Brexit Mean Brexit.docx

Brexit Mean Brexit: A No-Deal Brexit and British Exceptionalism. By Godson Azu. MA. International Relations. Introduction This is a reversed extract from my MA, research dissertation, which was writing on British exceptionalism and anti-Europe tendencies, having followed the renewed British/EU relations politics for a decade, looking at the complicated issues surrounding the ideological conceptualisation of Brexit in modern British Politics, in which its debates over the years, has resulted in an inevitable conditionality of Britain wanting to exit the ever-closer political European Union. To understand the phenomenon why ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and the fundamental principles that would lead to a ‘Hard’ or ‘No-Deal’ Brexit, come 29th of March 2019, it is important to have a brief historical background on Britain and European relations, in the very context of its integrations and mutual cooperation’s. The first step to create an European institution was realised approximately in the late 1940’s, which could have not been possible without a clear reference to the vision and statement of post-war WWII, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who after the war re-construction period re-emphasised the need for a “United State of Europe” (Pilkington, 2001, p2:) He formulated this utopian conclusion during his famous Speech to the academic youth conference, held at the University of Zurich in 1946. But, his real vision of a United State of Europe, as he said, is to ‘see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European community, but we have our own dreams and our own task. Thus, as an island, “We are with Europe, but we are not of it”. As Hugo Young points out that, Winston Churchill was not only the ‘Father of Europe’ but also the ‘Father of British miss-conceptualisation Europe’ the construct of British exceptional behaviour or characterisation in relation to the rest of the world. (Pilkington, 2001, p.3). Churchill’s inspirational speech, led to the formation of ‘European Movement’ in 1947, which eventual evolved into the creation of the ‘Council of Europe’ in 1948, being a realisation of the theoretical and idealistic thinking of Churchill’s Europe, with the aim, “To achieve greater unity between its members for safeguarding and institutionalising the ideas and principles which are common heritage, and facilitating their joint economic and social progress”. (Pilkington, 2001, p.8). The post-war re-structuring and re-construction of a badly divested continental Europe’s, infrastructures and political system, through the US aid, transformed Europe from being the centre of inter-continental war politics to a component in the new world balance of power, allowing the emerging integrated institutions to build a strong regional power-block, in global politics. http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-3278 Robert Schuman, the French politician and then foreign minister, who later became the architect of European Integration, and Jean Monnet a French diplomat who was instrumental to the integration process in the 1950’s, this two great men projected a French led interest agenda, to devise a regional economic cooperation, by advocating a step-by-step integrational process, with the goal to achieve a United Europe, through ‘Spill-over’ effects. (Geddes, 2004, p.61). The improved economic growth and steady industrial developments, lead to the realignments of forces among European states, as Germany replaced Britain as the industrial power of Europe, then balancing the largely agricultural economies of Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, to establish a meaningful customs union, they all accepted the initiative for a common purpose integrative relationship through high capacity resources and industrial pacts. (Young, 1999, p.27). Though the relationship between Britain and Europe has always been a very difficult one, historically Europe has been the centre point of all World Wars, and a volatile continent, over the centuries. Britain refused to participate in what many leading British politicians, and observers of the 1950’s, referred to as an experimental regional institution that is deemed to be a total failure. Thus, the main obstacle to Britain’s non-participation was the fear and ambiguity of surrendering its parliamentary power and state sovereignty to a Higher Authority empowered to act independently of the government of the member states, which was judged to be over the limitation of Britain’s commitment to European cooperation. (Gowland, and Turner, 2000. p.19-20). There are two key arguments deductive of the reasons for Britain’s non-participation in the regional integration process: the diplomacy and economic policy concepts The diplomatic historian argument, focused on policy elements of diplomacy, which they say was motivated by the opposition to supranationalism, a strong preference for an Atlantic basis for European security, and a need to balance relations with Europe, those of Commonwealth and the United States. The economic historian argument, which focused on the economic policy conceptualisation, in which the EC, are driving at developing a ‘Common Market’ Britain was strongly resisting attack on the ‘Sterling’ which they sought its convertibility with the US dollar, as a route to the re-establishment of Britain’s imperial glories. (Geddes, 2000. p.62). All attempts to join the community throughout the 1960’s, by the government of Herold Macmillan, and Harold Wilson, both as Prime Ministers at different times during this period, was met with a strategic blockage (Vetoed), by then French president Gen. Charles De Gaulle who saw Britain’s reluctance in breaking its Alliance with America and the Commonwealth as a challenge. thus, the two prime ministers, were instrumental in redefining Britain’s policy towards a European integration but were unable to secure an early entry into the EEC on two attempts of 1963 and 67. It was not until Jan. 1st, 1973, when the government of Edward Health as prime minister of Britain, finally secured an entry into the community of states. (Young, 1999, p.100-101). Britain joining the EEC, has permeated all aspect of the citizens public life, it has affected socio-cultural and economic functionality of government institutions, through the integrations substantive policy agenda at all levels, and practically in every sector. There was little evidence to suggest that membership had had a galvanising effect on British economy, in relations to the rapid recovery rate of other EC member states. (Gowland, and Turner, 2000. p.153-54). Thus, barely, 18 months into its accession, as EEC member state, a change in British government, that saw Harold Wilson returning into office for the second time as prime minister of a labour lead government, was put to test, with the public persuasion to call for a Referendum, on Britain EEC membership, and on the 6th of June 1975, for the first-time British exceptionalism manifest itself in a new dimension of pro-Europe and anti-Europe divide. And the European Referendum resulted in majority British people voting