Hegel and Multiple Modernities

Arta Moeini Professor Terry Pinkard The Geist and the Hegelian Conception of Modernity: Balancing Individuality and Community “The Orient knew and knows only that one is free, the Greek and Roman world that some are free; the [modern] Germanic world knows that all are free.” Hegel, Lectures on Philosophy of History Writing during the disconcerting period that characterized the early 19th century Europe (In the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars), Hegel was among the first thinkers to seriously and systematically contend with the concept of “modernity” as he sought a philosophical explanation for the rather strange condition of his age (his Zeitgeist so to speak) and its dislocating sociopolitical consequences. Hegel introduces his conception of modernity via his intricate and multilevel theory of Geist—in its development in time and its (gradual) coming to terms with itself. In the framework of the Hegelian system, the Geist finally becomes self-conscious of itself in modernity discovering its “Freedom”—Freiheit. As such, modernity in the Hegelian perspective becomes equivalent to the Idea of Freedom which is also “revealed” to be the central idea animating the Geist. Freedom is the true measure of “Progress” for Hegel. After elucidating Hegel’s theory of Geist and its formative relation to the Idea of Freedom as a cornerstone of Hegelian understanding of modernity (and historical progress), this paper attempts to illustrate that more than just identifying Freedom as the basic universal principle of modernity in theory, Hegel was concerned about its actual implementation in practice—its full realization; that by observing his contemporary Europe, he foresaw many possible hurdles on the way to full actualization of the Idea of Freedom which if not remedied could produce discontents in modernity down the road, causing it to derail (at least temporarily). Having identified the Idea of Freedom as the Universal (idea), he was taken by how this Universal would manifest itself in the Particular—how it could become concrete—without unsettling the human experience altogether—without it producing the kind of individualism and subjectivism that could go against (natural) human sociability weakening human communities by undermining the normative grounds for them. This paper thus argues that a critical part of Hegelian philosophy is devoted to harmonizing this (at long last uncovered) Idea of Freedom (which is shown to be the central concern of the Geist) with the effective reality of human existence as a communal being: this Hegel hopes to achieve through his notion of Sittlichkeit, or the ethical totality of life shaped in a community. This implies that although in modernity the Geist has discovered Freedom to be its essence, history has not ended. Rather, finding the “correct” interpretation of the Idea of Freedom, its right balance within concrete Forms of Life, will now be the central preoccupation of the Geist going forward. Ultimately, this paper presents a picture of Hegel as both a critic and a defender of modernity and its freedom project, whose philosophy, perhaps inadvertently and anachronistically, opens the door to the recently popularized idea of “multiple modernities”. As mentioned, Hegel’s view of modernity must be understood in tandem with his theory of Geist (Spirit or Mindedness) and its coming to consciousness in history which is also linked with his notion of Recognition (Anerkennung). In his Lectures on Philosophy of History, Hegel comes to imagine the world in terms of a series of epochs marked by dichotomies of rise and fall, formation and breakdown, and dynamism and stasis constantly shaping, reshaping and then transcending the worldviews (Weltanschauungs) of various socio-cultural spaces or what we would call “civilizations” along the universal yet (originally) “unconscious” trajectory of historical “progress”, where the absolute Spirit (animated in the world as the Weltgeist or the World Spirit) comes, through reason and quite logically, to self-consciousness of itself, its own mindedness, and specially its Freedom through us and the cultures/civilizations we inhabit (or in Hegelian terms through the subjective and objective Spirits). In this context, studying various “cultures” along with their respective Gestalt des Lebens or “Forms of Life” culminating in distinctive historical epochs, and the influence of these Forms of Life on one another all within this meta-narrative of “progress” becomes fundamental to the Hegelian project—it is an inquiry into how the Universal—on its way to full actualization—particularizes itself (manifests itself in the Particular in order to become concrete) attaining spontaneous unity of the “ideal” and the “real”. The cornerstone of Hegelian system of thought, the idea of a unity expressing itself as a duality (particular/universal), reflects the powerful influence of Baruch Spinoza on Hegel, a figure young Hegel admired immensely. Hegel is even reported as saying, “You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all.” A strong “panendeistic” current is evident in Hegelian thought. These Particulars, which could be investigated to (inductively) understand the Whole—the Absolute Universal—are natio-cultural