Solidarity and Indifference

Philosophy and Medicine VOLUME 69 SOLIDARITY IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE IN EUROPE " Founding Co-Editor Stuart F. Spicker Editor H. Tristrarn Engelhardt, Jr., Department of Philosophy, Rice University, and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas -1 RUUD TER MEULEN Associate Editor Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., Department of Philosophy and Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 1 Edited by Director, Institute for Bioethics, Pmfessor of Philosophy, Department of Caring Sciences, University of Maastricht, The Netherlandr WIL ARTS Editorial Board George J. Agich, Department of Bioethics, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio Nicholas Capaldi, Department of Philosophy, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma Edmund Erde, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Stra~ord, New Jersey Eric T. Juengst, Centerfor Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio Christopher Tollefsen, Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina Becky White, Department of Philosophy, California State University, Chico, California Professor Sociology, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, 'University of Tilburg KUB, The Netherlands and RUUD MUFFELS Department of Organisation Studies, Policy Sciences and Sociology; WORC/rISSEWReseach Director OSA, University of Tilburg KUB, The Netherlands Iu,UWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS The titlespublished in this series are listed at the end of this volume. DORDRECHT 1 BOSTON /LONDON 286 R. HOUTEPEN AND R. TER MEULEN traditional ties, on the other. One of the main problems for Austria has been the lack of a civil society (Volk), in a society that was traditionally dominated by the state. For a long time, promoting solidarity in the political debate had the purpose to build up a public society, which was important for the development of capitalist economy. The state was envisaged to have a leading role in this process. However, in practice the state lacked the legitimacy to play this role. The issue .of social justice was not a welldefined goal of state policies: it was part of the endeavour to create a viable public society with a strong sense of community. In the post-war era, when the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats dominated the political scene (the Great Coalition), the concept of solidarity dominated the political debate. However, there was no theoretical underpinning of this concept, ' except for some vague socialist or catholic ideologies. In fact, the concept of solidarity was in the end based on the value of the family as the main pillar of society and of the state. In her case study on the Long-Term Care Insurance, which was introduced recently in Austria, Puntscher Riekmann argues that this measure was not taken by way of responsibility of the state, but of an effort to sustain the family as the primary community for the care of the disabled members of society. Puntscher Riekman ends her chapter with an analysis of European policies regarding,social welfare and justice. In the European Union, the elaboration of welfare policies remains within the domain of the national states: supranational policies on a European level in the area of welfare and health care are not captured in the various European treaties. The lack of appropriate European social policies may reinforce nationalistic and exclusionist tendencies, particularly when national budgets are put under the rules of the European Monetary Union. Instead of widening the discourse on solidarity and justice to a European dimension, the lack of a real European social policy may result in a narrow-minded national discourse, reducing solidarity to the community of the own people (Volk). Puntscher Riekman argues that the rise of right-wing parties, particularly in Austria, exemplifies this threat. 3. THE RED THREAD OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PART The chapters in this second part of the volume present a mixture of general philosophical theory, national ideological debates and national history of the welfare state. Together, they may be considered representative for the kind of debates on solidarity, justice and the welfare state that are held in the countries of the European Union. The red thread through these debates is the difficulty of the goal to combine attempts at genuine social and institutional renewal, often with liberalising intents, with the traditional communal and redistributive characteristics of the welfare state. SOLIDARlTY AND INDIFFERENCE One thing will remain from socialism: It has sharpened our awareness that solidarity is more than a moral sentiment Warnfried Dettling (DIE ZEIT December 27,1996) The concept of solidarity is omnipresent, at least in Germany's public discourse. It has become a slogan that decorates the election campaigns of almost every political party. Unions appeal to the solidarity of the working class. Church representatives call upon us for 'solidarity with the poor'. References to the value of 'solidarity' dominate discussions about the future of the welfare state as well as reflections on the more general question of the social coherence of modern societies. Nevertheless: the more popular the concept, the more ambiguous its meaning. What remains is a wishywashy concept of solidarity that tries to evoke a vague sense of belonging, a readiness to help, or the value of social responsibility. This is the case not only with the trivialised or everyday use of the concept and its role in political discourse; it also holds for philosophical and sociological debates. Even here we find inconsistencies and a broad variety of implicit meanings attributed to the notion of solidarity. What exactly, then, is at stake when we talk about 'Solidarity and Care in the European Union'? What are the implications of referring to the notion of solidarity when it comes to welfare arrangements and health care systems in particular? In which sense do we talk about health insurance as grounded in or dependent on an idea of solidarity or - even more demanding on a solidaristic concept of society? Different concepts of solidarity will lead to different results. The first part of my chapter is an attempt to analyse the concept and the phenomenon of solidarity. Therefore, I examine the specific character of solidaristic associations and attitudes by relating them to other forms of social relations. Above all I am concerned with pointing out the differences between solidarity and attitudes like readiness to help or compassion on one hand, and other kinds of communality, on the other. As a result, I will argue in the second part of the chapter, that we should understand solidarity as a certain kind of cooperation that can be related to Hegel's concept of 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit) (Hegel, 1987). What, then, is the basis for solidarity? Under which conditions is solidarity available as a social resource for providing welfare arrangements; what are possible limits of solidarity and how are processes of desolidarisation to be understood, that undermine this basis? These questions are not only of interest with regard to developments within our societies, - SOLIDARITYAND INDIFFERENCE they are also of great importance for the task of framing new political institutions as in the process of European Integration. By turning to the theoretical and practical crisis of solidarity in the third part of my chapter, I try to examine some of the underlying premises that influence the discussion. The precarious character of solidarity here leads us to inquire into the social and ethical basis of solidarity. My thesis is that solidarity is 'neither given nor invented'. Even if it relies on the fact of 'being associated,' this fact still has to be 'realised' - in the double sense of being aware of something and putting something into being - in order to lead to solidaristic action. This leads to a certain view of the problem of desolidarisation discussed in part four. Following up on my discussion of solidarity and processes of solidarisation in the first part, I will argue that the problem of de-solidarisation, the 'downfall of solidarity' in modem societies (that troubles some recent social theorists) should be distinguished from phenomena like the 'loss of communalitylcommunity' or individualisation as such; neither is it properly understood as the loss of the 'moral infrastructure' or as the 'demoralisation' of society. Rather, it should be discussed as a deficit of social cooperation that can result in a situation of 'social alienation'. The conclusion is an attempt to apply some of these conceptual reflections on solidarity to the ongoing discussion about the social system and the foundation of the welfare state. 