overwhelmingly ‘Yes’ to remain in the European community, at the expense of the most Labour and Torey Eurosceptics, with then Prime Minister, Wilson celebrating it with a short statement, declaring the formal end of a 14 years controversy over Europe, and calling on all anti-marketeers to join wholeheartedly inside Europe to solve its economic crisis. Therefore, the continued British exceptionalism for over four decades developed a deep political diversity on British politics and its fragile membership of the European community. This could be observed in the dramatic shift of policy engagement by the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980’s, and 1990’s, with the Europe budget rebate half-cake compromise, of 1988, the ‘Black Wednesday’ and the suspension of Britain’s membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, (ERM), in sept 1992, under John Major, the marginal victory of the conservative Euro-sceptics MPs on the final Maastricht Treaty, in July 1993, all this acts indeed necessitated the creation of deep intra-party conflicts, an increased Euroscepticism, with outward looking globalism, and a dripping Europhile inward looking regionalism. The new millennium saw a renewed rise in public opinion and media publicities, calling for Britain to take back ‘powers’ from the EU, becoming so strong, and ever more profound towards the later years of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s Labour government, between 2005-2009. The 2008 global financial crisis, which had a serious after effect in Europe, allowed the conservative party, to use the European question as its campaign tool at the 2010 general election, which resulted in a ‘Hung Parliament’ between a deep Eurosceptic ‘Conservative’ and a liberal pro-Europe ‘Liberal Democrat’ forming a coalition government, with a challenging policy direction and common action on European issues. Euroscepticism and the European question surrounded the conservative’s party manifesto and campaign promises, first during the 2010 general election, and secondly at the 2015 elections, with Prime Minister David Cameroon, promising to call for a ‘Referendum’ on Britain, EU membership if voted into parliament with a full majority in the ‘House of Commons’. With this the British people were given the second chance in over four decades to decide Britain’s membership of the union, under its geopolitical pressure, financial crisis, and the rising immigrational issues across Europe. With the prime minister failing to persuade the British people with his ‘New Settlement’ agreement, for EU reforms, he called for a ‘Referendum’ on the EU membership to hold on June 23rd, 2016. (Smith, 2017, p.79). Key Words: Brexit, Exceptionalism, Eurosceptics, Unilateralism, European Union, Referendum The European Integrational process and creation. The European integration, as a theoretical concept is centred on regional institutionalism and neo-functionalism principles. Here we would be looking at ‘Neo-functionalism’ according to Rosamond, who explains the process of integration as a set of functional, ether, economic or social ‘Spill-overs’ leading to an economic and political integration, with actors transferring the expectations, and loyalties to a supranational central authority. (Farrell, el al. 2005, p.7). Neo-functionalism explicit and implicit suppositions Explicit: As an economic integration and interdependence, that is centred on the removal of varying barriers, on trade, investment, and labour mobility, and the creation of Common market, with its regulatory rules, to a certain extent producing increased interdependence and stability among member states. Implicit: The democratic states, this tend to imply that member states of the regional integration are unconditionally liberal and democratic. Providing a systemic mechanism for regular and reliable processes of holding the rulers, leaders, accountable to citizens, and are committed to respecting the rule of law, human rights, tolerant of citizens engagement in political activities, and the possibility of supporting or criticising the policies of the integration. There are critics of neo-functionalism, as a theoretical concept for institutional functionality, some theorist saw it as an automaticity process of integration, while other critics consider it, in the case of European integration, as a stately driven idealistic process, in which its sustainability is highly dependent on the strategic decisions of the key states interest. In other sense, integration should be an intergovernmental phenomenon. (Farrell, el al. 2005, p.7-8). This neo-functionalism integration was quickly conceptualised, by Mr Robert Schuman, then French foreign minister, and the architect of the integration process, with Mr Jean Monnet, the main driving force of the concept. They both draw-up what could be referred to as a governing document, called the “Schuman Declaration”, with the key concept of ‘neo-Functional integration’, based on the conceptualization, that “When states began to co-operate in one policy or ‘functional’ area, they would begin to build-up mutual trust, and increase the likelihood of co-operation in other functionally related areas, and in this way relations between states would drastically improve”. Accessed on the 5th,July.2017https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en. Thus, a year after the “Schuman Declaration” speech, which was designed to create a common interest between European states, the highly inspired proposal motivated the then Germany Chancellor Mr Adenauer, to respond with a swift positive action, and was then joined-up in the collective response by the leaders of Netherland, France, Italy, and Bel-Lux, going ahead to act on the “Schuman Declaration” proposal, and by April, of 1951, the six founding member states had signed the “Paris Treaty”, which eventually created the European Coal and Steel Community, (ECSC). Europe’s first ever supranational institution, which has been instrumental to the reforms and re-birth of the European Economic Community, (EEC), and subsequently the present enlarged European Union, (EU). Has kept the critical thinkers of liberal utopian idealist engaged on the probability of peace among states, through cooperation and interdependency. British politics and exceptionalism The institutional dimensions of British politics have two components of relevance for understanding the politics of Britain and Europe; first being the “Historic institutionalism” and secondly, the “Social integration”. (Geddes, 2004, p.22). According to the realist theories of international relations, in which most argued that states in the international system are highly driven by National Self-interest, rather than collective interest, and following the regional political trends and discourse, it is obvious that British national interest is well reflective of its historic heritage as a dominant imperialistic power, of the international system between the late 18th, and early 20th century, thus sustaining its global statues became a major priority for policy-makers, politicians, and technocrats alike, working to retaining British special role in