Role and Position of Bulgaria and Romania in the Black Sea Region

2017 V. INTERNATIONAL BLUE BLACK SEA CONGRESS PROCEEDING The Congress has been funded by BAPKO (Marmara University) Bu Kongre Marmara Üniversitesi BAPKO tarafından finance edilmiştir. Proje No: SOS-L-120516-0230 Edited by Prof. Dr. Alaeddi Yalçı kaya Asst. Prof. Dr. Arzu Al Dr. Hakan Mehmetcik Marmara Üniversitesi Yayın No: 849 V. INTERNATIONAL BLUE BLACK SEA CONGRESS PROCEEDING Editors Prof. Dr. Aleaddin YALÇINKAYA, Asst.Prof. Dr. Arzu AL, Dr. Hakan MEHMETCIK, E-ISBN: 978-975-400-407-6 Marmara University Press Copyright ©Mart 2017 i The Congress has been funded by BAPKO (Marmara University) Bu Kongre Marmara Üniversitesi BAPKO tarafından finance edilmiştir. Proje No: SOS-L-120516-0230 ii V. BLUE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS THE BLACK SEA POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REGIONAL SECURITY 12-13 December 2016 Marmara University, Anadoluhisarı Campus BESYO Congress Hall Honorary President Prof. Dr. Mehmet Emin Arat Marmara University, Rector Organizing Committee Prof. Alaeddin Yalçınkaya - General Coordinator, Chair of the Department of International Relations Prof. Nurşin A. Güney - Vice President, Wiseman Center for Strategic Studies Prof. Atilla Sandıklı - President, Wiseman Center for Strategic Studies Prof. Hasret Çomak- Istanbul Arel University Asst. Prof. Arzu Al - General Coordinator, Marmara University Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erhan Doğan, Marmara University Assoc. Porf. Vişne Korkmaz, Yıldız Technical University Asst. Prof. Gonca Oğuz Gök, Marmara University Asst. Prof. Şükrü Yazgan, Marmara University Hakan Mehmetcik, Marmara University Ali Murat Kurşun, Marmara University Ferit Belder, Marmara University iii Scientific and Advisory Board Prof. Recep Bozlağan, Vice Rector, Prof. Mehmet Akalın, Vice Rector, FPS Dean, Marmara University, Marmara University, Turkey Turkey Prof. Ahmet Demirel, Vice Dean, Prof. İlter Turan, Bilgesam Wise Men Marmara University Board Member, Turkey Prof. Ayşegül Sever, Marmara Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, Bilgesam University, Turkey Wise Men Board Member, Turkey Prof. Esra Hatipoğlu, Rector, Prof. Çelik Kurtoğlu, Bilgesam Wise Nişantaşı University, Turkey Men Board Member, Turkey Prof. Ramazan Gözen, Marmara Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Marmara University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Çigdem Nas, Yıldız Teknik Prof. Nuray Bozbora, Marmara University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Fuat Keyman, Sabancı Prof. Mensur Akgün, İstanbul Kültür University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, İstanbul Prof. Mehmet Özkan, Marmara Bilgi University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Ramazan Özey, Marmara Prof. Uğur Yozgat, Marmara University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Yusuf Şahin, Karadeniz Teknik Prof. Tayyar Arı, Uludağ University, University, Turkey Turkey Prof. Alexandre Shaidatovich Prof. Mert Bilgin, Istanbul Medipol Kadyrbaev, Oriental Institute, Russian University, Turkey Academy of Sciences, Russia Prof. Nejat Doğan, Erciyes University, Prof. Zerrin Toprak Karaman, Dokuz Turkey Eylül University, Turkey Prof. Hüseyin Emiroğlu, Kırıkkale Prof. Sergey Barisoviç Drujulovski, University, Turkey Moscow State Instıtute of International Relations, Russia Prof. Ensar Nişancı, Namık Kemal Prof. Erhan Büyükakıncı, Galatasaray University, Turkey University, Turkey Prof. Stephen Larrabee, RAND, USA Prof. Pekka Korhonen, Yjveskhyla University, Finland Prof. Daniel Smilov, Sofia University , Prof. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Princeton Bulgaria University , USA Assoc. Gregory Simons, Uppsala Prof. Elman Nasırov, Azerbaijan State Centre for Russian and Eurasian University, Azerbaijan Studies, Sweden Assoc. Prof. Emel Parlar Dal, Assoc. Prof. Nail YılmazMarmara Marmara University, Turkey University, Turkey Assoc. Prof. Emre Erşen Assit. Prof. Behlül Özkan iv TABLE OF CONTENTS SUSTAİNABİLİTY AND RESİLİENCY ARE KEY TO LONG-TERM GEOPOLİTİCAL AND GEOECONOMİC REGİONAL STABİLİTY ……………………………………………………………1 ELLEN WASYLİNA, PRESİDENT, THE INTERNATİONAL GEOSTRATEGİC MARİTİME OBSERVATORY .............................................................................................................................................. THE ROLE OF THE UNİTED STATES İN CURRENT WORLD POLİTİCS ........................................ 14 PROF. PEKKA KORHONEN, UNİVERSİTY OF JYVASKYLA, FİNLAND .................................. THE OBAMA ADMİNİSTRATİON’S RESPONSE TO NEW MODEL GREAT POWER RELATİONS AND US REFLECTİON ON THE ENGAGEMENT POLİCY TOWARDS CHİNA .............................. 23 PROF. SUİSHENG ZHAO, UNİVERSİTY OF DENVER, USA ...................................................... RUSSİA İN UKRAİNE’S QUAGMİRE: DROWNİNG OR COMİNG THROUGH? ................................ 38 DR. ANNA MATVEEVA, KİNGS COLLEGE LONDON, UK......................................................... AN OFFENSİVE REALİST ACCOUNT OF RUSSİA’S FOREİGN POLİCY İN THE BLACK SEA REGİON ....................................................................................................................................................... 55 ASST. PROF. ASLI KELKİTLİ, ISTANBUL AREL UNİVERSİTY ................................................. THE EFFECT OF ENERGY ON RUSSİAN FOREİGN POLİCY ........................................................... 66 SABRİ AYDIN, KARAMANOĞLU MEHMETBEY UNİVERSİTY................................................. GEOPOLİTİCAL IMPORTANCE OF EURASİA BLACK SEA REGİON AND ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCY .............................................................................................................................. 72 MELEK M. IBRAHİMOĞLU, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .............................................................. AN EVALUATİON FOR THE FUTURE OF CONTAİNER TRANSPORT İN THE BLACK SEA ........ 81 ASSOC. PROF. SONER ESMER, DOKUZ EYLÜL UNİVERSİTY ................................................. DATA MİNİNG İN STRUCTURAL ANALYSİS OF INTERNATİONAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANİES AND REFLECTİONS FOR INTERNATİONAL RELATİONS ............................................................... 90 PROF. MEHMET ÖZKAN, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY, ASST. PROF. LEVENT BORAN, NİŞANTAŞI UNİVERSİTY................................................................................................................ RUSSİAN HEGEMONY İN BLACK SEA AS A CYBER POWER; DATA OF 2015-2016 CYBER WAR .. 110 VAHİT GÜNTAY, KARADENİZ TECHNİCAL UNİVERSİTY ..................................................... NATİONALİST MOVEMENTS İN THE RUSSİAN FEDERATİON AND ITS PERİPHERY: A DEBATE OVER IGOR GİRKİN (STRELKOV) ........................................................................................ 121 ASST. PROF. UTKU YAPICI, ANDAN MENDERES UNİVERSİTY ............................................. THE ANALYZİNG OF RUSSİAN FEDERATİON-UKRAİNE CONFLİCT İN THE CONTEXT OF SECURİTİZATİON THEORY .................................................................................................................. 130 DR. SELİM KURT, GİRESUN UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................. THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATİONAL POLİTİCAL ECONOMY ON CENTRAL BANKİNG POLİCY MAKİNG ...................................................................................................................................................... 143 ASST. PROF. DR. ARZU AL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................................ BURCU ÖZDİL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................... EUROPEAN UNİON NEİGBORHOOD POLİCY AND İTS EFFECTS ON GLOBAL SECURİTY .... 151 EMRE ERDEMİR, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................................................ EVALUATİON OF MUTUAL RELATİONS AMONG EUROPE-RUSSİA AND UK FROM POLİTİCAL ECONOMY PERSPECTİVE ...................................................................................................................... 