What, according to Aristotle, is the good of having friends?

What, according to Aristotle, is the good of having friends? Friendship, it seems, has always enjoyed good press. In our present day, given the tremendous popularity of social networking websites like Facebook and MySpace, the notion that it is good to have friends and probably in abundance seems very much established. Against this backdrop, to ask what good there is in having friends may appear superfluous if not utterly nonsensical. While it may be suggested that the answer to this question is obvious, it is arguable that not many people could give compelling reasons why having friends is good. The question may thus be justifiably posed: what is the good of having friends? Not surprisingly, this is an issue that exercised Aristotle’s mind. In a number of his ethical works, namely the Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, Aristotle addresses this issue, arguing for the view that having friends is good. This essay will explain and evaluate Aristotle’s viewpoint. I will begin by putting Aristotle’s focus on friendship, as set out chiefly in books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in perspective. Aristotle’s treatment of friendship falls within the broad compass of his account of how the final good of human beings is constituted and realised. For Aristotle, the final good of humans consists in eudaimonia, a term often rendered as happiness, success, or flourishing. In developing his account of how eudaimonia may be achieved, Aristotle highlights the importance of virtuous living, distinguishing the virtues into two broad categories, namely moral and intellectual virtues. To Aristotle’s mind, given that friendship “is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living” (1155a4-5) it merits special attention. Accordingly, he devotes two full books to an explanation and analysis of friendship, books described by Vella as “one of the most thorough and insightful investigations of the nature and value of friendship” in all philosophy (2008: 157). Aristotle’s discussion of friendship bears much significance to his overall account in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN). It helps, so some scholars argue, to correct a possible misreading of Aristotelian ethical theory as egoistic. Given that the EN is generally focused on ways in which individuals may come to attain eudaimonia for themselves, some may hold that “Aristotle’s ethics is crucially self-centred rather than other-directed; each agent should seek what is good for her, not for others” (Vella 2008: 118). Countering this view, Cooper observes that it is within this discussion of friendship that Aristotle “directly expresses himself on the nature, and importance to a flourishing human life, of taking an interest in other persons, merely as such and for their own sake” (1980: 303). He further states that Aristotle’s treatment of friendship “contains a very significant amplification of the theory of moral virtue found in the middle books of the Nicomachean Ethics and that his theory of virtue cannot be completely understood unless read in the light of it” (1980: 303). A similar view is expressed by Shields who regards Aristotle’s discussion of friendship as constituting a corrective to the misimpression of Aristotelian ethical theory as thoroughly egoistic (2007: 334). Arguably, friendship has marked importance in Aristotle’s ethical scheme. With the aforementioned as background, it is important now to outline some central ideas of Aristotle’s viewpoint. The first noteworthy point is that the relationship Aristotle deals with, expressed in Greek by the term philia and translated in English as friendship, covers a wider range of phenomena than is entailed in our modern use and understanding of the term friendship (Cooper 1980: 301). Kraut explains that the use of the term philia was not reserved solely to voluntary relationships but also described the relationship held among family members (2009). That said, Aristotle’s interest and engagement of issues in Books 8 and 9 of the EN speak significantly to our contemporary understanding of friendship. This is not altogether surprising, given that philia accurately represents aspects of our present-day conception of friendship. The relevance of Aristotle’s view is remarkably evident with respect to his taxonomy of friendship. Led by the understanding that things are lovable on account of their being useful, pleasant or good, Aristotle posits three kinds of friendship corresponding to these reasons. Accordingly, friendship, for Aristotle, is based on utility, pleasure, or goodness, each kind being as it were contingent on the predominant factor or quality binding people together. Carmichael explains Aristotle’s categorization as teleological, specified “according to three desirable goals: ‘the good, the pleasant, and the useful (1155b19), exactly the same ends on which his whole ethical system depends” (2004: 17). To Aristotle’s mind, friendships based on utility and pleasure are deficient expressions of what genuinely characterizes friendship. He remarks: “Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental” (1156a14-18). Aristotle regards such friendships as imperfect and prone to easy dissolution. The “friendships” of persons in business relations – ‘my lawyer friend will help get us out of this mess’ – and shared sporting interests – ‘Josh is a friend I get together with once a week for game of tennis’ are illustrative of friendships of utility and pleasure respectively. It is little surprise that some would call people they relate with in such circumstances acquaintances rather than friends. Sharply contrasted with friendships of utility and pleasure is friendship based on goodness, also referred to as friendship of character (Cooper 1980: 308) or virtue-friendship (Cooper 1980: 307). Regarded by Aristotle as perfect friendship (teleia philia), it is “the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally” (1156b6-10). Friendship based on goodness is thus for Aristotle archetypal friendship. It is also understandably Aristotle’s primary interest in his treatment of friendship (Shields 2007: 335), especially since to his mind this relationship exhibits the