communities (i.e. Volkgeist). The Spirit/Mind only exists concretely through us humans and our norms and practices. It does not exist independently from us. The Geist becomes self-conscious of itself and its Freedom through people/cultures becoming self-conscious of themselves. This realization of this Freedom happens progressively and path-dependently in history through reason. Hegel’s philosophy of history assumes a developmental view to the unfolding of history and achievement of progress, which he calls the “historical dialectic”. This dialectic brings about progress unconsciously/naturally through constant emergence and breakdown of Forms of Life due to their inherent contradictions and their subsequent transcendence in a new configuration at a higher state(in a process Hegel calls Aufhebung or “Sublation”). Gestalt des Lebens is manifestation in the material/physical world of the Ideal of Gestalt des Geistes which exists in the intelligible world. Accordingly, history advances progress in a kind of a spiral. There is a teleology at work here although Hegel never even pretends to give a projection of the future for he insists the future and its telos are uncertain (to us in the present). As reiterated above, Hegel’s philosophy of history together with his Phenomenology of Geist (1807) advance the notion of Gestalt des Lebens or Forms of Life, each embodied in an epoch and reflecting a distinct Cast of Mind/Spirit or Gestalt des Geist which champions some unique conception and Worldview (Weltanschauung) of the world along with a particular set of absolute commitments (i.e. norms and mores) grounding that way of life. These absolute norms and commitments (accepted a priori) serve as the foundation of life for that Form of Life; they are so to speak the structure by means of which that Form of Life holds together. In the Hegelian conception, these norms are only valid so long as the members of the community “actually” believe in them. Hence, if these norms and commitments become challenged all of a sudden and people living in that cultural space/epoch no longer Recognize them as “facts” (as a result of coming into view of some paradox in their application), it follows that they are no longer binding and so the Form of Life associated with them begins to disintegrate and eventually collapse. As the Volkgeist (i.e. culture) adopts a new set of absolute commitments/normative totality in place of the old ones that have been discarded, it breeds a new Form of Life for itself. In the Hegelian premise, this is a common pattern, for each Form of Life possesses a Geist or “Mindedness” that is self-reflecting and self-negating and hence problematizes itself in coming to self-consciousness of itself. In coming to terms with itself, the Geist understands itself as a product of a socio-historical/cultural development and seeks even more development (comes to recognize its fluid/rather than fixed essence) Accordingly, when Forms of Life change and transcend themselves, their associated norms also transform and values that were previously taken as “fact” in that socio-cultural space turn out not to be so certain/rigid and are henceforth replaced by new sets of norms (taken to be social “facts”). This dynamic of generation, degeneration, and an eventual regeneration and transcendence in another shape and form (also popularized as Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis after Chalybäus’ commentary on Hegel)—under the weight of the antagonisms that come to manifest themselves as each Form of Life becomes “conscious” of itself—is critical to understanding the Hegelian approach to history and “unintended” “logical” achievement of progress. According to Hegel, this movement of Geist in history (in time and place) culminates in the Idea of Freedom. Accordingly, the Geist is in constant state of self-development and evolution, working out its own implications and coming to the full self-consciousness of itself as Spirit. It is always in a state of motion and change. As it evolves through the historical dialectic, Hegel maintains, it becomes evident for the philosopher of history that the purpose of this dialectic has been about the Geist understanding its own Freedom as its essence. History is the march of freedom through the world. As such, world history turns out to be the story of the progress and evolution of Geist’s consciousness of Freedom across time and (cultural) space. Suggesting an East-West trajectory to world history, he claims, (in moving from Asia to Europe) history of the world is “the development from the idea that one is free to the idea that some are free to the final Idea that all are free”. In so doing, he expands on the Principle of Subjectivity first propagated in the West by Descartes and later developed by Kant—emphasizing individual autonomy and freedom. As Dallmayr states, “Hegel located the core of modernity in the principle of "subjectivity" a principle which carried for him mainly the connotations of individualism, critical-rational competence, and autonomy of action” (see Dallmayr, “The Discourse of Modernity: Hegel and Habermas”) Using his famous “master-slave dialectic” and his notion of “struggle for Recognition”, he interprets this principle of subjectivity to mean that from now