Vietnamese Cultural Diplomacy: An Emerging Strategy

Vietnamese Cultural Diplomacy: An Emerging Strategy Gary D. Rawnsley & Chi Ngac Both authors would like to thank members of the Vietnam embassy in London who agreed to be interviewed on three separate occasions in 2012, 2013 and 2015. “… Cultural Diplomacy reveals the soul of a nation” (US Department of State, 2005, p.3) Since 2009, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereafter Vietnam) has turned its attention to developing a programme of activities that its government defines as “cultural diplomacy”. In Vietnam’s judgement, cultural diplomacy is an important strategic apparatus that must be integrated with the nation’s economic and political mechanisms of statecraft to further Vietnam’s regional and global ambitions. The government has identified cultural diplomacy as the most important method of building meaningful international relationships based on mutual understanding (MoFA, 2008, p.54). Hence, cultural diplomacy is ostensibly the driving force in the strategic shift of national ambitions and priorities: from “want to befriend” (stated at the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, CVN, in June 1991) to “search for friends and reliable partners” (9th National Congress, April 2001), “Vietnam is ready to be a creditable friend and partner with all countries in the international community, struggling for peace, independence and development” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001, p.42). to an aspiration for Vietnam to be a “responsible member of the international community” (11th National Congress, January 2011). The Vietnamese government is confident that this shift demonstrates its ambitions to engage more with the world and to participate in regional and international affairs; and the structural arrangements of Vietnam’s foreign policy - at the levels of both decision-making and implementation - are designed to help realise these aspirations. In short, Vietnam accepts cultural diplomacy as a rational alternative and strategic counterweight to the influence of major powers in the region (MoFA, 2008, pp.54-5). Vietnam could never hope to compete with China and Japan - and the US’s continuing involvement in Asia - in terms of hard power. Hence, this reality has provoked the government in Hanoi to seek alternative methods of expressing and exercising power and influence, and to raise Vietnam’s international profile. Vietnam’s Ambassador to the UK and Ireland at the time of field research, Minh Quang Vu, observed in an interview in 2012 how his country “does not focus exclusively on the ambition to use its culture to influence and dominate publics abroad, but it prefers to enhance mutual understanding, trust and relationship-building” (Interview, 21 May 2012). This chapter discusses and evaluates how the Vietnamese government aligns its cultural diplomacy strategy with its national and international ambitions, and considers how Vietnam’s diplomatic missions overseas integrate culture into their routines and practices. The Vietnam case-study is especially interesting and valuable for it challenges the received wisdom about which actors are best suited to designing and executing a cultural diplomacy strategy. While most studies of cultural diplomacy highlight the value of maintaining as much distance as possible from the government, thus allowing the cultural industries to work without being tainted by explicit political objectives or suspicions of “propaganda” – “it often behooves governments to keep in the background and to work with private actors” who “enjoy more trust than governments do” (Nye, 2008, p.105) - the Vietnamese government has decided to take a central and hands-on role in the design and execution of the country’s cultural diplomacy activities. The integration with economics and politics has clearly persuaded the government that the state should decide the narrative: which themes and images to present to the world, and how. This indicates a second reason for examining Vietnam’s approach: This is relatively new territory for Hanoi which has only recently dipped its toe in the public diplomacy waters; and this is reflected in the absence of any comprehensive discussion - in English and Vietnamese - of Vietnam’s public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy, or what might be termed its overall “soft power” strategy. Two important and valuable sources written by Vietnamese scholars are Nguyen, T.A (2008) and Nguyen, T.T.T. (2008). So, as a preliminary discussion and as the prelude to more thorough research, this chapter suggests that, by looking closely at Vietnam we can observe how a small power - a developing country which enjoys relative political stability and is growing in regional stature - begins to understand the necessity of international cultural engagement for the realisation of its ambitions, especially to balance the more powerful actors in the neighbourhood. The pursuit of cultural diplomacy may reveal weaknesses in a country’s hard power and may be able to compensate for deficiencies in the hard power and geopolitical domains. Small countries like Vietnam are more likely to use cultural diplomacy as a tool for domestic development by boosting tourism and foreign investment (MoFA, 2008, p.54-5). A final objective of this chapter addresses the prominence of culture in the strategies of Asian, and especially (neo)authoritarian societies. Neither Vietnam’s reasoning for situating culture at the centre of its diplomacy, not its methods of projecting the national culture to define and sell Vietnam to international audiences, is unique. Rather, any analysis of Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese public diplomacy must privilege culture as their core mechanism of international communications. Hence, this paper speaks to a wider research agenda that questions the relevance and appropriation of western approaches to public and cultural diplomacy and soft power by societies with very different culture, traditions, histories and political philosophies. We suggest that it is essential to analyse cultural diplomacy from the perspective of the specific society’s own understanding and practice; and this is why we are confident that this discussion will contribute to an analysis of “de-Westernisation” which