Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
DOI 10.3758/s13415-013-0205-3
Empathy and contextual social cognition
Margherita Melloni & Vladimir Lopez & Agustin Ibanez
Published online: 17 August 2013
# Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2013
Abstract Empathy is a highly flexible and adaptive process
that allows for the interplay of prosocial behavior in many
different social contexts. Empathy appears to be a very situated cognitive process, embedded with specific contextual
cues that trigger different automatic and controlled responses.
In this review, we summarize relevant evidence regarding
social context modulation of empathy for pain. Several contextual factors, such as stimulus reality and personal experience, affectively link with other factors, emotional cues, threat
information, group membership, and attitudes toward others
to influence the affective, sensorimotor, and cognitive processing of empathy. Thus, we propose that the frontoinsulartemporal network, the so-called social context network model
(SCNM), is recruited during the contextual processing of
empathy. This network would (1) update the contextual cues
and use them to construct fast predictions (frontal regions), (2)
coordinate the internal (body) and external milieus (insula),
and (3) consolidate the context–target associative learning of
empathic processes (temporal sites). Furthermore, we propose
these context-dependent effects of empathy in the framework
of the frontoinsular-temporal network and examine the behavioral and neural evidence of three neuropsychiatric conditions
M. Melloni : A. Ibanez (*)
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience (LPEN),
Institute of Cognitive Neurology (INECO), Favaloro University,
Pacheco de Melo 1860, Buenos Aires, Argentina
e-mail: aibanez@ineco.org.ar
M. Melloni : A. Ibanez
National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET),
Buenos Aires, Argentina
V. Lopez
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
A. Ibanez
Laboratory of Cognitive and Social Neuroscience (LaNCyS),
UDP-INECO Foundation Core on Neuroscience (UIFCoN), Diego
Portales University, Santiago, Chile
(Asperger syndrome, schizophrenia, and the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia), which simultaneously present with empathy and contextual integration impairments. We
suggest potential advantages of a situated approach to empathy in the assessment of these neuropsychiatric disorders, as
well as their relationship with the SCNM.
Keywords Empathy . Context-dependent effects . Social
cognition . SCNM . Frontoinsular-temporal network .
bvFTD . Asperger syndrome . Schizophrenia
Introduction
Empathy—the ability to recognize the feelings of others—is a
fundamental component of the human emotional experience
and social cognition that influences emotions and behavior
(Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, &
Grossman, 2011). Despite its obvious importance in everyday
life, defining empathy proves difficult because it lacks a
universally accepted definition. Here, we consider three levels
of analysis: (1) a definition (as an ability), (2) the components
(multiple underlying affective and cognitive processes), and
(3) a main set of neural regions. The term empathy is applied
broadly, which covers a spectrum of phenomena ranging from
generating feelings of concern for other people to experiencing emotions matching another individual’s emotions, knowing what another person is thinking or feeling, and blurring the
line between self and other (Decety & Ickes, 2011; J. R.
Hodges, 2001).
This ability is a complex phenomenon that can be partially
dissociated into different related cognitive processes. As such,
empathy can be described as an ability that emerges from
various subsets of cognitive processes. Thus, a behavior as
complex as empathy involves not only a minimal recognition
and understanding of another’s emotional state, but also the
affective experience of the other person’s actual or inferred
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emotional state (Decety & Jackson, 2004). As such, empathy
requires both the ability to share the emotional experience of
the other person (affective component) and an understanding
of the other person’s experience (cognitive component)
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; Hodges
& Klein, 2001). Empathy involves components automatically
elicited by affective arousal, emotional responses, and basic
understanding (bottom-up information processing). Moreover, empathy incorporates top-down controlled processes in
which the perceiver’s motivation, memories, intentions, and
attitudes influence the extent of an empathic experience,
which is underpinned by the interacting neural system
(Decety, 2010; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Decety & Meyer,
2008).
At the neural level, research on the mechanisms that mediate empathy has evidenced a relatively reliable neural network of empathic processes involving the anterior insula (AI),
somatosensory cortex, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety
& Lamm, 2006; Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006). Despite
this well-established evidence, it remains unclear whether
empathy is a modular or a domain-specific phenomenon.
For example, does the perception of others in pain always
imply a shared emotional experience? Does the context increase or attenuate the neural processing of empathy?
In imagining a scene of an unprotected child being hurt by
an aggressive adult, certainly, we would feel empathic sadness
and concern for the victim and anger toward the perpetrator.
Nevertheless, the set of feelings, cognitions, and actions related to empathy is strongly dependent on the appropriate processing of the contextual situation. In the above example, our
empathic emotion might be different if the victim was an adult
and even more different if he/she was an adult with aggressive
behavior. By being attacked by the perpetrator, we may feel
ourselves at risk, and we can decide to escape or attack.
Furthermore, we would feel and act differently depending on
when and where (e.g., at home, in the street, or at night) the
situation occurs. Also, our feelings about the situation and our
own actions may be different depending on whether the
perpetrator and/or the victim is an in-group or out-group
member. In addition, our possible reaction (e.g., defense,
attack, concern, or help) would depend on our own past
experience with suffering and bullying and on our own control
levels and impulsivity.
Research in cognitive science and social neuroscience has
revealed context-dependent effects not only in empathy (as
detailed below), but also in the related domains of visual
perception (Bar, 2004; Schwartz, Hsu, & Dayan, 2007; Zhang
& von der Heydt, 2010), emotion (Barrett & Bar, 2009;
Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; de Gelder, 2006; Ibanez,
Gleichgerrcht, Hurtado, et al., 2010; Ibanez, Hurtado, Riveros,
et al., 2011; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005),
language (Aravena et al., 2010; Cardona et al., 2013; Hagoort,
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
2005; Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007; Ibanez, Cardona, et al.,
2012; Ibanez, Lopez, & Cornejo, 2006; Ibanez, Toro, et al.,
2011), and social cognition (Chung, Mathews, & Barch, 2010;
Ibanez & Manes, 2012; Rankin et al., 2009) and in both
normal and neuropsychiatric conditions. Empathy is not an
exception.
