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The First Cognitive War

Israel's strategic environment has witnessed dramatic changes in the array of threats. The nuclear agreement between the world powers and Iran took the immediate Iranian nuclear threat off the table and postponed it for several treaties were signed with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), and following has since been reduced further now that the Syrian army no longer poses a risk, due to its involvement in the civil war and the tremendous losses it has sustained there. The sub-conventional threat, especially from Hezbollah, has because of the resources that Iran has invested to beef up the organization. Nonetheless, Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war should at least delay its decision to embark on another major operation against Israel. The current security threats to Israel are rooted in three sources: 1 a) states, al-Qaeda organizations, and organizations with expansionist visions, such many other states. In addition, efforts persist in establishing terrorist cells typical of the terrorism Israel has tackled since October 2015. In other

Cognitive Warfare

Beginning in the fall of 2015, Israel faced a wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated is a worldwide campaign at work seeking to attain a range of objectives, including the undermining of Israel's legitimacy and its judicial system, promotion of an academic and economic boycott, and attacks on Israel at the diplomatic level within the international community. The terrorism of no organizational infrastructure or organized logistics. Common to these attacks is the extensive use of social media to foment and promote action against Israel, both within Israel and abroad.

The information revolution underway over the last few decades has created many positive aspects, the phenomenon includes some highly problematic of cognitive manipulation, encouragement of potential terrorism, high levels of incitement, and the attainment of measurable outcomes affecting decision makers and public opinion -at far lower costs than in the past, when it was necessary to create effects and impact by non-virtual action in the physical realm. Thus, in an ongoing process, the effectiveness of classical force relevance of resource-intensive, kinetic means of warfare lessens. 5 The direct broadcast of mass media through social and other digital media allows for the transmission of messages targeting different audiences in a affects the classical media, such as TV, radio, and print journalism, thus generating more intense reverberations of the original message. The global wave of terrorism is in part a result of the messages transmitted over the effect on the levels of fear among civilian populations.

Beyond the challenge of terrorism affected by messages in social media and other internet platforms, Israel also has to deal with target groups investing extensive efforts into damaging its image and policies. Different audiences in the international community are subjected to internet-based efforts aimed at altering their consciousness in order to promote a boycott of Israel and oppose its policies and actions. These efforts have a direct impact on decision makers as well as on a range of relevant groups -be they NGOs, politicians, or others. One of the goals is to undercut the legitimacy of Israel's court system to affect relevant decisions in international institutions. Although these efforts operate independently and in a decentralized fashion, they fuel one another in a perpetual echo chamber.

Operation Protective Edge demonstrated the true dimensions of the phenomenon. The enemy's successes in the war cannot be measured only Hamas's adoption of the "victim doctrine" 6 serves to maximize those successes. The legal campaign confronting Israel (before, during, and after the operation) by many elements in the international community reduces the IDF's freedom of action in future confrontations in general and in the use of certain weapons in particular. For the enemy, these are all important long term accomplishments, of no lesser importance than physical damage and physical casualties. Another cognitive effort is aimed at affecting the Israeli public and weakening its fortitude. Hamas, for example, makes focused efforts aimed solely at generating cognitive-related victories while International Airport during Operation Protective Edge. Even though the rockets hit nothing, the idea was to generate a cognitive victory against the This type of warfare makes extensive use of information infrastructures to reach a wide variety of important target groups. In a cognitive war against enemies and rivals spread all over the globe, the main effort is aimed at success using modern communications technologies. Israel's security greatly depends on the IDF and the other security agencies, but it seems that the Israel formulated a proactive approach that succeeded in tackling suicide terrorism, the wave of lone wolf terrorists besetting Israel since the fall methodologies. Moreover, it is far from being the only and perhaps even the most dangerous of the threats, as the effort to constrain the IDF's freedom of action is a very severe and troubling threat.

