Nigeria’s Reckoning: An Introduction to Boko Haram

Nigeria’s Reckoning: An Introduction to Boko Haram Michael Kinzer 3 August 2014 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 History General Nigerian History Maitatsine Revolts of the 1980’s The Early History of Boko Haram AS‐DJ’s Fall and Defeat Reemergence of Boko Haram Ansaru Government Response Goals of Boko Haram Organizational Ties 4 4 4 5 7 8 10 10 11 12 Attack Analysis Attack Timeline Reemergence of Boko Haram Attack Analysis Additional Analysis 15 15 16 19 19 Organizational Structure 22 Conflict Analysis Causes of Grievances Vehicles Shaping Responses to Grievances into Support for & Participation in Boko Haram Summary of Conflict Analysis 24 25 Appendix 29 Bibliography 30 26 27 2 Executive Summary Nigeria has faced a host of problems since its independence in 1960. While Boko Haram is the largest Islamist uprising Nigeria has faced, Nigeria has successfully put down other Islamists uprisings, namely the Maitasine Revolts in the 1980’s. While Boko Haram’s history reaches back to the 1990’s, it only emerged as an insurgency in summer 2010. Summer 2009, it was nearly destroyed by Nigerian forces, only to reemerge radicalized as in insurgency in summer 2010. During this year in between, some – but not all – members of Boko Haram were trained by AQIM and Al‐Shabab. Upon its reemergence, Boko Haram has mostly targeted Nigerian police, churches, government buildings and civilians. In 2012, “Ansaru” split from Boko Haram. Ansaru is more internationally focused than Boko Haram. Recent reports suggest the two groups have reconciled, but remain separate. Boko Haram is a very diffuse organization made up of cells. There is no actual organizational structure; however, the varying factions within Boko Haram seek to maintain a public image of unity. As they are very diffuse and represent a variety of factions, there is no single mission statement or objective. Generally, Boko Haram seeks to establish Sharia in at least northern Nigeria, as they see the secular Nigerian state as inherently forsaken. Boko Haram has received significant support from AQIM and a limited‐but‐tangible amount of training from Al‐Shabab; alternatively, Ansaru, being far more international focused, has much closer ties to AQIM. Largely as a result of the being trained by those jihadist groups, Boko Haram’s attacks have dramatically increased in sophistication, in diversity of type, and in total number over the last four years. Boko Haram primarily operates in northeast Nigeria, at the intersection of numerous porous borders. Recently, Boko Haram has begun to increase attacks in the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Boko Haram exists and persists for a complex web of reasons. Northern Muslim Nigerians have grievances with the Nigerian state and society – as they suffer from disproportionately high rates of absolute poverty, become victims to widespread police brutality and state corruption, and experience a general sense of alienation from the richer, more developed Christian south. These grievances are articulated into support for Boko Haram through the “vehicles” of Salafist ideology, susceptible impoverished youth, and feelings of revenge against the brutal Nigerian security forces. Boko Haram, in turn, is further supported by AQIM and is able to flourish in the absence of strong Nigerian security apparatuses. 3 History: General Nigerian History In the mid 1800’s a man by the name of Usman dan Fodio (or Shaikh Usman Ibn Fodio, 1754–1817) founded the Sokoto Caliphate in modern‐day northern Nigeria. 1 The Sokoto Caliphate held political power and sovereignty over that region until 1903. In 1903, the British abolished the Sokoto Caliphate’s political power; however, the Sokoto Caliph retained the position of spiritual leader of the Muslims in northern Nigeria, a position that his successor still holds today. 2 Between 1903 and 1914, Nigeria underwent a process of colonization. In 1914, the British established the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. In 1960, Nigeria officially gained its independence from the British. In 1966, the country experienced its first coup, followed by the brutal Biafran Civil War. In short, the Biafran Civil War arose when the Igbo people of southeast Nigeria declared their independence from the rest of Nigeria in 1967. Over the next three years, the Nigerian federal government fought – at times through quite brutal tactics such as indiscriminate blockades leading to charges of genocide3 – the newly self‐ established “Republic of Biafra,” culminating in the eventual victory of the federal Nigerian government and the dissolution of an independent Biafran country. Throughout the next thirty years, Nigeria faced a series of coups, and Nigeria was mostly ruled by a series of military juntas. In 1999, the election of a democratically elected president ended that cycle of coups. Since 1999, the government has faced serious challenges – namely: massive poverty, corruption, ethnic and religious violence primarily in the “Middle Belt” region that separates the Muslim‐majority north from the Christian‐ majority south, etc. (For further reading on the ethno‐religious violence plaguing Nigeria before Boko Haram, consult the well‐written and detailed August 2010 USAID Nigeria Conflict Assessment, “Politics by Other Means: Nigeria Conflict Assessment.” Bibliographic details can be found in the Appendix and the Bibliography of this paper.) Maitatsine Revolts of the 1980’s While there have been countless Muslim organizations (mostly peaceful, but occasionally violent) formed since the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate as a political entity in 1903, no other movement deserves the attention of the Maitatsine Revolts – aside from Boko Haram. These revolts are eponymously named after Mohammadu Marwa – known by the nickname “Maitatsine,” which roughly means in the Hausa language as “he who curses.4” His followers were known as the Yan Tatsine, the latter word being the same as the latter part of the name “Maitatsine,” thus meaning the followers of Maitatsine. Maitatsine was known for his profoundly heterodox Muslim teachings; for example, he claimed the title of the Seal of the Prophets for himself over Muhammad (PBUH), rejected 1 Paden, John. “The Sokoto Caliphate and its Legacies (1804‐2004). Ibid. 3 BBC World News. “Biafra: Thirty Years On.” 13 Jan 2000. 4 Pham, Peter. “In Nigeria False Prophets are Real Problems.” 06 Oct 2006. 2 4 the Sunnah and the Hadith, and called for harm on other Muslim leaders5. Emigrated from neighboring Cameroon and based in the city of Kano, Maitatsine had gained significant popularity throughout the 1970’s amongst the poor, the youth, and the immigrant population of northern Nigeria. According to J. Peter Pham, writing for the World Defense Review, “Fired by his preaching, Maitatsine's students, thought to number several thousand, ratcheted up their verbal and, increasingly, physical assaults on what they saw as the corruption of within the Muslim community of Kano. Things came to a head in December 1980 when Yan Tatsine attacks on other religious figures as well as the police led the Nigerian army to intervene directly against the mallam [a title of Maitatsine’s]. The subsequent armed clashes – the students proved to be remarkably well armed – resulted in the deaths of around five thousand people, including Maitatsine himself.6 Following the initial clashes in December 1980, a series of related revolts led by members of Yan Tatsine erupted over the next five years, the last major riots occurring April 1985.7 According to scholar Mervyn Hiskett, most scholarship frames the successes Maitatsine amassing a large following and the revolts themselves in more‐or‐less socioeconomic terms.8 For example, most literature highlights the poverty of Yan Tatsine’s members, juxtaposed against the new wealth that oil was bringing to Nigerian elites. The Early History of Boko Haram: The “official” founding date of Boko Haram ranges from 2002 to 2004 depending on the publication consulted; however, the “official” formation date is somewhat irrelevant, as the current militant movement referred to as Boko Haram only reemerged powerfully in summer 2010. As noted by a document prepared by the House Committee of Homeland Security, “[Boko Haram] was not founded as a violent insurgency bent on overthrowing the Nigerian government. [It was f]ounded in the mid‐1990s as a religious study group.”9 This “religious study group” refers to members of the “Al‐haji Muhamaddu Ndimi” Mosque (the Ndimi Mosque) in Maiduguri, the capital of the state of Borno, the northernmost and easternmost state – bordering Chad, Cameron, and Niger – within Nigeria. A group known as “Ahlus Sunna10” – a group established by Nigerian graduates of the Islamic University of Medina focusing on Wahhabism and “Dawa” (proselytization) – had been active in northern 5 Elizabeth Isichei, “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980‐85: A Revolt of the Disinherited.” Oct 1987. Pham, 2006. 