Contextual modulation of empathy may represent an adaptive advantage, making behavior more sensitive to different
environment conditions. To perform this flexible behavior, our
brain must access the available contextual information to
predict the social meaning (e.g., others’ intentions, feelings,
and behavior) on the basis of previous experiences and the
relevance of the particular situation. In every empathic process, contextual cues evoke previous experiences allowing for
coordination of internal (previous experiences) and external
(situation appraisal) processes. Neural correlates of empathy
have been reviewed elsewhere (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012;
Carter, Harris, & Porges, 2009; Decety, 2010; Lamm, Batson,
& Decety, 2007), and other authors have suggested how the
situational context could modulate empathy (Hein & Singer,
2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009). However, none have proposed
a neural network model that accounts for the role of context in
the empathy process. Here, we first review the current research on empathy for pain, highlighting the contextdependent effects at different levels, and we then assess three
new outstanding issues:
1. We propose a social context network model (SCNM) of
contextual influence on empathy processing that depends
on a frontoinsular-temporal network.
2. We suggest that a general deficit in the integration of
social context and behavior could at least partially explain
the wide range of social cognition impairments of three
neuropsychiatric conditions: Asperger syndrome (AS),
schizophrenia (SCZ), and the behavioral variant of
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD).
3. Finally, we introduce a more lifelike approach of empathy
involving the contextual dependence of real-life scenarios
related to the SCNM, which may also provide more
sensitive and ecological measures when applied to different neuropsychiatric populations.
Neuroanatomy of empathy
In this section, we highlight the most systematic brain network
activation to empathic responses. As we will detail below (in
the Is empathy a context-dependent phenomenon? section),
these regions are systematically modulated by contextual
factors.
Like other social cognitive processes (Fig. 1), empathy
relies on a large array of brain structures and systems (Carter
et al., 2009; Decety, 2010) engaged in different networks of
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
409
Fig. 1 Social cognition brain structure and network. a Structures. Several brain regions are involved in social cognition: TPJ, temporoparietal
junction; dMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; STS/STG, superior
temporal sulcus/gyrus; FFA, fusiform face area; and vMPFC/OFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex. b Networks. Several core
social cognition networks have been described. Not surprisingly, most of
these encompass structures from the original “social brain.” One network
is centered on the amygdala (saliency network). A second network is the
so-called mentalizing, or ToM, network. Another network is activated
during observation of the actions of others, including their emotional
expressions. Finally, the empathy network is highlighted in blue. Please
note that for simplicity and clarity, not all regions implicated in the
networks are shown. Reprinted from “The Social Brain in Psychiatric
and Neurological Disorders,” by D. P. Kennedy & R. Adolphs, 2012,
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 559–572. Reprinted with permission
the social brain. A number of distinct and interacting
neurocognitive components contribute to the experience of
empathy: (1) affective arousal, a bottom-up process in which
the amygdala, hypothalamus, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
underlie rapid and prioritized processing of the emotion signal; (2) emotional understanding, which relies on self- and
other-awareness and involves the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ); and (3) emotion regulation,
which depends on executive functions instantiated in the
intrinsic corticocortical connections of the OFC, mPFC, and
dorsolateral PFC, as well as on the connections with subcortical
limbic structures implicated in processing emotional information (Decety, 2010).
Empathy for pain has been frequently studied because of
the robustness of pain in inducing empathy (Bernhardt &
Singer, 2012). As such, the neural circuits involved in pain
are relatively well characterized (Apkarian, Bushnell, Treede,
& Zubieta, 2005; Bushnell et al., 1999; Craig, 2003; Duerden
& Albanese, 2012; Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000;
Rainville, 2002). On the basis of the results from these studies,
a growing number of neuroimaging investigations have
shown that the same neural circuit (the pain matrix) implicated
in the experience of physical pain is also involved in the
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perception or even the imagination of another individual in
pain (Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006). This neural
circuit includes the supplementary motor area (SMA), dorsal
ACC, anterior medial cingulate cortex (aMCC), PAG, AI, and
amygdala (Akitsuki & Decety, 2009; Lamm et al., 2007).
Thus, instead of a domain-specific neural network, it seems
that several hubs and networks mainly centered around the IC
and ACC are engaged in empathy tasks.
Recent meta-analysis extends the activation of the pain
matrix to the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsal ACC
(Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). Of particular importance,
the activation of the AI is most often implicated across all the
studies of empathy for pain (Gu et al., 2010). It has been
proposed that the AI, through its intimate connections to
temporal and frontal regions, serves to index interoceptive
balance, which is related to the feeling of pain and emotional
awareness (Handbook of Emotions, 2008). This insular network plays an important role in the learning and adaptation of
prosocial behavior and might guide decision making and
homeostatic regulation (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff,
2009).
Is empathy a context-dependent phenomenon?
Social cognition processes, including emotional processing,
empathy, and decision making, are mostly embedded in a
social context (Baez et al., 2013; Ibanez & Manes, 2012;
Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). The ability to recognize, manipulate, and behave with respect to socially relevant information
requires neural systems that process the perception of social
signals and that connect such perceptions to motivation, emotion, and adaptive behavior (Adolphs, 2001).
Several contextual cue-based studies (see below) have
shown a modulation of empathy-related brain responses in
frontoinsular regions and have suggested that these regions
have an important role in vicarious sharing of many emotions
and sensations and may integrate information from a range of
different domains to allow the flexible selection of adaptive
responses. However, the insular and ACC activation in vicarious emotions does not imply that these regions are the
empathy-processing areas per se (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012).
