Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Memory and Perspective
Christopher Jude McCarroll and John Sutton
1. Introduction
In an essay in the London Review of Books, the late Jenny Diski describes a remembered scene
from her childhood. Aged 6 or so, she is seated on her father’s knee. Her father, she tells us,
looks just like he does in the pictures she has of him: ‘silvery hair, moustache, brown suede
lace-ups’. Diski doesn’t have many pictures of her childhood self but she’s pretty sure her
remembered image of herself at that age is accurate. The layout of the room is also correct:
‘Door in the right place; chair I’m sure accurate, a burgundy moquette; patterned carpet;
windows looking out onto the brick wall of the offices opposite’. Indeed, Diski had even gone
back to the block of flats and ‘sat in the living-room of the flat next door’ just to verify the
layout and confirm its accuracy. Nonetheless, for Diski, there is still something rather ‘odd’
about this particular memory. She writes:
Here’s the thing, though: I can see the entire picture. I can…see myself. My observation
point is from the top of the wall opposite where we are sitting, just below the ceiling,
looking down across the room towards me and my father in the chair. I can see me clearly,
but what I can’t do is position myself on my father’s knee and become a part of the picture,
even though I am in it. I can’t in other words look out at the room from my place on the
chair. How can that be a memory? And if it isn’t, what is it? When I think about my
childhood, that is invariably one of the first ‘memories’ to spring up, ready and waiting:
an untraumatic, slightly-moving picture. It never crossed my mind to notice the anomalous
point of view until I was middle-aged. Before then it went without saying that it was a
‘real’ memory. Afterwards, it became an indicator of how false recollection can be. (2012:
12)
The scene Diski describes is recalled from what’s known as an ‘observer perspective’. In
this external visual perspective, Diski views herself in the remembered scene. For Diski, the
falsity of this memory stems solely from this ‘anomalous point of view’. In all other respects
the memory is accurate: her father’s appearance; the layout of the flat―a fact which she even
verified in adulthood; and the phenomenology of the mental image is such that it presents as a
memory, not merely imagination. The only reason Diski doubts this memory is that she is
recalling the episode from an external visual perspective. As we will see, the allegedly
‘anomalous point of view’ of observer perspectives if often taken to show that such memories
simply cannot be genuine.
In this chapter we discuss the phenomena of perspectival memory. While surveying the
field, we suggest that visual perspective alone is not a guide to the truth or falsity of memory,
and that genuine memories can be recalled from an observer perspective. Such memories can
satisfy conditions placed on genuine memory. Observer perspectives can satisfy factivity
constraints, and can stand in appropriate causal connections to the past. In the first section we
identify the phenomena and provide an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to
point of view in personal memory. We articulate some doubts about remembering from an
observer perspective, before responding to these worries. We suggest that observer
perspectives may retain other forms of internal imagery: there is no neat division between
internal and external perspectives. We suggest that external perspectives may help in
understanding the past, and question the primacy of egocentricity.
2. Field and observer perspectives
The imagery involved in remembering past episodes in one’s life often involves visual points
of view. When we recall a past event we usually adopt the same perspective that we had at the
time of the original experience. We see the scene as we originally saw it from a first-person or
‘field’ perspective. Sometimes, however, we recall the past event from an external visual
perspective, from a position we didn’t occupy at the time of the original episode. In such cases
we view ourselves in the remembered scene, as from a third-person ‘observer’ perspective.
Nigro and Neisser conducted the first systematic experimental studies on visual perspective in
memory, and their terms ‘field’ and ‘observer’ memories became part of the vocabulary of
memory studies.
Since Nigro and Neisser’s paper, empirical research has produced a number of
consistent findings concerning these differing points of view. The field perspective is more
common. Observer perspectives are more common, though, in certain circumstances. One
robust empirical result is that observer perspectives are more common for older memories, such
as memories of childhood (Nigro and Neisser 1983). Observer perspectives are also more
common for events that involve a high degree of emotional self-awareness (Nigro and Neisser
1983; Robinson and Swanson 1993). Field perspectives seem to be related to remembering the
emotional details, feelings, or psychological states associated with an event; in contrast,
observer perspectives tend to include less sensory and affective detail but more information
related to concrete, objective details (Nigro and Neisser 1983; McIsaac and Eich 2002; Rice
2010).