ordering world affairs in the 20th century. A historical institutionalism focusses on the dimensions in which institutions ‘constrain and refract’ politics and ‘shape both the strategies and goals of political actors. (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2002, p.42). These historic dimensions had an important social impact on the capacity for European integration becoming fully embedded over time into the social components of national ‘interest and identity’ of British politics. Therefore, it is obvious that the two-dimensional factors, of historical perceptions and political structures were instrumental in shaping Britain’s exceptional attitude and reluctance on the aspirations of a European integration. Which has over time resulted to the disconnection between political cabinet office-holders and policymakers, on policy issues directions and decision-making on Europe new order. As the British government continued to struggle to determine their level of participation in the emerging European economic state, there was a divided opinion, as policymakers had an open-mind, having seen the Schuman plan as a breakthrough in ‘Franco-German’ relation, but were unable to conditionalize the seriousness of French intentions, and as such, could not subscribe to the French view of European integration, with a partial loss of national sovereignty as a necessary price for containing Germany. On the other hand, the government foresaw such an intention as a real threat to its global statues, as the centre of three great inter-locking circles of Europe, the commonwealth, and North America. (Gowland, and Turner, 2000, p.20). The politics of European integration was surrounded by the fear of exclusion, as expressed by Harold Macmillan who viewed the new ‘Franco-German’ relation as an “Empire of Charlemagne”, which arose the nine-tenth of subsequent ‘Tory’ pro-Europeanism; while on the other hand, then Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir report on the ‘Treaty of Rome’ warned straightforwardly that signing the treaty would lead to the loss of national sovereignty, this whole idea of losing independent political power and its crown sovereignty to an external higher authority, then arose another nine-tenth subsequent ‘Tory’ Euroscepticism. (Rosenbaum, 2001, p.6) The British political structure reluctance to accept a Europeanisation idea, began to take shape within its exceptional beliefs. Which can be argued on two key reasons; first as mentioned earlier here, is British historic conceptualization, centred on the disjuncture between the way Britain sees itself, and how others perceive it; secondly, the ambivalence of British politicians, resenting the position of Britain playing a second fiddle to the Franco-German axis. And according to Tilford, British exceptionalism, unlike the American’s, had a damaging impact on its political and economic interest. (Tilford, 2017). http://www.cer.eu/insights/british-and-their-exceptionalism Accessed 7 July 2017. The exceptional perception was highly instrumental on Britain not joining the European integration for its first twenty years, which was then reflected in the political phrase Britain had missed the “European Bus”. Then came the momentous House of Commons vote of Oct. 1971, with Edward Heath, as Prime Minister, which lead to the passing of the European Act of 1972 that pave the way for accession; Harold Wilson’s intra-party divisive politics on the 1975 ‘Referendum; then the “Money Back” campaign and the ‘Bruges speech’ 0f 1988, resetting nationalism and sovereignty by Margaret Thatcher resulting to the rebirth of Eurosceptic; the Maastricht Treaty elements and Britain exiting the ERM under John Major in 1992. The arrival of centre-left ideological New Labour party, led by Tony Blair, saw a renewed political structure on renegotiating Britain’s interest in a fully reformed political European union by 2005; the continuous labour government under Gordon Brown, saw through a dangerous global financial crisis of 2008, and then witnessing more active role of Britain in European reform process; and finally, the politics of Eurosceptic on demanding for “Power Back” and the controlling of own borders developed at the return of the Conservative party in government under David Cameroon, who under political pressure included the European question and the In/Out Referendum in the party manifesto in 2010. (Rosenbaum, 2001, p.7-8). British Euroscepticism towards the European integration is a manifestation of British Exceptionalism, which though explains Britain’s approach towards European integration as a pragmatic and utilitarian policy, stripped of its normative commitment to a European ideal of an ‘Ever-closer’ union. (Andrew Glencross, 2015). Therefore, the calls for a Referendum to determine Britain’s EU status, is an extension of its exceptional behaviour, which also evokes certain British superiority. (Gifford, 2010. p.329). Brexit The word ‘Brexit’ is synonymous with ‘Grexit’ a media slogan used to refer the possibility of Greece being forced out of the EMU and Eurozone in 2010, at the height of the financial crisis. Brexit was coined out of the wordings ‘Britain’ and ‘Exit’ simply meaning “Britain Exiting the EU”. And in the case of ‘Brexit Means Brexit’ according to prime minister May it simply means no “Turning Back” she went on to reaffirm the majesties government position, in a speech, in Jan. 2017, by confirming that Britain will remain the ‘Single Market’ or in the EU ‘Custom Union’ but instead the government will pursue a new trade deal agreement with the EU. In which she reassured both the British people and Europeans that though, “We are leaving the EU, but we are not leaving Europe” Accessed on 1st August 2017 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech The country began its preparation for the negotiation process to exit from the European union membership, with the triggering of EU Article 50, of the Lisbon Treaty 2009, the legal mechanism for any member leaving the EU, here is the part 1-2 of the Article; Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html 1st August 2017 The Supreme Court ruling on triggering Article 50, set the pace, after a case on it was brought before the court by a constitutional campaigner, Gina Miller, who stated that, “By denying the British parliament a vote on Brexit process, is undemocratic and a breach of long-standing constitutional principles; in defence, the government argued that on the ground “Royal Prerogative” which handed powers to the ministers of the crown, can act on the matter without consulting parliament. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38720320). Accessed on 4th August 2017 But, on its ruling the Supreme Court President Lord Neuberger, ruled by a majority of eight to three, that the “Government cannot trigger Article 50 without an Act of Parliament authorising it to do so”. The landmark judgement underpins Britain’s place in championing the ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘Constitutional Order’ on matters of jurisdictions. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38720320. Accessed on 4th August 2017 And by 29th of March 2017, prime minister May triggered ‘Article 50’ after the British parliament had voted affirmatively to support the negotiation process. In the Brexit letter to the European Council president Donald Tusk, she reemphasised her call for a “Deep and Special partnership” with the EU. She further stated, that Brexit for this British generation is a clear chance to shape a brighter future for the country; as she wants Britain to come out of the negotiation process, stronger, fairer, more united, and more outward looking than ever before. (http://www.politico.eu/article/britain-hands-over-brexit-notification-to-eu/). Accessed on 4th August 2017 With Article 50 triggered, it sent shock waves around the world creating more anxiety and uncertainty on economise and social conditions, thus the Brexit negotiation is expected to last for two years, which means by 29th of March 2019, Britain would have finally exited the union. Therefore, this binary reflects the conflicts between the conception of Britain as a European country, as envisaged by Winston Churchill, and British exceptionalism deeply rooted in its long history. (Adler-Nissen, et al, 2016, p.576). And according to Gamble, Brexit is a continuation of the national myth of political exceptionalism. (Gamble, 2012, p.473). There are two theoretical perspectives to Brexit, that shapes in understanding the approach and probability of its impacts. Thus, theories are more an abstract, rather than practical thinking, but it serves as a tool for narrowing down the chaos and complexities of political and social order. Here Brexit would imply to two key theoretical approaches, that of neo-realism and constructivism; both are highly significant in explaining the British behaviour and its exceptionalism. Neo-realism in this context emphasises the power game and interest accumulation by states in view of its role in decision-making concession. In the case of Britain sustaining and projecting its military and economic capabilities as a global power. Constructivism, on the other hand would imply the view on how identity and national interest are formed and their role in shaping Britain’s foreign relations. Post-Brexit constructivism would inform and shape Britain’s ‘Self-image’ as islanders, but with a wider global outlook. Steps to Leaving the EU. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887 Accessed 4 August 2017 Brexit negotiation The figure above helps draw a simple snake like shape diagram of the travel process for exiting the EU. The prime minister started by setting-up a high powered Brexiteer team with a new government department for Brexit, headed by veteran Conservative MP and Leave campaigner David Davis, to take responsibility for Brexit. Former defence secretary, Liam Fox, who also campaigned to leave the EU, was given the new job of international trade secretary and Boris Johnson, who was a leader of the official Leave campaign, is foreign secretary. These three are each set to play roles in negotiating with the EU and seek out new international agreements, this composition has changed over time, with Boris Johnson and David Davis resigning from the cabinet over Theresa May’s preferred Brexit plan, then came in Dominic Raab as Brexit Secretary, but then resigned in November 2018, over same complex Brexit plan, and now being replaced by a less functional Steve Barclay who in real terms would not be involved in any Brussels negotiations, although it would be Mrs May, as prime minister, who would have the final say. Thus, the key negotiating team in practical terms is made up of four teams from both sides of the divide, with high political, diplomatic, and technocratic experiences in the matter of national discourse. From the EU are; Michel Barnier (Leader), Sabine Weyand, Donald Tusk, and Didier Seeuws; the British team is led by David Davis, Olly Robbins, Sir Tim Barrow, and Sarah Healey. on the very first day of Brexit negotiation Britain showed its sign of weakened position, as Brexit led negotiator conceded to the EU conditionality, demand that “Enough Progress” would have to be made on three key priority areas, before entering any trade deals. This priority areas are; agreeing on the mutual guarantee of both citizens’ rights across the channels; the settlement of accounts through mutual financial commitments; and sustaining the commitments to the good Friday agreement. According to the EU lead negotiator Michel Barnier, he said that, “It is by lifting the uncertainties around these issues that we will lay the foundation and create the climate of trust which will enable us to build a new partnership”. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-talks-negotiations-latest-uk-eu-divorce-deal-government-agrees-caves-in-before-trade-deal-a7798076.html. Accessed on 7th August 2017 Hard or Soft Brexit It is most likely in view of the rhetoric and media publications on the subject matter that British government would tend to exit the EU the ‘Hard’ way, following the first step taking on the Brexit negotiation, which began couple of weeks ago in Brussels. This follows an understanding from the Prime Ministers statements, in which she said that, “We are European country and are proud of a shared European heritage, but we are also a country that has always looked beyond Europe into the wider world” The Atlantic News www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/Theresa-may-Brexit/ Accessed on 7th August 2017 She went further to state that, the British government would pursue a new free-trade agreement with the EU, without seeking access into the ‘Single market’ and the ‘Customs Union’. The prime minister insists that she would pursue and agree a trade deal that would allow British businesses to have maximum freedom to trade with and operate within the European market, and would offer same measures to European businesses in Britain. Quoting her, “No deal for Britain, is better than a bad deal” (www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/Theresa-may-Brexit/). Accessed on 7th August 2017 On the other hand, the EU have also insisted that they would not consider ‘Single market’ access for Britain, except on the condition that they accept the “Four Freedoms” of Goods, Capital, Services, and People. This whole conditionality is perhaps the single biggest obstacle to the smooth Brexit negotiation process. Reflecting that Brexit would be a hard one, notwithstanding the prime minister’s failure to retain her party full majority at the last general election, that weakened her ability to pursue a full mandate on Brexit, which has set a divided policy direction and decision-making within her cabinet ministers’ with her foreign secretary Boris Johnson and David Davis advocating ‘Hard’ Brexit by exiting the ‘Single market’ which is in conflict with Phil Hamond the Chancellor advocating for ‘Soft’ Brexit, to remain in the ‘Single Market’ while Liam Fox the International Trade secretary is saying that ‘Hard’ Brexit would benefit Britain by making it a global trading nation, recounting that Britain remains a full and founding member of WTO, and would only become a newly independent member of the