expands discussions about the concept beyond Anglo-American models and relocates public and cultural diplomacy within specific cultural, social and political contexts that better reflect local approaches to politics, international relations and communications. This research agenda is concerned with more than simply describing and studying how different countries design and execute soft power strategies; it is also an attempt to contribute a more culturally-sensitive and nuanced understanding and explanation of different theoretical and conceptual perspectives we may find beyond Europe and the US. As more and more governments in Asia are developing their public diplomacy capacity as an instrument of statecraft, we must appreciate fully the way understandings of power, diplomacy and public and cultural diplomacy are embedded within, help shape and are shaped by distinct environments. Vietnam experiences friction between the dominant narratives of socialist modernisation, driven by its Communist Party, and the continuous references to culture and tradition. Cultural, traditional and historical themes may be the most popular among audiences and are the easiest for the government to sell. Its dilemma – one that it shares with its close Communist neighbour, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) – is the lack of an obvious correlation between enjoying traditional qualities, including culture, and liking contemporary Vietnam, its policies, political system or its behaviour at home and abroad (Wang, 2010). Here, the Chinese experience is instructive. The appeal of the PRC’s modernisation and its self-projection as a strong, confident and increasingly powerful nation is problematic and reveals internal linguistic and conceptual conflicts about the product China is selling: Which is the more authentic China? As Ramo (2007, p.12) has noted, “China has changed faster than any nation in history” but “its image has failed to keep up with these changes.” Hence the persistence of specific rhetorical devices that serve a legitimising function at home, but mean little overseas. Vietnam too, another equally dynamic Asian society with growing economic and strategic relevance for the region, has yet to decide what Vietnam is or which Vietnam is the most appropriate for overseas consumption. Moreover, Vietnam has been constrained by its own past. Decades of colonialism, revolution, war, reconstruction and a damaging international embargo meant that cultural and public diplomacy were not national priorities until Vietnam could begin to engage more with the world after the normalisation of relations with the US in 1995. Yet war remains the dominant image of Vietnam for many international audiences and therefore restricts the efficacy of its cultural outreach. Unlike the Chinese Communist Party which embraces and projects China’s past status as “victim” during the “century of humiliation” to amplify its nationalist ambitions (Callahan, 2009), the government of Vietnam is far more cautious in discussing its recent painful history, preferring instead to focus more on the distant past and the virtues of its traditional culture. Cultural Diplomacy “Above all else is culture” (Liang Zhuge, military adviser in China’s Three Kingdoms). While there is no settled definition of cultural diplomacy, there are two descriptions that help our understanding of the concept and its practice. The first is a much-used and broad description which claims cultural diplomacy is “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2003, p.1). Pavan Varma, head of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, agrees with this essentially idealist approach, suggesting that culture [H]as the potential to shape, alter and impact the ideas and opinions of public communities. From a wide-ranging perspective, culture has the capacity to resolve tensions and prejudices – ethnic, religious, communal, national and international. It can create a climate of tolerance, respect and understanding among nations, religions and entire regions. It is thus an essential medium for peaceful and tolerant contact and communication (Varma, 2007, p.128) Another perspective is contained in the Report of the US State Department Advisory Committee on cultural diplomacy which described it as the “linchpin of public diplomacy,” adding that “it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented” (US Department of State, 2005, p.3). Absent in both definitions is reference to the political: to what ends is the “mutual understanding” in Cummings’s definition working towards? And for what purpose does the US State Department think it is a good idea to represent “the nation’s idea of itself”? In seeking answers to these questions, we are helped by Philip M. Taylor (2007) who always placed the political and strategic at the forefront of his thinking on the subject. He noted that the ultimate objective of cultural diplomacy is to serve and further the national interest; that it is a means by which power is accumulated, projected and exercised (otherwise are we simply referring to cultural relations or engagement?); and that in the cultural realm the distinction between hard and soft power may not be as discrete as we might suppose. Perhaps the problem is that current approaches to cultural diplomacy focus too much on the source of the product, as well as the product itself, and does not pay sufficient attention to either the motive of the source or the power of the receiver living within distinct political, social and cultural contexts (Womack, 2005). So it is worth remembering that cultural diplomacy must serve two masters; it helps promote the national interest – however it is defined and whoever defines it; and it must encourage mutual understanding, tolerance, respect, trust and the existence of shared interests. Hence the unresolved issue remains whether or not cultural diplomacy must pursue explicitly political agendas and interests, or whether these are the natural and long-term by-products of the projection of culture for its own sake. The agents of cultural diplomacy are in no doubt: “Artists engage in cross-cultural exchange not to proselytize about their own values, but rather to understand different cultural traditions, to find new sources of imaginative inspiration, to