The Epistemic Value of Aesthetic Judgements

THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS ___________________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Theological Studies Dallas Theological Seminary ___________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree Master of Sacred Theology ___________________ by Matthew A. LaPine December 2010 Accepted by the Faculty of the Dallas Theological Seminary in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Sacred Theology Examining Committee ABSTRACT THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS Matthew LaPine Readers: Dr. Douglas Blount, Dr. Nathan Holsteen This thesis seeks to defend the claim that aesthetic judgments have epistemic value for Christian belief. In other words, beauty may provide epistemic grounding for Christian belief. To accomplish this, first an objective account of beauty is put forth. Second, the paper offers an account of aesthetic judgments which sees them as basic and in some cases properly so. The argument is that the delivery mechanism for these judgments is reliable; therefore these judgments can be seen as generally trustworthy in the absence of recognizable defeaters. Next, the paper considers what value these judgments might have by developing a case for a necessary connection between beauty and truth. Finally, the question is considered in a theological context, that is, whether from a Christian perspective one should expect beauty to be a qualitative appeal for faith. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. BEAUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A History of the Argument A Defense of Real Beauty 2. AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Basicality of Aesthetic Judgments Objections 3. THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . 21 Rationality Beauty in Scientific Theory Choice Qualitative Truth Beauty in Christian Theology 4. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 iv CHAPTER 1 BEAUTY Blaise Pascal famously says, “The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing.”1 This line has become something of a mantra for Christians when presented with challenges to their theistic belief which they cannot answer. Conversely, this answer is often a sure sign for their protagonists of the gross irrationality of Christian belief. What underlies Pascal’s statement is the assumption that an appeal to the heart is appropriate (or at least typical) for forming belief. Yet, is this the case? Or is the atheistic protagonist right to consider this an irrational response? An appeal to beauty is often what underlies the ‘heart’s reasons.’ For instance, in Aldous Huxley’s Point Counter Point, Spandrell asserts quite confidently that Beethoven’s string quartet no. 15 is proof of God’s existence; “Don’t you think it’s marvelous?” he says, “Isn’t it a proof?”2 Richard Dawkins on the other hand counters, “If there is a logical argument linking the existence of great art to the existence of God, it is not spelled out by its proponents. It is simply assumed to be self-evident, which it most certainly is not.”3 While it may be said that Dawkins himself misses the point in that the argument he is responding to stems from beauty itself rather than the existence of great art, his question 1 Blaise Pascal, Pensees (New York: Penguin, 1995), 127. 2 Aldous Huxley, Point Counter Point (Garden City, NY: Grosset & Dunlap, 1928), 428. 3 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: First Mariner Books, 2008), 111. 2 3 remains. What argument can be made (if any) from the existence of beauty to ground belief, particularly belief in God? This paper argues that beauty has epistemic value for grounding Christian belief.4 To defend this claim, this paper attempts to provide a plausible model for understanding how beauty might provide grounding for belief. The first chapter attempts to argue for aesthetic realism, an account of beauty as an objective reality not merely a subjective psychological response to reality. The second chapter outlines a case for understanding aesthetic judgments in epistemic terms as in some cases being ‘properly basic.’ Finally, the third chapter attempts to give suggestions of plausible roles for beauty in understanding truth, especially with reference to Christian belief. Beauty must refer to objective aesthetic reality for it to function as the basis for truth claims. Therefore, it is necessary first to understand what beauty is, particularly whether it is an objective property or merely a subjective judgment.5 The question “What is beauty?” is nearly as old as philosophy itself. In Plato’s Greater Hippias Socrates, confounded by the question, reproaches himself and resolves to investigate the matter. Yet, for his reproaches, Socrates fails to formulate a satisfactory definition in Greater Hippias, instead concluding with the Greek proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: “beautiful things are difficult.”6 The difficulty in describing the nature of beauty combined with the seemingly radical divergence of empirical descriptions of particular instances of beauty have led many philosophers to reject the concept altogether. In fact, Alexander Nehamas 4 Note this is not the same as claiming beauty justifies Christian belief or even that Christian belief can be justified in a hard sense. 5 Of course aesthetic judgments are subjective in the sense that they are made by subjects. The question is whether these judgments correspond to aesthetic reality? 6 Plato Greater Hippias 286; 304. 4 writes, “Beauty is the most discredited philosophical notion.” Although this seems an 7 exaggeration, it raises questions about the possibility of any further inquiry in the topic. Why would anyone undertake the study of such a subject? Can the concept of beauty be resurrected? In an attempt to address these questions, what follows is a brief history of the philosophical discussion of the topic. The purpose of the following discussion is to trace the development of the modern understanding of beauty to better understand the forces which led to the contemporary understanding of beauty. With any particular philosophical topic, the more general development of philosophy has a profound impact on the sorts of conclusions which are accepted. Beauty is no exception. A History of the Argument Plato puts forth a conception of beauty in his Symposium. Here he presents beauty as the proper object of love.8 In this work Socrates tells of Diotima of Mantineia, who had explained the exploration of beauty to him. First, she says that youths should be instructed first to recognize beauty in bodies, to investigate all bodies to see the form of the beauty belonging to all. The investigation of bodies should lead to the investigation of the soul, from the soul to the bonds of kinship and their corresponding laws, and from the bonds of kinship to all branches of knowledge.9 For Plato, the beautiful and the moral good are indistinct, captured by the term τὸ καλόν, ‘the good.’ ‘The good’ for Plato is 7 Alexander Nehamas, “An Essay on Beauty and Judgment,” The Threepenny Review 80 (Winter 2000), http://www.threepennyreview.com/samples/nehamas_w00.html (accessed September 10, 2010). 8 For a more extended summaries, see George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis, IN: Pegasus, 1971); Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (New York: Routledge, 2001) 9 Plato Symposium 210e-212a. 5 highest of the forms. Plato’s forms are unchanging non-material ideas; material objects obtain their properties by participating in these forms.10 Because the forms are not immediately available to the senses, the Platonic theory has been looked on unfavorably by modern theorists. Plotinus proceeds along similar lines to Plato. Both Plotinus and Plato see beauty as a transcendent reality in its highest form, yet that is reflected in lower manifestations in the physical world. An examination of beauty should start at this highest principle, the source of beauty.11 Plotinus describes beauty as a sort of divine light in which the soul participates. For this reason the soul “eagerly embraces” beauty.12 The beauties of the senses help to illuminate and illustrate that fountain of beauty of which they are irradiations. What is significant with both Plato and Plotinus is that their conception of beauty was directly related to their conception of ultimate reality. The ‘good’ (or the ‘beautiful’) was that which was most ultimate. With Thomas Aquinas, the study of beauty shifts from a Platonic to an Aristotelian point of view. While Aristotle accepts the forms, he denies that the forms were un-embodied. Aquinas calls things beautiful “which please when seen.”13 Following Aristotle in seeing beauty as embodied, Aquinas presents a theory of what made a thing beautiful involving three conditions: “integrity” or “perfection,” “proportion” or “harmony,” and “brightness” or “clarity.”14 In presenting this model, 10 For instance, a chair might be said to be a chair precisely because it participates in 11 Plotinus Ennead I,6. 12 Plotinus Essay on the Beautiful. 13 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 1,5,4. 14 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 1,39,8. ‘chairness.’ 