7 Ibid. 8 Hiskett, Mervyn. “The Maitatsine Revolts in 1980: An Asssesment.” Oct 1987. p. 210 9 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, “BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” Nov 2011. 10 “Ahlus Sunna” is the transliteration that scholar Brigaglia uses in her paper. A Human Rights Watch report (p.30) refers to the group as “Al Sunna wal Jamma.” As a speaker of Arabic, I (the author) would surmise that both transliterations are inaccurate, and that the group’s actual name would best be transliterated as “Ahl Sunna wal Jamma’a, which translates literally as “People of the Prophet’s teachings and Community.” As the three key words of the group’s name are three of the most common words in the Islamic Arabic lexicon, this name is remarkably nondescript. 6 5 Nigeria for a number of years.11 This group had a particularly large following at the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri. In 2002, a group within the Ndimi community in Maiduguri withdrew to the more remote, scarcely populated village of Kanama in the neighboring Yobe state.12 There, under the leadership of a man named Muhammad Ali, the group formed its own community to practice “pure Islam.” Over the next few months, the group earned from its neighbors and the local media the nickname “the Nigerian Taliban,” a reference to the group’s similarity in strict implementations of Sharia law over its members. The “Nigerian Taliban” did not coexist peacefully with their neighbors, culminating in a large‐scale confrontation with the Nigerian police in December 2003 after a dispute about fishing rights.13 The Nigerian Taliban – members of the Muhammad Ali’s group – attacked Nigerian police officers in the confrontation, leading to an uprising by the Nigerian Taliban14; in response to both the immediate attacks and general local tension between the Nigerian Taliban and its neighbors, the Nigerian police ultimately ended up sieging Ali’s mosque in Kanama, resulting in the deaths of over 70 members including Ali himself. After the destruction of the mosque in Kanama, the survivors the “Nigerian Taliban” returned to Maiduguri to the Ndimi mosque. Later that year, one of the survivors of the Kanama mosque siege – Muhammad Yusuf – split from Ndimi mosque and from the Ahlus Sunna to found the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque also in Maiduguru. With the foundation of the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, Yusuf also split from Ahlus Sunna to found the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal‐Jihad (abbreviated AS‐DJ). When one examines this name (and knows some Arabic), one sees that Yusuf took the name “Ahlus Sunna” which translates to people of Sunnah (the most nondescript name a Muslim group could give themselves) and added the section Lidda'awati Wal‐Jihad which translates as “for proselytization and for Jihad.” By choosing this name for his organization, Yusuf simultaneously points to the organization from which his organization was born, but also differentiates his organization with a focus on Jihad, evidencing his and his group’s radicalization following their experiences of the mosque siege in Kanama.15 His new mosque community quickly spread into the neighboring states, and established a “state within a state.”16 Similar to the “Nigerian Taliban,” the AS‐DJ earned their own nickname from their neighbors – “Boko Haram,” which roughly translates from the Hausa language as “western education is forbidden.” This phrase “Boko Haram” was not a self‐chosen term, but rather a jab from its largely Muslim neighbors, mocking the group for Yusuf’s critique of Western education and public service in the Nigerian government.17 In short, the organization referred to as Boko Haram was “officially” founded by Yusuf in 2004 in Maiduguri, Borno;18 although it would not officially adopt its full current 11 Brigaglia, Andrea, “Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al‐Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria.” 2012. 12 Ibid. 13 Walker, Andrew, “What is Boko Haram.” June 2012. 14 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Forces Abuses in Nigeria.” 2012. 15 Brigaglia. 16 Walker, p 3. 17 Brigaglia, p. 37 18 Brigaglia, p. 38. 6 name until 2010 as the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal‐Jihad (AS‐DJ)19. Yusuf, and his immediate followers, had previously been members of the “Nigerian Taliban,” a breakaway group that attempted to create a puritan Islamic community near the village of Kanama, Yobe in 2002‐2003. The group known as the Nigerian Taliban broke away for the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, a mosque that served as a center for the Ahlus Sunna, a Nigerian group established with the intentions of proselytizing, and influenced by Wahhabi thought. AS‐DJ’s Fall and Defeat While over the next several years, Boko Haram/ AS‐DJ did not stage any large attacks on any religious, government, or private institutions, it would be inaccurate to say that they coexisted entirely peacefully. For example, in 2007, they orchestrated the assassination of the popular preacher Shiekh Ja’far who had become critical of AS‐DJ’s “hardline ideology.”20 Tellingly, as Sheikh Ja’far was both a member of Alhus Sunna and would occasionally preach at the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, his assassination solidified AS‐DJ’s split from its mother organization. For the most part, despite minor attacks and clashes with Nigerian police and local security forces, AS‐DJ was not involved in any high‐ profile violence beyond the assassination of Sheikh Ja’far until 2009. Confrontations in 2009 mark the modern emergence of Boko Haram. Therefore, while the history above is important to understanding the ideology, the background and the motivations of early Boko Haram/ AS‐DJ, the “modern history” of Boko Haram does not begin until 2009. According to the Human Rights Watch: The confrontation began on June 11, [2009] in Maiduguri when government security personnel and participants in a Boko Haram funeral procession clashed over mourners’ refusal to wear motorcycle helmets. Members of an anti‐robbery task force comprised of military and police personnel opened fire on the procession, injuring 17. Yusuf demanded justice, but the authorities neither investigated the alleged excessive use of force nor apologized for the shooting.21 Over the next month and a half, violence escalated as both Boko Haram and the Nigerian military exchanged attacks across Borno, Yobe, and Kano states.22 The violence came to its climax between 27 and 30 July as Boko Haram gained and then quickly lost military control of most of Maiduguri. The Nigerian military, by the end of the week, had effectively crushed this rebellion, killed around 800 Boko Haram members and had arrested hundreds, including Mohammad Yusuf himself. By the end of 30 July, the police had extra‐judiciously killed Yusuf while in custody in addition to dozen of other members. 19 Zenn, Jacob, CTC Sentinel, “Can Nigeria Exploit the Split in the Boko Haram Movement?” 22 September 2011. 20 Walker, p. 4. 21 HRW, p. 33. 22 HRW, p. 34. 