NORWAY_YEARBOOK_MUSLIMS_VOL_9.pdf

NORWAY Sindre Bangstad1 and Olav Elgvin2 Introduction For Muslims in Norway, the year 2016 was one marked by several conflicts between different organisations and actors in the Islamic scene. The main umbrella organisation for Muslims in Norway, the Islamsk Råd Norge (Islamic Council of Norway - IRN), saw an eruption of internal conflicts. It ended in a dramatic manner, as the elected board decided to step down, the secretary-general was reinstated, and the Norwegian Ministry of Culture temporarily withheld financial support for the organisation. In addition, there was renewed debate between different Muslim actors concerning the “correct” interpretation of Islam, with more liberal Muslim activists clashing with more conservative Muslim activists about how Islam should be interpreted and lived in a Norwegian context. There was also much public debate concerning Salafi-jihadism, and the compatibility of Islam with “Western values”. Public debates Throughout 2016, Islam and Muslims continued to be widely-discussed issues in mediated public debates in Norway. A quantitative search in Retriever, the searchable database for Norwegian media outlets, reveals that “Islam” was referenced 5,379 times in Norwegian print media in 2016. By comparison, “Christianity” (Kristendom) was referenced 1,608 times, and 1 Sindre Bangstad is a social anthropologist and a researcher at KIFO, the Institute for Church, Religion, and Worldview Research in Oslo, Norway. 2 Olav Elgvin is a doctoral student in comparative politics at the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen, Norway, and a researcher at the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Research in Oslo, Norway. 7 the name of the Prime Minister (Erna Solberg) 13,472 times. References in Norwegian media of both “Islam” and “Muslims” reached their peak in July 2016. A detailed look into the media references during this month shows that this was related to the terror attack in Nice on 14 July 2016, when Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a truck into a crowd in Nice and killed 84 people. The media coverage following the attack was partly about the attack in Nice, ISIS and Muslims in France. However, media coverage also focused on Muslims in Norway, and “fundamentalism” and “radicalisation” among Norwegian Muslims more generally. These debates focused on some specific events. In the beginning of 2016, there was continuing debate about the book Islam: Den tiende landeplage (Islam: the 10th Plague of the Nation) by the anti-Islamic far-right activist Hege Storhaug. This self-published book by a former journalist, which came out in autumn 2015, sold more copies in 2016 than any other book about Islam, Muslims, immigration or multicultural society had ever done in Norway.3 Another book about Islam by a Norwegian author also stirred debate. Usman Rana, a medical doctor and Muslim activist, who was born in Norway to parents who immigrated from Pakistan, published the book Norsk islam. Hvordan elske Norge og koranen samtidig (Norwegian Islam: How to Love Norway and the Qur’an at the Same time).4 Rana has for many years made regular appearances in the Norwegian media; he initially received a platform as chairman of the Pakistansk Studentsamfunn (Pakistani Students’ Society - PSS) from 2005 to 2006, and the Muslimsk Studentsamfunn (Muslim Student’s Society - MSS) from 2007 to 2008 (both at the University of Oslo).5 Rana has positioned himself as someone who tries to combine support for what he labels “traditional Islam”—with an emphasis on conservative moral and For more about Storhaug and the book, see last year’s entry, Bangstad, Sindre, and Olav Elgvin, “Norway”, in Oliver Scharbrodt, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, Jørgen S. Nielsen and Egdūnas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 8 (Leiden, Brill, 2017), pp. 514-530. 4 Rana, Usman Mohammad, Norsk islam. Hvordan elske Norge og koranen samtidig (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2016). 5 For a detailed profile of and interview with Rana, see Bangstad, Sindre, The Politics of Mediated Presence: Exploring the Voices of Muslims in Norway’s Mediated Public Spheres (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2015), pp.85-95. 