Salman Turki THE DISSERTATION

ARAB5005M Dissertation in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (28136) School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Leeds The Impact of Party Politics on the Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Transition from Opposition to Dominance in Post-Mubarak Egypt Salman Al-Ani Supervisor: Dr Mustapha Sheikh Word Count: 13, 058 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude for my supervisor Dr Mustapha Sheikh for his guidance and support throughout the writing of this project. I would also like to thank my friend Neil Arun for proofreading my final draft and for being always there to help and give advice. I would also like to thank my parents who were always supporting me throughout my studies. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Suhad Mohammad, for her support and encouragement. Disclaimer Except where otherwise stated and acknowledged, I certify that this dissertation is my sole and unaided work, Salman Al-Ani 21st August 2012 Abstract This study investigates the relationship between the party politics and the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from its inception to the present, with an emphasis on the Mubarak era and post-revolution Egypt. It commences by examining the core ideological precepts in the writings of Hasan al-Banna and it explores the ideological trajectory of Hasan al-Hydaybi and Sayyid Qutb under Nasser. The study scrutinizes the shift from rejection to the acceptance of party politics under Sadat and Mubarak, revealing how ideology was influenced by the oppositional discourse that the MB adopted as an outlawed organization. The study argues that the repercussions of its ascendency to power forced the Muslim Brotherhood to put ideology on hold in post-revolutionary Egypt. The analysis ultimately suggests that ideology becomes subservient to political goals and is shaped by context and opportunities. Table of Contents Chapter One: The aims of the research………………………………………………….……..5 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………5 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………….5 Historical Background………………………………………………………………………….6 Chapter Two: Contextualizing the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood…………………….8 Sharia…………………………………………………………………………………………..10 Al-Banna’s political vision…………………………………………………………………….11 Chapter Three: The Persecution under Nasser: Qutb VS. Al-Huday………………………...13 Chapter Four: Sadat’s Political Liberalization and the Brothers………...…………………...15 Chapter Five: The Brothers in the Mubarak Era………....……………………………………17 Chapter Six: Beyond Opposition……………………………….……………………………..29 Legal Recognition and Contesting Politics……………………………………………………..31 Elections’ Campaign……………………………………………………………………………35 Presidency and Beyond…………………………………………………………………………36 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………..40 List of References……………………………………………………………………………….43 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….51 Chapter One The aims of the research This research aims to investigate a possible relationship between two phenomena, namely, party politics and the core ideological principles of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to add further knowledge to the question of whether and how they influence each other and the extent of that change. The research particularly addresses how the transition from being a banned opposition organization to having a legalized majority party changes the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Methodology The research will be carried out following qualitative research principles, namely, correlation and evaluation. The research is carried out to analyze the ideological evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout three main stages, namely, the Banna phase, the Reform Initiative Phase and the Post-Revolution Phase. Each phase will be analyzed in the light of writings of MB literature which was authored in response to the sociopolitical circumstances. The association between politics in a given phase and the MB ideology demands a critical consideration to the respective political, social and religious context. The main knowledge gap concerns the association between politics and ideology. The research intends to provide an analysis to the nature and scope of that relationship. Literature Review The formative years of the Muslim Brotherhood were essentially dedicated to a revival of Islamic values in Egypt against the Westernization by the British colonizer; the message of the MB was politicized from the outset. (Krämer, 2010). After the 1952 revolution, the MB was recognized by the Free Officers but the honeymoon only lasted for two years. During the fifties and sixties, Nasser security apparatus threw thousands of the MB in detention camps. Their voice was brutally muted (Calvert, 2010). Sadat accommodated the MB to counterbalance the Nasserists and leftist. (Baker, 1990: 107). There is no clearer evidence that the MB moderated its ideology when in 1984 and 1987 the MB formed electoral alliances with the Neo-Wafd party and the Amal party respectively, despite ideological differences. (Burgat, 2003:165). Although the MB boycotted the parliamentary elections in the 1990, it declared its commitment to pluralism through consensus statements with other opposition parties to endorse democracy. (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009). In 2007, The MB produced a political platform ushering in a phase of ideological transformation. (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, Harnisch and Mecham, 2009). The post-Mubarak era presented a unique opening for the MB to take a lead in the restructuring of the political landscape in Egypt. While the oppression of the regime smoothed internal ideological difficulties in the MB, (Filiu, 2011: 92), the new pluralistic environment exacerbated internal rifts. After a ban that lasted for half a century, the MB was finally able to found its own political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, FJP. The founding of FJP aggravated tensions between the discourse of Islamic mission (Dawa) and electoral calculations. This tension illustrates an ideological dilemma that the MB is facing, namely, how to resolve the question of the inseparability of ideology and politics and how the latter may influence the former. Chapter Two Historical Background The society of the Muslim Brotherhood, MB, in Egypt was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, a schoolteacher from the Suez Canal city of Ismailiyya. As a religious and social reformer, al-Banna was able to reach out to different social classes, craftsmen, aristocrats and clergy, in the community of Ismailiyya. The inherent social networking role that the mosque always played facilitated access to different segments of society at no cost. The message of al-Banna was essentially one of social reform through Islam. It was obvious from the beginning that the strength of al-Banna’s message derived equally from its use of Islam as a guiding principle, which was emotionally consistent with a conservative nature of society, and from his personal appeal as a charismatic leader. In the context of six years, it grew from having 15 branches in 1932 to three hundred branches nationwide. Mitchell contends that these branches represented as many as 150 thousand members. Recruiting new members from different backgrounds, through worship in mosques and friendship in schools, was possible due to preaching a very ‘open door’ version of Islam that easily accommodated diverse Islamic doctrines and schools. Al-Banna believed that the Muslim Brothers should be like ‘‘an immense hall that can be entered by any Muslim from any door to partake of whatsoever he wishes. Should he seek Sufism, he shall find it. Should he seek comprehension of Islamic jurisprudence, he should find it…should he seek battle and armed struggle, he should find it’ (Lia, 1988: 162). By the mid 1940s, the estimated number of its members amounted to five hundred thousand. A similar number were estimated to be sympathizers.  (Esposito, 1984: 127). The success was a result of employing propaganda, organization and even militancy at certain historical junctures. (Hopwood, 1982: 22). Al-Banna made inroads into the education middle class and lower middle class. Kramer contends that the appeal of the MB was down to its apparent character as a ‘non-elite movement’ with an agenda appealing to the people. (Kramer, 2010: 39). Al-Banna saw the new recruits as a vanguard, religiously trained elite capable of making change, albeit with gradual steps that protected national unity and allayed the fears of other political players. For any Muslim to be a Brother, they must give the oath of allegiance (Bay’a), which is a cornerstone in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The relationship between the Guide and the Brothers will be one of trust and total obedience. (Bar, 2012). While the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood puts the interests of Umma above those of the individual, the individual is perceived as the nucleus of a new generation. An Islamic order can never be implemented in a society where individuals are not prepared to be vested with the Islamic values. Politicization seemed inevitable. The British presence following the nominal independence that Britain granted to the Egyptian monarchy was the most debated topic in the political circles. (Yapp, 1996). Al-Banna endorsed political contestation officially in 1938. The regime coerced him to cancel participation in the elections of 1941 by withdrawing all candidates. (Rinehart, 2009). The MB emerged stronger from the Second World War. Their popularity rose after the Wafd party’s cooperation with the British delegitimized it in the eyes of Egyptians. The king was also more reliant of the British. The organizational expanding of the MB, accompanied by the creation of the Special Apparatus, the paramilitary wing of the MB, were also factors that contributed to that post war strength. The Special Apparatus attacked several British military installations and government buildings. The Palestinian conflict gave moral grounds to attacks against the Jewish community in Egypt. In November 1948, the authorities confiscated a jeep loaded with bombs and explosive devices. The thirty men that Egyptian police arrested were members of the Brotherhood. The Egyptian Police referred to the MB as a terrorist organization with plans to attack Zionists. (New York Times, 1948). Al-Banna tried to maintain communication with the chain of command but an aggressive campaign of arrests followed and the leadership of the MB collapsed. Two months later, a student member of the MB assassinated Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi in retaliation for the dissolution decree. Banna himself