The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress

Author Query Form Dear Professor, All queries pertaining to chapter _____1_________ are listed below. These require your responses. Please provide your responses in the last column by using the PDF reader so that we can make the necessary amendments as per your advice. Queries pertaining to chapter/chapters: Page No Queries 6 AQ01: Please check the completeness of the sentence. 22 AQ02: Please provide volume number and page range details for reference. Author Response 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era EA Chapter 1 Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress Kerry Brown The Curious Case of Consent in Contemporary Chinese One of the puzzles in contemporary China is the ways in which the Xi Jinping leadership has at least been perceived to have created unity and consensus in a country undergoing huge changes, where this achievement might have been viewed as very difficult. Not only this; in the Hu Jintao period, society was regarded as riven by divisions and contentiousness. This was manifested in the ways in which this era ended in 2012, with one member of the Politburo (Bo Xilai) removed from his position due to corruption, and another two, Ling Jihua and, from the Standing Committee under Hu, Zhou Yongkang, under a shadow.1 The elite themselves seemed to be going into meltdown. If this was the case at their lofty level, how much more divided was it likely to be in the rest of society? From this unpromising start, the Xi leadership emerged with increasingly surprising stability. This was despite it starting, quite soon after its 1 Both were to be indicted for corruption formally after Xi Jinping was appointed as the Party Secretary. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 1 b3312_Ch-01.indd 1 01-06-2018 13:20:04 b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era EA 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era beginning, what might have been regarded as a high risk anti-corruption purge, targeting thousands of officials, and spreading from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other entities. It was also against falling growth, with the annual GDP dipping down from 2012 to around 7%, and then to 6.5% (In the first quarter of 2018, it was stabilised at 6.8%). As economic growth had been seen as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief claim to legitimacy after 1978 when reforms started, this also supported the expectation that the head winds for the Xi leadership would be against it. Party discipline after 10 years of breakneck growth was poor; cadres seemed increasingly divorced from the rest of society, or too deeply integrated into its commercial operations and implicated by issues and problems there; the language of elite leaders seemed ossified and outdated, and the CCP generally looked like it was in the midst of a crisis of relevance, responding nervously and defensively against the Jasmine Revolutions and the so-called Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East as they occurred from 2010 onwards. Despite these aspects which were some of the most important influences around the start of the Xi leadership, it became clear quite quickly that the dominant tone of the new era was one of confidence, that the focus of the CCP was initially to straighten its own affairs out, and that much of this gained its wide public support. Seen as increasingly autocratic, conservative and hardline outside of China, and being labelled a new kind of Mao, Xi Jinping despite all the muscular, forceful things his government proposed, from clampdowns on rights lawyers, to harsh treatment of any kind of dissent inside and outside the Party, faced almost no overt, visible opposition. A letter by some critics appeared in 2016, but barely left a mark (Bland and Yang, 2016). Within the Party super elite, at the Central Committee and Politburo, it seemed that no one spoke out of turn. The unity of the message, and the messaging, in this era where there is so much complexity and so many challenges is something that needs an explanation. This is especially so because the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 can be seen as the culmination of this process of tightening and enforcement of discipline and unity. It itself was conducted with a procedural smoothness that had been signally lacking in the 18th Party Congress in b3312_Ch-01.indd 2 01-06-2018 13:20:04 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 3 2012, with its late date (it slipped from the usual October into November) and the intense speculation beforehand about who would get what slot, and what Xi Jinping’s role in this would prove to be. In 2017, there was no question of Xi’s centrality. Nor was there any issue over the event’s date, or any unexpected happenings in the build up to it. The only unexpected thing was the abrupt removal of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai, accused of corruption in the autumn but before then figuring in most lists of potential candidates for entry to the Standing Committee, the ultimate group of elite political leadership in contemporary China. While there were plenty of questions about how many might be in this Standing Committee (seven, as was the case from 2012, or the larger nine, which had been the norm from 2002 onwards), how many would actually retire and observe the informal age limit of 68, whether there would be an obvious successor to Xi in the next appointees, and whether a figure like the immensely respected Wang Qishan, head of the anti-corruption struggle, would go, in terms of the general atmosphere in China and the sense of stability and following of process, the Congress build up was undramatic. That in itself was an achievement. It was also further evidence of this unexpectedly high level of elite and public support for Xi’s administration. What lay at the heart of this? Why is it that a political elite, many with personal memories of the late Maoist era and the truly cataclysmic results of this period of mass mobilisation and violently committed pursuit of idealistic outcomes, were willing to embrace a much more person-centred, charismatic leadership than had been the case at any time since the 1970s? Why the eerie lack of dissenting voices, even in the most subliminal and cautious fashion? Of course, continuing to produce economic results that at least mobilised and gained the material allegiance of people was important. But this had been the case since the Deng era from 1978, and in any case, as mentioned above, was becoming weaker, not stronger, under Xi because of the falling growth rate. The Xi leadership from 2012 simply didn’t