2. WHAT IS SOLIDARrIY? Corresponding to its etymological origins in the Latin 'solidus', meaning solid, tight, dense, whole, or united, the notion of solidarity evokes the idea of a certain kind of connectedness. The historical evolution of the term from the juridical idea of joint liability (the liability of every single debtor for the entire debt in a shared enterprise) is still present in its present day association with social security systems. The idea of 'standing in for each other' thus seems to cover the central aspect of this notion: 'That everyone has to stand in for the others and that these have to stand in for every single one is the basic content of solidarity' (Amengual, 1990). The usage of the notion in social theory goes back to these origins. Linked to the problem of social integration, solidarity refers to the 'social bond' that holds society together. As the sociologist Emile Durkheim explains in 'The Division of Labor', ('De la division du travail social'): 'Solidarity is what prevents the breakdown of society' (Durkheim, 189311978). Solidarity here has a descriptive meaning. It refers to a state of affairs within a group of people or society that is characterised by mutual attachment, connection or simply (objectively given) dependency. On the other hand, 'solidarity' is also a disposition to act in a solidaristic way. As such it has a normative meaning. When we appeal to solidarity we expect a certain behaviour and a certain attitude from each other; further, we think of this as something we somehow 'owe to each other,' something we should do and expect each other to do - 289 at least within particular relations and in specific situations. It is this second, normative aspect that leads to the most controversial questions. What exactly is it, then, that we expect when we ask for 'solidarity'? What kind of connectedness or relatedness is it that provides the basis for this specific sort of 'standing in for each other'? 2.1 Everyday use of the concept A first approach to answering these questions may be taken from our everyday understanding of solidarity as it evolves when we compare solidarity to other kinds of social relations. Like friendship, solidarity can be based on a feeling of (affective) attachment and some sort of connection. Nevertheless, when it comes to friendship we wouldn't speak of acting out of 'solidarity'. Feeling solidarity for someone or act,ing out of solidarity for someone is not specific enough to entail being their friend. Friendship is not only a 'stronger' emotional bond, relying on unconditional feelings and 'resemblances of the heart' (as expressed in the romantic concept of friendship); it is also necessarily restricted to a limited number of people. Friendship is a 'face-to-face' relation, whereas we can form solidaristic bonds with distant people and even with strangers. Think of solidarity as it evolves in solidarity campaigns. The desire to express one's solidarity with Nicaragua (or with the EZLN) has nothing to do with knowing the people of Nicaragua (or the Zapatistas in Mexico), nor even necessarily with knowing some of them. Here solidarity is mediated through a common cause (or what we think of as a common cause). We are solidaristic with a group of people or a political movement because it stands for something we ourselves identify with. Perhaps they are fighting for something that we ourselves consider worth achieving; perhaps - as we often suspect - we simply have the same enemy. (But even having the same enemy is not a simple fact, as will be argued below, but relies on taking a certain position with regard to something.) The notion of identification here points to an important feature and another distinction: solidarity should not be equated with the shallower common interest of a coalition. On the one hand, solidarity may be based on common interest, a 'common fate' and certain interdependencies, for example the common interest of workers during a strike. On the other hand, solidarity seems to express a 'deeper' commitment than is necessary for a coalition, which is only formed in order to achieve a certain goal. One doesn? change solidaristic commitments the way one changes sides in coalitions once a certain constellation of interests has altered. Moreover, many of the attitudes that we consider solidaristic don't seem to be directed to the realisation of simple self-interest - we can even think of them as characterised by a willingness to make sacrifices. Relations of solidarity therefore should not be seen as strategic. They seem to transcend a narrow conception of individual interests. This suggests an affinity between solidarity and loyalty. But although both seem to be based on identification SOLIDARlTY AND INDIFFERENCE with a common cause (a nation, an institution or an idea), there are also significant differences between them. Solidarity is a nonhierarchical relation; loyalty can have a hierarchical structure. It would be, for example, peculiar to speak of the mafia as calling for solidarity. The loyalty demanded and sometimes enforced in this context requires unconditional dedication that may go along with subordination. Solidarity, in addition to that, seems to be related to a sense of legitimacy. It often evolves out of the sense that a certain claim, for example of the workers' movement, is justified. It often disappears once we lose our confidence in the justification. Therefore one might be tempted to define solidarity as support of common goals considered 'worthwhile and legitimatey.' A solidaristic group would then be characterised by a specific self-image that distinguishes it from other groups. It is not just a group as such, fighting for its own dominance, but a group that considers itself legitimate. (That is not to say that it is legitimate.) Whether we could distinguish between 'regressive' and 'nonregressive' forms of solidarity with respect to this feature is an open question. Should we then call the connectedness and identification among a group of violent hooligans solidarity at all? Wouldn't our definition be too narrow on the other hand if we excluded these cases? Solidarity should, thus, be redefined: it doesn't refer to connectedness per se and it shouldn't be identified with community/communality. Emphasising the importance of a 'common goal' and not only of a somehow common background, face-to-face relations as such, as we fmd them in tight-knit communities, do not guarantee a basis for solidarity. On the contrary, small communities can be unsolidaristic. On the other hand there are many instances of the 'solidarity of strangers'. The decisive question is under which conditions the 'we' of a certain community is able to relate to each other and to act in a solidaristic way. As will be argued below, there are two crucial distinctions between solidarity and communality: solidarity does not evolve 'naturally' ('naturwiichsig'), it is in some respect an 'artificial' bond between individuals, one that is not 'given' but created. As such it is a relation between individuals, it does not presuppose the unconditional fusion of individuals into a community.2 This leads to another problem. Is a solidaristic group defined by the particularity - which is to say the exclusivity - of its 'common cause'? Is solidarity always the solidarity of one particular group against others? As far as 'loyalty' is concerned, this seems to be clear. We think of loyalty as a relation to a particular institution, directed at something exclusive; it is the commitment to a particular institution, nation or group as opposed to another one. To call for 'international loyalty' would therefore be absurd. Instead, the notion of 'solidarity' has a remarkable history as a compound of 'international solidarity'. And even if this was meant as the international solidarity of the working class opposing their oppressors, it is not to be understood as genuinely particularistic. Think of the universalism in the idea that the international movement of the working class fights for human 291 rights.3 The underlying idea - however flawed - seems to be that of a solidaristic mankind. But then, isn't there some truth in Richard Rorty's remark, that a 'we' that includes whole mankind would be somewhat too general in order to create solidaristic bonds. The very nature of solidarktic bonds - and their possible limits - thus remains to be discussed. These questions return when we address the difference between solidarity and compassion. Having distinguished solidarity from friendship, loyalty and other forms of coalitions, we should also tell apart solidarity from the less particular disposition of being ready to help. Confusing these attitudes - as is the tendency in current discussions means ignoring important connotations of the concept. Readiness to help and compassion are not always expressions of solidarity - and vice versa. And even if altruistic conduct and helpfulness often are part of a solidaristic practice, they are not what is constitutive of its specifically solidaristic aspect. That is to say, being moved by the suffering of others and even practising charity is not to be identified with acting out of solidarity. Offering help to anyone who is in a difficult situation - the homeless in the cities or the victims of natural disasters - or offering solidari-ty and acting out of solidarity has to be understood as something different. If we think of solidaristic motivations as an expression of common goals, shared projects or a common fate they are opposed to compassion in two significant aspects. First, solidarity, relying on inclusion, demands the realisation of a certain kind of connection that relates one's situation to the situation of the others. Acting out of solidarity means standing up for each other because one recognises 'one's own fate in the fate of the other'. Pity or compassion for the other, in contrast, do not necessarily relate the other's to one's own situation, except in the very vague sense of being a vulnerable human being oneself. Altruism, compassion and readiness to help can even go along with distance and ~ e ~ a r a t e n e s sSecond, .