Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2012
…
2 pages
1 file
Modelling real time is fundamental to reason about pervasive systems. The formal analysis of some time sensitive security protocols, such as distance bounding protocols, could lead to a more formal approach to time dependent properties formalisation and verification of pervasive systems.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011
Distance-Bounding identification protocols aim at impeding man-in-themiddle attacks by measuring response times. There are three kinds of attacks such protocols could address: (1) Mafia attacks where the adversary relays communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different sessions; (2) Terrorist attacks where the adversary gets limited active support from the prover to impersonate. (3) Distance attacks where a malicious prover claims to be closer to the verifier than it actually is. Many protocols in the literature address one or two such threats, but no rigorous cryptographic security models -nor clean security proofs-exist so far. For resource-constrained RFID tags, distance-bounding is more difficult to achieve. Our contribution here is to formally define security against the above-mentioned attacks and to relate the properties. We thus refute previous beliefs about relations between the notions, showing instead that they are independent. Finally we use our new framework to assess the security of the RFID distance-bounding scheme due to Kim and Avoine, and enhance it to include impersonation security and allow for errors due to noisy channel transmissions.
Journal of Computer …, 2011
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unified framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary, and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is finally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla-Peinado distance bounding protocol. through the accomplice and the adversary. The communication between the adversary and her accomplice can be set up, for example, using mobile phones. One may argue that the merchant will detect the attack. However, some payment systems are based on the NFC-friendly cellphones and this still facilitates the masquerade because the merchant is not able to see that the cell-phone performs a mafia fraud.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009
Relay attacks are one of the most challenging threats RFID will have to face in the close future. They consist in making the verifier believe that the prover is in its close vicinity by surreptitiously forwarding the signal between the verifier and an out-of-field prover. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising way to thwart relay attacks, by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. Several such protocols have been designed during the last years but none of them combine all the features one may expect in a RFID system. We introduce in this paper the first solution that compounds in a single protocol all these desirable features. We prove, with respect to the previous protocols, that our proposal is the best one in terms of security, privacy, tag computational overhead, and fault tolerance. We also point out a weakness in Tu and Piramuthu's protocol, which was considered up to now as one of the most efficient distance bounding protocol.
2014
Many security protocols rely on the assumptions on the physical properties in which its protocol sessions will be carried out. For instance, Distance Bounding Protocols take into account the round trip time of messages and the transmission velocity to infer an upper bound of the distance between two agents. We classify such security protocols as cyber-physical. The key elements of such protocols are the use of cryptographic keys, nonces and time. This paper investigates timed models for the verification of such protocols. Firstly, we introduce a multiset rewriting framework with continuous time and fresh values. We demonstrate that in this framework one can specify distance bounding protocols and intruder models for cyberphysical security protocols that take into account the physical properties of the environment. We then investigate how the models with continuous time relate to models with discrete time in protocol verification and show that there is a difference between these mode...
2010
In this paper, we classify the RFID distance bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final signature. We also give the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes, leaving the security bounds for the general case as an open problem. As for the classification, we introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the current and k-previous challenges and there is no final signature. We treat the case k = 0, which means each response bit depends only on the current challenge, as a special case and define such protocols as current challenge dependent (CCD) protocols. In general, we construct a trade-off curve between the security levels of mafia and distance frauds by introducing two generic attack algorithms. This leads to the conclusion that CCD protocols cannot attain the ideal security against distance fraud, i.e. 1/2, for each challenge-response bit, without totally losing the security against mafia fraud. We extend the generic attacks to 1-PCD protocols and obtain a trade-off curve for 1-PCD protocols pointing out that 1-PCD protocols can provide better security than CCD protocols. Thereby, we propose a natural extension of a CCD protocol to a 1-PCD protocol in order to improve its security. As a study case, we give two natural extensions of Hancke and Kuhn protocol to show how to enhance the security against either mafia fraud or distance fraud without extra cost.
2012 9th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 2012
Distance bounding protocols are launched based upon the round trip time measurements of the carried out messages to defend RFID systems against the relay attack. In such protocols, the reader authenticates tags and also estimates an upper bound for the physical distance between the tag and itself. Distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks. In this paper, a new distance bounding protocol is proposed based on mutual utilization of binary predefined and random challenges. Moreover, this protocol is analyzed to compute the attacker's success probability due to mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks. In this case, the analysis and simulation results show that the proposed protocol obtains the desirable attackers' success probabilities, with minimum system memory requirement and minimum number of rounds compared with other distance bounding protocols employed by RFID systems.