discover new methods and ways of working and to exchange ideas with people whose worldviews differ from their own. They want to be influenced rather than influence” (Channick, 2005). The details of this debate are less relevant than understanding three key issues: that cultural diplomacy (i) provides a politically-neutral platform that (ii) works best when distance from the government and its political agenda is maintained. Governments should facilitate the infrastructures for the non-governmental sector and the cultural industries to engage in outreach activities “[A]ctors in public diplomacy can no longer be confined to the profession of diplomats, but include various individuals, groups and institutions who engage in international and intercultural communication activities” (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992, p.139). ; (iii) it is acknowledged as an important and cost effective method of building trust and relationships with people (especially non-elites) by choosing themes that not only represent cultural aspects but also resonate with audiences; and (iv) it works across the long-term and demands long-term investment. It is unrealistic to expect immediate or short-term returns on activities. However, it is a mistake to place too much confidence in cultural diplomacy. It is not and should not be deemed a solution to a country’s diplomatic, political or even presentation problems; and while the strategic reasons for privileging culture are reasonable, there are still several interconnected concerns that the agents responsible need to address. The first relates to the difficulty of measuring impacts as opposed to outputs. It is easy to count the number of international visitors who pass through Vietnam’s airports or the box-office receipts for a movie made in Vietnam and exhibited at an international film festival. It is far more challenging to measure the response of individuals who encounter Vietnam in a cultural mode and determine whether or not their attitudes or behaviour towards Vietnam have changed as a consequence of engaging with a specific cultural product. After all, culture is highly subjective, and what may appeal to one member of the audience may not appeal in the same way, if at all, to another (Liebes and Katz, 1993). In fact there is a distinct possibility that the audience may reject the cultural product altogether as a threat to their own social values (as per “cultural imperialism”): “A target may find a sender’s promotion of cultural and political values (such as democracy) to be an act of coercion, not persuasion. A sender’s cultural and political values themselves may be interpreted by a target state to be the potential source of threat to society”’ (Lee, 2011, p.22). Janice Bially Mattern (2005) called this the hard character of soft power. Confidence in the universal application and value of one set of cultural products or principles can easily be translated as political and cultural arrogance. In other words, the audience may interpret the cultural product in an entirely different way from the way its creator intended. This means that the outcome of any soft power strategy, including cultural diplomacy, is “more in control of the subject than is often the case with hard power” (Nye, 2008, p.xiii), and therefore there is no guarantee that cultural interest will translate into tangible soft power outcomes; there is no certified direct correlation between consuming a cultural product and a change in opinion or behaviour towards the source (McConnell, 2008; Yoshiko, 2008). This is particularly the case when cultural products are being exported around the world for viewing by audiences who may have no or very little cultural understanding of what they are seeing. Hence, it is necessary to understand the audience for such outreach; to define with whom one wishes to communicate, why and how. Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy resonates more with audiences in Asia than in the rest of the world; and this may demonstrate that geographical and cultural proximity - with shared values (especially Confucianism), histories and interests - help identify what might be shared culturally to advance the relationship between neighbours. This also reflects Vietnam’s commitment to learning from its neighbours and absorbing the way they conduct cultural relations, and Japan has been a particular inspiration (Interview with Son Minh Pham, 22 July 2012). Meanwhile, Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy beyond Asia is constrained by a number of factors (most obviously, the shadow of the Vietnam wars), some of which are beyond the control of the government in Hanoi, but which require careful and innovative strategies if their effects are to be mitigated. The Structure, Aims and Objectives The importance that Vietnam attaches to cultural diplomacy is revealed by the publication in 2011 of Decision No.208/QD-TTG, “Strategies on Cultural Diplomacy Through 2020” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA, 2011). Clearly acknowledging the need for long-term planning to create long-term benefits, this document affirms that the economic, political and cultural approaches to Vietnam’s foreign engagement exist within a symbiotic relationship that compels them to interact and co-operate. Traditional-style diplomacy provides the vision and direction for Vietnam’s foreign relations; economic diplomacy is concerned with the endowment, accumulation and allocation of resources; while according to the government cultural diplomacy is the “spiritual foundation of external … activities” (ibid.). Hence the structural arrangements of Vietnam’s foreign policy - design, decision-making and implementation - are intended to facilitate such collaboration, with MoFA supposedly at the centre as the strategic driver. Each area of activity and each Ministry serve their own bureaucratic interests while also reinforcing the strengths and needs of the other two. For example, cultural diplomacy is connected explicitly to the five-year economic and social development planning mechanisms (which include tourism and foreign investment as part of their remit). In an interview for this chapter, Vietnam’s Ambassador to the UK and Ireland, Minh Quang Vu, described the aim of his country’s economic diplomacy as doubling