The Stranger's 'Farewell' (258 E 6-259 A 1) - (2011)

TώE STRAσύER’S ‘όAREWEδδ’ (2ηκ E 6-259 A 1)* DEσIS τ’BRIEσ ‘Don’t let anyone try and tell us that we dare say of the contrary of being that it is. We have long ago said farewell to any contrary of being, to the question of whether it is or of whether it isn’t…’ Those are the first words spoken by the Stranger after Theaetetus’ enthusiastic reaction (2ηκ E 4-5: ‘absolutely so’, ‘most true’) to the Stranger’s declaration (2ηκ D 5-E 3) that he and Theaetetus have ‘dared’ speak of ‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’έ A ‘contrary of being’έ A ‘form that there turns out to be, of what is not’έ The meaning of those two expressions, together with their difference of meaning, lies at the very heart of Plato’s dialogue, of what the Sophist is all about. If the meaning, with the difference in meaning, of those two expressions has not been understood, then the dialogue itself has not been understoodέ Such is the sorry plight of one of Plato’s most recent commentators. That is the sorry plight that I hope to save you from in the brief half hour that follows. I A ‘form that there turns out to be, of what is not’. The paradox is deliberate. The form of ‘what is not’ is a form that ‘is’έ The paradox is aimed at repeating, but also correcting, the contradiction in the words twice quoted from Parmenides’ poem (23ι A 8-9, 258 D 2-3), ‘things that are not, are’ (fr. 7.1). Those words supposedly encapsulate the contradiction that we, the ‘mortals’ of Parmenides’ world, are condemned to, by our belief that all the * I am most grateful to the organisers for again inviting me to join them in the study of a Platonic dialogue in the ideal surroundings of the Villa Lanna. I learnt a great deal from our debates, and I am especially grateful to Luc Brisson for comments on a written version of my text. If, in the following pages, my treatment of a complex subject seems perhaps too summary, it is because I have adhered scrupulously to the injunction not to exceed, in the main body of my text, 30,000 characters and spaces, and have therefore kept to exactly that number. 2 Denis O’Brien many things we see around us ‘come into being and pass away, are and are not’ (frέ 8.40-41). The key to the paradox is to be found in the Stranger’s theory of ‘the parts of otherness’έ τtherness is one of three forms, along with sameness and being, that is universally participated. Whatever is, participates in being. Whatever participates in being, participates also in sameness, since, whatever it may be, it is ‘the same’ as itselfέ Whatever participates in being and in sameness, participates also in otherness, since whatever is the same as itself is also ‘other’ than anything and everything elseέ It is ‘other’ than anything and everything that it itself is not. Simple and straightforward though that may seem, it is not quite so simple and so straightforward as one may think. If we believe in forms at all, and if forms are still an essential ingredient in the way that Plato thinks, then we may well agree, without demur, that whatever ‘is’, in order to ‘be’, cannot but participate in the form of being. We may also agree that whatever ‘is’ anything at all, cannot but be ‘the same as itself’, so requiring the existence of a form of sameness. But we may well wonder whether we need a third universal form, a form of ‘otherness’έ Might it not be that one thing is different from another, simply in virtue of being whatever it isς A cat is not a dog, a man is not a woman… But Plato’s Stranger is adamantέ Each and every thing, he insists (2ηη E 3-6), is different from all others, not in virtue of its own nature, but because it participates in the ‘idea’ of ‘otherness’έ That principle will cause Plotinus a good deal of heart-searching when he attempts to define our relationship to the One. But if we are not to stray too far from the text of the Sophist, we must turn our gaze from that distant, if fascinating, horizon, and accept that, for Plato’s Stranger, ‘otherness’, along with sameness and being, is a form that is universally participated. II Even so, the reader’s instinctive reaction, that any one thing is, after all, different from any other in virtue of its own intrinsic nature, does find a foothold in Plato’s theory, in so far as otherness, unlike sameness and being, is not itself undifferentiatedέ ‘Difference’ or ‘otherness’ exists only as chopped up into parts, with as many parts as there are individual forms, so that each individual form (beauty, justice, largeness) comes paired with its negative counterpartέ ‘σon-beautiful’ is the part of otherness that is opposed to beautyέ ‘σon-just’ is the part of otherness opposed to justiceέ ‘σon-large’ is the part of otherness opposed to largeness. The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 3 There is also therefore a part of otherness that is opposed to sameness and a part of otherness that is opposed to being. Being and sameness are universally participated. But so too is otherness, and so too therefore are all the parts of otherness, including the two parts that are opposed, respectively, to being and to sameness. Whatever participates in being and in sameness— and there is nothing that does not participate in being and in sameness— must therefore also participate in otherness, both in relation to being and in relation to sameness. The result is paradoxical, but inescapable. Whatever you like to think of (the Stranger takes as his example ‘movement’, 256 A 10-B 4) is both ‘the same’, since it participates in sameness, and ‘not the same’, since it participates in otherness in relation to sameness.1 III Modern commentators are often all to quick in wanting to draw out from Plato’s text distinctions that the author can never have intended. But here the lesson to be drawn is obvious enoughέ In asserting that movement ‘is not’ the same, we assert a lack of identity, not a lack of participation. Movement ‘is the same’ in so far as it participates in sameness, ‘is not the same’ in so far as, participating in otherness in relation to sameness, it is not identical to sameness. We may even take a step further. In the case of forms that are not universally participated, we presumably have to distinguish two senses of ‘is not’μ ‘is not’ as lack of identity and ‘is not’ as lack of participationέ Beauty, for exampleέ Whatever participates in beauty, ‘is beautiful’, in virtue of its participation in beauty, ‘is not beautiful’ in so far as, participating in otherness in relation to beauty, it is not identical to beauty. Whatever does not participate in beauty, ‘is not beautiful’, both because it does not participate in beauty and because it is not identical to beauty. But that double use of ‘is not’ is possible only when the form in question is not universally participatedέ There can be no ‘is not’, meaning lack of participation, for a form that is universally participated, as is the case for sameness, and as is also the case for beingέ ‘Is not’, in relation to being, as in relation to sameness, can mean only lack of identity, and not lack of participation. So it is, even for the part of otherness that is opposed to being, and that is therefore the form of non-beingέ ‘τtherness’ participates in being— όor further brief comments on the Stranger’s theory of the ‘parts’ of otherness, see the Additional Notes at the end of this article. 