on all forms of domination and hierarchy and indeed all normative authority have to be rationally justified (as necessary) making themselves legitimate: it is no longer sufficient to say “I rule by nature or by divine sanction”. The fact that No authority is justified until it can prove itself as necessary through reason leads to the emergence of the concept of legitimacy. Hegel believes that modernity has showed us that this progress has been inevitable and indeed necessary for human flourishing (after all man is the embodiment of Geist). Overall, Geist is producing itself by thinking of itself (through us) as through our minds and our power of agency (practical reason and autonomy to use Kantian language) we are connected and in fact united with the Geist (and also its materialization). It is through our collective agencies, or the agency of Humanity in its multiple manifestations (in cultures) that Geist accrues agency and is thereby endowed with the potential to attain full realization at some point in the future. The advent of “modernity” and the Idea of Freedom Hegel hails as the long-coveted, although as yet incomplete and imperfect, indication of progress. Hegel does not believe the struggle for Recognition has now been resolved. Rather, this self-consciousness of Geist and of its quintessential Idea of Freedom, he describes as only the initial first step (likening it to the birth of a new born and the foundation of an unfinished building) in the long path to full realization, actualization, and maturation of Geist. In effect, in “modernity” we have gotten only a general idea of the Geist and its make-up, not a whole picture, and so our journey remains far from complete. This is why Hegel consistently refers to the Geist as dynamic and active and never at rest. What we have is an abstraction that still needs multiple (practical) manifestations (across cultures) in time in order to become actually concrete and allow us thorough comprehension of its full effects. It follows that Hegel views “modernity” as just the beginning of a new (and maybe final) chapter in the story of Geist. At the same time, since the Geist has finally reached the crucial stage in modernity to be self-conscious of itself (and hence turning self-critical and self-reflecting) and in process problematizing itself, it has become necessary to problematize “modernity” (as a concept) philosophically in order to get an even better appreciation of the Geist that has effectuated it, a task to which Hegel dedicates himself. First, he acknowledges “both the “emancipatory potential” and the “ambivalence” embedded in the principle of subjectivity”. Fred Dallmayr, “The Discourse of Modernity: Hegel and Habermas” In Habermas’ characterization, the principle of Subjectivity, “explained for [Hegel] simultaneously the superiority of the modern world and its crisis character, in the sense that it represents both a world of progress and of alienated spirit. For this reason the first attempt to conceptualize the modern era was at the same time a critique of modernity.” Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.27 Hegel recognizes an uneasiness to the experience of transition to modernity admitting that there is something in this new world order that is a major loss. He states, “Our own epoch is a time of birth and a transition to a new period. Geist (spirit/mind) has broken with the previous world of its existence and its ways of thinking….reshaping itself—the gradual process of dissolution (of the old order)…in a flash and at a single stroke brings to view the structure of the new world.” Hegel, Phenomenology of Geist, preface Accordingly, having philosophically equated Modernity with the Idea of Freedom and its unavoidable discovery by the Geist, Hegel begins to cope with the fallout of this discovery. He thus argues that the problem that modernity shall and must resolve is the inherent tension it engenders between the individual and the community, the self vis-à-vis the collective—this Hegel claims is a problematic relationship that must be harmonized as modernity becomes immanent. Hence, the Idea of Freedom has to be balanced against the reality of human communal living in order to be truly actualized. Having discovered Freedom, it is on its realization and ordering of society according to this principle of Freedom that the Geist will have to now struggle. If Europe gets the relationship wrong, then the project of freedom will likely be bestowed upon another culture which could now develop it further through correct instantiation and institutionalization bringing it to its ultimate completion. Given his belief in the natural sociability of man, the main dilemma for Hegel becomes how to preserve the bonds of community in a world defined by Freedom and the principle of subjectivity? How to reconcile his Idea of Freedom in its full implication (as subjectivism) with his appreciation of man’s communitarian and social nature and his concern for harmonious communal living? He lays out his solution to this conundrum in one of his most important and influential works Elements of the Philosophy of Right: to make Freedom immanent in the objective Spirit (Volkgeist). This, Hegel points out, entails replacing the Kantian notion of Moralität (universal