3 7 religious values—with support for political liberalism and a secular state. Rana’s main inspiration is the American Islamic scholar Hamza Yusuf. He wrote the book after spending several months at Yusuf’s Zaytuna College in California. This book is probably the first authored by a Norwegian Muslim that tries to formulate a coherent theological proposal for what “Norwegian Islam” may look like. The reactions to Rana’s book were therefore indicative of larger trends in the Norwegian debate about Islam and Muslims. Some mainstream actors—notably commentators in VG, the largest newspaper in Norway—served Rana with accolades, and saw it as a much needed first attempt at reform among Norwegian Muslims.6 Other media pundits were sceptical, and dismissed Rana’s book as being “too little too late”, or regarded it as not being sincere in its professed support for secularism and political liberalism.7 A common topic in both of these lines of critique, however, is the view that Islam and Muslim communities are in need of reform. The disagreement here is not about whether there is a need for “reform” per se, but rather whether conservative interpretations of Islam may be a part of a secular and liberal society or not. Rana’s book also became a part of a larger debate among Norwegian Muslims concerning interpretations of Islam, and how confrontational or accommodating Islamic organisations should be towards mainstream society. The book was welcomed by some Muslim actors, while others—notably Fahad Qureshi of the Salafi-orientated group Islam Net—argued against Rana and the book.8 Islamic organisations in Norway have seen debates such as these for many years. What has changed in recent years, though, is that many of them are now taking place in the public sphere. 6 http://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/islam/mange-frykter-at-islam-endrer-norge/a/23642060/, accessed May 20 2017. 7 https://morgenbladet.no/aktuelt/2016/04/kjetil-rolness-om-mohammad-usman-ranas-bok, accessed May 20 2017, https://www.rights.no/2016/04/arets-morsomste-bok-signert-komiske-rana/ accessed May 20 2017. 8 http://www.verdidebatt.no/innlegg/11653513, accessed March 15 2017. 7 In 2016, these debates burst into the open. The most vocal participants in these discussions were Fahad Qureshi and other conservative activists connected to Islam Net, as well as Linda Noor and others activists connected to the politically liberal think-tank Minotenk. On 6 August 2016, Qureshi uploaded a video on Youtube in which he asked Muslims to engage in a “jihad with the pen” against a group he labelled as “progressive Muslims”.9 He mentioned three Muslims by name: Linda Noor, the leader of Minotenk, her husband Ali Chishti, and Mohammed Shoaib Sultan. The latter was a former secretary general of the Islamic Council of Norway, and is now a Green Party councillor at the City Council of Oslo, and an advisor on extremism at the Norwegian Centre Against Racism (ARS). All of these people had criticised Islam Net sharply in the previous months, with Chishti for example applying the label “extremists” to Islam Net in public.10 Later in the year, Minotenk published the anthology Islamsk humanisme (Islamic Humanism).11 Once again, Qureshi and Islam Net accused individuals associated with this book of making “innovations” in religion, and of touting a “progressive Islam” in order to become more acceptable to mainstream society. Transnational Links Muslim organisations in Norway have for a long time been embedded in transnational networks of various kinds, indicating the presence of what John R. Bowen has referred to as a “transnational Islamic public space”.12 The importance of this has if anything increased in recent years, due to the ease of online communication. Islamic scholars from the Middle East, 9 http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Islam-Net-oppfordrer-til-verbal-jihad-mot-muslimske-samfunnsdebattanter601608b.html#xtor=RSS-3, accessed April 5 2017. 10 http://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/islam-debatten/kampen-om-islams-sjel/a/23752924/, accessed February 10 2017. 11 Minotenk, Islamsk humanisme (Islamic Humanism) (Oslo: Moment, 2016). 12 Bowen, John R., “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 30, no. 5 (2004), pp. 879-894. 7 South Asia, Europe and the USA are regularly invited to Norway to present lectures and khutbas. These transnational networks cannot all be referenced here due to space limitations. In the case of Norwegian Salafi organisations (Islam Net), an important organisational point of reference is the Mumbai-based Islamic Research Foundation (IRF) in India, run by the Islamic televangelist Zakir Naik, and the Islamic legal reference point is Saudi-based Islamic Scholars Online. The Sufi Minhaj-ul-Qur’an, which for a number of years has attracted a significant number of Muslim youth in Norway, regularly hosts Minhaj delegates from Pakistan. For certain sections of well-educated Muslim youth of conservative leanings, Hamza Yusuf and his Zaytuna College in the USA has in recent years become an important point of reference. In late 2014 and early 2015, the Atlanta-based Madina Institute also established a presence in Norway. According to figures from the Norwegian Police Security Services (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste - PST) there were around 40 Norwegian Muslims who fought alongside ISIS in Syria at the end of 2016.13 In the latest available estimate, the PST in January 2017 estimated that a total of 90 Norwegian Muslims had been recruited as “foreign fighters” for Salafi-jihadi outfits in Iraq and Syria from 2012. Recruitment reached a peak and a saturation point in 2014, and was minimal in 2016. The main group thought to have been involved in recruiting young Muslims to Syria and Iraq has been the group Profetens Ummah (The Prophet’s Ummah), a network of Salafi-jhadi sympathisers mostly based in the Eastern part of Norway. However, Norwegian court cases under new Norwegian anti-terrorist legislation— introduced in 2015 in the form of a new Norwegian General Penal Code art 147 c and d, which prohibits the advocacy of, or the training or recruitment for, terrorist activities—has only been able to establish the involvement of persons from this group in a limited number of “foreign fighter” recruitment cases. The Prophet’s Ummah has previously established contacts with the UK 13 http://www.pst.no/media/82444/PST_Trusselvurd-2017.pdf, accessed 18 June 2017. 