was assassinated shortly after that incident. Since the banning of the organization in 1948, the relationship with successive rulers was one of mistrust and antagonism. Contextualizing the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood In the aftermath of World War One, Egypt was a constitutional monarchy under the British mandate. Poverty, illiteracy and economic stagnation characterized the Egyptian society at a time when an imperial Britain had a free hand to restyle the Egyptian society through importing its culture and political dominance of client-patron system. Western imperialism did not only reshape the political system in Egypt, it also influenced its social and cultural life. (Sullivan and Kotob, 1999: 41). While the MB saw imperialism as a ‘slow annihilation and profound and complete corruption’ (Mitchell, 1993: 227), colonization helped define what version of Islamism the MB preached. (Hinnebusch, 2009:149). It was a reaction to the religious, social, political and economical circumstances that plagued Egypt during the first quarter of the twentieth century. For al-Banna, Islamism simply meant the reform of society. (zhyntativ, 2008). The MB demanded that Muslims conform to Islamic teaching and eradicate Western influences; it viewed cinemas, nightclubs and theatres as profane. (Abdo, 2000: 7). People were made a victim of a socio-political and economical tyranny which accentuated patterns of dominance and patterns of subordination; relationships revolved around a pattern of landowners-farmers, financers-debtors, political patrons-clients, etc. (Mitchell, 1993: p.219). Hasan al-Banna identified these sociopolitical problems and constructed his message to address them in an Islamic frame of reference. In the words of Burgat and Dowell, ‘Hassan al-Banna…provided the missing political ambitions and organizational logistics to reform a movement which up until then had lacked a political structure’.(Burgat and Dowell, 1997: 34) Their rise in the 1930s antagonized the secular Wafdists in particular because they perceived in the Brothers a potential threat to their popular base and a competitor to national legitimacy, for both parties advocated similar national agendas. What made the MB relevant to the current political scene, Lia points out, was its ability to ‘to relate religion to mundane political and economic problems. (1988: 74). Donohue points out that religious identity as a definer of popular sentiment was taken over by ideologies like pan-Arabism and nationalism due to the influence of secularist thinkers. (Donohue and Esposito, 1983: 50). Meir Hatina contends that from the outset of state formation phase in the Middle East there was an ideological rivalry between two identities, secularism which is alien to local communities and another which is indigenous, that of Islam. The pressure of modernization brought by colonization accentuated the struggle. (Hatina, 2006: 9). The MB engaged in an ideological war against other ideologies, particularly nationalism and pan-Arabism. (Dunn, 2005). Wafdists and the Muslim Brotherhood both believed in Egyptian nationalism and the ejection of the British colonizer but they differed on prioritizing the role of Islam. Secularists agreed that Islam is a key component of the Egyptian culture and they shared the Islamists belief that national consciousness is a marriage of one language, history and civilization. (Esposito, 1984: pp. 68- 71). The appeal of the MB can be explained in the context of the failure of secular intellectuals to ‘formulate a functioning synthesis between Islam and modernism or to define the role of Islam in modern society’. (Zaki, 1995: 115). The MB, in this sense, saw the secularists as a perceived threat to Islam at home. On the other hand, secularists believed in nationalism as a religion and they believed that Islam would eventually yield its position and occupy a cultural role on the margin of the Egyptian society. (Piscatori, 1983: 5). The secularists who were to rule Egypt after the monarchy came to represent an existential threat to MB; the conflict was to characterize the second half of the 20th century Edwards argues that the nature characterizing the relationship between Islamists and secularists in Egypt was one of crisis in which both parties are involved in a zero-sum game where the rise of one leads to the demise of the other. (Edwards, 2005:11). Sharia The implementation of Sharia is central to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Islam, Sharia law is the divine law that deals with personal as well as general matters of Muslims everywhere. The primary sources of sharia law are the Quran and the practice and sayings of Prophet Muhammad, (Sunnah). Secondary sources of Sharia law are consensus (Ijma) of the Muslim scholars and reasoning (Ijtihad). The science of jurisprudence came into existence around questions where answers are not clearly stated in the Sharia primary sources. Until the early nineteenth century, Sharia law was uncodified; it was an accumulated combination of legal rules, fatwas and guidelines. The Ottoman Reforms between 1839 and 1876, called Tanzimat, transformed Sharia, through codification, to a legal manual which can be implemented by any legal officer. This codification marked the end of the monopoly of religious scholars on the interpretation of Sharia which effectively ended their political and social status. The Ottoman constitution of 1876 created a general assembly with responsibility of legislation and writing a constitution which subordinated the authority of Sharia to that of the ruler. The sovereignty of sharia was compromised to that of the state and that marked the end of the Islamic state and made Sharia only rule in matters related to family affairs. (Reberson, 2002: Feldman, 2008). Hasan al-Banna wanted to reverse this situation. He thought that the laws in Egypt were alien to the Islamic culture that is rooted in the Egyptian people’s history. The restoration of Sharia was a ‘social imperative’ for the Brothers because it meant an end to the marginalization of Islam as an all encompassing framework that regulates the social, political, economical and legal life of the individual and society . (Mitchell, 1993: 237). The issue of defining how to implement Sharia was a hypothetical question because the gradualist approach of the Muslim Brotherhood precludes the implementation of Sharia before society fully embraces the tenants of Islam. (Kramer, 1997:74) Al-Banna did not go into the specifics on how to implement Sharia because he feared that his interpretation might incite disapproval among Muslim scholars. However, al-Banna believed in the flexibility and adoptability of Sharia to address problems in modern times, given the prime importance of Ijtihad in the ideology of the MB. (Mitchell, 1993: 237). Al-Banna’s political vision In 1930 Hasan al-Banna wrote the charter of the MB which precisely stated that the MB ‘will not broach political affairs, whatever they be’ (Tadros, 2012: 69). However, as the organization grew in size al-Banna was tempted into entering politics despite his an ideological rejection of it. As the Egyptian people were resentful of the British dominance, al-Banna felt that the political elite were unable to effectively represent the people or to change a political scene dominated by the colonial British. Lia believes that Hasan al-Banna did not reject party politics because he did not believe in democracy but because partyism was adulterated with clientism and a deeply rooted patronage system (1988: 205). However, he seemed to have genuinely despised partyism for its divisive nature and for an inherent potential to breed schisms, whether in the Muslim Brotherhood or in society at large. ‘I have never ever seen a single election as a result of which the most qualified workers have been chosen. I have never seen an election that has left anything but a negative influence in the souls. They [the elections] always provoke a stream of invective and abuses from those who were not elected’. ( Lia, 1988: pp 71-72). Political reform was not enough; a comprehensive reform agenda was seen as the only possible solution to an Islamic renaissance. Al-Banna argued that ‘party politics is not feasible in Egypt at all. Especially at this time when a new era has begun, we have to cooperate join forces, make use of all talents to build a strong nation. We need a firm stability and complete devotion to all aspects of reforms’. (Lia, 1988: P. 203). In this sense, the MB could neither be defined as a political party, nor a religious movement, nor a charitable society. It is all these things. The suspicious attitude towards party politics was not only ideological, there were key organizational difficulties. The day to day political tussle creates a polarizing environment internally which ultimately lead to internal rifts that could develop into deeper ideological differences. In addition, budgetary transparency and operating under a restraining government’s legal oversight leaves political parties entirely exposed to pressure from the political system to support certain political stances. (Brown, 2012: pp 77-80). Politically, it took the MB ten years after inception to express interest in democratic elections and political contestation. Even as late as the year 1937, the general law of the Muslim Brotherhood prohibited political contestation. By the late 1940s, the charter was revised more than once and al-Banna reintroduced the MB as a political entity. (Tadros, 2012). Al-Banna’s expediency was manifested in his willingness to contradict his ideological enmity to politics in order to advance the goals of the MB; he believed that a party’s popularity would consolidate the power of his movement. (Pargeter, 2010: 23). In 1939, in its fifth annual conference the MB officially entered politics. Few years later, he emphasized the role of politics in Islam: ‘Al-Banna said ‘a Muslim will never become a real Muslim if he is not political and has a view for the affairs of his people’. (Lia, 1988: 202). Al-Banna emphasized that the MB was a non-elite movement, to distance himself from the patron-client system of the political elite and to stress, given the fact that he presented himself as a spokesman of Islamic revival, that Islam is not only a religion and that politics, economics and culture are inseparable. ‘Islam is worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and action, prayer and jihad, obedience and government, the book and the sword. None of these can be separated’. (Kramer, 2010: 52). In one of his most enduring explanations of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, Hasan al-Banna wrote a letter to King Farouq in which he identified the scope of his mission and the inherent encompassing agenda of the Islam he believes in: ‘We believe the provisions of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and