BRAVE SEPOY, INFEMININE NATIVES: MAKING OF BRITISH INDIAN ARMY

BRAVE SEPOY, INFEMININE NATIVES: MAKING OF BRITISH INDIAN ARMY ‘the Bengal sepoy came to an untimely end in 1857’ Roberts Fredrick, Forty –one Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief Interwoven with the histories of empire is history of its armed forces and Indian empire in the colonial period is no exception. Among all changes that mutiny of 1857 brought in the constitution of empire, one of the most significant was reconstitution of its armed force. Sepoy mutiny Sen S. N., Eighty Fifty Seven (1957), Majumdar, R.C., The Sepoy Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857 (1963) , in all its effect resulted into loss of confidence and trust of British in native militaries especially Bengal army - a onetime pride of company that brought the Indian subcontinent to its heel. From here colonial authority began a search for new ‘military collaborator’- a search that took them to fringes of empire especially Punjab, to find natural warriors or so called ‘martial races’. And to rationalise this new territorial shift ‘pseudo scientific’ theories of race or biological determinism were invoked along with elements of environmental determinism to cultivate and reinforce stereotyped ethnic identities called ‘martial races’ like Ghurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammedan and Jat peasantry. Though some scholars view the origin of race theory, less a hegemonic colonial strategy of classification but a product of social hierarchy of traditional Indian society – ‘a truth emergent from the nature of society itself’ Des Chene, M., Relics of Empire: a Cultural History of the Gurkhas, 1815-1987, (1991), Philip Constable, The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in Late Nineteenth and Early twentieth Century Western India (2001) but for others it was a instinctive defence mechanism of imperialism to secure its north western frontier against the growing Russian menace especially after 1880’s Yong Tan Tai, the garrison state, military, government and society in colonial Punjab 1849-1947 (2005), Omissi David, The sepoy and the Raj (1994), Cohen, Stephen, The Indian Army: Contribution to the Development of the Nation (1990). Equally important was the role of military ideologues cum administrator like Fredrick Roberts and McMunn, whose idea on martial race influenced a whole generation of military men. In this paper we tried to chart a historical process which show how ‘building militaries’ in itself became a new category of classifying and codifying Indian ‘otherness’. In colonial histories armies were not just a mechanical part of the state, but constituted an important social base of foreign ruler as collaborator. As per se Seema Alavi ‘the recruitment of East India Company was central to the development of the company’s political sovereignty’ Alavi Seema, The Sepoy and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-1830 (OUP) . The creation of British Indian Empire was integrally connected to the evolution of Company’s army. Beginning with the sixteenth century, as Dirk Kolff observed, there developed ‘military labour market’ based on peasant recruitment and British were just building on these existing tradition drawing men from traditional military labour market spread across a large geographical region from the Gangetic plains in the north to the Carnatic in the south Kolff, D. Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethno history of the Military Labour Markets in Hindustan (CUP) 1990, Cooper, Randolf, The Second Anglo-Maratha Campaign and the contest for India: The struggle for control of the South Asian Military Economy, (CUP), 2005, . In the early history of company, the inherent volatility of political situation and militarised state of society, created what Douglas Peers has called ‘Anglo-Indian militarism’, generating a sense of self importance in the army Peers Douglas, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison state in Early Nineteenth Century India (1995) . And in consequence to this at the turn of 19th century British possessed three well developed presidency armies –Madras, Bombay and Bengal and on the eve of the great mutiny in 1856, it numbered 214,000 Cohen, Stephen, The Indian Army: Contribution to the Development of the Nation (1990) page 33 . Though reforms, some successful or unsuccessful reforms (Cornwallis’s ‘New Model’ Indian army of 1794) were initiated to reorganise the army and promote universal military culture, the recruitment pattern still reflected the predominance of older elements as Bengal army for all its year of existence before 1857 was dominated by high caste Rajputs and Brahmins, coming primarily from Rohillakhand, Oudh and Bihar. The armies of Bombay and Madras presidency were more heterogeneous in nature. But reform process aimed at tighter control over army and introducing a more universalised military culture became more vigorous in the 1820’s