Black Market Britain: 1939-1955

Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer At 11.10 am on Friday 24 March 1944 Detective Sergeant Bert Hannam of the London Metropolitan Police knocked on the front door of Ivor Novello’s Aldwych lat. he composer, actor, and playwright lay in bed reading the paper. He had not been awake for long, as he had appeared on stage at he Adelphi in his musical he Dancing Years the night before. His secretary Captain Lloyd-Williams opened the door and showed Hannam through to Novello’s bedroom. here, the detective served Novello with a summons for conspiring with one of his most ardent fans and a frequent back-stage visitor, Dora Constable, to avoid petrol rationing and evade the motor fuel regulations. Constable, then working as a junior iling clerk for a venture capitalist, had helped Novello obtain a license to convert his chaufeur-driven maroon Rolls Royce from petrol to gas. Novello used the car to commute between his London lat and his country house in Berkshire, but the withdrawal of the basic petrol ration for private motorists in 1942 had forced him to commute by train. He detested the commute from Paddington to Maidenhead, and tried unsuccessfully to obtain a licence to convert his car to gas. When Constable heard him complain about the situation in his dressing room after a performance on Christmas Eve 1943, she promised to help him. Without her superiors’ knowledge, but with Novello’s connivance, Constable arranged for the car’s ownership to be transferred to her employer’s irm. She then applied for a licence to convert the car, claiming that it would be used by company executives to visit the irm’s factories. Having successfully obtained a licence, Constable provided Novello’s chaufeur with a letter explaining that he worked for the irm. Armed with this letter, the chaufeur resumed driving Novello between London and Berkshire. he scam was not discovered until Constable confessed all to her employer after being accused of embezzling more than £1,000 of company cash. A police investigation followed, unravelling the conspiracy and bringing Hannam to Novello’s door. On being handed the summons, Novello exclaimed: Going to take me to Court! I did hope they would believe my statement and forget this. Inspector, probably persons in my profession overrate their importance but really you know I am engaged on very, very important war work for morale and my licence should not have been refused. he War Ministry have caused all this trouble. he suggestion of me conspiring with a person of Constable’s type is repugnant. After reading a few lines of Constable’s statement, Novello slumped back into his pillows and delivered the lines that would later irritate and amuse newspaper readers by turns. 2 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer his is terrible. Oh! he publicity it will mean. I don’t mind myself but I detest causing a stain on the theatrical profession. You know inspector I used the car on numerous occasions to get to my home. My health would not stand the strain of train travel. I really thought Mr Haywood [Constable’s employer] knew all about the arrangement and that he was being kind to me.1 A month later, the journalists sitting in Bow Street Magistrates’ Court listening to the case seized upon Novello’s words, reporting his ‘verbal’ in full. his was possible because the editors of the national dailies devoted several scarce column inches to the case, as it had all the elements of a great news story: crime, celebrity, hypocrisy, selishness, and ungentlemanly conduct. According to one diarist, even he Times, the august paper of record, gave the case ‘quite a lot of publicity’, quoting what both sides said ‘with considerable gusto for such an organ’.2 he coverage showed Novello in an unsympathetic light. he fact of his conviction and sentencing to eight weeks’ imprisonment when combined with selective reporting of statements made in court gave the impression that Novello exploited a vulnerable and unstable woman, for whom he had no regard, in order to achieve his own selish ends at the expense of the national war efort. His fellow thespian Noël Coward, who also fell foul of wartime regulations, shared the public’s opinion, recording in a diary entry a conversation that took place over dinner at Novello’s house in Berkshire early in 1946. . . . we embarked on Ivor’s trial and the injustice, etc. I became a little uneasy but he has no qualms whatever. He told me how he evaded ire watching and lew to the shelter whenever danger threatened. Novello’s ‘selish, pathetic triviality’ rankled with Coward, who threw himself behind the war efort.3 Although Novello and Constable were not black marketeers dealing in rationed or price-controlled goods, they had evaded the regulations, and, in the eyes of many, disregarded the principle of ‘fair shares for all’ that