THE MARITIME DIMENSION IN INDIA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY

The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy 83 CHAPTER 6 The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy Sarabjeet Singh Parmar ‘In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But in practice, there is.’ —Yogi Berra Introduction National interests are the bedrock of any national strategy. A threat to our national interests or an objective to be achieved is the starting point for any strategy. The threat can be existent or evaluated. A strategy must be modified and should evolve with any change in the threat or objective. Therefore, any strategy must be flexible and be based on what the nation views as a futuristic goal. There are many definitions of national strategy, which can also be termed grand strategy. A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself1. It can be defined as the art and science of developing and using political, economic, diplomatic, psychological and military means, both during peace and war, to safeguard national security interests.2 Any national strategy depends on a variety of tangible and intangible fields. These fields would collectively and at times individually have a bearing on national interests. From these interests would flow the security objectives. The word security has earned a ubiquitous distinction and is often attached to terms like economic, oil, food et al; terms that have an inherent strategic element. The most vital national interest for a nation would be continued economic progress and well being of the country. History is testament to the fact that nations have used their economic power to further their national interests. National security objectives have been invariably derived from economic aims set out over a period of time. Economic goals have led to competition both at the national and international level. These competitions in turn, have led to the amalgamation of national assets and strong self reliance based on 84 Grand Strategy for India: 2020 and Beyond infrastructure and technology. This however depends on a well defined national policy that has to stand the test of time and any change in governance. As India is a maritime nation there is also an intrinsic link between economic power and maritime strategy. This paper seeks to identify the prevailing maritime threats and objectives that impinge on our maritime strategy and require immediate attention. The paper also postulates steps that could be taken so as to achieve a cogent maritime strategy. The formulation of strategies varies from nation to nation and in the Indian context there are certain aspects that have to be understood. Therefore, before entering the portals of threats and objectives, I feel it is important to revisit history briefly and recapitulate the road travelled by India in its quest for a national and maritime strategy. Backdrop The ‘apparent’ non-existence of a cogent and well defined set of national values is an aspect that becomes clearer when one understands the circumstances of India’s birth, the legacy left by the British and the threats that India has had to contend with. In 1947, India inherited many disadvantages—the accumulated minuses of many centuries—but one great advantage, that of a resurgent nationalism3. The nation was born after the traumatic experience of partition without sufficient wherewithal to support itself. The existing infrastructure was structured to support a colonial territory. Infrastructure was hence created on the basis of expediency which—apart from uneven development—meant that a comprehensive and concrete national policy was not formulated to establish India’s national interests and security objectives. However, India has since come a long way and has reached a stage where a lot of imperatives are falling into place. One such imperative is the revival of the nation’s rich maritime heritage, a heritage that was lost in the sands of time. Indian history and culture offer a fund of historical precedents and philosophical precepts to guide Indian’s strategy making efforts. With this wealth of insights to draw on, political leaders and mariners will likely display an impressive measure of intellectual flexibility and agility as they prosecute their maritime strategy.4 History shows that as most of those who ruled India had their eyes focused on land frontiers, imperialistic powers invaded via the sea, with a staying effect that charted the course of our nation’s history. The fact that India was subjugated and ruled by invaders who came not over mountain passes, but from across the sea, is a fact that should remain embedded in our memory forever. It should also influence our current and future attitude to maritime power.5 Threat—Maritime Security The Indian Ocean is best seen as one of the world’s great maritime highways, with some 50 per cent of the world’s merchant shipping passing through the Strait of Malacca. It joins the Pacific and Atlantic worlds.6 And when the The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy 85 Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal are factored in we get a vast water body that connects India to the rest of the world. India, geographically therefore, sits right atop the mid point or fulcrum of this water body which forms part of the IOR. For many nations this region is seen as an area of transit for their shipping and a means of connectivity. However, for India it is a nerve centre as its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) originate