rational morality) with his own notion of Sittlichkeit or ethical life (grounded in a community) that is mindful of the cultural fabric in which normative values (standards of Right and Wrong) are embedded. In this view, Freedom can only be saved from falling into the condition of adverse subjectivism by being objectivized in the Natio-cultural within which a Sittlichkeit is established—Freedom needs to be contextualized. Philosophy of Right is about understanding the ways in which Freedom is realized/turned concrete institutionally and practically (in a cultural setting/objective Spirit). Since the (infinite) Universal or “the absolute” exists only through its unity with the (finite) historic Particular or the “objective” by means of an active process, then “the self-transcendence of modernity encapsulated in the absolute spirit [as a general notion] is replicated, in somewhat different guise, on the level of objective Spirit” in order to become concrete. Dallmayr, p.687 Hegel is clever enough to realize the tension that subjective “individual” autonomy can have on mankind’s ability to live together given that our struggle for Recognition happens entirely in a social setting: although he celebrates human individuality and subjectivity, Hegel does not accept the individual (his subjectivity/personal autonomy) as a valid source of normative authority which always requires the other. At the heart of the Hegelian critique to Enlightenment modernity (espoused by a figure like Kant) lies his conviction that man is a social animal. Humans live and flourish in communities but they are also individual agents who require Recognition (of their social standing vis-à-vis the others). At the outset, when there is some kind of Recognition between two agents, and we do not presume at the outset that either of them share any principles (or any principles for settling disputes about principles), there can only be a struggle over such Recognition/Anerkennung. This is a struggle first and foremost over authority which always possesses social undertones. This is a crucial point for Hegel. Hegel‘s proposal to rectify this impasse is Sittlichkeit. Freedom thus is only meaningful in the presence of other agents; it necessitates the other. One cannot be Free without being recognized in the social space. Thus, “from Hegel's perspective individuals removed from public-ethical life are precisely unfree, since freedom is genuinely a public category” and not a private, individualistic one. Dallmayr, “The Discourse of Modernity: Hegel and Habermas”, p.691 Hegel is an avid critic of social contract theory: If the community is reduced to the sum of its individual members and is thus made secondary to the individual, Hegel posits, “and if its specific end is defined as the security and protection of property and individual freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and hence membership in the state not in the restricted sense of government but meaning cultural community as a whole which also includes government something optional. But the state's relation to the individual is quite different: since the former is objective Spirit, it is only as a member that the individual gains concrete objectivity, genuine individuality, and ethical life.” Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Par.258And so Hegel ushers in the idea of “national individuality” (Volkgeist/ Cultural Personality). In so doing, Hegel turns the philosophy of subjectivity on its head “with the aim of overcoming a subject-centered reason” which he sees as the ultimate source of all the possible shortcomings of modernity. Habermas, p.46 As Hegel proclaims, The idea of objective Spirit/Volkgeist “has this immense strength and depth that it allows the principle of subjectivity to unfold to the extreme of self-sustained individual separateness while simultaneously guiding the principle back into substantive unity and maintaining the latter within itself.” Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Par.260 Hence, the principle of subjectivity in the Hegelian sense finds its true “objective” realization in a higher subjectivity of a Cultural Whole overseen by the state—the Objective Spirit—and calibrated according to the principles of ethical life or Sittlichkeit. As established, the Idea of Freedom has been discovered in principle (in theory) but how this principle is to be exercised and implemented in actuality (the question of its institutionalization and what does it mean to be free practically) requires, according to Hegel, an entirely separate order of questioning. For this practical dimension, this inquiry must encompass the whole history of human existence and must entail looking into the past as well as the present. Hegel despises those who believe modernity is about the rejection of the past. In effect, Hegel is urging his “modern” counterparts to turn to the past for inspiration and apply its time-tested historical lessons under the novel rubric of (the general Idea of) Freedom. In order to become whole, modernity needs to embrace history. In Hegelian thought then, the only remedy to the turmoil and alienation that awaits modernity if it fails to free itself from false subjectivist interpretations of Freedom which breeds individualism, relativism, and