the hereafter. And those who think that these teachings are concerned only with the spiritual or ritualistic aspects are mistaken in this belief because Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword… the Glorious Quran…considers [these things] to be the core of Islam and its essence’. (Mitchell, 1993: pp. 232-233). With power came tensions; banning the MB was only a matter of time. The overthrowing of monarchy ushered in a period of persecution and ideological stagnation. Chapter Three The Persecution under Nasser: Qutb VS. Al-Hudaybi The revolution of Free Officers shifted the center of power from the aristocratic elite to the army officers, the middle class, farmers and workers, and the bureaucratic machinery. (Stephens, 1973). The Muslim Brotherhood although banned, was still powerful given the highly resilient organizational nature, a feature that was to characterize the organization for decades to come. An evident friendliness between the Free Officers and the MB grew following the ascendency of the Free Officers to power and lifting the ban 1951 by Nasser and Naguib. (Sullivan and Kotob, 1999: 42). The MB’s most important ideological question was centred on what to do if the regime’s coercion turned into a real political opening: Should the MB become a fully fledged political party or remain a religio-social welfare organization? The problem of character duality in the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology surfaced two months after the revolution precisely when the Free Officers issued a law ordering all political parties to register. The decision to register as a political party put the MB at crossroads. The General Bureau voted to register as a political party and a charitable society, a decision that brought about the resignation of the General Guide. (Zollner, 2009: 29). On October 26 1954, a group of militants tried to assassinate president Jamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria. Nasser blamed the attack on the Muslim Brotherhood and the incident led to the dissolution of the organization on January 14 1954 and the beginning of the suppression of the movement, the execution of its leaders and the imprisoning thousands of its members. Rached Ghannouchi argues that the persecution of Nasser turned the MB into radicals who were unable to conduct a thorough critical review. They ‘were unable to question themselves and evolve…they completely withdrew into themselves. Resistance was their priority. It was a question of survival, or resisting all external pressures’. (Burgat, 2003: 41). Sayyid Qutb, a prominent MB leader and prolific writer, was imprisoned by Nasser and while in prison, he authored influential literature that was to radicalize many Brothers and splintered them into smaller groups. Zollner points out that the MB went through an ‘ideological gap’ under Nasser. (Zollner, 2009: 42). In fact, two different prison courses were engaging in an ideological confrontation, one of Hasan al-Hudaybi, the second Supreme Guide, and Qutb. Al-Hudaybi wrote Preachers not Judges as an attempt to rebut Qutb’s Milestones. Qutb viewed democracy as a Western construct that is essentially flawed and a usurpation to God’s rule over the earth. He argued that devising laws and regulations according to man-made principles was a negation of God. It follows that political systems are all void of legitimacy. (Calvert, 2010). In his view, a society in which people are practicing Muslims who pray, fast and pay charity but in which positive law rather than Sharia reigns, is not Muslim. Although Qutb didn’t refer to the use of violence explicitly in Milestones, the resort to violence becomes clear when it is historically and ideologically contextualized. Effectively, he legitimized excommunication and the use of violence by a ‘vanguard’ to rid the society of un-Islamic practices. The resort to violence is legitimate, effective and inevitable; legitimate because it seeks the restoration of Islam in its purest sense and it is inevitable because ‘to establish the reign of God on earth’, the vanguard must ‘eliminate the reign of man’. (Kepel, 1984: 66). Thus, Qutb advocated a creation of a counter-society, or a state within a state. (Sivan, 1985: 85). Hasan al-Hudaybi renounced the doctrine of excommunication and he refuted the interpretation of Sharia in Qutb. Al-Hudaybi contended that muslims must strictly obey the divine will in matters of religious obligations, called Ibadat, which constitutes the core of Sharia. ‘The truth is that God left many worldly matters to us in order to regulate these in line with our reasoning. These are framed by general aims and limits, which he (God) set out for us, and according to what we were ordered’. (Zollner, 2009: 103). Al-Hudaybi’s interpretation of Sharia as a frame of reference was to become the main ideological premise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the years leading up to the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak. Chapter Four Sadat’s Political Liberalization and the Brothers The death of Jamal Abdul Nasser and the ascendency of Anwar al-Sadat in 1970 marked a new chapter in Egyptian political life and that of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Moving away from the authoritarianism of the one-party system that characterized his predecessor, Sadat introduced political liberalization when a new constitution included an article that stated clearly that Egypt had a multiparty political system. Other measures that Sadat took included freeing the press, softening the grip of the state on opposition publications, ending the random detentions and releasing political prisoners in addition to softened his grip on the MB’s activities to use them as a countervailing force to contain the Nasserists and the left(Ibrahim, 2002: 37). The Brothers wanted to end the political influence of communism in order to be the most powerful popular movement. (Hopwood, 1982: 116). The MB saw the regime’s pragmatism not just as an opportunity to regroup and expand its popular base but also as a perfect moment to avenge themselves on Nasserites who oppressed them in prisons and public life. The end of Nasserism, the Brothers believed, would eventually lead to the Islamization of Egyptian society. Although banned, the MB utilized the relatively tolerant regime’s position to the maximum effect. (Baker, 1990: 247). In October 1977, the Muslim Brotherhood under Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmesani filed a lawsuit against the dissolution ruling by Nasser. The case was postponed by the court more than 40 times between 1977 and 1990, which indicates the conviction of the MB of the feasibility of the political contestation. (Awadi, 2004). Al-Timesani tried to convince Sadat to legalize the MB as a sociopolitical movement and allow it to contest elections. In that way, the MB would still be a movement, not a party. Sadat invited al-Tilmesani to join one of three main political parties that he allowed to be registered in his initiative of political liberalization. However, the latter declined, emphasizing the independent nature of the MB and the centrality of an ideology that could not be replaced or compromised by a political platform. Furthermore, towards the end of the 1970s, Sadat offered the MB a legal status but only as a charitable society under the oversight of the ministry of social affairs. Umar al-Tilmisani declined the offer, which reflects a concern that dependence on government would cost the organization its autonomy and maneuverability. Sadat adopted a policy of ‘no religion in politics’ to boost his popularity and sabotage the politicization of Islamists after the decline of the state and the disillusionment of people. The MB rejected the slogan because it targeted their very existence and invalidated the unity of religion and politics. Contradicting himself and conscious of their growing popularity, Sadat competed against the MB to win the religious constituency. He called himself the ‘Believer president’ and called Egypt ‘the state of science and religion’. (Sullivan and Kotob, 1999: 72). Politics did not seem to be a priority as much as a necessity to implement the organization’s Islamic agenda. The MB benefited from the leeway that the regime granted without compromising their ideological core principles. In short, it was a marriage of convenience that was shaky, uncertain but extremely useful for both. For the MB, the aim behind this tacit cooperation with the regime was to encourage Sadat to introduce Islamic legislations which culminated in the constitutional amendment of 1980, which made Sharia, ‘the’ main principle of legislation instead of ‘a’ main source of legislation. Baker contends that ‘in the Brother’s eyes the essential struggle to preserve Islam took precedence over social goals such as development, revolution, or democracy that other Egyptians regarded as essential’. (Baker, 1990: 259). Al-Banna and al-Hudaybi resisted turning the organization into a political party to avoid exposure to government pressure to support certain political stances. The decision of the MB to be distant from the regime has laid the ideological premises for its significant legal expansion in the political and professional spheres in the 1980s. (Baker, 1990: 246). Chapter Five The Brothers in the Mubarak Era The Brothers welcomed the ascendency of Mubarak after the assassination of Sadat. Although internally divided on nominating him for a second term due to his ineffectual and unimaginative performance in the first six years(Al-Awadi, 2004: 117), the MB leadership made a pragmatic decision to endorse his nomination to avoid a war with the regime in a show of political maturity and strategic thinking. Mubarak started his reign by trying to build his legitimacy as a new president by committing to democratic elections. Combating radical Islamists after the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat was one of the serious challenges of the Sadat legacy that Mubarak had to deal with. He took a middle course between Nasser’s coercion and Sadat’s semi-authoritarian stance. (Walsh, 2006). Encouraging moderate Islamists to engage in political contestation was one strategy that Mubarak used to delegitimize violence by radical Islamists and to further isolate them. (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 74). What distinguished the MB from radical Islamists was not only denouncing violence as a means to bring social transformation but a commitment to Islamize society while ‘preserving the political status quo’. (Ismail, 2003:28). The security clampdown on fundamentalists also targeted the MB’s first generation who expressed sympathy with radical and militant Islamists; the fact that a number of key figures from the more conservative line in the MB fled the country paved the way for al-Tilmesani to stride