Empathy and contextual modulation networks imply partial
but overlapping processes and brain regions. On the one hand,
several studies have demonstrated a core activation of AI and
ACC during empathy for pain with different paradigms, and
these brain responses are modulated by different situational
contextual cues. But on the other hand, contextual modulation
and its concomitant frontotemporal activation have been observed in several social (Ibanez & Manes, 2012) and nonsocial
(Bar, 2004) domains. Moreover, contextual information in general domains impacts both the automatic bottom-up (e.g.,
Kveraga et al., 2011) and the top-down (e.g., Fogelson &
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
Fernandez-Del-Olmo, 2013) processing. Consistent with this
general two-stage modulation, empathy reports also show both
bottom-up (e.g., Ibanez, Hurtado, Lobos, et al., 2011) and topdown (e.g, Gu & Han, 2007) contextual modulation.
In this section, we review very diverse domains that show a
systematic influence of contextual effects. As described below,
these modulatory effects through a broad range of domains may
be accounted for by a common cortical network, the SCNM.
The contextual reality of the stimuli
If empathy for pain is a highly contextual phenomenon, it
should be affected by stimulus reality and ambiguity. Visual
contextual cues help to bias the meaning of ambiguous targets
(Bar, 2004, 2009). In this vein, Gu and Han (2007) found that
attention to pain cues and stimulus reality modulate the temporal brain dynamics involved in empathy for pain tasks. Gu
and Han designed two tasks in which the hands were in
painful or neutral situations. During the painful situation task,
subjects were asked to judge the pain intensity of the hand
owner. This judgment of pain intensity requires focused attention to the pain cues or counting the numbers of hands that
drew attention away from the other’s pain. Rating the pain
intensity of painful pictures induced an increased activation in
parts of the pain matrix, including the ACC, AI, and left
middle frontal gyrus. These neural activities were evident in
the pain judgment task, but not in the counting task. Additionally, subjects were also presented with cartoons showing
hands in similar painful situations to assess the stimuli’s
authenticity. Rating pain intensity of painful cartoons failed
to activate the insula and produced lower ACC activity,
suggesting that empathy was also modulated by the contextual
reality of the stimulus (Gu & Han, 2007). Furthermore, Fan
and Han (2008) investigated the neural activities underlying
empathy for pain by recording event related potentials (ERPs)
and showed that the early differentiation between the painful
and the neutral stimuli found in the frontal-central cortex was
modulated by the contextual reality of the stimuli (Fig. 2).
The contextual appraisal of intentionality, emotion,
and reward cues
As an adaptive and flexible cognitive process, empathy reactions and their neural correlates should be enhanced or
suppressed depending on contextual markers, which directly
inform the observer about the other’s intentions and the consequences of social behavior.
For instance, the intention to hurt during social interactions
modulates the neural response to the perception of pain in
others. Akitsuki and Decety (2009) found that empathy for
pain was modulated by the social context in which the painful
situations occurred (Fig. 3). The ratings of pain intentionally
caused by another person were greater than ratings of pain that
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
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Fig. 2 Early cortical modulation of stimulus realty reflecting the contextual appraisal of empathy. a Illustration of the stimuli used in this study.
The cartoons were based on the picture of stimuli. b Comparison between
the early ERP pain effects induced by pictures and cartoons. Adapted
from “Temporal Dynamics of Neural Mechanisms Involved in Empathy
for Pain: An Event-Related Brain Potential Study,” by Y. Fan & S. Han,
2008, Neuropsychologia, 46, 160–173. Reprinted with permission
was accidentally caused, and hemodynamic signal increase
was detected in the amygdala and left IFG (Akitsuki &
Decety, 2009). These findings were also replicated in children
(Decety, Michalska, & Akitsuki, 2008; Decety, Michalska, &
Kinzler, 2012).
In specific contexts, others’ pain may reflect the processing
of a threat or negative arousal, rather than being a precursor of
empathic prosocial response. In a recent experiment (Yamada &
Decety, 2009), likable and unlikable affective words (e.g., honest vs. rude) were subliminally associated with faces, using a
priming technique. Detection of pain was facilitated only by
unconscious negative affective processing, and not by positive
affective processing (Yamada & Decety, 2009). In another study
(Ibanez, Hurtado, Lobos, et al., 2011), two experiments (one
with semantic stimuli and the other with images) with neutral or
pain expressions previously primed with self (subject) or other
faces were presented. Behavioral and ERP responses (N100 and
P300) to pain and no-pain were modulated only during the
other-face priming condition. This result suggests that pain
processing of other-related, but not self-related, information
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Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
Fig. 3 Social context modulation of empathy for pain. a Examples of the
visual stimuli used for each category. Dynamic stimuli consist of three
pictures of the same size. PCO, pain caused by another individual; PCS,
pain caused by self; NPO, no pain with another individual; and NPS, no
pain with self. b Main effect of social context: Regions showing a
significant main effect of social context (e.g., areas showing greater
activation in self and other trials than in self trials). Activation profiles
in parameter estimate are also shown for regions of interest (ROIs) in the
right posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), right temporal
pole (TP), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and left amygdala (Amy). A
2 × 2 ANOVA was performed for each ROI. There was a significant main
effect for social context in each ROI. Adapted from “Social Context and
Perceived Agency Affects Empathy for Pain: An Event-Related fMRI
Investigation,” by Y. Akitsuki & J. Decety, 2009, NeuroImage, 47, 722–
734. Reprinted with permission
could imply danger rather than empathy, due to the possible
threat represented in the expressions of others (especially when
associated with pain stimuli). These results support the threat
value of pain hypothesis and suggest that in some circumstances, the processing of others’ pain is related to threats, and
not to empathy (Coll, Budell, Rainville, Decety, & Jackson,
2012; Ibanez, Hurtado, Lobos, et al., 2011).
Finally, the contextual effects of reward and emotion have
been observed in empathy for pain research. An fMRI study
(Guo et al., 2012) showed an enhanced brain empathic response (ACC, aMCC, insula, postcentral gyrus, and TPJ) to
others in pain when they received no reward, rather than a
large reward. The financial situation of the target in pain
influenced the neural empathic response. Another fMRI study
(Han et al., 2009), using emotional faces in pain and not in
pain as stimuli, suggests that observing painful stimuli in an
emotional context weakens the affective responses and increases the sensory responses to perceived pain. This study
also linked the interactions between the affective and sensory
components of the pain matrix.