1 4 Denis O’Brien otherwise there would be no ‘otherness’έ So also do all the ‘parts’ of otherness, including that very part of otherness that is opposed to being, and that is therefore the form of non-being. So it is that we arrive at the Stranger’s paradoxical definition of a ‘form that there turns out to be, of what is not’ (2ηκ D 6-7). The form of what is not, the form of non-being, is the part of otherness that is opposed to being, and that is therefore as much entitled to be called ‘non-being’ as the part of otherness that is opposed to beauty is entitled to be called ‘non-beautiful’έ But beauty is not universally participated. The part of otherness opposed to beauty is ‘non-beautiful’, but it is not, at the same time, beautifulέ σot so the form of non-being. The part of otherness that is opposed to being and that is therefore ‘non-being’ cannot but, at the same time, participate in being, otherwise it would not ‘be’ a part of otherness at allέ That is why there ‘turns out to be a form that is, of what is not’έ A form that ‘is’, since it participates in being—how could it not?—and yet, at the same time, a form of ‘what is not’, since what it is, is a part of otherness, that very part of otherness that is opposed to being. IV I don’t know what you think of that little conundrumέ Theaetetus is ecstatic. ‘Absolutely so’ (2ηκ E 4-5: πα πα ί γ ), ‘most true’ (ἀ α α). The boy’s enthusiasm is roused by the Stranger’s apparently having solved the problem posed by Parmenides, or more precisely by the problematical use to which the Stranger has put Parmenides’ verses, which would make it impossible to say, of ‘things that are not’, that they ‘are’, impossible therefore to lie, and impossible, therefore, to define the Sophist as a liar. But before we share the young boy’s enthusiasm, we need to balance the Stranger’s discovery of ‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’ with the disclaimer that follows immediately on its footstepsέ The ‘form of non-being’ is not a ‘contrary’ of being. What is, or what would be, a ‘contrary’ of beingς Contrariety first raises its head when, after listing being, sameness and otherness, the Stranger introduces the two remaining items in his list of ‘very great gene’έ These are movement and rest, said to be ‘most contrary’ to each other (250 A 8-9: ἐ α α α). Whether as cause or as consequence of their extreme contrariety, the Stranger insists on the impossibility of either form ‘mingling’ with the other (2η4 D 7-8). It is true that modern commentators have done their learned best to whittle away that wholly unambiguous assertion, none less so than Gregory The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 5 Vlastos, with his once fashionable theory of ‘Pauline predication’έ2 ‘Charity is patient’ means only that ‘charitable people are patient’έ ‘εovement does not mingle with rest’ and ‘rest does not mingle with movement’, if the predication is Pauline, therefore means only that things that are moving are not at rest, and that things at rest are not in movement. For unless movement, the form, were at rest, how could it ever be a form, an unchanging object of knowledge and the sole source of certainty? Vlastos’ analogy, though faithfully repeated as a ύospel truth in many modern studies of Plato, is plainly defective. The example of ‘charity’, taken from Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians (13.4-8), does not at all mean what Vlastos would have it meanέ ‘Charity is patient’ may indeed mean that charitable people are patient, but can hardly be taken to imply that charity itself is not patient. And yet that would be the analogue required if the Stranger’s meaning were to be that whatever participates in movement is not at rest, but that movement itself is at rest. εore troubling still, if the Stranger’s emphatic statement that movement and rest ‘do not mingle with each other’ (2η4 D 7-8) is to imply, or even simply leave open the possibility, that movement itself does mingle with (‘participates in’) rest, then why should the same dictum not imply, or leave open the possibility, that rest participates in movement—and in that case, with Vlastos’ criterion, how could ‘rest’ be a formς I am not sure what criteria are required, in the Sophist, for being a ‘form’ or a ‘kind’ (I am not even quite sure what criteria are required for being a form in the Phaedo), but if the Stranger says, firmly and clearly, that movement and rest are ‘most contrary’ (2η0 A 8-λ) and ‘do not mingle with each other’ (2η4 D 7-8), then I believe him, and even draw the conclusion that being physically at rest, and therefore not moving from place to place, is no longer a part, if ever it was a part, of what it is to be a form. V From the example of movement and rest, I even draw the tentative conclusion that lack of participation is in general, as it is for movement and rest, a necessary condition of contrariety. A necessary, but not a sufficient condition, as is made clear by the next appearance of ‘contrariety’ in the Stranger’s argumentέ What is ‘not large’, so the Stranger and Theaetetus agree (2ηι B 3-C 4), may refer either to what is equal or to what is small; it does not refer to ‘what is small’ in preference to ‘what is equal’έ This time, lest we readers of 2 Vlastos, 1971, 270-308 (chapter 11). Denis O’Brien 6 the dialogue might perhaps not have grasped the point, the Stranger himself spells out the conclusion to be drawnέ ‘σegation’ does not, of itself, designate contrarietyέ σegation is explained by ‘otherness’μ what is ‘other than’ something ‘is not’ that thing, whether or not it is to be counted