture, seems peculiarly prone to arouse either violent antipathy or fervent enthusiasm. Rarely does it engender an attitude which tries to present and assess it coolly and calmly, without positive or negative emotion. Nothing perhaps stands more in the way of such an attitude than the universally accepted ideas which I wish to explore in this essay. These three ideas are treated as indubitable facts about Indian philosophy. They seem so self-evident to enthusiasts and detractors alike, that to question them is to question the very concept of Indian philosophy as it has been traditionally conceived and presented by almost every writer on the subject. Yet, it seems to me that the time has come to question the traditional picture itself, to raise doubts about the indubitable, to investigate the sacrosanct and the self-evident. Myths have always masqueraded as facts and many a time the emperor's nudity has only been discovered by a child's disingenuity. The self-evident claims about Indian philosophy are legion. First and foremost is the claim to spirituality. Who does not know that Indian philosophy is spiritual? Who has not been told that this is what specifically distinguishes it from western philosophy, and makes it something unique and apart from all the other philosophical traditions of the world? The claim, of course, is never put to the test. In fact, it seems so self-evident as to require no argument or evidence on its behalf. Nobody, neither the serious nor the casual student of the subject, deems it worth questioning. Yet, the moment we begin to doubt the claim

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2012

Amongst its many other merits this collection of essays demonstrates the growing maturity of the study of the Indian philosophical tradition. Much of the good scholarship done on non-Western, and in particular on Indian philosophy over the last decades has attempted to show that these texts hailing from east of Suez contain interesting and sophisticated discussions in their own right, discussions that have to be understood against the Ancient Indian intellectual and cultural context rather than evaluated by how closely they can be seen as conforming to current fashions in the Western philosophical debate. While this approach has helped much in alerting us to the difficulties of forcing an ancient intellectual tradition on the procrustean bed of the philosophical interests and concerns of the current day, it brings with it the danger of shutting this tradition off under the bell jar of merely historical concerns. Many of the best scholars of Indian philosophy today set out to show why Ancient Indian philosophical debates are not just of historical, but also of systematic interest, and that both, scholars of Indian thought and contemporary philosophers can learn something from bringing both traditions together in a discussion. They aim to show that in the same way in which Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus have important contributions to make to the inquiry into topics that interest today's Western philosophers, so have thinkers like Śaṅkara and Dharmakīrti. The present volume is an excellent example of how successful such an approach combining philological accuracy and philosophical acuity can be.

Transcultural Studies, 2014

The article shows that the concept of ‘Indian Philosophy’ is the joint product of two philosophical cultures. One culture is Western philosophy that feels the need for wisdom. Therefore Indian philosophy is conceived of as ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ philosophy. The other is the Indian nineteenth century culture of reform thinking. Together with Western philologist the Indians highlight the ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ school of Vedanta philosophy as ‘the’ Indian philosophy. Vedanta philosophy as spiritual philosophy distinguished India from the West. It was a political project that functioned within India’s quest for independency. Modern Indian philosophers have been in the process of reconsidering this concept, especially after the appropriation of Western scientific culture.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90:4, 2012, 812-815., 2012

2012

The mistakes we make about ourselves result in our deepest sufferings. Philosophy, meant to be a remedy for our souls’ affliction, claims to offer both a diagnosis and a cure. I look to ancient India, where Buddhists and Hindus alike grapple with this fundamental human quest for peace of mind. For Indian thinkers, a philosophical treatise about the self is meant not only to lay out the truth, but also to embed itself in a process of study and contemplation that will lead eventually to self-transformation. By combining attention to philosophical content with sensitivity to skilfully crafted literary form, I try to deepen and enrich our appreciation of some of the greatest intellectual works in history. My survey includes the Upaniṣads, the Buddha’s discourses, the epic Mahābhārata, and the philosopher Candrakīrti, whose work was later to become foundational in Tibetan Buddhism. I show how the figures of the Buddha, the sage, and the epic hero mediate the reader’s relationship with the text. I go on to reveal that many contemporary theories of selfhood are not only anticipated but developed to an extraordinary degree of sophistication in these works, and that there are other ideas about the self found here which modern philosophers have not yet begun to explore. In the Appendices, I begin to disclose some of the paths along which Indian ideas about the self have migrated throughout history to the West.