talk in the remorselessly unitary way about its most important function being to support economic development as the Hu one had. It was promoting a more hybrid, complex message. Nor was it wholly about use of repression and fear. There certainly was plenty of that under Xi (witness the July 2016 clampdown on lawyers for instance, and the treatment meted out to the b3312_Ch-01.indd 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:04 b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era EA 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era journalist who was claimed to have leaked the Document No. 9 in early 2014). But informal and more formal investigation showed that Xi was a genuinely popular leader, rather than one who was simply feared. This lay behind the fond nickname for him from 2013, Xi Dada (Uncle Xi). And heavy use of repression usually gives evidence of the extent of dissent underneath the surface of society. In Xi’s China, targeted groups got rough treatment. But the emerging middle class, the key group for Xi, working in cities, in service sectors, were largely onside by consent, not force. For them, they had not been forced to like Xi. They did it willingly. Telling the China Story How is it that Xi has managed to create this level of consent among groups that are key for him? One thing is clear: whatever else he has done, from the first period of his time as Party Secretary Xi Jinping has been a teller of stories. And this ability to capture the complexity and ambition of what China is going perhaps gives a clue to the success of his leadership so far in terms of stability, confidence and unity. A book, published in 2017 by the state-owned Xinhua agency, was simply titled ‘Xi Jinping Tells Stories’ (Xi, 2017). A meeting of the Politburo in early 2013 reportedly involved Xi telling his Politburo colleagues that they needed to tell the China story to the outside world. China had been too passive, too marginalised, and now had the right, as the world’s second largest economy, to put its story out there. This was about more than its economic success. It was about it describing its world view, its distinctive cultural values, and the ways in which it was more confidently contesting the notion of a Universalist Western discourse of political and ethical values. It wanted neither economic nor geopolitical space, but intellectual and cultural space. That involved validation of ideas like the China Dream, and narratives of China’s engagement in the rest of the world like the Belt and Road Initiative, the new Silk road (covered in Chapters 2 and 8), which were more dynamic, more centred on China, and more communicative. These stories accepted the ways in which China was intrinsically global and integrated into the global system. But they also stressed that China wanted parity, and in many cases, greater international status in this new era. b3312_Ch-01.indd 4 01-06-2018 13:20:04 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 5 It felt it had the right to be seen as equal to the US, rather than contesting and competing with it. Its rise was an inevitable and peaceful one, and one it had the right to. This strand of historic destiny thinking, and of the Xi leadership occurring at a particular time in the country’s attainment of modernity on its own terms, and in its own unique way, was striking, and evidenced in the way that all elite leaders, not just Xi, spoke. It was supplemented by a strong sense that this moment, driving towards the delivery of the first Centenary Goal in 2021 (celebrating the 100th anniversary of the CCP) was not just one where, as had been the case in the Hu period, China would achieve middle income status. Above and beyond this, the Xi era would be culminating in a country which was having justice restored to it. The Communist Party, which had come to power in 1949 on the back of this vow that it would redeem Chinese people and restore justice to them after the century of humiliation at the hands of the west, and the injustices of the long imperial feudal period, was for the first time in reach of a modernity on its own terms, restoring the country’s status to it, and allowing it redemption and resurrection from a past full of sacrifice, humiliation and suffering. Jubilation at this achievement, guided and steered by the Party, was the great source of consent and consensus. The Party’s message under Xi is strongly patriotic, and one that to dissent from politically would lay people open to the deadly criticism of being disloyal and traitorous. This focus on achieving the imminent moment of national rejuvenation and renaissance (terms that have appeared heavily in the last few years in official discourse in the People’s Republic) is a clear underlying theme in the political and ideological content of Xi’s lengthy speech at the opening of the 19th Party Congress, delivered on 18th October 2017 in Beijing. The sheer size of this talk alone is symbolic of the expansiveness and ambition of the Xi era. But it is also indicative of a political vision which is comprehensiveness in ways that previous leaders since the era of Deng have not been so willing to engage in. Under Jiang Zemin, Party Secretary from 1989 to 2002, and Hu (2002–2012) their main mode of communication was to use statistics to promote the idea of how fast and successful China’s material development was. Theirs was a predominantly technocratic, and sometimes quite parochial, mode of address. China was achieving measurable outcomes and doing things in a way unique to itself, b3312_Ch-01.indd 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era EA 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era just asking for space, rather than trying to impose on anyone else. But under Xi, the bounds of the Chinese understanding of its status and role have started to flow outwards, to a legitimate global place. It is no longer in the position of explaining to itself and excusing. Under Xi, it is explaining to others, and making demands of them (Xi, 2017a). The grand narrative that Xi’s October 2017 address is obedient to is stated right at the start — mission. The country has an historic mission, and that mission is coming to a moment of major dénouement. There is urgency, this is when the sacrifice and toil of Chinese people throughout the modern era reaches its climax. Never forget why you started, and you can accomplish your mission. The original aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. This original aspiration, this mission, is what inspires Chinese Communists to advance. In our Party, each and every one of us must always breathe the same breath as the people, share the same future, and stay truly connected