An essay in formal ontology

2007

The aim of this book is to present the papers centered upon the subjects of Formal Ontology and Logical Philosophy. The idea of investigating philosophical problems by means of logical methods was intensively promoted in Toruń by the Department of Logic of Nicolaus Copernicus University during last decade. The main driving force behind the initiative and subsequent realizer of this ambition was Jerzy Perzanowski, who headed the Torunian Department of Logic since October 1992 until June 2003. Another aim of this book is to present to the philosophical and logical audience the activities of the Torunian Department of Logic during this decade. The papers in this volume contain the results concerning Logic and Logical Philosophy, obtained within the confines of the projects initiated by the Department of Logic and other international research projects in which the Torunian Department of Logic took part. To sketch the general setting of the Torunian enterprises in the area of Logic and Philosophy we would like to present here a brief history of the Department. The Department of Logic was founded by Tadeusz Czeżowski in the very beginning of the existence of Nicolaus Copernicus University in 1945. In October 1945 he took over the position of professor at the First Chair of Philosophy in the Philosophical Seminar at the Faculty of Humanities. Six years later this chair changed its name to "Chair of Logic". Nicolaus Copernicus University is a direct successor of Jan Kazimierz University in Vilnius. For this reason, the research in the Department was from the beginning strongly influenced by the extraordinarily rich and fruitful tradition of logical investigations which had thrived in Poland between the World Wars and had been established by such prominent logicians and philosophers as

European Modern Studies Journal, 2021

The Central focus of analytic tradition in philosophy was to eliminate all forms of confusion emanating from metaphysical colourationsin in any serious philosophical discourses, a commonplace in ordinary human daily conversations. Motivated by David Hume and Ayer's onslaught on metaphysics, the analytic philosophy as championed by George Edward Moore, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schilick, Gottlob Frege led the radical rebellion against German idealism as articulated by Friedrich Hegel and Francis Herbert Bradley. Subsequent upon the rebellion led by the logical positivists, logical atomism was born with the sole aim of formulating logically perfect language that will overcome the problem of ontology inherent in ordinary language. Ironically, the logically perfect language advocated by the logical atomists was confronted with worse problems than those bedeviling ordinary language. With emerging contradictions, absurdities and dilemmas that characterized the mechanical project of logically perfect language, the logical atomists like Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein had no option than to abandon their initial vision. Though the analytic movement was credited with the various revolutions experience in sciences however, it has failed to totally eradicate the problem of philosophy from human studies. To this end, this paper posits holistic approach of language use to addressing various ontological confusions associated with ordinary language.

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 2011

Many philosophers and logicians have contemplated the relationship between ontology and logic. The author of this paper, working within a Bolzanoan-Husserlian tradition of studying both ontology and logic, considers ontology as the science of the most general features of beings and the most general relations among them. He considers logic as the science concerning the most general statements of all (natural or artificial) languages and the most general relations among them from an inferential point of view. It is possible to see logic in a broader sense as the science of all kinds of relations among all kinds of entities, acts, and processes stating some (objective, subjective, artificial, or conventional) reality. These entities, acts, and processes are not individual; rather, they are idealized, such that their universals may be instantiated at all times and in all places. In formal ontology we search for the properties of those structures of the reality that are formally similar. So we may find some formal truths applying to all things and/or properties and/or processes in different areas of objective/subjective/fictional reality. Surveying briefly the most important relations of logic and ontology in both analytic and phenomenological traditions, the author focuses on this central point: If reality is one as the unity of more or less interconnected and interactive beings of all physical, nonphysical and artificial types, the system of inference too may be one as the unity of more or less interconnected statements of all natural and artificial types. The universal system of inference may be divided into several relatively separate subsystems (having a more or less degree of connection) just as the unified reality has divided into several relatively separate fields (having a more or less degree of connection

Symposium, 2012

It is accepted that certain mereological concepts and phenomenological conceptualisations presented in Carl Stumpf's U ber den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung and Tonpsychologie played an important role in the development of the Husserlian formal ontology. In the third Logical Investigation, which displays the formal relations between part and whole and among parts that make out a whole, one of the main concepts of contemporary formal ontology and metaphysics is settled: ontological dependence or foundation (Fundierung). My main objective is to display Stumpf's concepts of partial content, independent content, spatial wholes, sound wholes, and the different kinds of connection among parts, in particular, fusion (Verschmelzung). Second, I will show how Husserl improved this background, in particular with regards to the exact nature of the theory of manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre), in discussion with Georg Cantor, the father of set theory. Third, I will focus on Ingarden's use of formal ontology and on the different modes of being that can be justified by appealing to the concept of ontological dependence in its Ingardenian variations. If my interpretation is adequate, it should be inferred that formal ontology is the operative theory of phenomenological philosophy, and this must be acknowledged in its full significance with respect to the supposed independence of the phenomenological method since 1913. A further consequence, not developed in this essay, is that formal ontology can be mathematised.

