POVERTY IN AFRICA: CAUSES, SOLUTIONS AND THE FUTURE

POVERTY IN AFRICA: CAUSES, SOLUTIONS AND THE FUTURE Maxwell Adjei University of Ghana. Department of Political Science Email: [email protected] © Originally written in 2012 and updated in 2017. Recommended citation: Adjei, Maxwell. (2017). Poverty in Africa: Causes, Solutions and the Future. Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. 1 Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 What are the causes of Poverty in Africa? ...................................................................................................... 6 i. Corruption- Poor Leadership, Weak Institutions ........................................................................ 7 ii. Non-Representative and Inclusive Governments ....................................................................... 10 iii. Conflicts .......................................................................................................................................... 12 a.The Sudan-South Sudan Conflict ........................................................................................... 14 b.The Civil War ............................................................................................................................. 15 c.Identity sources of the conflict ................................................................................................ 16 d.Structural sources of the conflict ............................................................................................ 19 iv. Unfavorable Trade Policies- Weak Economies .......................................................................... 24 Are there any viable solutions to poverty in Africa? ................................................................................. 32 i. Tackling Corruption- Strong Institutions and Good Governance ........................................... 33 ii. Building Infrastructure, Sound Economic Policies and Regional Integration ...................... 38 iii.Effective Management of Intractable Conflicts ......................................................................... 43 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 References .......................................................................................................................................................... 45 2 Poverty in Africa: Causes, Solutions and the Future Abstract Despite its claim to large reserves of resources, Africa remains the poorest continent in the world. The incidence of poverty in Africa is multifaceted and cannot be traced to a single cause. This paper examines and reviews some potential causes of poverty in Africa. Many factors including corruption, poor governance and leadership, weak Institutions, intractable wars and conflicts, unfavorable trade policies (World Bank and IMF policies), among others are discussed as causes of poverty on the continent. With the causes identified, finding feasible solutions to poverty remains a great challenge for African leaders and countries. It is proposed here that any step toward addressing poverty on the continent should begin with drastic reduction in corruption which, according to Transparency International, costs the continent $150 billion annually. I suggest that inclusive, responsive and accountable governments are a necessity for combating corruption. The importance of strong institutions and reasonably fair distribution of resources are also emphasized. Finally, there must be long term plans (which transcend regimes) to address poverty. Keywords: Poverty, Africa, Corruption, Conflict, Poor Governance, Infrastructure, Inclusive Introduction Africa is blessed with a wide variety of resources including human and natural resources. This begs the question of why these resources have not been transformed and utilized to the benefit of residents on the continent. In 2009, the United Nations Population Fund reported that the population of Africa had exceeded one billion for the first time. Currently, “frica s population is estimated at , , , , which is an equivalent of 16.14% of the world population, making it the second most populous continent on the planet, after Asia. It is predicted that the numbers will further rise and possibly reach 1.9 billion by 2050 (World Population Review, 2012). Countries such as the United States of America, Brazil, China and India have relied on their large populations to propel economic growth and trade. However, “frica s large 3 population has become one of its greatest challenges to economic development. Many African countries face daunting challenges in managing their populations and ensuring that the welfare of their population is adequately catered for. Although in recent years absolute poverty in Africa has slightly reduced, income levels on the continent have actually been dropping relative to the rest of the world (WorldPoverty.org, 2012). Africa is getting relatively poorer on average and other natural occurrences such as flooding, bushfires etc. have made the situation direr. For instance, in 2012, the drought in North-East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya) drove millions of people who were already living below the poverty line into severe starvation (World Bank, 2011). It is estimated that almost 50% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa live on under $1 a day. 32 of the 48 poorest countries in the world are located in subSaharan Africa (World Bank, 2011). The level of poverty in Africa is seen as surprising, not only because of its large population and available workforce but also because of the abundance of natural resources on the continent. Africa is enriched with a lot of renewable and non-renewable resources such as petroleum, gold, diamond, iron, bauxite and many more. There is vast uncultivated land in Africa which is the second largest continent in the world covering about 22% of the world s land. Most “frican economies are heavily reliant on the revenue generated from the trade of these natural resources and agricultural produce. However, there is persistent concern that many African states do little to add value to their raw agricultural produce and diversify their economies, making them over-reliant on non-renewable natural resources. 4 The 2014 Africa Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report revealed that even though Africa had made significant progress toward targets on poverty reduction, a whole lot more can/must be done. The report goes on to state that, subSaharan Africa is the only developing region that saw the number of people living in extreme poverty rise steadily, from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010. Furthermore, the World Bank projects that by 2015, 40 per cent of the estimated 970 million people living on less than $1.25 a day will be from sub-Saharan Africa. The report however indicated that the number of Africans living under US$1.25 per day had decreased from 56.5% to 47.5%. Regardless of this, Africa could not meet its targets of eliminating extreme poverty under the MDGs. This finding is puzzling considering the significant amount of aid that was given to the continent under the MDGs. Africa, as can be seen from the Figure 1 below, remains the continent with the highest poverty headcount ratio. In the early s Latin “merica and the Caribbean and South Asia ranked higher than Africa in the poverty headcount; however, Latin America and South Asia have seen poverty levels fall dramatically as workers moved from low-productivity sectors such as agriculture into higher-productivity manufacturing, boosting growth and real wages. In Africa not much has changed in national economies as most counties still rely on the export of raw materials. Consequently, as World Bank reports, with the exception of three, 28 of the poorest countries in the world are in Africa. Figure 1. Poverty headcount ratio, 1981-2010 5 Source: Africa Progress Panel Report 2014, data from the World Bank Group (2014) and PovcalNet. It is therefore important to interrogate some of the reasons why Africa continues to underperform vis-à-vis other regions in the poverty headcount ratio. I briefly attempt to identify some of these reasons in the section that follows. What are the causes of Poverty in Africa? Despite its claim to large reserves of resources, Africa remains the poorest continent in the world. The incidence of poverty in Africa is multifaceted and cannot be traced to one cause. Many people, in and out of Africa, are quick to blame colonization for the continent s present predicament but Africa is not unique in this regard. Many countries that were once colonized are today enjoying economic prosperity and growth. Singapore and New Zealand, for instance, were both British colonies. Estonia was once under Russian and German control. Today each of these countries enjoy substantially high levels of Per Capita Income (PCI) compared to the 6 average African country. Whereas it could be reasonably argued that the conditions which preceded, gave rise to, and ended colonization differ in those places and Africa, the African continent has been free from colonization for more than three decades. It is therefore long