Rasa: Abhinavagupta on the Purpose(s) of Art (2015)

Rasa: Abhinavagupta on the Purpose( s) of Art Daniele Cuneo "Aut prod esse volunr aut delectare poetae." Horace, De arte poetic,z 333 "Plaisir ct instruction-saveur et savoir-sonr en effet Ia double fin assignee acc theatre." Lyne Bansat-Boudon, Pourqoui le theatre? Ltz riponse indienne "You gave me these emotions. You did nor tell me how to use them ." The "monster" in Fr,znkenstein (1994), d irected by Kenneth Branagh This essay cries to formu late an (over-) interpretation of the concept of rasa, as it is understood by Abhinavagupta especially, insofar as the purpose of art is concerned. In contrast with the well known binomial opposition as to the aim of art deemed as a source of knowledge and pleasure, being one of the horns of the issue p rimary and the other secondary and accessorial, th is essay understands t he msa experience as a transfo rmative p ractice involving both a beatific pleasure (priti, or better ananda) and an ethical Bildung (vyutpatti) , which ultimately represent nothing but two aspects of the same sentimental education or educative emotional arousal. Art brings forth a pleasurable experience that is an education to the right choice to be made, among a range of emotive possibilities, in front of any situational context to be coped with. In such an understand ing of the concept of rasa as a cognitive, emotional as well as moral experience, a specific interpretation of the ethical field is implicit, i.e., any morally meaningful choice coincides with the emotional response to 72 Rasa: Abhi1Mvagttpta on the Pttrpose(s) ofArt {Cuneo) 73 any given situation. Consequently, emotions are mo ral acts, liable to moral judgements and evaluations. The Dilemma Pleasure and instruction are the dual purpose of arr. 1 Such a statement is, in a way, a topos along the whole d iachronic and diatopic network of reflections and speculations on "aesthetics," even before such a term-aestheticswas first used in its modern and contemporary sense and even in p laces such a term has reached only in very recent times. However, on the different ratio and proportion of these two artistic aims, the thinkers of every latitude and time have forcefully d isagreed one another, especially insofar as their respective ideas o n the d efinitions of art and non-art diverged and also, at least by implication, insofar as their gen eral philosophical theo ries diverged. The two standard extreme opinions are obviously the two poles of the possible spectrum: the purpose of art is instruction, pleasure being at his best only a useful instrument for its achievement (cf. the utile dulci miseere of H o ratian memory); the purpose of art is pleasu re, instruction being at his b est a seco ndary offshoot. Both appear in these extreme formulations o ne-sidedly unfair and p artial, but even in t heir milder formu lation s th ey entail the germs of incongruence and unreasonableness. The pu rpose of the present essay is to suggest a tentatively coherent merging of t he two extremes, app arently con t rasting views by mea ns of an interpretive analysis of Abhinavagupta's aesthetics.2 Sketching the Western Debate Before approaching t he current issue in the C lassical Sanskritic cultural milieu and specifically in Abhinavagup ta's aesthetic theory, it may be useful to just delineate the origin of the Western debate on the topic and a couple of contemporary, still d ivergent opinio ns. As to the allegedly first work of the \Vestern legacy concerned only with art, i.e., the Poetics of Aristotle, the problem of the effect of an-specifically of poetry and theatre- is of fundamental importance. As it is well k nown, Aristotle's implicit polemical response to Plato's famo us devaluation of art as "copy of a copy" consists precisely in an acco un t of the essen ce of art as the capacity proper to a human productio n to arouse pleasu re along with, and in a way precisely by means of, transformative knowledge. Such edifying faculty of art depends on its imitative essence as well as on its peculiarly philosophical 74 Section 2: Aest heti cs nature. The ancient and traditional concept of mimesis is reinterpreted by Aristotle in its realistic understanding of art. Art produces knowledge since art is imitation and imitation is one of rhe commonest sources of knowledge. Instruction derives hence from the verisimilitude of rhe artistically represented events. Moreover, art, and specifically poetry, is deemed as more philosophical than history, since it deals with the universal, while history deals with the particular (Poetics 1451, 1b, 1-15). Thus, imitating should mean something like seizing the most essential features of any given thing. In chis way, experiencing an imitated entity collides with experiencing rhe given thing in its most characteristic and peculiar features. The aforementioned judgement of Plato is, on the ocher hand, probably also the expression of a professional rivalry, since the implication of rhe non-instructive nature of art is rhe social devaluation of artists, of poets in the specific case, which paves the way for the theoretical proposal of Plato, i.e., the philosophers as che unique moral and political leaders as well as inspirers of society. Plato's negative judgement, however, acknowledges the power of art: the capacity of art to mold mind, character and behavior. It is just a matter of choosing which kind of art will lead to which kind of episcemic import and moral transformation. After this extremely sketchy treatment of the cwo seminal authors of Western Philosophy, with a leap forward in time, up co the contemporary debate on rhe relations among arc, knowledge and morality, we can still find a battlefield of arguments wielded by powerful conflicting warriors. For instance, we have, on the one hand, the thesis as to che relation of knowledge and art to be found in a recent book by an Italian philosopher, Maurizio Ferraris (2007). Knowledge does not represent rhe fundamental purport of che artwork, bur every artwork accidentally conveys some knowledge. The relatively straightforward path of the reasoning can be cautiously summarised here. Art is nothing bur a thing that pretends to be a person, a thing chat prerends to have emotions. This pretence elicits an emotional response in humans, as we are hard-wired for responding to emotions with emotions. Any involvement determined by the artworks-including first of all the hedonic component that is the most common response-is a consequence of their capacity to elicit emotions as if they were real persons. The knowledge chat they may impart is just an unessential by-product, especially insofar as the sou rce o f knowledge par excellence is considered to be th e scientific discourse and the kind of knowledge rhe author has in mind is the one about facts and general rules that science is aptly made co produce. 