Turkish national identity and nationalism

Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 2 1880 to 1945 GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A DENVER, COLORADO OXFORD, ENGLAND Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data TK 12 11 10 09 08 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 his book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 Senior Production Editor Cami Cacciatore Production Manager Don Schmidt Media Manager Caroline Price Media Editor Katherine Jackson File Manager Paula Gerard his book is printed on acid-free paper. Manufactured in the United States of America Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview volume 2 1880 to 1945 Contents List of Contributors vii Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii hematic Essays 405 Culture and Nationalism Neil McWilliam 419 Education and Nationalism Peter J. Weber 435 Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Eagle Glassheim 444 Gender and Nationalism in the Age of Self-Determination Katherine O’Sullivan See 555 Baltic Nationalism Kevin O’Connor 570 Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova 583 Czechoslovakia Maria Dowling 597 Finland Jouni Häkli 000 Germany Stefan Berger 000 Greece Gregory Jusdanis 000 Hungary Steve Jobbitt 458 Nationalism and Geopolitics Gertjan Dijkink 000 Ireland William Jenkins 471 Language and Nationalism John E. Joseph 000 Italy Nicola Pizzolato 485 Literature and Nationalism Jason Dittmer 000 Poland Patrice Dabrowski 499 National Rituals of Belonging Ulf Hedetoft 000 Russia David Brandenberger 512 Perversions of Nationalism Aristotle A. Kallis 000 Spain Frederic Barberà 527 Philosophy, National Character, and Nationalism Paul H. Gilbert 000 Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak Europe 539 Austria Lonnie R. Johnson Middle East and Africa 000 Arab Nationalism Ralph Coury vi CONTENTS 000 Ethiopia Mohammed Hassen Ali Seyoum Hameso 000 Japan Neil Waters 000 Iraq Peter Wien 000 Colombia Jane M. Rausch 000 Turkey Kyle T. Evered 000 Puerto Rico Juan Manuel Carrión Asia Americas Oceania 000 Burma Jörg Schendel 000 Australia Stephen Alomes 000 China Hong-Ming Liang 000 New Zealand Linda Bryder 000 India John Mclane 000 Index 000 About the Editors List of Contributors Marco Adria University of Alberta Linda Bryder University of Auckland Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University Roderick D. Bush St. Johns University Stephen Alomes Deakin University Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico Celia Applegate University of Rochester Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii Chris Atwood Indiana University Colin M. Coates York University Ghania Azzout University of Algiers Saul B. Cohen New York State Board of Regents Alan Bairner Loughborough University Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor) Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Stella Coram Independent Scholar Joshua Barker University of Toronto Stéphane Corcuf University of Lyon Roderick Barman University of British Columbia Jefrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Ralph Coury Fairield University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Stefan Berger University of Manchester Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Ben Curtis Seattle College Brett Bowden Australian National University Patrice Dabrowski Harvard University David Brandenberger University of Richmond Devraj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal David Brown Murdoch University Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) viii CONTRIBUTORS Jason Dittmer University College London Dennis Hart Kent State University Chris Dixon University of Queensland David Allen Harvey New College of Florida Christine Doran Charles Darwin University Stephen Heathorn McMaster University Maria Dowling St Mary’s College Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University Stéphane Dufoix University of Paris Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol Jordana Dym Skidmore College Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, he Netherlands Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University Hugh Hudson Georgia State University Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University Bonny Ibhawoh Brock University Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen Grigory Iofe Radford University Will Fowler University of St Andrews Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, he Behrend College Michael Geisler Middlebury College Paul H. Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere Tareq Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto Seyoum Hameso University of East London Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna Paul Hamilton Brock University Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth Samira Hanii University of Algiers Cynthia Joseph Monash University N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) ix CONTRIBUTORS John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh Christopher Marsh Baylor University Gregory Jusdanis Ohio State University Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College Martha Kaplan Vassar College John Mclane Northwestern University Sharon Kelly University of Toronto Kim McMullen Kenyon College James Kennedy University of Edinburgh Neil McWilliam Duke University Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma Nenad Miscevic Central European University P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California Graeme Morton University of Guelph David B. Knight University of Guelph Joane Nagel University of Kansas Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Byron Nordstrom Gustavus University Taras Kuzio George Washington University Kevin O’Connor Gonzaga University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Orion Lewis University of Colorado Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Hong-Ming Liang Washington University in St. Louis Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Brian S. Osborne Queens University Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers Cynthia Paces he College of New Jersey Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee Razmik Panossian London School