underwrote the system of consumer regulation. he price and rationing regulations, evaded by Novello amongst others, were an important part of a system of controls on economic activity. Imposed during the Second World War and dismantled from the late 1940s onwards, the aim of control was to restrain consumption, prevent inlation, and ensure orderly distribution. Interest rates and taxation were the principal methods of indirect control, which worked in tandem with a range of direct or physical controls. Contemporary economists distinguished between seven types of direct control: labour control, import control, exchange control, export control, raw materials control, price control, and consumer rationing. Only the last two impacted directly on consumers, and it was non-compliance with these that came to be labelled ‘black market’. 1 he National Archives (TNA): Public Record Oice (PRO), Kew, MEPO 3/2354, ‘Statement of Detective Sergeant Herbert Hannam’, 27 March 1944. 2 Mass-Observation Archive (M-OA), University of Sussex, Falmer, Diaries, 1944, April, Women, D5349, 25 April 1944. 3 Noël Coward diary, 27 January 1946, in Graham Payn and Sheridan Morley (eds.), he Noël Coward Diaries (2nd edn., London, 1998), 50. Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 3 By diverting economic activity into oicial channels, policymakers and administrators simpliied supply chains, which made it easier for them to control the low of goods and services around the economy. But ironing out the meanders of existing chains and diverting resources into new untested channels created unexpected problems. Controls criminalized some customary practices, such as the conditional sale, and created new ones, such as coupon traicking. Most of these related to rationing, which introduced a second currency in the form of ration coupons, placing similar demands in terms of banking and accounting procedures on consumers and suppliers as the existing monetary currency did. Canalizing economic activity took time. he system of control was not fully formed until 1943. By then, three government departments—the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Food, and the Ministry of Fuel and Power—or the rationing ministries, controlled the price of clothing, household goods, food, petrol, and domestic fuel as well as rationed clothing, food, and petrol.4 Control reached its greatest extent in 1948 when 31% of consumer expenditure went on rationed goods.5 Not only did these oicial channels determine what was legal, but they also created new criminal opportunities as the forces of supply and demand found out weaknesses in the channels’ banks. Invited to deliver the Marshall Lectures in 1947, the economist Lionel Robbins, who had acquired an unrivalled overview of the war efort while directing the War Cabinet’s Economic Section, chose to outline the economic problem of war. According to Robbins, the Second World War was a ‘total war’ that required the British government to direct all available resources to the war efort. Having determined the minimum standard of living necessary to maintain the health and morale of the population, and securing the resources to deliver this, everything else could be directed to the war efort. Only direct controls backed by indirect ones could achieve these ends, as an uncontrolled free-market economy could not achieve them with the same speed or attention to detail.6 A high level of import dependence before the war exacerbated the problem facing the country as limitations on shipping space and foreign currency imposed additional constraints on civilian supplies. In a more sober paper for a Whitehall seminar, Robbins discussed the role that price control and rationing played in regulating consumer demand. As civilian supplies fell and demand increased due to full employment, prices began to rise. Price control and subsidies stabilized prices of essential and semi-essential goods. his ensured that people on low incomes could aford price-controlled goods, but it did not guarantee that they could buy them. To prevent consumers with time and money from emptying shop shelves of essential goods, rationing was necessary to parcel out supplies, balancing equality with individual need. Financial measures 4 See Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939–1955 (Oxford, 2000), 9–59 for details. 5 J. C. R. Dow, he Management of the British Economy 1945–60 (London, 1970), 173. 6 Lionel Robbins, he Economic Problem in Peace and War: Some Relections on Objectives and Mechanisms (London, 1947). 