158 ASST. PROF. ARZU AL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................... ELSON LALA, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................................... ORGANİZATİON OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMİC COOPERATİON İN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL EVENTS: EVALUATİON İN TERMS OF INTERNATİONAL POLİTİCAL ECONOMY ..... 167 v PROF. ALAEDDİN YALÇINKAYA, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .................................................... MUSTAFA ÇELİK, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................................................ INFLUENCE OF CHİNA'S RİSE İN CENTRAL ASİA SİNCE 2000S: AN ANALYSİS FROM REALİST AND LİBERALİST PERSPECTİVES ........................................................................................................ 178 ASSOC. PROF. EMEL PARLAR DAL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................. DOVLETGELDİ MYRADOV MYRADOV, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ......................................... ANALYSİS OF MIKTA COUNTİRES İN TERMS OF DEVELOPMENT .............................................. 190 ASST. PROF. GONCA OGUZ GOK, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................... BÜŞRA KILIÇ, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................................... TURKEY’S CONTRİBUTİON AND POSİTİON İN THE GLOBAL SECURİTY GOVERNANCE .... 200 ASSOC. PROF. EMEL PARLAR DAL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................. AHMET OZAN GÖKÇE, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY...................................................................... MIKTA VE KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİM ......................................................................................................... 212 ASST. PROF. GONCA OGUZ GOK, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .................................................... TUĞÇE CEYDA DURGUN, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................................. A THEORETİCAL OVERVİEW OF RİSİNG POWERS’ HUMANİTARİAN DİPLOMACY ................ 223 ASSOC. PROF. EMEL PARLAR DAL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................. NİLAY TUNÇARSLAN, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................... RUSSİA, AS A GLOBAL ACTOR : RUSSİA'S ENERGY POLİCY AND ENERGY DEPENDENCY TO THE RUSSİA ............................................................................................................................................... 234 ASST. PROF. ARZU AL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................... AHMET SİNDİRAÇ, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY............................................................................. THE RELATİONS BETWEEN AZERBAİJAN AND ARMENİA SİNCE THE FORMATİON OF THE OSCE MİNSK GROUP ............................................................................................................................... 244 PROF. ALAEDDİN YALCİNKAYA, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .................................................... AHMET DEMİR, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................. BANDWAGONING STRATEGY AND FREE-RIDER SEEKING: THE CASE OF AZERBAIJAN ...... 252 DR. FAZLI DOĞAN, SELÇUK UNİVERSİTY ................................................................................. THE STRATEGİC IMPORTANCE OF BLACK SEA İN CHİNA’S ONE ROAD ONE BELT INİTİATİVE ................................................................................................................................................ 264 DOÇ. DR. SONER ESMER, DOKUZ EYLÜL UNİVERSİTY ......................................................... THE EU’S NEW NEİGHBORHOOD POLİCY AND TURKEY-EU RELATİONS ............................... 274 ASST. PROF. ZELAL KIZILKAN, MARTİN ARTUKULU UNİVERSİTY ..................................... ROLE AND POSİTİON OF BULGARİA AND ROMANİA İN THE BLACK SEA REGİON ................ 280 DR. ASLIHAN ANLAR, KOCAELİ UNİVERSİTY .......................................................................... THE CRİSİS OF INTERNATİONAL VALUES AND REGİONAL SECURİTY: TURKİSH RUSSİAN CONFLİCT İN TURBULENCE OF ARAB SPRİNG ............................................................................... 293 PROF. RAMAZAN GÖZEN, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ................................................................ HOLD YOUR FRİENDS CLOSE, BUT YOUR ENEMİES CLOSER: TESTİNG THE TETHERİNG STRATEGY OVER RUSSİA AND TURKEY RELATİONS...................................................................... 306 ASST. PROF. ERDEM ÖZLÜK, SELÇUK UNİVERSİTY................................................................ THE ROLE OF AKKUYU İN RUSSİA-TURKEY ENERGY RELATİONS: IS IT A STRATEGİC INVESTMENT OR A STRATEGİC BLİNDNESS? .................................................................................. 320 DR. AZİME TELLİ, 19 MAYIS UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................. AN EVALUATİON ON THE POTENTİAL IMPACTS OF “CHANNEL ISTANBUL” PROJECT ON MONTREUX CONVENTİON: A GEOPOLİTİCAL MİSTAKE İN THE BLACK SEA? ............................ vi ASST. PROF. BÜLENT ŞENER, KARADENİZ TECHNİCAL UNİVERSİTY TARİHSEL SÜREÇTE KALKINMA ANLAYIŞI VE BU BAĞLAMDA MIKTA ÜLKELERİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ ........................................................................................................................... 349 YRD. DOÇ. DR. GONCA OGUZ GÖK, MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ ............................................ IDEATİONAL SETTİNGS OF THE JDP FOREİGN POLİCY AND THE EU: ROMANTİCİSİM VS FORMALİSM .............................................................................................................................................. 359 ASST. PROF. DR. ZUHAL M. UZUNER, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ........................................... REGİONAL CRİSİS AND CONFLİCT MANAGEMENT AFTER THE RUSSİAN INVASİON OF CRİMEA: THE CASE OF CRİMEAN TATARS ........................................................................................ 372 ASSOC. PROF. SEZAİ ÖZÇELİK, ÇANKIRI KARATEKİN UNİVERSİTY .............................. 372 POST-CRİMEA BLACK SEA: CHANGİNG GEO-POLİTİCS AND STRATEGİES .................................... KATERYNA PAİUK, ODESSA I.I.MECHNİKOV NATİONAL UNİVERSİTY MOVİNG AWAY FROM THE WEST OR NORMALİZATİON OF RELATİONS? COMMENTS ON TURKEY-RUSSİA RAPPROCHMENT ..................................................................................................... 387 ASSOC. PROF. ÇİĞDEM ÜSTÜN, ................................................................................................... THE IMPACT OF TURKİSH-RUSSİAN NORMALİZATİON PROCESS TO SECURİTY OF THE BLACK SEA ................................................................................................................................................. 396 PROF. KAMER KASIM, BOLU ABANT IZET BAYSAL UNİVERSİTY ......................................... CURRENCY CYCLES AND THEİR IMPACT ON GEORGİA-TURKEY TRADE RELATİONS......... 406 PROF. MİKHEİL TOKMAZİAHVİLLİ, TBİLİSİ STATE UNİVERSİTY ...................................... IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATİONAL POLİTİCAL ECONOMY, THE COMPARİSON OF IBSA COUNTRİES AND TURKEY .................................................................................................................... 421 ASST. PROF. ARZU AL, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................... NUR ASLAN, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ......................................................................................... BLACK SEA SOCİO-ECONOMİC GROWTH AND NEW COOPERATİON STRATEGİES ................ 434 ASSOC. PROF. YÜKSEL DEMİRKAYA, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ............................................. POWER, ECONOMİC INTERESTS AND IDEATİONAL ATTRACTİON: A THEORETİCALLY HETEROGENEOUS APPROACH İN UNDERSTANDİNG TURKEY’S FOREİGN POLİCY İN THE EARLY AKP-ERA ........................................................................................................................................ 