Conservation through Commodification?

Conservation through Commodification? Published in Ethic, Policy & Environment, 16 (2013), 3: 294-304. Jozef Keulartz Abstract During the past decade, we have seen the introduction of market-based mechanisms in biodiversity policy. Biodiversity markets are considered powerful tools to slow down or even stop the ongoing loss of biodiversity by internalizing costs that are traditionally externalized. This paper questions these optimistic expectations. Can we save nature by selling it? Is conservation through commodification a viable option? This paper maps both the social and ecological problems of the commodification of nature that is a necessary precondition for biodiversity markets to function. Introduction During the past decade, we have seen the introduction of market-based mechanisms in biodiversity policy. An important market-based instrument for biodiversity protection is the market for ecosystem services. Other important market-based tools are the so-called ‘payment for ecosystem services’ schemes. This market is modeled after the market in carbon credits, tradable certificates or permits representing the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. Parallel to this carbon market, there has already evolved a tradable permit market for ‘habitat credits’ or ‘species credits’. Developers who want to turn land to economic purposes are required to purchase these credits from organizations that compensate for the damage to valuable habitat by restoring or enhancing habitat of equivalent ecological value some place else (Bayon & Jenkins 2010; Madsen et al. 2010). Here we encounter what Andrew Light once called ‘malicious restorations’ (Light 2003, 401). In the early 1980s, when the term ‘ecosystem services’ was coined, the emphasis was largely pedagogical. The concept was first of all meant to raise public awareness of the importance of biodiversity and to justify its protection. Toward the end of the century the original emphasis on the concept of ecosystem services as a tool to communicate the value of biodiversity shifted to efforts to figure out how to cash ecosystem services as commodities on potential markets (Peterson et al. 2009; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). The turning point was an article by Costanza et al. (1997), in which the economic value of seventeen services for sixteen biomes was estimated at US$16-54 trillion annually (cf. Daily 1997). The idea behind biodiversity markets is that if positive and negative impacts on biodiversity can be measured as credits and debits, they can be more easily integrated as benefits or costs in economic decision making. By internalizing costs that are traditionally externalized, biodiversity markets are supposed to act as powerful tools to slow down or even stop the ongoing loss of biodiversity. But are these optimistic expectations justified? Can we save nature by selling it? Protect it by pricing it? Is conservation through commodification a viable option? Or will it have perverse effects, as some critics fear (e.g., McCauley 2006; Marris 2009)? To answer this question, I will first look at the market for carbon credits as the model for the biodiversity market. Under the Kyoto Protocol three market-based mechanisms have been established: Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism. I will focus on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the only mechanism that involves developing countries, as the most relevant mechanism for a comparison of the carbon and the biodiversity market (section 1). Next, I will zoom in on forests projects under CDM and argue that these projects suffer from severe problems and are less beneficial than all other CDM projects because they are subject to ecosystem dynamics (section 2). Finally, I will argue that the problems that the biodiversity market has to face are much larger than the problems of forest projects under CDM because the biodiversity market is far more complex than the carbon market (section 3). 1. CDM as model for the biodiversity market CDM projects should meet two objectives: they should address the sustainable development needs of developing (host) countries, and at the same time allow industrialized (investor) countries to earn emissions credits that can be used to meet their reduction commitments as cost-effectively as possible. Whereas the developing countries succeeded in creating a new source of funding for sustainable development, the industrialized countries succeeded in adding ‘geographical flexibility’ to the Protocol. Although CDM is not without its problems - the uneven geographic distribution of projects, the relatively high transaction costs, the so-called ‘free rider’ credits, the problem of leakage, the problem of low-hanging fruits - these problems can in part be overcome by developing more sophisticated methodologies and might be outweighed by the many benefits and win-win opportunities for the diverse group of stakeholders involved. The potential of the CDM can be demonstrated with a representative example: the NovaGerar Landfill Gas to Energy Project (Keulartz 2005; 2009). It aims at the conversion of the greenhouse gas methane in the landfill gas of two Brazilian dumpsites into electricity for the grid. To capture and collect landfill gas, landfill cells will be coated with an impermeable high-density polyethylene membrane. Leachate and surface run-off will be channelled and dealt with in a wastewater treatment plant. A broad variety of stakeholders will benefit from this project. The investor – the Netherlands – will be able to meet part of its Kyoto commitments in a cost-effective way. At least three corporations will profit from this project: EcoSecurities, a multinational environmental finance company, specialising in greenhouse gas mitigation; its joint venture partner S.A. Paulista, a Brazilian engineering and waste management company; and EnerG, a British specialist landfill gas-to-energy company that will provide technical advice. The project will of course be advantageous to the