Christianity and Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Study

World Cultures. 13/2 (2003). P. 195-212. Christianity and Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Study (Afterthoughts)1 Andrey Korotayev Program in Sociocultural Anthropology of the East, Russian State University for the Humanities, 6 Miusskaya Ploshchad', Moscow 125267, Russia; [email protected]. Our new tests have provided additional support to the theory that polygyny, unilineal descent organization and large extended families could be regarded as universal negative predictors of the communal democracy. Our tests have confirmed that that the Christianization correlates positively with the communal democracy. Our tests have also confirmed that the Christianization correlates negatively with polygyny (though no one hardly doubted this). However, our tests (contrary to our expectations) have failed to confirm the presence of negative correlation between Christianization and the presence of large extended families. Hence, the main channels through which the Christianization of Europe might have contributed to the development of the communal democracy in this part of the world are the destruction of the unilineal descent organization and polygyny (but not the large extended families). In general, our overall explanatory model looks as follows. We suggest that the kinship and family structures (determined in its turn by a large number of independent factors, both material [e.g. economic] and ideal [e.g. religious]) could affect significantly the overall political evolution of the respective societies. We believe, that the family structures affects primarily the political organization of the community (and we think we have provided enough substantial support for this point above). However, we also believe that the communal political structure could influence significantly the political organization of the supracommunal levels as is suggested by the test which we performed. As one could see the correlation between the democracy of the communal organization and the democracy of the supracommunal political organization turns out to be really strong and significant beyond any doubt. I think that though the democratization of communal organization under the influence of the previously democratized state is perfectly possible (for example, this could be observed in the post-Communist Eastern Europe), the communal democracy in its turn could contribute to the democratization of the supracommunal political organization. Note that in Europe the development of democratic communal organization preceded the formation of modern supracommunal democracy. There are certain grounds to believe that the democratic organization of European communities facilitated the formation of democratic structures on the supracommunal level. On the other hand, the non-democratic communal organization appears to inhibit the development of democratic state organization as seems to be evidenced by Near Eastern data.  1. INTRODUCTION 3 years ago Dmitry Bondarenko and I undertook a study of the correlations between the family size and communal democracy (Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000). Our theoretical expectations looked as follows: according to Whiting & Childe (1953) the dependence training is associated precisely with extended families, whereas the respective socialization pattern tends to ensure the compliance in the performance of assigned tasks and dependence on the family, rather than reliance on oneself, which would tend to produce a personality type compatible with "hierarchical" (rather than democratic "non-hierarchical") sociopolitical systems. Hence, we hypothesized that the family size and the communal democracy will be negatively correlated. The correlation turned out to be in the predicted direction, significant beyond any doubt (p < 0.001), but rather weak (Phi = – 0.19). At the meantime we also found out a significant (and a bit stronger) negative world-wide correlation between communal democracy and polygyny (Rho = – 0.26, p < 0.001). What could account for the significant negative correlation between polygyny and communal democracy? The first explanation which comes to one's mind is to consider the communal 195 democracy as an independent variable, whereas the polygyny would appear as a dependent one. It appears natural that within undemocratic communities the members of their elites would use their monopoly over the power resources in order to maximize the number of their wives; hence, the polygyny would appear as just one more dimension of a lack of democracy in the respective communities. However, some data turned out to cast doubt on to such an interpretation. Those data come first of all from the Circum-Mediterranean region. This region could be easily divided into two subregions – the Christian and Islamic ones. The point is that the communal elites in the Christian Circum-Mediterranean subregion had no option of having more than one wife, as this was most strongly prohibited by the Christian Church (e.g. Goody 1983: 44–46; Herlihy 1993)2. Yet, in this region the negative correlation between the polygyny and communal democracy is even more clear than in all the other regions (Rho = – 0.32, p = 0.005). Hence, one would suppose that the monogamy could well be one of the possible factors of the development of the communal democracy and not only its result. What could account for the "democratizing" influence of the monogamy? It seemed reasonable to connect it with the difference