438 ISMAİL E. SULA, BİLKENT UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................... THE OBAMA ADMİNİSTRATİON AND THE USA’S USE OF FORCE: SAME METHOD, SİMİLAR INSTRUMENTS ......................................................................................................................................... 451 MEHMET T. ÇAĞLAR, IŞIK UNİVERSİTY .................................................................................... MİNİMUM WAGES İN TURKEY AND UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATİON: AN ANALYSİS ..... 463 ASSOC. PROF. UTKU ALTUNÖZ, SİNOP UNİVERSİTY ............................................................. TÜRKİYE’DE ASGARİ ÜCRET, IŞSİZLİK VE ENFLASYON ILİŞKİSİNİN: VAR ANALİZİ ............. 463 ASSOC. PROF. MUZAFFER KOÇ, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ...................................................... STOCK EXCHANGES COOPERATİON AMONG THE MEMBERS OF BSEC ................................... 490 YASEMİN UĞUR ÇAM, MARMARA UNİVERSİTY ....................................................................... TURKEY AS REGİONAL ENERGY HUB: TURKİSH STREAM AND OTHER PROJECTS ............... 498 BY DR.SERGİY KORSUNSKY........................................................................................................... RECONSİDERİNG THREATS AND OPPORTUNİTİES İN A CHANGİNG BLACK SEA SECURİTY ENVİRONMENT:A VİEW FROM UKRAİNE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 501 DR. YEVGENİYA GABER, ODESSA NATİONAL MECHNİKOV UNİVERSİTY ....................... vii Role and Position of Bulgaria and Romania in the Black Sea Region Dr. Aslıhan Anlar, Kocaeli University Abstract The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union led to important changes in the Black Sea Region; three more countries (the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Georgia) emerged and these countries with Bulgaria and Romania entered into a political and economic transformation period. During these processes, the Russian Federation was in attempt to reestablish her sphere of influence over the post-Soviet countries. At the same time, a new development occurred outside the Region: the NATO enlargement and then EU enlargement. This dual enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions expanded towards to the Black Sea Region in the second decade of the post-Cold War period. Within the framework; Romania and Bulgaria among others started to establish relations with the NATO and the European Union and managed to become member states. As countries which had located in the Soviet sphere of influence, then entered into the European Union and joined NATO Alliance; Romania and Bulgaria have a specific positions in the Black Sea Region. They with Turkey have been neighbor to a giant state, the Russian Federation and countries in her Near Abroad. Their positions towards Russian Federation and their policies –either revisionist or pro-status quo have been effective in competitive stances of great power towards the Black Sea Region. In this study, Romanian and Bulgarian integration process into the Euro-Atlantic institutions and transformation of their policies towards the Region; which are parallel to each other; and its effect on security are aimed to be laid down in four parts (during the Cold War, the first decade (1991-1999), (2000-2014), after 2014) with a specific attention to the Romanian engagement into missile shield system. Keywords: Romania, Bulgaria, membership process, missile shield system, sphere of influence Özet Soğuk SКvКşıЧ ЛТtТЦТ vО SovвОtlОr BТrlТğТ’ЧТЧ НКğılЦКsı öгОllТklО KКrКНОЧТг BölРОsТ’ЧНО öЧОЦlТ НОğТşТЦlОrО вol КхЦıştır. BölРОвО üх вОЧТ ülkО (RusвК FОНОrКsвoЧu, UkrКвЧК vО GürМТstКЧ) НКСК ОklОЧЦТş vО Лu ülkОlОr RoЦКЧвК vО BulРКrТstКЧ ТlО ЛОrКЛОr sТвКsТ vО ОkoЧoЦТk НöЧüşüЦ sürОхlОrТЧО РТrЦТşlОrНТr. Bu НöЧüşüЦ sürОхlОrТЧО pКrКlОl olКrКk RusвК FОНОrКsвoЧu Нış polТtТkКНК НК ОskТ SovвОt МoğrКПвКsıЧНКkТ ülkОlОrТ kОЧНТ ОtkТ КlКЧıЧК sokЦКвК хКlışЦКktКвНı. AвЧı гКЦКЧНК ЛölРОЧТЧ НışıЧНКЧ ЛölРОвО вöЧОlТk вОЧТ ЛТr РОlТşЦО, NATO РОЧТşlОЦОsТ vО НКСК soЧrКsıЧНК НК AB РОЧТşlОЦОsТ РüЧНОЦО РОlЦОktОвНТ. Bu хОrхОvОНО RoЦКЧвК vО BulРКrТstКЧ НТğОr НОvlОtlОrlО ЛОrКЛОr NATO vО AB ТlО ТlТşkТlОr kurНu vО ОЧ soЧ 2007 AB üвОlТklОrТвlО ЛütüЧlОşЦО sürОхlОrТ tКЦКЦlКЧЦış olНu. EskТНОЧ SovвОtlОr BТrlТğТ’ЧТЧ ОtkТ КlКЧıЧНКkТ ülkОlОr Soğuk SКvКş’ıЧ ЛТtТЦТЧТ tКkТЛОЧ 16 sОЧОНО AB vО NATO üвОsТ olКМКk kКНКr НöЧüşüЦ РОхТrЦТştТ. Bu öгОllТklОrТ ТlО ТkТ ülkО KКrКНОЧТг BölРОsТ’ЧНО öгОl ЛТr koЧuЦК sКСТptТrlОr. TürkТвО’вlО ЛОrКЛОr RusвК FОНОrКsвoЧu’ЧК vО oЧuЧ ВКkıЧ кОvrОsТ olКrКk kКЛul ОНТlОЧ/tКrtışılКЧ ülkОlОrТЧ koЦşusu olКrКk; RusвК’вК kКrşı stКtüko вКЧlısı вК НК rОvТгвonist polТtТkКlКrı 2000’lОrНОЧ soЧrК ЛölРОНО РörülОМОk Лüвük НОvlОtlОr ЦüМКНОlОsТЧНО СОЦ ОtkТlОЧЦТş СОЦ НО Лu sürОМТ ОtkТlОЦТştТr. Bu хКlışЦКНК RoЦКЧвК vО BulРКrТstКЧ’ıЧ ЛütüЧlОşЦО sürОхlОrТ vО Лu sürОхtО polТtТkКlКrıЧıЧ РОхТrНТğТ НОğТşТЦ vО ЛuЧuЧ ЛölРОНОkТ НüгОЧО ОtkТsТ Нört ЛölüЦНО ТЧМОlОЧОМОktТr: Soğuk SКvКş НöЧОЦТ, 1991-2001, 2002-2013 vО 2013 soЧrКsı НöЧОЦ. KırıЦ’ıЧ ТşРКlТвlО ЛКşlКвКЧ sürОхtО Лu ТkТ ülkОЧТЧ tutuЦ vО polТtТkКlКrıЧК ЛКkılКМКktır. Bu sürОхtО öгОllТklО RoЦКЧвК’ЧıЧ ABD ПüгО sКvuЧЦК sТstОЦТЧО ОklОЧЦОsТ 1990’lКrНК RusвК’вК NATO tКrКПıЧНКЧ vОrТlОЧ tККССütlОrО НОğТЧТlОrОk ОlО КlıЧКМКktır. Ana Kelimeler: RoЦКЧвК, BulРКrТstКЧ, üвОlТk sürОМТ, ПüгО kКlkКЧı sТstОЦТ, ОtkТ КlКЧı 280 Introduction After end of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; Romania and Bulgaria among others started to establish relations with the NATO and the European Union and managed to become member states. Thus, they experienced an exchange of blocs and transformation of their domestic political and economic systems, accordingly their foreign policy. Therefore their domestic transformation and its reflections on their foreign policy in the Black Sea Region during the Cold War and after the Cold War should be looked into to understand effects of harmonization or splits of policies of a dominant state and its partner state on the order of a Region. In this study, first of all political and economic transformation of Romania and Bulgaria during the Cold War is to be looked into in brief; and then their integration process into the Euro-Atlantic institutions are to be laid down. At the end, change of their policies towards the Region and its effect on status-quo of the Black Sea region will be discussed. Romania and Bulgaria during the Cold War On the eve of the Cold War, the general environment of the Region was determined by the Soviet efforts to establish the Eastern Bloc with the Eastern and Central European countries. This period began during WW II, when these countries were invaded first by Germany and then by the Soviet Union to end the German occupation. Then, the left-wing coalitions in these countries were replaced by Communist Party governments, other parties and politicians were totally discharged and the economic, social and political systems were re-designed according to the Soviet model,1 that will be looked into this process in the following sub-sections: Military Relations of Romania and Bulgaria with the Soviet Union In 1949, the Soviet Union had signed twenty-year bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Bulgaria and Romania. As pointed out by Glenn E. CurtТs, tСОsО trОКtТОs “proСТЛТtОН tСО EКstОrЧ EuropОКЧ МouЧtrТОs ПroЦ ОЧtОrТЧР ТЧto rОlКtТoЧs аТtС СostТlО ДМouЧtrТОs to] tСО SovТОt UЧТoЧ, oППТМТКllв ЦКНО tСОsО МouЧtrТОs Кs SovТОt КllТОs”2 and legitimized Soviet military presence in those countries. During the Stalin period, Soviet control over East European military was widespread. Mark Kreamer also verified the existence oП tСТs sТtuКtТoЧ, Лв МoЦЦОЧtТЧР tСКt “tСО EКst EuropОКЧ КrЦОН ПorМОs аere little more than an ОбtОЧsТoЧ oП tСО SovТОt КrЦОН ПorМОs.”3 The East European states and the Soviet Union signed the Warsaw Pact Treaty- the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in May 1955, thus their alliance system was institutionalized. Curtis asserted that the Soviet Union used the Warsaw PКМt Кs К tool Пor suЛorНТЧКtТЧР tСО EКst EuropОКЧ stКtОs’ КrЦТОs uЧНОr SovТОt МoЧtrol. AПtОr tСО Hungary Revolution in 1956, Khrushchev tried to strengthen the position of the Soviet Union and began to transform the Warsaw Pact into a military tool, preventing defections in the future.4 The Prague spring 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia also showed that one of the missions of the Warsaw Pact was to keep the East European communist party regime in power. After the crisis in Czechoslovakia, as a reaction to it, the Brezhnev doctrine was announced, declaring tСКt tСО EКst EuropОКЧ МouЧtrТОs СКН “lТЦТtОН” sovОrОТРЧtв to ЛО ОбОrМТsОН КЧН ТП tСО FКСТr ArЦКoğlu, 20. Yüzвıl SТвasТ Tarihi, AlkıЦ KТtКЛОvТ, İstКЧЛul: 1983, pp. 525-529. “TСО АКrsКа PКМt”, Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, edited by Glenn E. Curtis, Federal Division of the Library of Congress, Washington DC: 1992, www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/WarPact.html, (accessed on 04.03.2011). 