host country as well. Brazil has over 6,000 landfills, the vast majority of which are not controlled in any way. 75% of general waste generated in Brazil is simply thrown into garbage dumps that are totally uncontrolled and have no landfill gas collection or drainage. The remaining 25% is disposed of at “controlled” landfills that cannot be called sanitary landfills. The CDM project could help to change this situation. For the local community the main social and environmental impacts of this project will also be positive. By managing the landfill sites properly the environmental health risks and the potential for explosions are greatly reduced. The project will have a small, but positive impact on employment in the local area as a number of staff will need to be recruited to operate and manage the landfill gas sites. Finally, as a condition of the license to manage both landfill sites, NovaGerar will donate 10% of the electricity generated on-site to the local municipal authority of Nova Iguaçú to provide lighting for local schools, hospitals and other public buildings. Combustion or containment of methane (CH4) generated by landfills or farm animals (by use of an anaerobic digester) is one of the main CDM categories. For other important categories see Box 1. Renewable energy (wind power, solar power, biomass energy, and hydroelectric power); Fuel switch (such as coal or oil to natural gas); Energy efficiency (e.g., cogeneration whereby plants use heat that would normally be wasted in the process of power generation); Destruction of industrial pollutants with a high Global Warming Potential; Afforestation and Reforestation. Afforestation refers to the planting of trees on areas that were not covered with forests, while reforestation refers to the re-planting of trees on areas that were once covered with forests. Box 1. Main CDM categories Generally, CDM projects seem to be rather beneficial, at least in principle, but there are several important difficulties. Large-scale hydroelectric power projects (dams) are particularly problematic, because of the resettlement of large populations without adequate compensation and the degradation of river ecosystems. Because of these social and environmental impacts, some European countries are no longer allowing large hydroelectricity power projects into the EU Emission Trading System, even though they have been individually approved by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the World Commission on Dams. The development and deployment of liquid biofuels for the transport sector also pose some intricate problems. In a short interval, the appreciation of biofuels changed dramatically from being a panacea for the world’s environmental and energy problems to the primary scapegoat for driving up food prices, causing deforestation and loss of biodiversity. Finally, some of the projects aimed at destruction of industrial pollutants with a very high Global Warming Potential, in particular fluorocarbon (HFCs and PFCs) and nitrous oxide (N2O), are also extremely problematic, because of the perverse incentive to produce these pollutants for the sole purpose of destroying them and claiming the credits. These projects only account for 2.0% of the CDM projects but represent 26% of the carbon credits by 2012. For example, one Chinese company generated $500 million in carbon offsets by installing a $5 million incinerator to burn the HFCs produced by the manufacture of refrigerants. The huge profits provided incentive to create new factories or expand existing factories solely for the purpose of increasing production of HFCs and then destroying the resultant pollutants to generate offsets. These projects are no longer eligible under CDM. 2. Problems and pitfalls of forest projects But most problematic of all CDM categories are the forest projects (Shrestha et al. 2005). There are two types of forest projects, afforestation and reforestation (A&R) projects on the one hand and reduction of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) projects on the other. Only A&R projects are allowed under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol during its First Commitment Period (2008-2012). The proposal to use carbon credits to reduce deforestation and forest degradation was initially defeated, but the idea was reborn in December 2005, at the 11th Convention of Parties (COP) in Montreal, Canada, where discussions began for the Second Commitment Period (2013–2017). It was an alliance of 15 developing countries known as the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, that has put the issue back on the table. At the 13th COP in 2007 in Bali, an agreement was reached on “the urgent need to take further meaningful action to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” Recent proposals (known as REDD+) are not limited to avoiding deforestation and forest degradation, but include the possibility of offsetting emissions through “sustainable forest management,” “conservation” and “increasing forest carbon stocks.” Afforestation and reforestation projects differ significantly from the other CDM projects. They are the only sequestration projects eligible under the CDM. All the other CDM projects are emission reduction projects. Emission reduction projects prevent or decrease the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere; sequestration projects remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and store it in biomass. Forest projects face severe socio-economic and ecological problems because, unlike emission reduction projects, they are subject to ecosystem dynamics. Negative socio-economic impacts and leakage Forest projects usually have far greater socio-economic impacts than emission reduction projects. These impacts may include population resettlement and loss of access to land and livelihoods. Local residents fear that they will lose control over their forests and that their lands will be subjected to land grabbing for profitable projects. The success of market-based forest management is dependent on the allocation of property