Another study looking at emotion and visual perspective in memory found that although
there was no difference in reports of emotional intensity between field and observer
perspectives, when subjects switched from a field to an observer perspective there was a
resulting decrease in reported emotional intensity. There was no corresponding change in
emotional intensity, however, when switching from an observer to a field perspective
(Robinson and Swanson 1993; see also Rice 2010: 233-234).
This last point also suggests that these visual perspectives in memory are not fixed. In
Robinson and Swanson’s (1993) study, participants recalled an event from a particular
perspective (eg field), and sometime later recalled the same event from the alternate perspective
(eg observer). However, evidence indicates that one can often switch between perspectives
within a single episode of remembering a past event. That is, remembering a past event may
involve adopting not just a field or an observer perspective, but may involve adopting both
perspectives in the same retrieval attempt (Rice and Rubin 2009).
Even if the term ‘perspective’ bears a visual bias, it refers more generally to the range
of imagery or ‘standpoints’ in distinct modalities that informs one of one’s body, the world, or
even other perspectives (Behnke 2003: 52). There are many different kinds, domains, and
modes of ‘perspective’. Perspectives can be cognitive, embodied, emotional, or evaluative in
nature; they occur in many domains, including imagination, perception, and memory; and they
can be first-, second-, or third-personal. These distinct perspectives and forms of perspective
stand in many different relations to each other. By initially insisting on such distinctions
between different kinds, domains, and modes of perspective, we can then investigate their
coexistence, fusion, integration, and coordination.
The distinction between field and observer perspectives in episodic memory is
paralleled in other cognitive domains: in imagination (eg Vendler 1979; Walton 1990;
Williams 1973; Wollheim 1984); in dreaming (eg Cicogna and Bosinelli 2001; Rosen and
Sutton 2013; Windt 2015). Even in the domain of spatial cognition one can adopt points of
view that are internal or external to the subject. Spatial information can be processed and
communicated from egocentric (route or embedded) points of view and allocentric (extrinsic
or survey) perspectives. In fact, just as an episodic memory may involve both field and observer
perspectives, spatial information is often interpreted and conveyed by integrating and blending
these distinct points of view (Tversky 2011).
3. Remembering from an observer perspective: truth and authenticity
In most studies on visual perspective in memory, the observer perspective is simply taken as
one particular instance of remembering a past event. These studies do not normally question
the authenticity of such memories in which one sees oneself from an external perspective. Some
psychologists studying the phenomena of point of view in memory are interested in the
question of whether, as a matter of fact, more observer perspectives than field perspectives tend
to be false. This is quite distinct from the question of whether there can in principle be genuine
or veridical memories in which one adopts an observer perspective.
We saw that Diski casts doubt on her childhood observer perspective memory solely
because of its anomalous point of view. But if one takes oneself to be remembering, and one is
accurately representing some past event in all aspects other than occupying the original point
of view, what motivates the claim that such representations are not ‘real’ memories?1 Why
would an external perspective entail a false memory? Diski seems to assume an idea which is
also apparent in some philosophical work, the idea that memory should preserve the content of
perception. In perception one sees an event unfold from a particular point of view. And because
memory preserves the content of perception, the remembered event should be recalled from
the same point of view one had at the time of the original experience.
The idea that memory exactly reproduces a past experience seems to put pressure on
the status of observer perspectives as genuine memories. Since ‘remember’ in relevant senses
1
Context and pragmatic considerations change the goals and functions of remembering. Whether one is testifying
in a court of law or reminiscing round the dinner table affects how we think about the truth of a memory. See
Sutton (2003), Campbell (2014), Harris et al. (2014).
is typically used as a success word, memory implies truth: this is a factivity constraint on
remembering. On the view we are here describing, truth in memory is taken to require
duplication of the past. But observer perspectives are not duplicates of the past event, because
they present the event from an ‘anomalous’ point of view. Thus, on this line of thought,
observer perspectives cannot appear in genuine remembering. On such a preservationist view
genuine memories should be recalled from a field perspective.