3 MКrk N. KrКЦОr, “CТvТl- MТlТtКrв RОlКtТoЧs ТЧ tСО АКrsКа PКМt: TСО EКst EuropОКЧ CoЦpoЧОЧt”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984-1985, p.55. 4 Curtis, op. cit. Warsaw Pact 1 2 281 Communism/Socialist Commonwealth was threatened, the Soviet Union had the right to protect and define communism by all means, including intervention. Within this framework, Bulgaria had a harmonious position with the Soviet Union but Romania pursued policies challenging the Soviet Union. In 1958, Romania demanded the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from its country; reduced its participation in the Warsaw Pact, including joint exercises, refused to allow Warsaw Pact forces to cross or conduct exercises within its territory and stopped sending its army officers to Soviet military schools for higher education.5 Finally, Romania reasserted full national control over its armed forces and military policies and found non-bloc sources of armament; gradually established her own arms industry.6 After 1989, in all the Eastern European countries, demonstrations and the collapse of the Communist governments (the so-called velvet revolutions) took place, and the USSR did not follow Brezhnev Doctrine policy towards these countries. The Soviet Union did not intervene there as it had in 1956, 1968 and 1981. During this term, Gorbachev announced the end of the Brezhnev doctrine or socialist internationalism regarding his Soviet client states.7 While all Warsaw member states started to establish non-Communist governments, Moscow did nothing. After the collapse of the Communist governments in the Warsaw Pact member states, the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was dissolved (on 1 July 1991, in Prague) after 36 years. Economic Relations of Romania and Bulgaria with the Soviet Union After WW II, during the 1948-1953 period, the political and economic systems of all the Eastern European countries changed and were reconstructed according to the Soviet model, especially the Stalinist pattern. Romania pursued an extensive economic development model and started its socialist economic transformation, closely imitating the Soviet precedent. 8 The manufacturing, mining, banking, insurance and transportation industries were all nationalized, a State Planning Commission was established, and the collectivization of agriculture was begun in 1948 and completed in 1965.9 According to Walter M. Bacon, the economic priorities of the first decade of Romanian Communist Party rule were typically Stalinist: rapid multilateral industrialization, capital accumulation and the exploitation of labour.10 In Bulgaria, according to Patrick Moore, three basic components of a socialist economy (but in the Stalinist model) were dictated to Bulgarian Communists: the establishment of the institute for Centralized Planning, the collectivization of agriculture (completed by 1958) and the development of heavy industry.11 The first five year plan was begun in 1949. Industrialization was started despite lack of natural resources, skilled labour and technology in Bulgaria.12 Natural resources and equipment were come from the Soviet Union, but with a steep price;13 thus dependency of the country increased with industrialization. 5 Curtis, op. cit. Warsaw Pact. Ibid. 7 Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F.Hopkins, The Cold War, Palgrave, New York: 1983, p. 154 8 АКltОr BКМoЧ, “RoЦКЧТК”, Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Terasa Rakowska- Harmstone, Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1984, p. 169. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 PКtrТМk MoorО, “BulРКrТК”, Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Terasa Rakowska- Harmstone, Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1984 p. 203. 12 Ibid., p. 204. 13 EЧМвМlopОНТК oП tСО NКtТoЧs, “TСО FТrst FТvО ВОКr PlКЧs”, BulРКrТК CouЧtrв StuНв, ОНТtОН Лв GlОЧЧ E. Curtis, Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1992, http://www.country-data.com/cgibin/query/r-1939.html, (accessed on 25.03.2011). 6 282 After Khrushchev came to power in 1956, he inaugurated a new economic program in Eastern Europe aiming at integration through multilateral institutions – COMECON. The COMECON Charter (1960) explicitly foresaw a Division of Labour and Co-ordination of Economic Plans as the principal means of successfully developing and extending International Socialist Division of Labour.14 This framework made food processing, agriculture, chemical fertilizers and small electrical equipment were giveЧ to BulРКrТК’s rОspoЧsТЛТlТtв Пor РrОКtОr East European trade and Bulgaria had great export obligations to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in the late 1950s.15 RoЦКЧТК, oЧ tСО otСОr СКЧН, rОjОМtОН MosМoа’s division of labour and economic integration policies, which relegated Romania to the role of supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials for the more industrially developed members.16 Instead, Romania continued to pursue the Stalinist way of development.17 The West also supported Romania, supplying technological and economic assistance.18 Romanian trade partners began to change and by 1964, nearly 40 percent of Romania's imports and almost one-third of its exports were conducted with the West.19 When Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the West was supplying almost half of the machinery and technology needed to build a modern industrial base.20 Despite this, Romanian trade with the COMECON countries remained an important amount till 1980. In 1971, the COMECON Member countries except Romania, adopted the Comprehensive Program for Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development of Socialist Economic Integration.21 According to the Program, all member states restructured their economies, gave more importance to industry, transportation, communication and material-technical supplies and reduced their funds allocated to the agricultural sector.22 During this term, all Eastern European countries were dealing with high debt to the Western institution as a result of trade deficits.23 Bulgaria managed to eliminate trade deficits and debts with considerable help from the Soviet Union.24 This provided better leverage for the USSR and made it more influential over East European countries, except Romania. “TСО COMECON CСКrtОr 1960”, trКЧs. Лв R. NötОl (GОЧОvК) ПroЦ tСО RussТКЧ, GОrЦКЧ КЧН Hungarian texts in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 15, 1960 cited by Michael Kaser, COMECON Integration Problems of the Planned Economies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, Toronto: 1965, p. 190. 15 “TСО FТrst FТvО ВОКr PlКЧs”, Bulgaria, op. cit., http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r1939.html, (accessed on 25.03.2011). 16 Encyclopedia of tСО NКtТoЧs, “RoЦКЧТК: A CouЧtrв StuНв”, ОНТtОН Лв RoЧКlН D. BКМСЦКЧ, GPO Пor the Library of Congress, Washington: 1989, http://countrystudies.us/romania/56.htm, (accessed on 03.04.2011). 17 Bacon, op. cit., p. 172 18 Ibid. 19 BКМСЦКЧ, “RomanТa: Countrв Studв”, op. cit., http://countrystudies.us/romania/56.htm, (accessed on 03.04.2011). 