to them. The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal of national rejuvenation (Xi, 2017a). The objective is the final realisation of a rich, strong and powerful country (fuqiang guojia). The CCP is integral to the achievement of this. Thus, the persistent language about mission, and the achievement of that mission. The Congress report admits current challenges — those arising from ecological issues, inequalities and the lack of innovation in the country. But it sees these as areas requiring attention and focus in order for China to have the right structure to achieve its narrative goal. Five years of ideological training creating elite political strategic clarity, and anti-corruption struggle creating administrative discipline means that the CCP now is in a good position to implement a holistic vision. At its heart is hybridity. The market will exist alongside the state. Rule by law (rather than rule of law) will exist and protect middle class commercial and property rights, but not allow the legal system and its activists to contest with the rights of the CCP and its monopoly on power. SOEs will integrate and co-operate with b3312_Ch-01.indd 6 AQ01 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 7 non-state ones. Chinese values will harmoniously work alongside western ones. This is the sort of vision of the great unity given by early modernisers like Kang Youwei in the late 19th century. Everything comes together in the overriding commitment to the nation, contributing to its strength and power. This is the grand Xi vision. In a sense, if we wish to search for a dictator or autocrat in contemporary China, it is not so much in the form of an individual person with their limitations, but more in the story they serve and link into. The mission to create a strong nation dictates to all those that serve this, within the CCP and society — and that includes Xi. Xi is as much the prisoner of this narrative, as the shaper and teller of it. He inherited it, from the earliest generations of elite Chinese leadership, and at very most he can adapt parts of it and refine or clarify it. But he cannot change it (Brown, 2017). 2017 and the Issue of Personnel That helps to explain the kind of elite leaders that emerged in 2017. First, the rumours about a reduction in the size of the Standing Committee were proved wrong. There was maintenance of the previous number, and therefore a commitment at least here to continuity. There was also an observance of the unwritten retirement rule. Despite some reports of Xi and others stating that the CCP tying its hands by imposing irrevocable retirement limits on leading cadres was self-limiting, the five members of the Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017 who were over the age of 68 in 2017 retired (Hornby, 2016). Again, this showed observance of the established norms of the CCP, and stuck to the notion that it was keen to institutionalise its power processes. All of this did not support the idea that Xi was an autocrat. He was still working within the standard contemporary rules and procedures. The main point of divergence with what had happened before was the lack of any obvious successor amongst those elevated in 2017. All but one of the newly appointed Standing Committee members (Zhao Leji was the exception) were of ages which would mean at the next Congress, in 2022, they would also be over retirement age. In the era of Jiang and of Hu, in their second Standing Committees, there had been obvious b3312_Ch-01.indd 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era EA 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era successors. In 2017, there no longer is. Some argue that within the full 24 strong Politburo, there are plenty of aspiring future leaders. Maybe the ploy will be to see them prove themselves in the coming years, and then be elevated in 2022. It might be that with the removal of time limits to the position of presidency, which happened in the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018, Xi will in fact relinquish his Party post and power will gravitate to the role of president which he will remain in. But this sort of new arrangement and configuration of power, along with helicoptering figures into the elite, might be regarded as destabilising — a source of unwanted uncertainty. The idea therefore that the Xi leadership has aspirations to continue in some form beyond the 2022–2023 current timeframe is more possible now than it was before the Congress. In terms of the vexed question of Xi having a specific group of people that have now been promoted and can help him with his political programme, the 2017 Congress outcome is illuminating because of the clear lack of any factional framework to see it in. At the heart of this is questions over the coherency of ‘factional’ models of political allegiance in the elite in the CCP. In the past, the factional has proved useful, with talk of Shanghai cliques, princelings, those linked with the China Youth League, etc. The China Youth League was often referred to in the Hu era, because of the importance of this organisation in his early career. It is the group most closely related to Li Keqiang, current Premier, and to figures like Hu Chunhua, the young, and highly regarded Party Secretary of Guangdong province. But Hu’s failure to get promoted this time, and the lack of any clear member of this faction alongside Li was taken as a sign that this particular group was now declining. The Shanghai-Jiang Zemin faction seemed to have representation with Wang Huning and Han Zheng, both natives of the city, and both active there in parts of their careers, the latter as Mayor and Party Secretary for over a decade in the 2000s. Adherence to a factionalist model is as often a sign of lack of information and understanding as evidence of it. The complex links and networks between politicians in China are things that it is hard to get good quality proof for from outside, not least because of the efforts by the CCP to demonstrate and manufacture unity to the outside world no matter what fractiousness there might be within it. Figures like Xi often have identities that stretch across different institutional and factional b3312_Ch-01.indd 8 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 9 boundaries. He himself served in the military, is a princeling, has links to Shanghai through briefly being Party Secretary there in 2007, and is also linked to groups in Fujian and Zhejiang province where he was active for much of his career. He has been linked to a so-called Shaanxi group, a province where he lived as an adolescent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. What this all means in terms