along ideological moderation and the rise of the more pragmatic middle generation of the MB cadre. (Pargeter, 2010: 44). The regime welcomed the electoral alliances between the MB and Wafd Party in 1984 and with the Amal and Labor Parties in 1987 to further its political legitimacy and tame the MB within the boundaries of the political system. (Hatem, 1995: 203). For al-Tilmesani, partyism was a necessity that found an ideological basis in the Islamic theology; the Islamic principle of consultation assembly, Shura, is, for al-Tilmesani, a legitimate form of multiparty system. (Clark, 1995:174). A key objective of the MB is to spread the message of Islam; the banning of the organization limited the exposure of the MB to the public yet the MB encouraged the regime to be more pluralistic so that it could operate more independently. (Sullivan and Kotob, 1999:49). Winning parliamentary seats provided the MB with a political platform and created a buffer zone to lessen the regime’s coercion. As a tactical strategy, the MB used the national platform to form coalitions with other political forces with different ideological orientation for the purpose of legislating Islamic laws and to criticize the performance of the regime in regard to economic policy and security. Criticizing the unpopular policies without providing feasible alternatives and forging alliances within the political status quo was like hitting two birds with one stone. (Brown and Hamzawy 2009: 14). While an electoral alliance required some ideological compromises, the MB seemed to have pressured other political forces to Islamize their discourse by agreeing to include objectives like the implementation of Sharia in their political programs. (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Mubarak issued an Electoral Law in 1983 that restricted political activism to political parties. The law stipulated that in order for any group to be eligible to apply for a party license it has to win 20 seats in the parliament. Given its popular base, the MB realized that the only way to be legalized, at least politically, is by contesting the elections and forming a party. Consequently, the Brothers participated in the elections in alliance with the New Wafd party. The NDP secured a majority of 390 out 448 seats. The opposition parties secured the remaining 58 seats. The decision to team up with the Wafd party is ideologically significant. The relationship between the MB and the Wafd party was one of mistrust and ideological enmity. The New Wafd represented a national secularist platform that the MB saw as a threat to the Islamic identity of the Egyptian people. Al-Tilmesani hoped that the New Wafd would be the first party to implement Sharia or at least support ‘those who want to’, however, the alliance with the New Wafd quickly collapsed in 1987.. (Ebeid, 1991: 30). Thus, al-Timesani initiated a new stage where core ideological principles were subservient to political calculations. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham believes that ‘Although the Brotherhood entered the political system in order to change it. It ended up being changed by the system’ (Wickham, 2011). Ideological change was inevitable as chances to implement its program outside the political life were highly unlikely given the state authoritarian polities. Mona El-Ghobashy points out that political life require significant ideological sacrifices ‘the case of the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] confirms that it is the institutional rules of participation rather than the commandments that motivate political parties. Even the most ideologically committed and organizationally stalwart parties are transformed in the process of interacting with competitors, citizens, and the state. Ideology and organization bow to the terms of participation’. (2005: 390). Although ‘Islam is the solution’ was the main slogan during the 1980s, political slogans were used during the election campaigns as well. The demand of political reform and multiparty system replaced the demand of implementing Sharia, which was dominant until then. The Brothers in parliament acted collectively demanding action on key issues, like judicial authority, press law and ending the emergency law. (Shehata and Stacher, 2006). Further, religion as a concept was no longer the only cause that the Muslim Brotherhood advocated; it was solely used for recruitment purposes in mosques and religious circles (Al-Awadi, 2004: pp. 80-106). Even the unwavering commitments to the implementation of Sharia as an Islamic frame of reference receded significantly. (Brown and Hamzawi, 2009). Political contestation led to opening up and generated a sense of urgency in addressing untapped areas. In order to protect the MB from internal rifts, ideological ambiguity was deliberately maintained to avoid ideological fragmentation (Pargeter, 2010: 55). In fact, the regime’s persistence to deprive the MB from recognition ‘relieved’ the organization from the potential of ideological schisms because forming a political party would mean an ideological dissolution of the organization, as co-existence of both seemed unattainable to some Brothers. (Rashwan, 2007). Even if the question of forming a political party died inside the organization due to the regime’s coercion, political contestation poses a challenge of accountability and ideological specifity. Brown and Hamzawy contend that the MB resorted to ideological ambiguity to avoid paying the price of specifity. ‘The tension remains between the old goals of creating Islamic states and enacting uncompromising versions of the sharia and the new goal of becoming influential players in a pluralistic, democratic system. The outcome of these tensions is a great deal of ambiguity on a number of issues’. (2006). The duality characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood stems from the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood started as a religious movement with a welfare agenda and evolved into a politically oriented movement. Both wings exist and they are interdependent on each other which make their discourse ideologically confusing. The pragmatic stance that the middle generation of the MB took since the early 1980s started to reconfigure the way the organization prioritizes its moral sense of mission compared to its new dedication to political contestation. Nathan Brown explains the impact of embracing political activism : ‘for the movements, politicization- the decision to dedicate resources to elections, the move to form structures that resemble electoral parties, the effort to craft platforms and appeal to new constituencies, the development of new appeals and programs…the emergence of new leadership grounded in parliaments – can have profound effects on both their ideology and their organization’. (Brown, 2012: 6). While ideological moderation allays the fears of the political and intellectual elite, it jeopardizes the credibility of the organization as religious organization in the eyes of its grassroots and sympathizers. It must be noted that the inherent ideological dichotomy of the MB was not visible under Nasser because the organization was persecuted. When the MB started to redefine itself also as a political actor, its pragmatism alienated many religious constituencies. (Nathan, Hamzawy and Ottaway, 2010) Abdel Moneim Aboul Futuh, a leader from the MB middle generation and a close associate of al-Tilmesani argued that an ideological change towards embracing political contestation should not be viewed negatively by the more conservative members who oppose the politicization of the organization: ‘The Brothers should admit that they have developed and reconsidered ideas towards parties, same as ideas towards women’ (Al-Awadi, 2004: 82). A draft of a political party was first attempted by Tilmesani in the lead-up to the elections of 1984. He ordered a committee to draft a party platform. The working title of the party was the Egyptian Reform Party; the platform was based on reforming the socio-economic conditions, the civil rights and freedoms. When Nasserite parties like al-Amal, the Umma and the Tajammu approached the MB to form an electoral alliance; the MB rejected because Al-Amal and al-Tajammu presented the Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad with a medal of peace. Al-Assad had massacred 40 thousands of the Syrian Sunnis in Hamah, including a significant number of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, al-Amal supported Sadat’s peace initiative. The MB considered losing the Golan Heights a ‘treason’ and those secularists were classified as the enemy ‘who at times cloak themselves with the mantle of Arabism’. (Sivan, 1985: 49). However, the parliamentary elections of 1987 accentuated the MB’s political expediency. On the one hand, the election campaign presented the MB as the representative of Islam and that voting for it is a sacred duty that would to the implementation of Sharia; along with the main slogan ‘Islam is the solution’, other slogans read ‘Give your vote to God, give to the Muslim Brotherhood’. (Ebeid, 1991: 43). On the other, the electoral alliance with the Amal party underscored how ideology became subservient to electoral calculations. The ruling National Democratic Party won 309 out of 448 seats and the MB won 36 seats in its coalition with al-Amal, making it the biggest opposition bloc in parliament compared to the 8 seats it won in 1984. ((Al-Awadi, 2004). It must be noted that the MB and the Amal were united in their enmity to the regime; al-Amal refused to side with the government in its attacks against the MB. (Flores, 1997: 91). The first clear confrontation with the regime was when the MB boycotted the elections due to the difficulty of fielding candidates to cover all the 222 districts as a new electoral law stipulated. The boycott was not a sign of ideological radicalization as other secular parties boycotted the elections. Mustafa Mashhur, who became the Supreme Guide at the height of the confrontation with the regime in 1996, believed that elections campaign was the ideal mechanism to spread the word of Islam. Sullivan and Kotob (1999: 59). Mubarak totally withdrew his commitment to pluralism as he claimed that the Islamists were to ‘hijack’ democracy; he tried to sabotage the ‘legal institutionalization’ (Esposito, 1984: pp. 254-257) of the MB, politically by rigging and socially’ in the professional associations and universities. The MB challenged the Mubarak regime on principles of democracy rather than religion through its pact with opposition parties in June 1991. The pact comprised the MB and nine other opposition parties which formally committed themselves to democracy and many liberal democratic principles by issuing a reform statement. Among the points was a commitment to human rights, compatibility of laws with Sharia and lifting of restrictions on political parties. (El-Ghobashy, 2006). According to Harnisch and Mecham, the MB ‘The dual call for democracy and shari‘a, as well as their large base of grassroots support across social classes, elevated the Brotherhood to the status of the only viable opposition group with a real prospect of dethroning the corrupt and authoritarian NDP government.’ (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:192). The MB tapped into the grievances of the marginalized lower and middle classes; it filled in the gaps left by a retreating government; it succeeded in providing a social alternative to secular elites and through an ‘alternative system of infrastructure, an implicit critique of the failure and inability of the state to adequately respond to the needs of its citizens’, as Esposito and Voll succintly put it. (2001: 190). In 1995, the regime clamped down on the MB, arresting hundreds of Brothers to block their participation in the elections. Due to the unfeasibility of participating in the elections, the MB decided again to boycott the elections and instead expanded its presence in professional syndicates, winning the elections in important syndicates. (Wickham, 2002). The decision to boycott the elections stirred internal debate on how that would benefit the organization, prominent MB leader Esam al-Aryan argued that such a decision would only embolden the regime to coerce the MB even further. (Al-Awadi, 2004). Al-Aryan represents a generation of the MB that responded to a new political reality during the second term of Mubarak. Their ideological moderation aggravated the internal discordance of the MB. The professional syndicates were dominated by members from the more pragmatic members of the MB middle generation, to compensate for the limited political openings. It must be noted that until the mid 1970s politics was mainly dominated by secular organizations. The secular forces were eclipsed by the Brothers’ growing momentum in addressing the mounting problems of the middle classes; the welfare projects in an Islamic frame of reference gained the Brothers unprecedented popularity and access to the public life. (Pargeter, 2010: 43). This generation expressed an ideological pragmatism as they entered politics, forging alliances with other political forces to advance the interests of its constituency. (Rouleau, 1998; Leiken and Brooke, 2007). The internal debate over question of partyism was taken to a new dimension when a group of 17 Brothers from the middle generation asked the Supreme Guide in 1996 for permission to form a political party and apply for a government license. The senior leadership rejected the request and the members were expelled; the defectors called their party the Centrist (Wasat) and the crisis exposed an ideological dilemma that continued to be the reason for internal schisms and debates. (Lynch, 2008). The founding members of Wasat believed that the Islamic discourse of the MB is not without flaws because it is based on human judgment, thus revisable. (Altman, 2006). The sacking of Wasat members from the MB by the old guard leadership that took over after the death of al-Tilmesani and the government’s refusal to grant a license united the MB and the regime through the common denominator of rejecting the popular appeal of the middle generation. (Burgat, 2003: 175). Carrie Rosefsky Wickham argues that the group of the Wasat emphasized a need for a critical review of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and the role of pluralism in political as well as social life. In her words, ‘Wasat represents a departure from the religious conservatism of the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream and other Islamist groups. Further, the platform of the Wasat party represents a sharp break from the conservative interpretation of Islam previously embraced by its founders’. (Wickham, 2004). Mohammad Madi Akef, a prominent leader from the first generation of the MB, assumed the post of Supreme Guide, or the Murshid, on the death of his predecessor Mamon al_hudaybi. Akef’s first mission was to produce the first political platform of the organization. The program was called the Reform Initiative; the document was mainly drafted by the more pragmatic members of the middle generation who developed a moderate ideological stance due to the influence of political contestation and syndicate activism. The party platform was mainly constructed around political and economical reform and not much focus was drawn to religious issues. (Lynch, 2008). The opening statement in the Reform program reads: ‘the Muslim Brotherhood movement decided that the people are the source of all authorities and called for the circulation of power through elections’. (MB, 2007). The document clearly endorsed the legitimacy of multiparty system as a protection against political tyranny and it justified Hasan al-Banna’s early rejection of party politics on the basis that most of the parties in al-Banna’s time were ‘puppets in the hands of the colonialists and the corrupt king and his attendants’. (MB, 2007). The document did not see the political party as a replacement of the organization. Akef believed that political participation is a means to serve the comprehensive vision of the MB to reform society. In other words, a political party can never achieve its missionary and educational objectives but it plays a certain function in the overall scheme of missions. (Altman, 2006). Under Akef, specifically in summer of 2007, a 128-page document was distributed by the MB leadership among a limited number of politicians, intellectuals and activists. The document presented an unofficial version of the MB political party platform. The platform introduced a thorough vision on political, economic and social aspects of life. It stated that “the people are the source of all powers, so that no individual, party, community or society can claim the right to power, unless it is derived from a free and true popular will.” (Altman, 2006). Significantly, the platform shied away from “Islam is the Solution’, as an all encompassing electoral slogan. Instead, it promoted a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’ and avoided touching on the future relationship between the organization and the political party. The dithering over defining the ideological future of the MB continued to be a major issue and a source of internal disagreement and schism. Nathan and Hamzawi argue that the MB did not want to completely immerse itself in politics and become a political party because it feared the resulting obstacles, a potential for state repression and internal rifts. (Nathan and Hamzawy, 2010). While Hasan al-Banna believed that reform should proceed from the individual to society and then the state, the document prioritized political reform which indicates a significant change in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood: ‘The beginning should be [about] political reform which is the starting point to reform the rest of all life walks’. (MB, 2007). Critics questioned the MB’s commitment to democratic value and political reform. Despite the platform’s unprecedented scope of intellectual transparency and its detailed answers to major issues, only two controversial issues surfaced in the media. The first issue is calling for the creation of a board of religious scholars which advices the parliament on issues related to religion. Essentially, the board keeps in check all the legislated laws in a way that they should all be consistent with Sharia and the recommendations of the board are binding, not advisory. The council in this sense is capable of vetoing any legislations incompatible with Sharia principles. Harnisch and Mecham argue that ‘such a council could effectively render a democratically elected parliament and president comparatively impotent. Thus, the state would have the appearance of a democracy but would, in essence, operate as a theocracy’. (2009). The second issue is about setting the criterion for presidency based on religion and gender; according to the document, Egypt’s presidency must be exclusively for a male Muslim. No woman can be the president nor can a Christian Copt be the president. (Nathan and Hamzawy, 2010). For the MB, the issue of citizenship rights of non-Muslims and women are contingent on Sharia. While Copts were declared citizens with equal rights and duties and partners in the ‘national struggle’, the MB’s position from them did not change. (Shafiq, 2001). On the one hand, the two issues exacerbated fears of secularists about the true intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood in case they rise to power; on the other the draft party platform stirred internal disagreement between the old guards and the more pragmatic middle generation of the MB. It could be argued that the inclusion of the article of the council of scholars proves that the Brothers were not completely convinced with democratic mechanism to be a guarantee to the application of Sharia law. An essential question remains standing: how the legislation compliance with Sharia is measured and according to what interpretation of Sharia? Abul al-futuh blamed the religious council and the presidency articles on certain interpretations of Sharia favored by the more conservative voices inside the organization and it did not represent the majority of the Brothers. (Nathan, Hamzawy and Ottaway, 2010) He believed that the supreme constitutional court must determine which legislation is in line with sharia and which is not. While Abulal-futuh represented an upright opposition group to the old guard inside the MB, each defended their vision and claimed that they represent the consensus in the MB. The result was an organization capable of appealing to a religious constituency and allaying fears of more liberal trends in society. In other words, the MB’s internal disagreement over defining its discourse endowed it with ideological flexibility due to competing trends to define its character. Brown pointed out that since the MB leaders were autodidacts in Islamic jurisprudence, a host of Muslim scholars sympathetic to them issued fatwas to support certain ideological stances taken by the Brothers, whether they were from the old guard or the younger generation. (Brown, 2012: 184). The impressive performance electoral of 2005 (88 seats) consolidated the MB’s political credentials. The regime responded harshly arresting around 1300 members prior to the second and third rounds. Compared to past parliamentary elections, it put the MB in the spotlight. The MB was required to be more transparent under the pressure of accountability. In what seemed to be an attempt to reduce pressure, Akef pledged his support of Mubarak for a third term provided that the regime secures elections without rigging and lifting the emergency law. The call was