How to Confront the Challenge

The IDF's main operation of force takes place in physical space, and its force buildup is also informed by the traditional dimensions of space. Thus, cognitive effect on different groups, but the classical objective of the use of military force has always been to attain real, physical achievements, while e.g., the destruction of the Egyptian and Jordanian air forces in the Six rationale was mainly psychological, such as the supersonic booms above Assad's palace in Damascus, sending him the message that he ought to rein in terrorism coming from the Golan Heights. Alongside these, the IDF operates some softer efforts, such as defensive and offensive cyber actions, designed to support the primary action, which remains kinetic. Although consciousness, the effectiveness of kinetic means against the threat inherent in a consciousness war is generally low. This is like a knight of the Middle Ages suiting up in his armor before going to war, who is brought to knees Kinetic force construction and capabilities remain a protective shield against a range of threats Israel still faces. But the IDF and the State of Israel must balance their investments in kinetic force buildup with the development of a current method of action, supported by the range of cognitive capabilities war effectively. The IDF cannot be the only element conducting this war. radical reorganization at the national level. Some of the challenges Israel wolf attackers, motivated primarily by incitement and cognitive efforts invested by jihadist organizations, or the effort to undermine the legitimacy of any use of force, which is liable to damage the freedom of action of other full recognition that we are, in fact, already in the midst of a mixed, multiof a comprehensive approach. Such an approach would have to combine all force operators in the state, as well as legal, economic, and diplomatic several ways, including: the development of intelligence guidance capabilities by means of relevant essential elements of information, and intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities to generate an ongoing, up-to-date, relevant situational assessment. The army must also develop methods to evaluate success at the cognitive front, in order to try to link action to results. Intelligence analysis and a concrete situational assessment would allow Israel to undertake a cognitive assessment, with this being an inherent part of the overall situation assessment, both at the national level and at the level of the IDF. Therefore, it is necessary to develop the ability to undertake an integrated situational assessment that would involve all the relevant elements at the national level (the IDF, the various security agencies, the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the state's public diplomacy organizations, and others). It is likewise necessary to develop the ability to act on the consciousness of a range of different target groups. The approach must make provisions for reactive (defensive) actions to existing threats, the ability to foil threats in the making, and also proactive (offensive) actions to attain goals with reference to a range of relevant target groups, including the potential lone and elements in the international community (decision makers, public opinion leaders, and NGOs).

To realize the ability to make such a situational assessment at the national level and to monitor actions and their results, it behooves decision makers to set up a National Cognitive Situation Room where all the relevant parties would be partnered. Such a situation room would have to formulate an ongoing situational assessment based on intelligence, research insights, and a continual evaluation in order to synchronize all actions of the different organizations action in the realm of consciousness, mostly toward marketing, advertising, and media campaigns. It is necessary to train and develop manpower at the national level that can operate effectively in the cognitive war in a similar way. The IDF will have to be involved, even though traditionally, the army's importance of technology as a critical component in operating in the realm of consciousness must not be underestimated. Realizing the method of action negligible compared to the sums going toward kinetic force construction.

Israel is not alone in this war. Even though there are differences between the challenges it faces and those confronting other nations, a platform for cooperation with states confronting similar threats must be established. Extensive intelligence cooperation with many nations is already in place. In addition, it is necessary to expand cooperation in developing joint capabilities and constructing broad coalitions involved in common actions. Cooperation is likewise needed in dealing with the giants of technology. Israel has already started a legislative process to handle incitement in general, and on the internet in particular. Attempts have been made with hi-tech companies to remove problematic contents from the web. 7 as regulation and legislation, which may help reduce incitement on the basis of international law. 8 This would reduce the freedom of action of potential terrorists and terrorist elements on the internet and their use of information technology.

Conclusion

what that war would look like. Indeed, the threat from Hezbollah in the northern sector is serious, and the IDF must prepare for it in every way. But concurrent with this threat, Israel is at this very moment in the midst of a cognitive war that uses internet infrastructures to attack Israel and its citizens with terrorism. Most of the action is aimed at people's psyches, whether it is to persuade the international community to act against Israel or to incite individuals to commit lone acts of terrorism. At the same time, the country's enemies use the web for a host of ends, including promoting the BDS movement, harming Israel's legal system, and damaging Israel's freedom of action and the legitimacy of the State of Israel.

Israel must appreciate the potency of this war, and take action in a way that would allow it operate effectively against enemies and hostile entities. Some of these challenges are shared by other states, and it is therefore war is not in the future. It is underway here and now. It would be best were the country's decision makers to internalize this insight as soon as possible so that appropriate action can be taken.