in the socialization practices within polygynous vs. monogamous families. The "non-democratizing" influence of the polygyny might be connected, among other factors, with the well-known "father-absence" factor (Burton & Whiting 1961; Bacon, Child, & Barry 1963; B. Whiting 1965; Munroe, Munroe, & Whiting 1981; Kon 1987: 32–33 &c). The above-mentioned authors have shown that the boys raised within the environment consisting mainly of women tend to develop personalities inclined towards aggressive domination-oriented behavior. Another important contribution belongs to Rohner (1975) who has shown that the development of the above-mentioned personality strongly correlates with the lack of the parental warmth, whereas such a lack is most typical for the polygynous families (especially for the non-sororal ones) characterized by the low degree of co-wives' co-operation – as a result, the co-wives are left too often face-to-face with their children without any hope for external assistance. It is well-known that such a situation provokes the lack of sufficient parental warmth and affection, excessively severe punishment of children (J. W. M. Whiting 1960; Minturn & Lambert 1964; Rohner 1975; Levinson 1979), which tend to produce the aggressive domination-oriented personality specified above. One would expect that the presence of the respective modal personality would contribute to the prevalence of the non-democratic power structures.3 Our cross-cultural tests supported this theory. We found a rather strong and significant negative correlation between polygyny, on the one hand, and warmth and affection of mother to son (Rho = – 0.55, p = 0.06), on the other, whereas the latter variable displayed a rather strong and significant correlation with democracy (Rho = + 0.64, p = 0.045). I also undertook a study of relationships between the presence of the unilineal descent organization and communal democracy (Korotayev 2003) and found a significant (and quite strong) negative correlation between those two variables (especially for complex class cultures: p = 0.002 [by Fisher’s Exact Test]; Gamma = – 0.84; p < 0.0003 Phi = – 0.49; p < 0.001). 196 In fact there are certain grounds to expect that the presence of unilineal descent groups would inhibit the development of communal democracy – indeed, their presence would favor hereditary communal leadership when the leadership position is transmitted within a certain descent group (normally the strongest one within the community and the one whose members would act as natural supporters of this leadership system). Thus, one would expect that the destruction of unilineal descent groups would contribute to the transition from the less democratic, hereditary, communal headmanship to the more democratic, elected headmanship (and the other way round). Hence, we had sufficient grounds to predict that there would be a negative correlation between the presence of unilineal descent groups and communal democracy. Our own previous cross-cultural research on unilineal descent groups in the complex cultures of Eurasia and North Africa (Korotayev & Obolonkov, 1989; 1990) reveals that the distribution of unilineal descent organization in the complex cultures of this mega-region has a peculiar shape. In the Western part of this mega-region (the part which virtually coincides with the Circummediterranean region of Murdock), the border between the areas traditionally lacking unilineal descent organization and the areas having them ran almost precisely along the border between the Christian and non-Christian worlds.4 And this was not just in Europe. In the African Horn, for example, only 3 of almost 100 cultures lack unilineal descent groups. Two of them—the Amhara and the Tigrinya—are the only deeply christianized cultures in the area. The exception—the Falasha (professing Judaism)—only confirms the rule. All the Islamic and "pagan" cultures of the area had unilineal descent groups. Could this be a coincidence? Probably not. Christian doctrine emphatically rejects unilineal descent group values.5 On the other hand, as Goody points out (1983, pp. 44–46), in the 4th century AD the Christian Church imposed regulations promoting the monogamous nuclear family (i.e. the regulations which prohibited close marriages, discouraged adoption, and condemned polygamy, divorce and remarriage). Goody suggests that the Church was striving to obtain the property left by couples lacking legitimate male heirs. The result, however, was that the nuclear family became the main form of kinship organization, with almost no corporate suprafamily kinship entities.6 Other norms and practices of the Christian Church are consistent with this argument. Take, for example, the rule of celibacy for the clergy. In this respect, Christianity differs from the religion which in many other respects looks so similar to it – Islam, where the marriage for rija:l al-di:n ("the Men of Religion") is not just permitted, but prescribed (as for all the other Muslims capable of marrying [e.g. Bogoljubov, 1991, p. 71]). Unlike the Islamic rija:l aldi:n, the Christian hierarch has no right to have legitimate descendants. Thus, he cannot be a competent member of a descent group, nor can he found his own descent group (with his name becoming the name of the lineage eponym ancestor). Given the immense influence the Christian hierarchy had on the traditional Christian states, one would expect that this factor must have contributed to the weakening of unilineal descent organization in Christian societies. Hence, we