4 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer had an ancillary role in combating inlation, mopping up excess demand through higher taxation and incentives to savers.7 his vision of war economy, which emerged from Robbins’ Economic Section, found expression in the price stabilization policy announced in the Fourth War Budget of April 1941. Demobilizing the economy would present government with a diferent problem. With the support of colleagues at the Board of Trade, Treasury oicials persuaded politicians of all parties to retain direct controls during the transition from war to peace.8 his was necessary in order to avoid mass unemployment and an inlationary boom as demobbed servicemen swamped the labour market while businesses restocked and shoppers scrambled to get their hands on decontrolled goods. Post-war control was also necessary to avoid a balance-of-payments crisis as the release of pent-up domestic demand sucked in dollar imports that the country could ill aford while its export industries struggled to recover and it serviced its debts. As the balance of payments righted itself and the supply situation improved, oicials planned to irst relax and then remove regulations within a few years of Japan’s defeat.9 Events such as the cancellation of US Lend-Lease aid in 1945, the harsh winter of 1947, and the Korean War reversed this process temporarily.10 As a result, price control and rationing continued for nine years after the war, ending in 1954, many years after decontrol in Canada, the USA, and Germany. he efects of control on civilians were dramatic. By the time a detective called at Novello’s lat in 1944, Britons’ standard of living and quality of life had fallen dramatically. Civilians saw their diet decline in quality and variety. Each week the food ration book entitled an ordinary adult to buy 4 oz of bacon and ham, 1s 2dworth of meat, 3 oz of tea, 8 oz of sugar, and 4 oz of preserves, which could be exchanged for an extra 4 oz of sugar and 8 oz of fats. Non-priority consumers like Novello received two pints of milk a week, a pack of dried eggs every two weeks, and four fresh eggs a quarter.11 Every four weeks, adults received food points worth 2s 6d each to spend on biscuits, breakfast cereals, canned foods, and dried foods, plus personal points for 12 oz of sweets and chocolate.12 Fillers such as bread and potatoes were coupon-free, as were ofal and fruit and vegetables. Subject to price control, they were costly and sometimes unobtainable. hanks to the gendered division of labour, the burden of meal planning, food shopping, and cooking fell heaviest on women.13 People’s personal appearance also deteriorated under control. With twenty-four clothing coupons to last six months, Novello could buy a new two-piece woollen suit for court hearings. He would have to wait a further six months to complete the 7 Lionel Robbins, ‘Economic Policy in War Time’, in Robbins, he Economist in the Twentieth Century and other Lectures in Political Economy (London, 1954), 201–25. 8 George Peden, he Treasury and British Public Policy 1906–1959 (Oxford, 2000), 346; Correlli Barnett, he Audit of War: he Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London, 1986), 265. 9 Employment Policy (PP 1943–4 Cmd.6527 viii, 119), 6–10. 10 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, 9–59. 11 R. J. Hammond, Food, 3 vols. (London, 1951–62), i, 402–3; Hammond, Food, ii, 799. 12 Manchester Guardian, 1 December 1943. 13 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, 99–150. Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 5 look with a new shirt, collar, pair of cufs, tie, and small pocket square. If Constable had the money, she could buy a single outit with her coupons.14 he lipstick and powder that Constable pulled out of her handbag during her court appearances were scarce luxuries. Rationed by price and subject to a punitive purchase tax of 33⅓ or 100%, women paid a fortune for cosmetics.15 he same was true of many other luxuries and home comforts. A stif purchase tax, steep income tax increases, and reduced supplies had eroded civilians’ ability to enjoy a drink and a smoke in the local pub. Home provided no refuge from these and other austerities. Fuel restrictions left Novello with only 4 cwt of coal a month to heat the many rooms of his large country house, which he could not redecorate nor refurnish.16 he middle class felt these enforced cuts keenly. Ministers argued that for reasons of equity, people on middle to high incomes had to accept larger falls in their standard of living and quality of life than did the working class. Although large in absolute terms, their personal sacriices pained them less than the smaller sacriices made by people on lower incomes. Equalizing the burden of cuts across the civilian population was problematic due to the diiculty of deining and measuring equal sacriice as well as more mundane resource constraints. Regulators wanted to deine equal sacriice in marginal rather than proportional terms. According to the economist A. C. Pigou, the aim was to ensure that ‘the last unit of commodity permitted to any one purchaser shall carry about the same satisfaction as the last permitted to any