and terminate here. The spread of island territories, a long coast line, the Exclusive Economic Zone, off shore oil exploration, fishing and the allotted deep sea mining area also demand that a stable and secure maritime environment be ensured and maintained. The geopolitics of the IOR has also given rise to threats. It would be prudent to view these threats in tandem with the unique features of the region. There are 56 nations in the region and around one third of the world’s population lives in this area. This number combined with the economic divide and differing modes of governance has resulted in a rise in piracy, terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear issues. This growing threat has forced nations to strengthen their presence in the region to ensure safety of shipping and their national interest. The region is home to a wealth of natural and mineral resources. The inability of most nations in the region to harness these resources is slowly leading to the ingress of extra regional nations. This influx could be a source of future conflict which would undermine maritime security and therefore affect regional stability. To counter or counter balance these threats India needs to define its national interests with a cogent and visible national maritime strategy. This strategy would have to be drawn up by a number of agencies and ministries and guided by political vision and direction. National interests would have to be permanent and non-negotiable. However, actions to ensure the sanctity of national interests would be dictated by changes in the prevailing geopolitical environment. This would require a continuous study of the region. Formulation of a matrix with groups, sub-groups and interlinks could ensure this. For example a “Regional Group” could be broken into “Internal Regional Sub Groups” analysing the nations of South East Asia, West Asia, Middle East, Africa and an “External Regional Sub Group” for Europe, the rest of Asia, North and South America. Similarly, groups and sub-groups could be formed to analyse governance, military, economics and trade. Based on the analysis of the matrix, policies that would blunt threats and strengthen objectives could be formulated. Threat—Piracy Piracy is being examined as a separate aspect as it involves a plethora of laws, nations, threat to sea going trade and could in due time, if not addressed, give rise to instability in the IOR. As per UNCLOS article 1017, piracy consists of any of the following acts: • Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 86 Grand Strategy for India: 2020 and Beyond committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: – On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; – Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; • Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft • Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraphs above. Article 101 is supplemented by articles 105, 106 and 107. Article 1058 clearly states that a pirate ship may be seized on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. It also states that the courts of the state carrying out the seizure may decide the penalties to be imposed and the action to be taken. Article 1079 states that the seizure may be carried out only by warships or by ships clearly marked and identified as being on government service and authorised to that effect. Article 10610 on the other hand could be considered a dampener as it states that seizure on inadequate grounds would hold the state affecting the seizure liable for loss and damages. Although Article 10011 states that all states shall cooperate towards the suppression of piracy, it again limits the action to acts of piracy on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state. Given the increase of piracy over the years and the fact that only an act committed on the high seas is considered to be an act of piracy inhibits and restricts states from taking effective action to curb the malaise. Deployment of warships by states has not had the effect of reducing piracy. Figures as per International Maritime Bureau report for the period January 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010 are indicative of the fact that acts (attempted and actual) of piracy the world over are on the increase12—239 in 2006, 263 in 2007, 293 in 2008, 406 in 2009 and 289 as on September 30, 2010. The breakdown of these acts13 in the IOR, as per the above report, is also alarming. However, it is clearly apparent that the number of incidents have come down in the areas where states have vigorously pursued anti-piracy actions. Year India Bangladesh Sri Lanka Somalia Gulf of Aden Malacca Straits Arabian Sea Indian Ocean 2006 2007 2008 2009 Upto 30 Sep 2010 4 33 8 9 8 1 - 7 13 4 26 10 4 4 - 10 9 1 12 51 2 - 10 12 47 100 2 1 1 4 18 56 44 1 2 - The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy 87 The United Nations Security Council has adopted various resolutions (UNSCR 184614 in 2008, renewed annually by UNSCRs 189715 and 195016) permitting the entry into Somalia’s territorial waters by states and regional organisations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. A study of piracy over both time and space, makes it clear that naval operations alone will not eliminate it. The best approach is to remove at least one of the three pillars of piracy: geography, political instability, or safe havens. Since the first pillar, geography, is almost impossible to change, primary consideration must be given to the remaining