as the contrary of whatever it is that it ‘is not’έ Once again, modern commentators lead you up the garden path, even when Plato must surely have thought that he had made his meaning unmistakably clear. This time it is Gwil Owen who has missed the point. ‘The equal’, so τwen assures us, his hand on his heart, is here thought of as participating in both largeness and smallness, ‘having in it something, in a broad sense some proportion, of both large and small’έ3 In making that point, Owen has not only given the expression ὸ ἴ ο a meaning not attested in any dictionary; he shows that he has wholly misunderstood the Stranger’s purpose. τwen apparently thinks that, although what is equal is ‘not large’, and is indeed quoted as an example of ‘negation’ (cfέ 2ηι B 9: ἀπ φα ), nonetheless it still has to be—well just a little bit ‘large’έ But noμ the Stranger’s point is not at all what τwen takes it to beέ ‘Equal’ is not at all large. Of course, two things may be larger than something else. They may also be smaller than something else. But that is not the point. One thing, if equal to another, cannot be larger or smaller than that same thing, since in that case it would be, at one and the same time, both ‘equal’ and ‘not equal’, contrary to what Aristotle calls ‘the firmest principle of all’, the principle of contradiction.4 The Stranger’s point is that ‘small’ and ‘equal’ are both ‘not large’, in that neither has any share in largeness. Something cannot be, at one and the same time, both large and small in relation to the same thing, nor can anything be, at the same time, both large and equal in relation to the same thingέ But although those two things (‘the small’ and ‘the equal’) are, each of them, ‘not large’, only one of them (‘the small’) is the contrary of largeέ Hence my point that lack of participation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of contrariety. Lack of participation is a necessary condition of contrariety: if the small is to be the contrary of large, then it must be ‘not large’ν it cannot be, at one and the same time, large and the contrary of large. But lack of participation, as expressed by a simple negation, is not a sufficient condition of contrarietyμ for the equal is also ‘not large’, without therefore being the contrary of largeέ 3 Owen, 1971, 235-236. 4 Aristotle, Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 b 17-18. The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 7 VI We have therefore to distinguish between those two uses of the negation: negation marking simple lack of participation (‘not large’ as applied to equal), and negation accompanying contrariety (‘not large’ as applied to small)έ That distinction is in addition to the Stranger’s earlier distinction (§ III above) between lack of identity and lack of participation. ‘σot large’ must, at the very least, indicate lack of identityέ Even what is large, since it participates in largeness, must be, in this primitive sense, ‘not large’ in so far as it is not identical to largenessέ ‘σot large’ may also indicate lack of participationμ ‘the equal’ is not large because it cannot be ‘equal’ and at the same time participate in largenessέ Thirdly and lastly, ‘not large’ may indicate contrarietyμ ‘the small’ is not identical to largeness, it does not participate in largeness, and it is the contrary of largeness. A hierarchy of negations therefore: negation as lack of identity, negation as lack of participation, and finally negation as a necessary condition of contrariety. Contrariety supposes lack of participation and lack of identity. Lack of identity is common to participation and to lack of participation. VII That is the minimal intellectual baggage needed, and supplied by the Stranger, for making sense of his remark relating to a ‘contrary’ of beingέ Contrariety requires both lack of identity and lack of participation. But what is there—what could there be—that meets that criterion for contrariety in relation to being? Absolutely nothing. And when I say nothing, I mean nothing. Just sheer nothing. For whatever something is, whatever it might be, or even whatever it might not be, it does, at the very least have to be, and in order to ‘be’, in the Stranger’s world, it has to participate in beingέ5 Whatever does not participate in being is… no, that sentence cannot be completedέ There ‘is not’, and there cannot ‘be’, anything that does not participate in beingέ That is why there cannot be a contrary of being. Contrariety excludes participation: lack of participation is a necessary— not a sufficient, but a necessary—condition of contrariety. And that See esp. Soph. 256 A 1-2μ Theaetetus agrees without hesitation to the Stranger’s assertion that movement ‘is’ because of its participation in ‘being’έ όrede, 1λθι, ηη-59, is wholly and obviously wrong in wanting to assimilate this use of ‘is’ (2ηθ A 1: ἔ ) to a copulative use of the verbέ In asserting that movement ‘is’ because it participates in ‘being’, the Stranger asserts nothing less, and nothing more, than that it ‘is’έ An ‘existential’ use of the verb if ever there was one. 5 8 Denis O’Brien condition cannot be met by anything at all, because, for anything at all to be anything at all, it would have to participate in being, and would then, no longer (as it were), be a contrary of beingέ ‘Being’ has no contrary. There is no contrary of being. That is why ‘the form of non-being’, although one of a long list of negative forms (‘non-beautiful’, ‘non-just’, ‘non-large’), is a special caseέ The part of otherness opposed to beauty is the negative form ‘non-beautiful’έ Whatever is not beautiful participates in the negative form non-beautiful, whether because it is not identical to beauty or because, as well as not being identical to beauty, it does not participate in beauty. If it does not participate in beauty, it may be the contrary of beauty (what is ‘ugly’ therefore), since it fulfils the necessary condition of contrariety which is lack of participation. But that is not possible when the negative form is the form of non-being. The negative form, the part of otherness that is opposed to being, does itself participate in being, and cannot therefore be the contrary of being. VIII The same truth will perhaps more easily be seen if we go at it the other way roundέ The part of otherness opposed to ‘beauty’ or to ‘largeness’ does not participate in the form to which it is opposedέ The negation ‘not beautiful’ or ‘not large’ does not therefore exclude contrarietyέ Were the