Attitudes, group membership, and social distance
As an adaptive behavior, empathy for pain should be sensitive
to others’ closeness. Inferring through a quick and efficient
process of how close or relevant the other in pain is to oneself
would modulate any emotional response, help to predict the
situational outcome, and guide one’s own reactions.
One study (Rae Westbury & Neumann, 2008) examined
the subjective self-reported empathy ratings, corrugator electromyographic activity, and phasic skin conductance responses (SCRs) during films depicting humans, primates,
quadruped mammals, and birds in victimized circumstances.
There were higher subjective ratings of empathy and larger
SCRs as the stimuli became closer in phylogenetic relatedness
to humans. The greater the similarity of the species to humans,
the larger the subjective ratings and SCRs become. Likewise,
within human interactions (Fig. 4), the degree of other’s
closeness (a loved person vs. a stranger) modulates the pain
matrix activation (Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou, & Decety, 2010).
Empathic responses and their neural correlates are moderated early by a priori attitudes toward other people (Decety,
Echols, & Correll, 2010). Subjects were significantly more
sensitive to the pain of individuals who had contracted AIDS
as the result of a blood transfusion, as compared with
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413
Fig. 4 Pain empathy responses associated with imagining a loved one
and a stranger in pain. a Double dissociation of pain empathy-related
hemodynamic activity in the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and right
temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Imagining a loved one versus a stranger
in painful situations was associated with increased activation in the ACC,
but not in the rTPJ, while imagining a stranger versus a loved one showed
the opposite pattern. b Parameter estimates in the ACC, insula, and rTPJ
in each condition. Hemodynamic responses in the ACC, anterior insulat,
and rTPJ are shown, respectively, for imagining the self, a loved one, and
a stranger in painful situations. Reprinted from “Love Hurts: An fMRI
Study,” by Y. Cheng, C. P. Lin, K. H. Chou, & J. Decety, 2010,
NeuroImage, 51, 923–929. Reprinted with permission
individuals who had contracted AIDS as the result of their
illicit drug addiction (sharing needles). This sensitivity was
evidenced by significantly higher pain and empathy ratings
and greater hemodynamic activity in the pain-processing areas
(e.g., AI, aMCC, and PAG).
The consideration of fairness for others in pain also modulates the pain matrix (Singer et al., 2006). Subjects were
asked to play a game with confederates who performed explicitly fair or unfair strategies. Frontoinsular and dorsal ACC
activation during the observation of pictures of others in pain
was reduced when “unfair players” received shocks (Fig. 5).
This modulation was also affected by the degree of affective
sharing, eliciting an enhanced reduction in the male over the
female subjects.
Racial group membership (Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009)
also influences empathic process. Notably, the neural response
in the ACC to perception of others in pain decreased when
subjects viewed faces of racial out-group members, relative to
racial in-group members. Similar effects were reported with
different group memberships (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff,
Batson, & Singer, 2010). Moreover, increased nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) activation was related to a stronger negative out-group evaluation. Thus, depending on contextual
information, some of the regions of the pain matrix activation
(e.g., NAcc) would imply an antagonistic motivation to empathy (e.g., revenge feelings or pleasure triggered by others’
suffering; see also Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011). Finally,
using transcranial magnetic stimulation to assess the motor
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Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
Fig. 5 Pain-sensitive activation networks to the sight of fair and unfair
players in pain. a, b Conjunction analysis between pain–no pain in the
context of self and the fair condition at p < .001 for women (pink, panel
a) and men (blue, panel b). Increased pain-related activation for women
in the anterior cingulate cortex, the left and right FI, and the left and right
brainstem. c, d Average activation (parameter estimates) in peak voxels
of the left and right FI (left and right panels, respectively) for the painful–
nonpainful trials in fair and unfair conditions for women (panel c) and
men (panel d). Reprinted from “Empathic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of Others,” by T. Singer et al., 2006,
Nature, 439, 466–469. Reprinted with permission
evoked potentials (MEPs) as a measure of pain resonance, one
report showed that decreased MEPs occurred only when
others in pain belonged to the in-group (Avenanti, Sirigu, &
Aglioti, 2010).
have beneficial consequences, such as freeing the cognitive
resources necessary for providing assistance and expressing
empathic concern.
The situated nature of empathy
Individual personal contexts
Not only the external cues triggering disambiguation of information about empathy for pain, but also the learning through
personal experiences involving exposure to contextual situations of pain should modulate the empathy activation in an
adaptive direction.
For instance, two studies investigated how physicians react
to the perception of others’ pain. One study compared the
neuro-hemodynamic response in a group of physicians and a
group of controls while they viewed videos depicting face,
hands, and feet being pricked by a needle (painful situations)
or being touched by a Q-tip (nonpainful situations) (Cheng
et al., 2007). The activation of the pain matrix in controls but
not in physicians occurred when painful situations were
watched, relative to the nonpainful (Fig. 6). A similar study
with physicians was later replicated with an ERPs study
(Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010). The results showed, in controls, an early N110 differentiation between pain and no pain,
reflecting negative arousal, in the frontal cortex, as well as late
P300 in the centro-parietal regions. In contrast, no such early
ERP response was detected in the physicians. This evidence
indicates that affect regulation in physicians has very early
effects, inhibiting the bottom-up processing of negative arousal arising from the perception of painful stimuli and, thus, may
All of the reviewed studies suggest that empathy for pain is
not a modular or context-invariant phenomenon but that several contextual factors influence the affective, sensorimotor,
and cognitive processing of the pain matrix. The neural networks of empathy for pain do not merely resonate with others’
physical condition but are a contextually embedded process.
This process would reflect an empathic flexibility that allows
people to adapt their reaction to the current situational demands (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012).
Most of the reports reviewed here (except some studies
described in The contextual reality of the stimuli and the
Individual personal contexts sections) detail the specific social
influence of SCNM on empathy. Nevertheless, frontotemporal
engagement of contextual modulation is observed during other
social domains or even nonsocial cognition domains, suggesting
a general processing for situatedness.