3 On the other hand, Martha Nussbaum, for instance, is a staunch upholder of the ep istemic value of art, especially in her recent Upheavals ofThought: The Intelligence ofEmotions (2001 ). Furthermore, her conception of the kind of knowledge that aesthetic experiences can impart and her conception of the role emotions play in human life Rasa: Abbinavagttpta Oil the Purpose(s) ofArt (Cuneo) 75 are extremely relevant for the interpretation I will propose of Abhinavagupca's stance on che matter. Therefore, it is better not to anticipate her main theses and close this preliminary section, whose only purpose is to sketch the complexity of the subject matter and to emphasize the open-ended nature of the problem at stake. Bharata's Straight-forwardness In the Classical Sanskrit cultural milieu, the issue of"the purpose of art" 4 in its dual being, hedonic and epistemic, is addressed almost at the very outset of the first extant treatise on art, che Nacyasascra [NSP by Bharata. In che first chapter, dedicated to the creation ofTheatre, Bharata, the great master of theatre, prompted by the questions of ocher sages, narrates how in the period of chaos and immorality determined by the transition from the Golden Age co the Silver Age, i.e., from the Krtayuga to the Tretayuga, the gods approached Brahm a for help. Indra, the Lord of the Gods, told him chat they desired an object of diversion,6 so co say, a pleasure-giving object and, hence, asked him to generate a fifth Veda,7 Theatre. This two-sided request discloses the intrinsic correlation between the hedonic function of art (an object of diversion) and its epistemic/ moral function (the fifth veda, that is, "knowledge;' sought after in order to re-establish morality as well as knowledge itself). Then, this dual nature of Theatre, hedonic as well as epistemic-and, in particular, morally episcemic-becomes even clearer in Brahma's own words as soon as he accepts ro create such an extraordinary entity: I will create this fifth Veda, called Theatre, connected with Traditional Hiswry (itibnsn), conducive to dhnmJa ("moral ity"), wealth (nrthn) and fame, instructive and comprehensible, a guide in all the actions of the people of the future, endowed with the significance of all the snstms ("scholarly treatises") and displaying all the am. H Another crucial passage as co the hedonic as well as morally epistemic function of Theatre is NS 1.108-115 of wh ich it is worth quoting here l.ll3b: "It [Theatre] impartS instruction to reach the good and produces contentment, amusement, pleasure, ecc.''9 Therefore, from the dialogue in the first chapter and from the ocher quote-as well as from other related passages of the Nacyasascra-it is clear chat che two purposes of art, delight and instruction (called priti and vyutpatti10 in the later terminology ofAbhinavagupta) are both considered fundamental, although instruction is in a way the purpose of the purpose, the prayojanaprayojana. After all, according to Bharaca's narration, it is for the sake of the reestablishment of dharma through instruction that Theatre was to be created. 76 Sectio n 2: Aesthetics The Naryasastra is therefore clear in supporting the view that knowledgemoral knowledge-is the main purpose of art. Conversely, if one analyses the various passages on the issue in Abhinavagupta's works on art, that is, the Locana on Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka [DhvA] and theAbhinavabharati [ABh] on Bharata's Natyasastra itself,u·there seem to be some apparent contradictions. As it has already been hinted at, the purpose of this essay is trying to conciliate these alleged contradictions and proposing a tentative, viable solution to the general aes thetic problem regarding the purpose of art. Abhinavagupta's Haziness Before focusing on Abhinavagupta's interpretation of t he issue, it might be useful to q uote at least some of the relevant passages from the authors who thrived between the composition of the Natyasastra and Abhinavagupta's great synthesis and systematization of the aesthetic thought of classical India. The first author to be considered is Bhamaha (7th c. CE) whose very clear statement on the matter (later taken up again by Abhinava himself, see below) reads: "The composition (or th e study [according to a reading found in Abhinava's Locana]) of good poetry imparrs skill in dharma ('morality'), m·tha ('power'), kama ('pleasure'), moksa ('liberation'), an d the arcs; it gives both fame and joy." 12 Unfortunately, Dal)Qin (7-8th c. CE) has no clear-cut statement on the subj ect in his Kavyadatsa. 13 Vamana (8-9th c. CE) is quite clear, insofar as he seems-differendy tO what Bhamaha maintains-to prefer delight ove r instruction, as it can be gleaned from Kavyalamkarasutra 1.1.5: "Good poetry has as aim the visible and the invis ible, as it is the cause of [the vis ible] delight [for its appreciator] and of the [invisible] fame [for its composer].'''• In his Kavyalamkara, 15 ｒｵ､ｲ｡ｾ＠ (9th c. CE) clearly regards instruction in the fourfold aims of mankind as the aim of poetry, although msa and its hedonic component do play the fundamental role of being the honey that allows the enjoyer of art to easily swallow the bitter medicine that is moral knowledge-rouse a slighdy hackneyed metaphor. Conversely, the Agniputana, a text whose date is very uncertain (possibly 9th- 10th c. CE), has a very telling statement in the direction of the epistemic and moral signifi can ce of theatre: "Theatre is a means tO attain the threefold aim of mankind [i.e., kama, artha and dhamza] ." 