What is Justice

I will discuss Thrasymachu’s new on present justice in the first and Second Republic of Plato’s. I will first demonstrate Plato’s project plan within its historical and cultural context. Now in order to show the function idea of Thrasymachus as representing common cultural conceptions extant at the time Plato wrote the Republic I shall refer to “Solon and Thucydides”, Thucydides is of particular value and a fellow member of the relate aristocracy at a time very close to Plato. In his description of Athenian attitudes to justice, then therefore offers a close source to compare with Plato. I shall then examine the key steps undertaken by Thrasymachus and then Glaucon in the Republic. Many of these steps are in response to objections by Socrates. Finally, I shall extract the logical propositions within these passages. By making explicit implied propositions and intermediate conclusions, I shall show that Thrasymachu’s position offers a compatible view of justice. Moreover, I shall show that this view is not one which attempts to provide a single definition. I shall further indicate that it is the false assumption that Thrasymachus is attempting a definition of justice, rather than merely describing various aspects of it, which generates the perception of incompatible. “It is said that It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong;” These words were written by Thucydides a few decades before Plato’s Republic. He reports them as spoken by the Athenians to the Spartans in the debate,(Thucydides, History,433-431BC.), which preceded the opening rounds of the Peloponnesian Wars. These words reflect an understanding of human affairs which was common throughout classical Greece, not least during the decades between the Peloponnesian Wars and the rise of Philip of Macedon, the era during which Plato lived and against which he reacted. It is this view which Thrasymachus represents in Plato's Republic. Plato's Republic is a political work which examines, among other things, the nature of justice. In Athens, if not all of classical Greece, justice is both a personal view as valor and virtue and a civic necessity. The presence of justice was considered essential both for the orderly interaction between citizens and for the overall survival of the polis. These were considered inter-dependent, as we see in Solon’s The Constitutional Order, which states that, should the citizenry fail to protect the “revered temples of Justice,” disaster will befall each citizen in person, invading the very unit of society. “ Thus does the public evil come home to each of us. Straining, the courtyard gates no longer hold fast, the evil leaps o'er the high walls; it finds every one, even him fleeing to the inmost chamber.” To the modern reader, it can appear that Plato is in error when he fails to distinguish between expressions of valor and virtue and the universal principle itself. However, this intimate interconnection between personal conduct and civic order means we cannot separate the relating aspects of justice from acting to illustrate of justice or its linguistic definitions. This is something we must bear in mind as we observe Thrasymachus offering apparently unconnected statements regarding justice, some of which appear unsteady if viewed as formal definitions. The Republic begin with a recitation and analysis of some of the more common understandings of justice extant at the time. With respect, Socrates asks Cephalus if he would agree unconditionally that justice is speaking the truth and paying debts,(Repbulic,I,331c.). Cephalus does not really answer, but the key point of the passage is to indicate that there is more to justice than a blind adherence to a rigid set of rules, and that the nature of justice deserves deeper examination. Here we see Plato’s dialectic in action, the formulation early in a dialog of a false proposition which can be subject to a Socratic refutation so as to clear the way for a proposition which can lead to a true conclusion. Polemachus then takes up the discussion for Cephalus, taking the traditional view of the poet of Hesiod’n value of doing good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies. An almost universally accepted value in the competitive culture of Classical Greece.(Republic,I,336a.), Socrates manipulates it until it becomes a practice of tyrants. At this point, Plato has dealt with two traditional conceptions of justice. It is now time for the famous Sophist, Thrasymachus, to appear. Thrasymachus will provide a series of responses to the question “what is justice?” On the surface of it, these responses will appear contradictory. Debate has raged over whether these statements are, in fact, contradictory. Some have questioned whether they should even be seen as constituting a coherent argument, while others have attempted to resolve the apparent contradictions by searching for complementary meanings within the terms of the statements and which indicate the existence of some "inner" sense to which the terms pertain, like Aristotelian properties concealing a mysterious foundation. Thrasymachus starts by stating, that "Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger." Socrates asks him to explain this statement further, (Republic,I,338c.). Thrasymachus then offers the following argument. Some cities are ruled by tyranny, some by democracy, and some by a aristocracy. And in each city this element is stronger, namely, the ruler. And each makes laws as to its own advantage. And they declare that