part of otherness that is opposed to beauty or to largeness to participate in beauty or in largeness, then the negation would exclude contrarietyέ What was ‘not beautiful’ could not then be the contrary of beautifulέ What was ‘not large’ could not then be the contrary of large. There would then be nothing that is ugly, nor anything that is small. Of course that is not so. There is a contrary of beauty, what is ugly, and there is a contrary of large, what is small. But the existence of a contrary is possible only because, in either case, the negative form does not participate in the form to which it is opposed. The negative form ‘non-beautiful’, in being opposed to beauty, does not participate in beauty. The negative form ‘non-large’, in being opposed to largeness, does not participate in largenessέ But what is not true of beauty and largeness is true of being. The very part of otherness that is opposed to being does participate in being. Therefore the negation does exclude contrariety. There can be, there is, a contrary of beauty (what is ugly) and of large (what is small). There is no The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 9 contrary of being. The negation (non-being) excludes identity. It does not exclude participation, and it cannot therefore include contrariety.6 IX We can now well see why the Stranger, immediately after announcing, triumphantly, his discovery of ‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’, should go on to add the inevitable disclaimer that his newly discovered form of non-being is not the contrary of being. It is not the contrary of being precisely because it participates in being—it is ‘a form that is, of what is not’—and because participation excludes contrariety. But what quite does the Stranger mean when he says that he and Theaetetus have ‘long ago’ said ‘good-bye’ to any contrary of beingς όor those who have ears to hear, the reference rings loud and clear. Earlier in the dialogue, the Stranger had asked Theaetetus whether we dare to speak of ‘what is not in any way at all’ (23ι B 7-8: ὸ α ῶ ὄ ). At first Theaetetus replies with a guileless ‘Why on earth notς’ (23ι B 9: πῶ γὰ οὔν) But he is soon brought to see that no, that we cannot even utter the words ‘what is not in any way at all’, nor the equivalent form of words ‘what is not, in and by itself’ (23κ C 9: ὸ ὴ ὂ α ὸ α ᾿ α ), without contradiction, since the very fact of using a singular expression, as opposed to a dual or a plural, would appear to imply that ‘number’, which Theaetetus, the budding mathematician, is only too happy to include among ‘what is’, has to be attached to ‘what is not’—to what is not ‘in any way at all’ (cfέ 23ι B 10-239 C 8). The ramifications of that discussion are what the Stranger alludes to when he says that he and Theaetetus, after the long and complex analysis of the ‘very great kinds’, have ‘long since bid farewell’ to a contrary of being, to the question ‘whether it is or whether it isn’t’έ Just as there is no nonbeing ‘in and by itself’, nothing that ‘is not in any way at all’, so too there can be no contrary of beingέ A ‘contrary’ of being would be whatever did not participate in beingέ But there isn’t anything that doesn’t participate in beingέ What is ‘not in any way at all’… is not ‘in any way at all’έ 6 Frede, 1967, 85-89, gets into a great tangle at this point in his attempted reconstruction of the Stranger’s argumentέ ώe supposes that, if the form of ‘nonbeautiful’ does not participate in beauty, it is because it is opposed, not to the form itself, but to whatever has the form for predicate. The text tells against him, and so does the logic of the argument. See the Additional Notes at the end of this article. 10 Denis O’Brien X τnly in the light of that distinction can we see the reason for Theaetetus’ enthusiastic acceptance of the Stranger’s definition of a form of non-being. What had seemingly called a halt to the hunt for a definition of the Sophist had been Parmenides’ condemnation of ‘the opinions of mortals’, as expressed in the verses ‘things that are not, are’ (frέ 7.1-2)έ ‘Things that are not, are’ is the outlandish proposition Parmenides claims that ‘mortals’ are committed to if they believe in the world perceived by the senses, if they believe in the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’ of all the many things that we think to feel and see around us, in all the things therefore that we think we see ‘coming into being’, passing therefore from non-being to being, and ‘passing away’, passing therefore from being to non-being. The resulting proposition, ‘things that are not, are’, is, for Parmenides, a contradiction, a contradiction arising from mortals’ failing to recognise the incompatibility of the two Ways, as defined by his mentor the goddess, in the opening verses of her speech (fr. 2)έ The first Way statesμ ‘is’ and ‘it is not possible not to be’έ The second Way statesμ ‘is not’ and ‘it is necessary not to be’έ That the two Ways are incompatible is clearly demonstrated by the modal accompanimentsμ ‘it is not possible not to be’, ‘it is necessary not to be’έ If it is necessary not to be, then it is impossible to be: the second Way therefore excludes the first. If it is impossible not to be, then it is necessary to be: the first Way therefore excludes the second.7 By declaring of ‘things that are not’ that they ‘are’, mortals have failed to recognise that radical incompatibility. They therefore take a subject drawn from the second Way, ‘things that are not’, and think to join it with the verb of the first Way, so arriving at the contradictionμ ‘things that are not, areέ’ The significance of that form of words, in the context of the Sophist, is that it is the form of words conventionally used to define a falsehood. To tell the truth is to say of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not. To say of things that are, that they are not, or (as in Parmenides’ poem) of things that are not, that they are, is therefore to say what is not true.8 But since Parmenides has shown that we cannot ‘know’, nor even ‘point out’ to others, ‘what is not’ (frέ 2.7-8), then how can it be possible to lie, and how can the Sophist be defined as a liar? 7 I leave you to wrestle with those two modal conjunctions if you are not already familiar with themέ I have dealt with them extensively elsewhereέ See τ’Brien, 1λκι, 278-302. 