of Economics Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College Fouad Makki Cornell University Hooman Peimani Bradford University Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) x CONTRIBUTORS Linda Racioppi Michigan State University Ray Taras University of Colorado Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki Jessica Teets University of Colorado Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion Toon van Meijl Radboud University Mijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber Hochschule für Angewandte Sprachen (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings he Australian National University George White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David Yaghoubian California State at San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Soia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) Turkey Kyle T. Evered Chronology 1839–1871 1877–1878 1914–1918 1915 1916 1918–1923 1919 1919–1923 1920 1922 1923 1924 1927 1928 1933 1934 1938 1952 Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat reform era. Russo-Turkish War results in an Ottoman defeat. World War I. Battle of Gallipoli. Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France. British and Triple Entente occupations of Istanbul. Amasya Agreement; Erzurum Congress; Sivas Congress. Turkish War of Independence. National Pact declared; Grand National Assembly formed in Ankara; Treaty of Sèvres. Sultanate is abolished. Treaty of Lausanne. Also, a recently re-seated assembly proclaims a new Turkish Republic and declares Atatürk as its president and İnönü as its prime minister. The caliphate is abolished. Atatürk delivers his famous 36-hour “Speech” (or Nutuk) to a Republican Peoples Party congress. Introduction of a new Turkish alphabet. Universal suffrage is declared. Turkish assembly confers surname/title “Atatürk” (or “father of the Turks”) upon Mustafa Kemal. Death of Atatürk. Turkey joins NATO. Situating the Nation Today linked inextricably to the modern Republic of Turkey, variations of Turkish nationalism actually arose in the inal decades of the Ottoman Empire (1290s– 1922). his political precursor to the Turkish nation-state was not, however, an entity that could be deined essentially as just “Turkish.” hough led primarily by a ruling Ottoman Turkish dynasty, the Ottoman state was a vast land-based empire that was notable for a populace of diverse ethnicities, languages, and religions. It was also an Islamic state that had claimed control of the Caliphate since as early as the 15th century. As an institution, the Caliphate originated in the seventh century following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632 CE). It was the only institution in history that authorized a uniied religious and political leadership over the Islamic world, as recognized at least by most Sunni Muslims, N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 761 and it thus became a major prize for empires of the Middle East to control since the time of the Umayyad dynasty in the later seventh century. For the Ottomans, reliance on the authority and symbolisms of the sultanate and the Caliphate were not the only means to rule an empire that included many non-Turks and non-Muslims. Practical governance of this pluralistic society functioned through the establishment of the millet system. Initially, a millet was deined roughly as a religious community, but concepts of ethnicity became integrated over time, as well. his system implied a centralized, imperial order within which local communities existed in a semi-autonomous state that both allowed them to express their own religious, cultural, and linguistic identities at a local scale and empowered them to manage related institutions (especially for religion and education). In this manner, the millet system was a safeguard against the empire’s potentially disruptive heterogeneity; rather than immediately assuming that unfavorable policies resulted from ethnic or religious discrimination, individuals were limited to making less politically volatile assumptions focused on their own communities, its leaders, and its representatives and liaisons in the imperial system. In depicting periods prior to the late Ottoman era, many historians have represented the millet system as a successful means of governing an extremely diverse society. Already in a sustained period of decline since the 17th-century economic crisis, the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century experienced serious challenges to its legitimacy and its very existence. Problems faced by the Sublime Porte (i.e., the Ottoman state) included the particularization of ethnic and religious groups into nationalisms that would seek total autonomy, competition with other global empires (such as the expanding Russian empire), economic and technological marginalization, and bureaucratic ineiciencies. Identifying many of these problems as stemming from failures to modernize, the Ottomans initiated the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. he reform era that followed (1839–1871) witnessed an emphasis on modernizing—and further centralizing and empowering—the empire’s bureaucratic institutions and the ways that state and society were managed. It was also a period marked by state eforts to enhance loyalty to the troubled empire by moving beyond requiring simply allegiance from its subjects and millets to actually promoting identiication with the empire. his state-fostered identity construct known as “Ottomanism” thus evolved in a context of reform that was both inspired by connections—and competition—with Europe, on the one hand, and devised to prevent internal ethno-nationalist fragmentation by substituting an imperial identity, on the other. In dealing speciically with its Muslim populace, the empire also emphasized “Islamism” as an identity subject to the Ottomanheld Caliphate. Lacking anything approaching a robust economy, many of the ambitious Tanzimat reforms were instituted piecemeal and partially, at best. Moreover, Ottomanism, interpreted by many non-Turkish citizens as an assertion of Turkish identity over other ethnic identities, often contributed more to ethno-national development among the empire’s ethnic minorities, and Islamism