other’, but measuring satisfaction was beyond the regulators’ abilities. Instead, they opted to make ‘an adjustment of rations based on needs rather than on demands’.17 When it came to prices, this meant taxing luxury goods heavily and leaving the market to set their price. In contrast, regulators ixed the price of essential and semi-essential goods so as to put them within reach of working-class consumers while securing a reasonable proit for suppliers. he middle class came to resent the ‘unfair’ principle of equal marginal sacriice on which administrators based these austerity policies, as its utilitarian focus on minimizing the marginal loss of an unknown and unknowable level of satisfaction ignored the large and measurable cuts in middle-class living standards. he squeezed middle ignored what they saw as special pleading by wealthy evaders who had the money to avoid the worst efects of control. Worth £146,245 at his death in 1951,18 Novello was a very rich man for whom control was a costly inconvenience. Cushioned by a high income and large personal wealth, Novello and others like him maintained their social rank despite the wartime levelling of incomes. A large wardrobe insulated Novello from the worst efects of clothes rationing. He could not replace clothes frequently, dressing more shabbily and less fashionably than before the war, but he could aford the highest quality clothing, which lasted longest. Food rationing afected him little. His staf shouldered the 14 E. L. Hargreaves and M. M. Gowing, Civil Industry and Trade (London, 1952), 339–40. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, 190. 16 W. H. B. Court, Coal (London, 1951), 364; Hargreaves and Gowing, Civil Industry, 332–8. 17 A. C. Pigou, he Political Economy of War (London, 1940), 141. 18 John Snelson, ‘Novello, Ivor (1893–1951)’, in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 60 vols. (Oxford, 2004), xli, 225–8. 15 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 6 additional burden of putting appetizing meals on the table. hey could augment his diet with fruit and vegetables from a large kitchen garden, which they tended. Unlike most civilians, Novello could also eat coupon-free at London’s best restaurants whenever he liked.19 Although they cost him dearly, Novello continued to enjoy his usual luxuries and home comforts, for which his staf had scoured the shops. Petrol rationing was harder to avoid. Taxis and hire cars were few in number and their operation restricted to the local area, which forced Novello to use crowded trains and mingle with his public. Removing his freedom to motor was a personal sacriice too far. hose who cheated a system designed to ensure ‘fair shares’ of scarce goods, especially those imported at considerable human cost during the war, were social pariahs, as their actions denied others a fair share. If caught, public opinion demanded that the authorities dealt harshly with all ration cheats, whatever their social standing. his was why ex-servicemen, including the secretary of the Citizens Union, wrote to the Home Secretary Herbert Morrison protesting at the leniency of Novello’s sentence.20 A few days later a secret summary of police morale reports crossed Morrison’s desk conirming the lack of public sympathy for Novello. According to the Chief Constable of Reading, the local populace welcomed the dismissal of Novello’s appeal against his sentence.21 A thirty-six-year-old food packaging manager from Belmont, Surrey, keeping a diary for Mass-Observation, shared this view. I am not at all sorry that Ivor Novello has had his sentence conirmed by the London Sessions Court. I often hear indirectly of men in public positions who because of inluence get away with breaking wartime regulations. When one is caught it would be a travesty of justice if a heavy conviction is not recorded. He deserves more than he got, and only simpering females have pity for him.22 But even ‘simpering females’ had little time for Novello. Having read about the outcome of the appeal in a London evening paper, Vere Hodgson noted in her diary: ‘Poor Ivor Novello. But it is no excuse to say you do not know you are breaking the law.’23 Public hostility towards Novello evaporated soon after his release from Wormwood Scrubs. Having served his time, he resumed his role in he Dancing Years to great acclaim, and received a standing ovation at the end of his irst performance.24 By the time of his death in March 1951, the conviction was forgotten: it did not 19 he Times, 12 June 1942. TNA: PRO, HO 45/25153, G. Nicholson to Herbert Morrison, 17 May 1944, and G. Briggs to Morrison, 18 May 1944. 21 TNA: PRO, HO 45/25153, ‘Police Duty Room report’, 21 May 1944. 22 M-OA, Diaries, 1944, May, Men, D5004, 17 May 1944. 23 Vere Hodgson diary, 16 May 1944, in Vere Hodgson, Few Eggs and No Oranges: A Diary showing how Unimportant People in London and Birmingham Lived through the War Years, 1940–1945 (London, 1976), 382. 