pillars, both of which are land based.17 As it became clearer that only land operations would either reduce, if not stop piracy completely, the UN Security Council adopted various resolutions (185118 in December 2008, renewed by UNSCRs 1897 and 1950) authorising land based operations. Despite the mandate authorised by the UNSCRs very little has been done to tackle the problem from land. The US has established a Military Command in Africa (AFRICOM). As per a Congressional Research Service Report19 prepared by the US DOD—“there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on ground”. The African Union force presently deployed in Somalia has been asking for more UN troops. More troops would enable effective control over areas from which the pirates operate thereby curbing their operations and would eventually eradicate this menace from the area. This aspect requires international understanding and cooperation between nations. Till no international understanding and commitment is achieved, piracy would have to be combated by navies at sea, which as of now is considered ‘ineffective’ in ending piracy in the area. India being an affected nation has been proactive in combating piracy at sea and was one the first nations to send ships to the affected areas. There are two viable steps that India should take to combat piracy. Firstly, use its navy as a central force to form a regional cooperative group. This would ensure availability of more assets thereby providing security to shipping in the area. Secondly, utilise its position as a responsible nation and nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council to push for land based operations. Thirdly, insist for a revision of the definition of piracy. A suitable revision would enable nations to tackle piracy in a more comprehensive manner. These actions would enhance its position not only as a regional stability factor but also increase its value as a futuristic international stability factor. Objective—Indian Merchant Shipping The shipping industry is effectively the most cyclic of all industries. Being a global industry, it is affected by a whole gamut of factors which range from: economic conditions, political events, natural disasters and age of existing 88 Grand Strategy for India: 2020 and Beyond vessels, new vessel delivery schedules, availability of ship building slots with shipyards, government regulations etc.20 This part of the paper examines the issues germane to Indian shipping vis-à-vis the present number and state of ships, the Indian government’s stance on issues like tax regulations and Indian merchant navy personnel. Shipping is measured in tonnage but for simplicity purposes the paper refers to number of ships. The Indian shipping industry comprises of about 31 companies that account for around a total of 974 ships (as on December 31, 2009 as per the Ministry of Shipping (MoS) annual report 2009-1021) and is 17th in the world. The Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a central Public Service Undertaking (PSU) is India’s biggest shipping company and accounts for approximately 30 per cent of Indian Tonnage. As on November 1, 2010, SCI had a total of 77 ships.22 As per the MoS annual report 2009-10, during the period January 1, 2009 to November 30, 2009, 440 ships were chartered for government cargo. Out of these only 138 were Indian flagships and they carried 38.8 per cent of the total cargo. The report further states that SCI has plans to acquire 62 vessels during the XI plan at a cost of about Rs. 13,000 crore. Out of these 62, seven have been delivered, orders for 32 ships have been placed and orders for 23 ships will be placed. However these numbers also cater for the replacement of ships that would be taken out of service due to age. The status of other Indian shipping companies is also similar. This nominal increase does not auger well for the increase in India’s overseas trade. It implies that India would have to charter more foreign flag ships which would result in outflow of foreign exchange revenue. This outflow if invested in Indian shipping companies would result in the healthy growth of Indian shipping. In addition the availability of foreign flag ships in times of crisis or conflict would reduce considerably or be available for a price. Therefore more Indian flag ships need to be built, preferably in Indian shipyards so as to ensure that the ship building industry also grows in tandem and is able to meet the shipping companies’ requirements. A major disadvantage Indian shipping companies face, vis-à-vis foreign companies, is the tax regime. Twelve different levels of taxes (direct and indirect) are levied on the Indian shipping industry. In comparison most of the foreign companies operate from tax havens. This deters foreign companies from setting up a base in India. Some nations like the US and China have a policy that requires national cargo to be carried by their flag ships. India has a substantial cargo base. In addition the government controls substantial cargo movement through PSUs. A policy of cargo reservation would go a long way to promote Indian shipping. Indian merchant navy personnel are preferred by a majority of companies over other nationalities for two main reasons. The ability to speak English is the first. Secondly and more importantly is that the Certificate of Competency (CoC) issued in India is one of the toughest to obtain and this increases the The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy 89 employment prospects of Indian merchant men. Indian