British investment in Vietnam in two years. He therefore identified cultural diplomacy as a method of deepening economic partnerships: “[At] conferences about business development programmes or campaigns,” he noted, “cultural aspects are often emphasised - especially when it comes to Vietnamese products - to … create a more favourable image of the Vietnamese market” (Interview, 21 May 2012). So there is official confidence in culture’s ability to add value to relationships built and maintained in other areas of activity, and that culture can, if deployed strategically, enhance “national brand value” and “prestige in the international community” (Jin, 2011). Yet despite the officially integrated, three-pronged approach to Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy (Pham, 2010), Son Thanh Bui, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs, affirmed that cultural diplomacy is the central pillar that is most useful for building mutual understanding with other countries and for developing meaningful relationships (MoFA, 2008, p.54); it is the fulcrum of Vietnam’s “comprehensive and modern diplomacy” (MoFA, 2011). This indicates that the government clearly recognises the potential of cultural diplomacy in furthering Vietnam’s foreign policy agenda, and this was echoed in interviews conducted with members of Vietnam’s mission in London: “Culture must come first as a gateway to the economy and to politics” (Interview, 10 July 2013). The Vietnamese government has identified five areas that require a commitment to cultural diplomacy: Establishing relations with countries that do not yet enjoy formal links with Vietnam Consolidating existing relationships and facilitating mutual understanding Projecting Vietnam’s image to the international community Associating Vietnam’s cultural heritage with UNESCO Recognising how Vietnam’s culture may absorb the “essence” of other countries (MoFA, 2011). Moreover, the same document describes how cultural diplomacy can help preserve Vietnam’s national security and connect with both the domestic constituency and the Vietnamese diaspora to nurture a sense of national identity. These are characteristics that Vietnam shares with its Asian neighbours: For example, among the principle audiences for Indian cultural diplomacy are diasporic communities throughout the world (Thussu, 2013); while the Chinese government is very clear that public diplomacy must be directed towards Chinese living within its borders, Chinese communities around the world, and international opinion (d’Hooghe, 2005: 100; Kurlantzick, 2007; Han, et.al., 2012: 63). Shambaugh (2013, p.62) sees this approach as a weakness in the Chinese strategy. He notes that “much of Chinese popular culture abroad is targeted at the overseas [Chinese] community and never reaches non-Chinese audiences. It is an insular discourse in Chinese, by Chinese and for Chinese.” It is possible to argue that this unique approach encourages tensions and contradictions in content, method and purpose, for the Chinese outreach strategy must reconcile the need to project both the economic modernisation of the country and the continuing appeal of traditional cultural themes; while simultaneously trying to explain and justify the continuation of rule by the CCP. The government must communicate these often contradictory themes to two different audiences to achieve different goals, and must therefore work hard to make sure the message is consistent across all platforms. A Chinese Foreign Minister has observed that diplomacy is “an extension of domestic politics” (Edney, 2012, p.907). Hence, the domestic programme of nation-building, ensuring stability and harmony, and maintaining the authority of the Communist Party all help explain China’s cultural diplomacy overseas. Edney (2012, p.914) notes that the “efforts to promote Chinese culture internationally and to increase China’s international voice are undertaken primarily in order to shape a public opinion environment conducive to the pursuit of the CCP’s domestic political agenda”. So Vietnam, like other regional actors, is confident that the projection of, and engagement in cultural activities will have strong and positive consequences at home and abroad - that the intangibles of cultural engagement can be converted into tangible political and economic benefits; and this is captured in MoFA’s “Strategy on Cultural Diplomacy Through 2020” (MoFA, 2011): To strongly step up cultural diplomatic activities to make the world better understand the Vietnamese land, people and culture, further build confidence of other countries, make relations between Vietnam and its partners more profound, stable and lasting, thereby raising the country’s status in the international arena and facilitating its socio-economic development. Cultural diplomatic activities will also contribute to absorbing the cultural quintessence of mankind, enriching and deepening the national traditional cultural values. Yet the formal and official mechanisms that have been created overseas to engage in cultural diplomacy do not provide the resources required to do the job: Vietnam’s diplomats receive no formal training in cultural diplomacy, indicating that government commitment and rhetoric is one thing; managing the day-to-day activities in its foreign missions to accomplish the stated objectives is quite another. For example, when in 2012 we first visited Vietnam’s embassy in London, and visited again in 2013, there was just one member of staff, a Cultural Attaché, who could devote time to this work, but had no separate pot of funds to draw from (and the Attaché remained subordinate to the Ambassador who is directly responsible for the embassy’s cultural diplomacy). A further visit to the embassy in 2015 revealed that there is now no Cultural Attaché, and cultural work is spread among colleagues. This is a serious situation for a diplomatic mission working in one of the world’s major cities, and which represents a diplomatic strategy that places culture at its core. It also devalues cultural diplomacy by sending a signal that it is not important and, moreover, that anyone can do it. MoFA’s budget for cultural work is small, and in 2008 had risen to only 1.8 percent in response to Vietnam’s economic growth. These funds had to cover both the development of