A Strategic Partnership: Turkey-Ukraine Relations

2012

This publication contains ten studies on current state and perspectives of bilateral relations between Ukraine and neighbouring countries, which have a land border with Ukraine or are located in the Black Sea basin. These are Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey. The study has been carried out within the project «Ukrainian prism: perspectives of bilateral relations of Ukraine with neighbouring countries» implemented with the support of the Regional Office of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine and Belarus. "Being important regional actors, Ukraine and Turkey accumulated significant “assets” for bilateral cooperation development, but cannot deny the fact that a great potential of cooperation remains unemployed. More efficient use of this potential is the most important issue in the bilateral agenda. Despite an active political dialogue and recent deepening of economic contacts between Ukraine and Turkey, activities in the international arena are not entirely coordinated and could be defined as one-way. Ability to avoid aggravation of the conflict issues have not yet been automatically applied to the declared strategic partnership. There is some huge unemployed potential in each area of bilateral cooperation".

2016

Obviously, in the last couple of years the difficulties of making the way through the regional turmoil and facing new challenges brought about a completely new background with the embedded unique opportunities for further deepening of strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey. The question is, however, whether the intensification of bilateral cooperation is a temporary phenomenon that will end up in nothing, once the Russian threat ceases to exist, or this is a tendency that will reveal itself even more as the countries explore the momentum of crisis to create a new, solid basis for their future relations.

European Focus, 2012

Today, energy draws the lines that divide and unite on the global power map. This makes the emerging Turkish-Russian energy partnership potentially a strategic challenge to Ukraine, as it could undermine Ukraine's unique geopolitical position in the long run. At the same time, Ukraine could benefi t from greater cooperation with Turkey, following the famously "multi-vector" foreign policy approach once associated with President Leonid Kuchma. This kind of cooperation could diminish Russia's geopolitical energy leverage in Eurasia, particularly over Ukraine and Turkey, who remain very dependent on Russian energy supplies to this day. If this partnership materializes, Kyiv and Ankara should also be able to accelerate their European integration process.

Journal of Liberal Arts and Humanities, 2020

Russian-Turkish relations have experienced some difficult turns in the last couple of years. As for energy, Turkey is a significant country for Russian energy diplomacy because Turkey is both a consumer and a transporter country. Turkish straits have been very significant particularly for Russian oil export. The problem between Turkey and Russia is that Turkey is part of the Blue Stream Pipeline, which bypasses Russian monopoly and allows other Caspian states to develop projects. As for their cooperation, Turkey needs Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Russia needs South Stream gas pipeline, so they are both interdependent in this field. Generally speaking Turkey is highly dependent on Russian energy resources, especially for natural gas. Turkey and Russia have simultaneously agreed on realization of the two above projects, which will at least for now suspend the Nabucco gas pipeline and Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline.

Research was conducted within the project “Ukrainian Think Tank Development Initiative” with the support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA), the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and the International Renaissance Foundation. The “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” project is conducted with the support of Black Sea Trust for regional cooperation - a project of the German Marshall Fund. INTRODUCTION Until recently, the “strategic partnership” between Ukraine and Turkey existed primarily as an attribute of diplomatic rhetoric rather than a meaningful format of bilateral relations. Despite active political dialogue and deepening economicties between Ukraine and Turkey, the foreign policy moves of both states lacked foresight and systematicity in many areas of cooperation. On top of that, Ukraine’s foreign policy narrative clearly had bipolar orientation (where to go, East or West?). The South remained a blank spot on the Ukrainian diplomatic map; any references on the possibilities of bilateral cooperation with Turkey were sporadic and declarative. Finally, the biggest obstacle to a strategic rapprochement between Ukraine and Turkey was that the latter belonged to the camp “indirectly supporting Russia in order to maintain a high level of cooperation with it.” The dramatic change in the geopolitical situation in the region in 2014 led to a revision of Ukraine’s policies towards Turkey. Turkey moved to the top of Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities following the loss of Crimea, the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the aggravation of the security situation in the Black Sea region in general. Furthermore, the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the majority of Middle East countries and its confrontation with Russia compelled Ankara to restore connections with its neighbors and Western countries. A rapprochement with Ukraine is one of the components of Ankara’s return to its pro-European course. As of today, Ukraine’s interests regarding Turkey are in the following areas: 1) Security, including security in the Black Sea region, and Turkey’s possible participation in establishing of the de-occupation mechanism for Crimea (the Geneva plus format); 2) Economic, in the context of attracting financial aid for the stabilization and restoration of Ukraine, as well as strengthening trade relations with Turkey; 3) Energy, including obtaining Turkey’s permission for passage of tankers with liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Bosphorus-, and the construction of an LNG terminal (following negotiations) and interconnectors; 4) Humanitarian, such as cooperation regarding internally displaced persons, in particularthe Crimean Tatars; establishing ties between the Crimean Tatar minority in Ukraine and the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey in order to advocate Ukraine’s interests in Turkey. On its part, due to a crisis in its relations with Russia, Turkey included topics that had been considered too sensitive until recently, such as energy and military technical cooperation, in its dialogue with Ukraine. Political dialogue on important security and economic issues has intensified; a series of summits have been held; negotiations on the FTA have resumed, etc. Therefore, today there are reasons to believe that, given effective Ukrainian diplomacy, Ukraine has a certain window of opportunity that could raise Ukrainian-Turkish relations to a new level. Above all, it is about developing a strategic vision of cooperation priorities instead of the reactive approach to bilateral relations, which is characteristic of Ukraine’s foreign policy. However, the revision of relations with official Ankara should be based not only on the current tensions between Turkey and Russia, but also on an understanding of all the benefits of a strategic partnership with Turkey.