and 1830’s, came increasing in conflict with older notion of military service and religious and cultural tradition of Indian sepoys. Though these actions met with acts of resistance from 1840’s, but the mutiny of 1857 represented the culmination point of this unrest. The Revolt of 1857 shook the foundation of the empire. For rebels mutiny was an act of nationalism (though still much debated), but for British it represented a loss of ‘collaborator class’, and more important problem of loyalist turning traitor. As revolt was spearheaded by the Bengal army, British blamed the high caste character of this as much cause of this revolt. Though revolt was suppressed with a more brutal force, it created two categories of Indian ‘loyalist’ and ‘rebellious’ Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies of The Raj (CUP)1994, in British perception as some groups, especially Punjabis, Pathans and Gurkhas, the newer elements of Bengal army not only withstand their colonial masters but fought in their cause. In an immediate response to mutiny, as British had fewer allies to fall back large number of army was raised from Punjab, an area demilitarised a few year back following two Anglo-Sikh war because of ‘warlike’ nature of its peasantry. Following the pacification of revolt, immediate debates in the British parliament and official circles moved in the direction of future composition of the native army Thus in July 1858 a commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Major General Jonathan Peel, Secretary of State for War, to study the lesson of the mutiny and to consider and recommend ways of enhancing the security and viability of the armed forces in India, it find itself grappling with the twin problem of, safeguarding the empire and alternative to Bengal army. The option of maintaining a European army, from very beginning was out of question due to scarce European manpower and huge financial burden, forcing the commission to fall back upon native troops. However in its final report commission recommended increase in European elements in proportion to native in army as well as monopolisation of artillery and arsenal by European force as safeguard Reports of commissioner in Tan Tai Yong. More important was its recommendation ‘that Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment’ ibid primarily aimed at diluting the high caste character of Bengal army. Though the policy envisioned a balanced pattern of recruitment, drawing from all the sections of society but in practice as Tan Tai Yong has shown, under the influence of Punjab committee The Punjab committee was formed to advise Peel commission was consist of John Lawrence, Neville Chamberlain and Herbert Edwardes it eventually became a policy of ‘divide and rule’ based on the logic of making army safe by the counterpoise of native against native. In Punjab committee’s viewpoint the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ is the best organising principle for native army as it would prevent it from galvanising into a unified force as mentioned in this statement: To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and which, while it lasts, makes the Muhammedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Muhammedan of another, corps should be in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within the which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Yong Tan Tai, the garrison state, military, government and society in colonial Punjab 1849-1947 (2005), And this divide was to further deepen by localisation of recruitment and service. David Omissi and others have argued that this policy of physical segregation of three armies reflected the concern of authorities at that time: the post mutiny Indian Army was there to uphold the Raj, and not just for the defence of India Yong Tan Tai, the garrison state, military, government and society in colonial Punjab 1849-1947 (2005), Omissi David, The sepoy and the Raj (1994), Cohen, Stephen, The Indian Army: Contribution to the Development of the Nation (1990). In pursuance of this policy, the Punjab became the chief recruiting ground for Bengal army as reward for its loyalty during mutiny and a counter to Hindustani element. At one level localisation ensured that Hindustani elements could no longer serve in other areas losing its importance, on the other hand security concerns in the north western frontier in the Punjab provide a rationale for increase in Punjab group. Consequently by 1861, the old Bengal Army was separated into two practically separate bodies, while the older remnants of Bengal army was reduced in strength and diluted in character by mixing it with men of low caste and the other created out of the regiments and levies of the Punjab Force that has been raised to put down the mutinous Bengal army. By 1862 the Bengal army had added third distinct component - the Ghurkhas. And these natural ‘race’ antagonism was not only preserved at the level of antipathy between