rights to individuals, groups or institutions and the conversion of communal or open-access resources to private resources (Castree 2003). The introduction of such management may lead to an erosion of the traditional ‘gift economy’ that is at odds with the market economy: in the gift economy each person is pressured to give away his wealth generously in order to enhance his status, whereas in the market economy people are tempted to accumulate wealth privately as a means to heighten their personal status. The clash of these two economies usually results in “confusion and ambiguity among community members over access to resources, usufruct and property rights” (Richards 2006, 184). Under these conditions, traditional community forest management will collapse although it “has proven to be one of the most equitable, effective and efficient policy incentives for forest conservation and forest restoration (Lovera 2009, 52). At the aforementioned meeting in Bali in 2007, the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change expressed strong concerns about these potential negative impacts. “REDD/REDD+ will not benefit Indigenous Peoples, but in fact will result in more violations of Indigenous Peoples’ rights. It will increase the violation of our human rights, our rights to our lands, territories and resources, steal our land, cause forced evictions, prevent access and threaten indigenous agricultural practices, destroy biodiversity and cultural diversity and cause social conflicts. Under REDD/REDD+, states and carbon traders will take more control over our forests.” http://www.international-alliance.org/documents/IFIPCC%20Statement%20on%20REDD.doc More recently, in September 2011, representatives of indigenous peoples have adopted the so-called ‘Sevettijärvi Declaration’, in which The UN climate panel is asked to make all efforts to include indigenous knowledge and local perspectives in its assessment processes (see Box 2). “We strongly reject false solutions such as REDD/REDD+, which threaten our livelihoods and adaptive strategies, and note that the Declaration’s founding principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent should be the baseline for any mitigation or adaptation intervention within indigenous communities and territories. Unlike REDD/REDD+, forest tenure and governance by indigenous peoples has been proven to reduce illegal logging and creates economic benefits from sustainable forest use as well as strengthening livelihoods and food security. In support of indigenous responses to the climate crisis, we demand policies and legislation to ensure indigenous forest governance and nurture forest biocultural systems.” Box 2. Sevettijärvi Declaration, September 2011 http://www.globalforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Declaration-Finland.pdf Due to its strong socio-economic impacts, the possibility of leakage is a more critical concern for sequestration projects compared to emission reduction projects. Leakage refers to an increase of carbon emissions that is caused by the project, but is outside its project boundary or timeframe. Conversion of agricultural land to forests can lead to unemployment and poverty, and often to accelerated deforestation elsewhere. If sequestration projects activities lead to a decline in access to land, food, fiber, fuel, and timber, the demand for these resources might be met from areas outside the project boundary. The increase of carbon sequestration from the project will be undone by a decrease outside the project area. Negative environmental impacts Sequestration projects may also have far greater negative impacts on biodiversity and natural ecosystems than emission reduction projects. These dangers are being reinforced by the definition of a forest adopted in 2001 by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Sasaki & Putz 2009). To qualify as a forest, three criteria have to be met: The tree crown cover should be minimally between 10% and 30% of the project area; The tree height should be minimally between 2 and 5 meter; The land area should be minimally between 0.05 and 10 hectares. This definition fails to differentiate natural forests from plantations. Natural forests can be replaced by plantations of exotic species such as eucalyptus, pines, acacias, and oil palm, while technically remaining ‘forests’. Moreover, the thresholds for tree crown cover are so low that the environmental consequences of forest degradation and destruction are not officially recognized. “For example, according to the UNFCCC definition, a forest with 100 percent tree cover could lose 70 percent of tree cover—and 70 percent of its carbon stocks—but still be categorized as a forest, with no acknowledgement that it is not a fully intact forest, or that carbon stocks have been degraded” (Myers Madeira 2008, 37). Additionality and the problem of non-permanence Forest projects generally face greater problems with the so-called additionality criterion than emission reduction projects. This criterion stipulates that the reductions in carbon emissions from a CDM project should be additional to any reductions that would occur in the absence of the project. In other words, to establish whether or not a CDM project meets this criterion one needs to know what would have happened in a business-as-usual scenario. In the case of sequestration projects, however, this kind of knowledge is highly uncertain. This uncertainty refers to the basic difference between sequestration projects and emission reduction projects, namely the problem of permanence. CO2 reduction from emission reduction projects is permanent, as the CO2 prevented from release into the atmosphere can not be re-emitted and, therefore, the reduction can not be reversed. A reduction of CO2 in the atmosphere due to sequestration activity, on the other hand, may partially or completely be reversed either due to natural reasons (such as forest fires) or human actions (such as logging). Therefore, CO2 reduction from sequestration is considered temporary. This basic difference is dealt