20 Ibid. 21 “COMECON- TСО CouЧМТl Пor MutuКl EМoЧoЦТМ AssТstКЧМО”, ОНТtОН Лв GlОЧЧ E. CurtТs, АКsСТЧРtoЧ DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1992, http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/CMEA.html, (accessed on 12.08.2012). 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 PКul MКrОr, “EКst EuropОКЧ EМoЧoЦТОs: AМСТОvОЦОЧts, ProЛlОЦs, ProspОМts”, Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Terasa Rakowska- Harmstone, Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1984, p. 322. 14 283 Romania was among the first countries to establish economic relations with the Western industrial countries. She became a member of Western economic organizations such as the GATT, the International Finance Corporation and the International Monetary Fund. 25 While she managed to develop her own industrial complexes in various sectors, she faced serious balance-of-payments crises in 1981.26 After 1983, Ceausescu refused to seek additional loans from the IMF or the World Bank and severely curtailed imports and maximized exports, but this led to a serious reduction in the quality of life.27 After 1985, Gorbachev decided to use the COMECON to realize his economic plans under the perestroika. According to David Mason, Gorbachev based his economic revitalization plan on high technology and investment in new equipment.28 In 1985 COMECON Moscow Summit (Extraordinary 41st Council Session), the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technological Progress up to the Year 2000 was adopted and ratified in 1986.29 After 1987, aММorНТЧР to MКsoЧ, MosМoа аКs “МКllТЧР oЧ tСО EКst EuropОКЧs to МoЧsТНОr rОПorЦs Кs аОll.”30 AЦoЧР tСО EКstОrЧ EuropОКЧ МouЧtrТОs, MКsoЧ КssОrtОН tСКt “BulРКrТК КЧН (surprisingly) Czechoslovakia have accepted the Soviet challenge and have begun their own process of reform. The East Germany and Romania have, for different reasons, resisted the prОssurО to ТЧТtТКtО НoЦОstТМ rОПorЦ.”31 Romania resisted the introduction of Gorbachev style reforms32 until Ceausescu was forcibly removed from the office in 1989. The economic reform and restructuring process and implementation of long-term Program was ended with 1989 revolutions in the Eastern European countries and the COMECON dissolved in 1991. Political Relations of Romania and Bulgaria with Soviet Union During the Cold War, the Soviet Union managed to constitute an international mechanism within the Eastern Bloc which enabled her to intervene in political developments in the Eastern European countries by establishing loyal governments in these countries. Christopher Jones Кlso КrРuОН tСКt “SovТОt ТЧПluОЧМО ТЧ EКst EuropО НОpОЧНs oЧ SovТОt МoЧtrol ovОr КppoТЧtЦОЧts to tСО uppОr ОМСОloЧs oП tСО EКst EuropОКЧ pКrtв lОКНОrsСТp”33 and she prevented empowerment of local Communists.34 After the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, other political factions and pre-1945 parties were eliminated.35 After the Communist triumph in Romania, members not loyal to Moscow, including Ana Pauker and Luca were purged from the Party. 36 Gheorghiu-Dej was a strong Stalinist who held party leadership on the basis of his Stalinism; therefore, Soviet influence had been very high in Romania at that time. After 1947, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was established and it managed to eliminate all institutionalized opposition groups by 1948. In 1949, Vernon V. AspaturiКЧ, “EКstОrЧ EuropО ТЧ АorlН PОrspОМtТvО”, Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Terasa Rakowska- Harmstone, Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1984, pp. 30-31. 26 Marer, op. cit., p. 324. 27 EЧМвМlopОНТК oП tСО NКtТoЧs, “RОtТrОЦОЧt oП tСО ForОТРЧ DОЛt”, RoЦКЧТК A CouЧtrв StuНв, ОНТtОН Лв Ronald D. Bachman, Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1989, http://www.countrydata.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11208.html, (accessed on 24.03.2011). 28 DКvТН S. MКsoЧ, “GlКsЧost, PОrОstroТkК КЧН EКstОrЧ EuropО”, International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 432 29 Curtis, COMECON, op.cit. 30 Mason, op.cit., p. 434. 31 Ibid., p. 437. 32 Ibid, p. 445. 33 Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact, Praeger, New York: 1981, p. 1. 34 Ibid. 35 Bacon, op. cit., p. 168. 36 Ibid., p. 169. 25 284 Valko Chervenkov -“lТttlО StКlТЧ”- became the new leader of the BCP and managed to outmaneuver local Communists37 through intense party purges (disqualifying nearly 100,000 of the 460,000 Bulgarian communists).38. In foreign relations, he pursued policies very similar to those of the Soviet Union to the extent that it was claimed that there was no such thing as Bulgarian foreign policy.39 AПtОr StКlТЧ’s НОКtС, ТЧ BulРКrТК, Chervenkov was replaced by Zhivkov, especially ЛОМКusО oП “К sСТПt ТЧ SovТОt support to ГСТvkov.”40 Romania still remained in the Eastern Bloc but rejected the de-Stalinization process and looked for more autonomous foreign policy options. In order to reduce Soviet penetration in domestic affairs, they expelled the Soviet advisors on economic, political and security issues, terminated subordination of Romanian intelligence services to the KGB,41 liquidated Sovroms and pursued a foreign policy different from that of the Soviet Union.42 Till 1986, many leaders managed to preserve their position in their countries; this means that the Soviet Union leadership had pro-Soviet leaders in the Eastern European countries. However, the leader in the USSR changed and started to carry out new policies in economy and political arena. At the beginning of thО rОПorЦ proМОss, СО Кlso НОМlКrОН tСКt “tСО prТЧМТplО oП equality would henceforth govern relations between Russia and the East European states, and tСКt outsТНО ТЧtОrПОrОЧМО ТЧ tСОТr КППКТrs аoulН Чot ЛО tolОrКtОН.”43 This new Soviet stance gave the East European countries communist parties a clear message – relations between the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries were to be restructured. There was no longer any Soviet tank factor44 or Soviet financial support in order to prevent a change in the political system. This started new processes in these countries, ending with collapse of the regimes in 1989. Within this regional structure, there has been relative security in the Black Sea Region based on the preservation of status-quo and order in the Region. During the whole Cold War years until Gorbachev, within the given framework of the regional structure, the Soviet Union tried to preserve the status-quo. During the Cold War, for countries under the strict control of a dominant country such as the Eastern Bloc countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, they made no effort to regain their autonomy because of unbalanced power differences between the USSR and them. After 1953, Romania attempted to pursue policies different from the USSR but she could not escape from the Soviet system. For example, after the Sino-Soviet split, Romania opposed the economic and military integrative policies of the USSR. Romanian leadership visited France, did not directly oppose China and accepted a neutral position between China and the USSR. While opposing the existence of Soviet military personnel in other Eastern Bloc 37 Moore, op.cit., p. 195. EЧМвМlopОНТК oП tСО NКtТoЧs, “TСО EКrlв CoЦЦuЧТst ErК”, BulРКrТК CouЧtrв StuНв, ОНТtОН Лв GlОЧЧ E. Curtis, Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1992, http://www.country-data.com/cgibin/query/r-1979.html, (accessed on 24.03.2011). 39 Moore, op.cit., p. 206. 40 Ibid., p. 196 41 Bacon. op. cit., p. 173. 42 Ibid., pp. 173-176. 43 AЧКtolТТ CСОrЧТКОv, “GorЛКМСОv КЧН tСО RОuЧТПТМКtТoЧ oП GОrЦКЧв: PОrsoЧКl RОМollОМtТoЧs”, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991 a Retrospective, edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Frank Cass, Portland and London: 1994, p. 158. 44 AММorНТЧР to ToЦ G. PКlЦОr, ТЧ GorЛКМСОv pОrТoН, “tСО МoЦЦuЧТst lОКНОrs in Central Europe were tolН tСКt tСОв аoulН РОt Чo ПurtСОr support ПroЦ SovТОt tКЧks КЧН solНТОrs.”, ToЦ PКlЦОr, “АСв SoМТКlТsЦ CollКpsОН ТЧ EКstОrЧ EuropО”, CATO IЧstТtutО CoЦЦОЧtКrв, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-socialism-collapsed-eastern-europe, (accessed on 05.07.2013). 