About US Intelligence

About US Intelligence Artur Victoria The information actions promoted by governments are not only under the responsibility of the intelligence community of a country, despite their centrality. The person responsible for these activities will vary according to the situation of peace or war and the kind of propaganda action to be unleashed. In addition, the available information products have quite different characteristics, and the type of employment can be tactical or strategic. Although the information service is the field of secret services par excellence, it encompasses, to a certain extent, the entire US public machine. Institutional responsibilities for informational and psychological operations, for example, are defined by the status of the target country's relations with the US. In the case of peace, the strategic objectives to which the other organs must subordinate are the Department of State, and this task remains under its control until the beginning of the hostilities. In a situation of conflict, the burden is passed on to the Department of Defense, which then becomes the centralizer of the use of such instruments, linking these informational actions with the other military measures involved. Whether in a situation of peace or war, intelligence services are primarily employed in the operation of information products involving the use of disinformation, under the logic of plausible denial, thus preserving the figure of the Secretary of State or the president of possible international constraints. The CIA is primarily responsible for the actions of disinformation abroad, directly assuming such measures when in the service of the Department of State, or acting jointly with military intelligence, when in situations of conflict. With the attacks of 2001 and the consequent restructuring of the US intelligence system, the actions of disinformation and propaganda by the US Intelligence were coordinated by the National Clandestine Service (NCS). This service since 2004 is centralized by the CIA and brings together all human intelligence agencies (Humint). Within the NCS, it is from the Division of special activities109 that all covert operations developed by the intelligence community are carried out. The covert actions, in turn, are divided into paramilitaries and political actions, the latter being the responsibility of the Political Action Group or political action group. Under the prism of the covert actions promoted by this group, we have the political actions, the actions of psychological operations. Psychological operations Psychological operations, or PSYOPs, are the privileged informational instrument for actions in which the behavioural change of the target public is objectified. With this type of measure, one expects more than the commitment of the capacity of perception of reality on the part of the affected population, but, mainly, the possibility of stimulating certain behaviour. As such, the affected sectors could be encouraged to give up fighting in a particular war or to elect a candidate as president appropriate to US interests. As defined by US military doctrine: The mission of PSYOP is to influence the behaviour of the foreign target audience to support US national goals. PSYOP accomplishes this, transmitting selected information and / or advising actions that influence the emotions, motivations, objective reasoning and, finally, the behaviour of the foreign public. The behaviour change is at the root of the PSYOP110 mission (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2005, p.1-2). In this way, one seeks to shape the adversary's understanding of the world, so that, without his knowledge, it may be possible to direct him according to the interests of the North American state. The advantages of psychological operations are many. The affected public can not only lose the ability to perceive for itself, but also have their behaviour shaped. Therefore, US values and interests can be reproduced worldwide, enabling eventual antagonists to become docile allies. Thus, however much military interventions may be required, they may require an effective lowering and may occur less often. Psychological operations are used in broad-spectrum interventions, supporting not only the military objectives but also the goals that can be obtained in a peace situation. The following table presents the information tools and US strategic objectives with PSYOPS, according to the contexts of war and non-war. It is interesting to note that a number of apparently inoffensive items, such as comic books, are viewed by American doctrine as instruments of ideological domination. Informational products and their use An important facet that determines the division of interagency responsibility in psychological operations relates to the type of information product to be employed. By the doctrine of the army, the information products are differentiated, mainly, from the diffusion of its origin, or the restriction on this one. In this way, information whose origin is known tend to be signed by formal and formal institutions such as the State Department, the Treasury, or the White House itself. On the other hand, the disinformation, whose source is hidden, would be part of the covert actions promoted by the intelligence services. Under this logic, once the adversary finds the source of the disinformation, the State Department or the president can always rely on plausible denial, claiming that the initiative was autonomous and restricted to the intelligence services. We have the following list of informational products that support psychological operations (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2005, pp. A-3): a) Open product - They are informational products in which the original source is provided, and therefore signed, which makes it possible to identify immediately its authorship. Its purpose is not to deceive the public, at least as to its origin. In the field of information declared is the following product: 1) White - These products have their origin patent and are used as support for the public and formal actions of the US State. They have as their advantages the credibility, the possibility of corroborating the information divulged from other sources. This type of information makes it difficult for the opponent's