organisation. Over the last two years the Brexit negotiation has gone from bad to worst with the Prime Minister struggling to get through the parliament, with her complicated ‘Backside’ deal, which reflects the concept of a ‘Bad Deal is better than No-Deal’ or the “Withdrawal Agreement” and the “Political Declaration of future relationship”. Thus, the document is most likely to be compared to a ‘Soft Brexit’ in the context of its partial membership. Brexit is all about globalism with strong elements of unilateral forces, that would enable Britain to act alone on its own accord and order of national interest, within a global environment. Even thus, the conditions of globalization are still inevitable and irreversible, considering its impact on nation-states and national governance. (Hardy, and McCann, 2017. Vol.21. No.3 Sage-Journals) Hard Brexit There are no standard definitions for the concept, but on the extreme ‘Hard’ Brexit, in contrast could be ‘Clean’ meaning clean-out, or ‘out-and-out’ leaving without a deal in place. If these turn-out to be the case of post-negotiation, it simply means that no real absolute compromise was reached on key issues, such as; the free movement of people, membership of the single market, the Northern Ireland ‘Backside’ which leaves the trading arrangement with EU open, like the rest of the world based on World Trade Organisation rules. This condition of no deal opens-up a new window for new dynamic bilateral, and or multilateral international trade diplomacy, thereby allowing for trade restrictions through tariffs between Britain and EU. Hard Brexit would mean British goods and services would be subjected to higher tariffs, with such items as British cars and agricultural produce losing values against cheap imports from abroad. And leaving the Customs Union would lead to bureaucratic bottleneck. Brexit and Trade A report by the centre for economic performance, (CEP), of the London School of Economic, has predicted that reduction in trade resulting from Brexit will lead to a fall of 1.3 to 2.6 per-cent in national income, depending on the type of deal negotiated. www.centreforcities.org/trade/brexit Accessed on 7th August 2017 Being part of the Single Market and in customs union has often being argued by Eurosceptic as the main reason behind British /EU membership, of which the benefits it has brought to Britain mainly relate to trade, most especially through the Common Agricultural Policy. By being a member of the EU and therefore a member of the SMP, gave Britain huge access to a larger market, now comprising 500 million people, with a 16 Trillion Dollar GDP. Britain had always supported the enlargement of the EU, of which they have also benefited through the extension of its liberal economic tradition in certain areas of the EU policy programs. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexit-means Accessed 7 August 2017 Brexit trade consequences A ‘bad deal is better, than no deal; or a no deal is better, than a bad deal’. These propositions are quite challenging considering Britain’s position of strength and weakness on the negotiation agendas. It is obvious that Britain is starting the negotiation from a weaker position to the EU, knowing very well that a bargaining power position affects the outcomes of trade negotiations, as the country with a weaker bargaining power is less likely to achieve their negotiation objectives. With regards to the trade deal, the balance of trade between the EU/Britain is at the advantage of the EU, with Britain desperate to reach a deal, more than the EU. http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit09.pdf Accessed on 7th August 2017 The outcome of the three key priority areas of stage one negotiation, would influence the position bargaining during the trade deal negotiation. It is important to understand here that one key factor of Brexit is for Britain to exit the single market and customs union, which allows the country to pursue its own trade policies for the first time since 1973, by pursuing an independent trade policies from a global perspective, presents the country with a unilateral opportunities to make deals from a position of strength and comparative advantage. In the next couple of years, Britain would have to re-negotiate new trade deals with the EU, while at the same time negotiate new trade deals with all the countries that do not currently have trade deals with the EU, and these whole processes could take as much as ten years to conclude. When such deals are completed it would reshape Britain’s economic future and global prospects. Therefore, any conditions of an early trade agreement with the EU, would be significant on how post-Brexit elements affects, the British economy and its ability to attract better trade agreements with the rest of the world. Thus, Britain revisionist theory would be an attempt to re-position itself as a sovereign power in an emerging multipolarity world order. Its deconstructive trade policy formation and approach would be shaped on a unilateral principle, such that it will take little or no interest on how its choices affects the rest of the world. Considering the facts that trade policies generates international ‘Externalities’ and these externalities do lead to a “Beggar-My-Neighbour” effects, in trade terms, that makes other countries worse off in the trade deals. http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit09.pdf Accessed on 7th August 2017 The concessions here are that ‘A Bad- deal is better, than a No-deal’ this situation would mean that Britain would have to hold-on to certain elements of Brexit conditionalities, in-order to retain or copy most EU, trade schedules, into its new trade agreements. This sounds more reasonable as it minimizes trade disruptions and reduces the scope for other WTO members to object to Britain’s new schedules. Presently the EU’s, schedules contain the celling for tariffs on a range of goods, such as 10% on cars or 3.7% on Christmas trees, once Britain retains these tariffs celling, it then can apply lower tariffs rates in the future. This process requires a three-way negotiation between Britain, the EU, and WTO members, as it implies that the EU would have to reduce its quotas and subside limits. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/brexit-explained/brexit-explained-10-things-know-about-world-trade-organization-wto?gclid Accessed on 7th August 2017 But in the case of ‘No-deal is better, than a bad deal’ it simply means that in absence of any concessions or compromises, Britain would walk-away without a formal and conclusive trade deals, which is most likely going to be the final outcome, as British Eurosceptic MPs, are bent on a ‘Hard Brexit’, with most of its leading Brexiters such as, David Davis is highly reluctant to concede key elements of Brexit to the bargaining chips. Under this conditionality of ‘No-deal’ with the two parties not reaching a middle ground on trade and immigration agreements, then the WTO trade rules comes into place, with the EU treating Britain with the same conditions it applies to all other WTO members, such as; the US, Brazil and China, and this also applies to Britain treating the EU, in the same conditions it applies to countries in the WTO, and then both international borders would be governed under new immigrational rules within its mutual context. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/brexit-explained/brexit-explained-10-things-know-about-world-trade-organization-wto?gclid Accessed on 7th August 2017 Soft Brexit and Immigration http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf 25 August 2017 Net immigration is the difference between the number of people entering the UK, and the number of people leaving it, so the above graph is showing verifiable data of migration trends of citizens from European Union which has been increasing over time; thus, with a slight reduction during the global economic of 2007-8, and by 2011-15 saw a rapid increase of EU citizens entering the UK mostly for economic benefits. Brexit has merely made more complex what was already one of the critical areas of British public policy agenda; which has been how to respond to the legitimate desire of a large majority of British people, on how to reduce the rising scale of immigration, most especially low-skill migration, while minimizing damage to an economy that in some sectors have become heavily dependent on migrant labour. Assuming the Brexit negotiation agreements ends the visa-free travel concession of EU citizens, between Britain and the EU, there would be an introduction of controlled, “Work-permits” visa process, to substitute the value for migrant labour. The introduction of a work permit for EU, citizens just as its been currently treated with Non-EU citizens, would allow Britain to control the flow into certain sectors of the economy, as it seems fit, and thereby help manage the annual target better than previously handled. One of the key arguments of Brexit was migration, the movement of people across Europe into Britain, and as such has attracted huge national interest, that requires an absolute control and management. It is estimated that more than half of the 3.3m-plus EU citizens have been primarily resident in Britain for at least the five-year qualifying period for permanent residency, of this figure about 1.6m are employees, around 400,000 are self-employed and the rest are dependents or retired. Many of these people would have integrated into the British way of life, with British friends, would have children in various British schools. These conditions would have already qualified them, in terms of length of residence to become British citizens and in this case the new regulations should encourage them to do so, at least those without a criminal record or some other disqualifying characteristic, under Brexit citizenship. But all this conditionality would be determined on the nature of negotiation and concessionary deals that would be reached by the end of 2019. It’s obvious that the EU negotiators are not willing to concede Britain remaining in the single market, without an open border movement. So, the options of alternative models of either, Norway, Canada, and Switzerland models of EU bilateral agreements seem very much inconsiderable, as British position remain weak, but fixed on taking back powers and control to British sovereign parliament, dealing with free trade and global competitiveness, and the absolute control of its national borders. A pure no deal scenario would mean borders between EU and a non-EU state, are suddenly imposed with tariffs and customs checks, and such checks at the borders would be a huge bureaucratic exercise which would involve new border regulations and immigrational laws, the development of specialised computer systems with new interface, and an increase in border staff. British Unilateralism and Brexit With Britain leaving the EU, a multilateral regional institution, that acts to a certain extent on common issues under a hegemonic and hierarchical structure, for the greater benefits of its member states, it looks to pave the way for Britishness, with the phrase ‘global Britain’ as it heads towards a unilateral order. The proposition here is that over the past four decades Britain has continuously seen its global powers and influence reduced or rescind to a growing hegemonic regional institution strongly under the hierarchical order of Franco-Germany axis. And, as in a Hobbesian world order, countries must be willing to act unilaterally to protect its state interest. Whether a country acts unilaterally or multilaterally relates not to the moral imperatives, but to the country’s perception of its national interest. In this case of Britain’s EU membership perception, it is that of losing its power to control its own sovereign authority, and sphere of influence in world politics. (Richard Morningstar, 2004, Harvard Int. Review) The decision to act unilaterally in any given situation by a country is centred on three key factors: Sovereignty: which defines the freedom of a country to act without securing permission or consent of others. Power: this is the ability of a country to execute an action by its own evolution. National interest: national interest at most time is subjective, depending on the condition and perception of a country on how its interest is being challenged by others. Following Theresa May Brexit concession that the British people have voted to leave a multilateral EU, to re- build a Stronger, Fairer, Partner, and Global Great Britain, and in addition to the Eurosceptic view of the EU, as a regional multilateralism, slow to act on key critical issues of member states, national interest, remains disruptive to Britain’s engagement with the rest of the world, in international politics. Therefore, its apparent that Brexit is a result of a multiplier effect equation, of Sovereignty +Power+ National interest = Unilateralism. Unilateralism tends to block the development of a multilateral architecture of global governance, which is the ultimate objective of the European federalist state. Unilateral actions are not only detrimental to the culture and structure of cooperation, it is also a costly venture, with the EU, becoming a subject of world politics without influencing the dynamics of globalisation that are set to decisively shape the 21st century. (Messner, 2000. p.8) Brexit has created and exposed a new and unusual political, social, cultural, ethnic and class-based division, within British political system and its deconstructive relationship with the Europe Union. These continuing and accelerating process of nationalistic tendencies over the past decades, with the politics as usual, has been progressively fragmented and disturbed with the ‘centre ground’ now seemingly attenuated and uncertain. A new hegemonic Britain would run counter to regional and global cooperation, if Britain decides to utilise its existing power differentials to achieve its national interests and sustain its comparative advantages at the expense of the ‘mutual benefits’ in all negotiations with its new global partnerships. But, then Britain would be mindful of the facts that with the emerging paradigm shift, of the international system, which is shifting towards a dangerous multipolarity