7 Following the what‐was‐understood‐as a militarily “successful” crushing of Boko Haram in July 2009, the group went “underground”23 for about a year’s time, only to reemerge the summer of 2010. There is no consensus on what the group did during its year underground; however, most agree that Boko Haram dissipated for about a year in the neighboring provinces. According to Andrew Walker, writing a report for USIP in June 2012, there are reports of Nigerians (presumably Boko Haram members) at “insurgent training camps in Algeria during this time,” 24 the UN Security Council believes Boko Haram members trained at “Tuareg rebel camp in Mali,” and that Abubakar Shekau (current Boko Haram leader) was in Cameroon, along with the other leaders, during this time. 25 Jacob Zenn, writing for the CTC Sentinel, traces the whereabouts of Abubakar Shekau –the current leader of Boko Haram–, Mamman Nur –the temporary leader of Boko Haram in between Yusuf and Shekau and the planner of the 2011 UN attacks in Abuja– and a number of other Boko Haram members. Zenn states that Shekau largely hid out in the state of Borno throughout this time, while “Nur was one of Yusuf’s few followers who fled to East Africa (reportedly to Somalia) and trained with al‐Shabab and AQIM militants.”26 Additionally, the International Crisis Group noted (citing their own interviews conducted in Abuja earlier that year) in a December 2010 report that Boko Haram, “[took] refuge in neighboring Niger and Chad, or simply [laid] low in Maiduguri,” for that year.27 In summary, it appears that for the year following the July 2009 military defeat of Boko Haram, most Boko Haram members went underground somewhere. While researchers generally do not definitively know where most members spent their time, these reports above suggest that Boko Haram members spent that time A) mostly lying low locally, either in Borno, the neighboring states, or the bordering countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon B) to a lesser, but significant, degree scattered across western Africa in the countries of Mali and Algeria working with groups like AQIM C) to a very small degree, to east Africa to receive training from Al‐Shabab. Reemergence of Boko Haram In June and July of 2010, Boko Haram announced its return to military action. On 14 June 2010, “the head of [AQIM] stated that his group would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other support in order to expand its own reach,”28 via an Al‐Jazeera interview. More importantly, in mid‐July 2010, Abubakar Shekau officially announced the return of Boko Haram to Nigeria in a video.29 In the video, he also announced that Boko Haram would be taking vengeance against those responsible for Yusuf’s death and praised Islamic insurgencies throughout the entire world. 30 On 7 September 2010, Boko Haram broke into a prison in Bauchi province, where they freed over 100 Boko Haram members whom had been arrested the year before in the 23 HRW, p. 36. Walker, p. 4. 25 ibid, pp. 4‐5. 26 Zenn, Jacob, CTC Sentinel, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria,” 24 February 2014. 27 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict.” 20 December 2010. p. 37. 28 Pham, Peter, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat.” April 2012. p. 3. 29 Reuters, “Nigerian Sect Leaders Praises al Qaeda, Warns U.S.” 30 Pham, 2012, p. 4 24 8 July 2009 arrests and an additional 750 other prisoners. 31 In the months preceding and following this prison break (July through October 2010), Boko Haram began a “series of assassinations in Maiduguri,”32 primarily committing the assassinations as a means of revenge and via drive‐by shootings on motorcycles, primarily killing those that had preached and/or spoke against Boko Haram.33 Over the next few years, Boko Haram carried out hundreds of attacks, mostly in northeast Nigeria. The attacks have varied in frequency, severity, and type. The next section of this paper, “Attack Analysis” will detail the attacks themselves, and provide analysis of the attacks’ evolution over the past four years; however, a short summary of the attacks is necessary to frame the history of the group over the last four years. Christmas time 2010, Boko Haram bombed a number of churches in the northeast 34 states. Boko Haram continued a series of attacks over the next few months, but did not gain international media attention until August 2011. During this time, they continued to target individuals who had cooperated with the police to work against Boko Haram. They also continued to kill police officers and steal their weapons and attack police checkpoints in Borno and Yobe, mostly employing “hit‐and‐run” tactics.35 On 26 August 2011, a Boko Haram member detonated a suicide VBIED (Vehicle‐Based IED) on a UN compound in Abuja (Nigeria’s capitol).36 While one could write an entire analytic report on the August 2011 attack on the UN compound, analyses of the attacks reveal four important elements. Namely: 1) The UN bombing was the second suicide attack and the second VBIED used by Boko Haram (the first was a mildly unsuccessful suicide VBIED detonation on a police headquarters in Abuja on 16 June 2011).37 Both attacks occurred after the return of Maaman Nur to Boko Haram. 2) The attacks are believed to have been planned by Maamaan Nur upon his return to Nigeria after training with Al‐Shabab militants in Somalia.38 3) This attack was Boko Haram’s first attack – and largely the only attack to date – on a distinctly international target. 39 4) Given numbers 1, 2, and 3, the UN bombing is believed to have been Maamaan’s attempt to evolve Boko Haram from a primarily locally focused militant group to a group with more explicit emphases on global jihad. Following these attacks, Boko Haram continued high levels of violence at governmental and civilian targets for the next few months.40 In December 2011, Boko Haram carried out some of its largest attacks to date against churches the northeastern provinces, killing dozens of Christians. 31 Pham, 2012, p. 4. ICG, 2010, p. 33. 33 HRW, p. 93. 34 HRW, p. 94. 35 Walker, p. 5. 36 Stratfor, “Boko Haram Adjusts its Methods.” 24 April 2014. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 Walker, p. 1. 40 Pham, 2012, p. 5. 32 9 During this time, Boko Haram’s leadership proved it was unwilling to negotiate with the Nigerian government. Notably, in September 2011, Yusuf’s brother‐in‐law Babakura Fugu, ostensibly speaking on behalf of Boko Haram, participated in exploratory talks with the Nigerian government. Later that month other Boko Haram members assassinated him. Additionally, a group of centrist Boko Haram members stated that Boko Haram was willing to negotiate. Several days letter, these members were publically beheaded. 41 During this time, Boko Haram witnessed the formation of a splinter group, known as “Ansaru” as a result of a number of disagreements and differing goals. In short, Ansaru condemns the violence against Muslim civilians, and it attacks Western targets, and seeks to reclaim the dignity of the Sokoto Caliphate. Ansaru is detailed in greater depth below. Lastly, while the attacks of Boko Haram will explored in depth in the “Attack Analysis” section, Boko Haram shot to international attention in April 2014, when Boko Haram members abducted some 200 school girls from the city of Chibok, Borno – a city located around 100km south of Maiduguri. 42 ANSARU In January 2012, a group known as “Ansaru” broke off from Boko Haram. Ansaru, or formally Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (“Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa”). The group split from Boko Haram over several disagreements. First, Ansaru took umbrage with Boko Haram’s indiscriminate violence against fellow Muslims. Rather, Ansaru believes only non‐Muslims should be harmed in the attacks that they preform. Secondly, Ansaru, far more internationally focused than Boko Haram, believes that their work should extend beyond Nigeria. As noted above, the only notable attack against a distinctly non‐Nigerian target claimed by Boko Haram was the 2011 attack on the UN building, which was coordinated by Maaman Nur (who is rumored by some to be influential within Ansaru). Ansaru has determined to focus its attacks on Western individuals, institutions, and entities. 