actions to demoralize the source, since they are usually factual, and have increased their credibility from the perception of power emanating from the US, "whether this diplomatic, informational power, military or economic111 "(DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2005, pp. A-1). On the other hand, with the disclosure of the source, the adversary can more easily target his refutation campaign by focusing attacks on it. In addition, the type of information employed tends to be more restricted and the correction of errors of approach more difficult, since the flaws tend to scratch the image of the institutions involved. b) Covered product - These products require a great capacity for coordination and integration between the component agencies. Mistakes often cost participants a price, affecting the country's image. The information disclosed is disclosed in a way that does not know the origin of the information, that is, its authorship is concealed or even falsified. It also makes the prescription of this type of product the use of the artifice of plausible denial, in which case the information sponsor is found, the information can "plausibly" deny its involvement. As a rule, the information whose source is hidden make up the list of measures employed by the covert actions of the intelligence services. As already mentioned, if the origin of the misinformation is discovered, the involved agency and its employees take the blame, preserving the other institutions of the State. They present the following information products: 1) Gray - Are informational products that hide or do not identify their origin. They are usually employed to support operational actions, such as elections or military battles. Its advantages are related to the information being dissociated from the prestige (or discredit) of the original source in relation to the target public. Thus, the United States can intervene in proceedings in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran, dissociating the dissemination of ideas or facts from its North American origin, which in the region 2) Black-They are products that emanate the misinformation proper, since they propose to spread lies or half truths. As positive points for their use of black products has as a great advantage the fact that they can be produced in or near the opponent's territory, quickly reaching the target audience. The presumption of information originated within the territory of the antagonist lends credibility to it and helps to demoralize the enemy implying the presence of internal dissidents. With proper form and content, disinformation may be indistinguishable from the original propaganda of the adversary, causing him to invest many resources to preserve the integrity of his original speech. Another important facilitator is the difficulty in identifying its origin, which hinders the actions of the enemy with a view to appeasing their effects. As a negative counterpoint to its users, the black information provokes great investment in security measures information for the protection of the source. Another aspect relates to the articulation with projects of more extensive psychological operations. Since such information is served by less formal channels, it is difficult to coordinate them with the broader psychological goals. Aspects such as safety and long-term planning also limit flexibility. Another obstacle is that this type of information product is very vulnerable to the discovery, manipulation and / or physical elimination of the source when operating within the opponent's territory. This endangers human sources within the country. Finally, in order to be effective the black product requires great planning and coordination, in order to have an orchestrated performance with the other information media employed. Because of this, their employment tends to be difficult in a timely manner outside the strategic framework, given the degree of planning involved and the necessary minutiae (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2005, p.A3). Psychological operations may also vary in scope, and may have tactical or strategic scope. Thus: 1) Tactical operations - They are used to support small and medium-size objectives, both in peace situations and in military confrontation. One example involves confronting the United States with Communist influence in the Italian elections of 1948. Concerned that PCI112 might win the election, the US government orchestrated a broad campaign to strengthen Christian Democrats. Employing white goods, the State Department reported on the difficulty of financing Italy with the Marshall Plan if the Communists took over the state, and the American press, like Time magazine, proclaimed in its March 22 - 1948, that Italy would find itself "on the verge of catastrophe" with the victory of the Communists. In the covert dimension, the CIA, in addition to funding the centre parties, forged documents and letters on behalf of the CIP, is radicalizing its power speech. He also published material focusing on the brutality of the occupation of the Red Army in Germany, as well as the impact of the Communist victory in Poland and Czechoslovakia (RICHELSON 1995: 244). As a result the Communist Party lost the elections. Tactical-level psychological operations are also employed in warfare. In this type of situation, intelligence organizations work together with the tactical intelligence sectors, blending the use of open and covert sources. During World War II, the English and North Americans developed several disinformation operations in order to deceive the German command about the landing points allied in the north of France. To this end, ostensible means such as radio broadcasts, newspapers, official communiqués, among others, were used, while disinformation was transferred from the network of German double agents at the service of the allies. (GODSON, WIRTZ 2008: 108) 2) Strategic operations - They are used to promote long-term interests of the American power. They tend to blend open and covert information, however, as they involve a large time period, informational measures have to be taken with care and planning, as errors can compromise the action itself, as well as tarnish the image of the promoter. An example of this type of action, already cited in this paper, is related