7 based propagandist Anjem Choudary (b. 1967), formerly of the organisations Al-Muhajiroon and Sharia4UK, which are both proscribed in the UK. The recruits of this group have to a large extent been marginalised young men with low levels of education, a troubled childhood, and a background in crime and gang activities in Norway. A report published in November 2016 on the background of some 137 individuals brought to the attention of the PST as Salafi-jihadi recruits or sympathisers in Norway, noted that 18% were converts.14 However, there have also been young female recruits, among them three young women in their teens and early twenties from Bærum, near Oslo.15 The Prophet’s Ummah first started to coalesce under a different name in 2011, when a loose network of young Norwegian Muslims mobilised against the publication of a drawing they regarded as denigrating the Prophet, which appeared on the front page of the liberal Norwegian daily newspaper Dagbladet in late 2010. The Prophet’s Ummah is estimated to have had a core membership of 30-50 Muslims. Its core leadership has faced intensive surveillance by the PST, and a series of prosecutions in Norwegian courts under anti-terror legislation, introduced by the Norwegian parliament in 2015.16 In 2016, however, the activity of The Prophet’s Ummah was very limited. They had a far lower presence in both traditional and social media, and their activity on the ground seems to have diminished as well. According to the annual assessment of the PST a reason for this may be that many of the activists in The Prophet’s Ummah were fighting or had been killed in Syria, while others were facing prosecution in Norwegian courts, or had been imprisoned.17 14 See http://www.pst.no/media/82364/Radikaliseringsprosjektet_rapport_ugrad_eng_12-09-16.pdf, accessed May 20 2017. 15 See www.nrk.no/norge/kvinnene-som-ble-radikalisert-og-reiste-1.12219865, accessed 20 April 2015 16 Most notably under Norwegian General Penal Code art. 147c and d, which prohibits recruitment to, and advocacy and membership of, a terrorist organisation. The one-time spokesperson of The Prophet’s Ummah, a Norwegian-Pakistani by the name of ‘Ubaydullah [Arslan Maroof] Hussain, has also been successfully prosecuted for criminal offences under Norwegian criminal laws against hate speech (Norwegian General Penal Code art. 185, formerly 135 (a)). See https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/hussain-v-norwegianprosecution-authority/, accessed April 5 2017 17 http://www.pst.no/media/81096/PST_Brosjyre_Trussel_NORSK.pdf, accessed 21 March 2016. 7 The strategy of the Norwegian PST of pursuing Norwegian Salafi-jihadis through the courts in 2016 appeared to have succeeded. Law and Domestic Politics 2016 saw an important milestone in the institutionalisation of Islam in Norway with the hiring of an Islamic chaplain for the armed forces. Unlike some other countries in Europe, Norway has not had regularly appointed Muslim chaplains, neither in the armed forces nor in institutions such as prisons or hospitals. This changed in 2016, when the armed forces decided to hire both a Muslim and a Humanist chaplain.18 Late in 2016, the position as Muslim chaplain was given to Najeeb Naz. Naz had formerly been employed as imam in the Sufi- and Barelwioriented mosque World Islamic Mission (WIM) in Oslo. This is one of the largest mosques of Norway, and was the first purpose-built mosque with a high minaret and traditional ornamentation in the country. According to interviews with activists in several Norwegian mosques, Naz is regarded as one of the more progressive imams on the Norwegian Islamic scene.19 He has emphasised that theological interpretations need to take the local and cultural context into account, and has shown interest in inter-religious dialogue, and in dialogue with actors in mainstream society. After the terror attack of 22 July 2011 by the Norwegian rightwing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, for example, he welcomed dignitaries such as crown prince Haakon Magnus V. and selected politicians to his mosque, where a commemoration for the Muslim victims of the terrorist attacks was held.20 As a chaplain in the armed forces, Naz will be tasked with catering to the religious needs of Muslim soldiers. 