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The Fundamental Rights Case : KESAVANANDA BHARATI by N.A. Palkhivala The Fundamental Rights Case : Propositions submitted before the Supreme Court by N.A. Palkhivala,*  Senior Advocate Cite as : (1973) 4 SCC (Jour) 1 WRIT PETITION NO. 135 OF 1970 IN THE MATTER OF : HIS HOLINESS KESAVANANDA BHARATI . . Petitioner; Versus THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER . . Respondents. Propositions regarding the true construction of Article 368 as it stood before the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1971, in support of the submissions that: (a) Parliament had no power to destroy or impair the essential features, the basic elements or the fundamental principles of the Constitution; and (b) Article 368 did not prevail over or override Article 13. 1. The whole ratio of the majority judgments as well as the minority judgments in Golak Nath case1, turns entirely on the meaning to be attached to two words — the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) and the word ‘amendment’ in Article 368. Therefore the crucial question is — what is the precise meaning to be attached to these two words. To start with any assumption that the word ‘amendment’ should be construed in its widest sense is to start with the answer instead of starting with the question. 2. The minority judgments in Golak Nath case, as also the earlier cases, proceeded on the assumption that the power of amendment dealt with by Article 368 was plenary. This assumption is wholly without foundation. 3. Article 368 referred only to the topic of constitutional amendment but was silent as to the subject-matter in respect of which the amending power could be exercised, and was equally silent as to the extent or width of the amending power. 4. It was only the proviso which enumerated the Articles the amendment of which required the concurrence of at least half the States. But even the proviso did not make it clear whether the institutions dealt with by it, e.g., the State legislatures and the High Courts, could be destroyed by Parliament in the exercise of its amending power with the concurrence of half the States. 5. Article 368 used the word “amendment” which is of the most elastic ambit; and the primary question is really of ascertaining the fair and reasonable meaning to be attached to that word in the context of Article 368, having regard to the genesis and general scheme of the Constitution, the basic constitutional structure behind the text of the constitutional document, and all other relevant circumstances which will be adverted to later. 6. It is clear beyond doubt that one of the well-settled meanings of the word “amend” is that which would preclude the power to alter or destroy the essential features, the basic elements, the fundamental principles of the Constitution; and it is submitted that the word “amendment” bore that meaning in Article 368. There is inherent evidence within the Article itself to support this view: (a) Whereas the Constitution is given by the people unto themselves, the power to decide upon amendments (with or without the concurrence of half the States) is given to the five-year Parliament which is merely a creature of the Constitution. This point is of such profound significance that it will be elaborated later as a separate topic. (b) Article 368 did not start with the non-obstatne clause “notwithstanding anything in this Constitution”. (c) Article 368 was drafted in a very low key. It used the word “amendment” simplicitor whereas even less significant amending powers in the other parts of the Constitution use the words “add” “alter” “repeal” or “vary”, in addition to the word “amend”. SeeArticles 31-B; 35(b); 252(2); 372; 372-A(2); V Schedule Para 7 and VI Schedule Para 21. Further, Article 368 merely talked of “an amendment of this Constitution” and did not extend the amending power to “all or any of the provisions of this Constitution”. (d) On the construction of the word “amendment” suggested by the Respondents, all fundamental rights could be taken away by Parliament by the requisite majority, whereas much less significant matters required the concurrence of at least half the States under the proviso to the Article. The basic human freedoms are of the most fundamental importance to all the States and to all their citizens. For instance, every State is interested in ensuring that Articles 14, 15 and 16 are respected and its citizens are not discriminated against, and that its religious and linguistic minorities are protected under Articles 29 and 30. Likewise, Article 32 is of no less importance to the citizens of the States than Article 226. Is it conceivable that while the Constitution required the States’ concurrence for matters of much less moment, it intended the essential features of the Constitution (which included the basic human freedoms) to be entirely at the mercy of a two-thirds majority at the Centre? (e) Under Article 368, the assent of the President to the Bill was necessary before the Constitution could stand amended. Under Article 60 the President has to take an oath that he will “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution”. Any proposed amendment which struck at the core of the Constitution would require the President, if he was true to his oath, to refuse his assent. It is reasonable to assume that the Constitution did not intend to create a constitutional crisis by permitting Parliament to destroy all or any of the basic features of the Constitution and by enjoining the President at the same time to be true to his oath and preserve, protect and defend the Constitution by refusing assent. On the other