6 Aquinas anticipates the more developed empirical attempts which would be made in the eighteenth century.15 Furthermore, his definition of beauty as those things “which please when seen” is a step toward those later subject-oriented descriptions.16 The eighteenth century brought with it a major shift in the study of beauty which corresponded to a major shift philosophically. To begin with, Alexander Baumgarten adopted the term ‘aesthetics’ to refer to the “sense” of beauty. The term itself is from the Greek word αἰσθητικός, meaning “of or for sense-perception.”17 Baumgarten sought to establish aesthetics as a field of study organized around the subjective, sense-oriented aspect of judgments of beauty. Although Baumgarten coined the term, he was simply one of many attempting analysis. Anthony Ashley-Cooper (also known as the Earl of Shaftesbury or just Shaftesbury) is a key figure of this period. While he still held to a classical neo-Platonist conception of beauty,18 he develops an aesthetic 15 Cf. The third earl of Shaftesbury, The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody (1711), Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design (1725), David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” (1757), Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) 16 It is somewhat paradoxical that these are referred to as both empirical and subject oriented. Yet the approach of the empiricists was precisely to determine what it was in the object which pleased when seen. This is radically different from the Platonic idea that beauty could only properly be apprehended through reason. Furthermore, the use of “subject-oriented” in this instance avoids the confusion of using the term “subjective.” “Subjective” does not mean “relative.” A common use of the term “subjective” simply orients the perspective of the investigation on the subject rather than the object. The empirical attempts of the eighteenth century were both subject-oriented in this sense and also objectoriented in that they proceeded to investigate the qualities of the object which provoked this response. 17 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1940) http://www.lib.uchicago.edu /efts/PERSEUS/Reference/lsj.html (accessed August 13, 2010). 18 Dabney Townsend, Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics (Amityville, NY: Baywood, 1999), 417: “[The doctrine] which has been maintained in this country, by several writers of eminence, by Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Aikenside, and Dr. Spence. . . . The doctrine to which I allude, is, that matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beauty from the expression of the mind.” 7 19 theory which accounts for empirical considerations. As such, Shaftesbury is a transitional figure because empirically minded philosophers increasingly tended to reject the classical conception. Hutcheson shifts the focus of the inquiry of beauty from the object of beauty to the subject by defining beauty as “the Idea rais’d in us.”20 While there were empiricists who endorsed and others who rejected the neo-Platonist account of beauty, the major shift of this era was to focus the inquiry on the subject-oriented response to beauty. Primarily, empiricists answered the question, “What is the source of pleasure in beauty in us?” They then when on to answer the question, “What is its source in objects?” For example, Edmund Burke distinguished between the Sublime and the Beautiful.21 The Sublime is taken to be whatever excites “ideas of pain, and danger . . . whatever is terrible . . . or operates in a manner analogous to terror.”22 He cites power, privation, vastness and infinity as examples. Beauty on the other hand is “that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it.”23 He cites smallness, smoothness, delicacy and color as examples. It is important to understand empiricism with regard to aesthetics directly corresponded to empiricism with regard to knowledge in general. Increasingly, philosophers and scientists looked to the 19 For instance Shaftesbury recommends a “test of time” for art. Dabney Townsend, “Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Theory,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 41 no. 2 (Winter, 1982): 205-213. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: 1726), 7, http://books.google.com/books?id=dh0vlzDNNwEC&dq (accessed August 14, 2010), emphasis in original. He continues, “and a Sense of Beauty for our Power of receiving this Idea.” 20 21 C.f. Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. David Womersley (London: Penguin Books, 2004). 22 Burke, 86. 23 Burke, 128. 8 senses for certain knowledge, rejecting outmoded rational ideas. Interestingly, Shaftesbury lamented this trait in his tutor, John Locke.24 In the years following these “philosophers of taste” the focus shifted entirely to “the aesthetic” as an attitude or subjective event; all vestiges of objective qualities began to disappear. Consequently, Schopenhauer describes beauty as follows: When we say that a thing is beautiful, we thereby assert that it is an object of our aesthetic contemplation, and this has a double meaning; on the one hand it means that the sight of the thing makes us objective, that is to say, that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious of ourselves as individuals, but as pure will-less subjects of knowledge.25 Schopenhauer calls something beautiful only because it is an object of contemplation. And it is beauty because it removes us if only for a moment from the grip of the will. With Schopenhauer the discussion of beauty completes its migration from an objective and rationally perceived idea (the beautiful) to a completely subjective understanding focusing on aesthetic experience rather than any ideal or quality which could be called ‘beauty.’ In the final analysis, the shift from a rationalistic objective conception of ‘the good’ to a subjectivistic account of aesthetic experience was driven by a complex set of 24 “Mr. Locke, as much as I honour him on account of other writings (viz., on government, policy, trade, coin, education, toleration, & c.), and as well as I knew him, and can answer for his sincerity as a most zealous Christian and believer, did, however, go in the self-same tract, and is followed by the Tindals, and all the other ingenious free authors of our time. It was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes's character and base slavish principles in government took off the poison of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) unnatural, and without foundation in our minds.” A personal letter cited by John A. Dussinger, “The Lovely System of Lord Shaftesbury: An Answer to Locke in the Aftermath of 1688?” Journal of the History of Ideas, 42 no. 1 (January-March, 1981): 151158. This letter was first published in 1716 in a collection entitled Several Letters written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 6th ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., 1907). 25 9 factors. But it is important to recognize that the subjectivist trajectory was significantly driven by the need to provide a coherent account of what beauty is and the subsequent failure to do so. Where epistemology increasingly demanded certainty through empirical means, aesthetics failed to live up to its demands. The empiricists radically failed to come to any sort of consensus as to what beauty is.26 A Defense of Real Beauty Yet, in spite of difficulties in formulating an empirical account of beauty, the concept of real beauty should not be dismissed. There are several reasons for this, reasons which parallel arguments that are made for objective moral truth.27 First, when an individual makes an aesthetic judgment, he assumes he is making a judgment about reality.28 29 This observation has very strong intuitive appeal, especially when obvious counterexamples to its Figure 1 denial are present. Consider figure 1. While one might argue about who is the most 26 Dickie. Aesthetics, 12: “In addition to the competing concepts, another reason for the decline of the theory of beauty was that a satisfactory definition of beauty (in terms of proportion, unity in variety, fitness, or whatever) could not be worked out.” 27 It is philosophically naïve to suppose (as many Christians commonly do) that beauty could be subjective and morals could be objective since the arguments for either correspond so closely. 28 For convenience, this paper will use “aesthetic judgment” synonymously with “a judgment of beauty” although the term has come to mean something quite different. Contemporary aesthetics as a field is much more interested in art than to beauty. Cf. Gaut and Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 8. 29 Even an opponent of moral facts, Frederik Kaufman, admits this, “We make moral assessments of the character of people and their actions in terms which suggest that we are evaluating real properties, and this has been held to give at least a prima facie case for moral realism.” Frederik Kaufman, “Moral Realism and Moral Judgments,” Erkenntnis, 36, no 1 (January 1992): 103. 10 beautiful among movie actresses, it is immediately apparent which woman in this figure is more beautiful. If we were asked to explain what makes the woman on the right more beautiful than the woman on the left, we might not be able to give a complete answer, but we would maintain our confidence and expect others to agree. It seems implausible to assert that there is nothing in this comparison itself that triggers this judgment. Certainly, some reality presents itself. Furthermore, Nick Zangwill makes the point that in real life relativists actually follow this intuition rather than their own model, “one can virtually always catch the professional relativist about judgments of beauty making and acting on non-relative judgments of beauty.”30 Second, there is a plausible reason to adopt an attitude of realism toward beauty or aesthetic truth if one has already adopted epistemic realism.31 Richard Boyd makes this very argument.32 He notes the rise in scientific realism and draws parallels between it and moral realism.33 For instance, he notes that one cause for the rise of scientific realism is the recognition that scientific methodologies are tremendously theory-dependent. Moreover, none but a realist conception of science can explain why a theory-dependent methodology should be reliable, namely because it rests on the 30 Nick Zangwill, “Aesthetic Judgment,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/ (accessed June 15, 2010) 31 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines realism as, “a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on.” Alexander Miller, “Realism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ (accessed August 14, 2010). 