of quantifiable impact on policy and political coherence is hard to say. Factional allegiances give the veneer of an explanatory framework. But once interrogated, all they do is prove the unexciting fact that those who have worked quite well with each other through being in similar organisations or in the same region in the past are likelier to work well together in new situations in the future. This is not a particularly Chinese phenomenon too. It happens everywhere (Cheng, 2012; Miller, 2015). There being a complex set of challenges that the Chinese government is facing now, and limited time to resolve these, it is likely that ability or at least recognition of ability and a similar understanding of how to face these challenges is more important than factional allegiances which, while observant of the importance of networks in Chinese society, underprivilege ideas and the generic importance of practical experience. The figures promoted to the Standing Committee in 2017 did not include people like Liu He, or Ding Xuexiang, who only managed to get on to the full politburo, despite there having been closely linked to Xi through provision of economic advice and administrative support. Instead, there were leaders who were perhaps not so close to Xi — the aforementioned Han Zheng, and Wang Yang, both of whom had a long and distinguished provincial leadership record, but neither with strong, specific links ideologically, nor in terms of their careers with Xi. In addition to the weak message on factionalism and its significance in contemporary Chinese elite politics, there is also the related issue of provincial leadership at the highest level being the best way for promotion to the Standing Committee. In the period from late Jiang to Hu, lengthy periods outside of Beijing in charge of municipalities or provinces was regarded as a crucial proof of future national leadership pedigree. Jiang Zemin, for instance, had spent his career mostly in Shanghai, rather than in national government entities in Beijing. Hu Jintao was even more province based. He had only a few brief periods b3312_Ch-01.indd 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era in Beijing, with most of the rest of the time in impoverished Western regions like Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet. Xi himself was absent from Beijing from 1985 to 2007, with 16 years in Fujian, five in Zhejiang and then one year in Shanghai. In his first Standing Committee, of the seven members, six had a record of some sort of provincial leadership. This is not surprising. Most Chinese provinces now have economies that are the same size as most major countries. They are in effect dealing with issues similar to those of leaders of nations elsewhere. 2 The 2017 leadership is a little more hybrid, but this importance of provincial leadership is still strongly present. Wang Huning is the great exception, because he has zero provincial leadership experience. The remainder have much more. Li Zhangshu was a provincial leader in Guizhou (as was Hu Jintao) and then the north eastern Heilongjiang. Wang Yang has been Party boss in Chongqing and Guangdong. Han Zheng was for over a decade a senior leader in Shanghai. Zhao Leji was Governor and then Party Secretary of the small, remote western province of Qinghai till 2007, and then of his native Shaanxi till 2012. This mixture or bureaucratic, central and provincial records is indicative of a story of continuity of administrative leadership in the PRC. To understand the details of this story, we need to look a little at the different make ups and interests of these leaders and how their individual narratives might combine together. Amongst the most intriguing is Wang Huning. A native of Shanghai, he started his career in the latter period of the Cultural Revolution as a French expert, but gravitated towards international relations in the 1980s, writing a thesis on concepts of sovereignty, and ending up as one of the youngest professors in Chinese academia. Over this time, he had a brief six-month stint in the USA, a period about which he produced a book some years later focussing to the decline of US power and its inherent political and social contradictions. Somehow he caught the attention of Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, and was transferred to Beijing. Around 1997, his academic work ceased and he disappeared into the corridors of power, 2 For evidence of the importance of provincial leadership as a route to Beijing national positions, see Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization, World Scientific, Singapore, 2010. b3312_Ch-01.indd 10 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 11 firstly as someone working in the central research office, a relatively harmless name that belies its influence and then as a member of the full Politburo from 2012. For what had he been rewarded with a place at the power summit in contemporary China? Wang was indisputably a bona fide intellectual. That alone made his elevation remarkable. In the Maoist era, the CCP was almost anti-intellectual most of the time, and in the Cultural Revolution vehemently so. Deng Xiaoping stressed the preferability of practice over theory. Neither Jiang nor Hu, nor any of their colleagues, would have remotely been called academic — they had been trained in a wholly different environment, and even though they had intellectual interests, their focus was relentlessly on policy and practice. To have someone from a university background, with no administrative or executive experience to his name was an innovation. Added to this is the manner in which Wang has been central to the ideological announcements over three generations of Chinese leaders. He was reportedly a guiding force behind the ‘Three Represents’ of Jiang Zemin, the adaptation of Marxism Leninism which permitted entrepreneurs from the non-state sector to enter the Party from 2002. He was also the chief craftsman for the Hu Jintao idea of ‘Scientific Development’, an attempt in the 2000s to marry socialism with the market, and produce more balanced growth across urban and rural areas. He was finally key to the China Dream, and then the core Xi ideological proposition, ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, written into the Party Constitution in October 2017, with its lengthy declaration that it was ‘the modernisation of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era.’ Wang’s centrality to each of these different, but fundamental, ideological points illustrated the strong strand of commonality across the different generations of Chinese leadership. For all the talk of Xi’s period marking a moment of caesura, and or bold innovation and change of tempo, with his people being brought into top slots, someone like Wang showed that there was a lot in common between each of the different generational leadership eras. This indicated that for all the excited commentary outside about Xi and his personal power quest, it was far likelier that he and other players in the central story saw themselves as being parts of a continuum of policy, ideology, mission and the Party work rather than starting anything bold and new (Patapan and Wang, 2018). b3312_Ch-01.indd 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Ranged next to Wang is his namesake (but not a relative) Wang Yang. Wang’s background was more from the established route of someone with extensive experience in the provinces at the highest level. In Chongqing, he had preceded the highly ambitious Bo Xilai, moving across to Guangdong in 2007 and then being made a Vice Premier in 2012. Wang is a highly regarded economist — perhaps the most accomplished in the current active political elite after Wang Qishan (who has been appointed Vice President since 2018, though no longer on the Politburo). Wang Yang was involved in an ideological spat with Bo in the late 2000s, about the issue of ‘how to cut the cake.’ Was the cake cut and distributed now so that people could receive parts of it and then try and grow it themselves individually, or was it maintained as one piece and grown collectively that way. Wang’s position was the more cautious ‘keep it together and cut later.’ Bo’s was the more entrepreneurial ‘cut it now and give it to the people to grow’ (Brown, 2014). In practice, Wang was associated with more moderate social policies, and gained a reputation during the major Wukan township uprising in 2011 of being someone willing to compromise, avoiding sending in heavy security to enforce obedience and stability. The successful resolution of that issue (successful in the sense that bloodshed was avoided, and unrest ceased) delivered on the one thing Beijing cared about — restoration of stability, no matter by what means. Li Zhangshu and Zhao Leji are lesser known figures. They are regarded as people with close links to Xi simply through working with him as parts of the central bureaucratic apparatus. In addition to his provincial experience mentioned above, Li has been head of the Central Secretariat since 2012, a post which controls briefing for top level leaders, arranges meetings, and serves as the ultimate gate keeper. Zhao Leji had been Head of the Organisation Department, the entity in the CCP in charge of personnel decisions since 2012. Zhao at least typifies the old model of elite leadership backgrounds. Youngest ever party boss of the tiny western province of his native Qinghai, he was then transferred to the central province of Shaanxi as Party leader. The fact that he has been chosen as the successor to Wang Qishan as head of the anti-corruption body from 2017 is a sign of how highly regarded he is as an administrator. It is b3312_Ch-01.indd 12 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 13 also probably recognition that as head of the Organisation Department, with control over personnel issues, he probably knows where many of the bodies are buried. The final new figure was Han Zheng, someone who had managed to survive the choppy waters of Shanghai for over a decade, as first Mayor and then Party Secretary. Han was a native of the city, which was slightly unusual because the usual preference for someone non-native to be the key powerholder in a specific locality (though there were exceptions to this rule). This at least militated against them becoming too tied into the networks and their associated protectionism and vested interests. He had also, a little like Xi during his period in the equally freewheeling and dynamic province of Fujian, avoided becoming implicated in large corruption scandals. In 2006, when Mayor, the Party Secretary serving alongside him (Chen Liangyu), was unceremoniously removed for his claimed links to a major property scam, Han was associated with the success of the city in holding the 2010 Expo (to which 70 million visitors came) and the creation of a strong domestic financial centre. The survival of Li Keqiang was also a subject of speculation before the Congress. Since 2014, Li had been the object of a number of rumours about his imminent side-lining, with some even wondering if he would even make it to the 19th Party Congress. One idea was that he might be shifted from his role as Premier to head the National People’s Congress, while maintaining his nominal rank in the Party hierarchy. It was true that in national news, Li was far less visible than Xi. The iconography and choreography of the 2017 Congress typified this, with him placed in a largely subservient position to Xi. This was partly down to the office he occupied. In recent history, of China’s Premiers, perhaps only Zhu Rongji had managed to look and sound as authoritative as the Party Secretary he worked alongside, Jiang Zemin. Figures like Li Peng were too tainted by Tiananmen, and Wen Jiabao regarded as ineffective. Even in the era of Mao, his long term, deeply admired and respected Premier Zhou Enlai was regarded as more of a servant of the Chairman, never remotely his equal. Li Keqiang has never dissented from the main policy lines of the CCP under Xi as, sometimes towards the end of his term in office, his predecessor Wen Jiabao did. He has been handed the portfolio of policy b3312_Ch-01.indd 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era implementation. For many of the promises that Xi makes as political leader, Li is the person with responsibility for carrying them out. In that sense, he operates as the ultimate fall guy. All the government undertakings that have been made in the period from 2012 onwards are up to him and his team to find a way to deliver. Significant failures (and there is plenty of scope for them) will leave them in the front line when blame is apportioned. They are the human shield standing before Xi who is more insulated from such detail. Looking at these figures, we see no straightforward factional narrative. Nor are they easily linked to Xi. The overall message about their inner allegiances is one of ambiguity. They are all clearly Party people. Their carers have always been in the CCP. But whether they are Xi’s people, and what that really means, is impossible to say. If a time came, however unlikely it looks today, when there might be a crisis, and choices needed to be made — Xi’s way, or another one — where would these figures go? What is not in doubt is that they are figures with proven records in their specific areas of expertise. It is here they give clues to their