18 https://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/forsvarets-foerste-feltimam, accessed December 8 2016. Interviews conducted by Olav Elgvin, 3, 4 and 6 March 2016. 20 https://www.nrk.no/norge/kronprinsen-mintes-ofrene-i-moske-1.7728515, accessed November 15 2017. 19 7 In 2015, several of the major parties in Norway considered whether to implement major changes in way they “governed Islam” in Norway. In comparison with many other countries in Western Europe, Norway’s policy towards Islamic faith communities and congregations has been comparatively liberal and lenient. All faith communities in Norway, including Islamic congregations and even secular Humanists, receive public funding, determined by their membership base.21 So far, this funding has not been premised on any kind of substantial “value commitment” from the faith communities in question. As a result of the increased flow of refugees arriving in Norway in 2015, there was pressure on Norway’s political parties to provide templates for, what has been deemed by proponents as, securing a better integration of immigrants in Norwegian society. In December 2015, all mainstream Norwegian political parties, with the exception of the Green Party and the Socialist Left Party, adopted a template for a new integration policy.22 This template will not become law, though, until the Norwegian government returns to Parliament with a formal proposal for new regulations and by-laws. In this agreement, the Parliament tasked the Government with examining whether one can deny foreign governments the right to fund faith congregations in Norway, as long as these countries do not practise freedom of religion themselves. Furthermore, the Parliament asked the Government to look into provisions for instigating an official and compulsory Norwegian education for “religious leaders”. Such an education for religious leaders has long been provided by the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo, but on a voluntary basis. No new formal initiatives were undertaken on this issue in 2016. Still, several politicians made statements concerning the matter. Sylvi Listhaug, the Minister for Immigration and Integration from the populist far-right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, 21 For details on the historical development of this form of State funding for faith communities in Norway, see Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Policy toward Religion, State Support, and Interreligious Dialogue: the Case of Norway”, Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, vol. 25, no. 1 (2015), pp. 92-105. 22 http://arbeiderpartiet.no/file/download/8541/129220/file/Et%20felles%20l%C3%B8ft%20for%20god%20inte grering.pdf, accessed 22 March 2016. 7 FrP), pledged to look into whether it could be possible to bar what she referred to as “hate preachers” from entry to Norway.23 Unlike some other European countries, Norway has hitherto not barred any religious preachers from entry to the country, though available provisions in Norwegian law clearly enable this. In spite of Listhaug’s statements, no new formal regulations on this topic were issued in 2016. Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations The most important umbrella organisation for Muslims in Norway has long been the Islamsk Råd Norge (Islamic Council of Norway - IRN). The IRN represents most of the mosques in Norway, and has a total membership estimated at 80,000. The IRN has come under heavy criticism in recent years. Different actors—ranging from the think tank Minotenk to Norwegian politicians of Muslim background—have criticised the IRN for being too lenient towards Salafi-jihadis and “fundamentalist” Muslims, and for not being sufficiently concerned with and committed to dialogue with mainstream society. In 2015, it looked as if this was going to change. The IRN appointed a new board, which was perceived as being more positively disposed towards dialogue. What happened in 2016, however, was the exact opposite.24 The new board claimed that the secretary general, Mehtab Afsar, did not fulfil his duties in a satisfactory manner. The board made a decision to dismiss him in May 2016, and this was informally announced through a Facebook post issued by the IRN’s deputy at the time, Ghulam Abbas. However, at the annual meeting of the IRN on 4 June 2016, where representatives from all the mosques gather to make decisions, a majority of the delegates refused to approve the board’s decision. When the board realised that their decision was overturned, all its members 23 http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Vil-vurdere-reglene-for-opphold-for-hatpredikanter-58231b.html, accessed December 15 2016. 24 This section is based on interviews with actors in the Islamic Council of Norway, conducted by Olav Elgvin on 6, 8 and 9 March 2016. 