8 Compare the Stranger’s definition of falsehood (240 E 10-241 A 1) with the definition of truth in Xenophon, Anabasis iv 4έ1ηέ όor details, see τ’Brien, 2000, κ2-89. The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 11 XI The Stranger’s initial answer to that question lies in his distinction between the form of non-being and an impossible contrary of being. It is true that we cannot say, of the contrary of being, that it ‘is’, for the contrary of being is precisely what ‘is not in any way at all’, whatever—impossibly—has no participation in being, and is therefore not even a ‘whatever’έ But not so the form of non-being. Non-being as a form indicates lack of identity, not lack of participation. It is perfectly true to say of all the things that we see and feel around us that they are ‘non-beings’ if our meaning is that, although they participate in being, they are not therefore identical to being, if therefore our meaning is that, although participating in being, they participate also in otherness in relation to being. The same things may therefore quite properly be said ‘to be’, since they participate in being, and ‘not to be’, since they are not identical to beingέ To say, of ‘things that are not’, that they ‘are’, is therefore a perfectly proper way of speaking, provided only that we distinguish a simple negation of being, necessarily true of whatever participates in being, from an impossible contrary of being, impossible simply because there is no contrary to being, since contrariety requires lack of participation and there ‘is’ nothing that does not participate in being—how could there be, since to ‘be’ is to participate in being? XII Dare I now unveil to you the latest misunderstanding of Plato’s textς ‘Plato deliberately leaves open the question about the being of what in no way isέ’9 That is precisely what the Stranger does not leave open. The author of the words I have quoted has hopelessly misunderstood the Stranger’s ‘farewell’έ Listen again to what the Stranger says, so joyfully and so light-heartedly, following his thrilling discovery of the form of non-being (258 E 6-259 A 1): Do not let anyone tell us therefore that we declare that what is not is the contrary of being, and that we dare say of that, that it is. As far as any contrary of being goes, we have long ago said good-bye to any question of its being or of its not being, of its having a logos or indeed of its being altogether without a logos… σotomi, 200ι, 1κ4 (the author’s own italics)έ σotomi’s ‘what in no way is’ is his translation of ὸ α ῶ ὄ (237 B 7-κ), translated in this article as ‘what is not in any way at all’έ όor σotomi’s study, see the warning note attached to the Bibliography. 9 12 Denis O’Brien In uttering those words, the Stranger does not for one moment mean to ‘leave open’ the possibility that what is not in any way at all might nonetheless, just possibly, if only a very little bit, ‘be’έ The whole point and purpose of his argument is to establish an impassable gulf between the form of non-being, ‘a form which is’, since it participates in being, and the impossible ‘contrary’ of being which, if there were to be such a contrary, would be what does not participate in being at all. What does not participate in being at all cannot but ‘be’—sit venia verbo—what both the Stranger and Theaetetus had earlier agreed could not be spoken of, nor thought ofμ ‘non-being, in and by itself’, ‘what is not in any way at all’έ To claim that the Stranger’s contrary of being might somehow, nonetheless, just possibly, ‘be’, is therefore to collapse the very distinction that the Stranger’s whole analysis has been designed to establishέ To misunderstand that distinction is, at I said at the beginning of my talk, to misunderstand the whole point and purpose of the Sophist. XIII It is precisely because of that distinction that the Stranger and Theaetetus are able to say good-bye to—with something of the double-entendre of our colloquial expression ‘to see off’—the troubles and tangles arising from Theaetetus’ thoughtless assumption (23ι B 7-9) that yes, of course we can speak of ‘what is not in any way at all’—‘Why on earth notς’ It is because of that distinction that there is now no longer any need, as so very obviously there had been before, to agonise over whether we can say of ‘what is not’, that it ‘is’ or that it ‘isn’t’, over whether ‘what is not’ has a logos or is altogether without a logos. It is in the light of that same distinction that we are able to understand the subtlety of Plato’s relationship to Parmenidesέ When the Stranger brings Theaetetus to see that we cannot speak or think of ‘what is not in any way at all’, of ‘non-being, in and by itself’, he is not out to contradict Parmenidesέ How could he be? Parmenides was already convinced that what is not, what ‘necessarily’ is not (cfέ frέ 2έη), cannot be ‘spoken of’ nor even ‘thought of’ (fr. 8.7-9). The Stranger’s task is both more delicate and more deviousέ ώe has to undo Parmenides’ assumption that the non-being of the second Way covers all and any non-being, his assumption that if we say—as the mortals of Parmenides’ poem are made to say—that ‘things that are not, are’, then we are necessarily uttering a contradiction. Were the non-being implied in the opinions of mortals to be a contrary of being, then their proposition would indeed be contradictory, since they The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 13 would be saying, at one and the same time, of things that do not participate in being, that they do participate in being. It is to undo that assumption that the Stranger introduces a distinction between non-being as negation and non-being as an impossible contrary of being. XIV But please note: to introduce a distinction where your opponent has seen none is not to persuade him that he has seen only one arm of the distinction and not seen the otherέ σoμ the point is that he has not seen the distinction… To bring to light the subtlety of the Sophist, it is not enough therefore to say that Parmenides’ non-being is a contrary of being and that the Stranger’s non-being is a negation, but not the contrary, of being. No: the point is that Parmenides has an undistributed conception of non-being, a non-being that does not allow for a distinction between negation and contrariety. It is true enough, of non-being as a contrary of being, that it cannot be spoken of, nor even thought of. But from that it does not follow that we cannot say, of ‘things that are not’, that they ‘are’, provided that our use of the negation does not imply contrariety. But try to make that point to someone who has