hand, on the construction put by the Petitioners on the word “amendment”, such glaring inconsistency between the President’s oath and the Parliament’s power is avoided. (f) Article 368 deals only with “amendment of this Constitution”. The preamble is not a part or provision of the Constitution. (1960) 3 SCR 250, 282. (See also Annexure “I” in which the same view is expressed about the preamble to the United States Constitution). Therefore, the preamble cannot be amended under Article 368. Secondly, the very nature and contents of the preamble are such that it is incapable of being amended. It refers to the most momentous event in India’s history and sets out what the people of India resolved to do for their unfolding future. No Parliament can amend or alter past history. If the preamble is unalterable, it necessarily follows that those features of the Constitution which are necessary to give effect to the preamble, are unalterable. Fundamental Rights are intended to give effect to the preamble, (1959 SCR 995, 1018-9). They cannot be abridged or taken away. (g) It is most important to note that the provisions of Article 368 itself can be amended under that very Article. If the word “amendment” is to be read in the widest sense contended for by the Respondents, Parliament would have the power to get rid of the requisite majority required by Article 368 and make any constitutional amendment possible by a bare majority. Further, Parliament would have the power to reduce India to a status which is neither sovereign nor democratic nor republican, and where the basic human rights are conspicuous by their absence. After doing that Parliament may — (i) repeal Article 368 and expressly provide that the Constitution should hereafter be unamendable, or (ii) amend Article 368 and provide for, say, 99 per cent majority for future amendments of the Constitution including any future amendment of Article 368 itself. 7. For the foregoing reasons, which are based upon the provisions of Article 368 itself, apart from other significant reasons which will be adverted to later, it is submitted that Article 368 should not be read as expressing the death-wish of the Constitution or as a provision for its legal suicide. It is fairly clear that Parliament cannot arrogate to itself under Article 368 the role of the Official Liquidator of the Constitution. Propositions on behalf of the Petitioners regarding the true construction of Article 13 as it stood before the 24th Amendment in 1971; in support of the submissions that— (a) constitutional amendment, whether under Article 368 or otherwise, was “law” within Article 13(2) and was void to the extent to which it contravened Fundamental Rights; and (b) Article 368 did not prevail over or override Article 13. I. Article 13(1) and (2) is not redundant It is a misconceived argument that Article 13(1) and (2) is redundant and, therefore, the question whether Parliament can abridge Fundamental Rights by constitutional amendment should be decided without reference to Article 13(2). The observations of Kania, C.J., in the Gopalan case, 1950 SCR 88 at 100, which are passing observations made in discussing the provisions of the Constitution generally, have been explained by Hidayatullah, J., in the Sajjan Singh case (1965) 1 SCR 933 at 961. So far from being redundant, Article 13 serves the most useful purpose of dealing clearly and comprehensively with the four dimensions of the bar which it imposes— (a) the authorities against whom the bar is imposed; (b) the categories of law to which it applies; (c) the laws in point of time which it covers; and (d) the effect of the bar. These four aspects are dealt by Article 13 as follows: (a) The bar is imposed against the State, i.e. the totality of all the forces of the State, even including statutory corporations and autonomous authorities. See Rajasthan State Electricity Board v.Mohanlal, (1967) 3 SCR 377, 385. (b) All categories of law are covered by the bar — from the highest (constitutional amendments) to the humblest (bye-laws); and all executive Orders and Notifications are equally covered Article 13(2). (c) All laws in force under Article 372 and all laws to be brought into force at any future date are brought within the scope of the bar. (d) The effect of the bar is to render the law absolutely void, so as to leave no room for the U.S. theory of a law being “relatively void”Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 613, 651-4. To say that Article 13(2) is superfluous in the context of the alleged power to take away Fundamental Rights by constitutional amendments, is to beg the question. The primary purpose of Article 13(2) is to prohibit the making of any law, including constitutional law, which takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights. The Preamble makes it clear that the object of the Constitution is to secure the basic human freedoms, and this security or guarantee would be meaningless if the legislatures against whom the guarantees operate is itself at liberty to abrogate the guarantees. II. “Constitution as by law established“ It is clear beyond doubt, and is admitted in the minority judgments in the Golak Nath case, (1967) 2 SCR 762, at 907 and 930, and in the earlier judgments in the Sankari Prasad case, 1952 SCR 89 at 106, and the Sajjan Singh case, (1965) 1 SCR 933 at 950-1, that the word ‘law’ is comprehensive enough to include both ordinary law and constitutional law. But it is sought to be argued that — (a) the result of an exercise under Article 368 is not a ‘law’, and (b) that the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) does not include constitutional law or constitutional amendment. As regards