the cultural and art industries in Vietnam and cultural diplomacy activities overseas. Embassy staff must still bargain and barter both with their colleagues in London and with their masters back home on a case-by-case basis. Cultural diplomacy competes for funds with all the other activities and priorities of the embassy. However, the embassy is able to overcome such problems by engaging routinely with Vietnamese communities in the UK who can sponsor and organise events, and particularly helpful and active groups are Vietnamese students and private sector businesses. Moreover, the embassy has nurtured close relationships with organisations such as the British Council and other bodies involved in the work of British cultural industries (the British Council Art Fund has created funding opportunities for Vietnamese artists and art organisations, including those living and working in the United Kingdom, to exhibit their work); and these arrangements, links and partnerships are reflected at Vietnam’s other overseas missions. Moreover, there is evidence that when he was in post, the embassy’s Cultural Attaché oversaw a process that included the careful targeting of specific audiences in the UK and had the confidence to contradict instructions from MoFA if a cultural activity may not work within the UK market (Interview, 21 May 2012). Vietnam has organised a series of bilateral cultural relationships with Japan, for example, through an Annual Japan-Vietnam Cultural Festival (Browne, 2012, p.40; Tsuboi, nd, p.6) and a handicraft exhibition in 2010. The Vietnam International Film Festival (ViFF), co-organised by the Vietnam-American Arts and Letters Association and UCLA’s Vietnam Language and Culture centre is an important international showcase for Vietnam’s nascent movie industry and demonstrates again the advantages of working with the non-governmental sector in strategic markets: ViFF complements the biennial National Film Festival organised by the Department of Cinematography inside Vietnam’s Culture Ministry. On the eve of the 2013 Festival the head of department, Ngo Phuong Lan, noted: “The film festival conveys an obvious message: ‘Vietnam’s Cinema - national, humane, creative and integrating’”. ‘Vietnam’s cinema - national, humane, creative and integrating’, Vietnam plus, 10 October 2013, available at http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnams-Cinema-national-humane-creative-and-integrating/201310/40003.vnplus, accessed 24 February 2014. Engagement with non-governmental agencies is an effective approach to cultural diplomacy because, as Nye has observed, they “directly touch the lives of far more people than government representatives do” (Nye, 2008, p.105). However, Vietnam still does not have the resources to compete with the outreach and engagement strategies of its more successful Asian neighbours. It has no equivalent of China’s Confucius Institutes, Korea’s King Sejong Institutes, the Taiwan Academies, the India Council of Cultural Relations or the Japan Cultural Centres. Nor does Vietnam have a developed cultural industry, so most of its cultural strategies are designed and implemented by MoFA or the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. This explains why the Vietnamese government is far more hands-on in terms of cultural diplomacy compared to other states who recognise that the more distant the government from the cultural product, the more credibility it will enjoy. This has less to do with the determination of the Vietnamese government to maintain control of the message (as in China) and more with the condition of Vietnam’s cultural landscape. It also suggests that there may be a correlation between existing familiarity with a country and the need for government intervention: The fact that Vietnam has little profile and “brand recognition” beyond its history of conflict may mean that central direction is required. This issue is discussed in the context of the China-Taiwan situation in Rawnsley (2012). Taiwan is far less well known than China and so must choose its narratives carefully. There are also more pressing reasons for government involvement. State institutions are in the best position to co-ordinate cultural diplomacy activities and the actors involved; they provide the infrastructures, visa regimes etc. required to support the work of the cultural industries. They can help arrange cultural tours and visits - in 2007 alone Vietnam despatched 407 touring performances and exhibitions across the world - and prepare the promotional materials that may help their activities to flourish. A further major structural problem that connects with the novelty of cultural and public diplomacy is the absence of training and instruction provided to members of the diplomatic corps preparing for despatch to overseas missions. The government decided to establish a cultural diplomacy course in several major universities (including the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, the Academy of Journalism and Communication, and Hanoi University of Culture) to orient students towards its cultural diplomacy strategy (MoFA, 2011). However, at the time of writing (September 2015) this decision has yet to be implemented. The Ambassador to the UK and Ireland, Son Minh Vu, said in interview that “the cultural diplomacy training programmes offered by MoFA and the Ministry of Education [are of] limited quality” (Interview, 21 March 2012). Themes The theme that defines Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy strategy is the promotion of the country as peaceful and stable, one that has navigated a delicate period of renewal after decades of war and ostracism, and which aspires to be an important regional player; a “dynamic economy … and actively participating in regional and international issues, struggling for peace, co-operation and development” (Pham, 2010). This is reflected in the comments of Deputy Foreign Minister Cuong Quoc Nguyen who observed that “Cultural diplomacy plays a very important role in creating a meritorious image of Vietnam in the international arena, and conveying a message of a peaceful, stable, friendly, open and reformed Vietnam that has seen rapid and sustainable development and a growing position in the region and the world” (MoFA, 2011). However, projecting such themes