This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz-the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.

Contemporary Polish Ontology

This book is a collection of articles authored by Polish ontologists living and working in the early part of the 21 st century. Harking back to the well-known Polish Lvov-Warsaw School, founded by Kazimierz Twardowski,¹ we try to make our ontological considerations as systematically rigorous and clear as possible-i.e. to the greatest extent feasible, but also no more than the subject under consideration itself allows for. Hence, the papers presented here do not seek to steer clear of methods of inquiry typical of either the formal or the natural sciences: on the contrary, they use such methods wherever possible. At the same time, I would like to draw attention to the fact that despite their adherence to rigorous methods, the Polish ontologists included here do not avoid traditional ontological issues, being inspired as they most certainly are by the great masters of Western philosophyfrom Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas and Leibniz, to Husserl, to name arguably just the most important. The subject of the present volume is no single ontological issue, in that its purpose is to demonstrate the richness of ontology as currently practised in Poland. The articles contained here touch upon and range across the most important ontological issues: substance and dispositions, persons and knowledge, as well as language, time and mathematical objects-not to mention the ontology of action and the metaphysics of possible worlds. During the very first meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov in 1904, Kazimierz Twardowski spoke the following words: "The one and only dogma of the Society will be the conviction that dogmatism is the greatest enemy of scientific work. Just as all radii of a circle, though originating from different points around its circumference, combine and meet in its center, so we wish all directions taken by the work and philosophical views of our Society to aim at just one goal: the illumination of the truth" (Twardowski, 1904, p. 241, trans. C. Humphries). The philosophical metaphor of a circle, in which various methods and issues, striving for true cognition, converge in the middle, fits well with the current book: the reader will encounter ontological analyses here 1 For a general overview, see Woleński (2015).

It is accepted that certain mereological concepts and phenomenological conceptualizations presented in Carl Stumpf´s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, [E.J. Bonset, Amsterdam, 1965 (1873] and Tonpsychologie, [Elibron Classics, Adamant Media Corporation, 2004] played a main role in the development of the Husserlian Formal Ontology. Thus the third Logical Investigation displays the formal relations between part and whole, and among parts to make out a whole. In this Investigation it is settled one of the main concepts of contemporary formal ontology and metaphysics: ontological dependence or foundation (Fundierung). One of the best students of Husserl was Roman Ingarden, who did not accept so easily Husserl´s transcendental turn of 1913. Ingarden specially worked on topics related to ontology, making extensive use of the Husserlian formal ontology, and he himself conceived many modes of being, based on different types of dependence´s relations. My main objective in this presentation is to display Stumpf´s concepts of partial content, independent content, spatial wholes, sound wholes, and the different kinds of connection among parts, in particular, fusion [Verschmelzung]. Secondly, I will display how Husserl improved this background with his formation in mathematics, in particular, with the issue about the exact nature of the theory of manifolds [Mannigfaltigkeitslehre] in discussion with Georg Cantor, the father of set theory. Thirdly I will focus in the use of formal ontology by Ingarden and the different modes of being which can be justified appealing to the concept of ontological dependence and its Ingarden´s variations. The analysis will be justified, in the case of Stumpf, appealing to the psychological representation of space; in the case of Husserl, to the notion of consciousness as field of experiences not unified by a transcendental ego (fifth LI); in the case of Ingarden, to the literary work of art, namely, to the dramatic structure. If this interpretation were adequate, what should be inferred about the relation between formal ontology and phenomenology? My point is that formal ontology is the operative theory in the phenomenological philosophy, and this must be acknowledged in its full significance in respect to the supposed independence of the phenomenological method since 1913. Besides, formal ontology could be mathematized. But this paper does not include a justification to this statement.

This essay suggests loosening pedagogical boundaries in order to prepare children for useful philosophical reflection, particularly ontological boundaries. The argument for this is that the analytic-continental distinction is muddier than most realize. I explain analytical developments in logic from 1884 to 1931 in a way designed to show there should be no real distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy. I suggest this explanation provides sufficient support for dismissing ontological boundaries in certain philosophical contexts as well as in early philosophical education.

stoqatpul.org

2007

Our 1991 paper on the logic of the ontological argument contained an analysis of the structure of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God. We showed that there is a valid argument for God’s existence in Proslogion II. However, in that paper, we deliberately decided not to include a discussion and analysis of the soundness of the argument. In these afterthoughts, we shall take up this question. We plan to argue for the following: 1. Anselm’s argument for Premise 1 is not valid. This casts doubt on the truth of Premise 1 of the ontological argument. 2. If Premise 1 is revised so as to be clearly true, and the rest of the ontological argument is modified so as to preserve validity with the revised Premise 1, then the resulting argument is sound but doesn’t have the conclusion that Anselm wishes to establish. Our analysis in what follows appeals to the theory of abstract objects (Zalta 1983) and to the distinction between exemplifying and encoding a property fundamental to that theor...