Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
…
5 pages
1 file
AI-generated Abstract
This paper examines the corporate governance framework of Honda, a Japanese multinational company, particularly focusing on its board of corporate auditors system. Unlike U.S. companies that require audit committees comprised entirely of independent directors, Honda's governance structure allows for a mix of corporate auditors, at least half of whom must be outside auditors meeting specific independence requirements. The corporate auditors are responsible for monitoring management performance and the audit process, while the setting of compensation for directors and auditors is subject to shareholder approval. The paper highlights key differences in governance practices between Japanese companies like Honda and NYSE-listed U.S. firms.
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 2013
This study provides insights on the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2002) in promoting high-quality financial reporting and good corporate governance, based on interviews conducted with 22 experienced directors from U.S. firms. Our analysis indicates that SOX has positively impacted the monitoring role of the audit committee (board), which directors attributed to the financial expertise and internal control requirements and heightened substantive diligence. However, some considered that an emphasis on financial expertise at the expense of legal expertise and financial markets expertise could compromise the quality of financial disclosures due to a lack of business savvy needed to inform accounting judgments and the standardization of reporting. SOX was also perceived as having led to a formalistic approach to accounting policy decision making by the audit committee and external auditor, as a buffer against litigation. While CEO certification was viewed as having led to heightened ownership and diligence on the part of decision agents throughout the financial reporting decision hierarchy, it was also identified as a source of the costly resource-intensive reaction to SOX. Directors also considered that SOX had led boards to take a narrow focus on financial reporting risk at the expense of strategy. Further, We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Theresa Libby (editor) and an anonymous reviewer, as well as Jean Bédard; Noel Harding; Elizabeth Carson; Roger Simnett; the participants at the School of Accounting, The University of New South Wales and the Nyenrode University seminar series; and the participants at the Asia-Pacific Conference, The Australian National University ANCAAR Forum, the 2009 ISAAR symposium, and the 2009 AAA Annual Meeting for their helpful comments and suggestions. Our special thanks go to the directors who participated in the study.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 2009
... We thank Scott Bron-son, Jon Hansen, Katherine Hansen, Beverly Hudler, Shelly Kane, Stacy Mastrolia, Fred Muchunu, Hazel Ryon, and Beth Swang for their assistance in transcribing, tabulating, and cod-ing the interview data. ...
Corporate governance refers to the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation (such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) and specifies the rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs. Governance provides the structure through which corporations set and pursue their objectives, while reflecting the context of the social, regulatory and market environment. Governance is a mechanism for monitoring the actions, policies and decisions of corporations. Governance involves the alignment of interests among the stakeholders. [2]
Journal of Corporation Law, 2018
Directors' independence at controlled companies is an intriguing corporate governance conundrum. Recently, Bebchuk and Hamdani have shed new light on it by providing an analyticalframework that seeks to make independent directors more effective in performing their oversight role. They convincingly argue that some independent directors should be accountable to public investors who, in order to achieve this aim, should have the power to influence the election or retention of several "enhancedindependence" directors. Starting from this persuasive outcome, and adopting a comparative and functional analysis, this Article will extend the Bebchuk and Hamdani framework in several directions, with the aim of rendering it more effective and adaptable to different jurisdictions around the world. First, reliance only on the initiative of activist hedge funds might raise some concerns with regard to the effectiveness of enhancedindependence directors as monitors as well as to the cohesiveness of the board. This Article will therefore argue that the involvement of non-activist institutional investors in the selection and election of enhanced-independence directors should be enhanced. It will further argue that the refinement of the election and retention process for independent directors might not be enough in order to tangibly enhance their independence, as the "human nature" of corporate boards must be taken into consideration as well. Pursuing this line of thought, it will develop an in-depth analysis of strategies available in order to limit the distorting effects of the board's relational dimension and to induce enhancedindependence directors to perform their oversight role in a truly independent way.
Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and function of audit committees in public companies in Barbados since the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom in the USA.
El Instituto Colombiano de Normas Técnicas y Certificación, ICONTEC, es el organismo nacional de normalización, según el Decreto 2269 de 1993.
https://servicioskoinonia.org/relat/425e.htm
The current world economic and productive system as well as the lifestyle of the capitalist civilization are the main causes of the “sixth great extinction of life” on this planet. Without radical change, we are headed toward a planetary ecological catastrophe and perhaps toward our own extinction as a living species. Based on this VISION that we take as given and whose evidence can be found everywhere, we enter into the theological JUDGEMENT of the situation. Our thesis is that, by themselves and alone, neither capital or politics or institutional religions, can provide a remedy for the destruction toward which we seem to be moving. That remedy will be possible only if there is a collective change of religious mentality. This is a task proper to theology. As things stand today, religion continues to be the world’s most deeply mobilizing force. Even those who say they stand outside religious institutions are not freed from a basic religious vision that essentially conditions their way of seeing the world and themselves. We maintain that only a change in this “deep” (religious) way of seeing, only a change in that “vision,” can make the survival of humanity possible. This is so because. we will only stop destroying nature when we discover its divine dimension and our identity in nature
Desafío migratorio y desafío demográfico: hacia una nueva cultura institucional de los derechos y de la integración, 2023
Praxis Educativa Num 1 Y 2 Vol Xvii, 2014
BMC Neurology, 2009
Applied Physics Letters, 2007
Materials Focus
Clean Air Journal, 2021
Proceedings of the Annual Conference of CAIS / Actes du congrès annuel de l'ACSI, 2016
Journal of Neurocytology, 2002
Cartas de um diabo a seu aprendiz