northern and Purbiyas but heterogeneous nature of Punjab society, riven by caste, tribal and religious difference was further exploited to inhibit any unity between Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans. It was with this thing in mind that the Punjab regiments in the 1860’s and 1870’s were formed entirely on ‘class company’ system which meant that each company of a regiment should comprise a different race or caste, one of Sikhs, one of Punjabi Muslims, one of Pathans, etc. By 1870, of the forty –nine infantry regiments of the Bengal Army, the Ghurkha and hill troops constituted four mixed regiments of Sikhs and Punjabis Muslims, most of them raised in 1857-8, accounted for sixteen, and the rest were the remnants of the Bengal Army, most of them of a mixed nature. With these changes, by 1870, 35% of the Bengal Army was recruited strictly from Punjab proper. But still the stage for ‘punjabicisation’ of Indian army not reached, as Yong argues as late as 1875, out of total strength of 44690, sepoys from Punjab accounted for only 12,558 in Bengal army, a result of uneasiness of authorities to allow any future 1857, restricting it to the necessary limits Yong. A direct consequence of this localisation policy and further tighten up of recruitment areas of the Bombay and Madras armies by Eden commission (1879), made service unattractive economically for natives and also alienated traditional group associated with military service, setting in pace the slow decline. The turbulent situation in North Western Frontier, following the Second Afghan War and growing threat of Russian menace in the 1880’s, saw newer notion of military efficiency taking precedence over considerations of balance and the social composition of the military as growing external conflicts demanded a newer function as a protection force against the – guardian of the imperial order within the empire. And this obsession with efficiency, under its most fanatical supporter Lord Roberts, Commander in Chief of Bengal army necessitate seeking the ‘best fighting material’, ‘warlike classes’ naturally inclined to fighting Philip Mason, A Matter of Honor (1833) or to say martial races as Roberts said: I have no hesitation myself in stating that except Gurkhas, dogras, Sikhs, the pick of Punjabi Muhammedans, Hindustanis of the Jat and Ranghur castes, and certain classes of Pathans, there are no native soldiers in our service whom we could venture with safety to place in the field against the Russian. Fredrick Roberts, Forty –one Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief Though the underlying factor for reorganisation was the Russo phobia, but the theory of martiality and notion of natural warrior ‘races’ is in interesting case in what Mauss called ‘techniques of body’, where body is not simply a matter of nature, but also universally, a social and historical matter in structure of domination Bourdieu Pierre, outline a theory of practice (1977) CUP, Foucault, Madness and civilisation (1965) and Marcel Mauss, Techniques of the body (1973) . This theory has two main strands. One was based on the idea of natural qualities, emphasising that martiality was an inherited trait and therefore an aspect of race. And second strand in martial thinking introduced a climatic environmental element according to which warlike people found in hilly, cooler places while in hot flat regions races are timid, servile and unwarlike. Both reinforcing the notion that some groups in India have inherent warrior instinct, and that inhabit the northern fringes of the empire. For Scholars like Fox and Bolt, this classification enterprise was nothing more than a manifestation of wider European doctrine of biological determinism or scientific racism drawing strength from contemporary ideas about race, culture and evolution aimed at comprehending the world in European notions Bolt C., Race and Victorians (1984), R. G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making (1985) in Lionel Caplon but more interesting, they also tried to invoke India’s past, the Aryan civilisation and feudalism to fashion the ‘other’ in a familiar image to build loyalties of ‘new collaborators’ while excluded others (tradesmen, artificers and goldsmith) ‘for they all had come under the ancient grooming of the vaishyas ....... and had never worn a sword by their side George McMunn, The Martial Races of India (1933). And this exclusion was not only restricted to geographical level, but also effected within certain groups by differentiation as few British officials would became avid ethnographer, labelling some as martial while excluding others within same groups as non- martial, as Cynthia Enloe argues ‘building militaries has been, in part an ethnographic enterprise’ Cynthia Enloe . And consist in this labelling, a remoteness from the centre both in the geographical and politico-economic sense. But this imagined pastoralism what Rosaldo refers to as the ‘idealised characteristics of a