32 Richard Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist,” Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey SayreMcCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 181-228. 33 For an example of contemporary authors espousing epistemic realism, see John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). 11 assumption of “cumulative successive approximations to the truth.” Obviously, there 34 are also differences between moral and scientific realism. In particular, Frederik Kaufman argues against moral realism, stating that moral judgments are not factual judgments because they do not show some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error.35 However, moral judgments need not be defined as ‘moral facts’ for moral realism. Boyd summarizes moral realism as follows, 1. Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false, etc.) 2. The truth or falsity (approximate truth. . .) of moral sentiments is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc. 3. Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge.36 The fact that moral or aesthetic judgments lack the specificity of epistemic ones suggests that one should exercise far more caution and epistemic humility with regard to them, not to consider them to be radically different sorts of judgments. The model of aesthetic perception presented below will attempt to illustrate further similarities and differences between aesthetic and epistemic realism. Finally, Robert Ehman suggests that moral objectivity best explains how one often feels compelled (sometimes quite strongly) to act in direct opposition to one’s 34 Boyd, 189, emphasis in original. 35 Kaufman, 103. 36 Boyd, 182. desires. 37 12 Beauty often functions in a similar way. For instance, a movie critic might say that the movie Avatar was spectacular aesthetically while at the same time feeling a strong aversion to the movie.38 Therefore, if honesty with regard to judgments of beauty constrains one to feel he ought to make a certain judgment, even in contradiction to one’s desires, then one has strong reason to suppose that judgment reflects objective reality. 37 Robert R. Ehman, “Moral Objectivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 28 no. 2 (December, 1967): 175: “The very fact that we are constrained by moral obligation appears to imply that it is independent of our attitudes and our will and that these are subject to it rather than to them.” 38 . . .” Note that, in introducing an aesthetic judgment, one sometimes says, “I hate to admit it, but CHAPTER 2 AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS The Basicality of Aesthetic Judgments For any epistemic system, the ‘delivery mechanism’ by which a belief is presented is integral for the system’s justification. Foundationalist theories have traditionally held that certain beliefs are acquired immediately, that is without mediation through other beliefs. Foundationalism calls these beliefs ‘basic.’1 In classical foundationalism all beliefs are either basic or believed on the basis of other beliefs. For instance, one believes 57 × 81 = 4,617 on the basis of his belief that 1 × 7 = 7, 8 × 7 = 56, 5 + 6 = 11, etc.2 Yet, one’s belief that 5 + 6 = 11 is not based on any such propositions. Rather, one simply sees that it is true. So a basic belief is one that is not inferred from other beliefs. According to this understanding, all non-basic beliefs are either inferred from basic beliefs themselves or from non-basic beliefs which connect in a chain of inference to basic beliefs. The important point to note is that basic simply means that a 1 Use of the term “basic” in this context should not be taken to be an unqualified endorsement of all forms of foundationalism. My complaints with classic foundationalism concern the doxastic assumption (which doesn’t admit external considerations such as proper functionalism) and the hard theory of justification with which it is sometimes associated. Pollack and Cruz list other complaints involving whether we integrate sense data through beliefs about that sense data, which are too detailed to address here. Pollack and Cruz, 35-44. 2 2000), 82. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 14 belief is not inferred from another belief. A belief may be basic, yet not properly so. 3 For a belief to be properly basic means that one is warranted or justified in believing it.4 This is usually understood in the following way: A belief is properly basic for a person S if and only if it is self-evident for S, or incorrigible for S, or evident to the senses for S. Thus, basicality refers to the direct acquisition of a belief and proper basicality refers to one’s rational justification or warrant for believing it. A good example of a basic belief is color judgment. The ‘delivery’ of these judgments is immediate.5 With color, when one looks at a red shirt he may have the experience of being appeared to ‘red shirtly.’6 This experience can be referred to as a ‘raw feel.’ Strictly speaking, a raw feel is not a belief, but rather a qualitative experience. Yet, qualitative experiences are the subject of one’s conscious awareness, or 3 Alvin Plantinga makes it clear that basic beliefs are not immune to objections, that is to defeaters. Plantinga, 343-44. In a review of Warranted Christian Belief Tyler Wunder takes issue with Plantinga suggesting a belief can be basic, yet also open to defeaters. This perhaps reveals an epistemic error which is inherent to the modern project, namely, that all warrant or justification for belief must be hard justification. This type of hard justification finds no place for aesthetic or moral beliefs since they are imprecise and often confused. If one cannot completely escape the subjective, if one can be influenced at all by preconceptions, then he has no access whatsoever to reality. Tyler Wunder, “Review of Warranted Christian Belief,” Philo, 5 no 1 (2002): 103-18, http://www.infidels.org/library/ modern/ tyler_wunder/warranted.html (accessed August 3, 2010). 4 In other words, “what is it that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief?” Plantinga, 153. Plantinga defines warrant, “in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief.” Plantinga, 156. 5 6 In the technical sense of “not mediated.” For a fuller explanation of the language of being appeared to see Roderick Chisholm’s, Theory of Knowledge. Chisholm distinguishes between seeming and appearing. That something seems to be is open to doubt that it might turn out to be false. For something to appear as in “this appears white to me” is incontrovertible. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 30-37. 15 apperception. Raw feels are apprehended and synthesized through apperception or conscious awareness.7 Furthermore, apperception should be distinguished from reflective inferences which are often drawn on the basis of apperception. For example, 1) one may have the qualitative experience of being appeared to ‘redly,’ 2) he may, by conscious attention, perceive this, and 3) he may draw an inference such as “this is red” or “this is dark red” etc. Foundationalists will typically call these inferences basic if they are not based on other beliefs. There is ambiguity in whether ‘judgments’ occur on the second or third level of empirical perception. Kant says, “I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of a judgment.”8 He defines a judgment as “the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unity of apperception.”9 This paper will assume that while it is sometimes difficult to differentiate on what level a particular judgment is operating, judgments, if they are properly basic, are either simple apperception or valid inferences on the basis of it. To say this is to recognize that ordinary judgments are often susceptible to defeaters, that is factors which overthrow true judgments.10 More will be said on this in the following chapter. To reiterate, in the interest of simplicity, judgments will be called basic if they are not based on other beliefs. 7 The “unity of apperception” is the phrase Immanuel Kant uses to describe how sense experience is apprehended by the subject objectively by use of the categories. He says, “It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On this account it is called objective.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 66. 8 “It is according to them, the representation of a relation between two concepts.” Kant, 66. 9 For Kant, there are different modes of apperception which fit within his broader system. Ibid., 67. 10 Properly these are undercutting defeaters. For any statement, “I judge X to be beautiful.” The undercutting defeater might function as follows, “In circumstances Y, my judgment of the beauty of X tends to be unreliable.” A number of possible undercutting defeaters are mentioned below. 