Is Dysfunctionality of Swiss Direct Democracy Possible

Swiss Political Science …, 2003

Scandinavian Political Studies, 1999

The aim of this article is to analyze the explanations for the increased number of referendums in Western European states. Bogdanor has explained this by the unfreezing of political alignments and institutions. After classifying referendums in 18 Western European states, it will be observed that especially the number of referendums introduced by citizens has increased wherever they are constitutionally provided, that is, in Italy and in Switzerland. Referendums in these two countries contribute most of the overall increase in the number of referendums in Western Europe. Moreover, the number of referendums concerning European integration have increased, also in states that do not have the referendum as an integral part of their political system. When it comes to the unfreezing of institutions, it must be pointed out that after the 1970s there have been no constitutional reforms which would have signi¢cantly increased the use of referendums.

unige.ch

Despite the emphasis put on the consensus-building capacity of the Swiss decision-making system, the institutional mechanisms favoring compromise are still little explored. In this contribution we develop a simple model of the determinants of conflict and consensus that accounts for both conflict-conducive factors such as an act's importance and consensusfacilitating practices, such as pre-parliamentary consultation procedures. Our results based on data from the 1995-99 legislature show that consensus among the parliamentary elite strongly facilitates the adoption of an act in the referendum phase, whereas the effects of preparliamentary procedures are more ambiguous and vary depending on the phases of the decision-making process. 1 The authors would like to acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no 5004-058512). We also would like to thank Max Bergman (SIDOS), Thomas Christin, Fabrizio Gilardi and Simon Hug for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. The data-gathering for this study would not have been possible without the help of experts of Swiss politics and numerous officials in the Swiss administration and parliamentary services as well as Michael Hermann (University of Zurich) and our colleague Sandra Villiger. We express our gratitude to them.

Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 2007

This paper describes institutions of direct democracy between 1997 and 2003 in 26 Swiss cantons (states), specifically the statutory initiative and referendum, the constitutional initiative, and the fiscal referendum. In particular, it discusses their applications, but also the legal requirements for making use of them, including the signature requirements, the time available for their collection, and the financial thresholds. Optional and mandatory forms of these direct-legislative institutions are distinguished. This paper also provides calculations of the index and sub-indices of direct democracy for the additional years 1997 to 2003, in continuation of Stutzer (1999), using the identical methodology. Extending Trechsel and Serdült (1999) and Stutzer (1999) this paper includes the political institutions of the so-called Landsgemeinde cantons. Description of these institutions is based on the author"s reading of 26 cantonal constitutions in their versions between 1997 and 2003. JEL-codes: H11; H73; K19; H40; H72; N40; D70; I31

This paper studies voting behavior in national referendums in Switzer-land, more concretely what motivates voters to vote counter to the vote recommendations issued by the Swiss federal government. Defining such an outcome variable allow comparative analyses of referendum voting across referendums and countries. For this purpose, I use the full cumulation of the VOX post-referendum surveys that cover 245 national referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 2010. These surveys contain information on respondents' voting behavior, their personal characteristics as well as referendum-specific information. I present initial results and discuss possible extensions.

2003

Despite the emphasis put on the consensus-building capacity of the Swiss decision-making system, the institutional mechanisms favoring compromise are still little explored. In this contribution we develop a simple model of the determinants of conflict and consensus that accounts for both conflict-conducive factors such as an act's importance and consensusfacilitating practices, such as pre-parliamentary consultation procedures. Our results based on data from the 1995-99 legislature show that consensus among the parliamentary elite strongly facilitates the adoption of an act in the referendum phase, whereas the effects of preparliamentary procedures are more ambiguous and vary depending on the phases of the decision-making process.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008

Direct democratic decision-making has often been associated with populism, irrationality, and oppression of minorities as it requires allegedly "cognitive overstrained" citizens to decide on complex political issues often brought forward by special interest groups. The usage of popular initiatives in particular in the State of California seems to provide conclusive evidence for all of these shortcomings. Due to its constitutional arrangement and its diverse structure, Switzerlandwhich historically served as a blueprint for introducing instruments of direct democracy at the statelevel during the progressive area in the United States-offers a unique case to assess these claims: More than half of the world's referenda held at the national level during the 20 th century have taken place in Switzerland. At the same time, the Swiss Federal Constitution provides for limited constitutional review only, excluding Federal statutes and international law from judicial control. Based on the lessons from the Swiss experience, this paper argues not only for a more realistic approach to popular decision-making but for a more differentiated understanding of the general term "direct democracy" by pointing at the often neglected importance of the interface between institutions of direct and indirect democracy. At the same time, it cautions against simplistic demands for "popular constitutionalism". In sum, this paper champions what I call an interactional model of direct democracy.

Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne

55 Joanna Marszałek-Kawa : Comments on the Issue of the Institution Poland is not Switzerland. Despite numerous assurances from Polish political elites and citizens' expectations, the quality of Polish democracy, particularly of political debate, which is full of negative emotions, is far from this model. Th ere is a popular saying in the Polish language: "to work like a Swiss clock". It refers to conscientiousness when it comes to fulfi lling one's duties. Other qualities that come to our minds when we think of Swiss people are: accurate, thorough, diligent, inquisitive, reliable, methodical, careful, and punctual. All these personal traits are not specifi c to Polish people, though. For Poles it is always too early until it is too late (Malaparte, 2004). We are totally diff erent nations. Th ese diff erences concern not only the standard of living, the way professional obligations are treated, customs, religiousness, and the political system, but also the way the idea of the common good is defi ned and built. It does not change the fact that each time we talk about the institution of a referendum in Poland, we always seek analogy to Swiss constitutional solutions (Sarnecki, 1978). It is obvious that what is the foundation and undoubted value of the democratic system is citizens' right to directly participate in the exercise of state authority. It is refl ected not only in their right of legislative initiative (Jabłoński, 2002; Eckhardt, n.d.) or the people's veto, which is stipulated in some national laws, e.g., in Switzerland. Under this law, proper entities (citizens) have the right to object to an act that is due to enter into force. It is also materialised in the form of electoral laws-stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws, 1997)-implemented during elections and in the institution of a referendum (Linder, 1996). institution of a nationwide referendum using the example of the referendum of 6 September 2015. We also discuss the history of this institution in Poland and address the issue of its legal foundations, as well as present arguments of the followers and opponents of this form of direct democracy. It is also necessary to analyse the motives behind the initiating entity's decision concerning the organisation of a nationwide referendum from a broader perspective and to evaluate its implications in the sphere of politics.