Sino- Russian energy dispute in Central Asia

ENRICO FANTONI, CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA, MIREES A.Y. 2017/2018 SINO- RUSSIAN ENERGY DISPUTE IN CENTRAL ASIA INTRODUCTION Central Asia's geographic proximity to Russia, China, the Caucasus and the Caspian region makes this oil and gas-producing region a crucial and ever-developing player in regional and global energy markets; the energy resources dependency of Russia, and the growing Chinese need for energy security have caused rivalry, competition, but also possibilities for partnerships in the region, where contracts for the export of natural gas and oil have brought to loans for the building of infrastructures, investments in energy resources and construction of pipelines. Beijing does not intend to withdraw from the region, while Russia is unlikely to continue tolerating the rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, as the Russian role has already been significantly reduced in this region. How China will satisfy its rising energy demand has impact on the availability and market price of energy resources such as oil and gas, but also on foreign policy. Of special interest is the role of rising neighbouring countries and region – Russia and Central Asia countries – who can supply China by way of pipelines. On this basis, the objective is to present the energy relations between Russia, China and other Central Asia republics, the role of International Organisations in the energy and border's security sector, strategic investments for the construction of pipelines and new opportunities for the exploitation of the potentialities of the region. 1. RUSSIA AND CHINA' S INTERESTESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA Energy security is one of the main points of the foreign policy of Russia and China but, while Russian position is better because it is a great producer and exporter of oil and natural gas, the Chinese need for energy import is growing up. Gregory O. Hall, Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, Russia, and the United States' Pursuit of Relevancy and Power (New York: Routledge, 2014), 94. After the end of the Cold War, Russia has remained the greatest power in the area of central Asia; the Islamic Republics, as they were integrated at high level in the centralised soviet economy, inherited a weak administrative, managerial and technological capacity, and were specialized in few sectors producing raw materials; furthermore, the infrastructures for the transport of energy and water built by the regime several decades ago are old, widespread and not good anymore. Gavan McDonell, The Euro- Asian Corridor: Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 3. Moscow' government tried to attract and integrate the ex- Islamic soviet republics into several organizations, like Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); also Putin contributed to this trend, forming the Eurasian Union initiative. These projects had limited success, because countries like Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and China itself inside SCO have sometimes bucked Moscow and looked for accords with external actors. Gregory O. Hall, Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, Russia, and the United States' Pursuit of Relevancy and Power (New York: Routledge, 2014), 94-95. Russia has not been able to halt China's expansion in the region anymore, even for its great military power. On the other side, although China sees Russia as a partner, it is also feared as potential aggressor. Almir Mustafić, Hamza Preljević, "Sino- Russian Relations in Central Asia since the End of the Cold War: Interaction, Cooperation and Challenges", Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies 10 (2017), 60-62, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320557850_Sino-Russian_Relations_in_Central_Asia_since_the_end_of_the_Cold_War_Interaction_Cooperation_and_Challenges (accessed March 29, 2018). Both the superpowers want to dominate in the region because it is rich in oil and gas, which can be found under the steppes of Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, while raw materials are present everywhere. Kazakhstan is the second largest producer of coal in the former Soviet Union and has also huge reserves of oil and gas; Turkmenistan is rich in gas reserves; Uzbekistan has more modest resources compensated however by a big touristic potential; Gavan McDonell, The Euro- Asian Corridor: Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 4. the top exports of Tajikistan are raw aluminium, lead ore and gold The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Tajikistan", https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/tjk/ (accessed April 6, 2018). that is also the most exported raw materials from Kirghizstan. The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Kirghizstan", https://atlas.media.mit.edu/it/profile/country/kgz/ (accessed April 6, 2018). It is for all those energetic potentialities that Russia has focused its attention on this geographic area, Gavan McDonell, The Euro- Asian