with through issuing temporary or long-term credits. Unlike carbon credits from regular CDM projects, these credits will expire after a certain time. Temporary credits will expire and have to be replaced after about five years, long-term credits after twenty or thirty years. As all it can do is to postpone the emission reduction obligation to a future point in time, the real value of these credits is much lower than the value of permanent carbon credits (Hetsch & Chang 2010, 30). As of August 2010, only 17 out of 2379 registered projects under CDM were afforestation or reforestation projects, representing just 0.59% of all CDM projects. No credit from A&R CDM has been issued to a project to date (Wang 2010, 19). The problem of permanence turns out to be persistent and impossible to solve. Solving the problem would assume a measure of control and power over nature that is simply not viable, according to current ecological theory (Keulartz 2012). Over the past decades, the ideal of total control over nature has crumbled as a result of the shift within ecology from equilibrium theory to non-equilibrium theory, from the perception of ecosystems as static entities with a linear, predictable development to the perception of ecosystems as dynamic entities that evolve along non-linear, unpredictable trajectories. The dynamic and non-linear nature of ecosystem development was already recognized by Henry Allan Gleason in the early 1900s; it became the focus of renewed attention in the 1970s through the work of Robert (‘Bob’) May and Crawford Stanley (‘Buzz’) Holling. In equilibrium theory “stability was the norm, and disturbance was bad” (Wallington et al. 2005). To maintain a predictable world and to assure a stable maximum sustained yield with as little fluctuations as possible, prevention of disturbance was seen as a prerequisite. But stability is usually inversely proportional to resilience, defined as “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables” (Holling 1973, 14). In other words, high stability might result in low resilience so that some event that previously could be absorbed can trigger a sudden dramatic change of the system. In non-equilibrium theory disturbance is no longer considered as bad but as an inherent feature of ecosystem dynamics. Disturbances like forest fires facilitate the renewal of ecosystems; their suppression might reduce the resilience that will prevent a system from collapsing and ‘flipping’ into another - undesirable - state. In summary, compared to regular emission reduction projects under the CDM, forest projects suffer from severe problems, especially with respect to additionality and permanence, because forests projects are subject to ecosystem dynamics. The problems that forest projects have to face will also hamper the upcoming biodiversity market, not only because forests harbor up to 90 percent of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity, but also because the flow of ecosystem services is by definition dependent on ecosystem dynamics. However, the biodiversity market is far more complex than the carbon market. While the carbon market has to do with only one single ecosystem service (climate regulation), the biodiversity market is characterized by bundles of dozens of ecosystem services. This adds some serious problems to those that we have already encountered in our discussion of A&R and REDD projects. 3. Ecosystem services The very influential UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report from 2005 uses four different classes of ecosystem services: provisioning ecosystem services (including food, fiber, fuel, and genetic resources); regulating ecosystem services (climate regulation, water purification, pest regulation, and pollination); cultural ecosystem services (spiritual, religious and aesthetic values, inspiration, recreation, and ecotourism); and supporting ecosystem services (that are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services, such as soil formation, nutrient cycling, and primary production). The sheer multitude of ecosystem services creates difficulties that challenge the optimistic belief in win-win opportunities. This can be illustrated with the following example. Forests deliver as many as fourteen ecosystem services besides climate regulation to which A&R and REDD forest projects are limited, i.e. air purification, water conservation, absorption of waste, soil conservation, pollination, disease and pest control, nutrient cycling, seed dissemination, biodiversity conservation, provisioning of key agricultural and industrial production, ultraviolet ray protection, wind control, forest culture, and forest recreation (Fu et al. 2010). These services often conflict with each other. “For example, the management of a forest for tree production (a provisioning service) may also affect water quality downstream (a regulating service) or decrease the value of the land for recreation (a cultural service)” (Rodriguez et al. 2006). Because ecosystem services usually are incompatible, we should move from win-win rhetoric to a more realistic thinking in terms of trade-offs. The concept of trade-offs, in its most basic sense, denotes that gaining something of value entails losing something else of value. In the biodiversity market trade-offs are conducted by making different ecosystem services interchangeable through a process of economic valuation, with money as the common measure of comparison. This leads to an accounting system that is very different from the carbon accounting system. Carbon accounting is fairly straightforward. The currency of the carbon market is the carbon credit, a tradable certificate or permit representing the right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. On the other hand, many of the biodiversity accounting methods are based on attempts to estimate the ‘willingness-to-pay’ of individuals for ecosystem services. There are various methods to calculate willingness-to-pay such as hedonic pricing methods, travel cost methods, and contingent valuation. This accounting system