argument (a) referred to above, it is submitted that the proposition that upon the procedure laid down in Article 368 being followed, the end-product is not a ‘law’, is erroneous. The forms of oath in the Third Schedule refer to “Constitution as by law established”. These words postulate — (a) that the Constitution itself was originally established by law; and (b) that every amendment thereto has likewise to be established by law in order that it may take effect. This necessarily involves and implies that every Amending Act under Article 368 is a ‘law’. The decisions of the Privy Council in McCawley v. King, 1920 AC 691 and The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, 1965 AC 172, establish that constitutional amendment is a ‘law’, whether it is a controlled Constitution or whether there is a sovereign legislature under an uncontrolled Constitution. As regards argument (b) noted above, it is submitted that there is no basis for the suggestion that the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) has to be read in a restricted sense so as to exclude constitutional amendments. On the contrary, there are overriding considerations, set out below, which warrant the conclusion that the ‘law’ contemplated by Article 13(1) and (2) is every category of law, including constitutional law. III. Article 13(1) covers constitutional law Article 13(1) enacts that all laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution are void to the extent of their inconsistency with the Fundamental Rights. Article 395 repealed the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Government of India Act, 1935, but not the constitutional laws of the Indian States or some other constitutional laws of British India. The Privy Purse caseMadhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India,2 establishes that the Covenants and the Merger Agreements entered into by the Rulers with the Dominion of India were constitutional law; in fact, they have been called in the aforesaid case “Constitutions in little”. These Covenants and Merger Agreements were in force at the commencement of the Constitution and they continued to remain in force. Further, in some of the States, the line between constitutional law and non-constitutional law was blurred, since the Ruler has absolute powers to take any legislative or executive action. Several laws of Indian States, constitutional as well as ordinary, continued after the commencement of the Constitution under Article 372: See AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1312, Paras 3 and 15: (1961) 1 SCR 957, 962-3: AIR 1954 Supreme Court 680: 1953 SCR 404, 412. It is fairly clear that such constitutional laws, which stood unrepealed, would be void under Article 13(1) to the extent of their inconsistency with Fundamental Rights. This means that the expression “all laws in force” in Article 13(1) would include constitutional law. The word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) could not have a different meaning. Therefore, the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) included constitutional amendments. It is further submitted that even assuming there had been no constitutional laws in force at the commencement of the Constitution which would be void under Article 13(1), that would be merely a fortuitous circumstance and would not derogate from the validity of the proposition that the word ‘law’ in ‘Article 13(1) and the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) included constitutional law. Since quite obviously all former constitutional laws throughout India were not repealed by Article 395, it must be held that when drafting Article 13(1) it was intended that the former constitutional laws should be hit by that Article. IV. No limitation on the word ‘law‘ in Article 13(2) The Preamble, the scheme of the Constitution, the historical background, the intrinsic evidence of the solemn guarantees in Part III as well as the intrinsic evidence in other provisions dealing with constitutional amendments, all lead to the inference that the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) was used in its ordinary sense as embracing constitutional law and there is no reason for reading the word in a restricted sense so as to confine it to ordinary laws. The Petitioner’s argument merely requires the word ‘law’ to be used in its ordinary sense without the addition of any limiting words. The real question is not whether there are any words of limitation in Article 368, but whether there are any words of limitation in Article 13(2). The minority decisions in the Golak Nath case, which refuse to read a limitation upon the words of Article 368 overlook that their own view reads a limitation upon the wide word ‘law’ in Article 13(2). If a limitation has to be read in either of these two Articles, there is no reason why it should be read in such a way as to enable Parliament to destroy Part III which is the foundation on which the fabric of the Constitution is reared. V. Constitutional amendments under Articles 4 and 169 and Schedules V and VI The argument that the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) excludes constitutional law or constitutional amendment, is inconsistent with the scheme of the Constitution. The Parliament has power under Articles 4 and 169, and Para 7 of Schedule V and Para 21 of Schedule VI, to make amendments to the Constitution by a bare majority and without following the procedure laid down in Article 368. If the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) does not cover constitutional amendments ex hypothesi it would not cover constitutional amendments made under