overdue for the continent to look inward for homegrown solutions and to find ways to ameliorate the suffering of impoverished people on the continent. Here, I discuss some of the major causes of poverty in Africa poor leadership and governance, conflicts (internal and external), illiteracy, unfavorable trade policies (global system), political instability, among others. These points are highlighted below. Corruption- Poor Leadership, Weak Institutions Many African countries are faced with a crisis in leadership and governance. The leaders of many African countries engage themselves in politics to satisfy their personal needs (politics of the belly) and fulfill the wishes of their relatives (nepotism). Their focus is amassing wealth whiles in power and thus very little attention is given to state institutions that are relevant in building up the economies of African countries and making them sustainable. These institutions include those that can perform checks and balances on the operations of government officials and due to their weak nature, much corruption goes on in the system without being addressed and dealt with. There are many policies and programs designed by African countries to deal with corruption. However, their implementation has become problematic due to the inability of institutions to do so or the lack of political will. Through corruption, large 7 volumes of state resources are lost to public officials further causing wide inequality between state officials and the average citizen (World Bank, 2011). Transparency International, for instance, estimates that President Mobutu of Zaire and Abacha of Nigeria may have embezzled up to US $5 billion each while in office, a figure multiple times beyond the lifetime earnings of the highest level civil servants in both countries. This systematically creates a situation of poverty and inequality where only a few influential and rich people in the society (mostly politicians and their allies) benefit from the political and economic system. Apart from the deep corruption in many African states, lack of experience on the part of leaders also contributes to the extreme poverty levels in Africa. In recent times, there has been an improvement in this area as many individuals with governance and policy acumen are engaging in domestic politics. In post-colonial Africa this was not the case as military men who had little to no knowledge about governance took charge of many national economies. Whenever inexperienced leaders took control over countries, whether through coup d état or colonial arrangement, the level of their naivety was normally manifested through their unrealistic social and economic policies which normally brings untold hardship to their already poor populations. For instance, through a military intervention, Idi Amin who left school at fourth grade and had little or no training in governance assumed the presidential office of Uganda, running the political and economic system of the country to near collapse and enriching his cronies and himself in the process. In 8 recent years, many leaders in Africa attain considerable education from good institutions on the continent and even some of the prestigious Western institutions. Even though the involvement of highly educated experts in African politics has not necessarily ended poverty on the continent, it has given the continent a chance to forge ahead with leaders who are comparatively knowledgeable in governance. In fine, many current leaders of African states have higher levels of education and usually have detailed knowledge on how national economies should function. Also, literacy rates have improved in many African countries leading to vibrant civil societies and resource for government to tap from. According to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), literacy rate among African adults has dropped to from 43% in 2014 to 38% in 2016. Aside this improvement, African leaders have pursued programs to combat corruption with relatively firm commitments. In 2003, the African Union (AU) established a voluntary self-monitoring Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) for states to conform to generally acceptable political, economic and corporate governance values. The presence of civil society groups, vibrant media and anti-corruption organizations has also helped to bring more transparency to many governments in Africa. Even in flawed democratic countries Uganda, Zimbabwe, Togo, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea etc., traditional and social media have been key in promoting efforts by individuals and civil society to get governments more accountable and transparent. However, there are concerns that democracy in Africa has not resulted in inclusive governance 9 and that governments are still not accountable to citizens as they should. I will discuss these concerns next. Non-Representative and Inclusive Governments The end of colonialism meant the beginning of self-governance in Africa. Postcolonial Africa owing to its history of independence activism was introduced to strongmen who had led independence campaigns. In the late s and s the surge in calls for independence in Africa led to the formation of many independence campaigns. Most of these campaigns, lacking strong organization and adequate funding relied on the charisma and mobilization skills of individual leaders to remain effective. This situation also allowed such leaders to personalize the independence campaigns and build their own support cults. Thus, the stage was set for these independence activists/leaders to take the center stage of leadership in postcolonial countries. It was also expected that these men who could be bold enough to stand up to colonial imperialists leading various independence charges would naturally fill the leadership void created with the demise of colonialism and successfully manage national economies. This expectation underscored the need for postcolonial political and economic systems to be built around such personalities. The expectation, as realized later, was not realistic as many postcolonial African leaders were incapable of transforming national economies in the directions they had promised during struggles for independence1. Unable to deliver this promised transformation and with 1 Jallow, Baba G., Leadership in postcolonial Africa: trends transformed by independence, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 10 a growing sense of frustration among its citizens, along with weak political parties, many of these leaders would adopt mechanisms to consolidate their power by limiting political participation especially by political parties and grant for themselves unlimited terms in office. As noted earlier, these leaders usually led loosely organized groups which could not successfully transform into strong political parties in postcolonial periods. Hence, with the presence of strongmen without strong party control, any efforts to democratize would have to contend with structural defects that tie to its very core/foundation. Early presidential democratic systems, as observed in newly independent Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, and Gambia developed into authoritarian regimes dominated by strongmen . Parliamentary systems like Swaziland, Ethiopia, Somalia, Botswana, and Lesotho on the other hand were characterized by weak political parties and would turn into one party states with legislative bodies doing nothing more than rubber-stamping the dictates of the prime minister. Consequently, attempts to democratize many African countries have only been successful in a few and in certain situations failing after early successes. According to international watchdog organization, Freedom House, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a decade and a half of growing democracy, through 2005. The region has since then experienced 8 years of democratic backsliding, leaving it at the same levels of freedom as in 2001. This unstable political system has slowed economic development on the continent and made it prone to civil wars and conflicts. 11 Conflicts The effects of conflicts on societies and communities continue to render many Africans poor. Several countries in Africa have been through civil wars at a point in time. When conflicts break out, the level of productivity and investment which is already low plummets even further. It becomes unattractive for private organizations to invest their capital to countries that are in conflict. Governments also spend a lot of their limited funds on the conflicts. Coupled with all these is the rise in unemployment leading to poverty and general high cost of living. There have been long running civil wars in African countries such as Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. In times of conflict, much state resources which could have been used to alleviate poverty levels in such countries are wasted on relief services and postconflict peacebuilding. It is estimated that Africa loses $18 billion per year due to wars, civil wars and insurgencies while on the average, armed conflict shrinks an African nation s economy by percent Hillier, 2007). The connection between poverty and conflict can also be seen to be reciprocal. As outline above, in most cases conflicts bring about poverty. When people are poor they, in turn, resort to conflict especially when they believe other people or corrupt governments are responsible for their poverty. Thus, poverty and conflict can be the cause and effect of each other. In a research conducted by Vinck et al (2011) in Liberia, 30% of respondents indicated that poverty was one of the root causes of the Liberian civil war. Aside poverty, most of the respondents (64%) identified, among other factors, greed and corruption as the cause of the Liberian civil war. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the number of active armed conflicts around the world decreased from 52 to 49 in 2016; of the 49 active conflicts, Africa had the highest number of conflicts (19) followed 12 by Asia (15), the Middle East (10), Europe (3) and America (2). Figure 2 below presents the UCDP data. Figure 2: Patterns of armed conflict, 2007–16 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute As Obi (2012) assert, the roots of conflict in West Africa are much deeper and complex, and are embedded in the interplay of historical factors, socio-economic crisis, legacies of authoritarianism and the politics of exclusion, international forces, and local struggles. Nonetheless, conflicts in Africa can generally be attributed to identity and economic motivations. Usually, one or more ethnic groups feel deprived of their identity or economic status and thus resort to violent means. Conflicts have also led to the loss of much human resource in Africa. In Rwanda only, close to 1 million people were killed in 1994 when conflict broke between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Similar losses have been recorded in Angola, Sudan, Somalia and many 13 other countries. So far as there is very limited resource availability and prevalent poverty levels in Africa, the chances of conflicts emerging are inevitable. Similarly, the prevalence of conflict will lead to extreme poverty levels and more hardship. The causes of conflicts in Africa is varied and usually embedded in a multiplicity of factors. The Sudan conflict for one, has been persistent on the continent, taking up many dynamics and motivations. An understanding of a conflict like this (Sudan) will give us a fair understanding of the complications involved in Africa conflict. The Sudan-South Sudan Conflict Even after the official split from South Sudan in 2011, Sudan, the predominantly Muslim North African country remains the third largest country in Africa with a population of about 37.2 million2. Sudan became the first in the African territory to gain independence from Britain in 1956 and also the first to have civil war in post-colonial Africa. The first Sudanese civil war began in 1955 (a few months prior to independence) and ended with a settlement in 1972. The second war started in 1983 following a fall through of the agreement that was made to end the first conflict. The history of the Sudan more specifically its civil wars indicates many of the complications involved with social and structural legacies of colonization, as well as economic, religious, ethnic and cultural identity. Several scholars [Johnson, 2003; Deng, 1997; Forest, 1998] have offered explanations for the sources of the civil war, mostly citing the country s Muslim north and the Christian/Animist south divide as the primary cause of the fighting. The role of colonization and the British politicization 2 The Countries of Africa By Size. http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-countries-of-africa-by-size.html 14 and consolidation of the North and South divide [Johnson, 2003] in Sudan has not been discounted as contributing in a way to the prolonged civil war in fact, the regional inequality and marginalization which were institutionalized during the colonial period will be discussed later as a structural source of the conflict. The Civil War Sudan s first civil war in Sudan occurred in 1955 prior to their independence when arrangements were in progress to transfer power from the British to the mostly Northern administrators. Poggo (2009) cites the uncertainties which an independent Sudan presented for southerners as primarily inciting this first war. The preoccupying concern among the northerners, as Deng observes, was to correct the divisive effect of the separatist policies of the colonial administration p. . The new government thus sought to unify the south with the north by nationalizing Islamic laws and practices. This religious imposition obviously disregarded the identity (religious, cultural and ethnic identity) of southerners who were mostly Christians and Animists. They thus rebelled, and the ensuing civil war led to the overthrow of the first government. The government that formed after the overthrow of the first, Deng (2011) observes, followed a similar path of Arabization and Islamization (with more intensity), making the North/South division sharper and leading to a fullyfledged civil war in the s. The civil war subsided after Jamal Muhammed Nimeiri led a military junta to overthrow this second government. Deng writes, Nimeiri s ambivalent attitude towards the rebels, Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 15 SSLM/A) allowed for negotiations and the Addis Ababa peace agreement, which granted the south regional autonomy (ibid). The Addis Ababa peace agreement was able to maintain relative peace till 1983 when the second civil war broke out. Like the earlier civil war, the second was fought over concerns of forced Arabization and Islamization of the south with other economic attachments. This time, Deng writes, the Sudan s People Liberation Movement (SPLM) had emerged as a political wing of the SSLA, with a clear objective to create a new, secular, democratic and pluralistic Sudan. By 1989, with a renewed sense of purpose for liberation on the part of the SPLM/A, under its leader John Garang and a firm commitment by then Omar al-Bashir led government to have an Arabic state of Sudan, the war showed no signs of slowing down. After years of prolonged battle, the second civil war was effectively brought to an end in 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed (Warczinski, 2008). The various sources from which the conflict emerged will be discussed next. Identity sources of the conflict Sudan s civil wars, as briefly discussed above can be seen to be driven by several motivations. Of these, the most conspicuous is the need for and to preserve an identity. Dukes (2013) stresses the importance of identity for any group, positing that the need for identity is a significant driver of conflict behavior among groups and individuals. Sudan s north/south division is reflective of an ethnic/religious division between the “rab Muslim North and the Christian/“nimist south. The South s need for identity and recognition vis-à-vis the North s desire for the south to give up its 16 identity in favor of assimilation have primarily led to the conflicts. Sudanese, like many other Africans strongly identify with their faith and religion, and any attempts to forcefully rid them of it will be resisted whenever practically possible. Islam in North Sudan has become not only a religion, but a way of life through which other worldviews on social, cultural and ethnic identity are formed. Southern Sudan on the other hand has been shaped primarily by their sustained resistance to Arab domination and Islamic culture (Deng, 1995). Whenever a group feels that their collective identities are threatened especially by other groups who they feel capable of resisting, they are inclined to adopt defensive and offensive measures to protect their identity. Also rooted in the southern Sudanese identity, is the pride they attach to their ability to resist pre-colonial Arabization when traders from the Middle East came knocking (Deng, 1995). This pride of resistance was constantly referred to by leaders of SPLM/A as a reminder to southerners not to give up in the face of the new monster Government of Sudan GoS , that threatens their identity Jok, 2012). More specifically, the first civil war in Sudan, as mentioned earlier, started around the time British colonial rulers were transferring power to a local Sudanese government. The thought of having a new local government which represented anything but us was more compelling for the southerners to resort to violence and threaten secession. There was genuine sense of fear among the southerners of losing their identity in their country, under their own government . This fear was heightened by the Northern government s attempt to create of Sudan an Arab Muslim nation state, and their 17 failure to recognize the South s ethnic and religious diversity in the now independent country. The issue of identity in the Sudanese conflict was explored further by Forest (1998) when he wrote that, apart from the openly acknowledged Arab Muslim north and Christian/Animist south divide, the war was driven by other ethnic motivations on both sides. He pointed out the Dinka and Neur ethnic divide in the SPLM, suggesting that the SPLM is viewed as a largely Dinka political movement which aims for an ethnic self-rule p. . This ethnic divide in the south led to a subsidiary war following the split in SPLM leadership between John Garang (a Dinka) and Machar (a Neur). It is important therefore to stress that a strict division of Sudan into an Arab Muslim North and a Christian/Animist South fails to account for further ethnic divisions that permeates each group (north/south). However, such division remains useful for the purposes of explaining the identity motivations of the civil war as the principal actors in the war, the GoS and the SPLM derived their membership across diverse ethnic groups in the north and south respectively. Thus, whenever engaged in the civil war, members from different ethnic groups in the north and south fought as a unit, under the GoS or SPLM. In the view of Johnson (2003), Garang effectively deployed an ideological term that rallied diverse groups in the south, west of Sudan, the Nuba, the Darfurians in Darfur, Ingessana Hills at Southern Blue Nile and the Beja of the eastern Sudan together as the indigenous marginalized majority with a similar goal to fight the center GoS . “gain, identity is being relied upon here to demarcate conflict boundaries and launch attacks. 