How does the brain integrate the contextual information
within pain activation? Although contextual effects have been
proposed as inherent in social phenomena (Adolphs, 2009)
and it is well-known that brain regions involved in empathy
are modulated in their activation by social context (Hein &
Singer, 2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009), current models of
empathy for pain integration of contextual information are
scarce. On the basis of the SCNM (Ibanez & Manes, 2012),
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
415
we propose that the contextual influence on the empathy
process depends on a frontoinsular-temporal network.
The social context network model (SCNM)
In social situations, people use common sense and implicit
associative learning derived from previous experience to update the contextual frames to predict the meaning of the social
targets that are most likely to appear in a specific scene, using
information about their relationships. A cortical network
(SCNM; Fig. 7) that mediates the processing of such contextual associations in social cognition settings involving the
regions in frontal, insular, and temporal areas has been proposed (Ibanez & Manes, 2012). The von Economo neurons
(VENs) in the frontoinsular cortex are present in great apes
and humans, but not in other primates, and they are more
numerous in humans than in apes (Allman et al., 2010). VENcontaining regions connect with the frontal pole and with
other parts of the frontal cortex, insular cortex, and temporal
areas (Allman et al., 2010; Allman, Tetreault, Hakeem,
Manaye, et al., 2011; Allman, Tetreault, Hakeem, & Park,
2011). Moreover, these neurons possess a distinctive anatomical feature, large axons that facilitate the connection between
the frontoinsular cortex and the other cortical regions (Allman,
Watson, Tetreault, & Hakeem, 2005). Thus, frontoinsulartemporal regions recruited in the SCNM are strongly
interconnected. Various frontal areas up-date the ongoing
contextual information in relation to episodic memory and
target–context associations (as indexed by different temporal
Fig. 6 Differential neural activations between experts and controls when
watching body parts being pricked by an acupuncture needle. a Subjects
from the control group activated the bilateral insula, periaqueductal gray,
anterior cingulated cortex, and supplementary motor area, whereas subjects from the expert group activated the right inferior parietal lobule and
medial prefrontal gyrus. b As compared with the expert group, subjects
from the control group scored significantly higher on pain intensity and
unpleasantness ratings. c Parameter estimate graphs show signal change
in the insula and medial prefrontal cortex for each condition in each
group. When watching acupuncture procedures, a stronger activation
was detected in the anterior insula in the control group, whereas the
experts showed a stronger activation in the medial prefrontal cortex.
When watching a Q-tip, there was no such double dissociation. Reprinted
from “Expertise Modulates the Perception of Pain in Others,” by Y.
Cheng et al., 2007, Current Biology, 17, 1708–1713. Reprinted with
permission
Fig. 7 The context network model (CNM). The CNM proposes that
there are three subsystems engaged in updating context information and
prediction making (frontal), internal–external information coordination
(insula), and value-based target–context associations (temporal sites).
Adapted from “Contextual Social Cognition and the Behavioral Variant
of Frontotemporal Dementia,” by A. Ibanez & F. Manes, 2012, Neurology, 78, 1354–1362. Reprinted with permission
416
sites). The insula plays a crucial role in the contextual modulation of empathy because it allows for the integration of
internal states, feelings, and motivations with the information
about the specific situation. Moreover, the anterior part of the
insula, together with the ACC, is the key node of the salience
network that plays a critical role in perceiving important
context-dependent information and generates the appropriate
behavioral response to salient events (Menon & Uddin, 2010;
Seeley, Zhou, & Kim, 2012).
Thus, the salience network converges with the SCNM,
highlighting the influence of large-scale functional connections for the integration of contextual information and the
social cognition process.
The role of the frontal lobe in contextual update and prediction
Frontal regions (orbital, prefrontal, and lateral portions) are
engaged in the prediction of the meaning of actions based on
the integration of contextual information with the encoding
and the retrieval of episodic learning (Barbas, Zikopoulos, &
Timbie, 2011; Lang et al., 2009; Watanabe & Sakagami,
2007). Prefrontal neurons have shown rapid adaptation to
context-dependent information with behavioral significance
(Kusunoki, Sigala, Gaffan, & Duncan, 2009; Sigala,
Kusunoki, Nimmo-Smith, Gaffan, & Duncan, 2008;
Watanabe & Sakagami, 2007). The contextual update of visual targets activates the superior orbital sulcus (SOS) (Bar,
2004). The SOS plays a role in the generation of predictions
via the update of associative activation, which is triggered
by the context (Bar, 2009). On the other hand, patients
with a frontal lobe stroke fail to identify how context alters
the social meaning and ignore the incongruity of context
(Mesulam, 2002).
Context–target associations in the temporal lobe
The hippocampus, amygdala, and related temporal sites
(e.g., the perirhinal cortex) index the target–context associative processing (Greene, Gross, Elsinger, & Rao, 2006; Lang
et al., 2009; Langston & Wood, 2010) and linked mechanisms, such as extinction (Bouton, Westbrook, Corcoran, &
Maren, 2006), environment representation (Bilkey, 2007), and
aversive associative learning (Buchel, Dolan, Armony, &
Friston, 1999). In humans, the parahippocampal cortex receives polysensory and somatosensory information required
for mediating global contextual associations (Bar, 2004).
The medial temporal lobes recruit contextual associations to fit the incoming information of the frontal regions
(Mayes & Roberts, 2001). In several psychiatric conditions,
frontotemporal interaction seems to affect the context–target associations of the emotional relevant information
(Millan et al., 2012), and more specifically, when a contextual situation must be inferred during empathy tasks, the
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
frontotemporal sites (the mPFC and temporal regions) are
usually recruited (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012).