43 According to Jacob Zenn, in January 2012, Ansaru actually distributed fliers announcing their formation and condemning Boko Haram’s violence against other Muslims.44 Government response: On 31 December 2011, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathon (president since May 2010) declared a state of emergency in response to Boko Haram’s violence. The state of emergency covered fifteen local city governments, where violence was the worst, thus creating fifteen pockets of states of emergencies across the states of Borno, Yobe, Plateau, and Niger.45 In Nigeria, states of emergency only last for six months before they have to be extended, and thus when Jonathon did not renew the state of emergency in June 2012, it 41 Walker, p. 5. BBC World News, “Nigeria Abductions: Timeline of Events.” 12 May 2014. 43 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), “Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (JAMBS – Ansaru).” 44 Zenn, Feb 2014. 45 HRW, p. 83. 42 10 expired.46 Within a year’s time, in May 2013, President Johnathon declared another state of emergency in the three states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.47 It was later extended in November 2013 and in May 2014. If Jonathon desires to extend the state of emergency a third time, he must ask permission from the National Assembly in November 2014. 48 As of August 2013, Nigeria had deployed 8,000 troops to the area under the state of emergency.49 As part of that second declaration, Jonathon created vigilante units to fight Boko Haram. The main government military force is the “Joint Task Force” (JTF); the vigilante units were comprised of civilians and the units are called “Civilian Joint Task Force” (CJTF). Despite a full counteroffensive undertaken by the Nigerian state, results have proven inconclusive. Many of the JTFs and the CJTFs are infamous for their extra‐judicious killings, human rights abuses, and corruption.50 Internationally, on 13 November 2013 the United States designated the groups known as Boko Haram and Ansaru to be Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s).51 Goals of Boko Haram Below (in the Organizational Structure Section), this paper will note how very diffuse Boko Haram is. It will also note that Boko Haram is constantly at risk for further splintering as not every faction within Boko Haram agrees on what Boko Haram’s goals should be. Thus, there is no formal manifesto; Boko Haram lacks the institutional unity to distinguish between orthodox and heterodox goals; rather, the varying sects have varying goals. Enumerated below are some of the largest components to the goals and intentions of Boko Haram. 1) AS‐DJ, despite its more popular name Boko Haram, is not only against “western education.” AS‐DJ, Boko Haram, is an extraordinarily complex organization with a combination of Salifist ideology, grievance, revenge, and ethnic tension driving its leadership. 2) Walker, writing for USIP, writes, “Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes northern politics has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a ‘pure’ Islamic state ruled by sharia law.”52 3) Boko Haram’s full name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda‐awati Wal‐Jihad which in Arabic means, “Organization of People of the Sunnah [the traditions of the prophet] for Proselytization and for Jihad.” As explored above, when Yusuf/ Shekau named 46 This Day Live, “Again, Jonathan Extends Emergency Rule in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa.” 14 May 2014. Unuoha, Freedom, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” June 2014. p. 4. 48 Premium Times, “Nigerian Senate Approves Extension of Emergency Rule in Adamawa, Borno, Yobe.” 20 May 2014. 49 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Nigeria’s emergency, countering Boko Haram.” 09 August 2013. 50 Majority Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, “BOKO HARAM Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” 13 September 2013. p. 27. 51 Kessler, Glen. Washington Post. “Boko Haram: Inside the State Department debate over the ‘terrorist’ label.” 19 May 2014. 52 Walker, p. 2. 47 11 their group this, they simply added “for Proselytization and for Jihad” to original name of their nonviolent Salafist mother‐group, implying that Boko Haram still maintains a Salafist ideology but is also committed to the idea of violence. 53 4) Following its reemergence, the group sought to avenge Yusuf. Thus, in 2010‐2011, many of the group members spoke about seeking revenge for the extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram members in 2009.54 5) Throughout its history, Boko Haram has always employed an anti‐western rhetoric. In its famous July 2010 video announcement on the eve of Boko Haram’s reemergence, Shekau announced to the US, “Don’t think jihad is over. Rather, jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury.”55 However, Boko Haram – with the exception of the 2011 UN bombings – has mostly not targeted western targets. Ansaru is more intent of attacking western targets. The recent wave of kidnapping westerners appears to be a strategy to raise funds rather than an ideologically pure attack on western targets. 6) Stoke religious tensions between Muslims and Christians. Tensions between Muslims and Christians existed before Boko Haram emerged; however, Boko Haram seeks to incite more violence between the two. Organizational Ties 53 Brigaglia, p. 37. Journal of Religion in Africa. “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter‐radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram.” 2012. p. 131. 55 Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 2011, p. 20. 54 12 ‐ Courtesy of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).56 Reports by academics, politicians, journalists, and governments vary when discussing the ties that Boko Haram has with other militant or terrorist organizations. The chart above accurately portrays the widest array of varying allies and opponents that Boko Haram is said to have. In other words, the chart, while acknowledging that not all allies or targets are as equally as important, it does overstate the importance that most researchers would concur upon. It is imperative to note that relationships between Boko Haram and other “terrorist” organizations are often overemphasized by the Nigerian government in attempts to get the US and UK to support the Nigerian government’s fight against Boko Haram and to distract Western governments from pressuring the Nigerian government to reform.57 Al‐Shabab: In general, Al‐Shabab has provided Boko Haram little direct training or financing; however, the most notable exception would be Maamaan Nur’s time spent training with Al‐Shabab from 2009 to 2011. Shortly upon Nur’s return to Boko Haram, Boko Haram detonated its first two VBIEDs in Abuja, evidencing the training that Nur had received. Ansaru: Ansaru, or formally Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (“Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa”), splintered from Boko Haram in January 2012, branding itself as a more ethical alternative to Boko Haram. As briefly noted above, Ansaru has argued that violence should be directed towards Westerners and Christians rather than against fellow Muslims living in northern Nigeria. In fact, Zenn describes the group as having an “almost exclusive focus on foreign targets.”58 Ansaru, in general, has much stronger ties with Al‐Qaeda than Boko Haram does. In fact, the International Crisis Group recently declared, “Ansaru became Nigeria’s al‐Qaeda franchise.” They cite an interview they conducted with an Ansaru member who “claimed Bin Laden’s deputy (now al‐Qaeda leader), Aiman Al‐Zawahiri, communicated directly with [Adam] Kambar [one of the ostensible leaders of Ansaru].”59 As such, Ansaru’s ideology parallels AQIM’s ideology more closely than Boko Haram’s ideology parallels AQIM’s. While Ansaru’s leader is only known by a nom de guerre, some suggest that the leader is Maaman Nur, born in Cameroon and trained in Somalia by Al‐Shabab;60 however, others suggest that Khalid al‐Barnawi is the leader of Ansaru. Khalid al‐Barnawi was trained very directly by AQIM in the tactics of kidnapping. Thus, while Boko Haram does have relationships with AQIM (to be explored below), AQIM has maintained much stronger ties with Ansaru. This relationship began to change slightly after the French intervention Mali in February 2013. As noted above, al‐Barnawi trained under AQIM leadership, and as AQIM 56 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Boko Haram Recent Attacks.” May 2014. p. 5. 