18 Structural sources of the conflict Galtung (1969) defines structural violence as any limitation which constraints a person s potential or increases the distance between a person s potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance. The glaring north/south division in Sudan might mislead one to gloss over certain structural aspects of the Sudan conflict. However, apart from identity differences, the north and South Sudan had different access to resource and power. Structural violence as conceptualized by Galtung includes economic and political structures that constrain human beings. In the case of Sudan to be discussed as follows, the south suffered structural violence through the colonial period and its aftermath. Sudan was colonized under a joint British-Egyptian rule in 18993, with Egypt having a little more than symbolic influence in the joint rule in reality Deng (1987) calling the Condominium a "British rule with Egypt as a rubber-stamp half." The separation of Sudan into Arab Muslim North and Christian/Animist South predates the British colonial period. Deng (1995) writes, the separation is rooted in the “rabization and Islamization of the North and in the resistance of those forces in the South, dating thousands of years before Christ, taking the form of trade in gold, ivory, and other commodities . The north and south religious division fueled by slave raids in the south ensured that conflict remained between the north and south. Thus, by no means is the British colonization considered as initiating the Sudanese conflict here. If anything, colonization helped in ending 3 Sudan profile – timeline http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14095300 19 slave trafficking in Sudan and produced a nominal unification of the country (Deng, 1995). Also, the effects of colonization, not only in terms of structural violence have thoroughly been discussed by scholars elsewhere. The issue here is that, British rule in Sudan enforced the already existing north/south divisions and utilized it for political expediency, thus leading to structural violence even with the end of colonization. More so, the ”ritish s lack of effort to bridge the north/south divide and to promote secularism prior to granting independence remains a concern here. Johnson (2011) observes that, up to 1947 (from 1899 when they colonized Sudan), the British were not fully committed to administering the south as part of Sudan with the belief that the south would be annexed by one of the East African countries. Thus, economic, political and social development activities were mostly centered in the north, further marginalizing the south. There was in fact direct effort by the British to limit interactions between the north and the south with northerners needing special permission to travel or conduct business in the south Forest, 2004, 79). Forest further observes that, the political and economic divide between the north and south was such glaring that the northern provinces of Khartoum and Kassala alone absorbed three-quarters of the country s industrial projects. In addition to these, British colonial officials recruited Arabic-speaking northerners and charged them with running the colonial administration (Kustenbauder, 2012). This responsibility apart from the economic benefits it provided also equipped northerners with useful administrative experience which the southerners lacked. This violence built into the structure and shown as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances is 20 what Galtung rightly refers to as structural violence. The short-term costs of personal violence, Galtung writes, appear as small relative to the costs of continued structural violence. Here, the implications of the British divisive administrative practice in Sudan lived long into the post-colonial periods making the south largely underdeveloped and vulnerable to the politically and economically developed north. Rubenstien (1999) contends that structural conflict occurs when patterned social relationships fail to satisfy basic needs or secure the vital interests of one or both parties. The Arabization and Islamization approach taken by northern rulers in the aftermath of independence essentially strained the already fractured relations between the north and south. Successive Governments of Sudan (GoS) have mainly ascribed to an unrepresentative system of governance, failing to pursue inclusive policies that enhance political and social participation especially in the south. Prominent national leaders like Nafi Ali Nafi, a Presidential Assistant of Sudan have argued for Sudan to be built as an Islamic state, with its constitutional laws derived from Sharia (Sudani, 2008). This view of Sudan which is not uncommon among political leaders in the north typifies the structural limitation that southerners in postcolonial Sudan are expected to get along with. Post-colonial political leadership in Sudan has failed to build a narrative that portrays the diverse religious and ethnic groups in the state. Instead, they have focused on institutionalizing divisive religious doctrines to the extent of declaring Jihad (ethnic cleansing) against non-Muslim southerners and Muslims who challenge the state s implementation of Sharia (Jok, 2012) which in turn has been met with resistance and violence. A way to resolve 21 conflicts like this, as Rubenstein suggests, is to restructure the relationships and reopen broken down channels of communication. Achieving this resolution however, Rubenstein admits, is not easy as the elite seeks to maintain their hegemony both by initiating structural changes that they desire and by limiting changes proposed by others p. . Whereas an understanding of the structural sources of the Sudan civil war is important, there is clear reason to think of identity as the underlying cause of the conflict. The structural violence caused by the British colonial rule has been discussed earlier. However, it is important to note that the violence attributed to this period only occurred as an entrenchment (formalization) of the already existing identity divide between the north and the south. From the onset (dating to pre-colonial periods), distinctions of us against them has existed between the north and South Sudan. To this end, colonization and its attendant structural violence only deepened the identity divide between both sides. The impact of colonization on ethnic/identity conflict was observed by Burton (1990) as he stated that, ethnic conflicts are being treated in about sixty countries where boundaries were drawn as a result of colonialism. Without doubt colonialism can further ethnic conflicts, however it is always an underlying need for identity that emerges as the main driver. In many conflicts, Sudan for one, Duke rightly observes that the fundamental drivers of the conflict visions of individual and community identity competing may be blurred with the development of new narratives and interests (technical, scientific and economic), as either side attempts to justify their involvement (pg.220). 22 Second, the government of Sudan s use of political and economic power to Arabize or Islamize the south is most meaningful through the identity narratives of both sides, even though the action itself constitutes structural violence. Political leaders in the north think of Islam as a way of life, not just a religion and thus, seek to establish uniformity in Sudan by forcing the dictates of Islam on all the population. In his concluding statements, Deng remarks that the ideological assimilation of “rabization and Islamization that approbates the “rab religion and culture over the African, religions and cultures in Sudan is the basic issue that incites conflict between the Arabized Muslims of the North and the African Christians and Animists of the South (1995, 12). Since independence, successive rulers in Sudan have sought to create a national identity based on religious laws, Sharia , without considering existing religious, ethnic and cultural differences in the country. Many of the rulers rationalize their Arabization and Islamization as necessary for a peaceful coexistence among all Sudanese. They have clearly failed to understand the value other groups attach to their identity and as Pruitt et al. (2004) would say, have adopted a contending strategy (to impose their preferred solutions on other parties) in the conflict. Pruitt et al. think of conflict as existing when a Party sees its own and Other s aspirations as incompatible p. . In Sudan, the Christian/“nimist south cannot fathom the idea of their coexistence/ compatibility with the Arab Muslim North in the face of an endless desire by the latter to coerce them into giving up their identity. The ensuing civil war is a result of this notion of incompatibility. 