16 As far as Dhana111jaya ( l Oth c. CE) is concerned, o ne might quote the following verse in the classical translation by Haas ( 1912, 3 ): "As for any simple man of little intelligence who says that from dramas, which distil joy, the gain is knowledge on ly, as in the case of history (itihasa ) and the likehomage to him, for he has averted from what is delightful!" 17 His stance as to Rasa: Abhi11avagupta 011 tbe Purpose{s) ofArt (Cuneo) 77 the relative supremacy of pleasure over instruction is quite clear, and also confirmed by the words of his commentator Dhanika.18 To sum up this admittedly cursory survey, the variety of opinions among the authors between Bharata and Abhinavagupta swings from one opposite of the spectrum, i.e., the prevalent purport of delight, to the other, i.e., the prevalent purport of instruction, without excluding some intermediate positions. Let's go back co the haziness of Abhinavagupta chat the title of this section promised. Since, amongst the two works created here, the Locana has been composed before the Abhinavabharati, the first relevant statement we encounter in Abhinavagupra's works is the following: For the aud itors it is true that both instruction [v_yutpatti] and delight (priti] arc goals, for it has been said, "The study of good poerry imparts skill in dhamJII, artha, kama, moksa, and the arts; it gives both fame and joy" [ Bhamaha 1.2). 19 Nevertheless, of instruction and joy, joy is the chief goal. Otherwise, what basic difference would there be between one means of instruction, viz., poetry, which instructs after th e fashion of a wife, and other means of instruction, such as the Vedas which instruct after the fashion of a master, or history which instructs after the fashion of a friend ? That is why bliss [anandajl 0 is said to be the chief goal. In comparison with (poetry's] instruction even in all four aims of human life, the bliss which it renders is a far more important goa!.21 However, later in the same text, Abhinavagupta objects to Bharra Nayaka's view th at "any instruction rhar poetry may furnish is incidental" (Inga lls 1990: 222) 22 : (We further admir thar] the educative effect (vyutpadana) [of pocu y] is different from that which comes from scripture through its mandates and from hisrory through its narrations. For in addition to the analogy it furn ishes that we should behave like Ram a [and not like Ravana]. it prod uces in the final result an expansion of one's imagination which serves as the means of tasting the 1/1SIZS . 23 Furthermore, I argue that a more literal and slightly different transl atio n of rhe second sentence will give a better idea of the "moral" enhancementif yo u allow me to anticipate my conclusion-that poetry brings about: "In the end, it determines an instruction that consists in th e expansion of one's imaginative power by means of the savouring of rasa and that is different from the analogical knowledge that I should be like Ram a." In more modern terms, one might say char the rasas, i.e., the aesthetic emotions one exp eriences in appreciating art, effect cognitively valuable changes in the emotional and perceptual dispositions of the enjoyer of art. In other words, our insight into life is made keener by rhe very enjoyment of arr. 24 But there is no need to further anticipate rhe conclusion of rhe present enterprise. 78 Section 2: Aesthetics Furthermore, in a later passage, Abhinavagupta enlarges the discussion on the various sources of instruction25 a nd adds, in the end, a very telling remark: Now since this rasa is brought by the union of vibhavas and their related factor (rhat is, by rhe whole emotional situation represented on the stage] ,26 a union which is invariably connected with instruction in the four goals of man, it follows that the subjection of a man to the relishing of the rasas by a literary construction of the vibhavas, etc., appropriate to rasa, serves at the same time for the instruction (vyutpatti) rhat naturally results. In this way literary delight (priti) is an aid to instruction. Our teacher [Bhattatauta] has put the matter rhus: "Rasa is delight; delight is the drama; and rhe drama is the Veda [the goal of wisdom]." D elight and instruction are not different in nature, for they occ upy a single realm. 27 The most problematic point is exactly this identification and the meaning of the last expression, the one following the statement o n the nondifferentiation between delight and instruction. In chis respect, Ingalls comments char" [b ]orh are found where rasa is present." This is unproblemarically true, bur I suspect char there might be more at stake here. H owever, before proposing my interpretation, it is better to delve further into the promised ambiguity and to analyse some passages of rhe Abhinavabharati commenting on the Nacyasastra in which Abhinavagupta is much more keen to accepting the educative role of art, and ro acknowledging it as its "primary" role. As already seated before, Theatre is created as "a guide in all the actio ns of the people of rhe furure;·zs as rhe gods said: "We desire an object of d iversion, which should be visible and audible."29 Abhinavagupra comments on chis passage: "'Visible' means pleasing, 'audible' means instructive, so che meaning is 'source of delight and instruction."' 30 Delight and instruction seem therefore on rhe same plane. Then, on commenting th e expression, "another Veda, rhe fifth, which will belong to all rhe classes;'31 he understands it unambigu ously as "a source of insrrucrion." 32 Then, on the issue of the appropriateness of represenring contemporary or non-co ntemporary deeds, Abhinavgupra states: Furthermore, rhe reproduction of contemporary deeds is not appropriate. Since, in such cases, because of the lack of delight (priti) caused by the absence of identification brought about by attachment, aversion, indifference, ere., those who should be instructed cannot receive instruction (vyutpatti) eithcrY Hence, it seems that, in theAbhinavabharati, Abh inavagupta maintains that imparting instruction is indeed the "primary" goal of theatre, as it would seem by the mere reading of the Nat yasastra alone. Then, on commenting NS 1.115, it is said: "it [i.e., Theatre] improves intellect. It indeed extends such Rasa: Abhi1tavagupta on tbe Pttrpose(s) ofArt (Cuneo) 79 imaginative power of one's own (pratibha)." 