N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 762 N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 763 was viewed both as divisive by many non-Muslims and as illegitimate by many Arab Muslims who had long doubted the appropriateness of a non-Arab Caliphate ruling over the umma (the collective Islamic community). his era also gave rise to the Young Ottomans, a disparate group of intellectuals who were comprised mostly of educated sons of the elite and lesser oicials. Media savvy, they were the irst in Turkey to employ a press for their own ends. hough their interests were diverse, they generally regarded the Tanzimat reforms as hollow approximations of European ideals that were applied autocratically and were essentially disloyal to Ottoman traditions and Islamic sensibilities. Advocating an alternative Ottomanism that was not just articulated from above, they were staunch critics of the state, committed to promoting alternative paths of modernization that would be true to their Ottoman heritage, to Islam, and to their desire to learn from Europe without being subordinate to it politically, culturally, or intellectually. Historically, the most prominent from this loose grouping of early nationalists was Namik Kemal. His contemporaries likely appreciated his powerful emphasis on the supreme importance of vatan (“fatherland”), a concern due to the ongoing territorial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Having already lost much of what would become Greece in the preceding decades, the Ottoman state was confronted throughout the 19th century both by other global empires and by rebellious ethno-nationalisms and religious groups. he most notable of these international conlicts was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which resulted in large losses of lives on both sides. Russia’s immediate geopolitical gains from the war were largely reversed later by other European powers at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, while the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territories in the Balkans and a great deal of prestige and legitimacy. Additional events that would contribute to the eventual decline and collapse of the empire included the following: Austria Namik Kemal (1840–1888) Namik Kemal was among the first foundational figures contributing to an emergent Turkish national identity. He was a writer of plays, poems, and prose, a newspaper columnist, and a publisher. Heavily associated with—directly or otherwise through the influence of his words—the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks, he was also distinguished from many as he never sought to thoroughly renounce Islam, even being associated especially with Sufism in his later years. As such, he is sometimes identified as an early model thinker for representing the compatibility between maintaining the Islamic faith alongside secular politics, as well as for advancing the ideas and agendas of a nascent Turkish nationalism. He is most credited with embedding the territorial idea of vatan in the collective Turkish nationalist consciousness. His early 1870s dramatic play Vatan yahnut Sillistre is associated most often with Kemal’s popularization of this term and the sentiments of territoriality.. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 764 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY seizing Bosnia-Herzegovina; a French occupation of Tunisia; a British occupation of Egypt; Bulgaria’s annexation of East Rumelia; the rise of Armenian nationalism amid Russian intervention; the Greco-Turkish War; and the Macedonian question. Prior to—and especially after—such conlicts, the Ottoman Empire was regarded by Western powers as the so-called “Sick Man of Europe.” Such losses also contributed to the further actualization of Turkish national identiication. he outcome of both the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the other losses that preceded it, plus the ascension of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918, reigned 1876–1909) to the throne, marked the end to the brief ive-year period of constitutional experimentation, when the Young Ottomans exercised varying degrees of inluence over Ottoman policies. In the subsequent decades, Abdülhamid II reverted to autocratic rule, although he sought to realize many of the reformist promises of the Tanzimat, applying his own versions of Ottomanism among the empire’s citizenry and Islamism among its Muslims. Accordingly, education became an important state tool in promoting these ideals—though iscal limitations often inhibited opening and expanding schools. Schooling was also a sphere of foreign penetration, with other empires and Christian missionaries opening schools throughout the empire— especially in territories of ethnic and religious minorities. As a leader, Abdülhamid II was not at all averse to employing severe—even violent—repression to perceived resistance, as was particularly true in policies toward the empire’s increasingly nationalistic and pro-Russian Armenian minority. In reaction to Abdülhamid II’s rule, as well as from a desire to revive the constitutionalism that was considered briely in the Young Ottoman period prior to his ascension, the so-called Young Turks (also known as the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP, and by similar names) articulated many alternative expressions of Ottomanism. As with manifestations of Ottomanism that were voiced by the Young Ottomans, the visions of Ottomanism expressed by the Young Turks expressed evocatively and appreciably a nascent Turkish nationalism. Almost without exception, historians of this period have depicted the rise of the Young Turks as inluenced—at least partly—by liberal ideologies in the West, as were many Young Ottomans. With respect to Islamism, some were quite devoted to its adoption and application, others were less enthusiastic, and some were even opposed to its emphasis. Many also manipulated ethnic and religious diferences within Ottoman society to acquire support against Abdülhamid II—sometimes creating enduring intergroup animosities. Others attempted to deine variously distinct Turkish nationalisms; some expressions had profoundly racial overtones, others were based more on ethnicity, and others integrated both approaches in deining “Turkish-ness.” Additionally, some Young Turks’ views went far beyond the realms of the Ottoman Empire and promoted pan-Turkism—seeking to unify all Turkic peoples from eastern Europe to eastern Turkestan (today, China’s Xinjiang province). hus, while notions of an Ottoman or Turkish territory might have been a growing N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 765 concern, speciic expressions of its location ranged from the European and Anatolian territories of the modern Turkish nation-state to the various territories claimed by the Ottoman Empire throughout its long histories, and even to the central southern core of Eurasia. Given such variabilities, it is diicult to make appropriate generalizations about the Young Turks collectively. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to distinguish between the political program followed by those who would later rise to power, on the one hand, and the individual works of this broad movement’s main luminaries, on the other. In sum, their profound diversity has sometimes been overshadowed by their unity of opposition to Abdülhamid II and their stated desires to restore a constitutional system. Disenchantment in the empire with Abdülhamid II and his tight control of the state was widespread. In 1908, a Young Turk leadership asserted control by gaining the support of troops stationed in Macedonia. hey reinstated the 1876, pre-Abdülhamid II constitution and marched toward Istanbul. Despite a counterrevolution led by Abdülhamid II in April 1909, the Young Turks established themselves, deposed Abdülhamid II, and set up a constitutional monarchy that they led. he sultanate, under Mehmed V (1844–1918, reigned 1909–1918), would be little more than a igurehead for the state throughout the remainder of the empire’s history. Focused on acquiring internal control, the Young Turks made the Ottoman state extremely vulnerable to external powers—even promoting cooperation among them (especially Britain and France). In recalling the territorial losses and insecurity that the empire endured during the previous century, this focus was both foolhardy and dangerous. his characterization was especially true of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in World War I. Seeking to alleviate their most immediate concerns over Ottoman territories with the British and the French and relecting the sympathies of many with the plight of Turkic Muslims in the Russian empire, the Young Turk political leadership entered eagerly into an alliance with Germany. he overzealous application of their political leadership’s policies within the empire was also counterproductive. Despite the hardships that instability and friction with external powers caused, the Young Turks attempted to achieve internal control by any means possible. When not preoccupied with foreign challenges along their borders, the Young Turks attempted to quell any dissension within them. For instance, shortly before Erzurum was captured by Russia in 1916, many Armenians were massacred or died amid deportations from Eastern Anatolia, making the massacres of Armenians under Abdülhamid II seem little more than a prelude in scale. Despite the deaths of many Turks in the interethnic violence that ensued, Armenian claims of “genocide” persist to the present day and still frustrate the Turkish nation-state internationally in its conduct of foreign afairs and domestically as various parties seek to address the matter publicly. hough the Ottoman Empire’s demise is often associated with World War I in prosaic general histories, this banal view only accounts for the last scenes of a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 766 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY Mehmet Ziya Gökalp Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), as he is more commonly known, is widely regarded as the most significant voice of an emergent Turkish nation prior to the rise of Atatürk. Born in Diyarbakir—possibly with some Kurdish ancestry—educated in veterinary science in Istanbul, and a self-taught philosopher and sociologist, he was influenced strongly by the works of Durkheim and other European notables. Advocating a centralized system of education, he viewed it as a chief vehicle for integrating Western ideas with Turkish national culture, and both with Islam. He held only minor political offices during the Young Turk era and served in the new republic’s assembly for only a short time until his death. Gökalp’s major accomplishment was the construction of an ideological foundation that facilitated both the transition from the Young Turks’ version of the Ottoman state to the modern Turkish republic and the creation of a national image that functioned as the theoretical counterpart to what would be Atatürk’s national policies. rather long drama involving many internal dynamics. he internal histories of identity construction—not only of Ottomanism, Islamism, pan-Turkism, and Turkish nationalisms but also of many ethnic and religious minorities’ nationalisms— and of conlicting views of governance and the proper paths to modernization were at least as decisive in bringing about the empire’s eventual collapse. In both the histories of the inal days of the empire and of the republic that would follow, the works of writers and philosophers from the Young Ottoman era, like Namik Kemal, and from the Young Turk era, like Mehmet Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, would prove decisive in articulating the lexicon and imageries that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) would draw upon in deining the Turkish nation-state. Instituting the Nation While debates over the eventual division of Ottoman territories—and especially the Bosporus—had been ongoing among European powers for almost a century, the eventual demise of the so-called “Sick Man of Europe” was especially a matter of concern amid the hostilities of World War I. Britain and France’s attempt to gain a foothold in Anatolia that could be used as a base for a push toward Istanbul and the Bosporus—the prolonged Battle of Gallipoli that took place throughout much of 1915—was thoroughly unsuccessful. his battle did, however, enable the meteoric