had reason to expect a strong significant negative correlation between “deep christianization” and the presence of unilineal descent groups. Why did we choose to consider only “deep” christianization? It took the Christian Church centuries to eradicate pre-Christian norms, values and practices (e.g. Bessmertnyj, 1989; 197 Herlihy, 1993). One would not expect a superfluous christianization to produce any radical changes in kinship and marriage practices and norms. Thus, we coded the following cultures (christianized not less than 500 year prior to the "ethnographic present”) of the Ethnographic Atlas sample as “1 (Deep christianization: present)”: Amhara, Armenians, Basques, Boers, Brazilians, Bulgarians, Byelorussians, Cheremis, Czechs, Dutch, French Canadians, Georgians, Greeks, Haitians, Hungarians, Hutsul, Icelanders7, Irish, Kurd, Lapps, Lebanese8, Lithuanians, Neapolitans, New England, Portuguese, Romanians, Russians, Serbs, Spaniards, Spanish Basques, Svan, Tigrinya, Tristan, Ukrainians, Walloons. All other cultures were coded as “0 (Deep christianization: absent)”. Our tests have shown that indeed the deep Christianization correlates negatively and very strongly with the presence of the unilineal descent organization (especially for traditional cultures organized as states: p = 0.0000000003 [by Fisher’s Exact Test]; Phi = – 0.7; p < 0.0000000001; Gamma = – 0.97; p < 0.000000001). At this point we came to the most difficult problem of any cross-cultural research, the problem of the causation direction. Is it really possible to consider the strict prohibition of the polygyny by the Christian Church as one of the causes of the development of the modern democracy in Europe? On the one hand, the transition from the general to occasional polygyny among the intensive plow agriculturalists seems to be caused mainly by economic factors (Burton & Reitz 1981; White 1988; White & Burton 1988) which made the polygyny impossible for the main part of the intensive agriculturalists. However, this does not appear to explain the total prohibition of the polygyny for everybody including the members of the upper strata (who always retained the economic opportunities to support more than one wife). Hence, the total absence of the polygyny in the Christian part of the CircumMediterranean region (but not in its Moslem part9) could be hardly explained by anything else but by the strict prohibition of the polygyny by the Christian Church. Though some regulations which established the monogamy as the norm were imposed by the Church still in the Roman times, even in the 12th century, when marriage was declared a sacrament, the Church had to struggle severely against rudiments of polygyny among both the elite and common people, for example in France. And the struggle for the observation of the Christian marital norms among the elite strata of the knighthood went on even in the 13th century (Bessmertnyj 1989). Of course, it might be not coincidental either that within the two religions strictly prohibiting the polygyny (classical Judaism and Christianity) the respective norms originated in the 1st millennium BC within the intensive agriculturalist society of Palestine mainly through the activities of the independent (non-temple) prophets (coming basically from non-elite strata) who appear to have managed to impose the monogamous marriage already predominant among the commoners on the elites (e.g. Diakonoff, Neronova, & Jakobson 1983).10 Of course, when in the 4th century AD the Christian Church imposed the regulations which made the monogamous nuclear family the predominant family form (i.e. the ones which prohibited close marriages, discouraged adoption, condemned polygyny, concubinage, divorce and remarriage) it in no way tried to contribute to the development of modern democracy in Western Europe more than one millennium later. As has been suggested by 198 Goody (1983: 44–46), the Church appears to have striven towards obtaining the property left by couples lacking legitimate male heirs. However, the unintended consequence of those actions was the formation of a relatively homogenous macro-region consisting of nuclear monogamous families, with almost no corporate suprafamily kinship entities.11 We do not believe this is a coincidence that a few centuries later we find this region consisting predominantly of democratic communities (Udal’tsova 1985–1987). And it could also hardly be a coincidence that it was this very region where the modern supracommunal democracy originated.12 These findings were presented at various venues on more than dozen occasions (starting with the 28th Annual Meeting of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research in Santa Fe [February, 1999]). Numerous discussions have shown that our research was not quite complete, that we have not provided some answers to a few quite legitimate questions. The main aim of this paper is to try to provide answers to those questions. 2. TESTS Our findings suggested that the Christianization of Europe must have contributed to the development of the communal democracy in this part of the world. This implies that Christianization should correlate positively with communal democracy. However, we did not test this implication of our theory. Thus, I decided to perform this test. Its results are presented below (see Table 1): TABLE 1. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Deep Christianization (for "politically complex" societies [> 2 levels of political integration over community]) Deep Christianization Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 41 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 3 69.5% 18 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 44 20.0% 12 30.5% 59 30 80.0% 15 100% Totals 74 100% NOTE: p = 0.001 (by Fisher’s Exact Test); Gamma = + 0.8; p = 0.001; Phi =+ 0.41; p = 0.0003. The data on communal democracy are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V72). The Christianization was coded by me for the Etnhographic Atlas cultures earlier (see Korotayev 2003). Indeed, as we see the correlation between the Christianization and communal democracy is 199 in the predicted direction, it is significant beyond any doubt and quite strong. Hence, the test has supported our theory. However, the main (and very reasonable) objection to our findings could be formulated as follows: Christianity was not the only characteristic which distinguished Europe from most other parts of the world (see e.g. Sanderson 1995:168–178). And some more or less unique features of the socio-political evolution of Europe may well be explained by a certain combination of those features, but not necessarily by all of them. However, all the features characteristic for the traditional European sociocultural organization would show significant correlation with other typical characteristics of the cultures belonging to the Christian European historical network, even if in fact any real functional link between those variables is lacking. Indeed, one can easily find a significant negative correlation between the communal democracy and the presence of male genital mutilations for the Circummediterranean region (see Table 2). TABLE 2. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Male Genital Mutilations (for the Circummediterranean region) Male Genital Mutilations Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 11 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 38 50.0% 11 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 49 71.7% 15 50.0% 22 26 28.3% 53 100% Totals 75 100% NOTE: p = 0.001 (by Fisher’s Exact Test); Gamma = – 0.43; p = 0.04 (1-tailed); Phi =– 0.21; p = 0.04 (1tailed). The data on communal democracy and male genital mutilations are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V37 and V72). However, one would hardly insist on the male genital mutilations being a factor inhibiting the development of communal democracy (or the other way round). On the other hand, even if Christianity really contributed to the development of the communal democracy, how could we tell which of the features associated with Christianity were responsible for this? Indeed, some features associated with Christianity and having no functional connection with the communal democracy would still display a significant correlation with the latter characteristic. The correlation demonstrated above could serve as a good illustration for this point too. 200 In fact the problem which our critics identified is quite real. Within the cross-cultural studies it is known as the Galton (or network autocorrelation) problem. Indeed, there are all grounds to believe that in the case discussed above we are dealing with a clear network autocorrelation effect. The significant correlation could be regarded as a result of the functioning of two historical networks – the Islamic and Christian ones. Circumcision (though not enforced on the Muslims by their Holy Book) is still a virtual obligation among Muslims, as it has strong support in the Holy Tradition (al-Aha:di:th). Christianity, on the other hand, does not directly prohibit the circumcision (actually, it is hardly possible to find support for such a prohibition in any Christian texts considering that Jesus Christ himself was circumcised and the supposed date of his circumcision is still one of the most important Christian Holy Days). However, the Christian Church (unlike Islamic and Jewish religious authorities) does not impose circumcision in any way; as a result, in the Middle Ages the absence of “male genital mutilation” became an important marker distinguishing Christians from both Muslims and Jews (with whom the Christians were in a hostile relationship with for most of this period). Thus, for Christians, circumcision was, at this time, a virtual taboo. As a result, the diffusion of Christianity in the region resulted in the diffusion of a virtual (and effective!) prohibition on circumcision. Conversely, the diffusion of Islam resulted in the diffusion of precisely the opposite pattern. The Christian factor is felt most strongly just within the region under consideration. Consequently, it is not surprising at all (al least for us) that within the Circummediterranean region Christianity correlates with the communal democracy in a particulary strong and highly significant way (see Table 3): TABLE 3. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Christianization (for the Circummediterranean region) Deep Christianization Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 53 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 5 79.1% 14 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 58 26.3% 14 20.9% 67 28 73.7% 19 100% Totals 86 100% NOTE: p = 0.00004 (by Fisher’s Exact Test); Gamma = + 0.83; p = 0.0001; Phi =+ 0.47; p = 0.00001. The data on communal democracy are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V72). The Christianization was coded by me for the Etnhographic Atlas cultures earlier (see Korotayev 2003). Against this background it is easy to predict that any feature correlating negatively with Christianity will correlate negatively with the communal democracy for the cultures of this 201 region. And if we control for the Christian factor testing only the non-Christian cultures of the region, the significant negative correlation will disappear (see Table 4): TABLE 4. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Male Genital Mutilations (for non-Christian cultures of the Circummediterranean region) Male Genital Mutilations Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 8 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 36 100% 0 72.0% 0% 8 14 28.3% 50 100% Totals 44 14 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 58 100% NOTE: p = 0.092 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = + 1.0; p = 0.003 (1-tailed); Phi =+ 0.23; p = 0.04 (1-tailed). The data on communal democracy and male genital mutilations are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V37 and V72). In fact we are dealing here with a marginally significant positive correlation (which is also likely to be accounted for by the Galton effect produced by the functioning of historical networks of the Sub-Saharan parts of the sample – "Moslem Sudan" and the "African Horn"). Hence, it appears to be necessary to re-perform some of the tests performed by us earlier controlling for the Galton effect produced by the functioning of the Christian European historical network. Indeed, to test cross-culturally the hypothesis that the Christianization of Europe contributed to the development of the communal democracy in this part of world through the destruction of large extended families, unilineal descent organization and polygyny it does not appear sufficient to demonstrate that these features correlate negatively with both the Christianization and the communal democracy. It seems also necessary to test if those features correlate negatively with the communal democracy in the non-Christian world. The positive results of such tests would support the idea about the presence of the general regularity manifested in the significant negative correlations between the communal democracy, on the one hand, and large extended families, unilineal descent organization and polygyny, on the other, rather than just by the functioning of the Christian European historical system. Hence, I decided to test this. The results of these texts are presented below (see Tables 5–7): 202 TABLE 5. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Polygyny (for non-Christian cultures of the world) Polygyny Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 52 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 481 54.7% 43 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 533 81.0% 113 45.3% 95 Totals 156 19.0% 594 100% 689 100% NOTE: p = 0.0000001 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = – 0.56; p = 0.00001; Phi = – 0.22; p = 0.00000001. The data on communal democracy and polygyny are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V9 and V72). TABLE 6. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Unilineal Descent Organization (for non-Christian cultures of the world) Unilineal Descent Organization Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 166 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 443 64.6% 91 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 609 84.7% 80 35.4% 257 171 15.3% 523 100% Totals 780 100% NOTE: p = 0.0000000004 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = – 0.5; p = 0.000000004; Phi =– 0.23; p = 0.0000000001. The data on communal democracy and unilineal descent organization are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V17–21 and V72). 203 TABLE 7. Crosstabulation Communal Democracy * Large Extended Family as the Predominant Family Type (for non-Christian cultures of the world) Large Extended Family as the Predominant Family Type Communal Democracy 0 (absent – hereditary/by 0 (absent) 497 appointment etc. leadership) 1 (present – elected [formally, or 120 76.8% 150 through consensus] leadership) Totals 1 (present) 617 83.9% 23 23.2% 647 173 16.1% 143 100% Totals 790 100% NOTE: p = 0.04 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = – 0.22; p = 0.02 (1-tailed); Phi =– 0.07; p = 0.03 (1-tailed). The data on communal democracy and family organization are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V8 and V72). Thus the negative correlation between the extended family organization, unilineal descent groups and polygyny, on the one hand, and the communal democracy, on the other, turns out to be a universal regularity which cannot be explained by the functioning of the Christian European historical network only. Note, however, an extremely low strength of the correlation between the extended family organization and the communal democracy. There also seems to be another weakness in our argument which does not appear to have been noticed by our critics. In fact, we have only tested the correlation between deep Christianization and the presence of unilineal descent organization, which turned out to be negative, highly significant and really strong (especially for cultures possessing state organization: p = 0.0000000003 [by Fisher’s Exact Test]; Phi = – 0.7, p < 0.0000000001; Gamma = – 0.97, p < 0.000000001 [Korotayev 2003]). However, we did not test the correlation between the Christianization, on the one hand, and polygyny as well as the extended family organization, on the other. The first correlation looked self-evident, and the second seemed to be also very plausible. However, one