fullest and best expression of love and friendship (1165b24). Perfect friendship, because it is based on goodness or virtue, tends to endure; the stability of each friend’s good character ensuring this. Virtue-friendship is however not commonplace because people of such unqualified goodness are rare (1156b25). “Such friendship,” Aristotle remarks, “requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’” (1156b26). This last point informs Aristotle’s view of there being nothing more characteristic of friends as their living together (1157b19). He also thinks that “[o]ne cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once” (1158a10). Finally, it is noteworthy that, “perfect friendship embraces the advantages of the two imperfect kinds, because the virtuous are also useful and pleasant” (Carmichael 2004: 18). Seemingly, considerable good will obtain in such a relationship. Before dilating on what Aristotle considers good about having friends (such as specified in the archetypal form of character-friends), a few more general ideas concerning his views on friendship deserve mentioning. Closest to an overall definition of friendship in the EN is Aristotle’s remark that for friendship to exist between any two people “they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons [utility, pleasure, goodness]” (1156a4-5). Remarkably, Aristotle views friendships of utility and pleasure as characterized by exchange of goodwill, even if, as Carmichael explains, this “is directed, not to the character of the friend, desiring their excellence to increase, but merely to the increase of those accidental qualities that please me or supply my need” (2004: 18). While emphasising goodwill or eunoia, Aristotle considers it crucial that goodwill be reciprocal. He remarks: “to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship” (1155b 34). A mutual feeling of goodwill, in Aristotle’s view, does not however suffice to characterize friendship. It is necessary that such mutual feelings be recognized. Taking the example of a monarch and her unknown loyal subject, one appreciates the soundness of Aristotle’s observation that “[t]hese people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings?” (1156a2-3). Aristotle’s general account of friendship therefore underscores goodwill, mutuality, reciprocity, and recognition. It is not surprising then that he thinks it erroneous to view the love of lifeless objects as instantiating friendship given that this does not involve a return of love or mutuality and there is no well-wishing to the object for its own sake (1155b29). Aristotle’s general account of friendship combined with his viewpoint about this relationship’s archetype finds clear expression in Finnis’s words, which also concisely summarises the preceding discussion. He states: In the fullest sense of ‘friendship’, A is the friend of B when (i) A acts (or is willing to act) for B’s well-being, for the sake of B, while (ii) B acts (or is willing to act) for A’s well-being, for the sake of A, (iii) each of them knows of the other’s activity and willingness and of the other’s knowledge, and (iv) each of them co-ordinates (at least some of) his activity with the activity (including acts of friendship) of the other so that there is sharing, community, mutuality, and reciprocity not only of knowledge but also of activity (and thus, normally, of enjoyment and satisfaction) (qtd. in Carmichael 2004: 18). The clarity obtained about Aristotle’s conception of friendship grants focusing now on what he considers good about having friends. This issue is specifically dealt with by Aristotle in the ninth chapter of book nine of the EN. There, Aristotle acknowledges a contested viewpoint about whether or not the happy man needs friends. He remarks: “It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends; they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort” (1169b5-7). After briefly considering this view, Aristotle posits that “the happy man needs friends” (1169b21), and subsequently argues in support of his position. Before going on to Aristotle’s arguments, two observations Cooper makes are noteworthy. First, he clarifies that Aristotle’s enquiry about whether a flourishing person needs friends is to be understood in terms of “whether the having of friends is a necessary constituent of a flourishing life – not whether friends are needed as a means of improving a life that was already flourishing” (1980: 318). Second, Aristotle’s concern in EN 9.9, as Cooper reads it, relates to why having friends is of itself a value to a person. He states: “That is, one wants to be given reasons for believing that, so to say, anyone who sets out to design for himself a life that shall be a flourishing one ought to arrange things so that he forms friendships – so that he becomes attached to certain people in ways that are characteristic of friendship, spends time with them [...] and so on” (1980: 318). Granted that Cooper’s observations are accurate, it becomes clear that friendship is profoundly significant in Aristotle’s ethical scheme; in view of his affirmative position, having friends, for Aristotle, is not just good but indeed essential for attaining eudaimonia. As all Aristotle’s arguments defending the value of friendship rest on the intimacy and affinity characteristic of friendship, these elements cannot be overemphasised. Aristotle is held as famously remarking that one’s friend is heteros autos - “another self”. Aristotle’s two central arguments that “it is only in and through intimate friendship that we can come to know ourselves and to regard our lives constantly as worth living” (Cooper 1980: 332) are hinged precisely on the notion of intimacy, the understanding of a perfect friend as heteros autos. The notions of intimacy and affinity present in perfect friendship as outlined above – recall the image of salt eaten together – is critical in fully appreciating Aristotle’s arguments. The first of Aristotle’s arguments may be termed the argument from self-knowledge. Remarkably, it is in the Magna Moralia rather than the Nicomachean Ethics that this argument obtains full and adequate development. Based on the two assumptions that self-knowledge is essential to human flourishing and that perfect