rise of a mid-level oicer named Mustafa Kemal. Later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he distinguished himself as one of the heroes of the fatherland in leading troops against this considerable invasion force. In the following year, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 formally divided the Ottoman lands. he plan efectively carved up not only much of the remaining Arab lands of the N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 767 Ottoman Empire between Britain and France, it also partitioned considerable lands in what would emerge—despite this plan—as the modern Turkish republic. Earlier agreements also made territorial oferings within Anatolia to Italy and even ofered the Bosphorus and Istanbul to Russia. With the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Sultan Mehmed VI (1861–1926, reigned 1918–1922) was briely in a position of symbolic leadership over what remained of the empire, while the British and then the Triple Entente began an occupation of Istanbul that would last from 1918 to 1923. At this time, the sultan had the remaining members of the top CUP/Young Turk leadership arrested— some had already led—and they were then convicted of various crimes, several of them in absentia. In May 1919, Atatürk and others began the Turkish War of Independence—recognizing the failed Ottoman state for the European puppet state it was beginning to become. he presence of foreign forces in Istanbul and Anatolia helped him acquire support with the call to arms that came in the form of the June 1919 Amasya Agreement. his movement for an independent nationstate was further galvanized by the subsequent 1919 congresses held in both Erzurum and Sivas. At these congresses, among many other issues, the territorial shape of an eventual Turkish nation-state was envisioned. his idealized Turkish national homeland was oicially declared in January 1920 the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact). he operative capital for this new homeland was designated in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 768 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY small, central Anatolian city of Ankara in April 1920 when a national assembly was established there. he earlier proposed Sykes-Picot partition would seem minor, however, in contrast with the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and its division of Anatolia. hough accepted by the marginalized Ottoman sultanate, this treaty was rejected by—and also contributed to further support for—Atatürk’s alternative government, which also abolished the sultanate in November 1922. Atatürk’s rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres and his leadership during the ongoing Turkish War of Independence forced an eventual replacement of the original treaty with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. his agreement roughly ixed international recognition of the boundaries largely associated with the modern Turkish republic. In October 1923, already possessing a state structure from the War of Independence, the new state’s assembly proclaimed the new Republic of Turkey, appointed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its new president, and declared that the military leader—and Atatürk’s key representative at the Lausanne peace talks— İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) would be prime minister. Upon this history of national struggle, the nation-state of Turkey would be established—as would a vision of its membership and the singular national narrative that was directed largely by Atatürk. In this manner, Kemalism—named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—became the singular deinition of Turkish nationalism, the ideological basis of the nationstate, and the doctrine of the republic. In this context, too, we see why Mustafa Kemal would later acquire “Atatürk” (or “father Turk”) as his surname/title from a 1934 act of Turkey’s assembly. Defining the Nation As noted above, there was a rich and diverse tradition of deining “Turkish-ness” —and, recalling pan-Turkism, even “Turkic-ness”—since as early as the Tanzimat era (if we include early, state-led Ottomanism) and the Young Ottomans. he new republic under Atatürk’s leadership sought to deine itself as a modern nationstate, and it thus circumscribed a Turkish nationalism that purged notions of Ottomanism and Islamism. Alternative Anatolian identities, such as those of the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Laz, and others, were also not included in visions of the new nation’s membership. While some of these groups had been previously expelled—or would be shortly amid population exchanges with Greece, for example, others were expected to assimilate ethnically and linguistically. In this sense, the vision of a Turkish nation that was being employed was one of an elective identity; through education and personal choice, people could become Turkish. Indeed, racial views of identity—especially when they were associated with pan-Turkish ideals and agendas—were characterized as fundamentally racist and even fascist, and advocates of such perspectives were later targets of proseN AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 769 cution in the Anatolian republic. While this view of a national identity was ine for everyone who was inclined to comply with it, it created particular problems for those who were not. Indeed, Atatürk’s euphemistic characterization of Kurds as simply “mountain Turks” relected not only intolerance for alternative inclinations of ethnic identiication (not to mention either ignorance or ambivalence toward a people who are Irani, and not Turkic) but also a pejorative view of alternative ethnic identities within the republic as primitive and ignorant. Given such perspectives, it is also understandable why the relatively poor republic that emerged from the Ottoman state’s collapse and World War I pursued policies of nation-building and education with such rigor. Meanwhile, Kurdish identity and political agendas were suppressed by the state, thus beginning the basis for the Kurdish question—and the associated problem of insurgency—that persists to this day in southeastern Anatolia. he geographic deinition of the Turkish