has not been easy given that the wars against France and the US continue to define and inhibit the international community’s assessment of Vietnam. In his keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Nguyen Dung Tan (2012) made reference to this history: “We do not forget the past but need to put it behind us and look forward to the future.” Moreover, Vietnam has felt the need to divert foreign attention and criticism from the more authoritarian nature of its communist credentials, and thus in its international communications pays particular attention to representing itself as a free market open economy that welcomes foreign trade and investment: “Vietnam is a friend and reliable partner of all countries” (MoFA, 2012). Vietnam sells itself as a “beautiful country with a legendary history, a unique culture, friendly citizens and a dynamic economy” (MoFA, 2008, p.8). Similar priorities were identified by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1988: “independence, self-control, openness, diversification, and multilateralism in international relations” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1988). However, Vietnam also goes beyond these pedestrian themes to highlight a very specific idea of “culture” and this has an impact on its international projection. In this geographic context culture refers to a “high level of social life and [the] expression of civilization.” Thus for the Vietnamese a cultured person is “civilised” and “educated” (Bui and Sekhar, 2012). This means that cultural diplomacy is not only about rebuilding relationships around political and economic objectives, but is also concerned with creating and communicating an image of Vietnam as a highly “cultured”, ie. civilised and educated nation, which of course means that the government must ensure that its education policies are working at home first before they can be communicated on an international scale. This is something to which Vietnam has started to pay serious attention since the 1990s. Until that time, “culture” was not a subject one could study at University; now it is a mandatory part of the curriculum. In 2001, the 9th Party Congress identified the objectives for Vietnam’s “cultural progress”: “To speed up the movement [whereby] the whole nation is united to build up cultural life. Building civilized lifestyles and cultural families etc.; bringing into full play the national and cultural identity; preserving and restoring tangible and intangible cultural [identities] that serve as the basis for cultural exchange among communities, regions, and between Vietnam and the outside world” (cited in Nguyen, 2008, p.4). In other words, there is a clear acknowledgement that the basis for Vietnam’s cultural projection overseas begins with the development of culture at home, and hence the government has designed a comprehensive programme to promote the traditional Vietnamese values among the Vietnamese. This was a campaign described as “All people unite to build a cultural life” (Vietnam News, 2012). Moreover, we find in Vietnam’s approach to cultural diplomacy an emphasis on ethical and moral perspectives on its conduct of international relations that have been informed by a mixture of influences - Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism. Vietnam’s diplomats observe how these influences allow for a flexible a pragmatic style of diplomacy, and that an ethical style of diplomacy can help build and maintain relationships. This so-called “ethical” diplomacy is contrary to the dominant paradigms in international relations because it tends to focus on states acting beyond their self-interests, treating other international actors equally, and operating in an honest and transparent way (Frost, 1996; Thompson, 1992; Graham, 2008). While it is important to evaluate such claims by measuring whether Vietnam lives up to them in practice - in public diplomacy as in international relations generally, actions always speak louder than words - it is possible to identify the connection of this ethical approach to cultural diplomacy which likewise emphasises mutuality, trust and respect. Our interviewees at Vietnam’s embassy in London made it very clear that “ethical diplomacy” is not an official approach, but more a style and way of thinking. These core values of Vietnam’s ethical-style diplomacy - which play well with audiences in neighbouring countries with Confucian traditions - include “harmony, duty, honour and respect” (Hunt, 2002), found scattered throughout history textbooks For example, the textbooks tell us that in the 15th Century, Nguyen Trai, the principal adviser to Le Loi (later the King) resisted the Chinese Ming dynasty’s occupation over parts of Dai Viet (the former name of Vietnam). This resistance was based on a philosophy that emphasised common interests among nations. The Ming’s invasion and occupation was described as inhumane and unjust, and hence there was never any question that the resistance by Dai Viet would triumph. and in the folk-tales and legends passed down through the generations. The 5th Plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee clearly connected the features of Vietnam’s cultural identity to its overseas projection. These features included patriotism, self-reliance, humanity, tolerance, morality, hard work and a “simple lifestyle” (MoFA, 2008, p.74). The problem, of course, is that such words are too ambiguous to be the basis for a sustained publicity campaign, yet the government has never been able to decide how to describe and communicate Vietnam’s cultural identity in a way that will be embraced by foreign publics. Hence the embrace of a more scatter-gun approach, even though scholars (such as Tuyen Thanh Nguyen and Graeme Johanson, 2008) and the outcome of a national conference on Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy in 2009 (the Year of Cultural Diplomacy) did call for a more focused method that highlighted fewer characteristics with more universal appeal. History has always been a prominent theme in public and cultural diplomacy, especially when governments communicate their development strategies to their own people at home. The Chinese government has been particularly enthusiastic in invoking History to marshal public opinion (Gries, 2004; Callahan, 2009). The purpose