Corridor: Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 4. beginning with some initiatives in the field of oil and gas. Ibidem, 9. All those countries are bound by a complex interaction of pipelines that depend upon the choices and cooperation of Russia Ibidem, 21.: this pipeline policy that does not let weaker countries as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan forge their independent energy politics to increase their export and chose their strategic partners. Gregory O. Hall, Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, Russia, and the United States' Pursuit of Relevancy and Power (New York: Routledge, 2014), 93. China and Russia depend on each other in many areas like trade, energy and economy; central Asia is crucial for oil and gas in their relationships, but also for the goal of maintenance of security and peace in the region threatened by the risk of instability in Tatarstan, Muslim region of Russia, and independence claimed by Uighur people in the Chinese Islamic region of Xinjiang. While Moscow' government has tried to protect its southern borders with defence and security organisations constituted with the former Islamic Soviet Republics against extremist Islamic groups, drug trafficking and other threats, Brian Carlson, "The limits of Sino- Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia, n. 18, (March 2007), 172, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/2007-8.pdf (accessed March 31, 2018). China tries to cut off any Islamic support to Uighur separatism in Xinjiang from central Asia and seeks to ensure that the stability in central Asia is not threatened by Islamic extremism. Ibidem, 173, (accessed April 2, 2018). 2. PROJECTS IN UZBEKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN The presence of huge mineral resources in Uzbekistan has always attracted great attention from Russia, that has looked for shares in some energy projects and has gone on with the accumulation of the fruits of old soviet times' investments. Gavan McDonell, The Euro- Asian Corridor: Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 29. Immediately after 1991 independence, the production of oil by Uzbekistan tripled, remaining however not so high; it relied mainly on the supply from Russia and Kazakhstan. Jeffrey Hays, "Natural gas, oil and energy in Uzbekistan", (Facts and Details), http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Uzbekistan/sub8_3f/entry-4737.html (accessed March 27, 2018). Indeed, the country has mostly hydrocarbon reserves of natural gas; from 2002 investments by Russia together with Great Britain have gone to finance the construction of gas fields that increased the output of their production and from 2007 the government of Tashkent decided to increase the price for the gas sold to Russia and Kirghizstan. Ibidem. In 2014 Uzbekistan exported about 300 million cubic feet of natural gas, of which the half sent to Russia, and the rest exported to China and Kazakhstan. Ibidem. Russia's Lukoil and Gazprom, together with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), one of the largest oil companies of the super-power, are among the most heavily invested companies in Uzbekistan's oil and natural gas industries. Jeffrey Hays, "Natural gas, oil and energy in Uzbekistan", (Facts and Details), http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Uzbekistan/sub8_3f/entry-4737.html (accessed March 27, 2018). Uzbekistan is also member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Asian Energy Club, a permanent intergovernmental international organization founded together with Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", (The Shanghai Cooperation Organization) http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/ (accessed March 27, 2018). It proposed to make stronger trust and neighbourliness among the member states in several fields, included the one of energy; Ibidem. in particular it wants to unify gas, oil and energy producers, consumers, and transit countries of central Asia in a unique block self-sufficient in energy. Jeffrey Hays, "Natural gas, oil and energy in Uzbekistan", (Facts and Details), http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Uzbekistan/sub8_3f/entry-4737.html (accessed March 27, 2018). In the case of Turkmenistan, in the early 2000s natural gas output increased sharply thank to export agreements with Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In the last years, it worked to develop its fields and export natural gas to more countries, like China, that has security of import of most of the Kazakh oil; CNPC is one of the main foreign companies involved in the Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon sector. Ibidem (accessed March 27, 2018). Relations between Russia and Turkmenistan were once more promising. Catherine Putz, "Russia's Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from Turkmenistan", in "The Diplomat", https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-from-turkmenistan/ (accessed April 7, 2018). In 2000 Turkmenistan signed an agreement with Moscow that foresees the purchase of 