nation also remained consistent with the vision articulated in the so-called National Pact of 1920, though with some exceptions; the former Ottoman vilayet (or province) of Mosul was relinquished to the British as part of Mandate Iraq, and there were some other less signiicant changes as well. his geopolitical organization of the state was viewed as critical to the Turkish state in a number of ways. Initially, with the exception of claims by Kurds and other minority ethnic groups and by Armenians and Greeks who had been expelled or were being “exchanged,” it was not a territory that could be viewed as particularly threatening to others or as irredentist. Indeed, it is often noted in Turkish national histories that Atatürk sought to safeguard Turkey by avoiding such territorial ambitions and opportunities, as in the case of his reported rejection of Azerbaijani invitations for him to annex Azerbaijan so that it would be under fellow Turkic peoples and not under Russo-Soviet control. Later, this geographic decisiveness created what many Turks viewed as an ideal Anatolian core upon which the national narrative could be established. he matter of religion was also a great concern. While Turkey is often characterized as supporting “secularism,” some scholars of the early republic prefer to describe it as endorsing “laicism.” As a concept, laicism was borrowed from constitutional developments in 19th-century France and had little to do with thoroughly suppressing any particular religion. Rather, it was a more explicit statement airming that the state would not support—or even simply favor—any particular religion. he removal of Islam from the political sphere began at least as early as Atatürk’s 1924 abolishment of the caliphate and the abolishment of Islamic courts, and it continued politically with the 1937 incorporation of “secularism” in the republic’s constitution and with related social reforms, such as the prohibition of veiling or covering by women and girls who worked for the state or attended its schools. Still, characterizations of the Turkish republic as “secular” or “laicist” are overstatements. Indeed, though Atatürk tried to keep the politicization of Islam and the Islamicization of politics in check, the state also neither aspired to eliminate religion entirely nor entrust it to non-state entities. In keeping with the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 770 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY corporatist Kemalist state, religion was to be managed by state institutions that would control theological education, staing of clergy, mosques and other infrastructure, and so forth. his arrangement would endure until changes in the administration of religion in Turkey which came about due to manifestations of political Islam that emerged over the past two decades. As with state repression of political expressions of ethno-linguistic identities, suppression of religion and dealing with its resurgence became an enduring challenge for the state. In addition to ethno-linguistic, geographic, and religious aspects of national identity, deining the Turkish nation and the Kemalist state in a way that was inclusive for women was also a major concern. hough Atatürk made women’s rights and opportunities a priority, the issue was not entirely new. During the later period of imperial decline, the roles of women both in the family and within a wider society were topics that were commonly discussed by supporters of the Ottoman state and by its array of critics, alike. hus, even prior to the creation of a secular Turkish republic, symbolisms of the place of women in Ottoman society constituted powerful discursive weapons in struggles against both tradition and conservative Islam. For Ziya Gökalp, the woman was employed symbolically in consonance with imagery from idyllic Turkic communities of ages past. In such contexts, women and men were idealized as having equal rights and privileges in both the home and society. herefore, notions of parity between the sexes were quite integral in the fusions of Turkic mythologies and political ideals that would emerge in most manifestations of Turkish nationalism. Among the key proponents of women’s roles in the emergent Turkish nation and nation-state was the prominent woman writer Halide Edib Adivar (1884–1964). In 1933, universal sufrage was declared in Turkey—ahead of similar declarations in some Western states. Narrating the Nation While an abundance of “Turkish” literature—novels, short stories, plays, songs, poetry, histories, essays, and so forth—emerged after the time of the Young Ottomans by writers such as Namik Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, and Halide Edib Adivar, among others, perhaps the most profound statement of the new nation-state was written on the Anatolian landscape rather than on paper. he designation of Ankara as the nation’s capital was a profound statement about what the Turkish nation was—or at least what it should be—and what it was not. Rejecting Istanbul, the centuries-long seat of both the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, Ankara would remain the center of the new Anatolian and secularist Turkish nation-state. As with many forward capitals, the planning for Ankara was ambitious and involved an international competition to select the ideal design for the modernist republic. Incorporating the usual state buildings and monuments— ones that were grandiose in scale and ultramodern and masculine in style—the N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 771 Yusuf Akçura Of both Volga and Crimean Tatar heritage, Akçura (1876–1935) was one of the few figures associated with the Young Turk movement who was not only influenced by European thought but who actually studied for a number of years in France. A prodigious writer, his pan-Turkish influence on the Young Turks is often explained by his parentage, his sustained connections with and sympathies for the Tatars of Kazan, and family connections to the distinguished Tatar Jadidist Ismail Bey Gaspirali. With the emergence of the Turkish state, he was a member of the Turkish assembly, but was perhaps most noted for being tapped by Atatürk to head the republic’s historical society—what would emerge to be