himself not grasped the Stranger’s distinction between negation and contrariety, and who therefore insists that what is not in any way at all might, even so, nonetheless, somehow ‘be’—let me warn you, you will be simply wasting your breath. ADDITIONAL NOTES The ‘Parts’ of τtherness The Stranger’s theory of ‘parts’ of otherness is frequently misunderstoodέ ‘Partition’ is not the same as ‘participation’έ When being is instantiated as ‘the being of each thing’ (cfέ 2ηκ E 2), the form is not therefore divided into so many ‘parts’ of being, nor therefore do all the many things that participate in otherness constitute so many ‘parts’ of othernessέ The point is that otherness itself, unlike being and unlike sameness, exists only as divided into ‘parts’, with each ‘part’ differentiated by its opposition to a specific form.10 ‘The being of each thing’μ for the reading at Soph. 258 E 2, see τ’Brien, 1λλ1bέ The variant, ‘each being’, recorded by Simplicius (Phys. 238.26) and adopted in successive Oxford editions of the text, by Burnet, 1900 and 1905, and by Duke et alii, 1995, is no more than a Neoplatonic adaptation, designed to feed back into the text of Plato the 10 14 Denis O’Brien This procedure does not entail what Nicholas Denyer calls a ‘conjunctive’ theory of relations, whereby the existence of a relationship would be established independently of the term of the relationship.11 ‘τtherness’, with Denyer’s reading of the Stranger’s theory, would exist independently of whatever it may be that it is ‘other than’έ That is exactly the conception of ‘otherness’ excluded by the Stranger’s account of the ‘parts’ of othernessέ There is no otherness that is not a ‘part’ of otherness, nor any ‘part’ of otherness that is not ‘other than’ a specific formέ A different misunderstanding arises when Michael Frede claims that the negation implied by the form of otherness derives from opposition, not to the form of beauty, but to whatever participates in beauty.12 The wording of the text tells against himέ ‘The nature of the beautiful’, describing the second term of the opposition (257 D 10-11: ῆ οῦ α οῦ φ ω ), is followed in quick succession by ‘the nature of otherness’ (2ηκ A 7-8: ἡ α ου φ ) and by ‘the nature of being’ (2ηκ A 11-B 1: ῆ οῦ ὄ ο [sc. φ ω ]), both expressions referring to the form. The repetition of the same expression (‘the nature of…’), in the same tightly worded and tightly argued context (257 C 5-258 E ημ the Stranger’s account of his new theory of the ‘parts’ of otherness), can hardly not have the same meaningέ The ‘part’ of otherness (2ηι D 7 and 258 A 11) that is opposed to ‘the nature of the beautiful’ and to ‘the nature of being’ will, in either case, be opposed to the form, whether the form of beauty, for the definition of ‘non-beautiful’ (2ηι D 10-11), or the form of being, for the definition of ‘non-being’ (2ηκ A 11-B 4) . The difference between ‘being’ and ‘beauty’, in this whole stretch of argument (257 C 5-258 E 5), will lie, not in the choice of a different term to express what it is that is negated (form as opposed to whatever has the form for predicate), but in the point that ‘being’, like sameness, but unlike ‘beauty’, is universally participatedέ ‘σon-beautiful’, in being opposed to the form of beauty, does not participate in beautyέ ‘σon-being’, although opposed to the form of being, cannot but participate in being. That distinction gives the Stranger the conclusion his argument requires. There can be, and there is, a contrary to beauty, but there can be no contrary to definition of non-being required by Plotinus for his identification of the ‘non-being’ of the Sophist with the ‘receptacle’ of the Timaeus. See the concluding paragraphs of these σotes and, for more detail, τ’Brien, 200λa, 302-30ιέ The supposed reference to a ‘part’ of being at 258 A 11-B 4 (the Stranger’s first definition of a form of non-being) is based on a misunderstanding of the syntax of the sentenceέ See τ’Brien, 200λb, θ4-67. 11 Denyer, 1991, 139-145. 12 Frede, 1967, 85-89. See above § VIII. The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 15 being. Contrariety excludes participation (see § VII above), and participation excludes contrariety. Frede and Denyer are not of course alone in failing to steer their way through the detail of the dialogue. Current literature on the Sophist is awash with the wreckage of failed innovation. But even apart from all the many errors bearing on the detail of the text and the argument, misunderstanding, as often as not, arises simply from commentators attempting to make the theory of ‘parts’ of otherness do more than it was ever intended to do, and therefore thinking to find in the Stranger’s theory his ‘answer’ to the problem of the false logos. This is far too simple a view of the matter. The distinction between negation and contrariety establishes that whatever participates in being, and therefore ‘is’, participates also in otherness in relation to being, and therefore ‘is not’ (cfέ § XI above)έ It is therefore a necessary truth that ‘what is not’, construed not as the contrary of being, but as a simple negation of being, ‘is’, and that ‘things that are not’, a pluralised version of the same words, therefore ‘are’έ To establish that same form of words as a paradigm of the logos that is false, and therefore to be able to define the Sophist as a purveyor of falsehood, will require a wholly new argument. Before the Sophist can be successfully run to ground, the Stranger’s second quotation of the controversial verses from Parmenides’ poem (258 D 2-3, fr. 7.1-2μ ‘things that are not, are’), accompanying his triumphant definition of a ‘form that is, of what is not’ (cfέ 2ηκ D 5-E 3), will therefore have to be followed by a stretch of dialogue, with ideas and distinctions significantly different from what has gone before. But to attempt to give even an outline of the new use that will be made of ‘otherness’, and of the relationship between ‘otherness’ and contrariety, in these later pages of the dialogue (259 D 9-264 B 8), lies beyond the scope of the present essay, and well beyond the scope of these Additional Notes.13 A more general difficulty may be treated more briefly. We may think to object that ‘sameness’, no less than ‘otherness’, should be divided into ‘parts’έ Both terms are essentially relativeέ ‘τther’ implies ‘other than…’ ‘The same’ implies ‘the same as…’ Since that implication leads to a theory of ‘parts of otherness’, why does the same implication not lead to a theory of ‘parts of sameness’ς The answer, I would suggest, lies in the difference between what I may perhaps call an ‘intrinsic’ relationship, for ‘sameness’, and an ‘extrinsic’ relationship, for ‘otherness’έ When ‘sameness’ is used, as it is in the Sophist, as a criterion of identity, for example in the sentence ‘I am the same as myself’, the term of the Readers who want to know more will have to tackle τ’Brien, 1λλη, ι2-88 (in French, but with a generous résumé in English). 