creates many social as well as ecological problems. Value reduction Some feel strongly that certain things, such as individual rights, cultural heritage, and species protection, should not be traded off at all (Hirsch et al. 2010). John O’Neill has questioned the assumption that money can be taken as an appropriate measure to render commensurate the different values that are at stake in biodiversity trade-off decisions. “There is no unit by which the value of the red squirrel and the variety of native British trees can be placed on a common scale” (O’Neill 1997, 548; 2007, 42). According to O’Neill certain kinds of social relations are incompatible with market relations. For example, the social relations between generations cannot be expressed in monetary terms: “If the environment belongs to your children it’s not yours to buy and sell.” The treatment of environmental goods as private property also raises issues of equity: “If you rely on market mechanisms, the poor sell cheap.” According to O’Neill, environmental problems are not rooted in an insufficient application of market norms but in the very spread of these norms into the sphere of nature. Another general point of criticism of the use of economic principles in biodiversity policy concerns the axiom that value and scarcity are inversely related. “A simple application of these principles to conservation would suggest that species recovery and relative abundance can paradoxically result in reduced support for conservation” (Vira & Adams 2009, 160). Trade-off asymmetry There is also a risk that certain types of services will dominate management strategies. The ecosystem services most readily incorporated into a socioeconomic framework are the provisioning services like food, timber and fresh water. Trade-off decisions with respect to ecosystem services show a general preference for these provisioning services, while regulating and cultural services occupy the second and third place respectively. Supporting services are likely to be ‘taken for granted’. This hierarchy seems to reflect short-term human needs. According to Rodriguez et al. (2006), the slowly changing variables, which underlie supporting services, are often ignored by policy-makers in ways that seriously undermine the long-term existence of provisioning ecosystem services (see also Rodriguez et al. 2005). So, in spite of the general belief among conservationists that win-win solutions can always by found, increases in provisioning services typically result in decreases in regulating, cultural or supporting services (Carpenter et al. 2009, 1308). But this is not the only trade-off asymmetry. From a series of case studies, it has been concluded that ‘Payments for Ecosystem Services’ (PES) cannot always serve to both eliminate poverty and improve environmental quality. “Achieving two objectives for the price of one policy is tricky and depends on specific conditions” (Bulte et al. 2008, 249). Not seeing the forest for the trees The ecological impacts of biodiversity markets might be as problematic as the social implications. A precondition for successful commodification is the allocation of property rights to individuals, groups or institutions. Another precondition is the precise demarcation of the goods and services at stake. Without clear conceptual and definitional boundaries, property rights cannot be executed at all. In order to take valuable goods and services out of their natural circulation and into the circulation of the economy they have to be ‘itemized’, that is, they have to be included in a list of all goods and services corresponding to different valued features of our environment. “Just as marketed goods have to be itemised, wrapped and packed for consumption, so too must the goods which nature provides. The sea (bits of it, at any rate) must be packaged as ‘bathing water’, or elephants (glimpses of them, at any rate) as items for viewing – ‘spectacles’, and so forth” (Holland 1995, 27). An obvious attraction of the itemizing approach is that it lends itself to economic valuation of ecosystem goods and services, but an apparent disadvantage is that it ignores the relational aspects of nature and obscures the fact that ecosystem functions are interdependent. Environmental goods and services are not by their nature fit to be itemized. Their itemization and compartmentalization may destroy important functions (Vatn 2000; Kosoy & Corbera 2010). In short, commodification means abstraction; to be fully interchangeable, biodiversity elements need to be detached from their ecological context, whereas biodiversity is in fact dependent on the existence of multiple interactions between these elements. One is constantly running the risk of ‘not seeing the forest for the trees’. Policies that enable biodiversity trading may perversely produce poor biodiversity outcomes. Conclusion: Enlightened anthropocentrism With ecosystem services we are faced with what can be called enlightened (or prudential) anthropocentrism (Keulartz 2012). This is a somewhat weaker form of anthropocentrism than traditional anthropocentrism associated with the conception of ‘natural resources’. Whereas natural resources are perceived to lie passively at our disposal, ecosystem services connote at least some degree of agency, be it only that degree of agency which facilitates such obedient and expedient performance as is permitted servants or slaves (Peterson 2011). The late Val Plumwood (2001, 2006) noted the failure of servant or slave-like conceptions of the non-human sphere to recognize that nature’s services have a much wider range of beneficiaries than the human. An anthropocentric approach may not protect biodiversity sufficiently because it emphasizes the instrumental value of biodiversity at the expense of its intrinsic value. Acknowledgments The author thanks Marc Davidson for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. References Bayon Ricardo, and Michael Jenkins (2010) The business of biodiversity, Nature 466 (8 July), pp. 184-185. 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