24 E. Marsh to C. Hassall, June 1944, in Christopher Hassall and John Guest (eds.), Ambrosia and Small Beer: he Record of a Conversation between Edward Marsh and Christopher Hassall (London, 1964), 294. 20 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 7 receive a mention in he Times obituary nor in the Daily Mirror, which championed fair-shares policies throughout the ‘People’s War’ and into the post-war years.25 As Coward’s diary entry from 1946 shows, Novello’s actions had been forgotten but not forgiven. Empathy, let alone sympathy, for Novello was a scarce commodity, much like the petrol he tried to wangle. His closest friends were the only people not to cast him as the villain of the piece. he former civil servant and patron of the arts Eddie Marsh, who was one of Novello’s character witnesses, felt that Novello ‘had certainly been most imprudent and far too happy-go-lucky, but if there’s one thing in the world I’m certain of it is that he had neither intention nor consciousness of doing anything wrong, and now he bears his misfortune with exemplary courage and fortitude’.26 Marsh’s fellow character witnesses, the actress Dame Sybil horndike and her husband Lewis Casson, president of the actors’ union Equity, viewed Novello’s actions in a similar fashion. It is all too easy to dismiss their view of Novello, and that of Novello himself, as special pleading. he actor broke the law and did not have a legitimate excuse for his actions; he was an unethical consumer. While it is the case that ignorance of the regulations was no defence, this misses an important point: like most black market ofenders, Novello did not consider himself to have done anything wrong. With Constable’s help he obtained a licence to which he believed his ‘essential war work’ entitled him. Regional oicials may not have considered his performances in he Dancing Years vital to the war efort, but Novello did. Entertaining civilians and of-duty servicemen and women boosted their morale. he government’s action in releasing the actor Barry Sinclair from the RAF to replace Novello in performances of he Dancing Years while he served his prison sentence conceded as much. He felt that his war work and the personal sacriices entitled him to a little comfort. he Regional Transport Commissioner’s oice did not share his view. When assessing licence applications, oicials decided whom to give a licence to on the basis of desert and need, asking whether the applicant did vital war work, and if so, whether the inability to use a car made it impossible for them to carry out that work. Novello agreed with the criteria while disagreeing with the decision that his work was neither vital to the war efort nor dependent upon the use of a car. Ofenders could, and often did, agree with the distributive principles on which oicials based price and ration levels while disagreeing with the application of these principles in their case. hey might also invoke popular beliefs about distributive justice that oicial allocations could not, or would not, take into account. hese two points are vital to understanding the pattern of non-compliance, as it reveals the ethical dimension of economic life in austerity Britain. By 1942 the stage was set for a boom in the underground economy as proithungry traders tried to capitalize on consumer greed—or at least that was what contemporary supply and demand theory predicted. he steps taken by the War Cabinet to mobilize the economy had reduced total consumer spending by almost 15% compared to igures for 1938, the last full year of peace. Food expenditure 25 26 he Times and Daily Mirror, 7 March 1951. Christopher Hassall, Edward Marsh, Patron of the Arts: A Biography (London, 1954), 635. Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 8 dropped by the same amount, while expenditure on clothing, furniture and hardware, and petrol tumbled by 39%, 71%, and 87% respectively. At the same time the quality and variety of the goods on ofer fell. It took a further six years to return to the pre-war level of total expenditure with consumption of many foods remaining below 1938 levels while consumption of non-food items loated little above until 1954, the year rationing ended.27 But the dire prognostications of the dismal science proved unfounded. True, the underground economy grew, but not to the extent anticipated by economists. North American economists developing a theory of price control and black markets in the late 1940s acknowledged their failure. hey attributed it to their disregard of an ethical dimension to illegal dealing, but found this hard to incorporate into their theories. Sitting at his desk in Chicago, Martin Bronfenbrenner excluded the moral dimension from his analysis of the relationship between oicial and black market prices, making the