THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS

Contemporary Pragmatism, 2019

Dewey's conceptualization of the public as polity contextualized: the struggle for democratic control over natural resources and technology Torjus Midtgarden Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, Norway [email protected] Abstract This article explores John Dewey's conceptualization of the public as polity in his lecture notes from 1928. Dewey's conceptualization suggests an account of the democratic legitimacy of public regulation of economic activities by focusing on polity members' mutual interest. Contextualized through Dewey's involvement in practical politics the article specifies the conceptualization by a policy focus on natural resources and technology, and explores and discusses it through two issues for democratic control over policy development: centralization of power in federal government; and the failure to understand, predict and control consequences of technology. Finally, exploring its relevance in a context of economic globalization the article rearticulates the conceptualization in terms of transnational relations and solidarities, using the transnational peasant organization La Via Campesina as an example.

Oelkers Jurgen Hrsg Osterwalder Fritz Hrsg Rhyn Heinz Hrsg Bildung Offentlichkeit Und Demokratie Weinheim U a Beltz 1998 S 143 164, 1998

DEWEYan pragmatism offers alternative theories of mind, seif, and society that challenge the cur¬ rency dominant ideology of the democratie public in the Unites States and elsewhere. By tracing Dewey's thinking to its origin in the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson we catch a glimpse of what makes democracy somewhat unique in the U.S., for better and worse. We will also see how Dewey appropriated and reconstrueted Emerson to develop his own theory of the democratie public. I will also examine Dewey's response to the "democratie realists", especially Walier Lippmann, who were skeptical of Dewey's democratie ideal. This will provide a distant mirror for reflections on our own era. The paper concludes with some speculations about the future of the democratie public in the U.S. in the age of multinational cooperate capitalism. 1 The descriptions of WFP and WFM are adapted from Johnson (1993, pp. 15-17).

Journal of Educational Controversy, 2014

ABSTRACT

2017

The promise of democracy is that citizens can make collective choices not only about short-term policies but also about the kind of institutions and future they want to share. This possibility turns not just on elections and other constitutional features of democratic government, but also on commitments to the public good-even the very idea that there is a public good-and participation in public communication to establish it and guide its pursuit. This is a claim against the authority or necessity of monarchs or dictators, but also for the possibility of choosing a way of life and organization of social solidarity. There have been many skeptics. In 1925, Walter Lippman (1993 [1925]) famously suggested that the public was a phantom, at most a reference point for establishing the collective interest but not a meaningful part of the process for ascertaining what policies would actually serve that interest. Solving problems, he said, required experts and effective administration but not large-scale public action or debate. Lippman's argument served famously to occasion John Dewey's (2012 [1927]) spirited defense of democracy and the centrality of public engagement to democracy. In a sense, Lippman can be seen as the foil to the entire ensuing development of the academic study and popular discussion of democratic publics: he said they don't matter much, that the real work of policy-making and problem-solving inevitably gets done by political insiders; most people are mere bystanders not agents; and democracy itself is best limited to elections that check abuses of power or resolve crises. In this chapter, I want to explore some ideas of the three most important authors to take up the theme of what publics might accomplish in the decades after Lippman's challenge: John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, and Jürgen Habermas. These can be brought together to help develop a stronger theoretical grasp of the problems and potential of democratic publics.

European Journal of American Studies, 2020

This essay takes the present ‘post truth’ threat to democratic politics as an occasion to revisit John Dewey’s view of the public as a political actor that is both indispensible for the project of modern democracy and vulnerable to self-effacement. Drawing on a recent development in democratic theory—epistemic democracy—that is in part inspired by Dewey, I trace how Dewey’s relativist understanding of truth animates his views of the public as a political actor and of democracy as a “collective exercise in practical intelligence” (Festenstein). But in linking the epistemic thrust of Dewey’s political theory with his view of communication as art, I move beyond established understandings of epistemic democracy to argue that the aesthetic is assigned with a key role in collectively exercising the practical intelligence that both sustains democracy and moves it forward—and that epistemic democrats have overlooked so far.

Journal of Communication, 2012

Res Publica, 1 (2), 1995

In the last decade there has been a resurgence of interest and practice in public philosophy. In the wake of the Great Recession, frustrating healthcare town hall meetings, and the shutdown of the federal government, there is great need for a return to civil and insightful debate. Philosophers can help and are writing increasingly for general audiences. Writers, public figures, and general readers could all benefit from the guidance and example of a great public philosopher. Those who champion public philosophy can find inspiration and lessons in Dewey’s work. Dewey is well-known as one of America’s greatest public philosophers. In this essay, I highlight some lessons we can learn from his example to understand and appreciate some of the central and necessary features of good public philosophy. In the context of great varieties of conceptions of public philosophy, I argue that public philosophy can best be understood as the application of what Dewey called the “supreme intellectual obligation” to the kinds of activities in which philosophers and public intellectuals can engage.