38 285 countries, Romania finally established diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1967. However, Romanian opposition against the USSR did not extend to withdrawing from the Eastern Bloc, so it can be defined as a friction rather than a split. Finally, as Walt points out, balancing or any other similar attempts were unwise for these countries because the Soviet Union was geographically very close, had more offensive capabilities than the sum of the capabilities of all of the Eastern Bloc states, was significantly more powerful than them and had the capacity and control system to make them obey.45 Therefore, they could only pursue bandwagoning policies with the Soviet Union. In those years from 1985 to 1991, all states in the Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union, were unsatisfied with what they had. In this way, the Soviet system and this regional structure was challenged and then dissolved. Relations with the European Union and the NATO 1991-1999 After the end of the Cold War, the European countries were engaged in the transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Union and signed the Treaty on European Union – the Maastricht Treaty – in December 1991. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, its non-Soviet members applied for EU membership. After their application, the EU Council decided to launch an enlargement process. In 1993, the EU announced the Copenhagen criteria for the full membership. Romania signed a trade and cooperation agreement with European countries in 1990, an association agreement in 1993, and formally applied for membership in 1995. When the first group of candidates was evaluated in 1997, the EU did not invite Romania, but she was invited with four other countries to begin negotiations in 1999. In contrast, Bulgaria, during period from 1990 to 1996, since she could not properly define her foreign policy priorities, tried to develop her relations with the West while taking care to keep her ties with the Russian Federation.46 Within this framework, Bulgaria signed trade agreements with European countries in 1990, then the EU Association Treaty in 1993, a Free Trade Agreement with EFTA countries (except Austria, Sweden and Finland) (World Bank, 1991) in 1994 and formally applied for the EU membership in 1995. According to the Europa World Plus Bulgaria Report, relationships between Bulgaria and the EU did not develop till 1997, when the Kostov government was established. 47 This РovОrЧЦОЧt rОlКбОН tСО polТМв oП МlosОЧОss аТtС RussТК, solvОН BulРКrТК’s НТsputОs аТtС MКМОНoЧТК КЧН RoЦКЧТК, КЧН trТОН to strОЧРtСОЧ BulРКrТК’s tТОs аТtС tСО EU. BulРКrТК СКs ЛООЧ placed on the list of applicants invited to begin membership talks at the meeting of EU leaders in Helsinki in 1999. Then the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was signed in 1999.48 Indeed, the EU put the integration of the Central European countries on its agenda during the first decade of the post-Cold War period; of the Eastern European countries during the second decade. The USA Policies and NATO Enlargements NATO’s rОlКtТoЧsСТp аТtС tСО CОЧtrКl КЧН EКstОrЧ EuropОКЧ МouЧtrТОs КЧН tСО SovТОt Union started with the London Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of NATO members in July 1990. With this announcement, NATO invited the governments of the Soviet UЧТoЧ, CгОМСoslovКkТК, HuЧРКrв, PolКЧН, BulРКrТК КЧН RoЦКЧТК “Чot just to vТsТt, Лut to StОpСОЧ АКlt, “AllТКЧМО ForЦКtТoЧ КЧН tСО BКlКЧМО oП АorlН OrНОr”, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, Spring 1985, p. 11. 46 MustКПК TürkОş, “GОхТş SürОМТЧНО Dış PolТtТkК нЧМОlТklОrТ: BulРКrТstКЧ нrЧОğТ”, TürkТвО’ЧТЧ KoЦşulКrı, ОНТtОН Лв MustКПК TürkОş КЧН İlСКЧ UгРОl, İЦРО ВКвıЧlКrı, AЧkКrК, 2002, pp. 192-193 47 Richard Crampton, History (Bulgaria), Europa World Plus, Routledge, London: 02 February 2012, http://www.europaworld.com/eng/bg.hi, (accessed on 06.02.2012) 48 TürkОş, op.cit., p. 197. 45 286 establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.”49 In December 1991 with the Rome declaration, NATO announced the adoption of a new Strategic Concept which envisaged a broader security understanding and invited these countries to broaden their relations and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established to serve as a forum for further cooperation and dialogue.50 In 1994, NATO under US leadership launched the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) which has been a major programme of bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries.51 Almost every Central and Eastern European county and former Soviet republics joined the programme. The National Salvation Front which ruled Romania till 1997 ЛОМКЦО К ЦОЦЛОr oП tСО NATO PПP ТЧ 1994, sТРЧОН tСО “StКtus oП ForМОs AРrООЦОЧt” ЛОtаОen NATO members and other PfP participants in 1995, КlloаОН NATO’s КТrМrКПt usКРО oП tСО МouЧtrв’s КТr spКМО Пor possТЛlО ЦТlТtКrв КМtТoЧ КРКТЧst ВuРoslКvТК ТЧ 1999. TСО BulРКrТКЧ РovОrЧЦОЧt, uЧlТkО RoЦКЧТК, СКН К “GorЛКМСОvТКЧ vТsТoЧ oП EuropОКЧ securitв”52 and preferred to preserve close relations with the Russian Federation and to take Russian concerns regarding the NATO enlargement into consideration. However, after the establishment of the NATO Russia Permanent Council in 1997, Russia reduced its opposition against NATO enlargement53 and in December 1997 Russia clearly expressed a positive attitude towards Bulgarian NATO membership.54 After that date, the Kostov government tried to strОЧРtСОЧ BulРКrТК’s rОlКtТoЧs аТtС NATO, КНoptОН tСО NКtТoЧКl ProРrКЦЦО for Preparation and Accession to NATO on 17 March 1997 and participated in the Stabilization Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and in the KFOR- the NATO Kosovo Force in 1999.55 In 1999 at the Washington Summit, Membership Action Plans (MAP) was signed with Bulgaria and Romania. Within this framework, the US established relations with the former Warsaw Pact and the post-Soviet states and pursued a strategy of integrating them into the world capitalist system. While doing this, she preferred to pursue a balancing strategy and tried to cooperate with Russia rather than to undermine her position in her sphere of influence, thus refrained from provoking Russia during this important transition process. Therefore, she limited her engagement with regional countries and left a free manoeuvre space for Russia in the former post-Soviet geography except the Baltic republics. As to the role of Bulgaria and Romania during this process, they were located in a grey zone. Romania was outside the Russian sphere of influence but not under European or US influence either because she was neither a NATO nor an EU member. Bulgaria was under considerable Russian influence. Therefore, they were not in a suitable position (in contrast to Turkey) to help extending the Western influence over the Region. As a result, they neither challenged nor supported Russian supremacy over the eastern part of the Region and Turkish “LoЧНoЧ DОМlКrКtТoЧ oЧ К TrКЧsПorЦОН NortС AtlКЧtТМ AllТКЧМО”, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4995/c900706a.htm, (accessed on 15.02.2012). 50 “PКrtЧОrsСТp Пor PОКМО ProРrКЦ”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm, (accessed on 24.09.2013). 51 Ibid. 52 DТЦТtКr BОМСОv, “FroЦ PolТМв-Takers to Policy Makers? Observations on Bulgarian and Romanian ForОТРЧ PolТМв ЛОПorО КЧН КПtОr EU AММОssТoЧ”, Perspective on European Politics and Society, Vol. 10, No. 2, 26 June 2009, p. 213. 53 TürkОş, op. cit., 199. 54 “ArО RussТК КЧН BulРКrТК FТЧКllв StКrtТЧР to Look Кt EКМС OtСОr Кs EquКl PКrtЧОrs”, The Sofia Echo, 12-18 February 1999 cited from Ibid. 55 “BulРКrТКNATO CСroЧoloРв oП KОв EvОЧts,” http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/bulgaria/chronology.htm, (accessed on 22.04.2013). 