13 16 Denis O’Brien relationship is no different from the subject of the sentence. So conceived, participation in ‘sameness’ does not require a reference to anything other than the subject of the relationship (in the example quoted, the person speaking) and the relationship itself (in the context of the Sophist, the ‘form’ of sameness)έ Participation in ‘sameness’ is not therefore conceived as impinging on the unity of the form, any more than participation in ‘being’ impinges on the unity of ‘being’έ σot so ‘otherness’, which has to be completed by the addition of a second term to the relationship, for exampleμ ‘I am other than youέ’ The additional item (the person spoken to, in the example quoted), by specifying the term to which ‘otherness’ is opposed, is an indispensable component of the meaning of the form, a component different by definition from the subject of the sentence, but also differing from whatever other items qualify as a second term to the relationship. In face of the conflicting claims of the countless objects called upon to establish, by their ‘otherness’, the separate identity of the subject of the sentence, the form, so we may well think to conclude, is unable to maintain its unity, and finds itself therefore, unlike ‘sameness’ and unlike ‘being’, divided into however many ‘parts’ are needed to match the countless possible oppositions (‘… other than x’, ‘… other than y’), required to satisfy whatever item participates in the form. All the countless objects called upon to complete the meaning of otherness, by specifying the second term of the relationship, as it were feed back their multiplicity into the very form itself, leading therefore to a partition of the form, divided into as many ‘parts’ as there are objects to which it is opposed. Construed in this fashion, the countless forms that specify the nature of otherness in relation to any one of their number never include the form that is the subject of the sentence, since no form participates in otherness in relation to itself. Beauty cannot participate in otherness in relation to beauty. Being cannot participate in otherness in relation to being. However blazingly obvious it may seem when stated abstractly, that principle has not been grasped by commentators who all unthinkingly assume that being itself is a ‘non-being’έ Being, the form, ‘is not’ all the numberless objects that participate in being (257 A 4-6), and that constitute therefore, in so far as they are not identical to being, so many ‘non-beings’ (cf. 256 E 5-θ)έ But being is not therefore itself a ‘non-being’έ όor being itself to qualify as a ‘non-being’, it would have to participate in otherness in relation to being, and in that impossible circumstance it would no longer be, as it is, ‘one thing, itself’ (2ηι A 5).14 όor ‘being’ itself wrongly taken to be ‘non-being’, see, for example, τwen, 1λι1, 233 n. 20έ τwen’s throw-away remark at the end of his note shows clearly that he has 14 The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 17 The relationships the Stranger has established, of ‘being’ and ‘other’, and therefore of ‘non-being’ as a ‘part’ of otherness, however tightly circumscribed, will not be the last word on the matter. Those same concepts will be radically revised when Plato’s ideas are taken over, many centuries later, as the starting-point for a major fresh development in the history of Greek thought. Hence my glancing reference to Plotinus (§ I above), intended as no more than the briefest of brief reminders that the philosophy of the Enneads is the philosophical horizon of much that is said, and of much that is not said, in the Sophist—even though it is a horizon to which commentators of Plato’s dialogue who live and move and have their being in the charmed circle of the ancient universities of England rarely raise their eyes, and are unable to see anything of any significance even when they do. The distinction between ‘non-being’ and ‘non-existent’, outlined in the preceding pages of this article, is an essential feature of Plotinus’ elaborate theory of matter and of the soul’s relation to matter in the sensible world, but with the difference that the theory of ‘parts’ of otherness has been radically revised, so as to yield a definition of ‘non-being’ as no longer the ‘part’ of otherness opposed to ‘the being of each thing’ (cfέ 2ηκ E 2-3), but as the ‘part’ of otherness opposed to ‘the beings properly so-called’, and therefore to all the forms (Enn. II 4 [12] 16.1-3). So defined, the ‘non-being’ that is ‘matter’ is able to take on the role of the ‘receptacle’ in the Timaeus, ready to receive, in so far as it is able to do so, any and every positive determination precisely because it has no positive determination of its own. But although matter, in this new and more radical sense, is ‘non-being’, it is still a ‘part’ of otherness and is therefore still not ‘utter non-being’έ It is not non-existent.15 Conversely, ‘otherness’, as defined in the Sophist, is altogether excluded from Plotinus’ conception of a transcendent first principle, with the result that Plotinus’ τne, unlike the Stranger’s form of ‘being’ (cfέ 2ηι A 1-7), is not ‘other’ than anything and everything elseέ The τne, if ‘being’ entails, as it does in the Sophist, participation in both sameness and otherness, is therefore not a ‘being’, with the further paradoxical conclusion, essential to Plotinus’ whole concept of emanation, that the relationship of ‘otherness’ is not reciprocalέ All the many things that issue from the τne are ‘other’ than not thought the matter through. No more has Job van Eck, whose attempted disproof of an earlier statement of my thesis turns very largely on this same error (2002, 66 and 70: ‘being itself is made not-being’)έ Van Eck’s error is compounded by his not infrequent mistranslations of the Greek and by his limited knowledge of French. See the warning note in the Bibliography. 15 For details, see τ’Brien, 1λλ1a and 200ηέ όor the distinction between ‘non-being’ ( ὴ ὄ ), and ‘utter non-being’ ( ὸ πα ὲ ὴ ὄ ), see Enn. VI 9 [9] 11.35-3κέ The ‘evil’ referred to in these lines is matter. 