Arxiv preprint arXiv:1004.1237, 2010
Almost all existing RFID authentication schemes (tag/reader) are vulnerable to relay attacks, because of their inability to estimate the distance to the tag. These attacks are very serious since it can be mounted without the notice of neither the reader nor the tag and cannot be prevented by cryptographic protocols that operate at the application layer. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising way to thwart relay attacks, by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. All the existing distance bounding protocols use random number generator and hash functions at the tag side which make them inapplicable at low cost RFID tags. This paper proposes a lightweight distance bound protocol for low cost RFID tags. The proposed protocol based on modified version of Gossamer mutual authentication protocol. The implementation of the proposed protocol meets the limited abilities of l RFID tags.
Journal of Chinese Religions, 2015
Chan 禪Buddhism’s rise to popularity in the Song dynasty produced far-reaching effects within Chinese religious culture. This paper examines the ways in which doctrinal, literary, and mythological elements, drawn from Chan sources, were utilized within literary works associated with internal alchemy (neidan 內丹), a form of Daoist self-cultivation that emerged in the late Tang and became increasingly widespread during the Song. I examine the works of the influential neidan practitioner Zhang Boduan 張伯端, who wrote favorably of Chan Buddhism and incorporated elements of its practice within his own tradition. Following this, I turn to an analysis of the writings of other authors and commentators within Zhang’s tradition. These authors held more critical views of Chan and of Buddhism in general; drawing upon long-standing polemical arguments, they attempted to present Chan as an inferior form of Daoist practice and claimed that well-known Chan practitioners were, in fact, engaged in neidan practice. With this study, I hope to contribute to the growing body of scholarship focused on the analysis of Buddho-Daoist relations and polemics in the Song period.
Có nhiều bạn inbox hỏi mình rằng "Mình học xong quyển ABC, xong luôn bộ XYZ, cũng luyện xong bộ QWT rồi luôn nữa... thì mình sẽ thi được bao nhiêu điểm?". Thật tình mà nói, rất khó để xác định được bạn sẽ được bao nhiêu điểm sau khi bạn đã ôn nhiều bộ sách. Người duy nhất đánh giá được năng lực, khả năng tiếng anh của bạn chính là bản thân bạn. Điểm số trong bài thi Toeic hay ngay cả những bài thi mang tính chất học thuật hơn như Ielts hay Toefl cũng chỉ mang tính chất tương đối chứ không thể xác định một cách chính xác được.
Introduction
Pervasive systems often contain devices which must operate in very different environments and connect together in different ways, and still satisfy all the desired security properties. The rapid development of wireless technologies (such as RFID) has led to new application areas for pervasive systems with novel security requirements for the protocols employed. Unlike traditional security protocols concerning message secrecy or different types of authentication, these new protocols employed in new applications usually establish security properties coupled with the wireless network environment.
Physical location is used as a measurement of trust in wireless networks, RFID-based systems and vehicular communication that require secure localisation, time synchronisation, neighbour discovery, and neighbour verification. For such location services, it is crucial to securely estimate distance between two nodes in a wireless network and thus impede man-in-the-middle attacks. The main countermeasure against such attacks is the use of Distance bounding (DB) protocols. DB protocols are a class of identification protocols in which one "verifier" node in wireless networks measures an upper bound on its distance to another "prover" node in the network. Accordingly, the security of DB protocols is applicable to most pervasive computing applications.
So far, DB protocols have been extensively studied: a large number of protocols have been proposed and analysed in the past decade. Regardless of the different type of DB protocols, the distance bound is obtained from a rapid exchange of messages between the verifier and the prover in the fast bit phase. In this phase, the verifier sends a challenge to the prover, to which the prover responds after some processing time. The verifier measures the round-trip time between sending its challenge and receiving the responses from the prover, subtracts the prover's processing time, and based on the remaining time, computes the distance bound between the devices.
Typically, DB protocols are designed and analysed with respect to three different classes of attack scenarios:
• Mafia fraud attacks where the attacker A relays communication between a honest prover P and a honest verifier V in different sessions
• Distance fraud attacks where a malicious prover P claims to be closer to the verifier V than it actually is
• Terrorist fraud attacks where the attacker A gets limited active support from the prover P to deceive the verifier V
All attacks aim to make the verifier believe that the prover P is physically closer to the verifier V than it really it. Recently, a fourth type of real time attack on DB protocols, called Distance hijacking attacks, has been defined and analysed [4]. Although nowadays many proposed DB protocols are resistant to mafia fraud, verifying DB protocols using existing informal and formal frameworks still does not guarantee the absence of other attacks, e.g., the distance hijacking.