34 Furthermore, on commenting NS 1.119, Abhinavagupta clearly states: "therefore, t he fruit [of theatre] is the instruction about what has to be accepted and what has to be abandoned." 35 This implicit definition of vyutpatti needs a further explanation. As Amaladass ( 1992: 261) puts it, vyutpatti, in general, means "learning;' "knowledge;' "proficiency," "training;' "craftsmanship." However, in this particular context, it indicates a practical capacity, the faculty of discriminating between the right t hing, to be done, and the wrong thing, not to be done. 36 To conclude this cursory list, one might quote one of the possible interpretations of the oftencited maxim by Bharata: "Verily, without rasa, no thing can progress." 37 Abhinavagupta glosses: "without it [i.e., the rasa) no thing, i.e., no purpose [of theatre), consisting of instruction and accompanied by [or, maybe, actually 'preceded by') delight, can progress.'' 38 Many more passages on the importance and centrality of vyutpatti might be quoted, but even more passages of the Abhinavabharati emphasize the crucial role of rasa as t he conditio sine qua non of Theatre, and its savouring as an inherently delightful experience. 39 Collapsing the Dilemma What follows is my tentative and adm itted ly over-interpretive solution for che just d epic ted "alleged contradictory nature" of Abhinavagupta's statements about both the primacy ofpriti or vyutpatti as aims of art and their possi ble interrelation/ identity. 40 As also Ingalls ( 1990: 233) put it, "Abhinava is able to make enjoyment and instruction come to much the same thing." In Locana ad DhvA 3.10-14, he says chat they are non-different in nature, i.e., chat they are identical , but the reason for this identification is the crux of the issue. It is said ekavisayatvat, Ingalls rranslaces, "for chey occupy che same real m." However, in the lines that follow t he quoted passage, Abhinavagupta do es say what chis visaya is: it is vibhavadyaucitya "the appropriateness41 of Determinants and so forrh." This term is furthe r qualified as priter nidanam 'che cause of delight.' The term visaya may be chen translated as "object." Therefore, the source and the object of both delight and instruction is che whole emotional situation (vibhavadi), insofar as it is appropriate, namely, insofar as an appropriate character (the alambanavibhava, in the technical terminology of Natyasascra) behaves (what is technically called the anubhavas) appropriately in a specific situation (the uddipanavibhavas). This is clearly t he source and object of inst-ruction, because such instruction consists precisely in developing the capacity to follow the "right" course of action in any particular situation. However, it is not crystal clear how the emotional situation as 80 Section 2: Aesthetics such can be the source and the object of priti, as priti is nothing but another n ame of the very experience of rasa, i.e., the aesthetic sublimation of the emotion appropriate for the specific situation. The solution might be simple: the bhava, the fundamental emotion, the inner life of the emotional situation, must b e included in this case-at least by implication-in the vibhavadi, as, in any emotional situation (vibhavadi), Ｒ＠ the emotion one feels must also be ｡ｰｲｯ ｩ ｡ｴ･Ｎｾ More than that, feeling the appropriate emotion is actually the only way to have the appropriate behaviour. 43 Therefore, the real inStruction (vyutpatti) is not only the capacity ro discriminate between different courses of action, but also, and maybe especially, the capacity to choose betwee n the various emotions o ne might, or better one should, feel in a specific situation. It goes without saying that this entails some kind of active mastery over the emotions, or at least the possibilit y to educate oneself to be "seized by" the appropriate emotion when the time comes. H ence, the source and the object of rasa, i.e., of both delight a nd instruction, is t he whole vibhavadi including the bhava. To put it blun tly, the visaya ofpriti and vyutpatti is the whole emotional life of human beings. Therefore, in my interpretation of his aesth etic theory, Abhi navagupta is arguing that the main kind of instruction offered by an is what we might call "affective knowledge;' i.e., knowledge as to what it would be like to be in a particular emotional situation and as to what is th e appropriate emotional response-« to such experiential circumstance-a kind of knowledge very different from the knowledge of facts or of general rules, which concern th e world as it is perceived by the senses and as it is studied today by natu ral sciences. Therefore, in this perspective, an comes to play an invaluable role in the very development of our moral sensibility... s Or, in a more pregnant fashion, the very aim of art is shaping moral sensibility through a sort of affective cu ltivation of the psychic dispositions of the human mind. As Pollock ( 1998: 141 ) put it, the aim of an is, "to help us develop a comprehensive moral imagination.".. 6 Consequently and as an aside, art as an instrument of emotional ed ucation cannot be morally neuter. It must be loaded with values and bristling with such seemingly paradoxical and implicit imperatives as "be afraid," "be astonished," "laugh," "be disgusted," and so forth, to be applied in this or that specific experiential situation. Obviously, this interpretation of art and its hedonic-cum-ethic value is tenable only insofar as the moral field is understood as including emotions. Namely, emotions must be considered moral events, liable ro eth ical judgements an d evaluations. Human beings must be held responsible for their emotional respo nses. As already hinted at, this interpretation of emotionality becomes acceptable, only insofar as modes of developing our emotional capacities, our emotional competence, actually exist, and only insofar as emotions Rasa: Abhinavagttpta 011 the Pttrpose(s) ofArt {Cuneo) 81 are not uncontrollable impulses that drive us notwithstanding our choices.47 They must be-at least to a significant extent-choices, our choices, morally meaningful choices. 