~ compassion signifies an asymmetrical relation, solidarity a symmetrical one. Compassion and altruism are likely to mark the relation between unequals, the relation between those who need and those who provide help. They create a one-sided dependency and therefore an asymmetrical relation. Opposed to this, solidarity is, at its core, a symmetrical, mutual and reciprocal relation. Solidarity means cooperation. The distinction between (political) solidarity and humanitarian help that is often discussed in 'solidaristic movements' (as in 'Third World' Solidarity) might indicate how to make sense of this feature. Humanitarian aid should be offered to human beings who suffer, no matter who they are and what they are doing, whereas the solidarity of solidaristic movements is expressed with respect to people (organised in social or political movements or not) with whom we share (political) goals. Of course, the transition may be fluent. Organising, for example, the victims of an earthquake against the municipal authorities and Rheir hstitutional deficits, posing fundamental questions of urban planning and poverty can lead from humanitarian aid to solidarity. But even this counts for the validity of the distinction. By - R. JAEGGI SOLIDARRYAND INDIFFERENCE addressing the situation of the earthquake victims, political activists (not made homeless by the earthquake themselves) were criticising the very political and social order they themselves are concerned with. Thus, while being united behind the same political goals (at least for a while) what might have begun as humanitarian help turns into a common struggle. Thus the relation between the activists and the victims becomes symmetrical and reciprocal. We can see the significanceof the distinction between solidarity and compassion when we look at the long history of oppressed groups calling for (and building on) solidarity.' Obviously, being treated as a 'comrade7 as opposed to being treated as a helpless victim affects the selfesteem of those concerned. See for example the history of relations between blacks and Jews in the United States. In this context Hooks (1995) remarks that "solidarity between blacks and Jews must be mutual. It cannot be based on a notion of black people as needy victims that white Jews 'help"'.6 Turning towards the development of modem welfare states this is also an important trait: overcoming pre-modern institutions of charity does not only provide the individual's subsistence on an asymmetrical basis; 'social rights' as the basis of modem welfare states are meant to be inclusive, treating people as members (having rights) and therefore defending their self-esteem. Related to what was discussed above, the understanding of welfare institutions as institutionalised solidarity would therefore imply a move from asymmetrical to symmetrical relations. Seeing 'one's own fate in the fate of the other' not only refers to the possibility that one is or could be confronted with the same situation as the other, it means that his fate affects me in a significant way. How should we understand, then, the symmetrj- and reciprocity that is characteristic for this notion of solidarity with reference to welfare state arrangements? Of course, one could easily understand it as the symmetry and reciprocity of an insurance model where everyone tries to lower his own risk by sharing it with others. But this would underestimate the extent to which the public support of welfare institutions depends on an idea of Co~ectedIIesS, especially when it comes to the affirmation of the redistribution-aspect that is linked to welfare systems. This becomes clear when we think of recent discussions concerning risk-individualisation in health care and privatisation of old-age insurance (for example in Germany). Thus, here again a kind of 'enlarged reciprocity' - referring to a certain idea of social integration - seems to be required. How can we understand solidarity as a relation that is neither to be equalled with asymmetrical attitudes, as in comp.assion and pity for the vulnerable groups in society, nor with well-calculated self-interest that leads to the formation of pressure groups? These motives will be examined in the next section, suggesting that we can understand the characteristics of solidarity as a form of non-instrumental cooperation that can be linked to Hegel's notion of 'Sittlichkeit' ('ethical life'). Solidarity, it is argued, is based on a non-instrumental understanding of cooperation that contrasts sharply with the instrumental conception of cooperation we find in most cases of commonality of interest. 292 3. NON-INSTRUMENTAL COOPERATION AND ETHICAL LIFE To characterise solidarity as a symmetrical and reciprocal relation generates certain problems: to conceptualise it as symmetrical may be quite convincing in cases such as a strike movement in a labour struggle; here solidarity means to stand by each other, to give each other mutual support in a joint activity. In this context solidarity is, indeed, a symmetrical relation. But in some of the cases mentioned above symmetry is less obvious. Solidarity with the Zapatistas or the (so-called) 'Third World7 may be perceived as one-sided. And how can social (health) care for helpless people be seen as symmetrical and as a form of cooperation at all? In these cases, there is no mutual support and the achieved engagement cannot expect any immediate payoff. However, as I will argue, the reciprocity of solidaristic relations is not meant to be a simple exchange relation. There is a kind of 'enlarged reciprocity7at work. The reason for solidarity is the belief that the success and wellbeing of others is important to ensure the flourishing of projects with which I myself identify. But even then, emphasising the symmetrical and reciprocal character of solidarity could mean underestimating its 'altruistic7 dimension. Rather the argument is, that the most challenging feature of solidarity is that in a certain way it seems to 'transcend7 the opposition between altruistic and egoistic motivations. That is to say, despite its reciprocity, the motivation for solidarity cannot be reduced to the enlightened self-interest of rationally calculating individuals. 293 3.1 Two models of cooperation Let me spell out the implications of these two models of ,cooperation. a) 1. case of insblunental cooperation,cooperation with others is a pure means to achieve individual ends: each individual has certain interests that are more likely to be achieved by acting together with others. The motivation for cooperation in this case has to be understood as arising out of 'enlightened self-interest'. In some cases it is simply rational to act together in order to achieve a certain goal. This is why we may call this type of cooperation 'instrumental': cooperation here is not a value .initself. It is easy to see that this kind of motivation will not lead to strong commitments. In most cases, the actors will cease to cooperate if p d when the cooperation fails to serve their individual interests. b) The second model applies when the goals to be achieved are common goals themselves. Interests are common interests. That is to say: I cannot even describe my interests and goals apart from the goals of the others. These are intrinsically 'common goals' because they are constituted only in common. The cooperation is 'non-instrumental' insofar as one does not merely use the others in order to achieve an individual goal. The individual's interest has to be understood as 'interest in the interest of the others'. A strike can serve as an example for both models, instrumental as well as non-instrumental cooperation. Imagine a scenario in which a - SOLIDARl'TY AND INDIFFERENCE certain group - in a labour struggle - is being made an offer and is tempted to end the strike. In this case, their comrades may appeal to solidarity by saying: 'we have started the struggle in order to achieve fair salaries for all as a common goal.' They may also continue to appeal to their self-interest: de-solidarisation will weaken our power for the next conflict. But if one determines the very purpose of the strike as achieving fair salaries for all, the problem is not only that one should not abandon one's comrades in a difficult situation, but also that the real goal of the strike would not have been reached. The case of 'common goals' is even stronger when we can attribute an intrinsic value to the process of cooperation itself, so to say a second order interest in not only achieving the common goal but in achieving it in a cooperative way. See for the structure of this relation the often-used example of playing in a music-band where one is interested not only in the outcome but in the process of playing together itself. An argument for limiting the concept of solidarity to non-instrumental relations would be that the model of instrumental cooperations based on enlightened self-interest fails to grasp the willingness to move beyond self-interest, to do sacrifices which characterises much of what we perceive as solidarity. It would be simply irrational (and therefore incomprehensible) from this point of view. On the contrary, from a rational choice perspective everyone entering into cooperative projects has an interest in enjoying the advantages of these projects without contributing his or her own share to them (the well-known free-rider problem). Thus, the understanding of solidarity based on 'instrumental' cooperation could turn out not only to be too weak a basis for what we need - in order for example to provide the basis of a welfare-state -, but it would also fail to understand certain types of social relations that already exist.' As an example: though operating on the basis of contributions to a social health insurance the basis structure of the German health care system mirrors 'strong features of solidarities', as Evers and Klein pointed out in their chapter on 'Solidarity and Care in Germany' in this volume. The very fact that the contributions