the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution by a bare majority. The consequences of this view are so starting as to be patently unacceptable: (a) If Article 13(2) does not operate as a bar, then under Article 4 read with Article 2 or 3 Parliament would have the power to create a new State and amend the Fourth Schedule so as to give the new State no representation in the Council of States or a representation which is indisputably unfair and which denies to the inhabitants of that State equality before the law as compared to the inhabitants of other States. (b) If Article 13(2) does not apply, amendments could be made in the Fifth Schedule which deals with the administration of Scheduled Areas, to provide that none of the Fundamental Rights shall apply to the Scheduled Areas. Or, a provision could be made in Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule that the Governor shall have the power to make regulations denying to Scheduled Tribes the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and confining them to certain ghettos as Negroes are confined in South Africa, or denying the Scheduled Tribes all religious freedom and prohibiting them from worshipping their Tribal Gods. (c) The Sixth Schedule which deals with the administration of Tribal Areas in Assam could likewise be amended to enable laws to be made or executive action to be taken in those areas, which may be patently inconsistent with Fundamental Rights. Thus on the Respondent’s construction of the word “law” in Article 13(2) as excluding constitutional amendments, Parliament would have the power to reduce the Scheduled Tribes under the Fifth Schedule and the Assam Tribes under the Sixth Schedule to the level of second-class citizens and deny them the most elementary civil liberties — and that too by legislation passed by a bare majority like any ordinary law. The Constitution is reduced to an absurdity when an ordinary law of Parliament passed by a bare majority injuriously affecting the aforesaid Tribes would be void as violating Fundamental Rights; but the same law passed by the same bare majority and by exactly the same procedure would be valid if it seeks to incorporate those violations in Schedule V or VI. Correctly speaking, there is no difference between ordinary legislative power and constituent power in such a case. The Indian Constitution is undoubtedly a controlled Constitution. To say that under a controlled constitution a law prohibited by constitutional limitations can yet be passed as a constitutional amendment by a bare majority, is a contradiction in terms. It is submitted that this is a conclusive argument which clinches the issue. Article 13(2) has necessarily to be read as including constitutional amendments made, for example, in exercise of the power conferred by Para 7 of Schedule V and Para 21 of Schedule VI. If such constitutional amendments were covered by the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2), it must obviously follow that constitutional amendments under Article 368 were also included and that the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) embraced all constitutional amendments as much as ordinary law. It is significant to note that even the 24th Amendment has merely added the following clause to Article 13: “(4) Nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368.” This means that constitutional amendments under Articles 4 and 169, Para 7 of the Fifth Schedule and Para 21 of the Sixth Schedule are still within the ambit of Article 13; and consequently the word ‘law’ in Article 13(2) did include and continues to include constitutional amendments. VI. Consequences of the contrary view If constitutional law is not covered by the word “law” in Article 13(2), the integrity of India and the “unity of the nation” referred to in the Preamble would be directly at stake. The Fundamental Rights could be amended so as to make them applicable to certain parts of India and not to others, to certain communities of India and not to others. Overtly favourable treatment could be given to the members of a political party, as is done in several other countries, and not to the rest of the citizenry. The South would be at the mercy of the North; minorities at the mercy of the majority; secularism at the mercy of religious fanaticism; and the process of disintegration of the Republic could well begin. The Petitioner’s submission, giving a fair and natural meaning to the word ‘law’ in the context of Article 13(2), denies to Parliament the power of reducing the Constitution to a caricature of its present self. If Parliament has an unfettered power of amendment, as claimed by the Respondent, even the two-thirds majority in Article 368 could be reduced to a bare majority, and the Fundamental Rights would thereafter be without any safeguard whatsoever. Alternatively, an amendment could be made in Part III to provide that if a Parliamentary Act or a State law starts with a declaration that the Fundamental Rights shall not apply to that law, such a law cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of any of the Fundamental Rights. In fact, the 25th Amendment is one category of such a law. VII. Evidence of proceedings before the Constituent Assembly The proceedings before the Constituent Assembly support the Petitioner’s viewpoint: (a) On April 29, 1947, an interim report on Fundamental Rights was placed before the Constituent Assembly and there was a debate on that interim report (see Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol III, pp. 399 to 436). On April 29, 1947, Shri K. Santhanam moved an amendment in Clause 2 which corresponded to the present Article 13 as follows: “Shri K. Santhanam: Sir, I gave notice of an amendment but I will move it in a somewhat modified form in terms of a suggestion made by Sardar Patel. I move that in Clause 2 for the words ‘nor shall the Union or any unit make any law taking away or abridging any such right’, the following be substituted: ‘Nor shall any such right be taken away or abridged except by an amendment of the Constitution.’ The only reason is that if the clause stands as it is then even by an amendment of the Constitution we shall not be able to change any of these rights if found unsatisfactory or inconvenient. In some Constitutions they have provided that some parts of the Constitution may be changed by future constitutional amendments and other parts may not be changed. In order to avoid any such doubts I have moved this amendment and I hope it will be accepted. The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: Sir, I accept the amendment” (Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. III, pp. 415-6). In the draft prepared by the Constitutional Advisor in October 1947, Clause 9(2) corresponding to the present Article 13(2) was so worded as to exclude constitutional amendments from being rendered void under that article: “(2) Nothing in this Constitution shall be taken to empower the State to make any law which curtails or takes away or which has the effect of curtailing or taking away any of the rights conferred by Chapter II of this Part except by way of amendment of this Constitution under Section 232 and any law made in contravention of this sub-section shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. But the Drafting Committee omitted the words excluding constitutional amendments, and in the draft Constitution as settled by the Drafting Committee, constitutional amendments were not excluded from the bar of Clause 8(2) corresponding to the present Article 13(2): “(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void;” (b) Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru referred to Fundamental Rights as “something that you want to make permanent in the Constitution” and Dr. Ambedkar referred to them as being excluded from the ambit of Article 368 (1967 Vol. 2 SCR 762 at 791-2)(SeeConstituent Assembly Debates, Vol. III, pp. 465-6 andConstituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 1661). (c) All the living members of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, which was entrusted with the task of drafting the Chapter on “Fundamental Rights”, are unanimously of the view that they intended the Fundamental Rights to be beyond the reach of parliamentary majorities. (Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970, Vol. II, pp. 99-100). VIII. Inalienable natural rights The Fundamental Rights, with very few exceptions, are inalienable natural rights. Since the rights embodied in Part III are inalienable, it must necessarily follow that they cannot be taken away by Parliament by law, whether the law is entitled “Constitution Amendment” or is labelled as ordinary law. “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other Fundamental Rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Per Jackson in West-Viginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, (1943) 87 L Ed 1628 at 1638: 319 U.S. 624 at 638. “The great purposes of the Constitution do not depend on the approval or convenience of those they restrain.” Jackson, Erresonv. Board of Education, 330 US 1, 28. “Man being what he is, cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from outward responsibility in depriving others of their rights. At least such is the conviction underlying our Bill of Rights.” Frankfurter: Joint Antifascist Ref. Comm.v. McGrath, 341 US 123, 171. “Our protection against all kinds of fanatics and extremists, none of whom can be trusted with unlimited power over others, lies not in their forbearance but in the limitations of our Constitution.” Jackson:American Comm. Assn.v. Douds, 339 US 382, 439. When we are dealing with the Fundamental Rights, “we are dealing with principles of liberty and justice ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ — something without which ‘a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible’.” Frankfurter: West Va. State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 652. If the basic human rights are to be fundamental and not fragile, it is impossible to hold that they can be abolished by an Act of Parliament merely by being called a Constitutional Amendment Act. A constitutional limitation would be no limitation at all if Parliament can do away with the limitation at its will. Constitutional guarantees which are away from extinction only by a bare majority or a two-thirds majority of a five-year Parliament are no guarantees at all. Further, the opposite view involves the inexplicable anomaly that a five-year Parliament which even by a unanimous vote cannot abridge a single Fundamental Right by ordinary law, can repeal by a requisite majority the entire Chapter on Fundamental Rights merely by calling the law a Constitutional Amendment. IX. Freedoms reserved by the people for themselves Our Constitution is given by the people, in the exercise of their sovereignty unto themselves: 1954 SCR 541 at 555; (1960) 3 SCR 250 at 281-2. The Fundamental Rights are merely the expression of the basic freedoms reserved by the people for themselves: (1967) 2 SCR 762 at 792; 1950 SCR 88 at 198. If the freedoms are reserved by the people for themselves, all the functionaries and agencies under the Constitution have to respect those freedoms and, ex hypothesi, no functionary or agency can destroy those freedoms. X. Reference to “the State“ in Article 13(2) Article 