57 Walker, p 10. 58 Zenn, Jacob, CTC Sentinel, “COOPERATION OR COMPETITION: BOKO HARAM AND ANSARU AFTER THE MALI INTERVENTION.” 27 March 2013. 59 Both quotes, ICG, “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.” 3 April 2014. p. 27. 60 Zenn, Feb 2014. 13 faced serious damage in Mali during this time, AQIM has been less able to support Ansaru. Concurrently, Boko Haram, responding to Ansaru’s accusations, has begun to decrease the number of innocent Muslims killed in their attacks.61 A recent report published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) provides a wealth of original research on the relationship between Boko Haram and Ansaru.62 Citing an interview conducted with an Ansaru member, ICG writes, “Barnawi [Ansaru’s leader] allegedly entered into a deal by which Shekau [Boko Haram’s leader], who had the men, would provide security cover, while Barnawi, who had the skills, would kidnap Westerners. Part of the ransom money would fund Boko Haram operations.”63 AQIM: AQIM, or Al‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, has provided Boko Haram with extensive training, financial, and ideological support throughout its history. For example, following the military defeat and death of Yusuf in 2009, AQIM offered “Salafist brothers” to avenge the deaths Boko Haram members.64 As noted in the previous sections “Ansaru” and “History of Boko Haram,” many Boko Haram members have conducted training in AQIM camps. The START report adds: Since 2011, AQLIM has provided Boko Haram with financing, including reportedly facilitating donation lines from organizations in Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, trainings and weapons. The two organizations conduct joint operations in Mali and the magnitude of AQLIM’s influence on Boko Haram can be seen in their increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks.65 AQ Central / ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/ JN (Jabhat al‐Nusra, aka Al‐ Nusra Front): There is little evidence of direct support to Boko Haram from any of these organizations; however, Boko Haram does publically support these groups. It is worth noting that Boko Haram is somewhat geopolitically indiscriminate in the groups that it praises. For example, “Boko Haram has praised both ISIS and JN for their victories against the Syrian regime; hasn’t come out in outright support of either against the other.” 66 As JN and ISIS consider each other enemies in the Syrian conflict, praise from Boko Haram does not equate to an ideological and geopolitically coherent endorsement. 61 Zenn, March 2013. ICG, 2014. pp. 26‐29. 63 ICG, 2014. p. 27. 64 Zenn, Feb 2014. 65 START, p 5. 66 Communication with a colleague who was citing work‐related communication with a member of the Critical Threats Project, 15 July 2014. 62 14 Attack Analysis: This attack analysis is divided into three parts. First is a time line of the most significant attacks claimed by Boko Haram. Second is a collection of graphs and maps. The third section is actual analysis of the data. Selected attacks claimed by Boko Haram in chronological order: • 13 April 2007: Assassination of Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam, who had been critical of Boko Haram67 • July 2009: Uprisings in the states of Korno, Yobe, and Borno. Uprisings crushed by Nigerian forces. • 7 September 2010: In its first large attack since the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram led a prison break in Bauchi. It freed around 100 of its own members whom were imprisoned the year before. It additionally freed 700 other prisoners. • 24 December 2010: Series of bombings and gun attacks against Christians across the cities of Jos, Plateau and Maiduguri, Borno.68 • 16 June 2011: First suicide Vehicle‐Based IED (VBIED) detonated by Boko Haram. The target was a police headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital.69 • 26 August 2011: UN bombings. This was the second suicide VBIED detonated by Boko Haram. The target was a UN compound, located within the diplomatic district of Abuja.70 Maamaan Nur is believed to have planned the attacks. First – and arguably only – attack claimed by Boko Haram on a distinctly international target. • December 2011 – January 2012: A series of bombings and shootings primarily directed against “southerners” and Christians in northern Nigeria.71 • April – June 2012: A number of suicide VBIEDs are detonated, targeting media offices and churches.72 • 5 September 2012: Destruction of cell phone towers. Boko Haram attacked the towers for the tactical purposes of handicapping the Nigerian military.73 • 17 September 2013: “[Boko Haram] gunmen dressed in military fatigues set up illegal checkpoints in order to assault civilians in Beni Shiek village, Borno state.”74 • 15 April 2014: Boko Haram members abducted some 200 school girls from the city of Chibok, Borno – a city located around 100km south of Maiduguri.75 67 Walker, p. 4. HRW, p. 93. 69 STRATFOR, “A First Suicide Attack by Nigeria’s Boko Haram.” 16 June 2011. 70 STRATFOR, “Nigeria: Boko Haram Demonstrates Improved Capability with U.N. Bombing.” 26 August 2011. 71 HRW, p. 93. 72 HRW, p. 95. 73 HRW, p. 95; START, p. 7. 74 START, p. 6. 75 BBC World News, “Nigeria Abductions: Timeline of Events.” 12 May 2014 68 15 NOTE: THE AUTHOR OF THIS PAPER CLAIMS NO CREDIT FOR THE FOLLOWING GRAPHICS. The following graphics were created by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and STRATFOR. Proper citations follow below. From the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker76: From the website: “The map depicts deaths by state. Nigeria’s northeastern states, particularly Borno and Yobe have been hit the hardest…” Graph 1: “The line graph depicts deaths over time. The red line shows the number of deaths by week and the orange shows a cumulative total. The number of deaths is a conservative estimate.” 76 Council on Foreign Relations, ed. John Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker.” 30 June 2014. 16 For Graphs 2 and 3: “These graphs depict countrywide deaths broken down by perpetrator. These include Boko Haram, state security services, and sectarian/ communal groups (excluding Boko Haram). To avoid double counting deaths, the NST [National Security Tracker] distinguishes between incidents in which one perpetrator is involved and in which more than one perpetrator is involved. For example, incidents involving Boko Haram are coded separately from incidents involving Boko Haram and state perpetrators.” 17 The following two graphs are from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)77: 77 START, pp. 1, 3. 18 From Stratfor78: Attack Analysis: Graph Analysis: From examining the diagrams above, one observes that: A) Boko Haram has been the largest source of violent deaths in Nigeria over the last several years. Consulting CFR Graphs 2 and 3, one sees that most of the deaths related to Boko Haram are the result of fighting between Boko Haram and the Nigerian army, police, and/or allied vigilantes. B) Attacks against “Private Citizens & Property” and against the police nearly make up half of the attacks that Boko Haram carries out, as per the START Target Types diagram. In fact, Boko Haram attacks police more frequently than they attack religious and educational institutions combined. C) Over the last six months, Nigeria has seen historic levels of violence. Additional Analysis: Most analysts writing on the evolution of Boko Haram over the last five years will note how the group has increased its military capabilities tremendously. Peter Pham poignantly summarizes the situation: 78 STRATFOR, April 2014. 