to the security systems are income related instead of being risk related, as it would be more typical for the idea of an insurance - counts for their characterisation as state-regulated institutions of a welfare system, runned by solidaristic principles. Paying income dependent contributions in this context means that it is not a simple version of reciprocity (with regard to later needs) or risk reduction but a more farreaching element of redistribution that is at work here. If one would conceive of solidarity simply as 'standing in for each other' because you know that you could be in the place of the other - the willingness to contribute could rapidly decrease if better-off people would rationally spell out the personal outcome of their contribution. Of course they are better off leaving public insurance systems and entering into private insurance. When we thus ask about 'solidarity' as the basis of the welfare state we ask for the - , 295 nature of the disposition that makes people go beyond their narrow selfinterest and be willing to include others in a 'We' that may be seen as a basis for redistribution. It is basically this element of redistribution that leads us to think about these institutions as solidaristic. Applied to our distinction: whereas the insurance-idea might be explained as 'instrumental', sharing risks with the others with regard to one's long term interest, the basis for this redistributional aspect seems to be a noninstrumental idea of cooperation. When we thus talk about 'solidarity' as the basis of the welfare state, we talk about the nature of the disposition that motivates people to go beyond their narrow self-interest and be willing to include others in a 'We' that may be seen as a basis for redistribution. Talking about solidarity as a 'fundamental value' therefore means thematising this willingness and the character of this comection as the basis of solidarity. How can this relatedness that is characterised by an interpenetration of self-interest and the interests of the other, undermining the very distinction between egoism and altruism, be understood? To go back to the dimension to which Hegel referred as 'ethical life' may be helpful here. Emphasising its formal structure, Michael Theunissen characterises 'ethical life' as 'those conditions in which the individual first and foremost finds his own self' (Theunissen, 1981). That is to say, individuals 'realise' themselves by comeding to those kind of relations that are 'intersubjective conditions of self-realisation' (Axel Hometh). The 'Other' is, as Marx argued, not the limitation but the precondition of my own freedom. These ideas obviously refer to a social (as opposed to an atomistic) conception of human life and personal identity. In this conception human beings are socially constituted on a fundamental level. This leads to a non-instrumental understanding of basic social relations. As Charles Taylor argues against atomistic theories: 'what man derives from society is not aid in realising his good, but the very possibility of being an agent seeking that good' (I'aylor, 1985). Embedded in a certain culture, acting within an already present structure of social cooperation, it would be mistaken to see them as 'using' these relations in order to promote their own good. Rather it is only the very background conditions that provide him with the possibility to articulate his own good. To share a common life form (however 'thin' this may be described in a post-traditional situation) in this perspective is essential - not only with regard to the problem of social integration but also with regard to the individual's possibility for self-realisation. Applied to this account of solidarity and the 'enlarged reciprocity', this means: as far as we share a common form of life, solidaxistic support has to be understood as an engagement that is related not only to the other but to the preservation of this common form of life.' In this respect it is 'neither egoistic nor altruistic'? Solidarity thus,is an 'e&cal9 concept, being solidaristic might be understood an expression of one's own identity, as it is related to others (to communal life). SOLIDARITYAND INDIFFERENCE For public health care - once we understand it as based on solidarity - this account has important consequences. The willingness to 'stand in for each other', to share health risks via supporting health care institutions, would then rely on two preconditions. Health must be a substantial and shared value. As Michael Walzer (1985) elaborated on, this presupposes certain cultural conditions. For example, threats to health must be seen as something that can be mastered at all, instead of being a destiny. But this doesn't lead to the acceptance of health care as apublic duty automatically. Think of the United States with its omnipresent culture of youth, health and fitness, where health obviously is an extremely important value. At the same time health risks are more likely to be individualised than in most European countries. Thus, in order to lead to public support of health care, health must be conceived of not only as a good but as a common good, providing medical care as part of a societies self-image - again, expressing what one could call a common form of life. In modem societies solidarity typically evolves in its institutionalised form, as social rights and welfarestate institutions. But who then should benefit from these welfare arrangements or who should be included in these systems of care and mutual responsibility? Citizenship is often understood as the basis for social rights and redistribution. But to tie social rights to citizenship means to include citizens and to exclude others. 297 all, how could we be obliged to include certain groups or individuals into the 'we7 of solidaristic bounds? We could suggest here a kind of a 'moral division of labour7: there are moral duties towards all human beings; ethical duties towards specific relations, groups and projects.'* Nevertheless with respect to solidarity the particularity remains problematic.13 Even if we have 'solidaristic duties7 only with regard to those with whom we share something specific or with whom we are bound up in some sort of cooperation, it can easily be argued that we are connected in a significant way to much more people than we may expect to be. Habermas' quest for a new cosmopolitic solidarity in this respect draws consequences out of the fact of growing interdependencies in a globalised world (Habermas, 1998). If we want to examine the possibilities for extending solidarity then (a problem that is also posed within the new institutional framework of the EU), we have to inquire the social and ethical basis of solidarity. Interested in the capacity for inclusion that can be ascribed to solidarity we have to ask for the character of 'identities7 that are linked with solidarity. What exactly means 'sharing a common form of life7? How is the basis of cooperative relations to be understood? My thesis here will be, that the 'we7 of solidarity is not necessarily fixed. It is open (and expansible) with respect to the different contexts of dependency and of cooperation that individuals are involved in. The capacity to form solidaristic associations then is related to the capacity to act within these contexts. 3.2 Theparticularity of 'Ethical Life' 4. PRECARIOUSBASIS OF SOLIDARlTY Referring to 'identity7 and 'common forms of life7 brings us back to an issue mentioned above. If solidarity is an expression of a common form of life it seems to be exclusive, particularistic. It would include only those who share this form of life. This is true, even if we hold that one can share common goals and form cooperative .relations with strangers (as is discussed in the examples of international solidarity), where a common form of life doesn't exist as a fact but as an idea (or as an anti~i~ation).'~ But even if we use the notion of cooperation in a wide sense; and even if we try to understand solidarity - under 'post-traditional7 conditions - as a connection that estimates the individuality of persons, as Durkheim does with his concept of 'organic solidarity' and as Axel Hometh does by defining solidarity in terms of mutual recognition with respect to the individual's contribution to a common praxis, we still have the problem that these contributions can't be recognised than on the background of shared values or a shared 'project'.11 Should we understand the 'ethical duty7to act out of solidarity - a set of obligations towards a specific group - as opposed to moral duties, that we are supposed to have towards all human beings? Forming solidaristic associations, so it seems, we 'owe something to each other', we have certain obligations as far as we are involved into these relations and with respect to their preservance. But how could we be obliged to enter these relations at 4.1 Being associated In her novel 'None to Accompany Me7 Nadine Gordimer characterises the motivation of one of her protagonists - a white South African - for working in solidarity campaigns as following: 'Vera read newspapers and reports (...) She did come to know. She went to work at the foundation, not of the white guilt people talked about, but out of a need to take up, to balance on her own feet the time and place to which, by birth, she understood she had no choice but to belong7 (Gordimer, 1994). Important in our context is the relation that is been made here between self-understanding and the effort to relate to the social conditions and circumstances she is confronted with. Solidarity for Gordimer's activist seems to mean relating consciously to the situation and conditions in which she finds herself (to which she belongs) which also implies a better understanding of herself. Seen in this light, developing solidarity means realising a context of dependencies in the double sense of recognising and actualising. We are always already 'in7 the social world and we are thus part of a net of social interdependencies. That is, our own situation is voluntarily or involuntarily - connected to the situations of others. This explains the meaning of the statement by U o n Bourgeois, founder of the nineteenth-century French intellectual movement of 'solidarisme': 'In understanding that one is an associated being one acts - - SOLIDARlTYAND INDIFFERENCE? . in solidarity'. Thus, solidarity points to the ability to relate actively and positively and to shape the social bonds and interdependencies, in which the individual is, as a matter of fact, always already in~olved.'