Yet this cannot be the whole picture. It is possible to accept the factivity constraint on
memory, yet deny that memory involves strict preservation; a degree of change may still be
compatible with truth. This is a point accepted, for example, by Sven Bernecker, a moderate
preservationist: ‘Memory implies truth, but it does not imply that the memory content is an
exact duplicate of the past thought content. Sometimes memory allows for moderate
transformations of the informational content’ (2008: 155).
Further, the preservationist account of memory is itself called into question by
reconstructive models of memory, which emphasise the flexible and dynamic nature of
remembering (eg Schacter and Addis 2007). For Bartlett, who conducted pioneering work on
reconstruction in memory, ‘Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless
and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the
relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions or experience’
(1932: 213). But construction in memory should not be equated with error or invention:
malleability is not in itself unreliability (Barnier et al. 2008). Memories can be influenced,
‘worked over’, constructed, compiled, and still be functional, faithful, accurate, true.
A broadly preservationist line of thought lies behind Richard Wollheim’s rejection of
the possibility that I might see myself in a (genuinely) remembered scene. Wollheim claims
that ‘would require that I be represented as from the outside, but the fact that it is an event
memory forbids this, for this isn’t how I experienced myself in the course of the event’ (1984:
103).2 Zeno Vendler articulates a similar worry: ‘one cannot remember seeing oneself from a
different perspective simply because it is impossible to have seen oneself from an outside
perspective’ (1979: 169, original emphasis). And, Vendler explains, this conclusion simply
follows from the truism that ‘one cannot remember doing something that one has not done’
(1979: 170).
On such views, because one did not (indeed cannot) see oneself from an external
perspective at the time of the original experience, one cannot have a memory in which one sees
oneself from an external perspective: one cannot recall from an observer perspective. But
perhaps this is to set an unrealistic standard for what a genuine observer perspective in memory
would have to be—a requirement of having visually perceived oneself during the original
event. We suggest, in contrast, that in order to ‘see’ oneself in memory from an observer
perspective, one does not need to have visually perceived oneself from an external perspective
at the time of the original event. Even if we grant that one cannot see oneself from an external
perspective, one can still have a memory in which one ‘sees’ oneself from an external
perspective.
This point is nicely made by Dominic Gregory:
my own observer memories do not involve its seeming to me that things once looked to
me the ways that the visual mental images show things as looking; I do not seem to be
recalling episodes in which I somehow saw myself. Rather, they involve its seeming to me
that there were once past scenes in which I played a certain part and which looked―‘from
2
On Wollheim’s conception, event-memory as a species of memory for events that one experienced is closely
related to episodic memory. Wollheim stresses that it is an exaggeration to say that in event-memory one must
remember the event exactly as one experienced it. Rather, in a genuine memory one should broadly remember the
event as one experienced it (Wollheim 1984: 103-104). But these broad limits to the mnemonic content must not
include ‘gross deviations’, which include ‘structural deviations, or deviations in identity’ (1984: 103). The
external visuospatial representation of the self in observer perspectives would, on his view, amount to such a
deviation. In response, we suggest that observer perspectives need not involve structural deviations or deviations
in identity.
somewhere’ rather than ‘to someone’―the ways that the visual mental images show things
as looking. (2011: 2)
Discussing the impact of present context on the content of memory, Peter Goldie argues
that what one now knows, thinks, or feels may infuse the memory of a past event. For Goldie,
the content of memory can be influenced at the point of retrieval by present knowledge and
emotion. He tells us that ‘in effect, I remember it as I now feel it’ (2012: 52). According to
Goldie, observer perspectives are more likely to occur when there is an epistemic, emotional,
or evaluative gap―what Goldie terms a triply ironic gap―between past and present. In other
words: what one now knows, thinks, and feels, is different to what one then knew, thought, and
felt. It is the (ironic) gap that opened between the past and the present that affords the possibility
of a memory from an observer perspective.
Goldie provides the example of remembering drunkenly singing at the office party:
feeling at that time a ‘heady delight’ but now shamefully realising that his colleagues were
laughing at him and not with him. For Goldie such a memory will typically be recalled from
an observer perspective: ‘I can see myself now, shamefully making a ridiculous fool of myself
in front of all those people, getting up on the table and gleefully singing some stupid song’
(2012: 52). Importantly though, ‘field episodic memories―memories of what happened “from
the inside”―can also be infected with irony, with what one now knows, and how one feels
about what one now knows’ (Goldie 2012: 52).