the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation). chosen plans also included signiicant green spaces and elements like an urban farm for research. Such designs revealed how the Kemalist state intended to instruct its citizenry on how their lives should be lived, not only in work but in recreation, and how the state intended to reach out and modernize what was still an essentially agrarian, rural society. he selection of Ankara was also telling about how the nation would deine its membership. Abandoning the cosmopolitan, world city of Istanbul, Ankara was reinvented as a quintessentially Anatolian hearth for an Anatolian Turkish nation. he ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of Ottoman society was thus rejected, as was any identiication with ambitions beyond the borders roughly identiied by the National Pact of 1920—with some subsequent modiications. he seat of the new nation-state thus spoke to its intentions of neutrality—as would be demonstrated in the subsequent World War II era—and its introspective orientation. Indeed, rather than looking to other Turkic societies to deine the nation, the Kemalist state incorporated pre-Turkic symbols of Anatolia—such as those of the Hittites and other early Anatolian-based civilizations. As a matter of state historiography, the Ottoman past was thus relegated to a far lesser status than the evolving histories of the republic would be. While Ankara as a tableau for the presentation of this idealized Anatolian Turkish state was a sound choice, the presentation’s mythic appropriations of past civilizations and its exclusions of contemporary identities still present in Anatolia (like those of the Kurds, Laz, remaining Armenians and Greeks, Alevis, and other ethnic and religious constituencies) would create profound obstacles for future generations. hough such excluded ethno-linguistic and religious “others” would confront the state in later years of the republic, other types of alternative narratives did emerge in the early period. In such cases, too, the urban landscape provides us with an ideal view of such discordant narrations of the nation. Although the Kemalist state was ambitious, populist, and corporatist—not only out of a desire to control but also out of sincere convictions of inclusivity in the program of modernization—its resources were seriously limited. his became immediately N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 772 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY Major intersection in Ankara with the city’s former Hittite-derived symbol prominently displayed. Since the rise of Islamism in contemporary Turkey, this symbol was replaced by a symbol incorporating a mosque. (Courtesy of Kyle T. Evered) apparent in the dynamics of rural-to-urban population shifts. Despite its remarkable planning, Ankara—and other large cities—simply could not foresee or efectively absorb the numbers of people arriving from the countryside. hus, encircling and interspersed with the ornately planned landscape of the capital emerged gecekondu (Turkish squatter settlements) that would endure in various forms up to the present day. hese neighborhoods of the disenfranchised in the capital and in other key cities would form the basis of a sort of Islamic populism that would manifest itself in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Mobilizing and Building the Nation In addition to the populism and corporatism that the state employed—and its written and unwritten policies of inclusion/exclusion, as indicated above—the Kemalist state also found particular nation-building institutions to be of paramount importance. Beyond just a centralized system of education that largely excluded private schools and universities—at least until recent decades—the state would also craft a distinct notion of “Turkishness.” his goal would depend upon controlling language, history, and notions of tradition, among other things. N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 773 At the time of the empire’s collapse, the common written language was Ottoman Turkish. It was a hybrid of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian and was written in variations of the Arabic script. For the vast majority of peoples in Anatolia, this language was not only inaccessible on account of their mass rates of illiteracy, but much of its vocabulary was also foreign. To foster nation-building projects, one of the immediate priorities involved both standardizing a Turkish language and the promotion of literacy. In 1928, Turkey adopted a modern Turkish alphabet—a move that also implied severing connections with its Ottoman and Islamic past and more closely approximating a European/Western future. In 1932, Turkey established what would eventually become the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Foundation). Initially guided by the so-called “Sun-Language heory,” language reforms began that would endure and continue long beyond the immediate interests generated by this bizarre view on the Turkish language and its derivation. In scope, the reforms generally entailed the replacement of Arabic and Persian words with Turkish words and/or neologisms. Words that were unique inventions for this particular Anatolian Turkish replaced words common throughout most Turkic languages. Geofrey Lewis’s book, he Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, provides a wonderful account of how the actions and results of the project far exceeded the original expectations of its mandate. As indicated in the previous section, the formative Kemalist state sought to further solidify the legitimacy of the republic in the minds of its citizens—while sharply diferentiating itself from its not-so-distant Ottoman and Islamic pasts. It thus created and fostered its own academic institutions that were devoted to the history of the Turkish nation. In this exercise, an unlikely mixing of the Anatolianbound Kemalism with a revamped pan-Turanian notion of ethno-genesis could be witnessed. As it became institutionalized, however, it was entirely apparent that the alluring pan-Turanian myths of Turkic origins would only be employed to the extent that they would reify the exclusively Anatolian imagery of the Turkish nation-state. While appeasing