~ But, even if solidarity is based on the fact of being associated, its emergence always seems to be precarious and to some extent contingent. The problem of unemployment or neo-liberal attacks on the welfare state existed for many years when at a certain point a student's movement in France thematised it; French and German workers during World War I would have had good reasons to promote working class solidarity instead of fighting each other on the battlefield (one of the first great defeats the idea of 'international solidarity' had to suffer); it took a long time before the women's liberation movement could raise the 'collective consciousness' of women as suffering the same destiny, a process still going on in various kinds of ethnic or social minorities. At any given time, there seem to be many more good reasons for solidarity than actual outcomes of solidaristic action. This points not only to features related to the problems of collective action and the theory of social movements. The readiness to act out of solidarity, it seems, cannot be traced back directly either to a person's origins or circumstances alone. In this regard, there would seem to be no fixed or certain foundation for solidarity, be it the cultural or historical origins of an individual or a group, their social, geographical, or organisational proximity, or even their objectively shared interests. Thus, even the statement 'we're all in the same boat' is a matter of interpretation. This is partly the case because we are never 'associated' in just one respect. We are at the centre of various relations, which link us to a nation, a class, to gender, a sexual orientation, or to various forms of life, and it is not at all clear out of which of these commonalities a basis for solidarity will emerge. Being a black lesbian professor in the United States, for example, should one relate to the black community all over the world (the 'African diaspora'), to women as such (black and white, gay and straight), to homosexuals (including men), to the upper-middle class, or to the academic community? Each of these classifications characterises a possible source of identification, but none of them compels someone to actually act on it. There could be reasons to identify with one of these groups, for example because she realises that she has been discriminated as a black or as a woman even though she has been professionally successful. But the pure fact of belonging does not create a compelling reason for solidarity. That is to say, there is no hidden,essence of collective identity out of which solidarity will automatically arise. Appeals to solidarity that relate to characteristics like being a woman, being black or whatever, create what they are appealing to as much as they discover previously latent characteristics. Even then, the social fact of someone being treated as a woman or as a black - e.g. being oppressed - is more powerful than the mere 'biological' fact of it. 'Consciousness raising' doesn't appeal an awareness of 'biological' but of social facts. That is even 299 true for the old problem of class-consciousness: obviously parts of the working class chose to identify with the nation of France or Germany instead of identifying with class struggle during World War I. In a classical Marxist perspective, this would count as 'failure' in achieving 'classconsciousness', not getting to move from class 'in itself' to class 'in itself and for itself'. But we have no way to argue like this, once we don't assume there is a hidden 'essence' of identity that goes without question. The same, of course, holds for 'citizenship': Why should being a citizen of a certain country without any further qualification - provide a basis for solidarity? Thus, the fact of being associated, which even might exist 'behind the individual's back', has to be actualised as a wdlhgness to identify with a certain situation (a 'common lot') and to act out of solidarity. The 'we' of the solidaristic group must first constitute itself in order to be. That is to say, solidarity only actualises itself as a common 'praxis' and it is this praxis in which the ability to 'stand in for each ofher' emerges.'' 'Common projects' or 'common goals' are therefore not limited to the 'common lot' of a group as it may be apparently given by existing social circumstances and then narrowly interpreted on this basis. The most interesting question with respect to solidarity is, how to get from a 'common lot' to 'common goals'. This has some consequences for the questions discussed above. The very fact that the 'we' of solidaristic action is not simply 'given' but has to be constituted leads to a potential for enlargement, for extending solidaristic relations.16 Mediated via a sense of cooperation or common goals, the very process of solidarisation sometimes provides the possibility for an inclusion of others. See for example the constructionworkers' strike in Berlin in 1998 that started with claims for exclusion of foreign loan workers and - at its height - ended up with demands for better wage and social security for all. The openness for inclusion here again seems to be depending on the ability to see the own situation as changeable. That is not to deny that the same process does very often lead to exclusions. But yet, even if it is true that solidarity has no fixed 'foundation' and that there is a potential for enlargement, solidarity is not a voluntaristic option. Solidarity in this regard is 'neither given nor invented'. You might get your own situation wrong in rejecting certain solidarities. Acting out of solidarity might imply realising interdependencies between one's own circumstances and those of others that one can deny only for the price of powerlessness with regard to these circumstances. Think of the need for international social legislation or labour laws that might be a consequence of the constructionworker's experience. Realising international interdependencies might enable them to react to a situation that would otherwise leave them helpless. Referring to our analysis above: the enlargement of solidarity does not rely on the deepening of our powers of empathy alone, as Rorty (1989) seems to suggest, but on the becoming aware of and relating to the 'fact of being associated'. - SOLIDARlTY AND INDIFFERENCE - 4.2 Solidarity as Empowerment Being solidaristic in this sense implies an empowerment of individuals. If solidarity has to be understood as the ability to relate to something to which one is already connected, the ability to form cooperative relations has to be seen as a precondition for taking an active part in the 'common life' that shapes our 'own life' whether we want it or not. This can be understood with respect to Sartre's notion of 'seriality' as against the 'fusion' into solidaristic groups (Sartre, 1960). On Sartre's account, seriality is a model of 'being together' in a passive way, gathered around social facts which individuals do not actively relate to and which therefore do not lead them to relate to each other. In his famous example, the queue at the bus stop symbolises this form of being together while not being together, bound together by an 'inert' structure. What happens once this kind of passive mass, which he calls 'serie', 'fuses' into a 'group' (as, for example, in the storming of the Bastille) can be described as a process of becoming able to act together instead of reacting in the same way to the same conditions. The revolutionary scenario Sartre offers here is quite impressive when he describes the turning point at which simple flight turns into common action. The process of 'fusion' is a move from passivity to activity, from passively reacting to a situation to actively relating to and shaping it. And again, mediated by what Sartre calls the 'perspective of the third', the'ability to act is related to becoming aware that one is in the same situation in such a way, that our positions are intertwined. As Sartre describes it: 'From the perspective of the third I see myself as the other and the other as myself'. Fusion is thus the exact opposite.of seriality, where 'each is the other and no one is himself'. Solidarity thus understood is an increase of power and also of 'authenticity', understood as authorship over one's own actions; desolidarisation, on the contrary, is a loss of power. 5. DE-SOLIDAREATION, SOCIAL INDIFFERENCEAND THE! 