7 stepped down. A new interim board was appointed, and the secretary general Mehtab Afsar was reinstated. This created much tension internally in Norwegian mosques, where different actors took sides for different parties in the conflict. It also created difficulties for the IRN with regards the Norwegian authorities. The IRN receives funding from the Ministry of Culture. After the annual meeting in which the board stepped down, the Minister of Culture Linda Helleland of the Conservative Party, opted to withhold the state funding for the IRN subsequent to a clarification regarding whether due process had been adhered to by the group.25 Sources within the IRN, and in the largest mosques of Norway, paint somewhat different pictures of the underlying reasons for the conflict. Some see it as inherently about personal relationships within the board and the administration at the IRN. Many of the persons on this board were veterans of the Islamic Council of Norway who had become accustomed to being in control, and who reportedly sought to micro-manage the work of the secretary general. At some point, for example, it was decided that every email sent to the main email address of the IRN should be sent as a copy to every single member of the board, and that no response could be sent from that email address unless it was approved by a majority of the board. Others see the conflict as being about the ideological positioning of the IRN. Should it adopt a confrontational or accommodative stance vis-a-vis Norwegian authorities and mainstream society? The board that stepped down emphasised dialogue with non-Muslims and Norwegian authorities. Afsar and his associates, on the other hand, have focused on building tighter relations between Muslims and Muslim organisations, on not backing down in the case of conflict with the authorities, and on providing religious services to Norwegian Muslims. 25 http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Kulturministeren-holder-tilbake-pengestotte-til-Islamsk-Rad-Norge501813b.html, accessed February 12 2017. 7 Under the leadership of Afsar, for example, membership in the IRN has increased, with several new mosques joining the fold. The IRN has also committed its organisational resources to providing halal certification for Norwegian Muslims, first introduced by the IRN in 2012. By 2016, revenue from the IRN’s halal certification had overtaken that of the state funding for the IRN as its principal source of revenue, and enabled the organisation to contract one new permanent employee.26 Muslim Population: History and Demographics The very first Muslims to settle in Norway were probably Pakistani Ahmadi proselytisers, who arrived in the 1940s. From the late 1960s until the introduction of legislation aimed at curbing labour migration, laid out by the Norwegian parliament in 1975, predominantly male labour migrants started arriving from Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey. They were later supplemented by family members from their countries of origin through family reunification, and refugees from countries such as Iran, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, from the 1980s onwards.27 There are no official records relating to the number of Muslims in Norway. Norwegian state bodies collect a wide array of information about the population of the country, pertaining to education, employment, contact with health services, marital status etc. Much of this information is aggregated and made available on the website of Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no). Unless indicated otherwise, all numbers and statistics here are retrieved from that site, using the latest available data. However, information about a citizen’s religious beliefs is not collected by the State. In order to provide an estimate of the number of Muslims in 26 See http://religiongoingpublic.com/archive/2017/going-under-the-radar-halal-controversies-in-norway, accessed May 15 2017. 27 For further background on the history of Muslim migration to, and settlement in, Norway, see Bangstad, The Politics of Mediated Presence, pp. 41-81. 7 Norway, one therefore has to go via two indirect routes. One may base one’s estimate on the number of persons of immigrant background from Muslim majority countries. Using this method, the Muslim population in Norway amounts to ca. 263,667 people, making up roughly 5% of the total population of 5.3 million. This indicator, however, excludes Norwegian converts to Islam. It will also include persons who do not necessarily self-identify as “Muslim”, including immigrants from Muslim majority countries who may not even be nominally Muslim, and persons from a Muslim background who do not self-identify as Muslim. Using this method, one almost certainly arrives at too high number of Muslims in Norway. Alternatively, one may make an estimate based on membership in mosques in Norway. The Norwegian state gives financial support to religious communities in proportion to the number of registered members, and there is therefore a strong impetus for mosques to enrol people as members. By 1 January 2017, there were 148,189 members in Norwegian mosques, making up roughly 2.8% of the total population. This method, however, might provide a number of selfidentifying Muslims that is too low. The number of persons in Norway who self-identify as Muslim may therefore fall somewhere between 148,189 and 263,667, or between 2.8 and 5% of the total population. Muslim Population 148,189-263,667 (2.8–5% of the population in 2016). Ethnic/National Backgrounds The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Norway are persons of immigrant background or descent. In addition, there are an estimated 3,000 Norwegian converts to Islam. 