to the operation developed by the CIA with a view to winning the Cold War culture. Between 1950 and 1967, employing a facade entity called Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA promoted the ideological-cultural positions of interest to the United States. Dozens of prestigious magazines have been published, books of respected intellectuals have been published, international conferences held, as well as promoted musicians and artists whose art has been seen as a promoter of American liberal interests. Accordingly with Saunders : “ The degree to which the American spy ring has extended its reach to the cultural affairs of its allies in the West, acting as the unrecognized facilitator of a wide range of creative activities, and positioning the intellectuals and their work as chessmen to be played in the Great Game, remains one of the most thought-provoking legacies of the Cold War”. An operation of this size, combining various actions and types of propaganda and disinformation, needs extreme care. The intellectuals in question will only remain useful to the extent that they do not lose their credibility, which would inevitably occur if the bond with the US intelligence agency was discovered. Information operations While these are disciplines of military doctrine for employment during the war, the fields that make up this doctrine have been widely applied by US intelligence agencies in both peace and conflict situations. As a significant part of the intelligence organizations' doctrine regarding information operations, they are confidential, understanding the US Department of Defence’s vision allows understanding the resources and concepts available on the ground of the informational conflict. In addition, the doctrines of IO give the dimension of relevance given by the US military and civilian intelligence services over the domain of all the informational spectrum, either by controlling the content or the physical medium. Information operations emerged during the 1990s in the context of US military and intelligence bodies, from the moment the information society became part of the model of victorious globalization imposed by the post-war hegemonic power Cold. Digital technologies began to play a central role as ordering social relations, doing the same with the dimension of conflict. With the primacy of the Internet, but with other communication networks and data traffic, several processes migrated to digital support and were integrated into networks. In addition to issues such as communication, access to news and creation of virtual communities, are also integrated economically more relevant dimensions, such as the financial system of nations, the control of power plants or airports. The fact that digital networks carry these informational relations, as well as several cultural facets, allows such networks to be a privileged arena for the exercise of soft power. The IOs can also be divided into two sets of capacities related to the actuation of information content and information systems. The disciplines that act on the sense that the information produces are the psychological operations, operations of security and disinformation military. The skills used to affect the physical structure that supports information are electronic warfare and computer network operations (PAUL, 2008). This combination of possibilities allows us to combine means to distort the content of information, while access to networks and communications systems. The following will describe what each grouping of processes consists of. Information operations are the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer operations operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision-making. Informational content The action on the content of the information itself involves the ability to re-signify the meaning of the adversary, either by making their own point of view or by deliberately misleading them. In addition, in this sphere related to information content are also involved the ability to obtain protected data from the opponent, as well as the ability to protect their operations from the enemy. Therefore, the following fields are used: a) Psychological operations - PSYOPS, as addressed in another topic, are intended to provide information to the adversary and induce him to change his behaviour in a way that benefits US interests. Psychological operations use the gradations of black, gray and white propaganda, which are determined by the veracity of the information made available, as well as by the disclosure of its origin. The PSYOPS have as their specificity the quest for the enemy's attitude change, implying action, and the comprehensiveness of their targets, which can be even all the people of a country or continent. b) Military disinformation - MILDEC has the function of deceiving the opposing commander so that it is led to a misunderstanding of the position of allied troops, as well as the intentionality of their use. Although military disinformation uses techniques common to PSYOPS, for example, it differs from it by the restriction of its objective, since it pretends to deceive only the command of the enemy army, whereas the psychological operations can target a whole population. Eventually such targets may overlap with psychological operations indirectly supporting the actions of MILDEC. In this way, the Groups that are suitable for PSYOP targeting in support of MILDEC operations include adversary command groups, personnel planning teams, specific factions within teams, nonmilitary interest groups that can influence policy and military decisions and analysts of intelligence systems (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2006, pp. II-3). The American military doctrine conceptualizes MILDEC as follows: Military disinformation (MILDEC), carried out at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is defined as the actions performed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers about military capabilities, intentions and operations allied forces, causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inaction) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the Allied forces' mission (Dept. of Arms, 2006, p. viii). Centrally military disinformation therefore seeks to deny the enemy the knowledge about the real pretensions