'CRYSTALLISED' SOLIDARlTY OF WELFARE STATES What threatens solidarity? What is de-solidarisation and what are the reasons for processes of de-solidarkation, which might undermine the basis (and the public support for) for welfare state institutions? De-solidarisation might be understood as loss of attachment, as the unwillingness of individuals to 'stand in for each other', as weakening of the identification with common goals. As opposed to the enlargement that was characteristic for the 'solidaristic' self, de-solidarisation would signify a withdrawal from the social world. Instead of the identification with a common form of life, indifference takes place. But then, de-solidarisation is not simply a matter of social indifference in the unproblematic sense of anonymity - which, to the contrary, can be seen as an essential and even desirable part of urban life insofar as it can be a precondition of certain types of independence and freedom. In the perspective set out above, de-solidarisation is a type of 301 . indifference that leads to powerlessness as opposed to the process of empowerment that was described above. As it is argued in the following, de-solidarisation is neither to be equalled with individualisation and loss of community, nor is it caused by the abstraction that goes along with the institutionalisation of solidarity (as we find it in welfare state institutions) alone. If solidarity indicates a certain kind of cooperation between individuals, de-solidarisation has to be understood as a type of disconnection that has to be explained without referring to a former unity or to immediate attachments. There is a set of practical problems that undermine the possibility of forming solidaristic bonds. Starting from the description of solidarity as the 'realisation' of being associated, we can describe these as the practical difficulty of even recognising of becoming aware of something as a 'common lot', not to speak of the social conditions for the very possibility to enter 'noninstrumental cooperation'. This is easy to see when it comes to recent developments in the labour market. Think of the phenomenon that in Germany was recently called 'Schein-Selbststhdigkeit', roughly translated as 'false independence', meaning that someone regards himself as working as an independent entrepreneur, as his own boss, but is actually dependent on getting jobs from a single employer. These kinds of jobs - ranging from messenger services to software design typically result from subcontracting or 'outsourcing'. Jobholders often are forced into this kind of 'independence', since it brings them reduced job security and benefits while allowing the employer the advantages of a 'slim' infrastructure, a reduced payroll, and lower social security contributions.17Working under conditions of 'Schein-Selbsthdigkeit', the 'fact of being associated' or sharing a 'common lot' might not be easy for the employee to see. In fact, the word would seem to serve as a perfect metaphor for many aspects of our social structure as it evolves in a more flexible, 'postmodern' or 'post-fordist' direction. A somewhat similar problem arises out of the increasing differentiation of 'lots' or social-economic outcomes - for example between those who hold regular jobs and those who work in precarious job situations. That is to say, the precondition for developing solidarity is an ability that is increasingly hard to develop: the ability to make a connection between 'lots' and situations that might at first sight not seem to be related at all. This is all the more true when it comes to international interdependency under conditions of economic globalisation, where the recognition of shared class, sectoral, or human interests across borders often gives way to competition between countries and regions for multinational investment and thus to the 'race to the bottom'. Realising the dependencies that pertain to these different situations to each other therefore is a precondition for the development of solidaristjc action. The 1998 UPS strike was one example for a successful 'consciousness-raising' in this respect; the alliances which have formed to protest against certain aspects of the expansion of the World - - SOLIDARITY AND INDIFFERENCE Trade Organisation that were negotiated in Seattle is another. Nevertheless, objective trends seem to make this kind of solidarity more difficult even as they make it more necessary. What can be learned from this for our understanding of solidarity and its possible decline in modem societies? De-solidarisation appears as disconnection that is caused by 'nontransparency'. If solidarity depends on the ability to be aware of the interdependencies and relations which connect us with others, the 'decline' of solidarity - its possible loss - has to be described as the inability to make this connection. More interesting than individual deficits here, are the social and structural obstacles, which prevent people and social groups from attaining this awareness. De-solidarisation then means not simply 'not being connected', being indifferent or 'atomised', but is an expression of a disconnection between individuals who actually are involved with or dependent on each other and have good reasons to form solidaristic bonds. This is to say that the independence here is somewhat delusional. This sense of de-solidarisation can be criticised as social 'alienation', as estrangement from something you actually are or should be involved with. A situation where important aspects of the social structure are 'hidden' or nontransparent, implying that people are unable to relate to it or to identify with it, can be seen as 'alienating'. Not only does this imply disconnection or estrangement, but it also implies what Marx analysed as 'Reification' (Verselbstbdigung und Verdinglichung), that is the tendency for things which are actually caused by our own activity to appear independent, natural, and beyond our control. This account of de-solidarisation as dis-connection fits in the picture of 'social disintegration' ('sittliche Entzweiung') in Hegel's classic account of bourgeois civil society. This disintegration as it threatens modem, advanced capitalist societies, is not to be confused with the common conservative lament about the loss of traditional community values. Rather, it refers to a situation in which individuals are not able to identify with the common life that nevertheless is the precondition of their own existence. They don't relate to it as to their own - that is, they fail to achieve what would be the challenge of a modem 'ethical life': individually grasping or relating to the 'whole' of social-ethical life as their own, and thus bringing forth their individuality as a part of it. What makes Hegel's account of 'social disintegration' so interesting is that it does not refer to a pre-modem unity of the individual and the community, but instead relies on the insight that the development of modem society has not cut but transformed the bonds between individuals and society. The decrease of individual's dependency that characterises modem society, with its loosening of traditional social bonds and 'liberation of individuals' is counteracted by the increase of interdependencies that comes with modem market society's complex division of labour. The crisis of disintegration that Hegel observed within the 'dialectic of bourgeois society' therefore points to a failure to reshape 303 - these new social bonds. This at least seems to be the feature Marx after all the best-known critique of Hegel's solution - was interested in and reacted to. Thus, it is not the modem development of individuality, but the neglect of the preconditions that make individuality possible, that leads to Hegel's diagnosis of social disintegration. De-solidarkation is not to be equalled with individualisation. It is interesting here to come back to Durkheim's idea of 'organic solidarity' providing the cohesion of modem societies. As opposed to the 'mechanical solidarity' of traditional, undifferentiated societies, 'organic solidarity', does not rely on similarities between individuals but on their different roles and abilities, which connects them to each other by the complex system of interdependency that grows up with the social division of labour. Since this type of solidarity, as an outcome of the division of labour, relies on the development of individual capacities, it seems to be the perfect 'solution' to the problems of modem societies. Here, the development of individuality does not loosen but strengthens the 'social bond', precisely because it creates the strong interdependencies sought by Hegel. In the highly optimistic vision Durkheim set out in his works up to and including The Division oflabor, modem society does not suffer from a process of atomisation.'