friendship, on account of its intimacy and affinity, entails a self-revelatory dynamism that enables the achievement of self-knowledge, Aristotle defends the goodness and necessity of friendship in a life geared towards eudaimonia. Aristotle states: “[A]s then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having someone else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself” (1213a24-26). Analogous to viewing oneself in a mirror, friendship affords a person self-knowledge with respect to character in much the same way that a mirror outlines physical appearance. Crucially, the robustness of this argument rests on three points, namely: (1) that self-knowledge is integral to eudaimonia; (2) a friend can be likened to a second self; and finally (3) self-knowledge is unachievable besides through friendship. The first point keeps with the tradition of classical Greek thought which prized self-knowledge – gnothi seauton. Of the three points above, it seems the least controversial as it is highly plausible that “a person’s life could not be called flourishing unless in addition to leading the sort of life that is as a matter of fact the best [...] he knew what sort of life he was leading and chose it partly for that reason” (Cooper 1980: 321). Much attention has already been given to what a friend as a second self entails. The characteristics of perfect friendship outlined earlier appear suitably oriented for grounding an estimation of this relationship in such terms. Were one to even concede that sometimes friendships happen between people on the strength of admirable traits one sees in the other but lacks in himself, it seems reasonable that strong underlying similarities of character, intuitively noted by each person, engender and aid in the strengthening of friendship (Cooper 1980: 322). That said, perfect friendships, as Aristotle conceives them, are of fully good persons who are alike in character (1156b7-8). One may therefore accurately view “friends of equal virtue as tokens of a type” (Shields 2007:337), mirroring each other in character and consequently as second selves to each other. The last point that self-knowledge is unattainable except through friendship seems the most contestable. Yet clearly this is what Aristotle expresses in the statement above. It may be suggested that other forms of relationship help one achieve some level of self-knowledge. Even if this were true, presumably Aristotle would counter that none, if any, enables the attainment of self-knowledge to such depths as obtains in friendship; the very nature of perfect friendship ensures this. Hence, self-knowledge qua self-knowledge is realised only through friendship. This presents one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statement. In any case, were it pressed that Aristotle’s present claim be attenuated, it is unlikely that an assertion such as “friendship affords the best possibility of self-knowledge” can be overcome. In addition, whereas objectivity with regard to oneself is difficult, a person’s character, viewed through his heteros autos with whom he is most intimate and alike, becomes objectified to him. As Cooper points out “knowing intuitively that he and his friend are alike in character, such a person could, by studying his friend’s character, come to know his own” (1980: 322). This may result in a situation of delight on contemplating what he and friend are with respect to virtue or unease about what he had thought himself to be, an unease that will doubtless motivate a good person to a more resolute pursuit of virtue. With respect to this value of self-knowledge alone, Aristotle is justified that having friends is good. Aristotle’s second defence of friendship centres on constancy in virtuous living. Briefly stated, Aristotle views friendship as essential for sustaining commitment to and constancy in activities of fundamental importance to a person, activities that contribute decisively to a person’s attainment of eudaimonia. The basic assumption for this view derives from Aristotle’s notion that a solitary life is difficult and that it is with and towards others that one can hope to be continuously active (1170a5-9). This notion is intuitively appealing. As Cooper writes, “the fact that others, especially if they are people one likes or admires, share with one in a commitment to the goal that gives the activity its sense is likely to strengthen one’s own perception of the worth or value of the activity and thereby enable one engage in it with interest and pleasure” (1980: 326-27). If this is true about mundane matters, it is conceivable that it applies to significant issues as well. At the level of commitment to issues of moral importance it stands to reason that each will know the other deeply and intimately. Gauging another person’s commitment to moral values will require knowing him and his character pretty closely, because in this matter commitment involves being either virtuous or not (Cooper 1980: 330). Clearly, the relationship described here is one only perfect friendship measures up to. To be constant in actively pursuing a life of virtue thus requires having perfect friends. Aristotle’s account of friendship and his view about what the good of having friends consists in lends itself most readily to our present-day situation. To a Facebook generation where the number rather than the quality of friendships seems the preoccupation, Aristotle’s conception is very instructive and deeply significant. Friendship, Aristotle points out, plays a critical role in helping secure a happy and fulfilled life. Sources Carmichael, Liz (2004) Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love. London: T&T Clark International. Cooper, John M (1980) “Aristotle on Friendship” in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (ed) Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shields, Christopher (2007) Aristotle. London: Routledge. Kraut, Richard, "Aristotle's Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/aristotle-ethics/>. Accessed: February 2, 2009. McKeon, Richard, ed (2001) The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: The Modern Library. Vella, John A (2008) Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. panie Addy, SJ MA Philosophy 8