autonomy. Wang Yang is a formidable administrator and economist. Wang Huning has been the core intellectual figure in elite circles for over two decades. Li Zhangshu is a formidable bureaucrat, and Han Zheng accomplished at governance, and survival (over a decade at the top of the Shanghai system with no major mishap must stand as a record!). Zhao Leji was also successful in his stewardship of provincial growth in impoverished western regions, and an effective manager of Party personnel issues at a national level. In that sense, they can be seen as a meritocratic line up. They are also the people who were, in terms of age and experience, placed as next in line for promotion at the last full politburo. Now is the natural moment for their time at the absolute top There is also one other commonality: they are, in Zhao, Li, and Wang Huning, people who are closely associated with Party building and strengthening issues in the period since 2012. This is therefore a Party-heavy line up, in the sense that there are few people who have had government ministerial roles, but mostly CCP ones, local or national. That underlines the ways in which under Xi the strategy has been on attending to the Party’s governance at first before moving on to other issues. Despite the way it might initially appear, the CCP has been predictable in this selection, not unorthodox or b3312_Ch-01.indd 14 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 15 maverick. That goes against, rather than for, the notion of an all-powerful, all-dictating Xi imperium with the (admittedly important) exception of there being no evident successor. The Policy Narrative There are a number of key aspects that flow from the convening of the 19th Party Congress. Each of these will help understand where the Xi leadership has come from and where it is heading. These concern implementation, comprehensiveness and finally issues around strategic intent. That framework also figures in the separate chapters in this volume, whether they focus on Party management (through the anti-corruption campaign — see Tsimonis’s chapter — or the specific design of the BRI, as Rogelja presents it). While the rest of this book looks at the achievements under Xi in the last five years alongside the challenges, and then attends to what might happen in the coming five years in specific areas, from the economy (Knoerich and Xu’s chapter) to international relations (Iverson), and the environment (Barratt and Hilton), along with more domestic issues like land and ownership (Sun and Yao) and ideology and its broad uses in messaging (Yang), this chapter will simply end with an overarching framework to see each of these thematic issues. Implementation The fact that Xi Jinping has a core elite leadership around him which is rich in executive experience is important. As already noted above, at the very least, these are individuals who have had to implement policies, either in provinces, in central ministries (though these are weakly represented) or in their Party positions. Their elevation is presumably because of a clear understanding that China’s current situation, however favourable it looks, is still beset by structural challenges which will need addressing and that they have a set of skills to address these. As also noted above, the Xi era has been one not just of the telling of largescale stories about national rejuvenation and historic mission, but also one characterised by the giving of a large number of promises. In the 2013 Plenum alone, the Third in the 18th Congress cycle, a statement b3312_Ch-01.indd 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era was issued in which there were 60 policy proposals, running from further reform of state enterprises, to adaptation of the household registration, social welfare and pension systems. The following year there were more promises in the Fourth Plenum, focussing on legal system reform. In 2015, the focus was on the 13th Five Year Programme, running from 2016. The emphasis throughout the Xi period has been on accelerated, meaningful reform. This has been presented as a justification for the reduction in number of the Standing Committee from nine as it was under Hu down to seven under Xi, and to the ferocity of the anti-corruption struggle, so that there were a smaller team with powers to make quicker, larger decisions. Reform in the previous 10 years up to 2012, it was felt, had slowed down, hit by bottlenecks and places of resistance, vested interest. The Party’s political authority had been eroded by its own poor governance, caused primarily by the distraction coming from the wealth creation going on around it, and the dilution and infection of purpose arising from that. From 2012, the focus has been on reenergising reform, largely by deepening the boundaries between the Party and commercial areas and ensuring that there are clearer rules and procedures. This has been accompanied by a realisation that the ‘new normal’ as it has been called by the Xi leadership of lower GDP growth but a focus on stronger quality meant an economic model was emerging in China which was more service sector orientated, higher consuming, more knowledge based and able to start fulfilling the aspirations of Chinese people to work in sectors away from manufacturing or agriculture. Human capital is becoming more important, and advanced (and better paid) in China. An economy to utilise these new talents needs to come into existence. Perhaps most symbolically important of all, the CCP at the 19th Congress promised that it would not aim to double GDP in the decade from 2020, in effect removing politically set targets and an almost obsessive focus on producing raw growth. The era in which one statistic could be taken as representing the whole story of China’s development is quickly coming to an end. Despite this raft of proposals, in terms of real achievements, the 2012–2017 period has a more complex tale. Some fiscal decentralisation has occurred, to give province and sub-province level governance a bigger role in terms of taxation and decisions on expenditure. A complex new b3312_Ch-01.indd 16 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 17 system was rolled out from 2013 onwards. The fact that so little is known about this shows how hard it is to get people’s attention in such a complicated area. And yet the tensions between centres and provinces remain one of the most long established, and intractable issues. If these reforms can sustainably address this, they will be significant (Kroeber, 2016, 110–127). It is also true that there have been changes to the One Child Policies, allowing families to have two children rather than one. And that the Household Registration System has been revised to allow people with rural registration more rights in cities where they live long term. But in many ways, these policy changes were simply pragmatic adjustment to what was already happening. These examples might form the basis for bolder, faster reform from 2017. But the results so far have been underwhelming. State-owned enterprises remain privileged and uncontested in the enterprise space and across the economy overall, and Xi has made categorically clear that this is not about to change. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone, established in 2013 as a launchpad for a new kind of open, rules regulated, finance strong district, has been stagnant, with very little happening. In the 2015 Stock Exchange crisis, the government violated its free market friendly rhetoric by heavy interventions. This more than anything else showed that the market in the discourse of Chinese leaders is a political tool. It does not mean the same thing as the word used by western politicians and economists but operates in much tighter constraints. Xi is one of ambition, but also one of high expectations. The Chinese middle-class matter to this administration and are the main audience for their language of a China Dream. As service sector workers, consumers and potential innovators, the Chinese people are the country’s greatest resource. And keeping them happy matters. This is not the Maoist era of unilateral dictation and control. Relations between the party state and the people are much more dynamic. And widespread dissatisfaction at issues like food safety, provision of healthcare and other things has potentially massive public consequences. These could very easily spin out of control. From 2017, the Party and its government will need to start addressing the massive issues of a welfare system that will be affordable and workable and a healthcare system that can meet the changing health profile of b3312_Ch-01.indd 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Chinese people, where chronic diseases are on the rise, and obesity and smoking are at levels higher than most other countries. China’s demographics is hugely problematic, with a falling birth rate, gender imbalances, and the looming challenge of a rapidly ageing population all about to reach critical turning points. That makes pension provision as thorny an issue as it is in most developed countries. Again, until 2017, the Xi government has said they will do something about these massive challenges. So far there has been little tangible action. Chinese people expect a lot from their government. The ghost of the period of high socialism where there was cradle to grave care still lingers in people’s expectations. The older generation in particular want levels of social welfare and care from the government, despite 40 years of marketisation eroding the role of the state so that its level of provision is now far less than ever before. It is likely that in the coming five years, this tension between the bold rhetoric of the CCP, the expectations of the Chinese people and the actual tangible implementation record will grow. Comprehensiveness For all the talk of a new era unlike those before, with a Xi more powerful than any similar leader since Mao, the very formulation of the new ideology gives an indication of how embedded this era is with other leadership ones which have come before. ‘Modernisation of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era’ is the comprehensive world view being put forward by the Xi leadership, written into the constitution, the first time a named ‘Thought’ with a leader has happened in this way since 1945, in the era before the CCP even came to power. This is administratively bold, but in essence the Xi doctrine is so clearly derived from the Deng one, and so intimately linked to it, that it is easy to see the ways in which they are linked as part of one ideological narrative, rather than presented as things from different realms. Xi though has not strayed from the parameters of reform set out under Deng. He has not contested the hybrid model Deng’s generation constructed, of ‘bird in the cage’ socialist market economic development. Nor had he replaced the commitment to building the primary stage of socialism with economic and material growth by some bold, new set of b3312_Ch-01.indd 18 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 19 ideas. Xi and his colleagues still work in the framework Deng established. Thus, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is firmly placed at the heart of the Xi view. What is new perhaps is a commitment to resuscitate this vision of reform and strengthen it — to go back to basics as it were, delivering on promises made earlier but which the government got distracted from. Xi is leading this return back to some primate, original notion of post-1978 reform. He is not rewriting the boundaries of that original consensus. This puts the powers imputed to him in perspective. Underneath the grand declarations of a ‘comprehensive’ era of reform, therefore, there is a more parochial set of objectives. To secure the central position of the CCP in the future trajectory of China, to ensure, in particular, that stability is maintained (even through the BRI region, as Rogelja makes clear), and that there is discipline and a sense of service in the Party and government. If this is a comprehensive vision, there is one large area that Xi’s lengthy speech at the 19th Party Congress made clear was not overtly on the cards, and that was any notion of meaningful political reform. This spreads across a number of different areas. In the space of legal reform, for instance, the CCP will not be granting any courts in China the right to hold the Party to account. Under Xi, the restraints on lawyers have been severe. The attitude towards those seen to be using legal instruments to challenge the Party’s monopoly on political power has hardened. So legal reforms have operated in a very clearly defined area where they are seen as instrumentally useful for rights over property, rights over commercial practice, giving predictability and reassurance to these areas even at the same time as examples of the violation of constitutional protections of freedom of speech and expression have shot up. In three hours and 22 minutes of speaking on the 18th October 2017 at the Congress, it seems an anomaly that in this one clear area where Xi might make changes that would mark him off as significantly different as a reformist, that of the political, he has desisted at least from saying he would do so. This question is particularly pertinent because some kind of participation in the political process by the emerging