Powerful Persistence

Society for Philosophy of Time http://s-p-o-t.weebly.com Powerful Persistence Florian Fischer (Bonn) Overview • Classical accounts of persistence • Assessment and diagnosis • Powerful persistence R B t t1 t2 The problem of temporary intrinsics Leibniz’ Law of indiscernibility of identicals ∀x ∀y (x=y ⟶ ∀F(F(x) ⟷ F(y))) Difference Difference Incompatibility Incompatibility Genus - Aristotle Incompatibility classes - P. Strawson Determinants/Determinables - Johnson / A. Prior Perdurantism R(ot1) B(ot2) PerdurantismCP Stage view / exdurantism R(st1) B(st2) Indexicalism Rt1(o) Bt2(o) Copularism O ist1 R O ist2 B Adverbialism O is t1-ly R O is t2-ly B Relationalism R(o, t1) B(o, t2) ExemplificationismEtn Et1(o, r) Et2(o, b) ExemplificationismE3 E3(o, t1, r) E3(o, t2, b) Constituentism R(or) B(ob) Contemporary accounts Perdurantism R(ot1) ∧ B(ot2) Exdurantism R(st1) ∧ B(st2) Indexicalism Rt1(o) ∧ Bt2(o) Copularism O ist1 R and O ist2 B Adverbialism O is t1-ly R and O is t2-ly B Relationism R(o, t1) ∧ B(o, t2) ExemplificationismEtn Et1(o, r) ∧ Et2(o, b) ExemplificationismE3 E3(o, t1, r) ∧ E3(o, t2, b) Constituentism R(or) ∧ B(ob) Sequentialism R(o1) ∧ B(o2) The problem of change David Hugh Mellor: `change needs identity as well as difference’ Continuity Change: persisting entity Exchange: more than one entity Contemporary accounts II Perdurantism R(ot1) ∧ B(ot2) Parthood Exdurantism R(st1) ∧ B(st2) Counterpart Indexicalism Rt1(o) ∧ Bt2(o) Multi-Location Copularism O ist1 R and O ist2 B Multi-Location Adverbialism O is t1-ly R and O is t2-ly B Multi-Location Relationism R(o, t1) ∧ B(o, t2) Multi-Location ExemplificationismEtn Et1(o, r) ∧ Et2(o, b) Multi-Location ExemplificationismE3 E3(o, t1, r) ∧ E3(o, t2, b) Multi-Location Constituentism R(or) ∧ B(ob) Constitution Sequentialism R(o1) ∧ B(o2) entia successiva Dissolving Leibniz One object has incompatible properties in the same way. Dissolving Leibniz One object has incompatible properties in the same way. • Not one object • Not incompatible properties • Not in the same way Dissolving Leibniz One object has incompatible properties in the same way. • Not one object (Perdurantism, Exdurantism, Constituentism, Sequentialism) • Not incompatible properties (Indexicalism, Relationism) • Not in the same way (Copularism, Adverbialism, ExemplifikationismEtn, ExemplifikationismE3) The problem The problem of temporary intrinsics The problem of change The problem of persistence R R t t1 t2 Focus The focus of the contemporary debate about the problem of temporary intrinsics is solely on avoiding the threatening contradiction in the context of Leibniz’ Law. • The continuity-maker is virtually never mentioned • There are no hybrid accounts No contradiction, no problem? Contradiction-freeness is not enough. • Dropping Leibniz • How change is brought about `Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. How is such change possible?’ Lewis, David - On the plurality of worlds, 1986 Produrance Dispositions Objects o is disposed to show manifestation m under stimulus condition s. Objects o has disposition D. Object o is in stimulus condition S. Object o shows manifestation M. (Breaking Bad) Imagine you want to poison your fellow drug lords in order to expand your business. As they are drug lords, they are suspicious. You carefully inject poison into a bottle of Gran Patron Platinum and bring it with you. After a bogus deal is struck you encourage your fellow drug lords to celebrate with a glass of tequila. You all drink – you will have to start, of course, to lower suspicion – but only the others die, as you are the only one who has the corresponding antidote administered. Diagnosis The problem of prevention prevails because everyone in the debate implicitly or explicitly thinks of the stimulus and the manifestation of a disposition as separate entities. Because of this there is always the in principle possibility of interference. `[A]ll events seem entirely loose and separate’ Hume, David - An inquiry concerning human understanding, 1748 Hume seem loose and separate hume are loose and separate A Case (Lightning) Person s is on her way to the university. As s passes the bookshop, about half-way through, she is struck by lightning. On account of the fatality of her encounter with electricity, s never reaches the university. The Imperfective Paradox `s was walking’ ⇒ `s has walked’ `s was walking to the university’ ⇏ `s has walked to the university’ `There is thus something that Davidson’s doctrine of events or of things that happened is missing, namely, not to put too fine a point on it, the things that didn’t happen. That is, he forgets about the things that didn’t happen, but were happening.’ Thompson, Michael - Life and Action, 2011 Dispostion Stimulus Manifestation process Manifestation processes R(a1) B(a2) a1 a2 Ongoing process t t1 t2 R(a1) a1 B(a2) a1 ≠ a2 a2 Ongoing process t t1 t2 `For Bergson, there is always a priority of movement over the things that move; the thing that moves is an abstraction from the movement.’ Lawlor, L. and Moulard, L. - Henri Bergson, 2016 R(a1) B(a2) a1 a2 Ongoing process t t1 t2 Thank you for the time! Hume D. (1748/2011) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Claremont: Broadview Press Johnson W.E. (1921) Logic: Part I. Mind 30(120):448–455 Lawlor L., Moulard L.V. (2016) Henri Bergson. In: Zalta E. N. (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, summer 2016 edn, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University Lewis D.K. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers Prior A.N. (1949) Determinables, determinates and determinants. Mind 58(229):1–20 Thompson M. (2008) Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Harvard University Press