That both field and observer perspectives memories involve constructive elements is a
point acknowledged by Dorothea Debus (2007). Debus also argues that observer perspective
memories are consistent with a causal theory of memory: observer perspectives can maintain
an appropriate causal connection to the past. Debus argues that, despite the external visual
perspective of observer memories, the information involved in such imagery has its source in
the original experience. For Debus, the shift in point of view between the original perceptual
experience and the subsequent observer memory results from a systematic modification of the
spatial information available at the time of encoding. Spatial information available at the time
of the original experience—and hence appropriately causally connected to the past—is
systematically manipulated into an observer perspective image. This seems to be the case for
Jenny Diski’s memory, in which spatial relations between the elements of the remembered
scene appear to be maintained through the shift in visuospatial perspective.
Nonetheless, a further related preservationist argument may be levelled against
observer perspective memories. Even if it is accepted that perfect preservation is unrealistic, it
could be claimed that memory should still broadly preserve the content of a past perceptual
experience. Aspects of the original perceptual content may be lost from the memory―memory
degrades with time and forgetting is natural―but nothing should be added to the content of a
genuine memory. In just such a moderate departure from strict preservationism, Bernecker
argues that ‘In the process of remembering, the informational content stored in traces may stay
the same or decrease (to a certain degree); but it may not increase’ (2008: 164).3
An argument against observer perspective memory can then be formulated thus:
genuine memory involves only content that was available at the time of the original experience.
Observer perspectives seem to involve a representation of the self that was not available at the
time of perception. Therefore observer perspectives involve additional content and cannot be
genuine memories.
3
This idea reflects a distinction in psychology between errors of omission and errors of commission. When
memory fails it can do so by way of either errors of omission―typically errors of forgetting or memory failures,
or errors of commission―when details are remembered that were not part of the original event. Errors of
commission are often called false memories, in which one ‘falsely remembers details, words, or events that weren’t
actually experienced’ (Intraub & Dickinson 2008: 1007).
One response to this argument is to urge that genuine memory can be generative.
Kourken Michaelian argues that on a (re)constructive model of memory new content can be
generated. According to Michaelian:
The generation of new content occurs when memory produces content in addition to that
which it took as input; this can occur either before retrieval, by means of transformation
of content received from other sources, or at retrieval, by means of transformation of
content stored by memory. (2011: 324).
Memory processes allow that new content can be added to genuine memory. Therefore, even
if observer perspectives have an additional representation of the self they can still count as
genuine memories. In a recent paper, Bernecker (2015) addresses visual memory and the extent
to which its content can differ from the content of a previous perception. Bernecker discusses
the possibility that observer perspectives may be counted as genuine cases of inferential
memory. Inferential memory is ‘remembering with admixture of inferential reasoning
involving background knowledge or fresh evidence’ (Bernecker 2010: 77). For example, one
may see a particularly beautiful bird in the park without knowing what type of species it is.
Being something of an amateur ornithologist, one then consults one’s book on Australian birds
and finds out that the bird was a Kookaburra. In saying that one remembers seeing a
Kookaburra one is inferentially remembering, because one did not know it was a Kookaburra
at the time of the original experience (adapted from Malcolm 1963: 223; Bernecker 2010: 25).
Non-inferential memory does not involve such inferential reasoning.4 Importantly, and in line
with Michaelian’s proposal for generative memory, Bernecker holds that ‘While non-
4
Non-inferential and inferential memory are sometimes referred to a ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ memory respectively.
Bernecker finds these labels unfortunate because they imply that inferential memory is somehow inferior even
though it is a pervasive form of memory (2010: 25). Nonetheless, Bernecker’s analysis of memory (2010)
concentrates predominantly on non-inferential memory.
inferential memory allows only for the decrease of information, inferential memory also allows
for the increase or enrichment of information’ (2015: 457).