48 In order to live a moral life-practically, I am just about to paraphrase a famous passage of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics49 - one ought to have the right emotion towards the proper object, to an appropriate degree and at the appropriate time and place. This maxim can be sensible, and even understandable, only insofar as it is possible to assess, at least theoretically, the moral significance of any specific emotion in any specific context. 5 For instance and somehow counterintuitively, anger-commonly considered a "bad emotion" -can be considered as an appropriate and therefore necessary emotional response in some specific situations (for example, the victim's anger against a rapist within the contemporary Western "average" moral framework). To generalize the import of the present discourse, in this sort of "emotional" theory of ethics, morality cannot be understood as a set of abstract, absolute principles, prescriptions or imperatives to be grasped by sheer reason, as it is the case for Kant's "categorical imperative." On the contrary, it sh ould be regarded as a living and practical capacity, consisting of an always selfrenovating "emotional" interpretation of experiential situations. This ethically charged interpretation of emotional life has been maintained by many contemporary philosophers su ch as Robert Solomon and Martha N ussbaum. 51 Along the lines of this moral theory,52 art brings forth a pleasurable experience that is an education to the right choice to be made, among a range of emotive possibilities, in front of any situational context to be coped with. Reading poetry and watching drama, for instance, are therefo re conducive to building a virtuous character. The different episodes represented in fictional narratives are aimed at fostering in the spectatOrs determinate dispositions (habitus) , or virtues, one might say, which determine the actual emotive responses one will and should have in coping with the various emotional situations one might and will encounter in real life. The consequence of reiterated aesthetic experiences is thus the development of a, "reflexive ethical capacity," as Ali (2004: 94) puts it in the closely related context of t he early medieval courtly culture. To sum up and take scock of the promised collapse of the dilemma, o ne might state that, in contrast with the well known binomial opposition as to the ai m of art deemed as a source of"knowledge" and "pleasure;' being one of the horns of the issue primary and the other secondary and accessorial, the rasa experience in Abhinavagupta's formulation is a morally transformative Er!ebnis involving both a beatific pleasure (priti) and an ethical Bi!dung ( vyutpatti), which ultimately represent nothing but two aspects of the same sentimental education or educative emotional arousal. I am well aware that in no place Abhinavagupta states clearly the dual nature of rasa as a cocktail of ° 82 Section 2: Aesth et ics beatific pleasure and laudable instruction, but I deem that this understanding is a possible and coherent interpretive solution of his many apparen tly contradicting statements in this regard. More than chat, I believe it is highly commendable to critically engage with texts such as the Natyasas cra and the Abhinavabharati, whose very nature of highly complex and culturally rich enterprises does not only demand for a merely philological assessment of their meaning ( in the lower understanding of the term 'philological'), but also and especially for a philosophical engagement with their purport and possible relevance for the contemporary debate within the field of both aesthetics in particular and humanities at large. This essay is, in a way, a reinforcement, a continuation and a nonmystical but emotion-centered reinterpretation of Amaladass (1992). To put it plainly, what is dissimilar in my interpretation of the current issue is, as I hope will be clear by che end of chis essay, che role of emotions as such in any aeschecical experience as well as in any ethical experience. The same topic had been already created-in a rather neutral way-also by Kulkarni (2003 b ). I wish co thank Elisa Ganser for her precious remarks and suggestions. Any mistakes, of course, are mine alone. NOTES 1. For an immediate reference to the Indian case, which is the one at stake here, see the quotation by Bansat·Boudon already pur iu ｾｸｲｧｯ Ｚ＠ "Piaisir er insrrucrion-saveur er savoir- sont en effet Ia double fin assignee ace theatre." obviously Indian theatre. 2. Abhinavagupra (ca. 950-1020 CE) is one of rhe most celebrated mystics, aesrhericians and philosophers of ancient India. He is the greatest exponent of rhe so-called Kasmir Saivism, i.e., a form of ranrric f,liVtl monism that he himself systematized by harmonizing a number of different religious and philosophical traditions. H e is rhe author of many fundamental works, among which his opw m,1gnum is the T,mrriiloka, a very original and extremely inAuenrial compendium of rantric Saivism. However, his cur rem fame in India depend s mainly on the monumenral contribution he gave ro the field of aesthetics by commenting upon Anandavardhana's Dlmlll)'liloka and Bharara's Naryasasrra. For a general account ofhislife and work, see rhe pioneering and reasonably comprehensive srudy of Pandey ( 1966). Further information can be found in more recent and up-to-dare ;cholarship available on the matter, such as Rastogi ( 1987) and Gnoli ( 1999). 3. The full implication of the existence of different kinds of knowledge (factual. scientific, affective and so forth-without claiming to give a complete li sting) will hopefully be clear by rhe end of the essay. 4. The issue of the purpose of art is viewed in rhe present paper from rhe point of view o f the enjoyer of art. The perspective of the artist as to the purpose of his own art is nor addressed here. The crucial concept ofy,l.f,•s-the fame that the poet accrues by means of his activity- and other related issues are therefore nor dealt with in the present essay. S. The Naryasasrra (Na,yasasrra, with the standard diacritics used ro transliterate Sanskrit terms) is an encyclopedic treatise on dramaturgy attributed ro rhe sage Bharara and usually dared from rhe second century BC to the second century AD. Besides drama ｰｾｲ＠ ｳｾＬ＠ it includes the discussion of many related topics such as enactment, dance, music, meter, ere. The t ext as it is extant nowadays most probably represents rhe unification and systematization of previous!)' existing materials. The Rasa: Abhinavagnpta 011 the Purpose(s) ofArt (Cuneo) 83 srarcmenrs and rhc theories expounded in chis crcacisc as co chc chcacrical arc will be Iacer considered as applicable and valid for every arc form whatsoever and, hence, for arr in general. For chc standard cranslarion of rhc rcxr, sec Ghosh ( 1950-1967). 