and strengths of the US military when in operations, confusing the ability to make an adversary decision. c) Security operations - OPSEC aims to identify information American or Allied forces, in order to enemy intelligence can obtain such information. From this diagnosis they are measures to eliminate or reduce the opponent's identify such information (PAUL, 2008, p.76). It is important to note that OPSEC not deal with classified data or with the establishment of criteria for the access to information. Their concern is with open sources and due care to the failures that may exist in informational operations in progress. Thus, security operations are defined by the US Army: Safety Operations (OPSEC) is a process that identifies critical national information to determine whether allied actions can be observed by the opposing intelligence system, determines whether the information obtained by the adversaries could be interpreted in a way that is employable to them, and then carries out appropriate measures that eliminate or reduce the exploitation of critical information by the opponent. OPSEC is a methodology that denies critical information to the opponent. Unlike security programs to protect classified information, OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally non-classified information that is associated with sensitive operations and activities116 (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2006b, P. vii). Military deception (MILDEC), conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (OPSEC) is a process that identifies critical information to determine if it can be observed by adversary intelligence systems and if executes selected by adversaries could be interpreted to be useful to them. measures that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly critical information. OPSEC is a methodology that denies critical information to an adversary. Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally unclassified evidence that is associated with sensitive operations and activities. In this way the security operations tend to be dynamic, working by project. Whenever a determined informational operation begins, those responsible for security will try to anticipate the risks of the opponent perceiving the action, and, from there, take protective measures. In this focus OPSEC differs from PSYOPS and MILDEC, since it acts with central target the enemy intelligence and other sectors responsible for perceiving the manoeuvres of disinformation of the enemy. Another difference of security operations is that, although they act on the content of the information provided, distorting it according to the needs of the current operation, they may also employ "direct attacks against the adversary's intelligence system" (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2006b, P. II-4), if necessary to compromise the intelligence system and the intelligence capacity of the enemy forces. Information systems Informational operations also act on the physical structure of the adversary information system. By compromising the antagonist's informational tools and technologies, one's ability to perceive ongoing actions, or even to develop one's own measures, is eliminated. Unlike the above disciplines, which attempt to manoeuvre the enemy's perception, electronic warfare and computer network operations will attempt to eliminate or circumvent the technological means available. In this way, they act by undermining the ability to collect data about the surrounding environment, trying to leave the adversary, in an analogy with humans, deprived of fundamental meanings such as sight, hearing or speech. It presents the following modalities: a) Electronic Warfare -EW involves the ability to gain mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, while denying the opponent the use of this. US Army doctrine divides this area into three categories (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2003, pp. 2-7): 1) Electronic protection -EP is responsible for the protection of communication systems and transmission of data before the attack of opponents. 2) Support Electronic Warfare - ES acts to identify the electromagnetic signals emitted by the adversary, in order to support the planning of electronic warfare operations against this enemy. The information obtained by ES also supports the actions of collecting intelligence of signals, as well as attacks against human targets, that can be located by the emissions of its apparatus of communication. 3) Electronic attack - EA is the sector responsible for "the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, anti radiation weapons, to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degradeing, neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability" (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2003, pp. 2-8). For this can be used from communications equipment, with the aim of shuffling the enemy communications, to electromagnetic missiles that will physically destroy the equipment of the enemy and the data collected by it. b) Computer Network Operations - CNE involves the dispute of the control of the digital information networks of the opponent, denying the use to this and protecting their own. CNE has three sub-disciplines, which are (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2003, pp. 2-9): 1) Attack of Network of Computers - CNA. In this sphere, the adversary's information system, as well as its weapons system, is attacked, destroyed, broken, or corrupted. Both attempts to destroy the network infrastructure and corruption of stored data. CNA employs lethal instruments, such as bombs, and other warlike and non-lethal devices to invade the enemy network. 2) Computer Network Defence - Acts defending the allied information system against attack by opposing forces. It resembles the measures that ordinary users adopt to protect their systems from hackers and virus attacks, adding some complexity. 3) Computer Network Exploration - CNE works centrally with gathering intelligence about the adversary system. Thus, it penetrates the networks of the enemy collecting data of its software and hardware, in order to feed the knowledge about it. (DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 2003, pp. 2-11). 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