Bernecker writes:
Should observer memories count as genuine memories? The main reason to answer in the
negative is that observer memories contain information that wasn’t available to the subject
at the time of the original representation. But then all inferential memories are admixed
with inferential reasoning involving background knowledge or fresh information. What, if
anything, distinguishes observer memories from other inferential memories? To not count
observer memories as inferential memories it would have to be shown that the fresh
information contained in observer memories is false or unreliable. However, there is no
evidence to suggest that memories from the observer-perspective are any less reliable than
memories from the field-perspective. (2015: 461)
Bernecker suggests that the main difference between field and observer perspectives lies in
their emotional content and concludes that ‘given that memories from the observer-perspective
are not less reliable than memories from the field-perspective I see no reason to not count them
as instances of inferential memory’ (2015: 461-462). Observer perspectives are therefore
permissible as inferential memories because such memory allows for the generation of content.
But even if observer perspectives can be classed as genuine (inferential) memories, and
hence not outright false memories, they are sometimes still taken to be examples of ‘distorted
memories’ (e.g., De Brigard 2014; Fernández 2015).5 Again, the thought is that because the
event remembered did actually happen the memory is not false, and the factivity condition is
satisfied; but because that event is remembered from an observer perspective, and so the
5
De Brigard says that distorted memories ‘present the remembered content in a somewhat distorted way, that is,
as a distortion of the content encoded during the original experience’ (2014: 160). Fernández distinguishes two
types of distorted memories corresponding to ‘storage’ (preservationist) and ‘narrative’ (reconstructivist)
conceptions of memory. The former is important in this context: ‘On the storage conception of memory, a subject’s
faculty of memory has produced a distorted memory when the content of that memory does not match the content
of the subject’s past experience on which the memory originates’ (Fernández 2015: 539).
content of the memory is different from that of perception, the memory is distorted. This
understanding reflects a distinction Bernecker appeals to between truth and authenticity: ‘a
memory state must accord not only with objective reality but also with one’s initial perception
of reality’ (Bernecker 2010: 214). For Bernecker, a moderate preservationist, genuine (noninferential) memory must satisfy both conditions―truth and authenticity (2010: 39). We
suggest that observer perspectives need not be considered distorted memories. Observer
perspectives can satisfy both truth and authenticity conditions.
How can observer perspectives accord with one’s initial perception of reality? We
suggest that observer perspectives may be constructed in part from external perspectival
information available during perception. Emotions, thoughts, and images which are
experienced during the original episode may be used in the construction of observer perspective
memories of the past event. Even though these experiences are internal, they can involve
adopting an external perspective on oneself. Recall that observer perspectives are more
common for events that involve a high degree of self-awareness. We suggest that during such
emotionally charged events, one’s literal (visual) perspective is internal, but one may adopt an
external thoughtful or emotional perspective on oneself. And it is from this ‘external’
perspectival information that observer perspectives can be constructed.
During perceptual experience an agent may make use of both egocentric and allocentric
spatial information. Observer perspective memories may be constructed from this nonegocentric information available at the time of encoding. Mohan Matthen tells us that:
Field-perspective memory presents scenes in egocentric terms—how they look through the
eyes of the observer. Observer-perspective memory is in allocentric terms: it is an
expression of observer independent spatial relations in the remembered scene…Now, we
know that visual perception incorporates both forms simultaneously…In view of this,
many cognitive scientists hypothesize that visual content contains allocentric information
as well—perhaps we have a map or model stored away in visual memory. The point to
take from easy switching between field and observer perspectives is that in episodic
memory, the egocentric and allocentric forms are somehow separated out and expressed
in two different, alternating perspectives. (2010: 13)
In most cases one attends to egocentric visual information available during a perceptual
experience. But non-egocentric perspectives are available during perceptual experience too,
and sometimes one’s attention is focused on this non-egocentric information.6 These different
perspectives provide different information on the same scene: they provide different ways of
thinking about the same episode. Distinguishing episodic from semantic memory, Mark
Rowlands remarks that ‘What is distinctive of episodic memory is the way in which facts are
presented: they are presented by way of experiences. And these experiences, in turn, are
presented as ones that the subject had at the time of the episode’ (2009: 337). We suggest that
field and observer perspectives involve different ways of thinking about the same past event,
presenting the same event in different ways. They involve different forms of information that
are both available at the time of encoding (see also McCarroll and Sutton 2016).