ignored. (Altman, 2006). Due to the regime’s policy of containment through repression (Ryan, 2001; Esposito, 1988; Mumtaz, 2012), the MB developed a strategy of not totally committing the sources and energies to political contestation in case of a regime’s crackdown. The MB’s strategy is tactical rather than ideological: avoiding confrontation with the regime through electoral self-limitation by fielding fewer numbers of candidates in very election (Eposito, 1988; Ryan, 2001). The decision to participate in elections, the discourse of the campaign and the prioritizing the key areas of the platform became purely tactical as the relationship with regime is in constant reshaping and as the long term objective of Islamization of society offers some ideological justification to the Muslim Brotherhood, a game of ‘musical chairs’ in which everything is decided according to the regime’s tolerance. (Brown, 2012: 137). The regime tightened its authoritarian grip on the group after the impressive electoral show of 2005 was further enforced by the 2007 constitutional referendum tailored to ban the MB from political activities; although the turnout was quite low the referendum was ratified. It banned any political activities based on a religious agenda. Chapter Six Beyond Opposition A corrupt government, stagnant economy, an aging autocracy high rates of unemployment, and proliferation of communication technologies all precipitated popular unrest in the years leading up to the ouster of the president Hosni Mubarak. (Anderson, 2011; Bellin: 2004). In April 2008, textile workers at a state factory decided to go on strike protesting low wages. Due to the flourishing of cyberactivism which involved planning and coordinating small demonstrations, a call for solidarity with the textile workers quickly gained momentum and the protest was a national event. The Muslim Brotherhood had no clue how to respond to the protest call. The guidance office finally refused to take part in the protest which stirred serious internal debates. (Filiu , 2011: 98). The regime continued its coercion of the Brothers and it was in this context that Mohammed Mahdi Akef resigned in 2009 and was succeeded by Mohammad Badi. After assuming the post, Badi emphasized the organization’s commitment to democratic values and an understanding of political participation not domination. Badi is known to be among the more conservative voices in the MB, even classified as a Qutbist committed to training a vanguard to precipitate the Islamic renaissance. The regime tried to circumvent the Muslim Brotherhood from contesting elections at any cost. In 2008, the authorities obstruct the Brothers from registering to run in the municipal elections. Out of the 52000 seats, only 21 candidate Brothers registered. (Sullivan , 2010). In 2010, the scope of fraud and elections rigging that took place in led Mohammad Badi to believe in the futility of the political engagement. Husam Tammam argues that the MB turned the focus of the organization inward, precisely on the spiritual education of the rank and file due to the bullying of the state and the ideological line of its Supreme Guide. ‘This conservative faction is more interested in working from within to cultivate a strong, disciplined movement than in engaging with other political forces and intellectual currents in Egyptian society’. (Tammam, 2010). It must be noted that the ascendance of Badi to the top executive post exacerbated the ideological differences between the old guard and the middle generation. Consequently, Abdel Moneim Abo al-futuh, then a member of the Guidance Bureau, stepped down. (Filiu, 2011). Carrie Rosefsky Wickham contends that there are three ideological lines in the current structure of the MB, the ideologically conservative, represented by Badi and the Guidance Bureau, which wields the real power in the organization. The second group is the pragmatic conservatives, presented by Muhammad Mursi and the reformers group, which mainly composes the splinter groups that defected after the demise of Mubarak. (Wickham, 2011). On June 6th 2010, Khaled Said, a cyber-activist, was beaten to death by police at an internet café in Alexandria after posting a video of police brutality. Shortly after, fellow cyber-activists created “We Are All Khaled Said” page on Facebook to commemorate Said’s death. Few weeks after the Tunisian uprising started, Wael Ghonim, an activist, wrote: ‘what should we offer as a gift to the brutal Egyptian police on their National Day, 25 January?’. The answer came ‘Tunisia, Tunisia’. (Filiu, 2011). An unprecedented popular uprising started building up on the police day and the Brotherhood leadership, afraid of state repression, did not take part in the protest at the beginning, although a number of the Brothers youth took part in the demonstrations. On 28 January, the Brothers officially joined the protests. On 3 February Badi announced the MB’s rejection of any negotiations with the regime. Two days later, Badi shifted the non-negotiation stance; along with a number of political parties, including al-Wafd, the MB entered in a dialogue with Omar Suleiman, the deputy of the president at the cabinet. A former Brother resigned following a secret meeting between the MB and Suleiman in which the MB considered withdrawing from the revolution in return of granting a legal status. (Tadros, 2012: 36). Sending Brothers to the Tahrir Square, where the protests erupted, and leaving a retreat line through negotiating with the government reflects how the Brothers evolved into becoming masters of pragmatism. Filiu points out that ‘what was a historic achievement for the Ikhwan veterans was perceived as a sell-out by the Tahrir protestors’ (2011: 98). Seen in this context, ideological premises were shelved as practicality continues to characterize the political manner of the MB. Legal Recognition and Contesting Politics After the ouster of president Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood dithered over forming a political party; the organization was torn between two demands, the call for persevering the missionary spirit of a socio-religious movement and another call for engaging in formal politics through forming a political party. It must be noted that the political trajectory of the MB from inception to post-Mubarak Egypt shows a considerable resistance to forming a political party which was seen by generations of the MB as a damaging distraction because it reduces the magnitude of the mission to sheer politics. (Tadros, 2012: 81). It also politicizes its constituency, which according to al-Banna, would put it on the brink of fragmentation. The Supreme Guide Mohammad Badi resisted the idea of forming a political party but he eventually yielded to the temptation of the political opening that the revolution offered. In May 2011, the MB formed the Freedom and Justice Party, FJP. The leading posts of the new party were given to members of the Guidance Bureau who nominally resigned from the MB to resume their new rules. The relationship between the FJP and the organization was a source of concern for politicians as many suspected that the party decision-making would be biased and advancing the objectives of the MB if FJP members were elected to senior executive posts in the presidency, parliament and the government. Furthermore, if candidates from the FJP present themselves in the same religious framework that the MB uses, it follows that they openly maintain a claim that they represent the community of believers which makes them synonymous with Islam. (Tadros, 2012). The FJP was chaired by MB leader Mohammed Mursi before he resigned to become the first elected president in Egypt. Running for presidency, Mursi openly emphasized his MB credentials ‘ ‘I am a son of the Muslim Brotherhood, and my intellectual and moral composition has been shaped by this group…I am presenting myself to the public on the basis of my personal qualities, my Muslim Brotherhood background, the fact that I am the Muslim Brotherhood/FJP candidate’. (Al-Anani, 2012). Nathan Brown compares the MB and FJP’s relationship to a helicopter parent who hovers too hovering too closely over its offspring, monitoring its behavior and dictating its manners. (Brown, 2011). An MB spokesman explained the relationship between the two “The MB has a bigger role than the party. (Ahram online, 2011).. (Ahram online, 2011). The FJP promised it would not dominate the parliament by only contesting 35% of the seats; the announcement aimed at allaying the fears of the Copts, liberal politicians and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forced (SCAF), the actual ruler of Egypt after the ouster of President Mubarak. (Telegraph, 2012). The FJP reneged on the promise by winning the largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 2012. However, it emerged as the biggest bloc in the parliament winning 235 seats, which composed 47.2% of the total 498 seats. It was followed by al-Nour Salafi party, an ultra-conservative Islamist party, which won 121 seats (24.3%). (BBC, 2012).. the remaining 25 percent of the seats were won by liberal, secular leftists and independent members. ( Ottaway and Brown, 2012). What complicated the political landscape, especially for the Brothers, is the emergence of several conservative Salafi parties. Salafism refers to a strict and literal interpretation of Islam and a return to the golden age of the first generation of Muslims. The common denominator with the MB is the implementation of Sharia and the Islamization of society. However, they substantially differ in understanding how to implement these imperative. (Brown, 2011). As a ‘liberal’ Islamist, Abou al-Fotouh was endorsed by the least expected political party, the Salafis. This endorsement was widely seen as a counter measure to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Chick, 2012). The MB announced two controversial decrees. Firstly, members of MB who are interested in politics are only allowed to join FJP. Consequently, four splinter groups emerged after being sacked when expressing resentment to the decree. It could be argued that the decree reflects the highly disciplinary nature of the MB and the strict undemocratic tendency in its leadership due to decades of oppression and tyranny by the regime. Mariz Tadros argues that the decree shows the MB’s leadership concern about the allegiances of its constituency and its potential political repercussions. (Tadros, 2012: 76). Secondly, the MB announced that it will not nominate a presidential candidate which implicitly means that MB members who wish to run as presidential candidates would be sacked for violating this directive. When Abdel Moneim Abou al-Futuh expressed his intention to run as a presidential candidate after the toppling of Mubarak, the MB rejected the proposal and expelled him. The MB changed tactics less than a year