structure, re-echoing the great-powers politics, in Mearsheimer, “Tragedy of great powers”, were he stated, that “International politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and its most likely to remain so” (Mearsheimer, 2001.). Therefore, in this new emerging structure, great powers would fear each other and always compete with- each other for power on the global arena. And under this power-politics condition it is not possible for any state to achieve global hegemony, and as such the world would tend to remain in a perpetual great-power competition. (Mearsheimer, 2001.) For Britain, global aspirations there is most likely not going to be space for hegemonic unilateralism in this emerging multipolar world order, though it is assumed that Britain would develop its unilateral options and positioning on major global issues as it affects its national interest and sovereignty. Britain would return to a hegemonic unilateralism, even though it has been in a relative decline, the country had been a hegemonic power throughout the 18th century, until the 20th century. During these periods in history Britain was the holder of the ‘Balance of power’ in Europe. (Morgenthau, 2005. p.204) And according to Schroeder, it is only an actual and aspiring hegemonic power that can consistently practice balance of power techniques. (Schroeder, 1994, p.48). However, within this social-construct Britain still assumes itself as the traditional ‘Off-shore balancer’ with the aim of preserving the rough power balancing between France, Germany and Russia; US, and China; with Brexit these would emerge as the new global order. Conclusion: The European integration was an idealistic, liberal (Utopian) conceptualization of ways to secure peace and prosperity through cooperation, in the wake of two world wars, an idea of deploying “economic means for political ends” hoping to make wars ‘materially impossible’. (Smith, 2017. p.7). Following liberal economic theory, Franco-German axis began to look for ways to establish peaceful, stable, and mutually enduring relationship in Western Europe. But Britain’s ambivalence would eventually affect its initial vision of the emerging cooperative community of states. British exceptionalism was very instrumental to early years of Britain’s reluctance to join the European integration, because Europe needed cooperation to achieve relative peace and prosperity, post-war unifications. Edward Heath the British prime minister of accession, confronted exceptionalism, by reviewing British foreign policy approach, leading to successful entry of Britain into the European Economic Community in 1973. He said that “There are some people who believe that the European policy for Britain would mean abandoning all the commitments outside of Europe. Actually, I have never shared this view, I have always believed that participation in the EEC would give us more strength to carry out these obligations”. (George, 1990, p.84) But, shortly after accession into the European economic community, Britain once again found itself struggling with membership progression, in relation to its agreed conditionality as a joining member, and not a founding member. The issues of budgetary rate contributions and losing of sovereignty became a major debate among conservatives and labour party divide, with Enoch Powell and Tony Benn, challenging the loss of constitutional and national sovereignty in turn for economic benefits which were consciously obvious. At this period of deliberate intra-party conflicts, Harold Wilson then prime minister was persuaded to call for the first ever Britain’s Referendum on Europe in 1975. The Referendum raised the issues of the loss of sovereignty and the benefit of remaining in the ‘Common Market’. It offered a simple choice to the British people, “Should Britain be a member of the EEC, ‘Common Market’ Vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Harold Wilson’s labour led government, championed the ‘Yes’ campaign, supported by many of the media houses, big-businesses and mainstream politicians. The ‘Yes’ campaign secured a decisive victory, on the ground of economic growth, through the ‘Common Market’ at the expense of its national sovereignty uncertainty. The post-referendum opened a new challenge, as many later saw the ‘Yes’ campaign as deceptive, with majority of the voters thinking or assumed that they are voting to join the ‘Common Market’ element, and not the EEC as a full committed member. Mrs Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988, laid some guiding principles for the future of Europe, and that of Britain, remaining in the EC, as an ‘Awkward Partner’ as the speech inspired the resurgence of Eurosceptic drive within British political spectrum. Thatcher was instrumental in renegotiating Britain’s budgetary contribution rebate, which were badly negotiated by both Heath and Wilson. As, she refers to it as being unjust and totally unacceptable to the British people, “I cannot play sister bountiful to the community while my own electorate are being asked to forego an improved health, education, and welfare systems”. (Szasz, 1999, p.79). this became very crucial in re-positioning Britain role and power politics in the regional institution. Following his predecessor, John Major opposed the proposals that would lead to the strengthening of a centralized authority over national economies and the growth of a bureaucratic superstructure union of “Eurocracy”. His conservative led government went further to advocate a socio-economic program, that would allow free competitiveness and the development of private enterprise. He was against the further integration in monetary area, and the creation of an economic monetary union, (EMU), not willing to subject British monetary and financial policies to the EU. (Minford, et al. 2005, p.46) The labour party and prime minister Tony Blair ‘New Labour’ ideological shift, developed a new strategic European foreign policy agenda, which centred on three key areas; dealing with crisis of unemployment across Europe; a joint effort in combating organised crimes; the protection of the environment; cross-border cooperation; conformity with the ‘Single Market’ and the enlargement of the union. Blair, while projecting and re-establishing Britain’s power in the heart of Europe, re-instated the drive for Britain’s hegemony within the region. He did say that, “the principles of modern British foreign policy confirmed Britain’s role as a ‘Bridge between Europe and the United States, this role defined as an axis of power, meaning a regional power, with global responsibilities”. (Wring, 2005 p.47) The coalition government of David Cameron and Nick Clegg opened- up a new political dynamism by bringing together a Europhile liberal democrats and Eurosceptic conservative pursuing a conflicting European foreign policy that centred on hard compromises over British social policies, powers and sovereignty. Thus, the coalition government tried preventing any further enlargement of the EU, without the consent of the British people, as they introduced a Bill on the EU before parliament envisaging a referendum on any further transfer of prerogative