19 The group has metastasized very rapidly in the last two to three years. It’s gone from a violent militant group that did drive‐by shootings and lobbed grenades at people it didn’t like to a terrorist group that carried out the first suicide bombings and truck bombings in Nigeria’s history, to now, in the last 12 months, to a group that occupies territory.79 Change in Attacks: According to the International Crisis Group, “The first attacks in 2010 were predominantly shootings, but improvised explosive devices (IEDs) began to be used in December [2010].”80 As noted above, Boko Haram notably used its first VBIED in June 2011 against a police headquarters in Abuja. With the rise of Ansaru, Nigeria has also seen a rapid increase in the number of kidnapping of foreigners, the very first kidnapping of “Westerners” taking place in May 2011. Boko Haram had denied involvement in these kidnappings; instead, media ultimately reported that the kidnappers were associated with AQIM and were operating in Nigeria.81 We now know that kidnappers of this sort would ultimately form Ansaru. Change in Targets: In general, the group was originally primarily concerned with revenge killings, avenging Yusuf and others killed in the July 2009 violence. Walker, writing for a USIP report, notes, “the group has also broadened its targets, away from direct revenge attacks on the state to include other representations of authority. This expansion includes setting fire to schools and attacking newspaper offices. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, with as many as 10,000 pupils forced out of education.”82 International Crisis Group notes, “Originally directed mainly at security forces and government officials, [Boko Haram’s] campaign has expanded to include attacks on Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, suspected collaborators, UN agencies, bars and schools.”83 As noted in several sections above, Boko Haram has a history of targeting Christians and churches. Some analysts suggest that the targeting of Christians are not simply hate crimes; rather, these attacks are also strategic attempts to stoke ethno‐religious tension in Nigeria.84 Change in Areas Operating: Boko Haram, with its roots in Maiduguri, is most active in Borno state (as evidenced by the disproportionately large number of deaths in Borno state and illustrated in CFR’s map above). Most analysts consider Borno and the neighboring state of Yobe to the be the “core areas.”85 In general, Boko Haram does not attack the southern states within Nigeria. Instead, they tend to focus their attacks in A) the northeastern most regions where they have historic roots, where state strength is the weakest, and where they are located closest to the notably porous borders with Niger, Cameroon, and Chad and B) in the “Middle Belt” region – the states which are located in the 79 PBS News Hour, “100 days since schoolgirls’ abduction, what explains Boko Haram’s expanding reach?” 23 July 2014. 80 ICG, 2014. p. 16. 81 Walker, p .10. 82 Walker, p. 6 83 ICG, 2014. p. 14. 84 Ploch, Lauren. Congressional Research Service. “Nigeria: Current Issues and US Policy.” 15 Nov 2013. p. 12. 85 ICG, 2014. p. 16. 20 center of the country, which are generally a mix of Christians and Muslims. While attacks have happened in many states throughout the country, the attacks tend to be centered in the cities of Maiduguri, Kano, Abuja, and Jos. As has been stated above, Boko Haram has historically been nearly entirely focused on domestic matters, despite Ansaru’s and AQIM’s transnational focus; however, Boko Haram is starting to have a presence in Cameroon. According to Lauren Ploch, writing for the Congressional Research Service, “the February 2013 kidnapping of a French family in northern Cameroon is believed to be Boko Haram’s first major operation outside Nigeria.”86 A recent news report notes that Boko Haram has kidnapped several foreigners and has successfully assaulted several military posts in Cameroon in 2014.87 According to the State Department, “[in 2013,] Boko Haram, along with a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, has also increasingly crossed Nigerian borders to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to evade pressure and conduct operations.”88 86 Ploch, 15. mn/ob/cb, IRIN News, “Boko Haram Steps Up Cameroon Raids.” 24 July 2014. 88 US Dept of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013.” April 2014. p. 9. 87 21 Organizational Structure: Most analysts agree that Boko Haram faces many internal divisions and is always susceptible to further divisions. Separately, “Boko Harm has not yet moved to establish a territorial state, nor to provide government services, [to date].”89 Structure: Overall, Boko Haram is a very diffuse organization. While nominally lead by Abubakr Shekau, the group faces many internal divisions and operates as a “cell‐based organization.”90 After conducting interviews with past and present Boko Haram members, the International Crisis Group (ICG) notes the following: The movement never had firm command and control. It is formally led by an amir ul‐aam (commander in chief) with a Shura (council) of trusted kwamandoji (commanders in Hausa) that is its highest decision‐making body. The amir ul‐aam cannot speak for the group without Shura approval. In major cities and towns where the group has a presence, a local amir is in charge, beside a commander who oversees and coordinates armed operations. Depending on his influence, the commander may be a Shura member. He is assisted by a nabin, (deputy), who is in turn aided by a mu’askar, who passes orders from the commander and the deputy to foot soldiers. Cities and large towns are divided into lajna (sectors) supervised by sub‐amirs for operational and administrative purposes.91 ICG also finds in its report that as of April 2014, Boko Haram is divided into six main factions. Each faction holds a slightly different geographic base than the next faction does. Shekau, holding the position of amir ul‐aam (commander in chief) of Boko Haram, leads the largest of these six factions; his faction has been the most active in recent months. ICG simultaneously categorizes Ansaru as one of these six factions while also noting that Ansaru operates with far more autonomy and sophistication than the other factions do.92 Jacob Zenn notes that between these multiple factions, there exists a “confederation.” He writes, “this confederation pools resources together from all factions for major attacks, such as the one in Chibok, but disagrees over two main issues: terms for a cease‐fire with the Nigerian government and the killing of Muslim civilians.”93 Additionally, according to Zenn, factions will often make announcements using Shekau’s name or even record videos to claim attacks using Shekau “look‐alikes” in order to preserve the image of cohesion amongst the factions.94 Size: In summary, most reports will A) simply estimate Boko Haram membership anywhere between a few hundred and a few thousand and B) state that exact numbers are not known. 89 Campbell, John, “Is Nigeria’s Boko Haram Becoming Territorial?” 22 July 2014. HRW, 11. 91 ICG 2014, pp. 18‐19. 92 Ibid, p. 22. 93 Zenn, Jacob, CTC Sentinel, “Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls.” 29 May 2014. 94 Ibid. 90 22 For example, according to a Congressional Research Service report, “According to U.S. officials, its core militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also appears to draw support from a broader following of several thousand young men, primarily from the northeast.”95 Pham writes, “analysts estimate active militants to number in the low hundreds, with perhaps as many as a few thousand supporters engaged to varying degrees.”96 Weapons procurement: Generally, Boko Haram A) purchases its weapons from its networks with AQIM and other militant Islamist groups through its porous borders with Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, B) steals its weapons from Nigerian police and/or military during raids97 and C) creates their own weapons. Writing in January 2013, Zenn notes that Boko Haram receives many of its weapons, including IEDs and “[RPGs] with a 900 meter range” from abroad, primarily through AQIM networks. He also briefly explores the possibility that Boko Haram might acquire MANPADs from Libya, as the contents of Libyan armories have been smuggled across North and West Africa.98 As noted above, the introduction of IEDs and VBIEDs evidences a technological sophistication and thus ties to other groups using VBIEDs; however, Boko Haram does not simply import VBIEDS from the neighboring countries – it builds them too. A September 2013 Department of Homeland Security Report notes, “Boko Haram has access to a significant amount of explosive material… [it] somehow utilizes commercial explosives as well. One theory on the origin of these explosives, presented by Scott Stewart of STRATFOR Global Intelligence, is that Boko Haram [steals] the material from central Nigerian mining operations.”99 95 Ploch, p. 13. Pham, April 2012, p. 5. 