49 287 position on the Southern part of the Region and the Straits thus has an enhancing effect on preserving the status-quo in the Black Sea Region. Bulgaria and Romania after 2000 BulРКrТК КЧН RoЦКЧТК’s ЦОЦЛОrsСТp tКlks ЛОРКЧ Кt tСО 1999 HОlsТЧkТ MООtТЧР КЧН accession negotiations with them started on 15 February 2000. During the period from 2000 to 2007, Romania fulfilled many legislative and judiciary reforms. In December 2004, at the Brussels European Summit, closure of Negotiation was endorsed and in April 2005, the Accession Treaty was signed.56 Even though there were shortcomings in the reform process, Romania was accepted as member state in January 2007 with the Commission decision to ovОrsОО “sКПОРuКrН ЦОКsurОs КЧН trКЧsТtТoЧКl ЦОКsurОs, ПТЧКЧМТКl МorrОМtТoЧ oЧ EU ПuЧНs КЧН К МoЧtrol ЦОМСКЧТsЦ Пor tСО juНТМТКrв КЧН ПТРСt КРКТЧst МorruptТoЧ.”57 During accession talks, the EU offered many opportunities to Bulgaria; in turn, the Kostov government promised to close down nuclear power plants; two units in 2003 and two more units in 2006.58 Moreover, Bulgaria fulfilled economic responsibilities and the EU Commission report recognized Bulgaria as a functioning market economy in 2002. 59 Bulgarian efforts on issues of judicial reform and the fight against corruption was judged by the EU as chapters that needed further efforts but was sufficient for accession60 and Bulgaria became EU member on 22 January 2007. In November 2002, at the Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government formally invited Bulgaria and Romania along with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks with NATO.61 Accession protocols were signed in Brussels in March 2003.62 On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria and Romania officially became members of the Alliance. These countries also established bilateral military relations with the USA. She signed military cooperation and defence agreements with Bulgaria which enabled the US to open the Aitos Logistic Center (2005, close to the Black Sea), the Bezmer Air Base (2006) and to use the Graf Ignatievo Air Base.63 NATO forces were allowed to use the Novo Selo Range military base which is very close to the Black Sea.64 Romania and the US signed the agreement concerning the status of US military forces in Romania in 2001 and 200565 and an agreement allowing the stationing of certain elements (land- based inceptors) of the US Ballistic Missile Defence System within Romanian territory, at Daveselu Air Base in September 2011 66 and EuropОКЧ CoЦЦТssТoЧ, “RoЦКЧТК – EURoЦКЧТК RОlКtТoЧs”, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/romania/eu_romania_relations_en.htm, (accessed on 28.05.2012) 57 Ibid. 58 DТЦТtКr BОМСОv, “BulРКrТК’s PКtС to EU MОЦЛОrsСТp КЧН BОвoЧН,” Bulgaria and Europe Shifting Identities, edited by Stefanos Katsikas, Anthem Press, London, New York and Delhe: 2010, p. 123. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., p. 126. 61 “BulРКrТК КЧН NATO CСroЧoloРв oП KОв EvОЧts”, http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/bulgaria/chronology.htm, (accessed on 28.05.2012). 62 “A CСroЧoloРв oП RoЦКnia-NATO RОlКtТoЧsСТp”, Сttp://ааа.ЦКО.ro/ОЧ/ЧoНО/2131?pКРО=3, (accessed on 28.05.2012). 63 “MТlТtКrв BКsОs ТЧ BulРКrТК”, MТlТtКrвBКsОs.МoЦ, http://militarybases.com/overseas/bulgaria/, (accessed on 05.06.2013). 64 Ibid. 65 “LОРКl FrКЦОаork oП BТlКtОrКl RОlКtТoЧs”, EЦЛКssв oП RoЦКЧТК to tСО UЧТtОН StКtОs oП AЦОrТМК, http://washington.mae.ro/en/node/537, (accessed on 05.06.2013). 66 “RoЦКЧТК’s PКrtТМТpКtТoЧ ТЧ tСО MТssТlО DОПОЧМО SвstОЦ”, RoЦКЧТК MТЧТstrв oП ForОТРЧ AППКТrs, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2161, (accessed on 19.06.2013). 56 288 usage of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, the 34th Mechanized Brigade Base, Babadag and Cincu training areas, and the firing ranges in Smardan.67 During this period, after completion of their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, it could be seen that Bulgaria and Romania attached importance to the Black sea basin politics. When documents on security and foreign policy, endorsed by states are reviewed, it could be observed that policies regarding the Black Sea have been placing in both Romanian and Bulgarian agenda. For example, in the National Security Strategy of Romania (in 2007), after identifying main threats and other related issues; Romania offered herself as a “НвЧКЦТМ vector of security and prosperity in the Black Sea RОРТoЧ.”68 In its strategy, Romania underlined the importance of the Region and of building a climate of security and prosperity there and noted that “tСО strategic goal of our country is to give an impetus to the European and Euro-Atlantic involvement in the RОРТoЧ.”69 Countering various threats, tension and destabilizing factors was an essential responsibility of states neighboring the Black Sea, and a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Region was needed. Harmonizing and establishing efficient institutional cooperation was given as a priority for Romania, attaching importance to the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation, which was “КЧ initiative chiefly aimed at championing democracy and economic development, energy security, confidence building, stability consolidation, peace, and sОМurТtв.”70 As was seen, Romania placed the Black Sea Region her security documents and displayed her will of being a pioneer country in the EU regarding implementation of the Union policies towards the Black Sea Region. The “АСТtО PКpОr oЧ DОПОЧМО КЧН tСО ArЦОН ForМОs oП tСО RОpuЛlТМ oП BulРКrТК”, accepted three years after she became an EU member country in 201071; underlined the situation in the Black Sea Region aЧН Тts ОППОМt oЧ tСО sОМurТtв oП BulРКrТК. TСО “ОбТstОЧМО oП ПroгОЧ conflicts, the actions of terrorist groups, sharp ethnic and religious disputes, high levels of orРКЧТsОН МrТЦО, МorruptТoЧ КЧН tСО ТllОРКl trКППТМkТЧР oП аОКpoЧs, ЧКrМotТМs КЧН СuЦКЧs”72 were defined as causes of regional security risks, which were similar to the European security discourse on the Black Sea. Romania and Bulgaria after 2013 On eve of events in Ukraine in November 2013, Romania initially condemned Russian annexation of Crimea and support for separatist in the Eastern Ukraine. Romania also became tСО ПТrst EU stКtО to rКtТПв tСО EU’s AssoМТКtТoЧ AРrООЦОЧt аТtС UkrКТЧО.73 She has fully implemented all sanctions imposed by the EU in March 2014. Besides this, she has also asked for their toughening at the EU summits in July and August 2014.74 “US MТlТtКrв EЧРКРОЦОЧts to RoЦКЧТК”, http://romania.usembassy.gov/policy/us-militaryengagements-to-romania.html, (accessed on 28.06.2013) 68 “TСО NКtТoЧКl SОМurТtв StrКtОРв oП RoЦКЧТК”, BuМСКrОst, 2007, p. 32; http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Romania2007_English.pdf, (accessed on 22.05.2012) 69 Ibid. 70 “TСО NКtТoЧКl SОМurТtв StrКtОРв oП RoЦКЧТК”, BuМСКrОst, 2007, p. 34; http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Romania2007_English.pdf, (accessed on 22.05.2012) 71 White Paper On Defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2010, p. 14, http://www.mod.bg/en/doc/misc/20101130_WP_EN.pdf, (accessed on 24.05.2012) 72 Ibid. 73 Tomasz DaboroаskТ КЧН TКНОusг IаКЧskТ, “BrОКkТЧР TСrouРС DТstrust ТЧ RОlКtТoЧs ЛОtаООЧ Romania and Ukraine, 27.04.