powers from Britain to the EU. And according to the coalition programme, which emphasised that, “the approach strikes the right balance between constructive engagement with the EU, in dealing with issues that affects Britain, and protecting its national sovereignty”. (The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 2010, p.67) Another of the coalition government pledge was that, they would strongly protect Britain’s national interest on the EU budget negotiations, with an agreement that it should only focus on the areas in which the EU can add values to British people. Thus, Cameron achieved a real-term reduction of Britain/EU monetary contribution, but not without a constructive parliamentary mandate. While the Bloomberg speech in 2013, by Cameron, only bought him time and some support from his Europhile party members, and giving sceptics the prospect for change, either through a reform process, or the chance of projecting leaving the EU. Even, with the speculations of a better deal from the EU, Britain’s European question never faded away, as the relevance of Britain huge monetary commitment, and migration target misses became a national issue. The prime minister Mr Cameron, went into the 2015 general election with a strong pledge wanting to address the relationship between Britain and the EU, through his new strategic principles, of the three ‘Rs’ (Reform, Renegotiation and Referendum), he was able to hold the party together throughout the course of the election, to secure a full majority, the conservative party eventual won the general election of 2015, with huge majority, thereby avoiding a second term coalition government. This gave Mr Cameron best chance to deliver on his three ‘Rs’ pledge, on the EU/Britain future relationship in other to impress the rising Eurosceptics. The conservative party made an unequivocal commitment to hold an In/Out referendum by the end of 2017, but that seems not to be the case as the referendum itself came earlier than assumed, with the process put before the parliament through a draft legislation under the Political Party, Elections, and Referendum Act 2000, (PPERA), which in all, proposed the need to place more formal and well-regulated framework than before, for the public and parliamentary debates u p/down the country. The 2016, referendum was a substantive call to repeal laws and powers of the 1975 referendum, which entrusted Britain into the European Community. Therefore, the Eurosceptic cohesive attempt to retrieve powers, border control and national sovereignty back from an emerging political ‘State of Europe’. With the British people voting to exit the European union, on the 23 June 2016, it suffixed a new word ‘Brexit’ meaning ‘Britain Exit’ which signifies that Britain is in the logical process of leaving the European Union Integration for good. In March 2017, Theresa May the post-referendum prime minister with a parliamentary mandate triggered Article 50 of the EU, to begin the negotiation process, and her declaration that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ seems to demonstrate the malleability of the concept. Britain has always pride itself as a leader in promoting open/end free trade, liberalization, peace, tolerance, and a cultivated democratic state. And liberals everywhere around the world have found British constitutional regime attractive and inspiring, which has stabilised many democracies around the world. Thus, Britain had been in relative decline because of uneven economic growth over the decades, but with post Hard-Brexit, British hegemonic and unilateralism would be a cost benefit, according to David Davis the first Brexit Secretary, he said that, “Britain would be floating freely in the middle of the Atlantic, away from Ireland and the rest of Europe” meaning going global and ultra-independent. (The Evening Standard, 21 August 2017). https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/new-warning-that-britain-must-accept-eu-rules-if-it-wants-close-trade-links-a3616231.html . Accessed 21 August 2017. Thus, the country and the EU member states are still beclouded with huge level of socio-economic uncertainty, post-referendum, and through a lengthy controversial Brexit negation, which has left businesses and concerned interests on the edge of what the future holds, as the phrases of a ‘Bad Deal’ or ‘No-Deal’ continues to feel the political space. With March 29, 2019 fast approaching, the government has been able to publish its “Withdrawal Agreement” between the UK and the EU, which includes an outline of the ‘Political Declaration on the future relationship after Brexit’. The key challenge of the withdrawal agreement would be how to fully compliment the absolute will of the majority British voters, considering how Soft or Hard the final deal reflects, “Brexit means Brexit”. The hypothesis here means, that Britain is strongly looking ahead to the pursuance of a global agenda, and by unilateral persuasions through its cultural and economic power, then exercising its hugely endured heritage, intellectual property authority, universal language monopoly and exerting its powerhouse of capitalist institutionalism in securing great competitive trade deals among nations of the world, most significantly with the commonwealth of nations its imperial community Proposition Therefore, this paper considers Brexit as a practical assertion of British exceptionalism structured on its historic perceptions, national identity, political institutionalism and sovereign entity, thereby redefining its regional hegemonic power in the Island of Europe. Brexit would act as a framework with the potentials of shaping perceptions of three conceptualizations; it would re-construct Britain and European identities in distinct sovereign environments; Brexit would shape an understanding of geopolitical realities; and finally, Brexit would de-construct the nature of global economic order. The theoretical imperative pre-Brexit and post-Brexit is that of a neo-realist construct, which shows that the international system is structured in an ‘Anarchical’ nature, anarchy here does not imply the presence of chaos and disorder, but refers to the absence of a world government, or global authority providing security and stability in the system. (Waltz, 1979, p.88). The empirical facts here show why euro-sceptics belief that Britain can survive in this anarchical structure of “Self-help” system, (Waltz, 1979, P88-89), with the full consciousness and confidence of its military/economic capabilities, distributive capabilities, and national security capacities. Furthermore, a Hard Brexit which is highly inevitable, would mean, “Global Britain” in real term, which simply means that Britain leaves the EU without any compromise or concessions on the single market and or open-border deals, that would elude the deep perception of Brexit, as Brexit is meant to open-up Britain to global influence and opportunities. The exceptional character of British hegemonic stability, which would continue to shape its unilateral foreign policy direction and relations with the EU, and rest of the world. 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