what they have made is what is to their own advantage to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone accordance in Thrasymachu’s understanding of Justice in Plato’ s Republic who goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere,(Republic,I,338d-339a.). The advantage is of the stronger. It is important to focus on the specification that justice is not, in this passage, an inherent aspect of the laws, but is an attribute given them by the rulers. This is not a definition of justice, but an empirical observation of political reality. Socrates’ objection is that the ruler may create laws which go against his own interests. Acting in accordance with these laws would still be called justice but would actually be to the disadvantage of the rules,(Republic,I,339b-e.). Clitophon attempts to recover Thrasymachus by arguing that "the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage, ”but Thrasymachus specifically rejects this interpretation,(Republic,I,340b-c.). Instead, he responds that, a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, (Republic,I,341a.), never makes errors and accurate decrees what is best for himself. Thrasymachus examines here the nature of the definition of a role. He says that, though we may use the term ‘ruler’ within the language, such that we can say "a ruler in error," in actual fact, at the moment a ruler is making the error, he is not ruling. In this sense, ‘ruler’ refers to a form of principles, rather than a political position. In this case, the principle is present only when executed perfectly. According to Thrasymachus, there are no degrees of quality in the execution of principles. When is not executed with perfection, it is not present at all. The name which is applied to principles is also used as a generic referent to the person executing it. However, this is merely a convenience of speech and not a definition. The true definition reflects the execution of the principles and not the person executing it, and this execution must be perfect, and so a person or number of people cannot be said to be a ruler when he decrees something which is not in his own best interest. Thrasymachus’ objection, if accepted, does prevent Socrates from pulling together the different propositions within Thrasymachus’ argument in a contradictory fashion. Socrates does not attempt to refute this argument. Instead, he simply requests that. (Republic,I,341b.), Thrasymachus speak more precisely in the future. He shifts ground and starts to attack Thrasymachus by exploring exactly what the role of the ruler is by reference to the ends then he seeks to achieve through the execution of his role. (Republic,I,341c-e.). At this point, Plato has shifted from Thrasymachus’ empirical analysis of the ruler as we experience the wood to a philosophical analysis. In a certain sense Socrates is responding to Thrasymachus’ description of political reality with a discussion of the ideal form of the ruler. Socrates argues to the conclusion that the function of the ruler is to do “what is advantageous for his subject” and states that is in fact.(Republic,I,342e.). what happened. Thrasymachus quickly dismisses Socrates’ proposition as in credulous, stating that the direction to caring for a flock of people or sheep is to exploit them. Thrasymachus instead focuses his response on the consequences of justice as a normative value. He argues that, in an exchange between two parties, the one who acts unjustly will have an advantage over the one who acts justly. It is at this point a new proposition about justice is introduced by Thrasymachus. “Justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and those it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve happy, but themselves not at all, “ (Republic,I,343c.). A just man always gets less than an unjust one. He then proceeds to give examples drawn from personal conduct and builds upon these to the duplicity of conduct conclusion that unjust conduct of sufficient magnitude can lead to political domination.(Republic,I,344a.). Especially, A Demonstration of compatibility in Thrasymachus ’ understanding of Justice in (Plato’s, Republic,VI.) “Injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. And, as I said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger where does the justice end? (Republic, I, 344c.), while injustice is to one's own profit and advantage. Thrasymachus never presents any further positions. The rest of Republic,I. Is occupied with various attacks by Socrates on Thrasymachus’ position. However, Glaucon, “as the older brother of Plato,” takes up Thrasymachus’ arguments in (Republic, II.). He reiterates Thrasymachus’ relying approach by proposing that, while justice is “valor and virtue,” it is a duty to perform. According to Glaucon, most people act justly for the accrual of benefit rather than the sake of being just itself, (Republic,II,358a.). He then argues that justice is a compromise which people accept in order to prevent more powerful people from treating them unjustly. Here he reiterates and expands what had been a minor aspect of Thrasymachus argument’,(Republic,I,344a–d). He further argues that anyone who had both the power and the will to act unjustly towards others would never enter into such an agreement,(Republic,II,359a-b). Repeat any Thucydides’ Athenians,’ Glaucon contends that competition between people is natural, and justice is the process of using the law to force this competitiveness(Republic,II,359c-360c.) into patterns of behaviour