even nihilism and despair is to create “an ethical totality/Sittlichkeit”, a notion “which is not germane to modern conditions but rather is borrowed from the idealized past of early Christian communities and the Greek polis,” using them as concrete and salutary examples. Habermas, p.42 It is from the ancients that he gets the idea of Sittlichkeit. To think for oneself freely and outside the confines of what was required of one socially (the Idea of Freedom in the Kantian sense) could effectively destroy the ethical/normative basis on which societies establish themselves by prioritizing subjective private reason over the (public) demands of the community: practically-speaking, this could set the subjective and objective Spirits (the private and public life) against one another. As a more empiricist thinker following in the footsteps of Hume and Herder, Hegel rejects Kant’s pure rationalism and his “rational” theory of morality. Hegel intuitively understand that humans do not always act on rational grounds, that their behaviors is often grounded on their passions, inclinations, and desires. These desires, Hegel believes, arise not in vacuum and for the individual independently, but in society. Thus, he needs an objective source of normative authority that could be binding for all members of a society. A source of authority which is out and above the self (external to him). This he finds in Sittlichkeit or standards of ethical life that naturally emerge within a “cultural universe” (Volkgeist). In the Hegelian view, these ethical ideals must also become the basis for laws and constitutions. Hegel seeks the normative neither in logos (like Kant) nor in pathos (like Rousseau), but in ethos (like Aristotle). In Philosophy of Right, “through his examination of the ethical life of the modern subject, Hegel provides a profound analysis of the conflicts inherent in the modern world, most especially the conflicts between the self and community in a liberal society.” Cecil L. Eubanks, “Subject and Substance: Hegel on Modernity”, Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law, Volume 6, Fall 2005, pp. 101-125 The Importance of Sittlichkeit in Hegelian thought expresses the harmony that is achieved through a collective conception of the “normative” in the social/cultural setting, which reflects common faith in the general structures around which the Form of Life is organized—a shared ethos in the realm of ethical life that is enriching to the individual and “thickens” his description of himself. It reflects the unity of the individual (and his interests) with the community at large (and its common good). In creating a Sittlichkeit, cultures could unify the subject and substance and harmonize “individuality” with “community” to simultaneously get the benefits of both (as it was briefly experienced in Periclean Athens). Hegel’s understanding of the Idea of Freedom cherishes at the same time both the primacy of “community” (organic part) and the free spirit of “individuality” (spontaneous part), and so it demands a distinctive set of shared normative values (common ethos which all individuals accept) that could keep the society as a whole in equilibrium. Conclusion In many ways, Hegel is among the first thinkers to reflect on the issue of modernity and tackle its supposed discontents thus opening the door to the study of the “problematic of modernity”. Hegel is a particularly important figure for he is the first to shine light on “modernity” as a “crystallized” concept (post-French Revolution/Enlightenment) which could finally in Hegel’s time begin to be studied and analyzed. It is in Hegel’s thought that modernity becomes self-aware of its own emergence so to speak. As Habermas puts it, Hegel was “the first philosopher to develop a clear conception of modernity”, for it was during his time that “the problem of the self-understanding of modernity became so acute that Hegel could perceive it as a philosophical problem and more-over as the basic problem of his philosophy”. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985) In process, Hegelian thought informs and influences the later discourse on the topic. To use Dallmayr’s characterization, “Hegel inaugurates the modern discourse in its multidimensionality and thus established the parameters for the continuation of this discourse by subsequent thinkers and schools of thought. By erecting these parameters, Hegel also serves as the basic foil or backdrop against which the later anti-discourse, initiated by Nietzsche and pursued by his heirs, is prominently profiled.” Fred Dallmayr, “The Discourse of Modernity: Hegel and Habermas”, Journal of Philosophy, p.684 As I think I have been able to show throughout the course of this paper, Hegel Innately understood the sheer significance of the “modern project” (and its implications) and the need to cope with it philosophically and phenomenologically. While championing subjectivity and individuality as engines for creativity and inventiveness representing the good in the modern project, Hegel rejected subjectivism and individualism (the bad in modernity) which he saw as dehumanizing and alienating inevitably culminating in nihilism, relativism, and absence of norms and values. For Hegel, modernity is (the unfolding