13(2) imposes a limitation on the power of “the State” which is a term of the largest possible import. The significance of the word “State” is vital to the present case. Part III gives protection to the citizen and guarantees him the basic human rights against the totality of all the forces of the State. If the State in its most comprehensive sense cannot make a law to take away or abridge Fundamental Rights, Parliament which is only one of the functionaries or agencies of the State cannot pass such a law under Article 368. In other words, when the State, i.e. the totality of all the legislative and executive forces throughout India, is interdicted from passing a certain law, it is not possible to exclude or exempt constitutional amendments. The all-comprehensive concept of the State harmonises with the all-comprehensive concept of the ‘law’ in Article 13(2). The juxtaposition contemplated by Article 13(2) is not of “Parliament” and “ordinary law”, but of all agencies comprised in the State and all branches of the law. XI. Fundamental Rights exist even in times of Emergency Even in times of crisis when a Proclamation of Emergency is issued, all Fundamental Rights continue to be in force except those dealt with by Article 19, and even the provisions of Article 19 are merely suspended and not abrogated during the period of Emergency (Article 358). Further, when the Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President has the power under Article 359 to suspend the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights in a court of law, but the Rights continue to exist and can be enforced after the Emergency ceases. It is inconceivable that the same Constitution which intended the Fundamental Rights to remain in existence even during the period of Emergency, at the same time intended to empower any five-year Parliament to take away those Rights altogether in normal times. Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner on the point that in the exercise of its amending power under Article 368, Parliament cannot alter or destroy the essential features of the Constitution: 1. It has been already submitted that just as there are inherent and implied limitations on the legislative power to make ordinary laws, e.g. the unexpressed limitation which disentitles the legislature to encroach upon the judicial domain, — (1971) 1 SCR 288, 294-7: (1970) 2 SCC 280; (1970) 3 SCR 745, 751: (1970) 1 SCC 509; (1970) 1 SCR 388, 392-3: (1969) 2 SCC 283; (1967) 1 AC 259, 287, 288, 290 (PC); 1940 IR 136. 1950 IR 67. Lane’s: The Australian Federal System, 1972, pp. 4, 94-5. there are, likewise, inherent and implied limitations on the other species of legislative power, i.e. the power to make amendments to the Constitution. 2. These inherent and implied limitations disentitle Parliament to alter or destroy any of the essential features, basic elements or fundamental principles (hereinafter called “the essential features” or “essential elements”) of the Constitution. However, Parliament may amend them without altering or destroying them. 3. The principle of inherent or implied limitations on Parliament’s power to amend a controlled Constitution stems from three basic features which, by definition, must be present in every controlled Constitution of a Republic: (a) The ultimate legal sovereignty resides in the people. (b) Parliament is only a creature of the Constitution. (c) The power to alter or destroy the essential elements of a Constitution is an attribute of ultimate legal sovereignty. If Parliament has the power to destroy the essential elements, it would cease to be a creature of the Constitution, the Constitution would cease to be controlled, and all the other institutions and authorities under the Constitution would be entirely at the mercy of a single institution, viz. Parliament. A power given by the Constitution cannot be construed as authorising a destruction of other powers given in the same instrument — and this rule applies a fortiori to the power of amendment. 4. It is true that the borderline cannot be precisely drawn between amendments which would be valid and those which would be invalid on the principle that the essential features are beyond Parliament’s amending power; nor would it be possible to specify exhaustively the amendments which would be invalid on that principle. But that is no argument against accepting the aforesaid principle: “. . .In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact definition, but what a reasonable man would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances and what he would regard as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving as tests in law, and natural justice as it has been interpreted in the courts is much more definite than that. . . .” Per Lord Reid, Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 at 64-5. “But such a lack of generality in criminal legislation need not, of itself, involve the judicial function, and Their Lordships are not prepared to hold that every enactment in this field which can be described as ad hominem and ex post facto must inevitably usurp or infringe the judicial power. Nor do they find it necessary to attempt the almost impossible task of tracing where the line is to be drawn between what will and what will not constitute such an interference. Each case must be decided in the light of its own facts and circumstances, . . .” Per Lord Pearce, Liganage v. Queen, (1967) 1 AC 259 at 289-90. In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, 1951 SCR 747, this Hon’ble Court held that the essentials of a legislative function could not be delegated, although it is not possible to enumerate precisely what those essential principles are nor is it possible to specify exhaustively those elements of legislation which cannot be delegated. 