6. NS l.llc: krif/.aniyakam iccb,imo. 7. NS 1.12: vtd.U?tpalicam.up. The Vedas arc the oldest scriptures oflndia, supposedly revealed co rhe r!is: rhe ancient seers. The standard canonization of rhc Vedic rexcual corpus consists of a Stim11veda, Yajurveda andAtharvavtda. Being considered as a fifth Veda fourfold division : ｾｧｶ･､｡Ｌ＠ implies che conferral of rhe highest moral and religious value. Tcxcs for which chis scacus has been claimed include rhc Mahtib!Jtimta and some Purd!Jas. 8. NS 1.14-15: dh,zmiJ•'m arthym?I.Yala.<.Yti>?J Ctl sopaddya'l• sas11ngmham bbavityataf Cll ｬｯｫＬｺｾｹ｡ Ｎｲ｡ｊﾷｺｫｭ､ｮｵｦｬ＠ II I I Jlll.l'll.<tittti1·tbi1StlnlpanntlJ!l sart'ilii/papr,ru,,rtaknm wi!ytikby•"l' pmimm11711 t•edll7{1 setib.ism1• k,zromy ,zham II 9. NS 1.113b: bitopadefajanana'/1 dbrtikrir/.timkbtidikrt. 10. The issue of vyutpatti "education" as che prerequisite of any good poec (cogecher wich pmtibha, "poe tic genius"), discussed in many works of alantktiraftistr.z ("poetics"), is beyond che scope of chc present essay, which focu ses, instead, on chc receptive dimension of arc. II. Abhinavagupra composed cwo ocher ccxcs of primarily "poetical" and "dramaturgical" conrene, che ｋｴｩｺｾｹ｡ｫｵｲｶ ｺ ｡ｲＡｊ＠ and the Gharakarparakulakat•ivrri. The first o ne is a lose commentary on rhc lose Kavyakauruka by Bhana Tauca, Abhinavagupca's reacher of d ramaturgy. T he second one, a commcncary on a shore poem acrribuced co Kalidasa, has no direct bearing on che issues ar hand and will nor be deale with in che present essay. For a cranslarion thereof, sec Parlier ( 1975). For a partial srudy thereof, sec Masson ( 1975). 12. Bhamaha's Ktivy.il,zmk,irll 1.2: db,znn.irth,zktimmnok,<t$11 ｶＬｩ｣ｺｫ＼ｾｉｊｬＡ＠ k,zroti kirliJ?l prili'!J ｣ＮｺｲＬｩ､ｬｭｫｾｹ｡ｮ｢ｨ ktdtisu ca ｬ､ｭ＠ I [or ｳＮｩ､ｨｵｫＬｶｹｬＤｴ＼ Ｇ Ｇｾｭ＠ ])" Ada peed rranslarion from Ingalls ( 1990: 71). 13. As co che problem of chronological prioriry berween Daf)<)in and Bhamaha, see Bronner (2012). 14. Kdvydl,utlk.il;witm 1.1.5: /.:,iVJili!J sad druddrU•irrbam, pritikirriberutv.il. 15. Rudraca's Ktiz•J•,ilamk,im 12.1 -2: nllllll ｫｴｩｶ ｹｴｾ ｬｩ＠ kriy11U SII>"IIJtintim az•,zganlllf Clltlln•m-ge I ｾ｢｟ｹ｡ｳ＠ u /,i ｴｲ｡ｾｹｮｩ＠ .<tistrtbhy,r/;11 lagbu c11 mrd11 ca ｮｩｭｳ I Jtunuit Jtrl ｫＬｴｲｬｾｙＱ＿＠ ｹｮ ｬｮ ｴｮｾＱｨｩｹ｡ｊ ｴｩ＠ r.ullir_yuktllJll Ｑ ｴｪｾｮＡｬｭ＠ ｵ､ｌ ＯＨｾｦ･ ｩｊ＿＠ f/iJlJ'tll'ild Cl'tlnJ'lllhti hi S)ltit 11 "On che mher ｨｾｮ､Ｌ＠ poetry brings forth a quick and gcnrlc comprehension of rhe fourfold aim of mankind on the part of the connoisseurs, as rhe flavourless scholarly rreacises just frighten rhem. Therefore, one should grcady srri,·e for it [i.e., poccry] robe associated wirh ms11s as, otherwise, rhey would be afraid of it, just as in che case of scholarly treatises." 337.7c: 16. ＮＭｬｧｮｩｰｺｭｾ＠ 17. D,<fllnip,,k.z 1.6: ｴｲｩｶｭｧ｡ｳ､ｨｾｬ＠ n.i{yam. Ｎｩｮ｡､Ｌｭｵｾ＠ nipake$11 V_Yu tpartimtitnv?J pbalam alpabuddbi(7 I yo 'pitihnslidir>ad tiha stidlms tasmai namnf? sr•.idupartiizmu/.:bti)'ll II 18 . .-Jv,zlok,z ad Daianipaka 1.6, p. 5: "[T]he fruit of rhe cen kinds of drama is che savouring of (che aesthetic emotion), which consists in supreme bliss perceivable only by one's self, nor just che mere instruction regarding the three aims of mankind and che like, as it is in the case ofhiscory and the like (svaS111/ll'tdJ'''pm·tmltinandllnipo mstisv,ido d,zflll"zip,indl!l pb,zlam, 1111 pullllr itihti.<ddiz•at mStl trivmg.idivyutptrltimtitnrm)." 19. Bhamaha's K.iv_YdlaJ?Jktim 1.2. See also above. 20. lr is worth nocing char tinanda ("bliss") and priti ("pl.easurc") are practically synonyms here and in Abhinavagupca's terminology. 21. Loc,zna ad DhvA 1.1, p. 40: ｦｲｯｴｾ ﾷｾＧｴｩＡ＠ ca vyutpattipriti yadyapi staq yatboktam-dbllrm,irrbak.imamok!t$11 ｶ｡ｩ｣ｫＡｾｉｊＱ＠ kaltiSII ca karoti kirtil!l priliJ?l Cll ｳｴｩ､｢ｵｫｶｹ｡ｮＡｖｉｬｾｭ＠ I II (Bhtimah.z 1.2 ) iri ltathtipi t11tm pritir tva pradhtinam lanyathti pmbhusammiubhyo vtdtidibhyo mimzsammitebhyaf wihtistidibhyo vyutpattihetubhyabko'sya ktil'yanipasya vyurpattihttorjtiytismu- Section 2: Aesthetics 84 I ｭｩｴｬｖ＼ｾｫｦ｡ｊｏ＠ viieft! iti priidbiinyentinanda evoktal; caturvmgavyutp,rller tZpi fdntZndtZ eva pdryantikm?1 mukbya'!l phala?!' Translation by Ingalls (1990, 71). 22. Loca1111 ad DhvA 2.4. p. 184: vyutp1111ir lltimtipmdhtinam eva. 23. Locana ad DhvA 2.4, p. 185: v_yutptid,mal/l ca idsanapmtiptiddntibb_yd'!' i dstretihtisakrtabyathd •·a mas tathaham ity upamtindtiriktdl/lrasdsv,idopd_y,uvapnllibhavijrmbhydrp ｶｩｬ｡ｫｦｾｺｭ＠ hdnipdl/l ｶｹｾｴｰ｡ｩｭ＠ ante karotiti. Translation by Ingalls ( 1990, 226). 24. One might also add that-as Ingalls ( 1990, 233) put ic-"inasmuch as it [i.e., chc inmuccion given by art] trains us to experience aesthetic bliss, it may even be said to be spiritually inscruc- I I dvc." 25. Locana ad DhvA 3.10-1-t, p. 336: ib.t pmbhusammiubhy.tl;irutismrtiprabb,·ribbyal; kartm•ytm1 idam i ty djntimdtraparamtirtbebb.ra& .<d.<trebh.ro ye na •ryutpanntiiJ, na ctipy asytdm?' vrttam Ｌ Ｑ ｭｵｦ､ｴｫｾｲ｡Ａｬ＠ ity ･ｶ｡＾＿ｬ｟ｙｵｫｴｾｉＬｲｭｰｨｓｩ｢ｮ､Ａ＠ anaktiri bb_yo mitra.<ammitebiJya ｴ ｾｙｩｬＯ＠ vyutptidytil} pmj.irtbiiMmp.idan,,yogyar,iknintti itibtisai.istrebhyo /.,bdbavyutp1111t1J•d;, ,,riJ,, ｣､ｶＮ nijtlputmprdyiis leftil?l ｢ｲ､Ｌｾｹｮｵｰｭｴ ､｡ ｭｵｫｨｴｬ＠ Ctllurvllrgop.i_yavyutp.tttir ,idbey,i brd,zytinupmvd,zi ,,,msdsvtidamaya ev,z. Ingalls ( 1990. 437) translates: "Princes. who ace not educated in scripturechose works of iru ti and snqti which consist in commands, like chose of a master, co do chis or thac-and who have not received instruction from history. which like a friend reveals to us che connection of cause and effect with such persuasive instances as 'This result came from such an act,' and who are therefore in pressing need of instruction, for they arc given the power co accomplish chc wants of their subjects, can be given instruction in the four goals of man only by our entering into their hearts. And what enters into the heart is the relish of rt!Stt (ms,isvadtl, the imaginative experience of emotion)." Abhinavagupta brieRy repeats the same analogy in Loctllllt ad DhvA 3.30, p. 399. translated in Ingalls (1990. 