later when it nominated a top MB leader, Khairat El-Shater, as its nominee for the presidential race. The change was attributed to the requirements of a new political reality in which the MB saw itself as a protector of the Egyptian revolution. (Fahmy , 2012). Further, MB spokesman Mahmmad Ghozlan announced those members who support Abou al-Futuh will be expelled. (Ahram Online, 2012). Abou al-Futuh’s defection was a result of a campaign led by El-Shater against the moderate leaders and the close circle of the former guide, Mohammad Akef. (Howeidy, 2012). The decision of Abou al-Futuh to run in the presidential race represents a postponed confrontation between two ideological trends in the MB, the moderate and the conservative. Both trends went through the nuances of political engagement during the Mubarak era but they developed different approaches to politics. The ideological crisis started to unfold as the friends of yesterday became outright enemies supporting different platforms. Such a confrontation was unlikely before the revolution but a new political landscape was in the making; the revolution toppled Mubarak and introduced a massive political vacuum. Kristen Chick argues that the contestation of Aboul Fotouh against the candidate of the MB symbolizes a major test to the authority of the organization as a representative of Islam. ‘Aboul Fotouh’s candidacy is perhaps the greatest challenge yet to the Brotherhood’s hegemony and an indication of how Egypt’s revolution revealed the rifts within the Brotherhood and opened the field to Islamists outside the organization’. (Chick, 2012). The FJP asserted its commitment to a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’. (FJP, 2012). It must be noted that the MB has reproduced the political platform of al-Wasat party, the 1996 splinter group from the MB. The MB tries to reconcile the mission-driven mentality of its rank and file of the Muslim Brotherhood with a change in ideology which advocates immersing into formal politics. The platform advocates a marriage between the moral message of the MB and politics. The FJP aims at ‘linking politics with principles, ethics, sincerity, loyalty, honesty, benevolence, and the sound conscience, which inhibit the person from committing wrongful things, abusing the public money, accepting a bribe as a gift or commission, violating the human rights, rigging the elections, snatching power or giving privileges to relatives and friends in office. (FJP, 2012). The party platform emphasizes the civil rights of citizens regardless of creed, sex, color. Unlike the political platform of 2007, the FJP stated clearly that any Egyptian citizen has an inherent right to run for the post of the president, an ideological modification to the strict discriminatory stances from women and Copts. (Birnbaum, 2012). A major task on the new Islamist parliament was to form a legislative committee to write a new constitution. The document was to determine who rules and who governs, the center of power and the balance of power, the nature of the relationship between the president, SCAF, the judiciary, the parliament and the executive branches of the government. The parliament was supposed to form a Constituent Assembly, CA, which was comprised of a hundred members of whom fifty percent were MPs and the rest from outside the parliament. Being the most powerful bloc in the parliament, the FJP tried to allay the fears of secular parties and independent politicians and activists by asserting that it is keen to include representatives from all sectors of Egyptian society. (al-Jazeera, 2012). In contrast to the FJP assertion, Islamists dominated the Constituent Assembly by 60 percent. Only six Copts and five women were chosen. (Hesham, 2012). Liberal and secular forces represented in the Constituent Assembly walked out of the sessions in a protest against the hegemony of the MB and they filed a law suit against its constitutionality of the CA. The Supreme Administrative Court dissolved the CA in April because it included members of parliament. Another CA was elected but it also contained parliamentarians from the Muslim Brotherhood and is threatened to be dissolved. The make-up of the Constituent Assembly renders the Muslim Brotherhood historical slogan “Participation not domination’, irrelevant. (Ikhwanweb, 2011). The pressure of a new political reality and the struggle for a new Islamic identity in Egypt have affected the ideology to an extent that reneging on promises has come to characterize the political behavior of the MB. The MB led parliament was dissolved by a ruling from the Supreme Constitutional Court in June; the ruling deemed the legislative lower house unconstitutional because parliamentary seats reserved for independents were taken by party members. (BBC, 2012). The timing of the dissolution decree was significant; it came two days before the second round of presidential elections. The Muslim Brotherhood nominated Mohammaed Mursi after Khairat El-Shater was disqualified, which reflects the military’s attempt to curb the growing power of the Brothers. Elections’ Campaign The MB leaders carefully tailored their elections campaigns. They competed against the Salafis for the Islamist constituency. And Mursi faced a similar ideological challenge from former MB and presidential candidate Abul-Futuh. They both competed against each other for the more moderate Islamist constituency. Mursi had to revert to the old tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood to express vehemently the creation of the Caliphate to lure the ultraconservative salafis, sometimes reiterating an unwavering commitment to the implementation of Sharia. He changed his ideological discourse when addressing average Egyptians and liberal Islamists. In the days leading up to the round-off session, when addressing the the salafis, chanted “The Koran is our constitution, and Sharia is our guide.” He proved to be a political chameleon with a dual discourse; while his presidential campaign posters in Cairo showed him in a short trimmed beard with a slogan ‘Renaissance comes through the will of the people, the posters in agricultural Delta showed his beard longer with another slogan ‘Egypt’s renaissance with an Islamic foundation’. (Nakhoul and Saleh, 2012). Further, the political platform of the Freedom and Justice Party makes no mention of the formation of a religious council, the gender of the president or the religious orientation of the president. Mursi pledged in a meeting with secular liberals and left wing politicians to outline a formation of a national unity government. He promised to nominate a Christian Copt and a Woman vice president, although these posts seem to be with no real executive powers, given predictions that Mursi may nominate up to six vice presidents in order to reduce their constitutional political significance. (Trager, 2012, Associated Press, 2012). If the executive powers of the president are not vested in his deputies, it follows that appointing a Copt and a woman is less about ideological moderation than about political symbolism. However, Mursi’s dual discourse underscores the extent to which ideology is constantly reconfigured to advance electoral gains. To broaden its support base, the MB had to change its discourse of the Islamization of society in order to accommodate more constituencies. Mona El-Ghobashy contends that the MB: ‘regardless of ideology, modulate their organizational and ideological features to align with changing environmental cues and incentives’. (2005: 391). Presidency and Beyond Few days before announcing the results of the presidential campaign, SCAF issued an addendum to the Constitutional Declaration which granted itself executive privileges previously exclusively endowed to the president in addition to exemption from civilian oversight on budgetary items. Effectively, the dissolution of the parliament meant that the new president would be powerless and would arrive to presidency without the oversight of a functional parliament. The fact that the new Constituent Assembly, dominated by Islamists, was also threatened by a dissolution decree reflects a culmination of a power conflict between MB and SCAF. The decision also meant that the SCAF is entitled to the legislative authority as long as the parliament is dissolved. Although the presidency emboldened the MB parliamentarians to meet in defiance of SCAF, the latter has managed, through systematic disempowering measures to show the MB as nothing but a power-hungry pragmatic party that is after domination of the political life; the remarkable success of the MB’s entry into politics has come at a high price. The popularity of the MB declined significantly despite the victory of Mursi. The FJP won 10.5 million votes in the parliamentary elections only to lose half of these votes in the presidential elections. 5.7 million Egyptians votes for Mursi. The MB’s attempt to control all the power branches, including the Constituent Assembly continues to discredit the MB. Atef al-Saadawy attributes the substantial losses to poor parliamentary performance and running up against high expectations due to aggressive elections’ campaigns. (al-Saadawy, 2012). Mursi’s first decision was to order the dissolved parliament to reconvene in what appeared to be an outright challenge to the military. The decision came without prior negotiations with SCAF and other political players. Mursi seemed to act more like a member of a banned organization than a statesman. Secrecy and surprising decisions characterize underground movements. (Berhi, 2012). The decision is a major change in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood which always took a non-confrontational stance. The new context of freedom has catapulted into uncharted waters where the rules of the game changed from a combination of ideological idealism and survival tactics to outright power politics and political pragmatism. The second major decision that Mursi took was to sack the spy chief, the heads of the air force, army, and navy, military police chief, the Field Marshal and Army Chief-of-Staff, ending a power struggle with the Military Council. The decision also included an annulment of the constitutional addendum to the constitution which ended SCAF monopoly of power. The shift in the power paradigm entitled the Brotherhood an unprecedented measure of power; they become in full control of the government institutions. (Londoño, 2012). Mamdouh Hamza believes that the decisions of Mursi are heavily influenced by the MB, “They are the only ones in the kitchen, 100%,” says Hamza. “In fact, Morsy might only be the coffee boy in the kitchen.” (Hauslohner, 2012). In the meantime, Mursi reneged on promises to appoint a Copt and a woman to be his deputes. Instead, he appointed a jurist as his vice president, in what a critic sees as ‘potentially co-opting or intimidating