16 It seems self-evident that aesthetic judgments, like judgments of color are basic.11 Aesthetic judgments seem to be based on an apperception of beauty which is immediate. They are, however, perhaps even more susceptible to defeaters than judgments of color because of their complexity. More will be said on this point in what follows. However, it should be noted that if aesthetic judgments are basic and in some cases properly so, that they are needs no argument. This truth should be accepted on the basis of its self-evident nature. For this to be the case, what seem to be powerful defeaters for this view need to be addressed. Objections The fact should be stated up front that while aesthetic judgments are basic, it is possible that proper basicality with regard to aesthetic belief is fairly rare. The reason for this is because aesthetic judgments are generally complex judgments rather than simple ones. They involve not only a combination of judgments but a multitude of possible defeaters. A good example of a moderately simple aesthetic judgment arises in the case of handwriting (see figure 2). From this example it is clear that there are varying Figure 2 degrees of beauty. It is self-evident that the uppermost example is the most beautiful on the whole (though there may be some particular details with respect to which the second 11 Obviously aesthetic judgments and judgment of color differ in many ways. This should become clearer in the next section. 17 example exceeds the first in beauty). There should be no disagreement concerning whether the first or the third example is more beautiful. Ideas such as gracefulness or proportion explain why the first is most beautiful. But these considerations are offered after the fact, that is, only after the judgment has been made and one is asked to justify it. Such post facto justification is often expected for aesthetic judgments. Furthermore, such post facto justification is most difficult in cases of complex aesthetic judgments. These cases both cause the most difficulty in providing justification and are the subject of wildest disagreement. The fact that disagreement exists at all may suggest that aesthetic judgments are not basic. Kaufman argues that the existence of mirror image moralities counts against taking moral judgments as factual.12 The language of ‘facts’ aside, mirror image aesthetic judgments pose a similar problem. Claims of mirror image aesthetic judgments are perhaps more common than mirror image moral judgments. Kaufman cites the mirror image morality of Friedrich Nietzsche which opposes “slave moralities” where the weak impugn the strong by calling them evil.13 Yet, considering Kaufman’s example, helps to solve the aesthetic problem. Nietzsche’s morality is the fruit of a developed philosophy which begins with the axiom that God is dead and denies morality, beauty and even rationality. If Nietzsche’s philosophy is fundamentally wrong, one might even expect a 12 A mirror image morality is an apparent moral framework from which one judges evil as good and good as evil. 13 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace B. Samuel (Stilwell, KS: Digireads, 2007), 13: “It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, ‘These birds of prey are evil, and he who is as far removed from being a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb,—is he not good?’ then there is nothing to cavil at in the setting up of this ideal, though it may also be that the birds of prey will regard it a little sneeringly, and perchance say to themselves, ‘We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we even like them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.’ ” 18 common man’s moral judgment to be closer to the truth since it is far less laden with philosophical baggage.14 In this sense, Nietzsche’s philosophical baggage should be considered as a defeater to his moral judgment. Defeaters for aesthetic judgment come in many forms, including prejudicial elements such as formal stylistic rules, personal or cultural prejudices, intention, will, or cognitive aptitude.15 Consider an example. Suppose a musician attends an orchestral performance. As a musician, his judgment of the performance comprises a large number of individual judgments of beauty which can each be impacted by defeaters. He might find the synchronization of the bows so poor that he finds the performance quite sour. He may be impacted by a personal relationship with the first chair cellist and find his performance accordingly poor. He may be impressed by the overwhelming skill exhibited by the oboist, therefore evaluating the performance higher than his nonmusician friends. His judgments will be very different from one who attends as a composer or as a novice. His novice companion may lack the observational or cognitive 14 In his movie Rope, Alfred Hitchcock depicts a man whose Nietzschean philosophy is overturned by an immediate confrontation with the moral situation of a murder. Rope, directed by Alfred Hitchcock, Warner Brothers, 1948; A similar example comes from The Weekly Standard: “When she herself was 18 weeks pregnant, Dr. Harris performed a D&E abortion on an 18-week-old fetus. Harris felt her own child kick precisely at the moment that she ripped a fetal leg off with her forceps: ‘Instantly, tears were streaming from my eyes—without me—meaning my conscious brain—even being aware of what was going on. I felt as if my response had come entirely from my body, bypassing my usual cognitive processing completely. A message seemed to travel from my hand and my uterus to my tear ducts. It was an overwhelming feeling—a brutally visceral response—heartfelt and unmediated by my training or my feminist pro-choice politics. It was one of the more raw moments in my life.’ ” David Daleiden and Jon A. Shields, “Mugged by Ultrasound,” The Weekly Standard, 15 no. 18 (January 16, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/mugged-ultrasound (accessed January 28, 2010) 15 Robert R. Ehman makes a similar point with regard to moral objectivity, saying, “One of the main weaknesses of traditional naturalist theories is that they focus on one relevant factor to the exclusion of others. The relevant factors not only include consequences, social rules, past commitments, and other external conditions but also such personal characteristics as the agent's talents, strength, and motives. In seeking to determine what is right, we must look to a whole range of factors, past, present, and future.” Robert R. Ehman, “Moral Objectivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 28 no. 2 (1967): 177. 19 power necessary to make a sound judgment. The complexity of each one’s experience does not take away from the fact that the simple aesthetic judgments are basic. Some judgments of beauty will be intellectual ones like an appreciation for technical complexities; some judgments of beauty will be physical, like the visual arrangement of the stage. Yet, the degree to which he overcomes prejudices and skillfully synthesizes individual aesthetic judgments will be the degree to which his judgment approximates aesthetic truth. Consider a few more examples. Parents often call children’s art beautiful because of emotional attachment to their children. The intellectual beauties of the act of creation and the innocence of childhood also influence their judgment. If an accomplished artist produced the same product, one Figure 3 would be disgusted. Also, cultural connotations can impact judgments. Consider in particular the feminine form as perceived through the eyes of various cultures. Again, consider whether figure 3 might be judged rather differently aesthetically in a culture where its cultural associations are unknown.16 These are reflex level associations which function as defeaters for judgments of beauty. Furthermore, the intrusion of will could impact our judgment. This factor led many of the empirical philosophers to include disinterestedness in their description of 16 Payne Knight says, “[Beauty] depends entirely upon the association of ideas, and not at all upon either abstract reason or organic sensation.” Payne Knight, An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste (London: Luke Hansard & Sons, 1808), 172. 20 proper aesthetic judgment. 17 While it is not always clear what “disinterested” means, it should be noted that if one seeks an object for its utility, for sexual purposes, or for the purposes of the exercise of power one’s judgment of the beautiful will be distorted.18 The overarching point is that the defeasibility or imprecision of aesthetic judgments does not imply either that they are utterly subjective, or that their ‘delivery mechanism’ is unreliable. Again, it seems reasonable to consider these judgments basic and, in some cases, properly so. Beauty can be both self-evident and imprecise. Consider for example one trying to find a friend in a room where the power just went out. He is aware that his friend is wearing a red t-shirt but he cannot discern whether the particular shirt he is examining is red or not. He comes to the tentative conclusion that the shirt is indeed red and that this might be his friend. He believes this because it is selfevident. The perception of the red shirt is clearly basic, but in this case it is arguable whether it is properly so. Moreover, the delivery mechanism itself is reliable, but the conditions surrounding the judgment obscure it. Furthermore, it is often the awareness of possible defeaters itself which aids one in getting nearer to aesthetic truth. 