heroic assumption that ‘consumers have no repugnance’ and producers are ‘devoid of scruples’ against black marketing. When fellow economists criticized his assumptions as unrealistic, Bronfenbrenner conceded the point but did not see how it could be squared with the notion of amoral economic man.28 Across the border in Montreal, Kenneth E. Boulding tried to integrate moral calculus into his analysis of black market prices. He assumed that buyers and sellers took ‘moral obloquy’ into account when deciding whether or not to look for a black market deal. In addition to weighing the beneits of an illegal deal against the likelihood of being caught and the severity of legal penalties, potential buyers and sellers had to consider the severity of social sanctions.29 he implication was that the greater the social stigma attached to black marketing, the less likely a person would be to evade price and rationing regulations. Boulding was ahead of his time. Nearly two decades later the New York-based economist Gary S. Becker published an inluential paper analysing crime and punishment in terms of rational choice for which he later received a Nobel prize.30 But neither Boulding nor Becker acknowledged that the emotional content of social norms governing the exchange, distribution, and use of resources makes cold calculation diicult if not impossible.31 Ivor Novello could have told them that social opprobrium is not just another cost. hrough an ongoing dialogue with parents, friends, and others, children internalize norms and experience self-contempt, guilt, shame, and regret after infracting a norm. Of course, the degree to which an individual internalizes these 27 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, Table 1.6, 53. M. Bronfenbrenner, ‘Price Control under Imperfect Conditions’, American Economic Review, 37 (1947), 107–20; J. A. Nordin and Wayne R. Moore, ‘Bronfenbrenner on the Black Market’, American Economic Review, 37 (1947), 933–4; M. Bronfenbrenner, ‘Regressus in Black Market Demand: A Reply’, American Economic Review, 37 (1947), 934–6. 29 K. E. Boulding, ‘A Note on the heory of the Black Market’, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 13 (1947), 115–18. 30 Gary S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 176. 31 See Jon Elster, he Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, 1989), 119, and Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1989), 98 on this issue. 28 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 9 norms varies. A weakly internalized norm has a loose grip on the emotions, making it easier to side-step. Individuals can also be deaf to its emotional tones when faced with a novel situation not covered by society’s pre-existing moral code. Until a moral consensus emerges that aligns existing norms with new legal prescriptions, individuals can justify breaking the law without infracting a norm. Even then there is always wriggle room, as it is not always clear how to apply a norm in a particular circumstance. his was the position in which Novello and others found themselves. he ine detail of what constituted a fair share in austerity Britain was unclear, leaving space to evade the regulations while maintaining a non-deviant self-image, but also placing limits on what illegal activities could be justiied and hence countenanced. Despite the theoretical problems involved in Boulding’s genulections to the moral dimension of economic life, economists continue to make obeisance to popular morality in their theories of price control, rationing, and black markets.32 In a similar vein, economic historians bob their heads to social and cultural factors when studying black markets in mid-twentieth-century Britain: these variables explain away what economic factors cannot. When discussing evasion, Ina ZweinigerBargielowska attributes the pattern of illegal dealing to the operation of supply and demand, and the structure of control, but concedes that ‘Altruism and commitment to the war efort contributed towards containing the black market’ before adding the further qualiication that ‘voluntary compliance was less forthcoming after the war’.33 Here she agrees with earlier discussions of evasion of price control and food rationing in wartime Britain.34 It is the contention of this book that explanatory variables such as the structure of control do not help us to understand why Ivor Novello broke the law while those in a similar position did not. Although the legal framework of control shaped the opportunities for evasion, the structure of control cannot explain why some did and some did not exploit these opportunities. If we are to understand Novello’s behaviour, we need to listen carefully to the accounts of his actions that he gave to detectives and others. Attending to traders’ and consumers’ accounts of their motives and intentions makes it possible to explore the morality of illegal dealing, especially when they are combined with other sources. here are obvious problems with this approach. First, how can such testimony be located? And, second, what is the nature of the link between what people said and what they did? Although laborious, inding accounts does not present too much of a challenge. Many individuals and organizations documented everyday life, conscious that they and their fellow citizens were witnessing and taking part in historic events. As the deining experience of what Tom Brokaw dubbed the 32 See John Butterworth, he heory of Price Control and Black Markets (Aldershot, 1994) for a review of this slim literature. 