23 Like the Sudan civil war, many conflicts in Africa have their emergence attributable to identity sources. Ethnic groups have declared war amongst themselves and against one another in the quest for superiority, recognition and economic improvement (Horrowitz, 1985). It is important for these underlying causes to be addressed if there remains any chance for their resolution. Instead of pointing accusing fingers at external aggressors for inciting conflicts on the continent, critical efforts should be made to understand the internal conditions which influence and incite these conflicts. Starting from this point, all other external dimensions of the conflicts can be interrogated and addressed effectively. Unfavorable Trade Policies- Weak Economies Another major cause of poverty in Africa is the unfavorable trade policies that exist in the international economic system. Post-colonial African countries were linked to the highly competitive international trade system. Trade systems that were established during the colonial period were in most instances maintained when colonialism ended. As mentioned earlier, many leaders in post-colonial Africa had little experience with international trade before they assumed leadership of their countries and were thus caught unprepared when faced with the reality. Many African states engage in the international market system as producers and exporters of raw materials and natural resources. These commodities without any added value attract the least of prices on the trade market and leave African countries having less income from their exports. 24 One main challenge to African states has also been the ability to modernize their economies through industrialization and diversification of resources. Even to date, Ghana and Ivory Coast the world s leading exporters of cocoa) are struggling to process raw cocoa into other finished products. In Ghana, only 8-15% of cocoa is processed domestically whereas cocoa exports alone contribute 28% of foreign exchange earnings (Breisinger et al., 2008). This shows that if more of the raw cocoa is processed locally, Ghana can raise its foreign exchange earnings considerably from cocoa. Apart from the revenue that is lost through unprocessed cocoa, Ghana and Ivory Coast have traditionally been price takers on the international market even though they both produce about to per cent of the world s cocoa. Thus, these two countries have not had any significant role in determining the price of cocoa even though they control almost the whole cocoa market. This is just one of the many examples where African countries are unfairly treated in the international trade system. Another observation has been the failure of many policies proposed for African countries by the Bretton Wood Institutions (IMF, World Bank) and other international organizations. These policies have largely not been able to pull African populations out of their poverty. Over the past 30 years, the World Bank has provided more than $50 billion to fund various projects and programs specifically, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, these World Bank programs in Africa have failed to achieve their goals of alleviating poverty on the continent. In some instances, the strict conditions attached to those policies only end up worsening the situation of the 25 people. As Ayitttey “frica assert, adjustment lending has been a stunning fiasco in p. . Similarly, UNCTAD (1998) reports that, despite many years of policy reform, barely any country in the region has successfully completed its adjustment program with a return to sustained growth. Indeed, the path from adjustment to improved performance is, at best, a rough one and, at worst, disappointing dead-end. Of the countries identified as core adjusters by the World ”ank in , only three (Lesotho, Nigeria and Uganda are now classified by the IMF as `strong performers (p.xii). In most Africa countries, the state remains the biggest employer. Yet, most adjustment programs and loans contracted from these institutions come with conditions which instruct African governments to reduce their public spending (wage bill) thus ultimately causing the loss of jobs of these people and making them poorer. A case in point is the SAPs result in Malawi. One of the conditions under the SAP required full liberalization of the Malawian economy, the IMF's prescription for improving economic growth; the actual results, however, were cuts in social services and the removal of all agricultural subsidies. Thus, a bag of fertilizer that cost farmers about US $5 in 1990 more than doubled its price by 1998, rendering it unaffordable for most Malawians (Kwengwere, 2004). This policy affected agricultural produce in Malawi and pushed the country to the brink of famine and crisis. The Bank in 1994 evaluated the performance of 29 African countries it had provided more than $20 billion in funding to sponsor SAPs over a ten-year period, 1981-1991. Its report, Adjustment Lending in Africa, released in March 26 , concluded that no “frican country has achieved a sound macroeconomic policy stance and that, of the 29 countries only six had performed well: the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This indicated that the SAPs failed in about 80% instances and countries. Without narrowing “frica s economic development path, African countries must practice open economies and promote friendly business environments which is suitable for capitalist investment. To begin with, each economic activity is aimed at solving the economic challenge of society which involves the production and distribution of scare resources. Three solutions have been proffered to deal with society s economic problem over the years. Within the enormous diversity of the actual social institutions that guide and shape the economic process, economists have identified three overarching types of systems that separately or in combination enable humankind to solve its economic challenge. These great systemic types can be called economies run by tradition, economies run by command, and economies run by the market. Economies run by tradition is perhaps the oldest and, until recently the most generally prevalent way of solving the economic challenge. Tradition is a mode of social organization in which both production and distribution are based on procedures devised in the distant past, ratified by a long process of historic trial and error, and maintained by the powerful forces of custom and belief. At the core of tradition, is the idea of the universal need of the young to follow in the footsteps of their elders to ensure social continuity. Societies based on tradition solve their economic problems very manageably. First, they deal with the production problem 27 by assigning the jobs of fathers to their sons. Thus, a hereditary chain ensures that skills will be passed along and jobs will be staffed from generation to generation. While writing about economies run by tradition in his book The Wealth of Nations, “dam Smith observed that, in ancient Egypt, every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father and was supposed to commit the most horrible sacrilege if he changed it for another (p. 62). Another way through which societies have tackled their economic problem is through the establishment of an economic command/authority. This manner of solving the problem of economic continuity just like tradition also displays an ancient lineage. This is the method of imposed authority, of economic command. It is a solution based not so much on the perpetuation of a viable system by the changeless reproduction of its ways as on the organization of a system according to the orders of an economic commander-in-chief. In most situations, this authoritarian method of economic control is superimposed upon a traditional social base. For instance, the pharaohs of Egypt exerted their economic dictates above the timeless cycle of traditional agricultural practice on which the Egyptian economy was based. Economic command, like tradition, offers solutions to the twin problems of production and distribution. In times of crisis, such as war or famine, command may be the only way in which a society can organize its workers or distribute its goods effectively. Even in the United States, martial law is declared when an area has been devastated by a great natural disaster. On such occasions people are forced into service and