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2008, European Review of Agricultural Economics
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2 pages
1 file
This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to
We develop a model for studying dynamic competition in environments with frictions that lead to partial lock-in of customers to products. The dynamic aspects associated with customer retention and acquisition introduce pricing incentives that do not exist in more traditional, static product markets. The proposed model, while highly stylized, maintains certain symmetry properties that allow us to obtain equilibrium existence and uniqueness. We then study the comparative statics of the model and derive a closed-form relationship between average equilibrium markups and the Herfindahl index. We illustrate how the model can be used by analyzing mergers in such a dynamic environment.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition in two variables: capacity and prices. The model has a two-stage setup. In the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a product-differentiated, price setting game in the second stage. Since costs are endogenized through the first stage, this has important implications for the measurement of market power in the product market. In particular, simpler one-stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market power, which can be linked to the taxonomy for two-stage games given in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). We then estimate this model-demand, cost (short and long run), and conduct-for the European Airline Industry using data for the period of 1976-1990. We perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one-stage specification in favor of our two-stage setup. In particular, we find that some degree of market power in the product market exists. However, market power in the two-stage setup is significantly lower than in the more widely employed one-stage specification, which is consistent with the direction of bias in puppy-dog games. This illustrates that firms market power in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted for.
2005
A generalized measure of market power is derived that accounts for both supply expansion by the competitive fringe and multi-market participation by the dominant firm. Traditional market power measures are shown to be biased-upward (downward) in the case of complements (substitutes). Numerical simulations suggest that this bias can be pronounced. These findings have potentially important implications for antitrust in the new economy as there may be a natural tendency for certain markets to “tip” in favor of a dominant provider.
… at the annual meetings of the …, 2002
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2007
De ep pa ar rt ta am me en nt to o d de e E Ec co on no om mí ía a U Un ni iv ve er rs si id da ad d d de e O Ov vi ie ed do o Available online at: www.uniovi.es/economia/edp.htm * * *
Antitrust Law Journal, 2007
for helpful suggestions and Farrell Malone for research assistance. Professor Hausman served as a consultant for O2 in the Com Reg proceeding discussed in the article and filed two declarations. Both authors have previously served as consultants to Vodafone and to eircom. 1 See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 0.1 (1992, revised 1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]. 2 See Commission Regulation, Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power, 2002 O.J. (C 165) 6, 14-15 ¶ 70 [hereinafter SMP Guidelines]. 3 The guidelines provide the analytical framework used by the agencies and provide guidance in shaping enforcement policy. For example, the Merger Guidelines state the goal is "to reduce the uncertainty associated with enforcement of the antitrust laws in this area." See Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at 0.
2000
Market definition plays a key role in competition analysis and has often proved controversial. However, it is merely a means to an end, the real issue being to establish whether or not firms have significant market power, i.e. the power to increase prices. This objective is rather different to the traditional neo-classical economic view of a market. The introduction of the SSNIP test in the US Department of Justice 1982 Merger Guidelines resulted in the development of new methods for defining markets and for measuring market power directly, thus eliminating the need to define the market at all.
This paper describes a mode of economic analysis one can use to measure market power in the context of antitrust litigation in the steel plate industry. We describe our framework of analysis, our method of defining the relevant market and the indicia we examine to evaluate the degree of market power exercised by the Defendant in this market.
2017
We explain that traditional approaches to defining markets to investigate market power fail in times of rapid technological change because demand and supply are in constant flux. Currently, empirical analyses of markets rely upon historical data, the value of which degrades over time, possibly resulting in harmful regulatory decisions. This points to a need for a different approach to determining when regulation is an appropriate response to market power. We present an approach that relies upon essential factors leading to monopoly (EFs), such as control of essential resources, which persist across generations of products. Market power analyses should be a search for EFs and policy responses should focus on diffusing the market power without destroying value. Our research constructs a theoretical model to illustrate the decay problem and the value of the EFs approach, and uses the telecommunications industry to illustrate our approach.
SIEPI Doctoral workshop. Rome, 2006
Chamberlin (1935: 3) states that,“it has, in the main, been assumed that the price system is like this–that all the phenomena to be explained are either competitive or monopolistic, and therefore that expedient of two purified and extremes types of theory is adequate”. However, in some case, paradoxical results occur, as analyzed by Clark (1923: 417),“if all the competitors followed suit instantly the moment any cut was made, each would gain his quota of the resulting increases in output, and no one would gain any larger proportion of his ...
F. Lafarga & L. Pegenaute (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la traducción en españa, Madrid, Gredos, 2009, p. 349-350., 2009
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