33 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, 201–2. 34 Geofrey Mills and Hugh Rockof, ‘Compliance with Price Controls in the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II’, Journal of Economic History, 47 (1987), 197–213; Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945 (1977; Berkeley, 1979), 282–3. 10 Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer ‘greatest generation’ in the American context—that is to say, the generation that came of age during the depression and the Second World War—there is a vast quantity of life writing about the war and the early post-war years, both published and unpublished. And, of course, there are press reports of remarkable court cases like Novello’s. he second issue about the reliability of such evidence is trickier to deal with. Often traders and consumers were uncertain of the regulations. In his Christmas letter for 1944, a retired bank clerk, who played the organ at his local church, told his sisters that he gave his clothing coupons to his daughter so that she could buy a dress. he former clerk knew very little about ‘this coupon business’ and was unsure whether or not this was legal.35 In fact it was legal, but his uncertainty coloured his account of his actions. Even if individuals knew their actions to be illegal they did not always understand or recall their motives. hey might also deliberately conceal them. he context in which an account was given might distort it too. he memoirs of career criminals are a useful source, but the conventions of true crime writing and courtroom pleas shape these accounts. Also, members of a group might give the real reason for their actions to other members while giving a good reason to outsiders. Although such accounts are self-serving and partial, they are an invaluable source. As Novello’s case demonstrates, individual dissatisfaction with oicial rations and prices could prompt people to break the law. At the same time, the rhetoric of fairness placed limits on evasion as disgruntled individuals had to justify to themselves and others obtaining more than their ‘fair share’. Unhappiness with the system of allocation was also a threat to compliance with control schemes. Although the majority of Britons accepted the need for wartime control and its continuation to prevent a post-war inlationary boom during the transition from war to peace, there was considerable political disagreement about its extent and when or if it should end.36 Initially, support for control rested on collective memory of the experience of the First World War, patriotism, and, most importantly, the government’s legitimacy. Support was, however, conditional on control of delivering goods in short supply to those who wanted them, when they wanted them, and in quantities that accorded with popular notions of fair shares. Political disagreements about the future of control, which emerged from 1943 onwards, threatened to destabilize this moral economy. People’s concerns about the fairness or efectiveness of control mattered, as it was easy for traders and consumers to evade price and rationing regulations if they wanted to. Due to the country’s dependency on foreign imports, the authorities had near complete control over its supply chains from source to point of sale. Yet the vertically and horizontally integrated control schemes that geography made possible could not stop collusive ofences such as overcharging and conditional 35 P. Chignell to sisters, 15 December 1944, in Philip Chignell, From Our Home Correspondent: Letters from Hessle in the Second World War (Beverley, 1989), 51–2. 36 See Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity, 60–98 and 203–55 for detailed discussion of popular attitudes and party politics. Introduction: the ‘unethical’ consumer 11 sales, or the transfer of unused rations and ration coupons. Administrators, producers, traders, and consumers learned anew the lesson of the First World War that no price control or rationing scheme, no matter how well designed, was watertight. Britons had plenty of opportunities to evade the regulations, but how many of them followed Novello’s lead and took them? And if they did, why did they take them?