Kuhn, naturalism and cognitive psychology

September 7, 2012) I have argued that the Kuhn of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions promotes a naturalistic study of science. The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge is also seen by many of its proponents as a naturalistic approach to science, and as such may be seen as part of the Kuhnian legacy. Nonetheless, I argue that it has been an inadequate successor to Kuhn. In particular, its emphasis on externalist explanations of scientific change are inconsistent with Kuhn's model of scientific development. A more faithful and fruitful heir to Kuhn's legacy is the cohort of psychological and cognitive studies into scientific reasoning as based on exemplars and their like.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas S. Kuhn In the “Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” Thomas Kuhn pursues developing a new way of explaining the nature of science, particularly the development of scientific thought throughout history. Thus, he poses a strong argument which lies in the idea that there is no static nature of science, and that scientific thought changes, going through revolutionary transformations. Hence Kuhn undermines logic positivism because scientific thought is explained in logical terms. The main question his position asks is, is he successful in the task he has proposed in his book? Kuhn’s principle concepts will be analyzed to study how he aims to understand the development of scientific thought. On the one hand, he defines each concept. On the other hand, each of those concepts will be analyzed in such a way to be able to argue if there is a flaw or ambiguity within the general analytical framework Kuhn deploys to explain the nature of science.

Perspectives on Science, 2005

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2012

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn's proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn's thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and identify two broad strands of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other focusses on cognitive habits. After contrasting these, I argue that the conceptual strand fails to be a complete account of scientific revolutions. We need a broad approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology and cognitive science.

2015

In this essay I argue that Kuhn’s account of science, as it was articulated in The Structure of Scientiªc Revolutions, was mainly defended on philosophical rather than historical grounds. I thus lend support to Kuhn’s later claim that his model can be derived from ªrst principles. I propose a transcendental reading of his work and I suggest that Kuhn uses historical examples as anti-essentialist Wittgensteinian “reminders ” that expose a variegated land-scape in the development of science. T. S. Kuhn was a physicist who became a historian, but who also wrote a book, the Structure of Scientiªc Revolutions (1970),1 that proved seminal in philosophy of science. In that book, unlike what was typical in philosophy of science before the so-called historical turn, there are quite a few refer-ences to particular cases from the history of science. After the Structure, and all the praise and controversy that it evoked, Kuhn published Black-Body Theory and Quantum Discontinuity (1987), a book ...

2009

American Psychologist, 1985

2016