17 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” III,2; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35. 18 Closely related to this is the point that, from a Christian perspective, the noetic affects of sin might corrupt one’s ability to produce properly basic aesthetic judgments. See below. CHAPTER 3 THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS To say beauty has ‘epistemic value’ is to say that it is useful for forming true beliefs. In particular, this paper is interested in whether aesthetic judgments have epistemic value for Christian belief. In considering this question, one needs to consider two further questions. First, is there good reason to suspect that any appeal to beauty itself is prima facie irrational? Second, is such an appeal legitimate theologically? The first question will be addressed in three stages, an examination of rationality, an evaluation of beauty’s use in scientific theory choice, and a suggestion about qualitative knowledge. Then, some suggestions will be made concerning the value of beauty theologically. Rationality The original challenge of this paper was to defend the epistemic value of beauty by providing a plausible model for understanding the epistemic role of beauty. The question has been, “is it irrational even to suggest an epistemic role for beauty?” However, it is often unclear what is meant by the terms ‘rational’ or ‘irrational.’ What is counted as ‘rational’ is often shaped by the a priori assumptions one allows. In other words, there is often troubling circularity with regard to the concept of ‘rationality.’ Robert Audi explains, 22 The issue of realism is at the heart of metaphysics; that of rationality is at the heart of epistemology. Neither of these issues can be isolated from the other, nor can we separate epistemology and metaphysics. Our account of what there is constrains our theory of rational belief, and hence of rationality in general; and our theory of rational belief constrains our ontological outlook. It may be, however, that philosophers naturally tend to take one or the other of these two philosophical domains, epistemology or metaphysics, or some account developed therein, as primary. If we give priority to epistemology, we tend to produce an ontology that posits the sorts of objects about which our epistemology says we can have knowledge or justified belief; and if we give metaphysics priority, we tend to produce an account of rational belief which allows knowledge or justified belief about the sorts of things our ontology countenances as real.1 On this basis, it is not surprising that beauty is quite often dismissed as irrelevant to epistemic concerns. Scientific methodology typically allows only truths which are either testable by empirical means or basic to scientific methodology in general (such as properties or numbers). Audi writes, In metaphysics, the assumption of the primacy of scientific method implies a tendency to take science as the arbiter of the real. The obvious point here is that we should tend to countenance as real whatever our best confirmed scientific theories posit as such, or at least posit as explanatorily basic. . . . But there is a further implication: we must also countenance as real whatever must be posited to understand science itself, for instance properties, numbers, sets, or whatever. And, assuming Occam's Razor, many philosophers think we need countenance nothing else.2 Yet, should a theory of rationality be adopted which excludes both the possibility of real beauty and its epistemic value? On what grounds might one exclude what seems to be a common a priori assumption, aesthetic realism? While it is beyond the scope of this paper to put forth a theory of rationality, there is no strong reason to exclude aesthetic realism. Moreover, if a real connection between truth and beauty exists, any theory of 1 Robert Audi, “Realism, Rationality, and Philosophical Method,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 61 no. 1 (1987) 65. 2 Ibid., 68. 23 rationality must value beauty. The next section addresses this connection between truth and beauty. Beauty in Scientific Theory Choice Beauty functions in an important way for scientific theory choice. For science, empirical observation obviously plays a central role for the forming of beliefs about how the world is. Science uses empirical observation to draw inferences about natural laws by enumerative induction.3 Yet, given the limits of enumerative induction, science is sometimes presented with theories which seem to satisfy empirical conditions equally well (i.e. empirical equivalence).4 In these cases scientists often appeal to some set of scientific virtues. Thomas Kuhn says, “Five characteristics – accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness – are all standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory. . . . together with others of much the same sort, provide the shared basis for theory choice.”5 James McAllister is a philosopher of science prominent for his work on the relationship between aesthetic criteria and theory choice. He points out two problems for theory choice: first, “the alluring thesis that scientific progress is fractured by revolutions into distinct epochs which adhere to forms of rationality peculiar to each and not shared 3 In other words, given circumstances C at time N, event E happens. Furthermore, given circumstances C, at time N1, event E happens. When this relationship is observed for every Ni+1, a law is put forth that whenever C happens, event E cannot fail to happen. 4 Lars Bergstrom, “Underdetermination of Physical Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Quine, ed. Roger Gibson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 5 Beauty in this context is often reduced to simplicity. Thomas S. Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,” The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977): 322. See also Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), 23: “Scientific method was vaguely seen in §5 as a matter of being guided by sensory stimuli, a taste for simplicity in some sense, and a taste for old things.” 24 by adjacent periods,” and second, “the mounting realization that the development of science is shaped partly by factors which relate not to the verisimilitude or empirical adequacy of theories but rather to their aesthetic or formal features.”6 He suggests that either of these problems threatens a “paradigm-neutral canon of rationality.”7 In the case of the latter problem, “if theory-preference is further vitiated by the aesthetic predispositions of scientists, the resulting edifice appears irremediably contaminated by irrationality.”8 He aims to dispel both of these difficulties by presenting a coherentist model of scientific progress which discards atemporal definition for aesthetic features.9 He invokes a traditional distinction between metarationalism and metainductionism. According to the former, “the norms of scientific methodology are formulated a priori by inference from the nature and goals of science: on this foundationalist account a methodological precept correctly inferred will remain forever valid.”10 On the other hand metainductionism holds that “the norms of scientific methodology are developed and refined by an induction over those amongst all past proposed norms which have demonstrated the most fruitful applicability.”11 He suggests that while indicators of truth are formulated by inference via metarationalism, indicators of beauty are formulated a 6 McAllister, 25. 7 Ibid., 25. 8 Ibid., 25. 9 A coherentist model measures epistemic justification on consistency with all other held beliefs. McAllister uses Copernicus, Dalton, Mach and Einstein to illustrate how conceptions of what makes a theory simple can change over time; Ibid., 32. coherentism. 10 Ibid., 38. 11 Note that these correspond to the broader epistemic theories of foundationalism and 25 posteriori by metainductionism. The reason he proposes this solution is clear from the following: It would be logically possible to ascribe such a coincidence [the correspondence of beauty and truth] to universal accident, but this assumption would appear unpalatably to construe beauty of theories as miraculous. Furthermore, the postulation of a similar accident could not be regarded as permitting either an epistemologically complete account of past instances of theory-succession or a secure algorithm for scientific progress; both of these purposes would require a relation of nomological coincidence, whether deterministic or statistical. Satisfactory understanding of a similar law-like correlation would in turn require a causal explanation of the positive association between truth and beauty, most prima facie plausibly by demonstrating how a theory’s endowment of indicators of truth ensures it simultaneous possession of indicators of beauty. Any explanation to this effect (in itself difficult to envisage) would conflate the two categories by reducing indicators of beauty to a subset of indicators of truth, since if a theory lacked features of beauty it would tend also not to be true. Such a conflation would violate a category of requirement other than indicators of truth. Approaches postulating either an accidental coincidence or a nomological correlation of truth and beauty thus appear equally problematic.12 13 McAllister is reluctant to accept either coincidental or necessary correspondence between truth and beauty because this would in the first place construe the correspondence as “miraculous” and in the second reduce indicators of beauty to a subset of truth. While his solution may present a plausible explanation as to how aesthetic principles are uncovered, it misses its mark in demonstrating that there is no nomological connection between beauty and truth.14 In illustrating that aesthetic principles have not been atemporally defined, he has simply demonstrated both that aesthetic values have been ill defined and 12 Ibid., 37. 