merchant personnel prefer to work for foreign companies due to higher pay, easier tax regimes and also because an Indian working for a foreign company has an NRI status. This has resulted in a manpower shortage for Indian ships. It would be difficult to obtain a census on the number of Indians working for foreign companies but the number sailing on Indian flag ships would be minuscule in comparison. This is a drain that the Indian shipping industry can ill afford. Shipping is important for trade and therefore has a direct impact on a nation’s economy. The National Maritime Development Programme of 2005 is a step towards strengthening India’s shipping industry and port infrastructure. But even so, urgent steps require to be taken to improve Indian shipping. Firstly, increase the orders for ships by ease of funding, either by lower interests on lending rates or by soft loans from a corpus that would have to be created. Secondly, revise the tax regime so as to enable Indian shipping to compete with foreign companies on equal terms. Although the government introduced the Tonnage Tax system from the financial year 200405 more needs to be done. Thirdly, promulgate a policy to ensure reservation of cargo shipments by Indian flag ships. Fourthly, initiate steps to retain Indian merchant personnel by offering remuneration that is equal to that offered by foreign companies. Objective—Port Infrastructure As per the MoS annual report 2009-10,23 India has 12 major ports and about 200 minor ports. The major ports are managed by the Port Trust of India and are under the jurisdiction of the Government of India. The minor ports are operated by state governments. This section examines the major ports as they handle about 90 per cent of the nation’s trade. Out of the 12 major ports six are on the west coast—Kochi, New Mangalore, Mormugao, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT in Mumbai), Mumbai and Kandla; and six are on the east coast—Kolkata (Haldia), Paradip, Visakhapatnam, Ennore, Chennai and Tuticorin. Ports provide the connect between land and sea for the passage of trade. To ensure a healthy state of trade a port has to be productive. The productivity of a port is measured in terms of a set of key performance indicators. In simple terms the performance of a port is generally measured in terms of the speed with which a vessel can leave post entry to the port, the speed at which cargo is handled (loading or unloading) and the duration that cargo stays in port prior to shipment or post discharge. Although there has been an increase in productivity, the performance of Indian ports does not compare favourably with the efficiency of other ports in the world. To improve productivity three main parameters require to be studied—capacity, efficiency and connectivity. The aggregate capacity of the major ports as on March 31, 2009 was 574.77 million tonnes per annum (MTPA).24 In comparison the Port of Singapore 90 Grand Strategy for India: 2020 and Beyond registered a total cargo tonnage of 471.5 million tonnes.25 The dual situation of limited capacity and a growing demand is creating congestion at ports, berthing delays and longer turn around time of ships. The available depth of water in some major ports precludes the entry of large vessels. As a result these ships have to go to other ports and offload the cargo meant for India to smaller vessels thereby increasing the freight cost, congestion and turn around time. Efficiency is reduced due to outdated equipment, training and labour practices. This results in loss of revenue because of ships waiting for a berth and on the berth itself. Connectivity to ports is in relation with the movement of cargo. Ports require both road and rail connectivity with the hinterland to ensure fast shipping of cargo. The lack of adequate connectivity is restricting the productive growth of most Indian ports. In order to keep pace with the growing demand of sea borne trade there is need to fast track the upgrade and expansion of port infrastructure and review the management practices. The resources necessary for this can be provided by privatisation. Although the port sector has been opened to private industry more needs to be done to ensure progress. Many ports of the world have involved the private sector and this has resulted in a change in the organisational model. The Landlord Port model is fast replacing the Service Port model. In this model the port authority retains control over port infrastructure, planning, leasing, safety, navigation and coordination. The private operators provide the cargo service, marine service, berths et al. Presently Ennore, which commenced commercial operations in 2001, is the only major port of India with a Landlord model. The changeover of all ports to this model would depend on the efficiency levels achieved at Ennore. Although all major ports have both road and rail connectivity, they require an improvement in quality as well as capacity. This fact has been commented upon by the MoS in its annual report 2009. The report of the Committee of Secretaries on rail road connectivity had stated that each major port should preferably have four-lane road connectivity and double line of road connectivity. The rail connectivity is to be implemented by Indian Railways and the road connectivity by National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). These need to be fast tracked. Objective—Maritime Forces Maritime forces in the context of strategy include the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, elements