7 The largest ethnic/national groups of Muslim background (in absolute numbers): Somali: 41,463 Pakistani: 36,700 Iraqi: 32,304 Syrian: 22,285 Iranian: 21,364 Turkish: 18,172 Bosniak: 17,684 Afghan: 17,519 Kosovar: 15,328 Moroccan: 9,955 Other Muslim majority countries: 27,893. Inner-Islamic Groups Figures are uncertain, but it is generally assumed that ca. 20% of Muslims in Norway are Shi’i and 80% are Sunni. There is a small Ahmadiyya community as well, estimated at 1,500 in 2010. Among Sunni Muslims, most of the mosques cater for specific ethnicities. In recent years, there has also been an increasing number of young Sunni Muslims who have joined Salafi organisational platforms that frequently cross the ethnic divide. Though there is still no academic 7 research on the topic, there is also some evidence to suggest that the Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at (TJ) has been gaining ground in some mosques in the Oslo area in recent years. Norway’s Muslim population is largely an Geographical Spread urban population, with the greatest concentration of Muslims found in and around the capital of Oslo, and in larger urban centres, mainly in Eastern Norway, but also in Stavanger in Western Norway and Kristiansand in Southern Norway. Number of Mosques Around 130–140 (estimate). Muslim Burial Sites In terms of current Norwegian law and legal practice, Norwegian Muslims do not have separate burial grounds. Instead Muslims are under the Funeral Law (Gravferdslova) of 1996, last amended by the Norwegian parliament in 2010, that allocates separate plots in municipal burial grounds. These are administered by Joint Parish Councils (Kirkelige Fellesråd) affiliated with the 7 Lutheran State Church in Norway. This is a consequence of the fact that under Norwegian law only municipal burial grounds receive public funding, and that the Funeral Law privileges the Lutheran State Church. There were in 2013 a total of over 2,000 burial grounds in Norway, but less than 15 of these were non-church burial grounds. To date, no separate Islamic burial grounds exist, but an estimated 50 municipal burial grounds across Norway have sections for Muslims. In May 2013, the newspaper Aftenposten reported an acute future lack of burial grounds for Muslims in Oslo. Muslim and inter-denominational concerns over this issue led to the establishment of a Burial Council (Gravferdsråd) in Oslo in November 2013, in which the Muslim umbrella organisation Islamic Council of Norway also takes part.28 “Chaplaincy” in State Institutions Norway has not institutionalised Muslim chaplaincy in State institutions. The first ever This section draws on van den Breemer, Rosemarie, “Graveyards and Secularism in Norway: in Search of a Fitting Category”, in Rosemarie van den Breemer, José Casanova and Trygve Wyller (eds.), Secular or Sacred? The Scandinavian Case of Human Rights, Law and Public Space (Göttingen-Bristol, Connecticut: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 170-96. 28 7 salaried military chaplain was recruited in 2016, when, Hæren, or the Norwegian Armed Forces, hired both a Muslim and a Humanist chaplain. Late in 2016, the position as Muslim chaplain was given to Najeeb Naz. Naz had formerly been employed as imam in the Sufi- and Barelwi-oriented mosque World Islamic Mission (WIM) in Oslo. Otherwise, there are no salaried Muslim chaplains employed in hospitals, prisons or other parts of the military in Norway. However, in Oslo Prison, occasional visits by volunteer imams are organised for the purposes of Friday congregational prayers and pastoral care. Halal Products Provision of halal-slaughtered meat has historically been quite erratic in Norway. Ethnographic research on processes of halal provision and certification, undertaken by Sindre Bangstad and Ragna Lillevik,29 suggest that Norwegian Muslims have been forced to resort to private slaughter by tacit 29 The work was conducted under the auspices of a Norwegian Research Council (NRC)-funded project on Muslim Politics and the Governance of Islam (2015-2019), coordinated by Olav Elgvin. The findings from this work will soon be published by Sindre Bangstad. 