is to frame discussions about identity and help the CCP preserve its political legitimacy, and there is no contradiction between the modern and the traditional, both of which feed into the Chinese cultural diplomacy strategy. An example of how Vietnam has integrated its own historical identity with its cultural diplomacy strategy occurred in 2010 when the government arranged a series of activities to mark the 100th anniversary of Thang Long-Hanoi, Vietnam’s imperial citadel. The most important of these was the programme to persuade UNESCO to accept the old royal palace as a centre of World Cultural Heritage. This conforms to the Communist Party’s belief that “cultural heritage is an invaluable asset” and is the “essence of national identity and the basis for creating news values and cultural exchanges” (in Nguyen, 2008, p.9). UNESCO’s interest in Vietnam also dovetails with the organisation’s recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s contribution to heritage preservation and the restoration of the traditional arts. UNESCO suggested that Vietnam should “spread knowledge of the greatness of his ideals and his works for national liberation”. Moreover, the Vietnamese government has co-operated with UNESCO to protect and promote the cultures of ethnic groups. For example, UNESCO supported a project to promote (especially among younger Vietnamese) the music and rituals of the Gong culture in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. In this way the government of Vietnam has identified ethnic diversity as a way of promoting a more complex picture of Vietnam’s identity, heritage and culture; and this connects to the economic agenda as Vietnam’s growing coffee industry is centred in those areas of the country inhabited by minority ethnic groups (Interview, 10 July 2013). At the same time, the Vietnamese government seized this historical opportunity of receiving UNESCO’s explicit support to launch a comprehensive information campaign that distributed to foreign broadcasters, journalists and visiting dignitaries its position and record on human rights and democracy, especially Vietnam’s involvement in the relevant agencies of the United Nations and ASEAN. One example is participation by young Vietnamese artists in the ASEAN Art Graphic Competition and Exhibition, endorsed by the government as a way of showcasing modern and traditional Vietnamese culture. So the themes that structure Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy strategies are common among governments throughout East Asia where people share a Confucian heritage and values, and have a shared history of (post) colonialism in one form or another. Hence, we have arrived at a possible explanation for the success of Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy among its neighbours and the absence of impact beyond Asia: Cultural proximity, defined by Straubhaar as “the tendency to prefer media products from one’s own culture or the most similar possible culture” (Straubhaar, 2003, p.85). This means that audience attention is best attracted and sustained when viewer and cultural content share a “cultural linguistic” or “geolinguistic” location (Sinclair, Jacka & Cunningham, 1998; Straubhaar, 2003). Therefore there is reason to argue that different types of cultural diplomacy work on different levels with different audiences: while Vietnam’s approach based on shared values works well with audiences in East and Southeast Asia, it has less relevance to audiences elsewhere, in which case the exotic “other” may be a more powerful image. This means, for example, that in the cultural diplomacy activities organised by the Vietnamese embassy in London traditional music and dancing are prominent, but differentiate between “high” and “low” culture (the former represented by symphonies and ballets by Vietnamese composers and musicians; while the latter, targeting “ordinary” Brits, includes Vietnamese puppet shows, fashion shows and even a Vietnam Festival at London’s Spitalfields Market. Interview 10 July 2013). Moreover, while Vietnam cannot compete with the popularity of the Korean or Japanese cultural waves (Hallyu and J-Pop respectively In 2000, Korea exported US$244.5 million worth of cultural products; by 2010 this had risen to US$2.6 billion (Thussu, 2013, p.35).), in East Asia so called ‘V’ pop has experienced some success in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. Vietnam, via Ho Chi Minh TV, exported some television programmes to Thailand in the 1990s (Nguyen, M., 2011; Nguyen, S., 2011). Again, this suggests the power of cultural proximity with Vietnam’s neighbours in South East Asia. However, public admiration for, and interest in Vietnam’s cultural expression does not necessarily translate into greater levels of international public support for Vietnam and its foreign policy objectives. This suggests a fundamental weakness of locating culture and tradition at the forefront of soft power, namely there is no guarantee that cultural interest will convert into tangible soft power outcomes. How does cultural power connect with one’s national aspirations and foreign policy ambitions? As Nye (2008, p.x) has observed: “Whether the possession of soft power resources actually produces favourable outcomes depends on the context and skill of the agent in converting the resources into behavioural outcomes.” Published research (for example, McConnell, 2008; Watanabe, 2008) suggests that there is no direct correlation between consuming a cultural product and an increase in sympathy or empathy with the source. Watching a Vietnamese movie or attending a Vietnamese food festival does not necessarily translate into a change of attitude, opinion or behaviour towards Vietnam. Moreover, even the argument that attraction is based on cultural proximity is flawed when we consider how geostrategic and historical differences may inhibit the free flow of cultural products. As noted above, the so-called “Korean wave” (Hallyu) has enjoyed considerable success in East Asia; it is the most successful example of nation-branding in Vietnam, and Korean culture penetrates all aspects of life there. However, Hallyu has experienced a serious backlash from the Chinese who have considered this an attempt by Seoul to assert the primacy of Korean culture over all others (Cho, 2005, p.160). As discussed earlier, these allusions to “cultural imperialism” (and in this case a different form of cultural imperialism that is not synonymous with the idea of Americanization that still dominates the literature) demonstrates that ostensibly “soft” instruments of power can have “hard power” consequences and interpretations. On perceptions of Asian countries and culture within Asia and the US, see Whitney & Shambaugh (2009). Conclusions Vietnamese cultural diplomacy faces the same problem as its Chinese counterpart - that is, there is a clear disconnect between the aims and objectives of Vietnam’s strategy and the political reality of life in the country; and the exposure of these contradictions threaten the credibility of Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy. Perceptions about the government’s domestic behaviour and its responses to issues of human rights, democracy and freedom of speech all sour the international assessment of Vietnam’s soft power. Stories about a new crackdown on free expression in late 2009, which intensified in 2013, Concerns led to Reporters Without Borders ranking Vietnam 172/179 on its Press Freedom Index. 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Sharpe, Armonk, NY. together with the frequent arrest of bloggers who dare challenge the official narrative, present a difficult picture for Vietnamese cultural diplomacy to sell; while political turbulence in 2013 - the government barely survived the first ever vote of confidence in the National Assembly - undermines the image of a peaceful and stable country. In July 2013, the Vietnamese government relaxed restrictions on foreign television channels broadcasting in the country. These regulations required foreign channels to have a local partner with a translation and editing license to meet “people’s healthy needs” (in May 2013, 21 channels, including the BBC and CNN, were taken off air). The decision was overturned when foreign governments said such restrictions were damaging their investment in Vietnam. The soft power consequences were clear: “We know that the international community is watching,” said John Medeiros, chief policy officer at the Cable & Satellite Broadcasting Association of Asia. “Frankly, the Vietnamese government is getting some bad press [because of this]” (Than Nien News, 2013). This indicates that Vietnam still experiences problems within the political realm which prevent policies, values and principles - as well as cultural products - being as attractive to international audiences as they otherwise might be. In fact, we may well argue that cultural diplomacy is by its very nature an instrumentalist method of conducting foreign relations, and by focusing on the instruments of soft power - cultural products - we are presented with an incomplete picture. Rather, to truly understand the successes and failures of Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy we must ensure that we grasp the consequences of political decisions made in Hanoi that may influence audience reaction. In turn this architecture compounds the problems associated with building and maintaining credibility as the reality of the Vietnam government’s behaviour challenges and undermines any of the more positive messages and themes that its cultural diplomacy is able to communicate. For example, no volume of Vietnamese public or cultural diplomacy will compete with China’s nationalist rhetoric and convince Chinese audiences of Vietnam’s claims to parts of the South China Sea and sovereignty of the Paracels and Spratleys (and similarly Chinese public diplomacy will achieve little in Vietnam on the same issue). Vietnam is a relative novice in terms of engaging in public and cultural diplomacy; and this is understandable as it is only recently that Vietnam has found the renewed confidence to engage with the international community in a meaningful way after decades of revolution, war and recovery. This tentative approach explains not only the government’s direct hands-on approach to activities, but also the absence of official proposals and guidance on Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy, and this is reflected in the few government sources cited in this paper. It is difficult to find any official documentation beyond Decision No. 208 QD-TTG (MoFA, 2011) except in matters of finance and budget; and this deficiency reveals a country still feeling its way and improvising. Hence, it is possible to argue that Vietnam’s cultural diplomacy is impulsive, passive and disorderly, and therefore the success of its cultural projection is limited. Members of the Vietnamese embassy in London concede that the cultural diplomacy is somewhat confused and they have difficulty identifying the most unique cultural products that best represent the country (Interview 10 July 2013). The themes that resonate most are those that are familiar to Vietnam’s regional neighbours, namely Confucianism, harmony, self-reliance. These themes do not travel well beyond Asia so cultural diplomacy must depend on projecting exotic tropes with more appeal to foreign audiences unfamiliar with Vietnam. At the same time, the Vietnam wars continue to cast shadows over the country’s international communication. While China is now more visible than at any time in the past and a continuous presence on our television screens, in our movie theatres, in our high streets and on our University campuses, Vietnam is still largely invisible, generating little news coverage and little attention beyond curiosity about war and refugees. Funding is invested in particular ad hoc activities in particular countries, rather than providing the resources for a comprehensive programme that begins in Hanoi. And this is a stunning situation that contradicts the official view of cultural diplomacy as the central pillar of a three-pronged strategy that is required to facilitate Vietnam’s political and economic engagement. With the exception of the Year of Cultural Diplomacy in 2009 the government has devoted insufficient resources to cultural diplomacy, while the academic study of public diplomacy in Vietnam is undernourished. This can only lead one to the conclusion that, despite official pronouncements to the contrary, economic diplomacy is the over-riding strategic priority. Notes 31