Rowlands suggests that in observer perspectives ‘you may well be accurately
remembering the episode itself…However, you do not accurately remember the experiences
that presented the episode in its occurrence. You seem to be remembering visual experiences
that you could not have had’ (2009: 340-341). In contrast, we suggest that observer
perspectives can be both true and authentic: they can both represent an event that occurred and
the experiences occurring at the time of the event. Further, not only can observer perspectives
make use of allocentric information that was available at the time of the original experience:
such memories can also maintain perspectival information in distinct modalities. In this way
6
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into detail on how non-egocentric information may be constructed
into an observer perspective. For a fuller exposition, including a discussion of the cross-modal translation of nonvisual to visual information, see McCarroll (2015).
observer perspectives may accurately represent the experiences (kinaesthetic, emotional, even
imaginative) that one had during the original event, and that are recalled in genuine episodic
memory.
4. The plurality of perspectives
In many cases of memory imagery, one may adopt an external visual perspective and yet
maintain an internal perspective in relation to other embodied, emotional or cognitive
modalities. Yet there is often, albeit implicit, an exclusive association between kinaesthetic,
embodied, or emotional imagery and an internal visual perspective. This is coupled with the
parallel position that an external visual perspective is (necessarily) isolated from such forms of
embodied imagery (Vendler 1979; Williams 1973). In this section we discuss the complex
relations between internal and external perspectives in distinct modalities.
Perspectival imagery need not be consistently either internal or external across all
modalities. An external visuospatial perspective on a past experience is compatible with an
internal embodied (kinaesthetic or emotional) perspective. We can underline the way different
perspectival modalities can thus come apart in memory by considering the parallel case of film.
In film, point of view (POV) shots represent the visual perspective of a character involved in
the action; even though they are removed from the domain of memory they may be roughly
analogous to a field perspective. It has been argued that such POV shots invite the viewer to
take up the position of a character in the narrative the film portrays, perhaps through imagining
from-the-inside, or empathising with the character (Messaris 1994: 33). The visual perspective
invoked in POV shots may sometimes thus invite the spectator to adopt, or empathise with, the
character’s perspective in other respects or modalities too: but this is not necessarily so. As
Murray Smith notes:
POV may be particularly effective in rendering how a character sees, and so enabling our
imagining from the inside how the character sees, but it is not particularly useful in
evoking, say, a character’s joy or humiliation or anxiety. Emotional simulation certainly
does not need a POV shot in order to be prompted. (1997: 418)
Consider POV shots that represent an evil or monstrous character in the film, stalking or
lying in wait for another character. In such cases, even though one shares or adopts the visual
perspective of the monster, say, one’s emotional and kinaesthetic perspectives may be far from
in harmony with that creature. One may feel the emotions of the individual the beast is
watching; one may feel the fear or terror of the victim rather than the excitement or bloodlust
of the fiend. Here, different perspectives can come apart: one shares the (internal) visual
perspective with one character, while at the same time not in any way sharing that character’s
affective perspective, and perhaps even adopting the external emotional perspective on that
character which is held by the victim. The point of view may be visually internal, as if one were
seeing the action through the eyes of one of the characters, but in other modalities―such as
emotional or kinaesthetic―one’s perspectives need not neatly align with those of that
character. This example shows us how a visual field perspective can be coupled with an
‘external’ emotional perspective.
One powerful and disturbing example of the divergence of perspectives within
cinematic point of view is found in Jonathan Demme’s Silence of the Lambs.7 In the concluding
sequence, Detective Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster) confronts the notorious serial killer ‘Buffalo
Bill’. We see Clarice, groping around in the pitch dark, wielding her gun but unable to see,
visibly shaking and terrified for her life; but we see her from the terrible ‘night goggles’
perspective of Buffalo Bill. We are visually aligned with the killer, we see Clarice from his
7
Thanks to Robert Sinnerbrink for this example.
point of view through the eerie green of lens he is wearing: yet our emotional and even
kinaesthetic perspectives are more aligned with Clarice: we feel her terror, her helplessness.8
One’s visual perspective on a remembered, imagined, or filmed scene can diverge from or align
with perspectives in other modalities: there is no simple internal/external dichotomy.
Sports psychology offers further indications of the multimodality of perspectives. There
is evidence that embodied imagery is not exclusively tied to an internal visual perspective.