The insula: balance among internal and external milieus
The insula is a major cortical brain area involved in different
cognitive, affective, and regulatory functions, including interoceptive awareness, emotional responses, and empathy (Couto,
Salles, et al., 2013; Ibanez, Gleichgerrcht, & Manes, 2010;
Touroutoglou, Hollenbeck, Dickerson, & Feldman Barrett,
2012). The insula integrates contextual information with specific feelings to produce a general evaluation (Singer et al.,
2009). The insula acts as an interoceptive “body marker” of our
experiences of empathy for pain (e.g., empathic concern and
pain avoidance), and AI may constitute the main neural hub of
empathy process (Singer, Seymour, et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, the insula seems to play a general role (not
restricted to empathy processing) in the integration of the
internal and external milieus (Craig, 2009; Ibanez,
Gleichgerrcht, & Manes, 2010; Singer et al., 2009). Seeley
(Seeley et al., 2007) used rs-fMRI to demonstrate that both the
AI and dACC are the key nodes of an independent brain
network, the “salience network,” which facilitates the detection of important contextual stimuli and segregates the most
relevant stimuli among the internal states and the external
stimuli and guides behavior. These regions coactivate in response to varied forms of salience, including the emotional
dimension of pain (Peyron et al., 2000) empathy for pain
(Singer, Seymour, et al., 2004), faces of loved ones (Bartels
& Zeki, 2004) or allies (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, &
Frith, 2004), and social rejection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, &
Williams, 2003). Thus, the salience network, with the insula
as its integral hub, facilitates target brain regions generating
the appropriate behavioral responses to significant stimuli
(Lavin et al., 2013; Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al.,
2007; Seeley et al., 2012).
Moreover, the integrating role of the insula during social
cognition tasks may be dependent on its frontotemporal connections (Couto, Manes, et al., 2013; Couto, Sedeno, et al.,
2013). Frontal and temporal regions are strongly connected
with the insula, especially the regions (ACC/MCC, OFC,
amygdala, and striatum) regulating context-dependent behaviors (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Thus, the contextual modulation of the frontotemporal regions should influence and, at
the same time, be influenced by the insula.
Thus, the SCNM would modulate and influence the pain
matrix depending on the specificity of the situation and the
saliency of the event, allowing a very complex pool of empathic responses in each situation. At the same time, the
SCNM affects the different affective, sensoriomotor, and cognitive components of the empathic process at bottom-up and
top-down stages. Thus, the interaction of both networks (empathy for pain matrix–SCNM) would allow the prediction of
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
the situation’s social meaning on the basis of an update of
previous context–target associations and their motivational
relevance for the observer.
Empathy and the SCNM in neuropsychiatric conditions
The majority of neuropsychiatric conditions have deficits in
social cognition domains and/or abnormal activation of the
social brain areas (Ibanez, Aguado, et al., 2013; Kennedy &
Adolphs, 2012; Millan et al., 2012). Some conditions share
impairments in both the contextual integration and empathic
processes. These conditions detailing the convergent impairments of contextual appraisal and empathic process are
presented below.
Empathy and context in AS
AS is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by
severe and sustained impairments in social interaction (particularly empathy; Baron-Cohen, 2009) and by the development
of restricted repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, and activities. Adults with AS, as well as adults with autism spectrum
disorders (ASDs), exhibit deficits in multiple social cognition
domains. Specifically, it has been proposed that AS patients
have difficulty in identifying the emotions and thoughts of
others and responding with an appropriate emotion (BaronCohen, 2002). Although reduced empathy is considered a core
feature of AS (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Dziobek
et al., 2008), the majority of studies have focused on either the
cognitive or the emotional component alone and have relied on
self-report questionnaires (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright,
2004; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007;
Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Yaniv, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002),
which likely present limited ecological validity (Dziobek
et al., 2008) and require abilities such as abstract thinking
and introspection.
Regarding the assessment of contextual clues during empathy tasks, only one behavioral study has assessed this issue
(Baez et al., 2012). AS adults were tested with multiple social
cognition tasks (including measures of empathy) with differing degrees of contextual influence. AS adults presented with
a pattern of social cognition deficits characterized by a decreased ability to implicitly encode and integrate contextual
information to gain access to the social meaning. Nevertheless, when social information was explicitly presented or the
situation could be navigated with abstract rules, their performance improved. These findings confirm previous reports that
suggested that AS adults may use abstract rules to compensate
for their impairments in social cognition (Hayashi, Kato,
Igarashi, & Kashima, 2008; Soulieres, Dawson, Gernsbacher,
& Mottron, 2011). In addition, a context-dependent measure
of empathy (EPT) triggered the contextual influences in the
417
identification of intentional and accidental harms. AS patients
showed abnormal empathic concern, punishment, and discomfort ratings for intentional pain situations (when the intention to hurt needed to be inferred from the contextual
information). Consistent with previous findings (Dziobek
et al., 2008; Klin, 2000; Rogers et al., 2007; Zalla, Sav, Stopin,
Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009), this study indicates that AS individuals have difficulty with inferring the intentionality of
actions from the scenarios in which explicit contextual information is not available.
At the neural level, there is increasing evidence suggesting
that people with ASD have anatomical differences in specific
limbic tracts that connect temporal and orbitofrontal limbic
regions (Pugliese et al., 2009). The ACC and its connections
with the pain matrix (Lavin et al., 2013) are significantly less
activated during social tasks in ASD (Di Martino et al., 2009;
Thakkar et al., 2008). Moreover, AS adults present with
smaller insula volumes (Kosaka et al., 2010) and insufficient
activation of the right insula during an empathizing task in an
fMRI study (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Additionally, adults
with ASD show abnormal frontoinsular-temporal activation
during social cognition tasks (Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith,
2002; Pelphrey, Adolphs, & Morris, 2004; Silani et al., 2008).
Finally, in ASD subjects, fronto-temporo-parietal brain regions serving to associate the contextual information are atypically activated when a social context is presented at the time
of encoding (Greimel et al., 2012). Together, these findings
suggest that the SCNM could be related to the peculiar deficits
of AS and seem to be associated with impairments in the
capacity to implicitly integrate action intentions with contextual cues to access the social meaning, not only in empathy
tasks, but also among different social skills (Baez et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, both hypotheses (the implicitness and the general impairment of contextual social cognition) require further
research and direct testing of contextual manipulations and
frontotemporal-activation-specific measurements.