7 agreement with select Norwegian farmers; private importation from neighbouring countries such as Sweden; and to a wide range of small-scale Muslim and nonMuslim private enterprises offering “halal certification” of dubious guarantees. Securing state support for the establishment of a Muslim-controlled halal certification regime acceptable to most, if not all, Norwegian Muslims, has therefore been a crucially important priority for the Islamic Council of Norway since the 1990s. The Islamic Council of Norway established its own halal certification in 2012, and has a standing halal certification committee, responsible for assessing halal certification applications from producers, distributors and restaurants. The establishment of the Council’s halal certification also meant that the IRN agreed to abide by the slaughter of halal meat according to Norwegian animal welfare regulations, which requires the animal to be fully unconscious when being slaughtered. This has caused some Muslim congregations under the IRN’s own umbrella 7 (most notably the Turkish Süleymancioriented Diksin) to opt out of the IRN’s halal certification, since they consider these methods of slaughter to fail to meet the standards of “proper” halal slaughter. They rely instead on the limited state import quota for halal meat, which allows for the import of a limited amount of halal meat from producers in Germany and Turkey. Upon certification from IRN, applicants are provided with the right to use the Islamic Council of Norway’s halal certification brand in marketing. As of 1 January 2017, the IRN has certified 21 producers and distributors and eleven restaurants and public institutions, mostly in urban centres of Norway, as offering certified halal products. Among public institutions, only one hospital, namely Akershus University Hospital at Lørenskog outside Oslo, is certified by the IRN. Non-pork options are however available to prison inmates in Norwegian prisons in Oslo and the larger cities, as well as at university hospital in Oslo. In the provision of halal certified meat in Norway, 7 the largest meat industry business overall, NORTURA, has halal certified meatproducing plants in five different locations across Norway, and its halal meat brand Alfathi, is by far the largest producer. By agreement with the Islamic Council of Norway, NORTURA also pays 1% of the revenue from its sales of halal certified meat to the Council. However, lobby groups opposed to halal slaughter and certification have also been active in Norway. They have been actively involved in social media mobilisation which forced NORTURA to issue a press statement in which it guaranteed to non-Muslim meat consumers that no halal-slaughtered food would be found in non-halal slaughtered meat, offered to non-Muslim Norwegian customers in 2015. The institutionalisation of halal slaughter and halal certification in Norway has by and large passed under the radar of an otherwise very polarised debate on Islam and Muslims in Norway. It has succeeded due to a mutual commitment to finding pragmatic solutions on the part of 7 Norwegian Muslim organisations and the relevant authorities and producers in Norway.30 Places of Islamic Education and Learning There are at present no Islamic primary or secondary schools in Norway. Norwegian universities in Oslo and Bergen do offer programmes in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies. The Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo appointed Norway’s first chair in Theological Studies in Islam in late 2015, when the Danish scholar Safet Bektovic became an associate professor there. The Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo also has a regular course for religious leaders from various faith communities, including Muslims. Muslim Media and Publications Norwegian Muslims have generally not established specifically Muslim media outlets, preferring instead to express their interests and views through Norwegian mainstream media. Muslim civil society 30 For scholarly work examining how the topic of halal food was covered by two large national tabloid newspapers in Norway between 2008 and 2014, see Thomas, Paul, and Amina Selimovic, “Sharia on a Plate? A Critical Discourse Analysis of halal Food in two Norwegian Newspapers”, Journal of Islamic Marketing, vol. 6, no. 3 (2016), pp.331-353. 7 organisations have however their own websites. 2014 saw the establishment of an online magazine by Muslims, entitled minareten.no. Main Muslim Organisations - The Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge – IRN, Storgaten 39, 5. etg. N-0184, Oslo, http://www.irn.no). An umbrella organisation for most of the Sunni mosque congregations in Norway, excluding Tablighi Jama’at (TJ), and with a very limited number of Shi’i mosque congregations as members. The Islamic Council of Norway was established in 1993. The Islamic Council of Norway has since then been the preferred dialogue partner for various Norwegian state bodies on Islamic matters. The internal structure is more or less democratic, with the members (the mosques) choosing a board and a secretary general. The secretary general is the only salaried employee at the organisation. The Islamic Council of Norway has often found itself under criticism, both from media pundits and politicians (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) who