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Russian companies to let them satisfy their obligations Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2000), 12.; in January 2016 Gazprom announced that it would not have purchased Turkmeni gas anymore, due to problems linked to international gas market and individual financial difficulties of Gazprom. Catherine Putz, "Russia's Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from Turkmenistan", in "The Diplomat", https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-from-turkmenistan/ (accessed April 3, 2018). In 2007 Turkmenistan agreed to build a pipeline along the Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan and Russia to export 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Europe by 2010, and pursued also other markets, like the Chinese one. But, when a piece of the Central Asia- Centre pipeline network under the responsibility of Gazprom exploded in 2009, both sides began to blame each other, and Russia diminished the amount of gas imported from Turkmenistan. So, the import of gas by Russia declined radically: in 2015 it was only 4 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan. Catherine Putz, "Russia's Gazprom Stops Buying Gas from Turkmenistan", in "The Diplomat", https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russias-gazprom-stops-buying-gas-from-turkmenistan/ (accessed April 3, 2018). Like Russia, Turkmenistan is at least counting on Chinese market; Turkmenistan, that already has a great business with China, expect a growth of over 60 bcm in export by 2020; it is also true that Turkmenistan is paying back the costs of construction of pipelines financed by China, so the total profit remains low. Ibidem. 3. KAZAKHSTAN IN THE ENERGY MARKET The most productive area of Kazakhstan in terms of oil barrels is the Western region, in the north of Caspian Sea; Jeffrey Hays, "Oil in Kazakhstan", (Facts and Details), http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Kazakhstan/sub8_4e/entry-4676.html#chapter-6 (accessed March 28, 2018). the country has the largest number of oil field not settled in the Persian Gulf: one of them, the Kurmangazy field, along the borders between Russia and Kazakhstan, is receiving financings by two Russian companies, Rosnef and KazMunaiGaz. Probably, there are reserves of about 240 million tons. Ibidem (accessed March 28, 2018). In 2015 Kazakhstan produced 1,653,100 barrels of oil, with an increase of 1.29% in comparison with the previous year, "Kazakhstan Crude Oil Production by Year" (IndexMundi), https://www.indexmundi.com/energy/?country=kz&product=oil&graph=production (accessed March 28, 2018). but for its increase in production and export Russia is still involved, given that the pipelines that transport oil from Kazakhstan to Europe are linked to the Russian ones. Jeffrey Hays, "Oil in Kazakhstan", (Facts and Details), http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Kazakhstan/sub8_4e/entry-4676.html#chapter-6 (accessed March 28, 2018). China has a very important role in cultivating and developing energy industry in Kazakhstan that, together with the other nations of central Asia, have become fundamental for supplies of raw materials, due to the distortions of fluxes from Middle East caused by the "Arab Spring". Bernardo Mariani, "China's role and interests in Central Asia", in Safeworld (Safeworld, The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172938/chinas-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf (accessed April 8, 2018). So, the country has taken advantage from the cooperation with China and has had the possibility to play among rivalries between Russia, China and western subjects, evaluating where the benefits are higher; Nicola Mocci, Michelguglielmo Torri, "Rallentamento dell'economia e debolezza politica in Asia", Asia Maior: Osservatorio italiano sull'Asia, (2012), 91. its approach toward the energetic sector is aimed to give short-term relief and promoting political acquiescence in the country. Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2000), 80. The Atyrau- Alashankou pipeline financied by KazMunaiGaz and the CNPC is important to supply oil for the Dushanzi refinery in Xinjiang region. In 2005 CNPC purchased PetroKazakhstan for $4.2bn, qualifying as largest purchase ever done by a Chinese company. In 2009 the same Chinese company lent $5bn to KazMunaiGaz and gained a stake in MangistauMunaiGas, an important oil developer in Kazakhstan. In 2011 China imported from Kazakhstan 4.39% of the total crude oil that imports from abroad. Bernardo Mariani, "China's role and interests in Central Asia", in Safeworld (Safeworld, The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172938/chinas-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf (accessed April 5, 2018). 4. RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO DOMINATE OVER CENTRAL ASIA Even though it is important for Kazakhstan to escape from Russian coercion and find alternative markets to increase the reserve of foreign currency through the sale of oil and gas, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2000), 221. the Russian Federation still wants to dominate over the former Islamic Soviet Republics of Central Asia and does not see China as welcome in the region. The years immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, concerned about its internal problems, did not invest in the central Asia region because it had its own oil and gas. Therefore, central Asia was seen just as security buffer zone and it was exploited using pipelines that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. As initiative of rapprochement with the countries of central Asia Caspian Sea Almir Mustafić, Hamza Preljević, "Sino- Russian Relations in Central Asia since the End of the Cold War: Interaction, Cooperation and Challenges", Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies 10 (2017), 66, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320557850_Sino-Russian_Relations_in_Central_Asia_since_the_end_of_the_Cold_War_Interaction_Cooperation_and_Challenges (accessed March 30, 2018)., in 2008 Russian companies planned to invest between 14 and 18 billion dollars for the development of infrastructures and gas and oil field in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; however, given that the price of oil fall, and after the Russian intervention in Syria and the annexation of Crimea that lead to international sanctions against Russia, the investments in central Asia diminished. In August 2015 LUKoil, the largest Russian oil company, sold 50% of its stake in Kazakh oil producer Caspian Investment Resources to the Chinese Sinopec for $1.2 billion. Almir Mustafić, Hamza Preljević, "Sino- Russian Relations in Central Asia since the End of the Cold War: Interaction, Cooperation and Challenges", Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies 10 (2017), 66, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320557850_Sino-Russian_Relations_in_Central_Asia_since_the_end_of_the_Cold_War_Interaction_Cooperation_and_Challenges (accessed March 31, 2018). The Chinese attempt to gain control of the resources in central Asia conflicts with the Russian will to establish energetic monopole in the region. Brian Carlson, "The limits of Sino- Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia, n. 18, (March 2007), 174, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/2007-8.pdf (accessed April 2, 2018). For some instances China and Russia could appear true allies but for many others they are only competitors; the economic policy of Russia in central Asia serves for its goal to overcome stagnation in the Far East, and is afraid that the new route of transport East- West through Caucasus and Central Asia could hurt its economy, create a damage for its Far East Region and threaten its territorial integrity, that could even be weaken by an increasing powerful China. Ibidem. 5. CHINESE ENERGY NEEDS AND CENTRAL ASIA- CHINA PIPELINES Chinese urbanization and inexorable economic growth leads the country to look for energy resources outside its borders, influencing the world energy market; following this trend, China will account for 25% of the growth in the trend of total energy demand by 2030, and central Asia will contribute to the research of secure and diversified energy resources for China. Kazakhstan is already one of the main Chinese oil suppliers, while Turkmenistan in 2014 was one of the main Chinese gas suppliers. In 2013, during the visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping in Ashgabat, the two parts signed an agreement to reinforce the long-term and stable cooperation in the energy sector, with the promotion of joint exploration and development of oil and gas. Bernardo Mariani, "China's role and interests in Central Asia", in Safeworld (Safeworld, The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172938/chinas-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf (accessed April 6, 2018). By 2020, the government of Beijing has expected to import up to 65 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from Turkmenistan. Even in Uzbekistan China has made important investments in the sector of energy. Bernardo Mariani, "China's role and interests in Central Asia", in Safeworld (Safeworld, The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172938/chinas-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf (accessed April 6, 2018). An agreement signed in June 2010 foresees that Uzbekistan will provide 10bcm of natural gas a year to China. Hydrocarbons technology, "Central Asia- China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China", https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagasp/ (accessed March 30, 2018). China has concluded also agreements that foresaw investments for the construction of a pipeline between Central Asia and the region of Xinjiang. Almir Mustafić, Hamza Preljević, "Sino- Russian Relations in Central Asia since the End of the Cold War: Interaction, Cooperation and Challenges", Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies 10 (2017), 65, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320557850_Sino-Russian_Relations_in_Central_Asia_since_the_end_of_the_Cold_War_Interaction_Cooperation_and_Challenges (accessed March 30, 2018). The 3,666km long pipelines, starting from the city of Gedaim, on the Turkmenistan- Uzbekistan border, and ending to Horgos, in China, is formed by two parallel lines; Line A was opened in December 2009 and the Line B in October of the following year. The total cost amounted to $7.31 bn. Hydrocarbons technology, "Central Asia- China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China", https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagasp/ (accessed March 30, 2018). The pipeline, built by CNPC, in 2010 transported 4.38 billion cubic metres of natural gas from fields in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Chinese gas transport network. In 2010, China and Kazakhstan agreed to construct the second phase of the Kazakhstan- China gas pipeline; it carries about 5 to 10bcm of natural gas a year from the Caspian Sea to China and links the two Kazakh cities of Beyneu and Shymkent, where it connects to the Central Asia- China pipeline. The pipeline has also been connected to the Second West- East Gas Pipeline, it is projected to serve regions like Shanghai and Guangdong Province passing through fourteen provinces in southern China. Ibidem. In September 2011 CNPC and KazMunaiGas, the state-owned oil and gas company of Kazakhstan, signed an agreement to build the Line C of the Central Asia- China pipeline in Uzbekistan; completed in 2014, has increased the annual transmission capacity from Central Asia to China of 55bcm. Ibidem. Many actors contributed to the construction of the pipeline: the Turkmeni section was built by Stroytransgaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom, with a cost of $600m, with other contractors like China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (CPECC) and Zeromax. The contractor of the Uzbek section of the pipeline was Asia Trans Gas, a joint venture formed between Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC. The Asian Gas Pipeline company, a joint venture between CNPC and KazMunayGas, built the Kazakh section, while Vyksa Steel Works, subsidiary of the United Metallurgical Company, had a contract for the supply of 355,000t of pipes for the Kazakh and Uzbek segments of the pipelines. Hydrocarbons technology, "Central Asia- China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China", https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagasp/ (accessed March 30, 2018). CONCLUSION Russia seeks diversification among Asian energy buyers, but its focus has increasingly been on China. The Islamic Republics are still bound to the ties built by former Soviet Union, but China is emerging as one of the most influential players, and there is little Russia can do about that. Even though the two superpowers have more to gain from cooperation than outright competition, China is stronger, and this power asymmetry will continue to grow at the expense of Russia, already weakened by economic stagnation in the Far East and Islamic threat in the southern borders. Russian companies are keen to bid on various infrastructure initiatives in Central Asia, but the greatest project is in the hands of China, that agreed investments with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the construction of a system of pipelines between Central Asia and its border regions. Thank to this rebalancing of power with Russia declining and China emerging as one of the region’s most influential players, China is rising in Central Asia due to its project of regional connectivity, appetite for Central Asian energy resources and ample reserves, which it distributes to Central Asia through commercial investments, loans, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and several other entities. At the same time, a long-term stable interest in the platform for business structures will sustain only if there are specific bilateral and multilateral projects guaranteed with both investment and political support. At the end, the goal of the "energy club" is the formation of an atmosphere of openness, confidence in the discussion of vital economic and legal problems, and exchange of opinions regarding methods of resolution. Moreover, under conditions of the continuing instability of the global economy, the activation of the SCO energy policy would play a significant role in ensuring the sustainable growth of the member-countries. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ebel, Robert and Menon, Rajan. Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2000. Hall, Gregory O., Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, Russia, and the United States' Pursuit of Relevancy and Power. New York: Routledge, 2014. McDonell, Gavan, The Euro- Asian Corridor: Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995. Mocci, Nicola and Torri, Michelangelo, "Rallentamento dell'economia e debolezza politica in Asia", Asia Maior: Osservatorio italiano sull'Asia, 2012. WEBSITES Carlson, Brian. "The limits of Sino- Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia", n. 18 (March 2007): 165-187. 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