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-0427/breaking-through-distrust-relations-between-romania-and-ukraine (accessed on 03.12.2016) 74 AlТЧК IЧКвОС, “RoЦКЧТК: LКrРОlв IЦЦuЧО to RussТКЧ PrОssurОs”, A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia- Ukraine Crisis, Joerg Forbrig (ed.), Europe Policy Paper, February 67 289 Romania further developed her relations with new Ukrainian government and Ukraine КЧН sСО Кlso МoЧМluНОН КЧ КРrООЦОЧt oЧ sЦКll ЛorНОr trКППТМ ТЧ 2014 КЧН rОsuЦОН ОППorts “oЧ the Ukraine-Romania Joint Presidential Commission, an intergovernmental committee on the ЧКtТoЧКl ЦТЧorТtТОs, КЧН К МoЦЦТttОО oЧ ЦТlТtКrв ЦКttОrs.”75 After the NATO summit in Wales (2014), Five Trust Funds were set for Ukraine and Romania has also became a coordinator state of the trust fund on Cyber Defence for Ukraine.76 Under the framework of NATO, Romania asked for increased security measures in the Region and supported and took part in NATO operation in the Black Sea. 77 During the same period, in May 2016, the US activated a land-base missile defence station in Romania, which was said that this shield aimed to protect NATO countries from short and medium-range missiles, particularly from the Middle East.78 AММorНТЧР to BBC ЧОаs, “TСО sТtО Сosts rКНКr and SM-3 ЦТssТlО ТЧtОrМОptors, КЧН аТll ЛО ТЧtОРrКtОН ТЧto NКto's ЦТssТlО sСТОlН.”79 Both Nato and US officials failed to reassure Russia that the shield in Romania and Poland did not aim at Russian territory and did not undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent80 and they are defensive purposes against potential attacks from so-МКllОН “roРuО stКtОs,” pКrtТМulКrlв IrКЧ.81 Russia continues to see this system as a direct threat to Russian security and to peace in Europe.82 At this point, it should be noted that at the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was also concerned about the stationing of nuclear weapons and their supporting infrastructure in the territories of new member states, which meant an eastward movement of NATO military infrastructure.83 To dissipate her conМОrЧs, NATO ЦОЦЛОrs НОvТsОН tСО tСrОО Чo’s ПorЦulК, аСТМС ЦОКЧt tСКt “NATO СКН Чo ТЧtОЧtТoЧ, Чo plКЧ КЧН Чo rОКsoЧ to НОploв ЧuМlОКr аОКpoЧs oЧ tСО tОrrТtorв oП ЧОа ЦОЦЛОrs Чor КЧв ЧООН to МСКЧРО КЧв КspОМt oП NATO’s ЧuМlОКr posturО or ЧuМlОКr polТМв.”84 Despite this, Russia today is facing a development of stationing some parts of nuclear infrastructure of NATO on the territories of Romania and Poland. As it could be seen, Romania, as a staunch ally of the USA and the EU can follow a policy in compliance with the decision, taken by Brussels and NATO due to lack of division between decision makers and population on an attitude to Russia and of energy and economic dependency.85 2015, p. 40. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/region-disunited-central-european-responses-russiaukraine-crisis, (accessed on 1 December 2016) 75 Daborowski and Iwanski, op. cit. 76 NATO, “RОlКtТoЧs аТtС UkrКТЧО KОв ArОКs oП CoopОrКtТoЧ”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm# (accessed on 1 December 2016) 77 Inayeh, op. cit., p. 40. 78 BBC NОаs, “US AМtТvКtОs $800Ц MТssТlО SСТОlН BКsО ТЧ RoЦКЧТК”, 12 MКв 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36272686 (accessed on 3 December 2016) 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 IlвК ArkСТpov КЧН MКrОk StrгОlОМkТ, “PutТЧ АКrЧs NATO MТssТlО SСТОlН Тs TСrОКt to PОКМО ТЧ EuropО”, BlloЦЛОrР, 13 MКв 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/poland-tobreak-ground-on-missile-shield-site-as-russia-fumes (accessed on 3.12.2016) 82 Ibid.. 83 MКrtТЧ A. SЦТtС, “A BuЦpв RoКН to КЧ UЧkЧoаЧ DОstТЧКtТoЧ? NATO-Russia Relations, 1991-2002”, Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Rick Fawn, Frank Cass, London and Portland: 2003, p. 64. 84 Ibid. 85 Inayeh, op. cit., p. 41-42. 290 While Bulgarian leaders have been cautious on a prominent US role on the Sea86, on eve oП rОМОЧt МrТsТs ТЧ UkrКТЧО, BulРКrТК’s DОПОЧМО MТЧТstОr КЧЧouЧМОН tСКt МrТsТs ТЧ UkrКТЧО posОs К rТsk to tСО МouЧtrв КЧН РrОКtОst РuКrКЧtОО oП sОМurТtв oП tСО МouЧtrв Тs NATO’s ЦОЦЛОrsСТp.87 She was condemning the annexation of Crimea and joining the sanctions against Russia.88 However Bulgarian government stayed in a difficult position between obligations to the EU and domestic political and economic considerations.89 АСТlО “ЧoЧ-compliance with the overarching decisions coming from Brussels would mean a freeze of relations with the EU ЛloМ,”90 Bulgaria opposed further sanctions against Russia.91 During this crisis, Bulgaria was trying to pursue more assertive stance against Russia in compliance with her Western counterparts, on the other hand she is continuing to treat the issue carefully in order to avoid break in relation with the Russia due to strong public and political opinion divide on relations with Russia, energy dependency, intense economic ties.92 AММorНТЧР to PОtrovК, “BulРКrТК Тs anywhere near to choosing Moscow over Brussels in the context of the Ukrainian crisis.93” It could be stated that Bulgaria, while he is located under the auspices of the NATO and the EU, could strive to find a free manoeuvre space to follow more autonomous policies regarding relations with Russia. Conclusion Romania and Bulgaria, during the Cold War, were member states of the Eastern Bloc under the dominancy of the Soviet Union and have been part of the Euro-Atlantic institutions under the US leadership till 2007. As a specific feature of the subordinate states, they should follow policies in compliance with the positions of the superior states or institutions. While policies that may be considered as a split such as Georgian NATO membership objective or Ukrainian signing of the Association Agreement with the EU may lead more tremendous effect on the country itself and regional security, therefore they are rarely seen; the frictions within a bloc or an alliance may be more possible. During the Cold War, Bulgaria had been a staunch ally of the Soviet Union and she pursued policies very similar to those of the Soviet Union to the extent that it was claimed that there was no such thing as Bulgarian foreign policy.94 On the other hand, Romania after Stalin period were in strive of pursuing more autonomous polices. However these frictions were not important enough to lead to a security problem in regional or international environment, only to a discontent within the Bloc. 86 Ronald Linden, Balkanizing Security Romania, Bulgaria and the Burdens of Alliance, Seattle, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2008, p. 9. 87 “UkrКТЧО CrТsТs Тs RТsk Пor EuropОКЧ SОМurТtв -BulРКrТК’s DОПОЧМО MТЧТstОr”, SoПТК NОаs Agency, 15.09. 2014, http://www.novinite.com/articles/163388/Ukraine+Crisis+is+Risk+for+European+Security+%E2%80 %93+Bulgaria%27s+Defense+Min (accessed on 03.08.2015) 88 MКrТЧ LОssОЧskТ, “BulРКrТК, IЧМrОКsТЧРlв КssОrtТvО Лut Чot HКаkТsС”, Central European Responses to the Russia- Ukraine Crisis, Joerg Forbrig (ed.), Europe Policy Paper, February 2015, p. 7. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/region-disunited-central-european-responses-russia-ukraine-crisis, (accessed on 1 December 2016) 89 Ibid. 90 MКrТЧК PОtrovК, “BulРКrТК КЧН tСО UkrКТЧТКЧ CoЧПlТМt Кt CrossroКНs аТtС tСО RussТКЧ FОНОrКtТoЧ КЧН tСО EU”, 10 MКв 2015, http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/bulgaria-and-the-ukrainian-conflict/, (accessed on 03.12.2016) 91 Lessenski, op. cit., p. 7 92 Ibid., p 8 93 Petrova, op. cit. 94 Moore, op.cit., p. 206. 291 After the Cold War, Romania and Bulgaria attempted to re-position themselves within the revised international and regional system, trying to achieve integration with the EuroAtlantic institutions however they, especially Bulgaria were careful not to provoke position of Russia which tried to re-establish dominance in her relations with the post-Soviet countries. After 2001, the Western countries especially the USA and NATO were challenging the Russian dominance over the post-Soviet countries under the effect of developments after 9/11 and Afghanistan operation which led to increase geopolitical importance of the Central Asia and Caucasus. While Bulgaria leaders have been cautious and different leaders have been changing polices regarding issues of USA presence in the Black Sea or relations with the Russian Federation; Romania, in contrast to the previous period, was also attempting to challenge the on-going Mountreux system by establishing military relations with the USA through allowing the construction of American/NATO military bases on their territory and supporting the discourse of need for change in the Mountreux regime. During the process after 2014 events, Romania has been in compliance with the EU and US policies while Bulgaria, this time has been in hesitate in pursuing policies that observe obligations imposed by its membership into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. When factors behind these frictions (in Bulgarian and Romanian cases) are looked into; historical background, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural ties, compliance among decision makers and will of population, economic and energy (in Russian case) dependency should be considered, that may be held in the following studies. 292