* Rather it is characterised by the development of new social bonds that will create a new 'morality of social division'. We may understand this morality as something like an 'industrial ethical life'.lg By undermining the possible antinomy between individualisation and solidarity, Durkheim is able to avoid creating a parallel between individualisation, the loss of traditional communal bonds, and the decline of solidarity. Since they arise from the complex interdependencies of the division of labour rather than the simple resemblakes of traditional societies, Durkheim thinks of modem forms of solidarity as stronger than the earlier, 'mechanical' solidarity could ever have been. The important point here is that this social cohesion and solidarity here is not only possible in spite of individualisation but it is an outcome of it. The very distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity therefore provides us with an important conceptual tool. With regard to the diagnosis that sees the 'decline of solidarity' as an outcome of individualisation and the loss of communal values, we can see at once that this account of community relies on a 'mechanical' notion of solidarity illsuited to the complexity and pluralism intrinsic to modem societies. This diagnosis also lacks the 'materialistic' foundation of Durkheim's approach, i.e., its basis in concrete structural organisation. Inquiring into the present state of and prospects for 'solidarity', we should not refer only to values and virtues as is often the tendency especially in neoconservative cultural criticism - but follow Durkheim in analysing the present conditions of cooperative relations within the division of labour as a constitutive aspect of society. The optimistic account of individualisation, which seems almost jubilant about the 'new sense of community' that evolves out of - SOLJDAlUlY AND INDIFFERENCE individualisation and manifests itself in 'new' forms of civic engagement, lacks such a material foundation as well.m Not only should the notion of solidarity that is developed here lead us to wonder whether these ostensibly praiseworthy forms of 'solidarity' are not simply a retreat to the very old phenomenon of charity. It should also suggest that this discussion is based on a somewhat shallow (and 'idealistic') sense of 'community'. Thus, on my account, de-solidarisation is the outcome of the condition of the systems of social cooperation that should not be equated with the free-floating presence of public virtues. This brings us to a second point that refers to Durkheim's diagnosis of social anomie. As we have seen, according to Durkheim, the division of labour does not itself cause alienation, as other interpreters have protested. Durkheim saw a crisis within modem societies; he didn't fail to recognise problems of social disintegration that marked industrial society. Remaining within his general' framework, Durkheim attributes such problems to the 'anomic7division of labour that fails to lead to solidarity. That is to say, the division of labour can cause both integration and disintegration. On his view, anomie is a problem of establishing the new morality of industrial societies - a problem that will hopefully be solved with further development. Since it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the concept of anomie at length, the focus will be on one, out of many, explanations that Durkheim gave for the failure to develop the bases for organic solidarity. This returns us to the problem we started with: the nontransparency of the social bond and the loss of c o ~ e c t i o nto the whole that may go along with the division of labour. The precondition for the successful creation of solidarity within the division of labour is a sense of connectedness to the whole within conditions of growing specialisation. That is, in order to foster solidarity, the cooperative structure must allow the individual to see himself as a part of the whole and his work as something that is done for its sake; the structure of the cooperation must therefore be somehow transparent. By seeing himself as the subject of his own actions, while seeing his effort as a part of a cooperative project, the individual benefits by the integrating effects of (organic) solidarity and also the increased differentiation and individualisation afforded by modernity. The availability of solidarity thus seems to be related to the influence we can exert on the relations that bind us together; that is, the influence we have in reshaping the networks of cooperative relations in which we already participate and so, more generally, our ability both to be part of and to form and reform our social conditions. This is in striking contrast to the 'resource-model' of social relations, which gets caught in its own metaphor, as if social resources were as naturally given as the resources of the natural environment. Turning to the social diagnosis of a 'downfall of solidarity', the question we have to pose in order to examine our present resources for solidarity is not so much how much we have 'in common'. More specifically, the 305 question is whether what we have in common will enable us to see ourselves as acting subjects with respect to the social institutions that shape our lives. 5.1 Crystallised solidarities and welfare institutions Seen from the perspective set out so far, not the loss of tight-knit communities but a misapprehension of modem dependencies; not individualisation but a certain ideology of individualism; not the decline of public virtues but the transformation of social cooperation is a threat for solidarity. Drawing a conclusion out of this account then brings us to a further consequence. If we take welfare institutions as 'crystallised7forms of solidarity - and that is how we may understand them, once we take the interdependency that characterises 'bourgeois civil society' (as Hegel analysed it) into account we might ask whether it is the very process of institutionalisation that leads to a weakening of solidaristic bonds.21 As it is often held, welfare institutions are replacing more direct forms of mutual help. The development of the G e m healthcare system is an interesting example for this process of institutionalisation of solidarity.= Starting on the basis of 'small scale solidaristic organisations' of mutual help that were relying on membership in particular social groups (sharing work tasks etc.) the G e m health care system moved towards institutions of health and social care, that are highly professional and controlled by the state. Solidarity here, mediated via welfare institutions, is getting more abstract, less personal. The 'common form of life' that should provide the basis for solidarity is no longer a very specific social bond. It is often hold that its motivational force might weaken under these circumstances. This might be true with respect to the developmental preconditions of solidarity. But if social rights reflect an institutional 'crystallisation' of solidarity, this is due to the character of 'civil society' as a system of interdependencies. Consequently social rights should not be considered as somehow opposed to solidarity - or as a threat to 'grown' solidarities and 'face to face' relations but as its very prerequisite, taking into account the characteristics of individual liberty in modem societies. From our point of view then the presence of solidarity will depend on the framework of cooperative relations within a society and on the individual's possibility to be an active part of them. It is not institutionalisation as such that is a problem for solidarity but social institutions becoming a life on their own. Referring to the problems of expanding solidarity in a new political setting like the EU this means that the availability of solidaristic motivations will depend on how far citizens are able to understand it as a project that they can actively shape, but also on how democratic it is, down to the basis institutionsof everyday life. - 308 R. JAEGGI Gordimer, N.: 1994,None to accompany me, Bloomsbury, London. Habermas, J.: 1998,Die Einbeziehung desdnderen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. d am Main. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1987,Vorlesungenm r Philosophie des Rechts, Suhrkamp,F Honneth, A : 1993,'Posttraditionale Gemeinschaften,' in H. Bmnkhorst and M. Bmmlik (eds.), Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit, Fisher, Frankfurt am Main. Hook, B.: 1995,Killing rage: ending rackm, Holt, New York. Radin, M.J.: 1996,Contested Commodities, Harvard University Press, Harvard. Rolty, R.: 1989,Contingeny, Irony, Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeM.Y. Sartre, J.-P.: 1960,Critique de la Rakon Dialectique, G a l l i i d , Paris. Schipperges, H.: 1996,Geschichte der Medizin, Springer, Berlin. Taylor, C.: 1985,'Distributive Justim,' Philosophical Papers, II,Cambridge Univemity Press. Theunissen, M.: 1981,Selbstverwirklichungunddllgemeinheit, De Giuyter, BerlioJNew York. Tugendhat, E.: 1994,Vorlesungenuber Ethik, Suhrkamp,Frankfurt am Main. Walzer, M.: 1983,Spheres ofJustice, Basic Book, New York. Wildt, A: 1992, 'Solidaritat,' in J. Ritter and K-F. Griinder (eds.), Hktorkches W6flerbuch der Philosophie, 8,WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, p.1004. Wildt, A : 1995,'Zur Begriffs- und Ideengeschichtevon SoLidarit%t,'in H. Bayertz, Solidaritiit. Rechtsphilosophkche Hefte, 4,Franldurt am Main. MCOLA PASIMAND MASSIMO REICHLDI SOLIDARITY, ClTIZENSHIP AND SELECTIVE D I S T R l B W JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE The idea of solidarity has many facets, and several concepts, drawn from philosophy, sociology, economics, law and religion, can be invoked to explain it (Villa, 1998). Among these concepts are cooperation, loyalty, membership, mutuality, reciprocity, unity, brotherhood and so on. AU these concepts relate to the social order and are aimed at improving social cooperation. Especially after the French Revolution, solidarity has been c o ~ e c t e dwith two other principles of democratic societies, namely freedom and equality. In contemporary societies, market economy relates to freedom (e.g., freedom of employers), while representative democracy relates to equality (e.g., of citizenship). Social solidarity is, therefore, a very scarce resource and its meaning changes with historical periods, crossing other words of the political vocabulary, such as equality, freedom, justice, self-interest, altruism etc. The concept of solidarity is not a heritage of the Enlightenment tradition or of the liberal ideology. Its origins, especially in its 'fraternity version', can be traced to the Christian-Catholic democratic ideology and to the socialist tradition (Martinelli et al., 1989). These traditions have been determinant factors in some models of the Welfare State, which have been created in many European countries after the Second World War. More recently, the debate on social justice in political and social theory, particularly the struggle between liberalism and communitarianism, has had large implications with respect to solidarity as well. In this chapter we will first try to set out the problems in the relationship between the individual and society, particularly focusing on the problems of solidarity in modem societies. Besides, we will consider the problems of social citizenship within the Welfare State, in the light of the complexities of contemporary societies. In this way we will try to single out the main arguments justifying solidarity-based public policies, with particular reference to social policies. Finally, taking account of the present communitarian criticisms to the modem view of society, we will try to sketch a model of 'selective solidarity', that will be able to integrate justice and solidarity. SOLIDARITY AND INDIFFERENCE! 