Ukraine Diplomatique, 2021

While Ukraine and Turkey have recently celebrated the centennial of the establishment of diplomatic relations and currently continue to reinvent each other as strategic partners, it might be a good time to take a stock of the bilateral relations for the past century and define a road map for the future. Both countries have come a long way in developing their partnership since the opening of the first diplomatic missions in Istanbul and Kyiv back in 1918 up to the declaration of strategic partnership in 2011 and a subsequent emergence of the Ukrainian-Turkish defence industry alliance in the aftermath of the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. Throughout much of this time, the overall dynamics of the bilateral dialogue has been characterized by two contradicting trends. On the one hand, the contacts between Ukraine and Turkey have been marked by a generally positive agenda without a burden of the past conflicts or historical traumas. On the other, for many years in row official relations between Kyiv and Ankara remained overshadowed by the Russian factor and were mostly regarded in the Turkish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle, being deprived of their own unique value. The situation has dramatically changed in recent years, setting a new ambitious agenda for both states. Some of the goals have been successfully fulfilled, like creation of the new frameworks for regional cooperation, launch of additional formats of bilateral political and military consultations and introducing the visa- (and later passport-) free regime for crossing the border. Some other plans, like signing a Free Trade Agreement and stepping up cooperation in the high-tech spheres of space and aviation, are yet to be achieved. This article aims to provide a brief overview of the past history of bilateral relations, a comprehensive analysis of the current state of play between the two countries and discuss emerging trends in the Ukrainian-Turkish partnership, as it continues to evolve in a new regional and global security environment. Key words: Ukraine, Turkey, Black Sea region, strategic partnership, alliance

Administrative Consulting, 2020

The introductory paragraphs of the article consider the historical approach to how important the black sea and Crimea are in geopolitical terms, which became more important after the eighteenth century. In addition, the main issue that was studied in the article; the Maritime geopolitics of the black sea and Crimean peninsulas in accordance with the new situation that arose as a result of the annexation of Crimea to Russia after the referendum, as well as the state of Turkey's energy needs and how the issue of energy security will be resolved in the future. Although Turkey has two important waterways, such as the Straits of Istanbul and the Dardanelles, it has been appreciated why it cannot turn this superiority into some kind of advantage. The data used in the article is usually based on official reports published by government agencies. The point from which mutual trade relations between Turkey and Russia originate, through gas pipelines, and the benefits and harms of the situation are discussed. Both in the Black sea and partly in the Eastern Mediterranean, gas exploration operations are underway; their reflection in Turkish foreign policy has been deconstructed. Questions such as how much natural gas Turkey needs per year and which countries import gas that needs it were discussed with the data.

International Journal of Engineering Technologies and Management Research, 2020

Currently, the Republic of Turkey plays a vital role in international processes taking place on the world stage. Since ancient times, at the crossroads of the paths between the world of East and West, the Republic of Turkey claims to have an excellent position in the relations of these regions with each other, as well as in their internal processes and events. The universal location between Europe and Asia makes Turkish foreign policy one of its main political issues, especially in the field of regional cooperation. Moreover, the changes in the world of recent decades, such as the collapse of the USSR, revolutions and military operations in eastern countries, the transition of Crimea to Russia, lead to the fact that Turkey pursued its foreign policy thoughtfully and actively, taking the most advantageous positions for itself. An essential region for pursuing Turkish policy is the Black Sea region. The events of recent years have significantly affected him and the role that large states play in him, such as the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation. It also began to arouse great interest among states and regions of the Western world, such as the European Union. The changed geopolitical structure of the Black Sea region has led to the need for its members to determine their positions and areas of interaction in which they are ready to cooperate or, on the contrary, to oppose each other. In this article, the author will examine the relations of the Turkish Republic and the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region and its importance. In this study, political relations, security, economy, energy, and security will be discussed. In the conclusion of the study, the current state of Turkey-Russia relations and assessments will be made about its future.

Ukraine-European Union: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific and practical conference (Uzhgorod, October 04-05, 2024). Uzzhorod, 2024. ISBN 978-617-8390-43-3 --pp. 12-20. , 2024

Türkiye’s Strategic Role in the Black Sea Region and Encouraging Prospects for Ukrainian-Turkish Cooperation Russia destroyed the exploitation of the huge gas fields around Crimea when occupied it. Oil and shale gas are in significant quantities under the Ukrainian waters of the Black Sea. Turkish countries may help, even more, Crimea is inhabited by a Turkish people: the Crimean Tatars, who suffered much under Russian oppression and Soviet deportation, too. Tatars must be good manpower when the gas and oil have been exploited from under the shelves of the Black Sea because Crimean Tatar workers can be trained for this profession in Türkiye. Keywords: Oil, gas, Crimea, Ukraine, investment, Tatars, Türkish_interests. Росія припинила експлуатацію величезних газових родовищ навколо Криму, коли окупувала його. Нафта і сланцевий газ в значних кількостях знаходяться під українськими водами Чорного моря. Турецькі країни можуть допомогти, більш того, Крим населений турецьким народом: кримськими татарами, які теж сильно постраждали від російського гніту і радянської депортації. Татари повинні бути хорошою робочою силою, коли газ і нафта видобуваються з-під шельфу Чорного моря, тому що кримськотатарських робітників можна навчити цій професії в Туреччині.