Morris, Spittle and Watt tell us that:
Researchers have found that participants are able to form kinesthetic images equally well
with either [visual] imagery perspective…and more recent research even suggests that for
some tasks, kinesthetic imagery may have a stronger association with external [visual]
imagery than with internal imagery. (2005: 129-131)
This illustrates that an observer perspective in visuospatial imagery can be coupled with
internal kinaesthetic imagery. The tasks which are purported to have a stronger association with
external visual imagery are open rather than closed skills: football rather than darts, for
example. In open skills, the external environment (the position of other players, say) may have
an impact on successfully performing the action, and bodily form in movement may be
important. In these open skills egocentric and allocentric information are integrated.
Consider the following example in which the professional footballer Wayne Rooney
discusses his use of imagery in preparation for matches:
Part of my preparation is I go and ask the kit man what colour we’re wearing – if it’s red
top, white shorts, white socks or black socks. Then I lie in bed the night before the game
and visualize myself scoring goals or doing well. You’re trying to put yourself in that
moment and trying to prepare yourself, to have a ‘memory’ before the game. I don’t know
if you’d call it visualizing or dreaming, but I’ve always done it, my whole life … when
8
The scene can be viewed here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQZYz7qR0Fo
you get older and you’re playing professionally, you realize it’s important for your
preparation – and you need to visualize realistic things that are going to happen in a game
(Winner 2012; see also Sutton 2012).
This ‘memory before the game’ appears to involve Rooney visualising himself
performing from an observer perspective: note his attention to external details such as the
colour of the kit. Rooney is using external visual imagery to prepare for professional football
matches. As part of his preparation, Rooney cultivates internal kinaesthetic imagery which
coheres with his external visual imagery, such that internal and external perspectives fuse.
To return to autobiographical memory, in their 1897 survey of earliest recollections
Victor and Catherine Henri note that observer perspective memories are common in memories
from childhood. But they suggest that while such memories present a visual representation of
oneself as a child they are in a sense distanced from any internal feeling accompanying the
memory:
A large number of responses contain the same affirmation about the way that rememberers
see themselves in memory: they see themselves as children, they do not feel themselves
children, they have a representation in which a child appears, and they know that they are
that child: “I see myself in sickness like someone who is outside of me.” “I’m at the
seashore and my mother is holding me upon her arms; this scene appears to me as though
I were far away from it.” Such are the observations that are found in many of the
responses.9
Observer perspectives may tend to involve less emotion or embodied imagery: but this is not
necessarily so, as the following response from the Henris’ survey demonstrates:
9
The Henris’ 1897 paper in French was partly translated in the American journal Popular Science Monthly in
1898. Our quotations are from the complete translation by Nicolas et al. (2013: 370).
I had the croup when I was 12 months old, and they had to burn all the lumps in my throat.
I have a very clear visual image of the scene; I distinctly see four people holding me down
by force, laid out on one side; what I see most of all is the scorching brazier where two red
irons are heating until they are red-white; right now, I still seem to feel that burning iron
approaching my lips. (2013: 370, original emphasis)
On one reading of this passage, it is a memory recalled from an observer perspective: the
respondent sees him or herself in the scene, being pinned down to receive the gruesome
treatment. But the memory is also infused with kinaesthetic and, perhaps, emotional elements.
The memory articulates the external visual perspective as well as the simultaneous emotional
and embodied perspectives: it evokes the fear of the searing heat as well the sense of danger
looming towards the subject, invading personal space.10
So not all the features or qualities that are experienced from-the-inside are lost in the
observer perspective. Visual, emotional, kinaesthetic, and other embodied perspectives may
come apart: there is a plurality of perspectives (Sutton 2010). If we consider that ‘neither affect
or kinaesthesis need be determined by visual perspective, or even inevitably follow it, we make
room for a range of relations between these distinct modalities to operate in different contexts’
(Sutton 2014: 143).
The plurality of perspectives is not only restricted to embodied, experiential or
emotional imagery. As Goldie (2012) argues, it may also involve cognitive or evaluative
perspectives on the past which may be either internal (reflecting considerations at that time) or
external (bearing knowledge that was not available in the past). These cognitive or evaluative
perspectives may or may not align with visual perspective in personal memory: there is no neat
internal/external divide.