13 Nomological: “relating to or denoting natural laws, which are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but just are so.” Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th rev. ed., 2008, s.v. “nomological.” 14 Which was evidently his goal: “The queries which opened the present section have thus been answered. There are no nomological connections between truth and beauty, merely inductive associations continually updated by scientists in the light of the degree of success of past theories.” McAllister, 41. 26 that the aesthetic states are complicated. Furthermore, in describing the inductive process by which aesthetic criteria are supposedly refined,15 he has ignored the fact that scientists have appealed to beauty as an a priori principle which serves as a basis for judging theories. While perhaps the concept of beauty has been refined inductively, this does not preclude scientists appealing to it as a metarational principle.16 In fact, scientists have operated under this assumption. Moreover, to deny a nomological connection between beauty and truth is to bring a charge of irrationality against a great swath of figures in the history of science from Copernicus to Einstein.17 These men assumed a nomological connection by using aesthetic considerations as a basis for determining theory. The fundamental point to be made here is that scientists do appeal to aesthetic criteria, often without clear definition of the principle, but always as a basis for theory choice. This does suggest a necessary connection between truth and beauty. The implications of this suggestion are difficult and “miraculous” given a naturalistic 15 Presumably by looking at what are judged to be true theories and embracing them as beautiful: “to account for such variability it is here claimed that a community selects its aesthetic canon at a certain date from amongst the aesthetic features of all past theories by weighting each feature proportionally to the degree of empirical success scored to that date by all the theories which have appeared to embody it.” Ibid., 39. 16 He asserts the same dialectical truth with regard to indicators of truth: “It remains of course possible for indicators of truth to be inductively learned by a scientific community but this is irrelevant to the a priori logical status of such criteria.” Ibid., 38. 17 Two of his examples were Nicolaus Copernicus and Albert Einstein: Copernicus, Commenariolus, “A system of this sort seemed neither sufficiently absolute nor sufficiently pleasing to the mind. . . . I often considered whether there could perhaps be found a more reasonable arrangement of circles. . . . The suggestion at length came to me how it should be solved with fewer and much simpler constructions than were formerly used.” Of Einstein, McAllister says, “Einstein was famously motivated by simplicity; when once commenting upon a discrepancy of as much as ten per cent between a measured gravitational deviation of light and the effect calculated from general relativity, he weigh structural simplicity against any empirical deficiency of the theory: ‘For the expert, this thing is not particularly important, because the main significance of the theory does not lie in the verification of little effects, but rather in the great simplification of the theoretical basis of physics as a whole.’ ” Ibid., 32. 27 assumption. Finally, the obvious implication of a nomological connection between beauty and truth is that where one finds beauty one should expect to find truth. Qualitative Truth ‘Raw feels’ were previously discussed in the evaluation of perceptual beliefs. There is another aspect of ‘raw feels’ which is potentially productive for aesthetic knowing, that they contain qualitative content. Thus not only are they epistemically significant for the possibility of knowledge by way of sense experience, but also are significant because qualitative content contains fullness of meaning which cannot be exhausted by its propositional representation. Theodore Schick makes the suggestive argument that qualitative content is necessary for complete knowledge.18 In other words, there may be an aspect to knowledge which cannot be captured by means of propositions. A common view of knowledge is presented by Wilfred Sellars who claims that all knowledge is propositional.19 In this case, ‘knowing’ the color red would be the same as knowing how to use the word red. Whatever qualitative experience one has of redness is valuable only to the extent that it allows one to use the term red in appropriate contexts. Furthermore, for Sellars one cannot adduce non-epistemic facts for epistemic facts. He argues that this is akin to committing the “naturalistic fallacy.”20 If Sellars is right, beauty, a qualitative concept, would be worthless for epistemology altogether. 18 Theodore W. Schick, “The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 no. 2 (1992): 383. 19 Wilfred Sellars, “The Myth of the Given,” in Empirical Knowledge, ed. R.M. Chisholm and R.J. Swartz (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973). 20 This is a common concept in ethics referring to drawing an ought from an is. 28 However, Schick argues for qualitative content for several reasons. First, he says, “The notion that having a concept requires having a language is a troubling one, for it seems to make language learning impossible. Children learn to understand and generate an infinite number of sentences after being exposed to only a finite number of them.”21 Second, agents who have conscious experiences have knowledge of those experiences. One who has experienced a sharp stabbing in the chest knows what it is like to experience that sort of pain. Furthermore, Schick points out that there are different types of knowledge such as “knowing-that” and “knowing-how.” For instance, knowing how to ride a bike is different than knowing conceptually how bike riding works. “Knowing-how” concerning bike riding cannot be reduced to “knowing-that.” In the same way, “knowing-what” is experiential qualitative knowledge and cannot be reduced to “knowing-that.” Schick illustrates the fuller dimension of “knowing-what” knowledge by considering how a color-blind person may be able to use the word “red” appropriately in some situations, but certainly not in all situations because she lacks the qualitative content necessary to apply it correctly.22 Schick further demonstrates qualitative knowledge by citing Hilary Putnam: If a historian reads documents, examines the public actions, reads the diaries and letters, how then does he decide ‘Smith was hungry for power’? Not by applying ‘general laws of history, sociology, and psychology’ to the data as positivists methodologists urge he should! Rather he has to absorb all this material, and then 21 Ibid., 38; consider also the conscious awareness of babies and animals. One wouldn’t assume that a baby or an animal thinks propositionally, but they do have knowledge in some sense. This concept is considered in the Crash Test Dummies song “How Does a Duck Know”: “How does a duck know what direction south is? / And how to tell his wife from all the other ducks?” Crash Test Dummies, “How Does a Duck Know,” God Shuffled His Feet (BMG/Arista, 1993). 22 Schick, 388. 29 rely on his human wisdom that this shows power-hunger ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (as the courts say). In effect, he uses himself as a ‘measuring instrument.’23 It is precisely his qualitative knowledge which informs the historian. Putnam’s example suggests others. For example, imagine a scenario in which a decision needs to be made about a factual question like, “Did the defendant commit murder?” The jury might be affected by the impression the defendant makes on them, his court demeanor. This is qualitative knowledge. Morally, qualitative knowledge is significant when one considers what it is like to be another human being, perhaps one who needs help. It is easy to imagine how qualitative knowledge might be important for belief in God, especially given the fact that theological language is so clearly analogical.24 Qualitative knowledge seems to be a neglected aspect of epistemology.25 Yet, it does have potential for fruit in epistemology for a couple reasons. First, if knowledge is defined only in propositional truths, a vast amount of ‘knowledge’ is excluded. Moreover, it is possible that ultimate reality is best apprehended through multiple ways of knowing. Second, as was illustrated by Schick qualitative knowledge directly impacts propositional knowledge (by swaying a jury or teaching a child to speak for instance). To ignore it is to cut off a fruitful (and necessary) aspect of understanding the world. 23 Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) 73. 24 Surely Paul’s prayer in Ephesians 3:14-19 is that the Ephesians might have a sort of qualitative knowledge of God: “For this reason I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named, that according to the riches of his glory he may grant you to be strengthened with power through his Spirit in your inner being, so that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith—that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may have strength to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.” 