the judiciary’. (Lynch, 2012). Although the sweeping decisions were seen a restoration of civilian rule, political opponents are concerned that these measures are to cement Mursi’s rule and lay the foundations for a Caliphate run by the Brothers. Questioning the democratic credentials of the MB is exacerbated by their rise to power; they have to prove their commitment to their democratic elections and the updated system of values that they adopted since the early 1980s. Stathis N. Kalyvas points out that if a religious organization rises to power during a transitional phase it has to prioritize its commitment to peaceful power rotation as the ‘the credibility is further undermined by their reputation for "pious passions, strong beliefs, and inflexible values" and their ideological principles, which include (or are plausibly seen to include) the rejection of liberal democracy as a principle’ (2000). Now in power, the MB is in a position to govern and to come up with practical solutions to current problems in the economy, fuel, transportation, health, education and other vital sectors. The transition from opposition to governance will have everlasting repercussions on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the administrative level, the shift will put the MB on the top of the post-revolution institutional order. The decision-making mechanisms are accessible to the Brothers now, given the fact that they won the parliament, the Constituent Assembly, the presidency and a significant part of the government. Mursi promised a national unity government but the nomination method is highly eclectic to advance the interests of the MB in the state. The main criterion in picking up the ministers of the new cabinet is ideology-free technocracy to be balanced by deputy ministers from the MB. (Trager, 2012). Mursi assigned the ministries of youth, labor, housing, information and higher education for Muslim Brotherhood leaders. It is significant that the Brothers in Mursi’s first government were not given ministries dealing with serious issues in problematic areas like the economy, fuel, transportation and labor which affect the lives of ordinary people. Taking responsibility for a sinking ship of a suffering economy, a deteriorating security situation of a country surrounded by a changing regional landscape would severely damage the credibility of the MB, especially if this is seen in purely political calculations and ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections. (Hamza, 2012). Furthermore, Mursi’s policy is contrary to his promises during the elections campaign and his widely publicized Renaissance Project in which he promised to implement a comprehensive plan to overhaul the economy, security services, and transportation and sanitation problems. (Knell, 2012). Taking the information ministry, for instance, would give the MB a free hand in reshaping its public image. For this reason, an Islamization of the press is feared due to the naming of 50 new editors in chief for the national newspapers by the upper house of Parliament which is dominated by the MB. For instance, the new editor in chief of Egypt’s oldest newspaper was sacked in 2010 for writing a piece inciting violence against the Christian Copts. (NY Times, 2012). Taking the oil ministry would have put the Brother Minister on the front. It is highly likely that any criticism from the opposition due to poor performance would jeopardize the credibility of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, FJP. (Hamza, 2012). Running the foreign ministry by an MB leader would have naturally put him in a direct contact with Israel and he would have continued to run the day-to-day diplomatic tussles with his Israeli peer, which goes against the ideological centrality of the Palestinian question in the Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric. In contrast, during his presidential campaign Mursi promised his supporters to pray in Jerusalem. “Yes, Jerusalem is our goal. We shall pray in Jerusalem, or die as martyrs on its threshold.” (Kessler, 2012) Yet in his first speech as a president he pledged to respect and support international treaties, in an implicit reference to the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty with Israel. There is no mention of expelling the Israeli ambassador from Cairo anymore. Ideological change is likely as the Muslim Brotherhood stepped across the threshold of presidency, parliament, government and most likely the Constituent Assembly. It can be argued that the prolific ideological writings by the Brothers during decades in opposition will shrink in size and importance as the movement and its political wing continue to dominate the political life and assume more government responsibility. Khalil al-Anani argues that the shift from opposition to dominance reflects a ‘shift from ideology to methodology…the pressures and demands of the current phase will compel it to reduce the weight of ideology in its discourse and to pursue a more cautious and prudent approach to the application of its policies and programmes’. (Al-Anani, 2012). Conclusions Since the demise of president Mubarak, the MB has undergone an ideological revision dictated by the dramatic reshaping of the political landscape. While Jamal Abdul Nasser’s persecution sent the organization underground, shattered its structure and generated a radicalized ideology, Sadat’s political liberalization and Mubarak’s reversal of it trained the MB in political survival and opportunism, rendering its Islamist ideology irrelevant and causing internal schisms over its very soul. While in opposition, the MB attacked the poor performance of an aging state responding tothe government’s banning order by forging alliances with political parties and expanding in professional syndicates and student unions and charitable networks. It was only possible to cast doubts about the real intentions of the MB when it was a banned organization because it had no clear political agenda or a written political program. Despite the sharp criticism that the MB exacted on the regime, it did not produce an alternative program because it was categorized as an opposition force that capitalizes on the poor performance of the government. The need to come up with practical proposals came as an immediate result of the rise to power. After the toppling of Mubarak in 2011, The MB ended more than an eight decades’ status of being an ‘outlawed’ organization; it was finally allowed to found its own politically party. Emerging as the biggest political bloc in parliament and then winning the presidency catapulted the MB to the center of power in Egypt. Now that the MB is already beyond the opposition phase, the ascendance to state power demands a solid political vision and a nominal role for religion, the impact of politics on the Muslim Brotherhood is evident in the substantial changes in its structure, political discourse and ideology. Religion gradually disappeared from the discourse of the Brothers as most of them become MPs or top cabinet officials, addressing the day to day problems that the ordinary Egyptians face. Put differently, the rhetoric of the social justice in Islam and the call for comprehensive reform based on the principles of the Shaira gradually recedes as the political pragmatism is increasingly characterizing the political manner of the MB. This shift caused a great deal of inconsistency as the ideological core precepts are constantly being reinterpreted and even revised, especially during electoral campaigns to lure other constituencies or allay concerns of regional and international powers, namely, Israel and the US The post-Mubarak context edged the MB even further towards postponing the implementation of its ideology and thus closer to political pragmatism. The impact of politics on ideology stems from an inherent conflict. On one side lies the MB’s desire to prove to its followers and sympathizers its commitment to core ideological precepts like the implementation of Sharia, the eradication of Israel and a pledge to an Islamic supra-community, such as showing solidarity with Hamas and other Islamist groups. On the other side lies the MB’s need to send reassuring messages to its critics of its acceptance of democratic values such as peaceful rotation and multiparty system, domestically, regionally and internationally. It can be argued that president Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood have realized that shelving defining ideological objectives like the restoration of Caliphate through establishing an Islamic state in Egypt is a necessary measure in the face of mounting pressures of a new political reality. The MB has to accept the rules of statesmanship and the burden of governance domestically and a complicated power balance regionally. For the first time since its inception, the MB is held accountable for the decisions and actions it takes by the electoral constituency that it represents, not by God, and as a political party, not a religious organization. The sharp decline in the popularity of the MB, despite winning the majority in parliament and the presidency, underscores how its dual identity caused a dithering over which course to take. The indecision did play against the image of the MB and it did damage its credibility. Almost two years since the Egyptian uprising, the MB reneged on many promises it made earlier, a fact that illustrates the difficulty of resolve the conflict between the moral commitments to an Islamic ideology and the changing parameters of party politics. The power politics put the MB at crossroads; it had to decide which way to go next, to stay a religious organization or a political party. The ouster of Mubarak resulted in an end of dabbling in politics. Instead of reforming society through a bottom-up Islamization of society, an orchestrated change from the top-down seems to be happening. There is no clearer evidence of this than in forming his first cabinet. President Mohammad Mursi showed his allegiance to the MB by not assigning ministries with daunting challenges to fellow Brothers. In case of success, the MB will be credited, otherwise, the ministers will be held accountable individually for incompetence. It is yet to be seen whether the MB will succeed in governance and implementation of its ideology after its ascendance to power. It is evident though that political contestation has led to an upgrade in the system of its values. Shelving its Islamic agenda came under the pressure of formal recognition by the regime. The party politics is already reconfiguring the priorities in the platform of the MB and it is likely that the MB’s own constituency will be affected accordingly. List of References Al-Ahram. (2012). Brotherhood to expel members who support Abul-Fotouh presidential bid. [online]. 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