Related Work
The first DB protocol was proposed in [3] in 1993, but the first formal analysis of DB protocols was presented in 2007 ( [9]). In [9], the authors not only proposes a new protocol for distance bounding that requires less message and cryptographic complexity, but also uses authentication and secrecy logics to analyse its security. Their logical framework is only based on qualitative analysis and does not provide any extended analysis of the timing properties. Since then, several quantitative frameworks for the verification of real time sensitive protocols have been proposed.
The constraint solver tool, which is a protocol security analyzer taking advantage of constraint programming techniques, was used to automatically analyse DB protocols in [8]. A natural limitation of their analysis is that it cannot tackle unbounded analysis since the constraint solver only considers bounded number of protocol processes. Meanwhile, a related approach to modelling and verifying physical properties (namely communication, location, and time) of DB protocols using HOL/Isabelle was presented in [10]. Being a verification effort, the two approaches in [8] and [10] differ in the classical way that model checking differs from theorem proving: the former tests for attacks while the latter proves their absence of.
It seems that since the introduction of the first RFID distance bounding protocol [7] in 2005, numerous DB protocols have been proposed, in an attempt to make them appropriate for the RFID systems. Unfortunately, many protocols in the literature address no rigorous cryptographic security models, nor the case of clear security proof. Also, they are commonly designed without any formal methods, which lead to inaccurate analyses. We consider that distance bounding for RFID systems is more difficult to achieve due to constrained resource of RFID tags.
During the last two years, there has been a recent surge in interest and research, in the arena of formal approaches to RFID-based distance bounding protocols. A new framework [6] was proposed, based on common game-based notion on cryptography, to analyse the security of the RFID DB protocols. Although this new approach addresses RFID authentication and can also be applied to general DB protocols, it still abstracts away from timed analysis. Another systematic method [2] aims to improve analysis and design of RFID DB protocols. Although the unified framework includes a thorough terminology about frauds, attackers, and provers, thus clarifying many misleading terms, the generic model only allows for the refinement of the security analysis, but not to verify security properties.
Our Approach
To the best of our knowledge, all the existing techniques for verifying security protocols specifically for pervasive systems abstract away from real time, focusing only on the sequencing of events. Although this has many advantages, it is a serious limitation for reasoning about RFID protocols for secure distance bounding, which rely on real time considerations. Furthermore, past efforts to analyse DB protocols have only been manual. Automated analysis would avoid the problems and distrust in manual analysis of protocols that have often been reported. Thus, we consider that automated approaches are critical since they are quite likely to find flaws that manual approaches cannot.
Our contributions will be threefold: (1) To give in-depth and rigorous analyses of how to formalise time dependent properties in security protocols using modelling languages such as applied pi calculus [1], (2) to define the time dependent security properties formally against attacks RFID distance bounding protocols could address. Finally, (3) we will extend existing formal verification techniques (such as model checking and process calculi), towards a automated verification of such protocols.
The most two popular approaches are based on automated methods, such as model checking, and interactive methods, such as theorem proving. In both scenarios, it is standard to formalise an intruder model based on the Dolev-Yao model [5], which identifies the intruder with the network. However, the conventional Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols is inappropriate to analyse DB protocols in our case. Analysis of RFID DB protocols involves examining whether it is possible to make a tag appear closer than it really is, to an honest reader. The problem is different and difficult compared to standard Dolev-Yao analysis of protocols that only consider whether an attacker can generate messages required to violate some security properties. Thus, we need to consider the timing required for genera-tion and transmission as well.
Formal verification using automatic verifier ProVerif has been discussed in [8] as an extension of their analysis. In particular, it suggests adding four events in the DB protocols, two each for the verifier and prover, corresponding to sending and receiving the challenge and rapid response in the fast bit phase. The security property they formulate is a time-based trace equivalence that we plan to formalise in applied pi calculus as a starting point for our timed analysis.
Conclusion
The timed analysis of RFID distance bounding protocols will enable us to tackle the problem of modelling real-time aspects in timed process calculi and thus define and formally verify time dependent security properties. This will be essential to formally verify pervasive systems.
L'information en droit de la concurrence et de la régulation, 2019
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019
The Technology of Maya Civilization: Political Economy and Beyond in Lithic Studie, 2011
Development, 2005
Aspectos de lingüística histórica española en el contexto europeo, 2018
Journal of Teacher Education and Educators, 2021
Rangeland Journal, 2017
Nurse Education in Practice, 2014
Rev. Inst. Adolfo …, 2009
Frontiers in Cellular and Infection Microbiology, 2022
Twin Research and Human Genetics, 2012