of the Indian Air Force, Army, central and state governments. The responsibility of ensuring both external and internal maritime security is an enormous task and therefore, need constant reviewing. This would have to be based on the evaluation of threats and objectives The Maritime Dimension in India’s National Strategy 91 carried out by a study of the matrix as mentioned earlier. These aspects could be grouped into two categories—“Intra IOR” and “Extra IOR”. India is already viewed as a prominent player within the IOR. If India wants to be viewed as a global player then it would require showing its presence in areas beyond the IOR. Therefore, the capability of maritime forces to operate in areas beyond the IOR for extended durations in pursuance of maritime strategy requires review. As of now there are some generic aspects that require attention. First, is the requirement to maintain a prominent presence in the IOR for ensuring a stable and secure environment. Second, is the security of India’s interests in the areas beyond the IOR. In order to be viewed as a stable global player, both these aspects would have to be portrayed as “non aggressive”. Third, is the security of India’s SLOCs. A visible presence would ensure safety of shipping in peace and intent in times of crisis or conflict. Fourth, is the internal security aspect. Security of the island territories and coastline has been the subject of an ongoing debate. The Home Minister, in February 2009, had stated that the centre had decided to set up a coastal command. As of now it is yet to see the light of day. The delay is possibly due to the differing views of various agencies and ministries involved. This issue requires serious thought and possibly an act of parliament to ensure establishment of the coastal command. Conciusion In the Indian context national strategy has come to mean much more than just safe guarding the nation’s territorial and political boundary. It also includes economic well being. The emerging Indian economy has aided a resurgent India to be a voice to be heard on the world stage and a regional power of consequence. As the economy booms and India grows both in stature and power the level of competition will also rise. There will be more threats to be faced, objectives to be achieved and a greater responsibility to be borne. The ability to project substantial power across the seas while abiding with international law and the importance of the oceans for a nation’s growth lends an impetus to the maritime strategy of India. Maritime strategy, which is so essential to India’s growth, faces multiple threats and therefore requires to be visible and stated clearly. This would not only enhance the much needed stability in the seas surrounding India but would also aid in economic growth. NOTES 1. 2. Posen, Barry R, “The Sources of Military Doctrine” (Cornell University Press 1984), p. 13. ‘Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia’, USA, 16 Jul 1997 (Definition as given in Joint Publication JP – 1-02), p. 654. 92 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Grand Strategy for India: 2020 and Beyond Singh Jaswant, “What Constitutes National Security in a Changing World Order? India’s Strategic Thought”, CASI Occasional Paper No. 6 Jun 1998, p. 1. Holmes, Winner and Yoshihara, “Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century” (Routledge, 2009), p. 5. Prakash Arun, “A Vision of India’s Maritime Power in the 21st Century”, Air Power Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 Winter 2006 (Oct-Dec), p. 4. Till Geoffrey, “Security in the Indian Ocean Making Waves?, RUSI Journal June 1997, p. 16. UNCLOS. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ texts/unclos/part7.htm (Accessed on 24 Nov 2010). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)—International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the period 01 January to 30 September 2010. Ibid. UNSCR 1846. Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/ 630/29/PDF/N0863029.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 24 Nov 2010). UNSCR 1897. Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/ 624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement. (Accessed on 24 Nov 2010). UNSCR 1950. Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/ 649/02/PDF/N1064902.pdf?OpenElement. (Accessed on 09 Dec 2010). Wombwell James A, “The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends”, Occasional Paper 32, May 2010, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 167. UNSCR 1851. Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/ 655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 24 Nov 2010). CRS Report for Congress—Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ RL34003.pdf (Accessed on 09 November 2010). Special Analysis and Commentary by Credit Analysis and Research Limited, “Indian Shipping Industry exploring the ‘unchartered’ waters”, Available at http://www.careratings.com/archive/3/1776.pdf (Accessed on 30 Nov 2010). Indian Ministry of Shipping Annual Report 2009-10. Available at http:// 122.160.143.74/shipping/writereaddata/l892s/18119985-AnnualReport2009.pdf (accessed on 02 Nov 2010) SCI Fleet Profile. Available at http://www.shipindia.com/fleet/fleet-profile.aspx (accessed on 02 Nov 2010). Note 22. Ibid. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Annual Report 2009. Available at http:/ /www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/images/pdf_capture/mpa_annual_report_2009.pdf (Accessed on 05 December 2010).