10
Arguably the ambiguity between a field and an observer perspective inherent in this description points to the
fact that both types of memories can be emotional.
The view we discussed above that genuine autobiographical memories can only involve
field perspectives reflects the thought that egocentric perspectives are natural and primary. One
example of this tendency to favour egocentricity can be seen in a study on the use of drawings
as a means of lie-detection. Aldert Vrij and colleagues argue that people who draw a
remembered scene truthfully are likely to sketch it from an internal perspective, as if from a
shoulder-mounted camera, while ‘liars’ will draw it as from an overhead or external vantagepoint. Truth-tellers use more direct phrases, phrases such as ‘I saw’ that imply direct perceptual
experience, while ‘liars are more likely to convey indirect, hypothetical knowledge (eg ‘I would
see …’)’ (Vrij et al. 2010: 588). The authors hypothesise that this distinction will hold for
scenes that participants draw, either
From a ‘shoulder camera’ (observer) position, where someone sketches what she/he could
actually see, or from an ‘overhead’ (actor) position, where someone sketches the location
as it could be seen from the air. The former is more direct and likely to be the result of
actual first-hand experience than the latter, which ‘removes’ the participant from the scene.
We thus predicted that more truth tellers than liars would sketch the drawing from a
shoulder camera position. (Vrij et al. 2010: 588)
Yet this way of thinking arguably misses the ordinary mingling of route (internal, field) and
survey (external, observer, overhead) perspectives in spatial cognition.11
We argued above that we think about, process, and communicate spatial information
from both egocentric and allocentric perspectives. Indeed, work on spatial cognition calls into
question any notion of egocentric primacy: ‘The primacy of egocentric perspective has been
11
While Vrij et al. did find that ‘significantly more truth tellers (53%) than liars (19%) sketched the drawing from
a shoulder camera position’ (2010: 592), nonetheless almost half of the truth tellers drew the scene from the
‘anomalous point of view’ said to characterize liars. Indeed, we doubt that an ‘own-eyes’ point of view is
intrinsically tied to reality. In a study on point of view in spontaneous waking thought, observer perspective
thoughts were more likely to be memory reports, whereas field perspective reports included more fantasies such
as seeing ‘a slice of ham hovering in space’ (Foulkes 1994: 682).
challenged by research showing that rats, monkeys, and people on first encountering an
environment immediately form multiple representations of space, in particular, allocentric
representations’ (Tversky & Hard 2009: 124). In studies demonstrating how we often naturally
adopt another’s spatial perspective as a means to improve action understanding, Tversky and
Hard conclude that ‘the deep meaning of embodied cognition is that it enables disembodied
thought’ (2009: 129). The mind is not always bound by limitations of the physical world.
We suggest therefore that external perspectives offer another way to interpret the world.
The intermingling of the multiple internal and external perspectives that one can adopt when
remembering provides a way of understanding the past that goes beyond a purely egocentric
point of view.
This intermingling of perspectives is seen in the anthropologist Bradd Shore’s (2008)
research on memory work at long-running annual religious camp meetings at Salem. At these
camps, older adults spend time watching the younger campers engage in a range of activities:
bible readings, sports, and arts and crafts:
Over time at camp meeting, people come to watch their kids doing exactly what they did.
This effects an alternation between field and observer memories and a kind of blurring that
allows campers to ‘participate’ in the lives of their offspring at the same moment as they
gain reflexive distance… In its subtle orchestration of memories of doing and of watching
over time, Salem provides perfect conditions for the fusion of observer and field memory;
conditions that ultimately inform narrative expression and create a powerful sense of
identification in ‘family’ over the generations. (Shore 2008: 114)
This blurring of perspectives is a fusion that affords a greater degree of understanding of the
past. It may take a mix of internal and external perspectives to fully understand and appreciate
a past event.
5. Conclusion
The imagery of personal memory involves a plurality of perspectives. In remembering the past,
we can adopt a range of viewpoints, internal and external, visual and non-visual, which can
fuse or integrate in various ways. Even in the present moment we have ways of getting outside
ourselves. Remembering from an observer perspective, from an external visual point of view,
is but one way we have of thinking about and understanding our past. Sometimes adopting an
external point of view can help put the past in perspective.
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