governed by pleasing appearance. His following discussions throughout Republic II extend this position by showing that it is merely the reputation for justice which is important, not the reality(Republic,II,360e-362c.), even with regard to the gods. In fact, for Glaucon, the ideal is according to the principle combination of ruthless injustice combined with the appearance of utmost justice. There are several arguments presented by Thrasymachus and Glaucon in Republic I and II. Only one offers an obvious definition of justice, while the others discuss the consequences and causes of justice. We can summarise the logical structure of Thrasymachus’ definitional argument as follows. Premise1. Laws are created by government for their advantage. PremiseII. Justice is obedience to the laws. Conclusion1.Justice is to the advantage of the government. , Premise3.The government is the stronger. Conclusion2. Justice is the advantage of the stronger. Afterwards Thrasymachus defines justice as the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys the law(Republic,I,343c.) and serves. It is often the case that the critical element examined within this statement is that justice is the good of another, as if this criterion can be separated from the advantage of the stronger and the ruler. This leads to the popular alternatives that there exists an apparent contradiction between justice is the advantage of the stronger and justice is the good of the other. However, Thrasymachus does not connect these two phrases with and. Had he done so, then the two phrases could legitimately be treated as complementary elements in a definition which permits of multiple criteria. However, when commas are used in this fashion within definitional statements, they stand in for “ that is to say”. Thus, the grammatical structure of the sentence implies that “the advantage of the stronger and the ruler is a clarification of the preceding phrase, If this is the case, then Thrasymachus has further defined “another as the stronger and the ruler.” On this basis we may represent the logical structure of this second proposition as Premise1.Justice is the good of another. Premise2.The other is the stronger. Premise3.The good of another is the same as the advantage of another. ConclusionI1.The good of the stronger is the advantage of the stronger. Conclusion2.Justice is the advantage of the stronger. To show clearly that whether the two definitions of justice as the advantage of the stronger and justice as the advantage of another are contradictory or not depends on how one interprets the connection between the two adjacent phrases in the sentence. While this is not the common interpretation of this passage, and depends on the accuracy of the translation, I am inclined to trust the translation and regard Thrasymachu’s statement here as complementary to his original statement. There also exists an argument regarding the effects of justice. PremiseI. Justice pertains to interactions between two parties of differing degrees of power. PremiseII.Justice is good for the stronger party and bad for the weaker. We can, furthermore, extend this by making explicit the implied connections between terms, as follows. Premise1II.What is good for someone is to his advantage. We can therefore conflate good for with “the advantage” to reach the following at the end. ConclusionI. Justice is the advantage of the stronger. These examinations show that Thrasymachus is operating on a principle view of justice, but that this stability is not made explicit within Thrasymachus’ statements. The unsatisfactory is, to a certain degree, a product of a modern understanding of the definition. Plato does not seek to create strict definitions in the modern mode, but indicates aspects of a concept through reference to linguistic usage, empirical examples, thought experiments, and so forth. To a certain degree, this is what Aristotle attempted to make formal with his four causes. Thrasymachus describes a form of justice “obedience to the law,” an effect of justice “advantage of the stronger and an aspect of the dynamics of justice,”, that in an exchange between the just and the unjust, the unjust will win. If one accepts that Thrasymachus is discussing justice in this way, and if we make explicit the implied propositions and connections within his statements, a coherent picture emerges which enlighten various aspects of justice rather than attempting to define a single constituting definition. Works Cited Ancient Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, (1st, ed), etc: Oxford UP, Plato, Republic. Trans. by G.M.A, Grube and rev. by C.D.C. Reeve. Reading in Ancient Greek Philosophy: from Thales to Aristotle,(4, ed). Ed by S. Marc Cohen, Curd, and C.D.C Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett 2011, Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian – September 30, 1954, Ed, M. I. Finley, Trans. Rex Warner, Thrasmymachus and Justice: A Reply G. B. Kerferd Phronesis Vol. (c.a.9)d. No. 1,pp. 12-16 Published, Biography Adkins A. H. ,Merit, Responsibility, and Thucydides Classical Quarterly 25. No. 20, pp. 209- 220, Gordon Robert, Socratic Definitions and "Moral Neutrality" The Journal of Philosophy. 61, (ia.60) 15: 433-450, Solon On the Athenian Constitution Trans by David Shavin FIDELIO Magazine, Summer. P1. What position does Thrasymachus take on Justice and why. P.1 How does he shifts his position under the questioning by Socrates. P.I1 What is that finally embraces Thrasymachus into silence. Angelino I