requisition homes. There may also be imposition curbs on the use of private property such as cars, 28 or even limits on the amount of goods a family may consume. Unlike tradition, the exercise of command has no inherent effect of slowing down economic change. Rather, the exercise of authority is the most powerful instrument society has in enforcing economic change. Authority in communist China and Russia, for example, has affected radical alterations in their systems of production and distribution over the years. Also, there is a third solution to the economic problem. This is the market organization of society which is supposed to allow society to ensure its own provisioning with a minimum of recourse to either tradition or command. In a market economy such as the US economy, the free interplay of demand and supply is expected to regulate prices and maintain a certain order in the economy. However, despite its potential to create mass wealth and economic growth, many of the problems encountered in the United States have also been attributed to the failure of the market system. Fundamentally, the market system has been criticized for favoring the rich over the poor (Wallerstein, 2004). From this view, a capitalist system might not be suitable for most African countries considering the largely reported incidence of income inequality on the continent. The market system is very complex and difficult to understand unlike the traditional and command systems, in which one can quickly grasp the nature of the production and distribution mechanisms of society. This is because, in a market society, it is not clear that even the simplest problems of production and distribution will be solved by the free interplay of individuals; nor is it clear how and to what extent the market mechanism is to be blamed for society s 29 ill after all, we can find poverty and misallocation and pollution in nonmarket economies too. Just as described by the traditional theory of the firm, in a market economy, firms (corporations) exist and make decisions in order to maximize profits and that businesses interact with the market to determine pricing and demand and then allocate resources according to models that look to maximize net profits. The idea that fair prices will be set by interplay of demand and supply seems problematic because of the unending quest for profits by businesses and corporations. Few large corporations and businesses such as Walmart, for instance, wield enormous influence in the US economy such that through their actions and inactions prices, demand and supply can be altered. Whereas businesses/firms have played and continue to play important roles in the market economy, society has evolved and become much more complex seeing the public sector s influence expand in the economy. Events that led to and happened during the second world especially underlined the important role that government can play in the society. After assuming office in a period of harsh economic difficulty and challenges, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the Hundred Days of the New Deal, which laid the foundation for a new pattern of government relationship to the private economy, a pattern that was to spell a major change in the organization of American capitalism. The change was the appearance of the public sector as a major force within the economy, a change marked by an unprecedented enlargement of the range and reach of governmental powers within the market system. Social Security, housing legislation, the National Recovery Act, the dissolution of public-utility 30 holding companies, and the establishment of a Federal Housing Authority are all state managed programs that were introduced after the New Deal. In modern times, the US government continues to play a relevant role in the economy and public spending continues to be a major force in the economy. African governments instead of being pressured to introduce structural adjustment programs must be guided to work at identifying ways to reduce waste and abuse in the public sector and promote investment from the private sector. The financial crises and economic recession have intensified debates about capitalism and how market economies like the US operates. The housing bust in 2007 which led to the recession in 2008 in some ways can be attributed to the greed of business persons to make huge profits by gambling on mortgages and facilitating easy credit/loans to increase their portfolios. This is a constant challenge posed to a market economy. How can the desire for profits of businesses be controlled to ensure such desires do not end up harming the society/ public interest? Leaving an economy to be run solely by firms/private sector could pose a sustainability threat. As Adam Smith puts it in the Wealth of Nations, it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantage . The relevance of government in the modern market economy must therefore go beyond setting rules and regulations. The public sector should be viewed as an active partner in the economy rather than a distraction. Unlike in many industrialized economies where 31 spending on the health and welfare of citizens depends on public-private partnership welfare and tax subsides, in the US social programs rely heavily on government funding. African governments should therefore not shirk their contribution to social programs in the name of marketizing their economies. They should rather pursue resources to take care of the many public goods and social programs such as social welfare, roads, security etc. which are given less attention by firms and business. After exploring some of the causes poverty in Africa, the next section discusses some solutions to these causes. Are there any viable solutions to poverty in Africa? Despite the intensity of the debate on causes and solutions to “frica s poverty, no universal set of solutions are proposed here. This is partly because different factors cause poverty in various countries, even though some factors may be more ubiquitous. As the United Nations asserts, poverty is not simply the lack of money; it also means that people do not know where their next meal will come from, they cannot afford decent living conditions, their incomes are unpredictable and low and those suffering in extreme poverty lack access to the good things of life and life s fulfillment and expectations are greatly threatened. This undermining of human dignity makes the amelioration of poverty a moral as well as an economic issue. Finding feasible solutions to poverty remains without 32 question the greatest challenge facing African countries today. A few ideas on how to tackle poverty on the continent have been proposed below. Tackling Corruption- Strong Institutions and Good Governance Corruption has been identified among the common causes of poverty in Africa. There is a high amount of corruption in both the private and public sectors of the African society. Many times, institutions that are supposed to check, report and punish corruption are themselves corrupted or rendered ineffective. The high levels of corruption in the public sector drain much of the resources of the state to a few public officers and politicians rendering many poor people poorer. Corruption takes place when public officials misappropriate state resources and use them for purposes which do not benefit the people. According to Transparency International (TI), of the 10 countries considered most corrupt in the world, 6 are in sub-Saharan Africa. TI also estimates that corruption cost the African continent roughly $150 billion a year. Many of the problems that face Africa are linked to corruption. For instance, many military interventions are carried out because the perpetrators may believe that their access to state resources would provide them with all the riches they desire on earth. Most politicians seek re-election and entrench themselves in power because holding office gives them access to the state's coffers, as well as immunity from prosecution for their corrupt practices. It is evident that many African states have taken bold steps to deal with corruption in recent years, yet corruption still persists at high levels. To effectively deal with corruption, African countries need to strengthen their institutions especially those responsible for dealing with corruption and reduce the 33 level of control the state have over them. In 2008, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) reported that institutions needed to check and report corruption in most African countries have been largely inefficient and ineffective due to their uncertain political footing. In the report UNECA further claimed that these institutions were often funded and overseen by the executive branch and thus anticorruption agencies could be eliminated at the will of politicians. For instance, in South Africa, the Scorpions Investigating Unit, a very effective anti-corruption agency was disbanded in 2009 under contentious circumstances (Lewis, 2012). Whereas Africans must play a leading role in finding ways to tackle corruption, development partners in the developed countries also have a role to play. The developed countries can help fight corruption in Africa through the conditions they attach to the aid and loans they advance to African countries. As part of the conditions, they must demand a succinct report and account from African governments on the projects for which they provided funds for. They must also demand of them to put in practice the rule of law and strengthen agencies and institutions that monitor government actions. For instance, Kenya established its anti-corruption commission in part to unfreeze $1 billion in aid (Hanson, 2009). There must be a renewed effort by African leaders to give more independence and resources to anti-corruption agencies and create a friendly environment for NGOs and non-governmental agencies to scrutinize their dealings and operations. There can be an appreciable amount of transparency in the governance of African countries if the principles of good governance and rule of law are adhered to by African leaders. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s where military 34 interventions featured prominently in African politics, the 21 st century has brought about democracy in most African states. Through the Arab spring in late 2010 and 2011, many African countries that had been ruled by individuals for long periods of years like Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (41 years rule) have seen new leadership. It is however yet to be established whether the new leadership of these countries will be able to ameliorate the economic difficulties of its populations. In fact, in some cases (such as Libya), the economic performance of the countries after the change of leadership has been rather abysmal. As of 2014, 30 African countries had signed onto the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to guide their transformation to constitutional rule and democracies. Many African countries including Ghana, Kenya etc. have been applauded globally for their commitment to good governance, democracy and development. In order to ensure a wane in the high levels of poverty and inequality in Africa, the commitment of African leaders to openness in administration must be continued and further enhanced. Another way to tackle corruption is to reduce the centralization of power and pursue more decentralized systems. Decentralization has been defined as the transfer of powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political administration and territorial hierarchy (Fass & Desloovere, 2003). It is also any act in which a central government transfers power to agencies, actors and institutions at the lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot, 2002). The pursuit of decentralization is aimed at bringing governance and development decision-making process closer to the ordinary citizen at the sub-national level (Akudugu, 2012). 35 Generally, the benefits of decentralization are argued as ensuring; (1) efficient resource allocation leading to growth and development in rural areas and the country as a whole; (2) community participation in decision making; (3) accountability of subnational governments; (4) effective mobilization and utilization of local revenue and (5) poverty alleviation. Decentralization became an important policy in Africa between 1960s and 1970s and this led to a transformation in governance (Brosio, 2000). The motivation to practice a decentralized system of government in Africa is influenced by the cultural, political and economic conditions of the country. The political crisis, ethnic and regional conflicts have influenced the practice of decentralization in countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. Also, efficient service delivery characterizes Cote D Ivoire and Uganda Shah & Thompson, 2004). In all, the purported benefits of decentralization can be a reality when a well-established system of fiscal decentralization exits. Governments in their quest to improve service delivery to their citizens and reduce poverty have decentralized governance. Most governments in Africa believe the means to alleviate poverty is through the local government system (Brosio, 2000). However, there is little agreement among scholars as to whether the transfer of power and authority to sub-national government increases or decreases their effectiveness in the provision of public goods and the generation of own-source revenue (Fjeldstad, 2014). Decentralization brings to the forefront the means by which sub-national or local governments can administer their respective jurisdictions and to also reach the 36 target of minimizing poverty and improving service delivery to the citizenry. Revenue generation is an important task for all levels of government as a sound revenue system is needed to effectively function. In Africa and most parts of other developing world, many local governments are financially weak and depend on financial transfers from the central government. This has resulted in poor governance and service delivery at the local level (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012). For example, Local governments (LGs) in Ghana per the Local Government Act 462 have been given the mandate to generate revenue from local or internal sources. However, LGs are faced with the challenge of generating revenue internally to finance their activities though they have high potential revenue sources. Across the country, LGs are struggling to raise revenue to finance public projects; the increasing demand for improved services by citizens and the rising cost of service provision has led to the fiscal straits faced by MMDAs. Though, Ghana as a country has chalked some successes with its fiscal decentralization, nevertheless, the mobilization of internally generated funds (IGF) by the various metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) deserves more attention. According to a former minister for local government and rural development, Akwasi Oppong-Fosu, it is estimated that IGFs constitute only 20% of total MMDAs revenue (MLGRD, 2014). This therefore has led to MMDAs mainly depending on the financial transfers from the central government; which is the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). The DACF currently constitute 7.5% of the national budget. However, the DACF faces serious challenges in terms of its consistency and reliability. The inconsistencies in the transfer of the 37 DACF can be observed from 1994 to 2000, when only 3 to 4 percent of the 5 percent national revenue to LGs were actually transferred (Awortwi, 2010). The delays and inconsistencies in the DACF were also observed between the periods of 2005-2008 as a shortfall of not less than of % was observed ILO, , 59). Building Infrastructure, Sound Economic Policies and Regional Integration African countries have a large deficit in their infrastructure. The unavailability of some basic infrastructure inextricably makes people impoverished and slows down the economic development path. Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated by the World Bank to be 2% lower than it could be because of the infrastructure deficit. According to the World Bank, the main area in infrastructure where Africa is challenged includes health, transport, telecommunication and power. In modern times, Africa is still struggling with diseases like malaria, fever and cholera largely due to poor health conditions and facilities. These illnesses and diseases cause many people in Africa to become unproductive and this subsequently leads to the loss of money for the state and the impoverishment of the affected people. Inadequate transport infrastructure such as roads, railways, bridges, and factories cause a lot of agricultural produce in African countries go waste leading to loss of income for farmers. In Ghana, for instance, the roads to many farming communities are poor and inaccessible. Farmers thus go through so much stress in getting their produce to vehicles for conveyance to market places and urban areas and in some cases, have some of their produce decay. Power sustainability and reliability is also a major 38 problem for African countries including Sub-Saharan Africa s largest oil producer, Nigeria. This situation discourages many investors from investing in African countries. Investments which could have lifted many people out of poverty in Africa are thus lost. Even though Africa has seen some improvement in infrastructure in recent years, this does not lift the continent out of its infrastructure deficit and a lot more commitment is needed from African leaders to put out adequate infrastructure in their countries. Political leaders in Africa must see the provision of infrastructure as a primary effort to reduce poverty in their countries. Provision of infrastructure must gain prominence in the economic policies of African countries and backed with action. The type of economic policies put out in some countries only end up decorating the macroeconomic indicators of those countries rather than transforming the lives of the people. African countries must roll out policies that benefit the people directly. They should employ the use of many social interventions in areas which can generate income for the people. For instance, because many Ghanaians are engaged in agriculture as the main