certain masculine imagination- fierce pride, a warrior spirit, rugged individualism, reproduce for British Military men a consistent rhetoric of martiality Des Chene, M., Relics of Empire: a Cultural History of the Gurkhas, 1815-1987, (1991) in Caplon lost in the industrial society of its own. As this contrast between plains and hills served as metaphor for masculine – feminine distinction between northern races and ‘effeminate races of the south’ it also contradict the picture of Indian ‘otherness’ one feminine the other as masculine as Europeans. But for all its contradictions this process of categorisation and classification helped the Raj to identify potential allies who were then drawn into the army and stand still till the last day of its rule. The army’s preference for the so called ‘martial races’ brought a gradual shift from territorial to racial and caste basis. Consequently, from 1890 onwards Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Dogras, Jat, Pathans and the Gurkhas were the principle classes recruited into the Indian army. Official antipathy towards the madras army diminished its status as mere reserve force both inferior in quality and quantity, but also eliminated ‘unwarlike’ portion of the armies Telegus, Ahirs, Gurjars and others. The composition of non Punjabi regiments in the Bengal army was subsequently confined to Muslims, Brahmins, Rajputs, Jats, Bundelas, and Hillman. In the Bombay army similar changes were made by expanding the numbers of Baluchis and Punjabis in the cavalry. Kitchener records IN Tan Tai Yong And this racial homogenisation was further achieved by replacing the older ‘class company’ regiments of mixed classes with ‘class regiments’, in which entire regiments consisted of a single class with their specific territorial recruit depots. Some scholars argue that the direct consequence of this racial organisation was marginalisation of Dalits. As Philip constable in case of Bombay army, has shown that as under British a new closed status or exclusive high-caste Maratha kshatriyas concept of naukari and military recruitment has emerged against the seventeenth and eighteenth century cultural concepts of open status kshatriyas naukari, it made army the exclusive domain Maratha kshatriyas leading to exclusion of mahar and mang soldiers after 1895 Philip Constable, The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in Late Nineteenth and Early twentieth Century Western India (2001). But Lionel Caplon’s work on Gurkhas, also show this marginalisation was not only restricted to lower classes but even older high caste elements like Khas (or Chetris) and Thakuris were eliminated even when they were specified as martial races. It was the tribal’s of Magars and Gurangs who were the ‘beau ideal’ of a Ghurkha solider. At the same time this notion of martiality didn’t remain static over time and newer groups like Rais, Limbus, Tibeto-Burman Tamangs and Sunwar were also incorporated later. The new C-in-C Kitchener continued with this recruitment policy, and dissolved the earlier tripartite division of army and created an Indian army made up of four division Bengal, Bombay, Madras and Punjab. However during the two world wars, the social base of army was broadened but the notion of martial races was so persistent, or became a ‘habit of mind’ as Omissi shows immediately after the First World War army returned to its pre war ethnic mix David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian army 1860-1940, Martial races (1991) in War and Society. The period of 1900 saw the completion of what is called ‘punjabicisation’ of army, a gradual process which has its beginning in the crisis of empire in 1857. But the underlying factor that provided momentum to this shifting pattern, first in post 1857 and then in 1880’s was the changing notion of security of Indian empire, ‘a jewel in the crown’ Paul Scott, Jewel In the Crown. And the abstract categories of martial and non-martial races, rationalised by the pseudo-scientific theories of race, not only build ‘brave’, ‘loyal’, ‘chivalrous’ stereotyped ethnic identities, but also excluded others from this discourse especially Bengalis. And this ‘effeminate other’ rejected and countered such racial stereotypes by building the counter- culture of masculinity in the popular Akharas and revolutionary terrorism. Though it’s problematic how much these racial notions were grounded on British understanding of traditional Indian social hierarchy as some older groups were marginalised while newer groups recruited not from all part of subcontinent but only Greater Punjab, the sword arm of the British Indian Empire. In sum total the policy of recruitment based on division and classification, beginning with the mutiny must be seen as part of ‘the instinctive defence mechanism of imperialism, an understandable tendency to seek out those groups who might be relied upon by the colonial power (collaborators) and exclude those who could not’ Cynthia Enloe .