97 Phil Stewart and Lesley Wroughton, Reuters, “How Boko Haram is beating U.S. efforts to choke its financing.” 01 July 2014. 98 Zenn, Jacob, CTC Sentinel “Boko Haram’s International Connections.” 14 Jan 2013. 99 Majority Staff of the Committee of Homeland Security, 2013. p. 18. 96 23 Conflict Analysis In the pages above, this paper has noted Boko Haram’s history, explored its organizational structure, and analyzed its attacks; however, none of these analyses explain how the political, economic, societal, religious, military, etc. situation in northeast Nigeria has allowed for Boko Haram to have survived and thrived throughout its history. If one is familiar with the scholar Johan Galtung, one knows his famous “typology of violence.” Galtung, rather than creating a pedantic typology, has created a typology useful to understanding and diagnosing the complexity of conflict. In this typology, all violence is a violation of one of the four basic types of human needs – survival, well‐being, identity, and freedom needs. Violence occurs when these needs are violated; for example, when a person is killed, a person’s survival needs are violated – meaning they cease to survive. When a someone faces crippling poverty, this person’s well‐being needs are violated – as they may starve or lack access to medical treatment, meaning they cease to have well‐being.100 This paper will use this typology to describe the many types of violence occurring in the regions where Boko Haram is active. Boko Haram is an ongoing reaction to the many types of violence that the citizens of northern Nigeria continuously undergo. These can be called “grievances.” Boko Haram is a reaction that is additionally prolonged and shaped by Salafist ideology, outside support from AQIM, ignorance and illiteracy of those being recruited,101 and an inability of the Nigerian government to militarily defeat Boko Haram. That which directs the response to the grievances can be called “vehicles.” In other words, the rise of Boko Haram is a manifestation of grievances that people of northern Nigeria have. They have grievances as they are subjected to all types of violence, ranging from poverty, to police brutality, and even to feelings of alienation. Some of this violence is given directly from the Nigerian government – i.e. police brutality and extrajudicial killings. Some of this violence is less the direct work of the Nigerian state, but more circumstantial – i.e. mass poverty and feelings of alienation. Sometimes the distinction between the violence being circumstantial (like poverty) and the violence directly coming from the government (like police brutality) is unclear and irrelevant, as people are likely to blame whomever they see fit for their circumstances. As is true of human nature, not every person with a grievance adopts physical violence; however, some people do turn to violence. The Salafist and Taliban‐and‐Al‐ Qaeda‐inspired ideology of Boko Haram (rooted in militant misappropriations of Islam) act as “vehicles” which encourage Nigerians to respond to their grievances through avenues of violence and participation in Boko Haram or Ansaru. Illiteracy and misunderstanding of Islam spurs youth to join Boko Haram. Economic and military support from AQIM and the inability for the Nigerian military to defeat Boko Haram also are “vehicles” to violence, as they permit Boko Haram to be an outlet for these grievances. 100 101 Galtung, Johan. Journal of Peace Research. “Cultural Violence.” Aug 1990. Unuoha, Freedom, USIP, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” June 2014. p. 5. 24 Causes for Grievances This section will frame the grievances that sometimes lead individuals to join Boko Haram as varying violations of survival, well‐being needs, identity, and freedom needs – or violence as defined by Galtung. Survival Needs (violations include death) A Human Rights Watch report on Nigeria accurately summarizes situation with by naming their report, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria.”102 Both the Nigerian police and army are notorious violators of human rights. In that HRW report, the section “Boko Haram Attacks” spans fifteen pages, and the section “Security Forces Abuses” spans the nearly‐equal length of fourteen pages, implying that force is excessive on both sides. Onuoha, writing for a USIP report, notes: The Nigerian security and military forces deployed against Boko Haram have been criticized by an enraged local population, social commentators, opinion leaders, civil society organizations, and media for their harsh tactics, which have injured civilians and damaged property. Allegations include unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, extortion, and intimidation.103 This violence is truly spiraling in a vicious cycle. The more Boko Haram is active, the more active the Nigerian security forces have traditionally been.104 The more active the security forces are, the more abuses they commit. The more abuses they commit, the more grievances Nigerian citizens have. The more grievances they have, the more likely they are to either support Boko Haram or join Boko Haram as a means of vengeance. The more support Boko Haram has, the more active they become. Well‐Being Needs (violations include crippling poverty, lack of medical care, starvation)105 Despite the increasing prosperity of southern Nigeria driven by petroleum exports, northern Nigeria remains deeply impoverished. A report compiled by the Department of Homeland Security states, “According to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, ‘relative poverty was most apparent in Muslim dominated northern states... [almost] 70% of [northern] Nigerians in 2010 were living in ‘absolute poverty’.’”106 This 2010 70% absolute poverty rate actually marked an increasing poverty rate. Between 2004 and 2010, the national poverty rate (different from the numbers above) increased 6.2% nationally, with most of growth of poverty stemming from the north.107 Many Nigerians see their poverty as the fault of a corrupt national government that does not care for the Muslim north (which feeds into feelings of alienation, which will be explored in the section below). Additionally, as absolute poverty is a form of violence (violation of well‐being needs), many residents find the need to retaliate against the 102 HRW 2012. Unuoha, USIP, p 7. 104 Council on Foreign Relations, “Nigerian Security Tracker.” 105 Galtung, pp. 292‐293. 106 Majority Staff of the Committee of Homeland Security, 2013. p. 29. 107 Unuoha, USIP, p. 6. 