18 Denis O’Brien the One. But the One itself does not participate in ‘otherness’ in relation to all the many things that have their origin in the One.16 ώence what I referred to as Plotinus’ ‘heart-searching’ when he looks to describe the state of the soul that returns to, and is united with, the One. Is the soul, when united to the τne, ‘other’ than the τneς If she is not ‘other’ than the One, does she therefore, when she returns to the One, cease to be herself?17 Bibliography Burnet, J. 1900. Platonis Opera (ed.), tomus i, 1st edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burnet, J. 1905. Platonis Opera (ed.), tomus i, 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Denyer, N. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge. Duke, E. A., et alii. 1995. Platonis Opera (ed.), tomus i. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Frede, M. 1967. Prädikation und Existenzaussage, Platons Gebrauch von „…ist…“ und „…ist nicht…“ im Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. σotomi, σέ 200ιέ ‘Plato Against Parmenidesμ Sophist 236D-242B’, in S. Stern-Gillet, K. Corrigan (ed.), Reading Ancient Texts, vol. i, Presocratics and Plato. Leiden, Boston: E. J. Brill, 167-187.18 όor details, see τ’Brien, 1λλ3 and 1λλη (Étude I). όor part of the answer, see the concluding pages of a forthcoming article (‘δe σonÊtre et l’Altéritéμ Plotin et ses Prédécesseurs’)έ The blimpish historian of philosophy (a familiar figure of my youth, and one I still occasionally come across) who finds the preceding four paragraphs so much gobbledygook is wholly, and tragically, wrong. 18 I should perhaps warn potential readers of this item that the author is as unreliable on questions of modern doxography as he is when he asserts that Plato’s Stranger makes allowance for the possible existence of what is explicitly said not to be ‘in any way at all’ (see § XII above). In the course of his argument, Notomi attributes to an Aunt Sally that he graces with my name statements that are nowhere to be found in anything I have written and that do not represent anything that I have ever said or even thought. I nowhere translate πο α (237 A 3) as ‘claim’ or ‘declare’, as σotomi wrongly claims I do (p. 172 n. 14)έ I nowhere identify ‘non-being’ with falsehood, as Notomi wrongly claims I do (p. 172 n. 1η)έ I nowhere take the simple utterance ‘things that are not’ ( ὴ ἐ α) as a sufficient indication of the opinions of mortals, as Notomi wrongly claims I do (p. 173 n. 16). Notomi has yet to learn the first lesson of a fledgling controversialist: never attribute to your chosen adversary things that he has not said. You can hardly expect your criticisms to be taken seriously if you do. Oh, and if you possibly can, when attempting to criticise someone else, do try to avoid falling into gross error of your own. 16 17 The Stranger’s ‘farewell’ 19 τ’Brien, Dέ 1λκιέ Études sur Parménide, tome i, Le Poème de Parménide, Texte, Traduction, Essai Critique, ‘en collaboration avec Jean όrère pour la traduction française’έ Parisμ Jέ Vrin. τ’Brien, Dέ 1λλ1aέ Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, An Exercise in the Interpretation of the ‘Enneads’. Napoli: Bibliopolis. τ’Brien, Dέ 1λλ1bέ ‘Platon et Plotin sur la Doctrine des Parties de l’Autre’, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 116e année, tome 181, 501-512. τ’Brien, Dέ 1λλ3έ Théodicée Plotinienne, Théodicée Gnostique. Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill. τ’Brien, Dέ 1λληέ Le Non-Être, Deux Études sur le ‘Sophiste’ de Platon. Sankt-Augustin: Akademia Verlag. τ’Brien, Dέ 2000έ ‘Parmenides and Plato on What Is σot’, in εέ Kardaun, J. Spruyt (ed.), The Winged Chariot, Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L. M. de Rijk. Leiden, Boston, Köln: E. J. Brill, 19104. τ’Brien, Dέ 200ηέ ‘εatière et Émanation dans les Ennéades de Plotin’, in C. Viano (ed.), L’Alchimie et ses Racines Philosophiques, La Tradition Grecque et la Tradition Arabe. Paris: Vrin, 63-87. τ’Brien, Dέ 200λaέ ‘Plotinμ δa Question du εal’, Cahiers d’Études Lévinassiennes 8, 295-317. τ’Brien, Dέ 200λbέ ‘Plato the Pythagoreanμ A Critical Study of Kenneth Sayre, Plato’s Late Ontology, A Riddle Resolved’, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3, 58-77. Owen, G. E. δέ 1λι1έ ‘Plato on σot-Being’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. i, Metaphysics and Epistemology. Garden City, New York: Doubleday (overprinted Macmillan), 223-267. Reprinted (but, most unfortunately, with a different numbering of the footnotes) in M. Nussbaum (ed.), G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic, Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. London: Duckworth, 1986, 104-137. Van Eck, Jέ 2002έ ‘σot-Being and Differenceμ τn Plato’s Sophist 256 D 5258 E 3’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23, 63-84.19 Readers will naturally be led to wonder whether you have the finesse to see the mote you claim to see in someone else’s eye, if you are unable to see the beam in your ownέ 19 This item too calls for a word of warning. The author criticises, at some length, the translation of a crucial sentence in the Greek (256 D 12-E 3), a translation which he attributes to myself (p. 66 n. 5), but which is not mine at all. The words Van Eck has quoted, and that he has attached to my name, are not words that I have ever, or would ever, have written. This extraordinary blunder has arisen because Van Eck has taken 20 Denis O’Brien Vlastos, G. 1971. Platonic Studies. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pressέ There is the same pagination in a ‘Second printing, with corrections’, 1λκ1έ upon himself to translate into English my όrench translation of Plato’s ύreek and, seemingly without a qualm, has then put his translation between inverted commas, preceded by a reference to myself, all this without the slightest indication to the reader that the words in quotation marks are not mine, but his. Shame on the author, and shame on the editor, for so flagrant a violation of the sacredness of quotation marks. For in this worst of all possible worlds, not only is Van Eck’s ‘quotation’ not a quotation, but a translation; it is, as it happens, a translation that is doubly false, false as a translation of my French and false as a translation of Plato’s ύreek—as is also the attempted translation of Plato’s words that Van Eck seeks to put in its placeέ Error piled on errorέ