source of employment, the government should therefore subsidize agriculture inputs to make sure that the people can get access to them easily. Having access to those inputs create income for the people and reduce poverty. There must also be clear action by African countries to add value to their raw material produce. As highlighted earlier, many African countries export their agricultural or natural resource produce to developed countries with no added values. This makes them attract very little prices on the global market. There should therefore 39 be policies that will transform the economies of African countries into industrialized ones where exports of only raw materials will be a thing of the past. African countries must add value to their agricultural produce by processing them into finished goods before putting them for sale on the global market. Massive industrialization will translate into millions of jobs which will provide income to many people in Africa. There can never be a fair level of competitiveness for African countries and developed ones so far as Africa assumes the role of exporters of raw materials on the international level. To lift its people out of poverty, African countries must modernize their internal economies mainly through industrialization. Many people who would freely move into agriculture in Africa lack the needed support. Governments must make available credit facilities to support its people who are willing and able to engage in productive activities. One major problem that African countries face is their inability to determine the prices of their own exports freely. In most instances the conditions on the international market and the demand needs of the developed countries push African countries to settle on prices which are far below their expectations. They are left with no option to decide on the prices of their exports to other continents and countries. In the words of Claude “ke, independent “frican states were developed as segregation of enclaves and linked directly to the colonial powers . Thus, immediately African countries earned their independence, they had to continue with the trade routes established by their colonial masters during the colonial period. They continued with the exportation of raw materials such as agricultural produce, gold, timber, diamonds etc. to the industrialized colonial masters. There was little to no 40 effort made by Africa to trade among itself and radically transform their economies with different trade routes/partners and industrialization. One major way through which African countries can develop economically is for them to strengthen the economic and trade relations among themselves. Regional integration can allow African countries to collaborate on a wide range of issues that are more or less connected to alleviating poverty in the region. Most of “frica s countries have low per capita income levels and small populations which result in small markets. Even though the entire Africa market may not be large as that of the European Union or Asia, it can be another good platform for trade. There should be a deliberate effort by African countries to remove trade restrictions and barriers among themselves to make regional trading more attractive and profitable. For instance, it has been pointed out that the reality on the ground is that transport costs in “frica are still among the world s highest and this discourages trade in Africa. For example, shipping a car from Japan to Abidjan costs US$1,500 (including insurance) whiles shipping that same car from Addis Ababa to Abidjan would cost US$5,000 (Hartzenberg, 2011). As mentioned earlier, there should be enough commitment by African leaders to develop physical infrastructure which ultimately will promote regional trade and integration. Again, closer trading links between these countries would strengthen their capacity to participate in world trade. Regional integration would enable many countries to overcome the obstacles represented by their relatively small domestic markets, by enabling producers to realize greater economies of scale and benefit from the establishment of regional infrastructures. A regional approach in key structural areas 41 such as tariff reduction and harmonization, legal and regulatory reform, payment systems rationalization, financial sector reorganization, investment incentive and tax system harmonization, and labor market reform enables participating countries to pool their resources and avail themselves of regional institutional and human resources, in order to attain a level of technical and administrative competence that would not be possible on an individual basis. Undoubtedly, regional integration will strengthen the bargaining position of African countries and make them more confident in the arena of international trade. To effectively do this, African countries must show enough political will and commitment to building regional institutions and policies that will be well implemented in their respective countries. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) established within the UN became the champion of regional integration, already in the mid-1960s proposing the division of Africa into regions for the purposes of economic development. Despite some of the gains it has brought, a lot has to be done to ensure that economic integration really works for the African continent. Much focus must be put on sub-regional blocs like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) etc. before extensions are made to economically integrate the entire African continent. For instance, Ghana has the potential of diversifying its economy through the production of salt which is a common resource in the country. However, it has become very difficult for the country to have adequate investment for its salt production whereas other West African countries continue to import salt from Brazil and 42 Australia at higher costs. Nigeria, for example, buys $1.5 billion worth of salt each year in order to feed both domestic demand and its oil industry. This purchase is done primarily from ”razil and “ustralia whereas Ghana s salt resource remains untapped. It would be economically prudent for West Africa states to collectively work to ensure that the salt industry in Ghana is exploited to the benefit of all. They can, through the ECOWAS, invest in Ghana s salt industry and create an automatic market for its output by being primary consumers. African countries must provide adequate support and cooperation to the various sub-regional economic blocs on the continent whiles taking bold steps to implement the policies and plans derived from them. Effective Management of Intractable Conflicts The emergence of wars and conflict as identified earlier is another major way through which many people are driven in poverty. Conflicts have so many interrelated issues like outbreak of diseases, loss of capital, loss of property among others which make the living conditions of the people domiciled in the affected area very difficult. Africa has been described the most warring region in the world and a hopeless continent In policy-making circles and media characterizations. (The Economist May 13-19, 2000). Conflicts in Africa are typically ethnic in nature and more often internal than external. In the view of some authors such as Nnoli (1998), ethnic conflicts persist in Africa for many reasons including the fact that colonial incursions exploited and compounded inter-ethnic inimical relations. For example, in countries like Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Kenya, Tanzania, 43 Zaire, and Zimbabwe, colonial powers utilized the segmentation of ethnic groups to their advantage. The divide-and-rule policies of colonial administrators assured the docility of different ethnic groups and thus shielded them from the menace of insurrection. In other words, it was feasible to divide ethnic groups and pit them against each other so that they could focus their energies on fighting one another rather than overthrowing colonial governments. This was also the strategy utilized by the apartheid regime in South Africa. These ethnic induced sentiments are deeply rooted in the lives of many Africans and will prolong for a long period of time. To effectively handle and prevent such conflicts, Africa countries must embark on massive nationalistic campaigns and educate their citizenry on the need to thrive as one people of a country first before seeing themselves as members of their ethnic groups. The curricular in schools especially at the initial years of formal education must focus on shaping the minds of students to be utmost patriotic to their countries. Governments must commit resources to study the roots/causes of already prevailing ethnic conflicts and take up a neutral position in finding solutions to them. Government can employ of the services of professionals in the resolution of conflicts through various means of mediation and national reconciliation. Conclusion Poverty is not only limited to Africa. The eradication or significant reduction in poverty levels in Africa cannot be done with simple and generalized solutions. 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