Empathy and context in schizophrenia
SCZ is among the most disabling mental illnesses and frequently causes impaired social functioning (Brissos, Molodynski,
Dias, & Figueira, 2011). In patients with SCZ, several studies
have shown deficits in multiple social cognition domains,
including empathy (for a meta-analysis, see Achim, Ouellet,
Roy, & Jackson, 2011). However, most of these findings were
obtained using tasks that do not manipulate contextual
influences.
At a behavioral level, one study evaluated the performance
of SCZ patients and patients with bipolar disorders in social
cognition tasks, which incorporated different levels of contextual dependence and real-life involvement (Baez et al., 2013).
The results demonstrated that both patient groups exhibited
deficits in social cognition tasks with greater context sensitivity
418
and real-life involvement. These findings are consistent with
recent reports of social context processing deficits in SCZ
(Huang, Chan, Lu, & Tong, 2009; Monkul et al., 2007; Penn,
Ritchie, Francis, Combs, & Martin, 2002). Patients did not
differ from controls in tasks involving explicit knowledge. A
previously described ecological task of empathy for pain
(EPT) was also assessed. SCZ patients exhibited difficulties
in comprehending the situations, suggesting deficits in the
ability to distinguish neutral and accidental situations from
intentional pain situations in settings with contextual information provided (see also Montag, Heinz, Kunz, & Gallinat,
2007; Villatte, Monestes, McHugh, Freixa i Baque, & Loas,
2010). These results are also consistent with those in studies of
SCZ patients who reflect double impairments in contextual
appraisal and emotion inference (Champagne-Lavau, Charest,
Anselmo, Rodriguez, & Blouin, 2012; Huang et al., 2009;
Ibanez, Riveros, et al., 2012; Monkul et al., 2007; Riveros
et al., 2010).
Consistent with the proposal of a wide SCZ impairment on
contextual modulation, recent reports suggest a general and
multilevel deficit in contextual integration of information,
from the more basic process (e.g., visual perception; Dakin,
Carlin, & Hemsley, 2005; Javitt, Shelley, Silipo, &
Lieberman, 2000; Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips, & Lovell,
2004) to high-level cognition (e.g., speech and social cognition; Amoruso, Cardona, Melloni, Sedeño, & Ibanez, 2012;
Chung et al., 2010; Green, Waldron, Simpson, & Coltheart,
2008; Ibanez, Riveros, et al., 2011; Penn et al., 2002). In SCZ,
basic context-dependent perception (especially during visual
paradigms) seems to be systematically affected, suggesting
that impairments in contextual appraisal of empathy would be
a part of a more extended contextual impairment.
At the structural and functional neural levels, the most
affected brain areas in SCZ are the temporal and frontal
regions. Systematic meta-analysis of SCZ volumetric studies
(Shepherd, Laurens, Matheson, Carr, & Green, 2012) reveals
gray matter reductions of frontal, temporal, and insular regions. Regarding the neural correlates of empathy, SCZ patients showed a significant impairment in empathic behavior,
accompanied by dysfunctional activation in regions known to
be related to empathy and contextual integration, such as the
insula, amygdala, and ACC (Derntl et al., 2012; Fakra,
Salgado-Pineda, Delaveau, Hariri, & Blin, 2008; Gur et al.,
2007; Habel et al., 2010). More specifically, impaired empathy in SCZ underlies an abnormal frontoinsular-temporal network (Benedetti et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010).
Disentangling the contextual deficits from basic empathic
processes provides important insights into the cognitive profile of SCZ. In these patients, deficits in context processing
may be a core deficit that underlies perceptual, cognitive, and
social cognition impairments, including empathy (Chung &
Barch, 2011).
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
Empathy and context in the behavioral variant
of frontotemporal dementia
The bvFTD is a neurodegenerative disease mostly characterized by progressive changes in personality and social cognition, including a loss of empathy, disinhibition, impaired
social awareness, and loss of insight (Mendez & Perryman,
2002; Neary et al., 1998). Patients with the bvFTD present
with deficits in empathy processing (Eslinger et al., 2011;
Fernandez-Duque, Hodges, Baird, & Black, 2010; Lough
et al., 2006; Mendez & Perryman, 2003; Perry et al., 2001;
Piguet, Hornberger, Mioshi, & Hodges, 2011; Rankin et al.,
2006; Rankin, Kramer, & Miller, 2005) and several impaired
domains of social cognition, such as facial expression (Lough
et al., 2006), decision making (Gleichgerrcht, Ibanez, Roca,
Torralva, & Manes, 2010; Manes et al., 2011), figurative
language (e.g., sarcasm, Rankin et al., 2009); ToM, (Torralva
et al., 2007; Torralva, Roca, Gleichgerrcht, Bekinschtein, &
Manes, 2009), and interpersonal norms (Rankin, Kramer,
Mychack, & Miller, 2003; Sollberger et al., 2009). These
results lead to the hypothesis that the bvFTD presents an
intrinsic affectation of the SCNM that results in the inability
to incorporate context into the control of social behavior
(Ibanez & Manes, 2012).