6. NOTES As the German philosopher Andreas Wildt (1992) does in his lexicon article on 'solidarity': 'Solidarltdt bedeutet die Bereitschaft, sich fik gemeinsame Ziele oder fiir Ziele anderer einzusetzen, die man als bedroht und gleichzeitig als wertvoll und legitim ansieht (...) ein praktisches oder jedenfalls emotionales Engagement fiir gemeinsame, meistens kooperative Ziele, vor allem im Kampf gegen Unrecht.' I am referring here to a rather 'thick' or substantial concept of community, not to what could be called a thin or 'minimal' concept of community as for example Axel Hometh discusses in his essay 'Posttraditionale Gemeinschaften', in: H. Bmnkhorst, M. Bmmlik (1993). This reflects the tension between universalism and particularism in revolutionary movements influenced by Marxism. When Manr in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights,' described the proletariat as the revolutionary class for example, this is not meant to be a particular class but the universal class, which is going to overcome all particularities because it stands outside of bourgeois society. In a broader sense one could suspect that the communist utopia then is kind of a universal community: community and universalistic at the same time. And of course one can not only be sceptical whether this conception works out but about where it may lead to, with its neglect of politics. For a penetrating analysis of Man' idea of ~ m m u n i t ysee Bmdney (1999). Interesting in this respect is one remark by M.J. Radin: 'Perhaps altruism means giving unselfishly in the context of a presupposition of selfishness;' (Radin, 1996) See, for example, the socialist Kurt Eisner's impassioned statement in 1908, which makes a clear distinction between compassion and charity and the notion of solidarity within the working class movement: 'Nein, nichts mehr von Liebe, Mitleid und Barmhemigkeit. Das kalte, stahlharte Wort Solidaritat k t in dem Ofen des wissenschaftlichen Denkens gegliiht. Sie wendet sich nicht an schwimmende, gleitende, rosig leuchtende, untergehende Emphdungen, sie schult die Kopfe, h'hmert die Charaktere und gibt der ganzen Gesellschaft die granitene Gmndlage einer Umgestaltung und Erneuerung aller menschlichen Beziehungen in ihrer ganzen Breite.' Cited by Wildt (1995). See for this topic the extremely interesting review essay by David Brion Davis (Davis, 1999). Obviously this approach is based on a non-individualisticview of personhood and individual development that sees individuals as embedded in social contexts. This understanding refers to the idea that individuals form even their individual 'preferences' in relation to significant others and to values and ideas they identify with. I will not discuss here these - contested matters in general. With respect to institutionalised Welfare State solidarities it is clear that the notion of a 'common life form' has to be understood in an abstract way. With respect to the internationalist examples this might as well be an anticipation of a common form of life - even if the crisiis of 'international solidarity' is partly due to the problems that ~ c c wout of an all too ready identification of a 'common fate', underestimating differences and tensions. A motive in Marx that Bmdney brings out very clearly in his interpretation: by fulfilling the other's needs I realise myself and establish the communality we both are dependend on. lo One should not deny that part of the crisis of 'international solidarity' was a result of being too eager to subsume circumstances under a 'common lot' that are not that easy to compare. l1 'Jemandem Solidaritlt entgegenzubringen namlich meint, ihn oder sie als eine Person zu betrachten, deren Eigenschaften von Wert fiir eine gemeinsame Lebenspraxis kt' (Hometh, 1993). l2 The problem the particularity of a 'common form of life' vs. the universality of moral duties leads to the question whether health care should be based on 'solidarity' alone. Consider Emst Tugendhats example of an asylum-seeker in Germany, who was - as a non-citizen refused to advanced medical treatment for his broken leg with the argument that there was no necessity for him to be unhurt since he had no work-permissionat all. This case of degradation leads to a basic notion of health care as a human right rather than as a right of citizens. One could also argue that both moral and ethical obligations are at stake here. Of course, the broken leg must ' - - 307 other hand, the question for example what kind of preventive health care schemes should beset up for citizens, might concern ethical questions, being related to particular forms of life. '3 Not to mention that there are a number of reasons to criticize the whole idea of a moral division of labor here and to put the boundaries between 'moral' and 'ethical' duties into yestion that can not discuss here. In an interesting way one could see the ability to form solidaristic relations as an enlargement of the self and its power to form meaningful relations to the world. See with respect to this Dany Cohn-Bendit's comments on the basic 'solidaristic' attitude of the '68 movement. What distinguished this period, according to Cohn-Bendit, was the manner in which people had integrated 'everything that happened in the world in the light of their own experience' ('alles, was in der Welt passiert im Lichte der eigenen E r f h g e n aufnehmen'). Being solidaristic therefore means enlarging not only the range of what is in one's 'own interest', but also one's understanding of what belongs to my own person. This is another argument for the precaious character of identities: the possible range of matters individuals can identify with and relate to is not immovable. Taking into account the enthousiasm of this period one could say: this enlargement takes place as far as things are seen in the light of the possibilities of change. Common goals, so to say, cannot be set up unless individuals are able to see themselves as an active force in shaping their world. 5.1 Here the distinction between commonality and the constitution of a 'common world', which underlies Hannah Arendt's political philosophy may be helpful. Thus, one could say that it is the common praxis which constitutes the common world, not the other way around although it is still an open question how much we already must have in common in order to create a common world. l6 Based on the enlargement of cooperation this is not to be equaled with Rortys idea of the enlargement of solidarity. Rorty seems to understand solidarity mainly as a moral sentiment, the enlargement of solidarity thus is understood as a process of moral education (Rorty, 1989). l7 It is easy to see that the most current debatelpolitical struggle about these topics is a debate about a solidaristic or non-solidaristic unde&ding of the social hf'rastmcke. Since this model tends to impose the risks on the individual and lately also on the welfarestate - without s-g the gains and without contributing to the infrastructure. la This pictures somehow changes in his later work. l9 Of course the character of 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit) here may be put into question. It is not necessarily the same sort of cohesion M a n had in mind when he spoke of 'relating to each other by fulfilling each other's needs' (cf. Bmdney), but may also be interpreted in a more functionalistic way. Nevertheless, when we consider Durkheim's diagnosis of growing anomie, we find certain hints that support this interpretation. Of course, what should be discussed here are also the different meanings of 'individualisation' underlying the discussion. We can see the idea of the welfare state and social rights evolve in Hegel's philosophy. With his remark that 'hZustand der biireerlichen Gesellschaft ist Annut ein Unrecht'. he seems to ground social rights in the fact of interdependency and the dependence of the individual from public support (Hegel, 1987). See for this Adalbert Evers, Martha Klein: Solidarity and Care in Germany. This volume. - - " - " Amengual, G.: 1990, 'Gattungswesen als Solidaritat. Die Auffassung vom Menschen in der Bestimmung des Gattungswesens als Be* und Grundlegung der SolidaritP,' in H.4. Braun (ed.), Ludwig Feuerbach und die Phihophie der Zukunft, Berlin. B ~ d n e yD.: , 1999, Marx' Attempt to Leave Philosophy, Haward University Press,Harvard. Brumlik, M. and B d o r s t , H. (eds.): 1993, Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit, Fischer, Frankfurt. Davis, D.B.: 1999, 'Blacks and Jews,' New YorkReviewof Books, December 1999. Dwkheim, E.: 189311978, De lo diviswn du travail social, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Evers. A. and M. Klein: 2M1. '.Snlidaritv and Cart- in G~rmanv'/thic vnlmm.-\ -