25 This is not to say it is completely ignored. Rather, when knowledge is defined as justified, true belief, it is difficult to account for qualitative knowledge. The most well known article on qualitative knowledge is Thomas Nagel’s “What is it Like to Be a Bat,” which argues against physicalism. Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to Be a Bat,” The Philosophical Review, 83 no. 4 (1974): 435-50. 30 Beauty in Christian Theology In evaluating the possible philosophical connection between beauty and truth, there are at least two ways beauty could be appropriated by a Christian. First, one could argue on the basis of the existence of beauty toward a particular viewpoint, perhaps using a causal or design argument. This type of argument reasons from the reality of beauty, not a given instance of it. For instance: 1. If the world was designed by a theistic creator, we should expect to find beauty and apparent design. 2. Beauty and apparent design exist. 3. Therefore, we should expect that the world was designed by a theistic creator.26 Or 1. Beauty exists. 2. Theism is a sufficient explanation for beauty; moreover theism is the best explanation for beauty (and atheism is not). 3. Therefore, theism.27 Strictly speaking, the first argument is logically invalid. The second is perhaps more promising, especially given the facts that beauty has such strong intuitive appeal and is difficult to explain naturalistically. However, since neither of these arguments expresses how belief in God is actually formed, a second type of argument will be considered. The second type of argument argues from the appearance of beauty in one particular instance, namely the Christian faith. It could be referred to as an evidential 26 This argument, which is logically fallacious, (because it affirms the consequent) is the form of argument often used for scientific theories. This is also called abductive reasoning. 27 explanation.” This argument is another form of abductive reasoning referred to as “inference to the best 31 argument. Yet, for most Christians, beauty doesn’t formalize into an argument with premises. Most Christians embrace the truth of the faith because they have encountered the beauty as a lover is encountered by the beloved. In fact, there are two significant senses in which this type of evidential argument is consistent with Christian theology: 1) Christian theology assumes a necessary connection between beauty and truth, and 2) the point of the Christian narrative is to some degree that all men should worship God, or to put it in aesthetic terms to admire him, to consider him beautiful and glorious, to be joined with him. In other words, a central aspect of faith from a Christian perspective is the embracing of the truth of the gospel by acknowledging the beauty which presents itself in God’s revelation. Romans 1 illustrates both of these elements. First, Romans 1:20-21 contains an argument which includes the ideas of perceiving God’s attributes and subsequently rejecting God’s glory. Verse 20 says that God’s invisible attributes are clearly perceived in the things that have been made.28 Next, verse 21 suggests that depraved men did not honor him, nor give thanks, but rather exchanged God’s glory for images resembling mortal man and animals (vs. 23).29 While the concept of beauty is not explicitly present in this passage, the concept of God’s glory (δόξα) contains it.30 Numerous theologians including Augustine, Jonathan Edwards, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Karl Barth have 28 τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται Romans 27 1:20 NA . 29 Hans Urs von Balthasar focuses his theological aesthetics on the concept of God’s glory essentially equating it with beauty. He presents a similar argument from Romans 1 in The Glory of God: Seeing the Form, 430-432; Hans Urs von Balthasar. The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. vol. I-V, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, ed. Joseph Fessio S.J. and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982). 30 E.g. “visible divine radiance” Kittel, “δόξα, κτλ.,” in TDNT, 2:247. 32 considered beauty to be an integral part of what constitutes the glory of God. Therefore, 31 not to recognize God’s glory, and correspondingly his beauty, is the epitome of sinfulness which Paul describes in Romans 1. Furthermore, Paul’s point is precisely that men and women have exchanged the truth about God for a lie. In this way, the correspondence of beauty to truth is illustrated. They should embrace the truth because God’s glory is evident in creation. Furthermore, both Barth and Balthasar connect beauty closely with the saving death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.32 In Mark 14:3-9, Jesus calls the self-sacrificing ‘waste’ of expensive ointment in washing his feet a “beautiful thing.”33 Yet, this is ironic since her deed is simply a picture of the beautiful self-sacrifice he was soon to offer. Indeed, the purpose of his saving work, as evidenced by Ephesians 1, is “to the praise of his glory” (vv. 12, 14). Barth says, “We are no assuming that we have here [in the incarnation] the centre and goal of all God’s works, and therefore the hidden beginning of them all . . . this work of the Son as such reveals the beauty of God in a special way and in some sense to a supreme degree.”34 Yet, as Richard Viladesau emphasizes, this is in spite of the fact that Isaiah 53:2 says “he had no form or majesty that we should look at him, nothing in his appearance that we should desire him.” There is a sense in which the 31 Augustine Confessions 10,27; De vera religione, 32 (ML 34); Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections (Edinburgh: Geo. Caw, 1812), 214. http://books.google.com/books?id=99cHAAAAQAAJ& (Accessed September 25, 2010); Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Π/1, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1970), 645. Balthasar, I, 124. 32 Balthasar, I, 124; Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/I, 663. 33 He says, “She has done a beautiful thing to me.” “Beautiful” is καλὸν in Greek which is often translated ‘good.’ However, the Syriac version is explicit concerning its sense translating it “beautiful” (rÁ∏◊). 34 Barth, 661. 33 beauty of the incarnation “converts” the sense of beauty, by embracing death, fear, and ugliness.35 Balthasar says, [Christian beauty includes] the Cross and everything else which a worldly aesthetics (even of a realistic kind) discards as no longer bearable. This inclusiveness is not only of the type proposed by a Platonic theory of beauty, which knows how to employ the shadows and the contradictions as stylistic elements of art; it embraces the most abysmal ugliness of sin and hell by virtue of the condensation of divine love, which has brought even sin and hell into that divine art for which there is no human analogue.36 Viladesau suggests that for one to understand this dimension of beauty one must “see things from God’s point of view . . . from the point of view of absolute love.” He suggests a “conversion” is needed.37 Indeed, 1 Corinthians 1:18 says, “the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing.” Therefore, from a theological perspective, the Spirit himself is the ultimate persuader of the beauty of the gospel.38 In light of this language of ‘conversion,’ it could be suggested that a central claim of this paper (that beauty is in some cases properly basic) is put in doubt. Earlier a brief allusion was made to sin as a possible defeater to aesthetic judgments. Depravity could so debilitate aesthetic judgment to the point where it is unreliable. In this case, radical conversion would be necessary before any true (or approximately true) judgments could be made. However, even among Reformed theologians (whose position on 35 Viladesau, 188. 36 Balthasar, I, 124. Jeremy Begbie argues that this is the way in which Christian aesthetics can avoid sentimentality, by engaging evil and ugliness not by trivializing it. Jeremy Begbie, “Beauty, Sentimentality and the Arts,” in The Beauty of God, ed. Daniel J. Treier et al. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007), 64. 37 Viladesau, 188. 38 Cf. Plantinga, 303-304. 34 depravity is strongest) moral depravity does not imply one is completely incapable of moral judgment. Louis Berkhof comments on what depravity does not imply: 1) that every man is as thoroughly depraved as he can possibly become; 2) that the sinner has no innate knowledge of the will of God, nor a conscience that discriminates between good and evil; 3) that the sinful man does not often admire virtuous character and actions in others, or is incapable of disinterested affections and actions in his relations with his fellow-men . . .39 So even from a Reformed perspective depravity does not mean that sinful men are incapable of making approximately true moral judgments. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose a radical corruption of aesthetic judgment sense to a greater degree than moral judgment. Finally, Matthew 5:16 provides a reminder that the beauty of believers’ actions is a powerful apologetic for faith in God. It says, “In the same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works (καλὰ ἔργα) and give glory to your Father who is in heaven.” Athenagoras took the correspondence between beautiful works and the truth of the faith seriously as an apologetic method. The central appeal he makes to the emperors of Rome in his Embassy for Christians is as follows: But amongst us you might find simple folk, artisans and old women, who, if they are unable to furnish in words the assistance they derive from our doctrine, yet show in their deeds the advantage to others that accrues from their resolution. They do not rehearse words but show forth good deeds; struck, they do not strike back, plundered, they do not prosecute; to them that ask they give, and they love their neighbors as themselves. . . . We know that the life that is in store is far better than can be described in words, if we depart pure from all stain. We are so far lovers of our fellows as not only to love our friends. For Scripture tells us, if you love them that love you and lend them that lend to you, what reward shall you have? . . . These thoughts are but few out of many and trivial rather than lofty, but 39 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), 246. 35 we do not wish to trouble you with more. Those who taste honey and whey can tell if the whole be good by tasting even a small portion.40 For Athenagorus there was a stark contrast between the philosophers who thought well but did not live accordingly and simple people who lived well. In addition to offering more sophisticated arguments, he puts this argument forth as his most powerful exhibit. In summary, Christian theology assumes a connection between truth and beauty. Furthermore, embracing the gospel itself can be seen as embracing of its beauty. Yet, it is the beauty of God’s love within the framework of ugliness and sin which is the most powerful form of beauty. This powerful beauty of love in response to hatred and ugliness is perhaps the most powerful Christian apologetic. 40 Athenagorus Embassy for Christians 42-43. CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION The basic aim of this paper was to defend the claim that beauty has epistemic value for Christian belief. To do this a model was put forth for understanding how beauty might impact beliefs, particularly Christian beliefs. In addressing the topic of beauty, it was necessary to evaluate the historical development of the concept and the possibility that beauty actually reflects objective reality. An attempt was made to explain how aesthetic judgments might be made in a basic way. The fact that aesthetic judgments are unmediated is important because it emphasizes the reliability of the ‘delivery mechanism’ for these beliefs. However, defeaters for aesthetic judgments were examined. It was noted that awareness of defeaters raises the likelihood that these beliefs are warranted. Finally, the role of aesthetic judgments was evaluated in terms of rationality and theory choice in science. It was suggested that qualitative belief is useful analogically for Christian belief. Finally, a theological perspective was offered concerning how aesthetic beliefs function within Christian theology. While a position of complete neutrality is impossible for judging epistemic claims, beauty is at least an important criterion for evaluating truth. Furthermore, while it may be impossible to have absolute certainty with regard to aesthetic judgments, given the process of forming these beliefs a certain amount of approximation should be expected. This observation allows beauty to speak to issues of truth with a voice of its 37 own. As was noted at the beginning of this paper, beauty matters. Yet, the suggestion of this author is that not only does it matter; it should matter. APPENDIX A PLATTITUDES CONCERING BEAUTY Platitudes about Beauty A definition of beauty has not been offered for two reasons. First, as argued above, we know beauty intuitively before we ever seek to evaluate what it is we know. Second, it may just be that defining ‘beauty’ is as difficult as defining ‘red.’ In his Beauty, Roger Scruton explicitly avoids defining beauty “in terms of some property or properties supposed to be exhibited by all beautiful things.”1 Moreover he does not reject but rather ignores the transcendental view of the neo-Platonists; he says nothing about Hutcheson’s view that beauty “ ‘consists in’ unity in variety.” He simply says, “Everything I have said about the experience of beauty implies that it is rationally founded. It challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find.”2 His assessment is basically right. There are perhaps no simple laws about what makes something beautiful. Yet, perhaps it is possible to begin to formulate some principles which approximate it. 1 2 Roger Scruton, Beauty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 195. Scruton, 195-97. David Bentley Hart takes a similar approach: “It is impossible to offer a definition of beauty, either in the abstract or in Christian thought; what can be done . . . is to describe a general ‘thematic’ of the beautiful, a broad summary of the themes that will govern the meaning of ‘beauty.’ ” Hart, 17. 39 Some suggestions are listed below: i. 3 Beauty evokes desire. This point should not be understood to imply a characteristic psychological response to beauty, but rather that the perception of beauty is to perceive an external reality which precedes a movement of the will, in fact commands it.4 Moreover, it is illegitimate to say (as Kant et al.) that the desire beauty produces is disinterested. Beauty produces not a consuming frenzy, but love. ii. Beauty is objective, not mind dependent. That beauty produces desire implies also that it does not depend on a preexisting movement of the will. As Zangwill says, “it is not the case that if I think something is beautiful then it is beautiful.”5 Neither is it the case that if I will something to be beautiful then it is beautiful. While beauty doesn’t necessarily equate to being (as is sometimes argued), this statement does imply that its appearance is theoretically accessible to all. iii. Beauty can be a judgment of sense perception or intellectual perception Bodies can be beautiful as well as ideas. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to draw a hard line between physical beauty and moral beauty; actions can be beautiful.6 These 3 Adapted from Scruton, Beauty, and Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite. Zangwill, “Aesthetic 4 Hart, 19. 5 Zangwill. Judgment.” 6 This is the old Greek way of understanding κολός/κἀλλος. Cf. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, “The Great Theory of Beauty and its Deline,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31 no. 2 (1972): 165. 40 judgments are the same sort of judgments, sharing the same complexities and difficulties. Obviously, however, they differ in their moral implications. iv. Beauty is gradient A child may call a dandelion beautiful and recant because it pales in comparison to an iris. Yet, this does not mean that his judgment concerning the dandelion was false. A comparative judgment should indicate perhaps that an iris is more beautiful than a dandelion, but it would not require that a dandelion be called ugly.7 v. Judgments of beauty are often synthetic judgments with many basic components. The performance of a song may contain beautiful elements such as pitch, timing, or balance. Yet, it is only when these elements are synthesized skillfully that a warranted judgment is made. The problems presented by proponents of situational ethics illustrate this point perfectly.8 vi. Judgments of beauty are subjective, but reflect objective reality. Immanuel Kant is basically right to suggest that our minds construct our ideas of reality. Yet, this observation does not solve the metaphysical problem created by Hume. Why should Kant assume that judgments are subjective and universal? Metaphysical realism 7 As a matter of fact, one’s frustration with the weed may lead him to judge them ugly, but that sort of judgment would effected by his desire for an immaculate lawn. Giordano Bruno makes a similar claim, “Nothing is absolutely beautiful; if a thing is beautiful, it is so in relation to something else.” Giordano Bruno De vinculis in genere, Opera III.63.7. 8 Joseph Fletcher tells a story about a man who could take pills to stay alive for three years, but his life insurance policy will drop his coverage when it expires in one year. If he does not take the pills he will live six months and his family will be left with financial security. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1966), 166. Hierarchical ethics is the answer to these quandaries. Imagine a man who is late for paying his rent. He is driving to pay it when it hits a pedestrian. It is both wrong for him to be tardy with his rent, and to leave the pedestrian to die. In this case the choice is simple. But it shows how objective moral truth is possible within a framework of hierarchy when complex decisions are understood as separate judgments. The same is true for beauty. 41 is a plausible answer to this question, but one which cannot be asserted except a priori. The point of this assertion is to say that our subjective states are an important part of judgments of beauty but that they correspond to objective reality. vii. Any account of beauty must take into account creativity and diversity The Christian conception of God as infinite perhaps helps to explain why beauty is so resistant to description. If we understand the source of beauty to be infinite, it is very plausible that the creativity of expressions of beauty may be infinite. BIBLIOGRAPHY 43 Anton, John P. “Plotinus’ Refutation of Beauty as Symmetry.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 23 no. 2 (Winter 1964): 233-237. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Edited by Kevin Knight. New Advent. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ (Accessed August 30, 2010) Athenagoras. 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