of) the Idea of Freedom and the Geist’s self-consciousness of itself as Freedom. This Freedom (Universal) however remains as yet an elusive abstraction, a generality that is in need of becoming concrete through its manifestation (in the Particular). It (Freedom) is a universal truth that is one and the same everywhere, but how it is ushered in across cultures, how it is implemented, and how it understands itself varies. So ultimately for Hegel, everything relates to the interpretation of this general/abstract Idea of Freedom which has revealed itself to be the Universal. Hegel predicts that interpreting the principle of subjectivity/ Freedom as pure subjectivity of the “self” causes deep tension between the individual and the community, eradicating the source of normative authority and leading to discontent and disillusionment. His response to this is problem calls for recovering and reinforcing normative authority in the modern age best accomplished by means of a Sittlichkeit. In light of this, the fullest and most objective expression of subjectivity, for Hegel, occurs at the level of the national culture/ objective Spirit: it is really through the autonomy and the self-determination of the Volkgeist that the principle of subjectivity is ultimately realized. Hegel is a harbinger of the Idea of “Multiple Modernities”. In the course of the Geist coming to self-consciousness of itself as Spirit, the Idea of Freedom emerges as an (abstract) universal precept, but its immanence—the way it is actualized (through us humans who embody the Geist)—could vary, potentially producing a whole gamut of (manifestations of) human Freedom across the globe. This Idea of Freedom, Hegel maintains, is only objectivized and actualized in what we would today call civilizations or cultures (that is distinctive human collectivities with unique constellation of values) and so the realization of Freedom for Hegel comes to be inherently tied with the notion of Sittlichkeit—the ethical system in which one makes choices which is itself free to differ from the prevailing Sittlichkeit of another cultural domain. The Universal Idea of Freedom understood in this way thus demands the proliferation of multiple ethical/normative systems across the globe each expressing and hence actualizing this freedom—the conception that “all are free”—differently in their own unique and creative ways and more importantly having the freedom to engage in this actualization that transpires on the global stage in the first place. Ultimately in the Hegelian conception, the same underling idea/principle can and will have different expressions across the cultural universes. By claiming that there could exist different renditions of the universal ideal (i.e. Freedom) in modernity and that these manifestations could be actually conducive to the essential meaning and self-discovery of modernity itself, Hegel is the first philosopher to give credence to the conception of Multiple Modernities some two hundred years before the idea was explicitly expressed. As such, Hegel’s philosophical program is informed by his unique breed of “historicist universalism” while his view of modernity advances no doubt a kind of “heterogeneous monism” The notion of Heterogeneous Monism could be contrasted against the Homogenous Monism/ absolute cosmopolitanism of Kant. In fact, it could be argued that Hegelian system develops really as the result of Hegel’s endeavor to rationally reconcile the ideas of Kant with those of his nemesis Herder producing the ultimate systematic synthesis of their philosophies. which parallels quite nicely with recent theories of multiple modernities. As such, the most pivotal conclusion drawn from Hegel is that the manners in which the Idea of Freedom is actualized and put into practice could differ across cultural complexes (Freedom is the general premise but it could adopt multi-fold expressions across cultures). it could attain multiple manifestations. It is the universal particularizing itself in a plurality of ways. And even though Freedom is the universal Idea, it can still mean different things across different Gestalt des Geistes. This profound diversity in applications of the Idea of Freedom across cultural contexts could indeed prove salutary in finally (although the nature of our agency means that we cannot know this ex-ante) resolving the unsolved struggle of Recognition/Anerkennung. According to Hegel, to be modern means that people are free to think for themselves and in doing so acquire an inherent dignity. However, humans actualize their freedom of choice within a particular culture in accordance to a unique ordering of the ethical system of life in that cultural complex. This is the underlying reason why Hegel, consistent with his emphasis on “Freedom”, refuses to speculate about the future insisting on the unpredictability of the future. Precisely because, the Idea of Freedom in the Hegelian framework can manifest itself in a multiplicity of ways across the various human cultures and how it evolves across these different cultures underlines the dynamism of both Geist and humanity. In this fashion, Hegel impresses upon his careful readers that the story is far from finished and that it has certainly not ended in 19th Century Europe. 8 | Page