of the most basic principles of cross-cultural research (as well as the scientific method, in general) is that even the most plausible hypotheses must still be tested. For these tests I chose a subsample of cultures for which the Christian factor turns out to be really relevant, i.e. the ones having 3 or more levels of political integration over community (that is, almost exclusively states). The results of these tests look as follows (see Tables 8–9): 204 TABLE 8. Crosstabulation Deep Christianization * Polygyny (for "politically complex" societies [> 2 levels of political integration over community])) Deep Christianization Polygyny 0 (absent) 0 (absent) 13 1 (present) 20 16.9% 1 (present) 64 33 100% 0 64 83.1% Totals 77 Totals 0% 20 100% 97 100% NOTE: p = 0.000000000002 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = – 1.0, p = 0.0000000002; Phi =– 0.71, p = 0.00000000000000001. The data on polygyny are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V9). The Christianization was coded by me for the Etnhographic Atlas cultures earlier (see Korotayev 2003). TABLE 9. Crosstabulation Deep Christianization * Large Extended Family as a Predominant Family Type (for "politically complex" societies [> 2 levels of political integration over community])) Deep Christianization Large Extended Family as a 0 (absent) 0 (absent) Totals Predominant Family Type 0 (absent) 75 17 84.3% 1 (present) 14 85.0% 3 15.7% Totals 92 89 17 15.0% 20 100% 109 100% NOTE: p = 0.62 (by Fisher’s Exact Test, 1-tailed); Gamma = – 0.03, p = 0.47, 1-tailed; Phi =– 0.008; p = 0.47, 1-tailed. The data on family organization are from Murdock, 1967; Murdock et al., 1986, 1990, 1999–2000 (V9). The Christianization was coded by me for the Etnhographic Atlas cultures earlier (see Korotayev 2003). 205 As one can see, in this sample the Christianization turns out to correlate negatively, very strongly, highly significantly (and quite predictably) with the polygyny. However the extended family factor has failed to pass this test. The Christian states are as likely to have large extended families as non-Christian ones. Hence, one has sufficient grounds to doubt that Christianization contributed to the development of the communal democracy in Europe through the destruction of the extended family organization. 3. CONCLUSIONS Our new tests have provided additional support to the theory that polygyny, unilineal descent organization and large extended families could be regarded as universal negative predictors of the communal democracy. Our tests have confirmed that that the Christianization correlates positively with the communal democracy. Our tests have also confirmed that the Christianization correlates negatively with polygyny (though no one hardly doubted this). However, our tests (contrary to our expectations) have failed to confirm the presence of negative correlation between Christianization and the presence of large extended families. Hence, the main channels through which the Christianization of Europe might have contributed to the development of the communal democracy in this part of the world are the destruction of the unilineal descent organization and polygyny (but not the large extended families). In general, our overall explanatory model looks as follows. We suggest that the kinship and family structures (determined in its turn by a large number of independent factors, both material [e.g. economic] and ideal [e.g. religious]) could affect significantly the overall political evolution of the respective societies. We believe, that the family structures affects primarily the political organization of the community (and we think we have provided enough substantial support for this point above). However, we also believe that the communal political structure could influence significantly the political organization of the supracommunal levels as is suggested by the following test (see Table 10): TABLE 10. Communal Democracy * Supracommunal Democracy Crosstabulation (for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample) Democracy of the Supracommunal Organization Communal Leadership 0 1 Totals (absent) (present) 0 = Non-Democratic 58 (100%) 52 (90%) 6 (10%) 1 = Democratic 20 (100%) 7 (35%) 13 (65%) Totals 59 19 78 NOTE: Fisher’s Exact Test p = 0.000005; Phi = + 0.56. As a source for the data regarding Democracy of the political organization we used Tuden & Marshall 1972. The variable which we have chosen is SELECTION OF EXECUTIVE which has the following values: 1 = Absent; 2 = Patrilineal, Fa to So; 3 = Patrilineal, Fa to FaBr, then to So; 4 = Matrilineal, MoBr to SiSo; 5 = Matrilineal, MoBr to MoBr; 6 = Ruling family; 7 = Decision by limited power group; 8 = Elected by council; 9 = Informal recognition; 10 = Formal elections; 11 = Appointee of alien society; 12 = Divination. We have not considered the societies with value 1, whereas the values 8-9 have been re-coded as 1 (Democracy Present) and all the other values have been re-coded as 0 (Democracy Absent). As a source of data on the communal democracy for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample we used Murdock & Wilson 1972 (Local Political Succession, Primary). The re-coding has been done along 206 the same lines as with respect to the previous variable. This table, naturally, does not consider the societies lacking supracommunal levels of political administration. As one could see the correlation between the democracy of the communal organization and the democracy of the supracommunal political organization turns out to