103 25 Nigerian state. In order to retaliate, they join Boko Haram. Part of Boko Haram’s ideology – dating back to the days of Yusuf – is that not only is “western education” forbidden, but also that participation in Nigerian government is forbidden. Instead, Yusuf would have argued that these establishments must be destroyed and replaced by true Sharia. Identity Needs (violations include alienation, desocialization, destruction of culture) As noted above, the Muslim north is far poorer than the Christian south. Muslims throughout Nigeria are also concerned that the current President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathon, has violated a de facto power sharing agreement. This agreement stated that the presidency would be rotated between Christians and Muslims with each election of a new president. Jonathon, after coming to power from the position of vice president following the president’s natural death in 2010, broke this cycle by running for president rather than waiting to run until it was a Christian’s turn.108 As a result, many Nigerians experience feelings of political marginalization leading to feelings of alienation. Citing academic literature concerning the radicalization of youth, Unuoha notes that feelings of alienation is one of the leading drivers of youth radicalization and a major driver leading youth to join Boko Haram.109 Vehicles Shaping Responses to Grievances into Support for & Participation in Boko Haram Above, I have outlined the major grievances shared by many citizens of northern Nigeria. Not every citizen who has these grievances decides to join Boko Haram. In between the grievances and participation in Boko Haram are a number of “vehicles.” Grievances are that which create “fertile grounds”110 for insurgency, and “vehicles” are that which actually lead individuals to join Boko Haram. Such vehicles include illiteracy, larger militant Salafist ideology, transnational support and training mostly from AQIM, and Boko Haram’s successes. Many impoverished youth join Boko Haram. Many who join suffer from feelings of alienation, live in crippling poverty, and are often illiterate.111 Thus, when Boko Haram preachers preach about the need to rebel against the state in order to implement “pure” Sharia law, the youth join. This ideology frames the modern secular Nigerian state as inherently corrupt and damaging to society. Therefore, when these youth are experiencing the varying types of violence listed above – when they are experiencing crippling poverty and feelings of alienation and witnessing police brutality and government corruption, the youth, oriented in Boko Haram’s ideology, can simply and cleanly place fault at the secular Nigerian state. Boko Haram’s ideology, that all problems arise from the absence of true Sharia, is able to provide a simple prescription – create a Salafist Sharia state.112 108 Ploch, p. 3. Unuoha, USIP, pp. 2, 3, 6, 7. 110 HRW, p. 22. 111 Unuoha, USIP, pp. 2‐7. 112 For analyses of Boko Haram, see “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter‐ radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” in the Journal of Religion in Africa 42 (2012), pp. 118‐ 144. 109 26 Additionally, Boko Haram persists because it receives support and training from transnational jihadist groups like AQIM and Al‐Shabab. These relationships have been noted extensively above, and this paper will not repeat that information here. These relationships provide A) training and financial support and B) ideological support that frames Boko Haram’s struggle against the Nigerian state in transnational terms. As the Nigerian security forces are facing an increasingly complex Boko Haram, and as the Nigerian security forces are notably hated amongst local populations, the Nigerian security forces are unable to defeat militarily Boko Haram. Summary of Conflict Analysis In summary, Boko Haram exists because of a long web of factors. I have chosen to break this web into a two‐step explanation made up of “grievances” and “vehicles.” The grievances could be summarized as socio‐economic depravity113, political marginalization, distrust of the state, feelings of revenge, and feelings of alienation. These grievances normally do not lead to participation in Boko Haram; however, the following vehicles shape grievance‐response into Boko‐Haram support. Vehicles include Salafist ideology, support from transnational jihadist organizations, and an inability for the Nigerian state to wage an effective counter offensive. 113Egbeleke, Aderopo Ayodele, International Institute for International Studies, “Rethinking Boko Haram: Contending Perspectives among Nigerians in Diaspora and Youths.” Dec 2013. p. 10. 27 Conclusion Boko Haram can not be and should not be neatly defined and categorized. It is extremely diffuse and subject to further splintering. Boko Haram, while increasing attacks in the countries neighboring Nigeria, can hardly be called an “international terrorist organization.” It has not historically been internationally oriented, despite the one attack at the UN building in 2011. Rather, Ansaru presents a far greater danger to the United States than Boko Haram does. Boko Haram has aptly been called a “symptom”114 to the varying problems plaguing northern Nigeria. As is true with all conflicts, there is no simple military solution. Boko Haram will cease to exist, not after a military defeat, but rather after the complex political, economic, ethnic, and religious problems are cured. As such, many analysts point to the presidential elections of 2015 as a critical year in Nigeria.115 Possibilities for western government to help reduce the violence would mean to attempt to decrease any of the factors listed in the conflict analysis section. As such, Western governments should consider attempts to decrease the grievances by pressuring the Nigerian state to reform and/or attempts to “slow” and weaken the vehicles by crippling AQIM or to discourage abuses on the part of the Nigerian state as a means to increase its effectiveness. 114 Olojo, Akinolo, International Centre for Counter‐Terrorism, “Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram.” Oct 2013. 15. 115 Ploch, p. 3. 28 Appendix: The following is an annotated bibliographic of sources I recommend to readers. Needless to say, I (the author) have surely left details out and have chosen certain explanations over others. Below is a list of reports on Boko Haram and a brief explanation of each report. Full bibliographic is found in the Bibliography section after the Appendix. • “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II), The Boko Haram Insurgency,” published by the International Crisis Group in April 2014 contains the most recent original research out of any article cited by this paper. The information that they have compiled in this research is the result of recent fieldwork. Their paper answers questions about Boko Haram that western analysts have had for years. I would consider this the most authoritative and comprehensive report on Boko Haram to date (4 August 2014). It is 62 pages in length. • USAID’s “Politics by Other Means” and the International Crisis Group’s “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict” were written in August and December 2010 respectively. They highlight the complex security situation of Nigeria in 2010 ‐ just as Boko Haram was emerging as an important entity. I, the author, recommend that readers also consult these documents, as they are snapshots of 2010 Nigeria on the eve of Boko Haram’s insurgency. 65 and 47 pages in length respectively. • “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy” written by Lauren Ploch for Congressional Research Services in November 2013, is similar to this paper (24 pages in length). Lauren focuses more on US policy towards Nigeria and explores the other issues facing the country – beyond just Boko Haram. • “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter‐radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram” and “Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al‐Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria.” – These two articles are two of the best summaries of Boko Haram’s theology. • “What is Boko Haram?” by Andrew Walker writing for USIP. This June 2012 article, while slightly dated, is a concise (13 pages) and precise introduction to Boko Haram. If one is entirely unfamiliar with Boko Haram, they should this article first. Additionally, while there are countless analysts writing on Boko Haram, the three academics that I have consistently found to be the most accurate and nuanced in their analyses of Boko Haram are Jacob Zenn of the Jamestown Institute, Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council, and John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations. Moreover, another tremendous resource is the “Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), a project of the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, [which] documents and maps violence in Nigeria that is motivated by political, economic, or social grievances.” 29 Bibliography A First Suicide Attack by Nigeria’s Boko Haram. Stratfor. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/first‐suicide‐attack‐nigerias‐boko‐haram. (Accessed August 4, 2014). AFRICA, FAROUK CHOTHIA BBC. Profile: Who Are Nigeria’s Ansaru Militants? BBC News. 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