At the neural level, disruption of the orbitofrontal–amygdala circuit and other frontotemporal networks are thought to
be responsible for the main bvFTD symptoms (Hodges,
2001). The right OFC regulates behavior with a predominantly right-sided network involving the insula and the striatum
(Viskontas, Possin, & Miller, 2007). The initial symptoms of
the bvFTD reflect the involvement of OFC and the disruption
of the rostral limbic system, which involves the insula, the
ACC, the striatum, the amygdala, and the medial frontal lobes
(Boccardi et al., 2005; Viskontas et al., 2007), followed by the
temporal pole, the dorsolateral frontal cortex, and the basal
ganglia. In addition, studies using voxel-based morphometry
have shown that bvFTD patients have a crucial gray matter
loss in the AI and other frontal areas (Williams, Nestor,
& Hodges, 2005). Interestingly, the specific network of
the ACC and orbital frontoinsular regions seems to be involved
in processing the emotional salience of stimuli (Seeley et al.,
2007). This evidence likely suggests that one aspect of
the decreased ability to attend to salient, socially significant cues may depend on the connectivity in a right
frontoinsular intrinsic network that is selectively targeted by
this disease (Seeley, Crawford, Zhou, Miller, & Greicius, 2009;
Shany-Ur et al., 2012).Together, all these findings suggest
that the specific pattern of social cognition impairment in
the bvFTD can be understood as general deficits in the integration of the social context triggered by an abnormal
frontoinsular-temporal network (Ibanez & Manes, 2012;
Seeley et al., 2012).
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:407–425
Plausibility and relevance of the SCNM in AS, SCZ,
and the bvFTD
Above, we have briefly summarized recent preliminary evidence of contextual impairments during empathy tasks in AS,
SCZ, and the bvFTD, which suggests an overlapping and
partial dissociated pattern of impairment among these disorders. These disorders involve abnormal structure, activity, and
connectivity at the main hubs of the SCNM. Although highly
speculative, partially shared empathic and contextual integration deficits in AS, SCZ, and the bvFTD may refer to abnormal brain connectivity among the areas predicting the social
meaning of empathy-triggering situations through the update
of experience-based learning of target–context associations.
Impairments in the implicit contextual appraisal of social
cognition (including but not exclusively empathy) would be a
core feature of AS. A pattern of social cognition deficits
characterized by a decreased ability to implicitly encode and
integrate contextual information to gain access to the social
meaning has been identified in recent reports. Conversely, in
AS, a better behavioral and typical neural response is observed
in social cognition tasks with explicit abstract information.
In SCZ patients, ecological measures with contextprocessing requirements seem to be more sensitive than classical social cognition tasks. Nevertheless, contextual impairments in SCZ are observed in nonsocial domains, suggesting
that the impairment in context-dependent empathy tasks represents only a subset of a more general affectation of contextual appraisal.
The bvFTD is a prototypical disorder in which contextual
social behaviors are disrupted. Different sources of evidence
suggest that the ability to integrate others’ emotions and
intentions within a specific social context is a core bvFTD
impairment underlying empathy and social cognition deficits.
Taken together, these findings raise three main questions.
(1) Are the empathy deficits described in AS caused by
impairments of the implicit encoding and the integration of
contextual information to access social meaning (Baez et al.,
2012)? (2) Is there a general (not restricted to social cognition
or empathy) impairment of contextual integration in SCZ
(Baez et al., 2013)? (3) Does the bvFTD involve a specific
deficit of contextual integration of social information (Ibanez
& Manes, 2012)? These outstanding questions cannot be
answered with current evidence, but they open a new line of
research, whose aim is to help disentangle the interaction
among empathy and contextual processes and the differences
among these disorders.
Contextual influences in cognitive neuroscience are usually
ignored (Bar, 2004; Maren, Phan, & Liberzon, 2013). For
modular theories of social cognition (e.g., Chiao &
Immordino-Yang, 2013; Cosmides & Tooby, 1997), the mind
is composed of a set of domain-specific and functionally
419
specialized modules. Thus, theory of mind was conceptualized as having modular properties (Apperly, Samson, &
Humphreys, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985;
Leslie, 1992) even when not presenting all modular features
(Ibanez, Huepe, et al., 2013; Stone & Gerrans, 2006). In the
case of empathy, similar explanations in terms of domain
specificity (Gu et al., 2010) or single explanatory mechanisms
such as the mirror system mechanism (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009)
seem to be inadequate or insufficient for understanding the
flexible and adaptive empathic responses.
Moreover, a contextual approach to empathy and its relationship with SCNM would provide more sensitive measures
of cognitive impairments in the conditions described above. In
these disorders, empathy is mostly assessed through selfreporting or experimental designs without contextual modulations. It is also important to promote the use of tasks involving
real-life social scenarios, because this type of “ecological”
measure is a context-sensitive tool and should be applied in
neuropsychiatry (Burgess, Alderman, Volle, Benoit, & Gilbert,
2009; Ibanez & Manes, 2012; Torralva, Roca, Gleichgerrcht,
Bekinschtein, & Manes, 2009).
On the other hand, the traditional empathic skills interventions for individuals with neuropsychiatric conditions are
based on learning explicit rules to build and foster relationships with others. However, social skills acquired during those
interventions fail to generalize to situations outside of the
treatment setting. Thus, incorporating naturalistic environments and the implicit learning of contextual clues into the
treatment plan may help individuals with neuropsychiatric
conditions to generalize the learned empathic skills. Although
the implementation would be challenging, intervention programs should be based on teaching implicit rules for
interpreting unpredictable social contexts.
Concluding remarks
Social context modulation seems to be involved in empathy
for pain. In that sense, empathy can be better understood as a
complex contextual phenomenon related to different processes and different neuronal networks (Kennedy & Adolphs,
2012). Empathy processes should not be reduced to a single
or unique structural activation (e.g., the insula or ACC) but, on
the contrary, should include a complex and context-related
network. The SCNM provides an explanation for flexible
empathic processes. Here, the frontal regions would update
and predict the social meaning by recruiting previous experiences stored in temporal regions, and the insular “mediator
effect” would index balance among the saliency of external
information and the intrinsic relevance for the internal and
motivational states. Empathy should involve the coactivation
of the SCNM, depending on the ambiguity of the information
420
provided in the social scenarios. Thus, the interaction of
empathic processes with contextual information would recruit
an extended and distributed network that would be further
investigated in normal and neuropsychiatric conditions.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank Jean Decety for many
helpful comments and for the discussion of an earlier version of this
work. This study was supported by grants CONICYT/FONDECYT
Regular (1130920 and 1090610), PICT 2012-0412, and PICT 20121309, CONICET and the INECO Foundation.
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