be really strong and significant beyond any doubt. At this point we come to the most difficult problem of any cross-cultural research, the problem of the causation direction. I think that though the democratization of communal organization under the influence of the previously democratized state is perfectly possible (for example, this could be observed in the post-Communist Eastern Europe), the communal democracy in its turn could contribute to the democratization of the supracommunal political organization. Note that in Europe the development of democratic communal organization preceded the formation of modern supracommunal democracy (Udal’tsova 1985–1987). There are certain grounds to believe that the democratic organization of European communities facilitated the formation of democratic structures on the supracommunal level. On the other hand, the non-democratic communal organization appears to inhibit the development of democratic state organization as seems to be evidenced by Near Eastern data. Thus, the possible relationship between Christianization and democracy could be presented in the following way (see Diagram 1): Diagram 1 Supracommunal Democracy +  – +  – +  – Unilineal Descent Organization – – – – – –   Communal Democracy – – – Polygyny – – – –  –  207 –  Christianization 4. NOTES 1. This study was supported by grants from the Russian Foundation for the Humanities (RGNF # 0103-00332a) and from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR/RFFI # 01-06-80142). 2. Note that even in the Islamic world the Christian Church imposed the monogamy within the Christian communities in the most rigid way: "The Moslems were astonished mainly by the fact that the female slaves in the Christian and Jewish houses were not at the sexual disposal of the houses' heads... The cause of this was that the Christian regulation in the East considered the liason of a man with his female slave as lechery which should have been expiated by the formal penance... The Khalif al-Mansu:r once sent to his phisician Georgios three beautiful Greek female slaves and 3,000 golden coins. The phisician accepted the money, but returned the girls back saying to the Khalif: 'I cannot live with them in one house, because for us, the Christians, it is permitted to have one wife only, whereas I already have a wife'..." (Mez 1996/1922: 159). However, in the Islamic world Christians did not constitute anything more than a confessional minority; thus, this fact would not affect Murdock's codes with respect to the Moslem ethnic groups. Of course, within the Christian states the Church had much more opportunities to impose the strictest monogamy among the whole population including the uppermost strata. Of course, one could easily recollect at this point an apparently contradicting case of the polygynous Mormons. Note, however, that "the Mormon Church officially abandoned polygamy 101 years ago [in 1890] after it was forbidden by Utah law in a deal required by Congress for the territory to become a state. The church now excommunicates members for polygamy" (Johnson 1992: 129). 3. Note that the positive correlation between the presence of polygyny and hierarchical power structures seems to be attested even with respect to the non-human primates (Shnirel’man 1994: 63– 64). 4. In East Eurasia the only complex culture area consistently lacking unilineal descent organization was the area of the Hinayana Buddhist states. This area will not be be studied in this paper, but we shall consider it in our next paper. 5. For example, “Going on from there, he saw two other brothers, James son of Zebedee and his brother John. They were in a boat with their father Zebedee, preparing their nets. Jesus called them, and immediately they left the boat and their father and followed him” (Matthew 4:21–22). “Another disciple said to him, ‘Lord, first let me go and bury my father’. But Jesus told him, ‘Follow me, and let the dead bury their own dead’ ” (Mat. 8:21–22). “For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law – man’s enemies will be the members of his own household” (Mat. 10:35–36). “Someone told him, ‘Your mother and brothers are standing outside, wanting to speak to you’. He replied to him, ‘Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?’. Pointing to his disciples, he said, ‘Here are my mother and my brothers. For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother’ ” (Mat. 12:47–50). “But you are not to be called ‘Rabbi’, for you have only one Master and you are all brothers. And do not call anyone on earth ‘father’, for you have one Father, and he is in heaven” (Mat. 23:8–9). (Cited from The Holy Bible, New International Version. Colorado Springs, CO: International Bible Society, 1984, ; I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Tamara Tsereteli for finding those quotations). 6. Of course, this is not the only channel through which Christianization might have led to the destruction of unilineal descent organization (cp. e.g. Stark, 1996). 7. 19–20th centuries. 8. Maronites. 208 9. It appears remarkable that we would find the total absence of polygyny in Christian societies neighboring the Moslem societies living under entirely similar economic and ecological conditions and practicing (at least occasionally) polygyny (e.g. the Montenegrans [Jelavic 1983: 81–97; Fine 1987: 529–536] vs. the Highland Albanians [Pisko 1896; Durham 1909; 1928; Coon 1950; Hasluck 1954; Jelavic 1983: 78–86; Fine 1987: 49–54, 599–604, etc.]). 10. 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