533). 26. The uibh,ivtidi are the well-known dements of any theatrical representation that have co be enacted in order to arouse chc ms.1 (say, the aesthetic experience) in the spectators. It might be worth repeating here, for the sake of those unacquainted with the theatrical termini tecnici, what I have explained elsewhere (Cuneo 2011. 56-57): "As the renowned rasasutr,z has established: vibh.ivii>mbh,ivav)'tlbhicdrisa'!l_Yogtid >"•HIIItisp•zlli/;, namely, 'The ms11 is produced by che union of che Determinants (vibh,iv.ts), che Consequents (.mubbtivas) and the Transitory States (vyabhic.iribbtiv,ls).' The vibbdv.1s ('Determinants') are chose factors that make che emotion possible, chat determine, or even cause ir. Thus they are both the subject and the object of rhe emotion as well as rhe whole array of stimulating 'environmental' factors chat determine the rise of the emotion, namelr. the whole emotional situation. For instance, in a love situation. the lover and che beloved are che subject and the object of rhc emotion, while the stimulating factors are springtime, garlands. splendid mansions, and so forth. The anubhtivas ('Consequents') arc the consequences, che effects or, one might say, rhe 'symptoms' of an emotion, namely. in the case of love, both voluntary acts, such as verbal expressions of one's feelings. sidelong glances and the like and involuntary responses, such as perspiration, horripilation and so forth. Obviously enough. these acts are the very object of representation on the part of the actors. The vy.zbhicdribiJ<it•.ls ('Transitory States') are a whole set of chirty-chree complementary, or secondary, emotions such as anxiety, em·y, shame and indignation. Hence, the combination of all these elements on che stage determines the production of ms.z." 27. Loc,zn,, ad DhvA 3.10-14, p. 336: J/1 Ctl I'IIStiS clllurvargop.i]''lV.Ylltpatti-ntintariy,zkavibｵｰ｡ｮｩ｢､ｨｾ＠ rasdsvtidav.tiv,zi)'am eva baviidisal?l)'Og.tpmsadopanllta it_r Will!' ｲ｡ｳｯ｣ｩｴｶ｢ｨ､Ｌｊ .mlmsabhtil'in_rii>?l vyutpaiTau pra_yojakam iii pritir tl'tl vyutpa11e& prayojikd Jpritydtmd ca rasaJ tad m1 nd{ya>?llld{_ram tl't!l'eda ity asmaduptidhytiyal} Ina caite pritit:yutp.•ui bhinnanipe I tllyor ap.Y ekal'i$ayatvdt. Translation by Ingalls ( 1990, 437). Moreover, the relationship between priti and V)'lltp.ztti is hinted at in another passage, a possibly ambiguous one. See ｌｯ｣ｭｾ＠ ad DlwA 3.33. p. 455: pritimdtrap11>)•1Utts•iyiw.itl priter eu,, ctilaukiktlCIIIIlatk.imniptipi r•.rutp,ztl)'"'ig,,tvdt. Although Ingalls ( 1990. 592) translates: "This Ii.e .. chc non-applicability to poetry of the normal criteria of factua l verifiability] is because the end of poecry is pleasure, for it [is) only by pleasure, in the form of a otherworldly delight, char it can serve co instruct us" the last phrase might also mean-in a different grammatical interpretation-chat delight (priti) is actually secondary (miga) with respect co inmuction (vyurp.1tti). One more interesting passage correlatingpriti and vyutpatti-being the lim a condition for che occurrence of the second-is ABh ad NS 4.2-3. p. 85. in which, on commenting on the term ursiibajanana of verse 2, Abhinavagupca states: "and it is by means of that very delight [i.e., raM ] that there is a production of an urge to ace cowards [the ｯ｢ｾ｡ｩｮｭ･ｲ＠ of] I Rasa: A bhi1zavagttpta on the Pttrpose(s) ofA rt (Cuneo) 85 t he means for the three aims of mankind [i.e., a moral instruction] (tena ca ｰ ｲ ｩｴｰｭｫｲ･ｾｯｳＬｨ｡Ｎ＼ｹ＠ trivargopdpwisllJasya jllnan,rm). Bur we are already in t he realm of the Abhinllvabhiirati here. I wish co t hank Elisa Ganser for pointing our co me this passage. 28. NS 1.14: bhavisyaraf ca lokasya sarvakmmiinudarfakam 29. NS 1.11: krit/aniy.rkam icchiimo drs,vam fravyal!l cayad bhavet. 30. ABh ad NS 1.12, vol. 1, p. II: driyam iti hrdya1rr fravyam iri ｶｹｵｴｰ｡ｩｲ､ｾｮ＠ iri pritivyutp,midmn ity arrha&. 31. NS 1.12: vedm!J p1Z1icama1!1 ｳｩ ｮ Ｌ ｷ｡ｲｾｬｩｫｭＮ＠ 32. ABh ad NS 1.12, vol. 1, p. 12: vyutpattid,iyi. 33. A Bh ad NS 1.58-59, vol. 1, p. 27: na ca vartamdnacaritiinukiiro yukta& I vinqiiniil!l tatra rtigadllesam<!dh,va.<thattidinii llll)lllilJibh.illtibbiive priw· abhtivena vyutpaller an abhtiviit. 34. AB h ad NS 1.108-1 15, vol. 1, p. 41: buddbi111 vivardhayati svapmtibb,im (I'll tiidrfh!J vir,,·,,yati. 35. ABh ad NS 1.119. vol. 1. p. 45: lend beyop.ide_y,rvyutpattil; pbal,wt. 36. See also Namisadhu's commentary on Rudra1a's K tivy.ila1!1ktira 1.18: _yukttiyuktdvivek,r ｴｬＨｩｮｵ｣ｰ＼ｾｲｪ､｡ｊ＿ｉ＠ [vyurp,lftir ｩｹ＼ｾｭ｝Ｎ＠ Ingalls (1990, 440) translates: "Education (vyutp,mi) is the discrimination of right and wrong, the thorough knowledge of what is appropriate and what is nor." As far as the vyutp,ati of the poet is concerned, in Locan,, ad D hvA 3.6, p. 317, Abhinavagupta explains char iris "rhe skill in rhe careful weighing of all char may be helpful ro such [new presentations of everything one wishes ro describe in poerry) (vyutpattis ｴＬ､ ｵ ｰ｡ｹｯｧｩｳｭｮ＼ｾｓｴｬｶｵﾭ P""r"dparyiimarfakauf,,/am ). Translated by Ingalls ( 1990, 4 11 ). 37. NS 6, prose after 31, p. 272: 11a hi mstid rte kafcid arrha& pmvartate. 38. ABh ad NS 6, prose after 31. vol. 1, p. 271: tlll/1 viniirtha& prayojanam pritipura.<.<aram vyutp.lltilll<IJ•"I' n,r P""'''"·tare. Another related passage is ABh ad NS 1.108-115, p. 40: "Furthermore, for those who, like princes, etc., are nor in pain, as rheir conditions are urrerl)• pleasurable, chis Theatre is instructive in rhe world-based field of the means to reach rhe moral norm (diMrma) and rhe or her purposes of mankind (ye punar ,rdu&khir,il; mkhllbht<yiS{avrtta_ya eva r,ij,rpurrtid_y.is us,im lok,wrlle ､ｨＬｲｭｬｩｹｵｰＮｾ｡ｶｧ･＠ up11ddaktit:Y etannaryam)." On slightly different bur extremely intaesting notes, rhe brief passage preceding the one just quot ed mentions a very specific kind of pleasure char Theatre can furnish, the pleasure born out of instruction: "Even in a subsequent moment, it [i.e., theatre] produces a maturation, i.e., a pleasu re born our of instruction. Thus, rhe purpose is char chose who suffer may achieve a pleasure, in a subsequent rime, which surpasses rhe pleasure [attained during rhe performance) that [normally) appeases that [pain of t heirs) (ktiltintat'e ｦ｡ ｭ｡ｳｵｫ｢ｬ Ｇｩ ｬ｡ｲｾｫｩ ､ｭｴｬｲ｡ﾭ 'pi pm·iptikam sukhmn upadtiajaJ?I )ana til)' fl'll'!l dukhitdniil!l ｴ｡ＡｰｬＧ .<ukbal,ibhdl? ｰｲ＼ｾＩＧｪ｡ｮｭ＠ )." 39. Another important passage connecting rhc experience of ms,r and the moral development of rhe cnjoyer of art is the long discussion on the essence of rhea ere contained in ABh ad l'\S 1.107. For a full translation of the passage, sec Gnoli ( 1968,88-101 [Appendix i)) or Cuneo (2008-2009. vol. 1. 200-206). As far as rhe present matter is concerned, the gist of rhe passage-as summarized by Amaladass ( 1992, 266)-is the following: "[T )he effect of an aest hetic experience on the spectator is such char sometimes a kind of c.rmatktim-a sense of wonder-continues for se,·eral days. Because of ras.r experience such an impression remains deeply fi xed in the heart like an arrow in such a way chat by no possible effort it can be erased, let alone extracted. T hanks ro it, the desire of attaining rhe good and abandoning rhe bad are const antly present in t he mind of the spectator, who accordingly does rhe good and avoids the bad: iubham ticarary afubha111 ｳ｡ｭＱｾｪｨｲｩＮＢ＠ A survey of rhe theories concerning the purpose of art of the followers of Abhinavagupra lies beyond rhe scope of chis article. However, we might just quote the famous verse by Mamma1a on the purposes of poetry and Hcmacandra's rc-claborarion of the same issue. Mamma,a's ｋＬｩｬｾｹ＼ｰｭ＠ 1.3: "Poetry leads to fame, the acquisition of wealth, the knowledge of rhe ways of the world [and) the instantaneous [obtainment of] supreme beatitude, associated with instruction in the manner of a beloved woman ＨｫｩｶｹｴｾＧＡｬ＠ y afase 'rthak rte vyavah,iravide Jiverm·aksalaye ｳ｡､ｹ ｴｾｬ＿ｰｭｩｲｶ｡ｹ･＠ ktintds.r'!•milatayopadeiayuje IJ)." Hemacandra's Kiivytinufdsanam 1.3: "Poetry leads to bl iss, fam e and instruction in the manner of a beloved woman (kdvyam dnandiiya yaiase kiintdtul;wayopadeiJya c.,)." 40. Two "easier" interpretations might come ro mind, even though they are both simplistic and possibly unfair ro Abhinavagupra. The first possibility is that Abhinavagupta gradually changed his mind: from an idea of art as primarily bestowing delight, as propounded in rhe lim passages I I 86 Section 2: Aesthetics of the Locana, to an idea of art as primarily bestowing instruction, as propounded in che passages from rhe Abhin,wabhtirati. The second possibility is ascribing a slight contradictory or confused attitude co Abhinavagupca's characterization of the purposes of arc. 4 1. ｋｾ･ｭ ･ ｮ､ｲ｡Ｇｳ＠ Aucityavictimcarcd is an II ch century work entirely devoted to the aeschecicalcum-sociomoral concept ofaucitya, "appropriateness" or "propriety." For a study and a translation thereof, see Suryakanra ( 1952). On aucitya in secondary literature, see rhe fundamental Raghavan ( 1942) and Krishnamoorchy ( 1994). 42. The obvious counterexample is the existence of mstibbtisa, rhe 'semblance of an aesthetic emotion: which occurs when something inappropriate is represented in arc. For instance RavaQa's love for Sica is an inappropriate emotion, for the simple reason char he is a horrible and evil demon and she is a beautiful and rightful woman . On >"ll.<abhdsa, see Bhattacharya ( 1935 ), Krishnamoorrhy ( 1974) and, co an extent, also Pollock (2001 ). 43. My abridged reasoning runs like chis: one acts only on rhe spur of desire, and desire is rhe direct consequence of chc emotive response roan emotional situation. For an enlarged explanation of chis model of human action, see Cuneo (2007). 44. As I have diffusedly argued elsewhere (Cuneo 2007). any emotional response is nothing but a form of cognitive appraisal. 45. On art and ethics from a western perspective, see Gaur (2007). 46. lmplicicly, "the criticism of poetry remains for all of rhem [i.e., rhe Indian thinkers] fundamentally a criticism oflife. since in the last analysis rhe correct reading ofSanskrit literature requires a correct understanding of and subscription co a larger social theory" (Pollock 1998, 141). T he aim of arr is therefore "to create politically correct subjects and subjecriviries" (Pollock 1998, 141). In Bourdieu's terms, one might say chat the purpose of arc is rhe incorporation of rhe social through an affective and emotive medium (cfr. Bourdieu 2003). The moral imagination that is developed by appreciating art is obviously molded by the dominant moral principles of the culture of which chat very arr is a harbinger. Furthermore and vice versa, it is possible to enjoy a work of arr in its own terms (i.e., to experience the rasa) only by shari ng-or at least by comprehending-the values and the moral constructs of rhe society chat produced ir. For an analysis of the social imperatives implicit in Sanskrit literary theory, see Pollock (2001 ). 47. In other words, in order to maintain such a ,·iew about the purposes of arr, it is necessary co subscribe some form of cognitive theory of emotions, as I have argued it is che case for Abhinavagupra in particular and for Indi an pre-modern culture in general (Cuneo 2007) . 48. As already hinted at, the cogency of chis argumentation is strengthened by the absence of a sharp distinction between emotive and cogniti\'e phenomena in the classical culture of South Asia, see preceding note. 49. Arisrocle, Nicom.ube,m Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6, Il06b15-29. SO. For a comparable case, see for instance the moral justification ofm.myu ("anger") for k,<•II>'!J•,•s in Hara (2001 ). 51. On the close relationship between morality and emotion, often understood as a dependmce of morality on fundamentally emotional judgments. see Solomon ( 1976), Gibbard ( 1990), Oakley ( 1992), Freeland ( 1997), Hjorr; Leaver ( 1997), Blackburn ( 1998) and Nichols (2004 ). On rhe general importance of emotions in morality, see also l\'ussbaum (2001) and Solomon (2003) . A very similar view has been already maintained b)' Sarrre (2000, 23) who scared, for instance, "the existentialist does not believe in the power of passion." To elaborate, passions, desires and feelings have no power to move us with our our consent and so can never be offered as an excuse for any apparenrly uncontrollable behavior! 52. 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