perceive them as too conservative, and from conservative Muslims who perceive them as too lenient towards Norwegian mainstream society and values. - Muslim Student Society (Muslimsk Studentsamfunn - MSS, Postboks 22 Blindern 0313, Oslo, http://www.mss.no). While it has a limited membership base, the MSS has nevertheless, since its establishment in 1995, played an important role in the Islamic scene in Norway. The MSS is based at the University of Oslo, where it frequently hosts meetings and invited lectures, and has published the irregular magazine Salam. MSS has by virtue 7 of tradition, and its close links with the Islamic Council of Norway, held a place on the board of the IRN, and has been involved in dialogue with both government bodies and Christian and Jewish faith communities. Several of the leaders of the MSS have also participated actively in public debates in Norway. The MSS has thus served a role as a platform for Muslim voices engaging with the Norwegian mediated public sphere. - The Islamic Network (Islam Net, Postboks 38 1469, Rasta, http://www.islamnet.no). Islam Net is the largest Muslim student and youth group in Norway, and was established by a group of engineering students at the then Oslo University College (Høgskolen i Oslo - HiO) in 2008. From the onset, it has had a clear Salafi orientation, largely in the quietist mould. Islam Net has focused on organising large conferences where they invite high-profile (and often controversial) Muslim preachers, and see their goal as reaching out to non-practising Muslims as well as to non-Muslims. Islam Net’s activities have often been accompanied by criticism and controversy. In the last couple of years, however, its leader Fahad Qureishi has gained some mainstream acceptance as a “legitimate” Muslim representative, and has often participated in media debates on how to prevent “radicalisation”.31 - Minotenk (Torggata 1 0181, Oslo, http://www.minotenk.no). A civil society organisation and think tank, founded in 2010 by Abid Raja, a Norwegian social-liberal politician, parliamentarian and former mosque spokesperson for the World Islamic Mission (WIM) mosque in Oslo. Norwegian converts to Islam currently play an important role in the organisation. Minotenk has in recent years emerged as an important interlocutor for the Government in its counter-radicalisation work. While not having any members in the proper sense, it is nevertheless regarded as a central Muslim voice in the Norwegian media. For an academic discussion of Islam Net, see Bangstad, Sindre, and Marius Linge, “‘Da‘wa is Our Identity’ – Salafism and Islam Net’s Rationales for Action in a Norwegian Context”, Journal of Muslims in Europe, vol. 3, no.2 (2015), pp. 174-196. 31 7 Minotenk has taken an increasingly critical stand towards the Islamic Council of Norway and the institutionalised Islamic scene in Norway in recent years. - Equality, Integration and Diversity (Likestilling, Integrering og Mangfold - LIM, Fredshuset Møllergata 12 0179, Oslo, http://www.lim.no). LIM is a Muslim civil society organisation in Norway, which shares many characteristics with Minotenk. LIM was founded in 2010 by persons of Muslim background, but is strongly secular in orientation. - The Islamic Community Bosnia and Herzegovina - Norway (Det Islamske Felleskap Bosnia og Herzegovina, Frogners vei 2A 0571, Oslo). The most important mosque congregation for Bosnian Muslims in Norway. - The Islamic Society Norway - Rabita (Det Islamske Forbundet Norge, Calmeyers gate 8 0183, Oslo, http://www.rabita.no). An important mosque congregation for Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims in Oslo, with historical links to the FIOE (Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe). Rabita has also attracted a significant number of Muslims converts, and persons associated with the mosques have often participated in public debates. - The Islamic Culture Centre in Norway – Diksin (Det Islamske kultursenter i Norge – Diksin, Tordenskjoldsgate 40, 3044 Drammen). A Turkish Sunni mosque congregation. Diksin has been the only mosque to challenge the “halal monopoly” of the Islamic Council of Norway, due to the fact that this Turkish Süleymanci-oriented organisation, does not accept the methods of halal slaughter authorised by the IRN, that are compliant with the State animal welfare regulations. Several members of the mosque have been involved in importing halal meat to Norway from abroad. It has congregations in Øvre Eiker, Oslo and Stavanger. 7 - The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Norway (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama‘at Norge, Postboks 200, Furuset 1001 Oslo, http://www.ahmadiyya.no/). The main congregation for Ahmadiyya Muslims in Norway. - Islamic Cultural Centre - ICC (Tøyenbekken 24 0188, Oslo, http://www.islamic.no/). Norway’s first mosque congregation, established in 1974, is one of the mosques with the highest number of congregants. It is dominated by Norwegian-Pakistani Sunni Muslims. 7