middle class would presumably be a solution to many of the challenges the CCP is facing. It would allow for greater credibility and scrutiny of the Party’s governance, and show it was willing to address in a much more sustainable and aggressive b3312_Ch-01.indd 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era way corruption. It would also help with some issues of social stability by giving disgruntled people at least space to express concerns and feel that they had some role in seeing these addressed and perhaps resolved. The rise of a higher tax paying middle class in China (currently the tax base, unlike in developed countries, is predominantly from enterprises, rather than individuals, accounting for the importance of SOE’s) is one which carries with it inevitable political implications. No taxation without representation, as the great British reformer Thomas Paine said. Can the CCP really create a system where one party has a monopoly on power, but where there is some level of tax payment by the increasingly large and important bourgeoisie? The lack of any meaningful vision of political reform in the Xi era so far suggests that this is precisely what they are trying to do, despite the fact that it has never been achieved elsewhere. They may, as political philosopher John Keane has argued, create a wholly unique form of one party ‘managed’ democracy. But that would mean a rewriting of current views of modernisation theory. This above all is why developments in China in the coming few years are of particular global importance, because of the attempt to create something new which most others argue will not be possible (Keane, 2017). Strategically, it is clear that the Xi leadership will maintain its central focus — the construction of a rich, powerful country with the Party’s hold on power uncontested. This is reaffirmed in the leadership line up, and in the announcements in his speech. The historic mission to make one party rule sustainable, to continue the hybrid political economic system in the country, and to aim for achievement of the First Centenary Goal supports the idea that the Xi leadership domestically and internationally will be a nationalist one (with potentially particular sharp consequences, as Lee points out in her chapter, for the issue of Taiwan). The imminence and all-consuming importance of that goal means that all other objectives flow into achieving it, with the CCP at its heart as the chief strategist. Importantly, in this context, it is the sustainability of the Chinese nation and state that gives the CCP a future role. The CCP exists to achieve this. A weak nation will mean a CCP which is questioned, undermined and vulnerable. The Xi leadership will therefore devote whatever resources it can through communication, propaganda, international activity and domestic thought and CCP management, to achieving the construction of b3312_Ch-01.indd 20 01-06-2018 13:20:05 9”x6” b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress EA 21 this great state. It will create on the one hand a political environment which is confident, populist and dynamic, and yet on the other hand a cautiousness, with the CCP stating that its repressiveness and management of internal and public affairs is justified because of the absolute priority to deliver a China that will never again be weak, divided and victimised. The Xi leadership is one in which the CCP has a centrality that it has lacked in much of the previous four decades. It now lies at the heart of a society geared towards achieving its goal of being a fully modernised nation and economy for the first time in modern history. This leadership is driven by a moral narrative of Chinese history, one where the Party figures as a redemptive vehicle, one delivering justice to the Chinese people after their century of humiliation and victimisation. In the international space, China under the CCP has never before enjoyed such opportunity for status and dominance. But they must not blind us to the ways in which the organisation Xi leads is the servant of this history and narrative, rather than in control of it. It has massive domestic challenges to face, which will be discussed further in this book, and a global environment in which people are sceptical and wary of its intentions. Never have the stakes been higher for Chinese leaders. They need to implement, to control and to ensure that they do not miss the great opportunity before them. This makes the Xi era after the 19th Party Congress one of great expectations and great ambitions, but also great risk. Bibliography Bland, B. and Yang, Y. (2016). China cracks down on Xi Jinping critics after calls for resignation. Financial Times, March 25th, Available at: https://www. ft.com/content/877a88fe-f260-11e5-aff5-19b4e253664a. Brown, K. (2014). The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China. I B Tauris, London and New York. Brown, K. (2017). The Powers of Xi Jinping. Asian Affairs, 48, pp. 17–26, Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03068374.2016. 1267435. Cheng, L. (2012). The Powerful Factions among China’s Rulers. November 5th, Brookings Institute, Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thepowerful-factions-among-chinas-rulers/. b3312_Ch-01.indd 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy 01-06-2018 13:20:05 EA 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 34 35 36xy b3312 The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era 9”x6” The Chinese 19th Party Congress: Start of a New Era Hornby, L. (2016). China official hints at scrapping party age limit. Financial Times, November 1st, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/2fa0a3be9fe1-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2. Keane, J. (2017). When Trees Fall, the Monkeys Scatter. World Scientific: Singapore. Kroeber, A. R. (2016). China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know? Oxford University Press: Oxford. Miller, A. (2015). The Trouble with Factions. China Leadership Monitor, No. 46, Available at: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46 am-2.pdf. Patapan, H. and Wang, Y. (2018). The Hidden Ruler: Wang Huning and the making of Contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary China, 27, pp. 47–60, Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2017. 1363018?journalCode=cjcc20. Xi, Jinping (2017). Xi Jinping Jiang Gushi (Xi Jinping Telling Stories). Renmin Chubanshi: Beijing. Xi, Jinping (2017a). Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th National CCP Congress. Xinhua, Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/ 2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm. b3312_Ch-01.indd 22 AQ02 01-06-2018 13:20:05