some citizens’ fantasies of the pan-Turanian, they would refocus attention back toward Anatolia. In short, a co-optation of Turkists was sought through the deployment of mythic histories of the nation. Yusuf Akçura was appointed to lead this movement and establish what would become the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation). At its 1932 gathering— and with the enthusiastic support of Atatürk—the so-called “Turkish historical thesis” was advanced as the singular paradigm of the nation’s history. Blending aspects of the mythic, the historic, and the fantastic, this thesis purported that the origins of all Turkic peoples could be traced to central Asia. he “Turkish historical thesis” was based on notions concerning the Turkic cultural hearth in central Asia, from which Turkic peoples difused in successive waves outward to Europe, the Middle East, east Asia, and even to the Americas. According to this thesis, the civilizations that would later emerge were all culturally and biologically derivative, at least in part, of an early Turkic people of one ethnic type or another. his insinuation of a Turkic contribution to, or at least a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) 774 MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY presence within, the major civilizations of the world was an idea that was not promoted outside Turkey, but it was further developed and taught from early childhood on within the republic. he Anatolian Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist period thus depicted earlier peoples of the region as ancestral brethren— sometimes in a rather extreme fashion. he earliest of Anatolia’s prehistoric agriculturalists and pastoralists, the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Lydians, the Galatians, the Sumerians, the Byzantines, and the Seljuk and Osmanlı/Ottoman Turks were thus all rooted in the soil of Anatolia and were alive in the present day in the Turkish nation and its political manifestation, the Kemalist state. Monuments of a romantic Anatolia would be erected subsequently, even in prominent locations within the nation’s capital. Indeed, images from Hittite art have been common motifs in government publications and textbooks throughout the nation-state era. heir contemporary usage has been in decline, however, as they have been increasingly replaced—sometimes even amid contestations regarding claims as to their authenticity/legitimacy. he earlier, Kemalist-era icon for Ankara featured one such Hittite statue, and its departure is but one example of the declining symbolic relevance of Anatolian icons. Finally, within the Turkish republic, the question as to whether or not to employ folk culture as a medium for nation-building was never an issue. Indeed, that question seems to have been resolved by Young Ottoman and Young Turk theorists, like Namik Kemal and Ziya Gökalp, respectively. Moreover, the message was not at issue either; the state would promote the Anatolian ideal of Turkish nationalism as fostered by the Kemalist state. he main questions concerning folk culture, therefore, tended to center around the forms to be promoted and how they might complement—or how they might require modiication in order to complement—the historical and linguistic projects of the new nation-state. Of the varieties of folk culture that the Turkish state actively promoted, folklore could easily be identiied as having been among the most prominent. Indeed, as a crucial component of nation-building, folklore studies in Turkey enjoyed the status of a discipline unto itself for many years. In 1927, the Halk Bilgisi Derneği (Folklore Association) was established. Publications, such as the association’s journal Halk Bilgisi Mecmuası, soon followed. Building upon some of the earlier works of igures like Gökalp, many initial works were devoted to the epics of heroic igures or popular tales. Under the Kemalist leadership and institutions of the early republic, the Turkish nation developed along a largely singular trajectory within Turkey until the inal days of World War II and Turkey’s increased contacts with the West through programs like the Truman Doctrine and its entry into NATO in the early 1950s. While divergence from this trajectory did occur—as was the case with panTurkish or Kurdish activists—it was policed and repressed by the state. In this isolated and controlled context, histories of Turkish national identity and the Kemalist state traveled roughly the same path until the republic increased oppor- N AT IONS AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY 775 tunities for political dissent within its borders—as with the adoption of a multiparty system—and allowed increased contacts beyond them. Selected Bibliography Ahmad, Feroz. 2001. he Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge. Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. he Development of Secularism in Turkey. Introduction by Feroz Ahmad. New York: Routledge. Bozdo ğan, Sibel. 2001. Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba, eds. 2003. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Evered, Emine Ö. 2007. “An Educational Prescription for the Sultan: Hu¨seyin Hilmi Paşa’s Advice for the Maladies of Empire.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3: 439–459. Evered, Kyle T. 2005. “Regionalism in the Middle East and the Case of Turkey.” Geographical Review 95, no. 3: 463–477. Gökalp, Ziya. 1968. he Principles of Turkism. Translated and annotated by Robert Devereux. Leiden, he Netherlands: E. J. Brill. Kandiyoti, Deniz, and Ayşe Saktanbar, eds. 2002. Fragments of Culture: he Everyday of Modern Turkey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. he Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Landau, Jacob B. 1995. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2001. he Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, Geofrey L. 1999. he Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mardin, Şerif. 2006. Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. White, Jenny B. 2003. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Zürcher, Erik J. 2005. Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd ed. London: I. B. Tauris. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)