5. The following are some of the essential features of the Constitution: (i) The supremacy of the Constitution. Ours is a controlled “Constitution” par excellence. All institutions, including Parliament, are merely creatures of the Constitution and none of them is its master. (ii) The Sovereignty of India. This country cannot be made a satellite, colony or dependency of any foreign country. (iii) The integrity of the country. The unity of the nation, transcending all the regional, linguistic, religious and other diversities, is the bed-rock on which the constitutional fabric has been raised. (iv) The democratic way of life, which connotes much more than merely the people’s right to vote and elect representatives to power. In totalitarian, authoritarian and Fascist countries also, the people have such a right to vote and elect, but the equal freedom to choose between different parties and the freedom to oppose are denied. (v) The Republican form of Government. India cannot be transformed into a monarchy. (vi) The guarantee of basic human rights to all its citizens to ensure JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity. These rights are categorised and elaborated as Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution. Parliament cannot damage or abrogate the essence of any of these rights. (See, further, the Annexure.) (vii) A secular State, that is, a State in which there is no State religion. (viii) A free and independent judiciary. Without it, all other rights would be writ in water. (ix) The dual structure of the Union and the States. Entries in the Legislative Lists or other powers may be transferred from the Union to the State or vice-versa, but not so as to imperil the existence of either the Union or the States. (x) The balance between the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. None of the three organs can use any of its power to destroy the powers of the other institutions, nor can any of them abdicate its power in favour of another. (xi) A Parliamentary form of Government as distinct from a Presidential form of Government. (xii) The amendability of the Constitution as per the basic scheme of Article 368. That article itself can be amended but not so as to destroy its basic scheme. For instance, Article 368 cannot be amended so as to — (a) empower Parliament to alter or destroy any of the essential features of the Constitution; (b) make the Constitution literally or practically unamendable; (c) make it generally amendable by a bare majority in Parliament; (d) confer the power of amendment either expressly or in effect on the State legislatures; (e) delete the proviso and deprive the States of the power of ratification which is today available to them in certain broad areas. ANNEXURE  The Historical Background regarding Fundamental Rights The historical background is of great importance. The difference in basic approach, which results in some Constitutions having guaranteed fundamental rights and others not having them, “may be traced mainly to the spirit and genius of the nation in which a particular Constitution has its birth” (See McCawley v. King, 1920 AC 691 at 703). The history of India prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, has perhaps not been paralleled in its essential features in any other country: (a) For several decades the national leaders had been struggling to achieve independence and had envisaged a Constitution for free India which would provide basic human rights which could not be withdrawn under any circumstances. (See Granville Austin’s: “The Indian Constitution: Corner-stone of a Nation“, pp. 52-59, reproduced in the Compilation filed on 23rd November, 1972). (b) India was to become a free democracy for the first time in its 5000 years old history. Since freedom had not become a way of life in this country, the basic human rights had to be carefully protected and preserved. (c) The country was welded together into one nation under one Central legislature for the first time in its history. The fundamental rights represented the solemn balance of rights between citizens from various parts of India, “the fundamental conditions on whichinter se they accepted the Constitution” (Cf. Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe, 1965 AC 172 at 193-4). (d) A sense of security and safety had to be created in the minds of the people when there were such tremendous diversities of religion, race, caste, creed, language, culture, etc., particularly in the minds of the religious and linguistic minorities. (e) Economic and political thinking in the country ranged from antiquated feudalism to extreme leftism, and the necessity arose of putting the Fundamental Rights beyond the reach of the party in power and the State. Since the question essentially is as to the intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution — did they intend that Parliament should have the power to destroy fundamental rights? — the above background is not only relevant but significant on the question as to the real intention. The makers of the Constitution had a large number of foreign models before them in which there were provisions for amending the essential features of the Constitution by means of Referendum and other modes of ascertaining the wishes of the people in whom the ultimate legal sovereignty resides. The absence of any such provision in our Constitution clearly shows that the founding fathers of our Constitution did not want to provide in the original Constitution itself any channel for altering or destroying the basic constitutional structure. It is inconceivable that they intended to empower Parliament to destroy any of the essential features of the Constitution. In particular, it is inconceivable that after having provided the most complete and comprehensive guarantees of the basic human freedoms known to any Constitution of the world, the Constitution-makers still intended that any Parliament for the time being in session may take away or abridge all or any of those basic freedoms.   * * *   Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner on the necessity of taking into account the consequences of each of the rival contentions regarding the width of the power of amendment, the question of abuse of power being wholly irrelevant to the issue of the true scope of the power. The word used in Article 368 is “amendment”, a word of ambiguous import and elastic ambit. The principle of inherent and implied limitations means deducing what is left unsaid from what is said, and perceiving what is implicit in the express provisions and scheme of the instrument. The entire attempt is to fathom the true intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution. The submission of the Petitioner is that — (a) according to one of the well-settled meanings of the word “amend”, the power of amendment in Article 368 does not comprise the power to alter or destroy any of the essential features, basic elements or fundamental principles of the Constitution (hereinafter called “essential features”); (b) in any event there are inherent and implied limitations on the power. The Respondents controvert both (a) and (b). They submit that the power of amendment comprehends the power to alter or destroy the essential features; that there are no inherent or implied limitations; and that the power is absolute and limitless. Thus this Hon’ble Court has to decide upon; (i) the meaning of the word “amendment” and (ii) the existence of inherent and implied limitations. The conclusion on these two distinct questions would resolve the most crucial issue arising in the case — the scope and width of the power of amendment. In ruling on this most crucial issue, it is not only desirable but imperative to consider the consequences of the plea of limited power and also of the plea of limitless power. To form a value judgment on this central point while ignoring the consequences of each rival view, is to form no value judgment at all. The Constitution is an organic whole and presents an integrated scheme; and it is judicially impossible to determine the width of one power without considering its effect on other powers and institutions. The test of the true width of a power is not how probable it is that it may be exercised, but what can possibly be done under it. The question of abuse or misuse of power is entirely irrelevant. To say that taking into account consequences involves consideration of abuse of power is to confuse the extent of power with its exercise, and its scope with the manner of its use. When the question is as to the width of the power, the hope and expectation that it will never be used is as wholly irrelevant as an imminent danger of its use.   * * *   Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner regarding the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971. The Twenty-fourth Amendment has sought to achieve five results: (i) It has inserted an express provision in Article 368 to indicate that the source of the amending power will be found in that Article itself. (ii) It has made it obligatory on the President to give his assent to any Bill duly passed under that Article. (iii) It has substituted the words “amend by way of addition, variation or repeal. . . . “in place of the bare concept of “amendment” in the original Article 368. (iv) It makes explicit that when Parliament makes a constitutional amendment under Article 368 it acts “in exercise of its constituent power.” (v) It has expressly, provided, by amendments in Articles 13 and 368, that the bar in Article 13 against abridging or taking away any of the Fundamental Rights should not apply to any amendment made under Article 368. The petitioner does not dispute that the amendments covered by (i) and (ii) above are within the amending power of Parliament. If the amendments covered by (iii) and (iv) above are to be construed as empowering Parliament to exercise the full constituent power of the people themselves, and as vesting in Parliament the ultimate legal sovereignty of the people, and as authorising Parliament to alter or destroy all or any of the essential features, basic elements and fundamental principles of the Constitution (hereinafter called “essential features”), the amendments must be held to be illegal void. Likewise if the amendment covered by (v) above is construed as authorising Parliament to damage or destroy the essence of all or any of the Fundamental Rights, the amendment must be held to be illegal and void. If the aforesaid construction is correct, it is submitted that the Twenty-fourth Amendment would be void and illegal for the following reasons: (1) A creature of the Constitution cannot increase its own constituent power The limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution conferred by Article 368 prior to the Twenty-fourth Amendment is hereinafter referred to as “the constituent power”. A creature of the Constitution, as the Parliament is, can have only such constituent power as is conferred by the Constitution which is given by the people unto themselves. While purporting to exercise that constituent power, Parliament cannot increase that very power. No doubt, Parliament had the power to amend Article 368 itself, but that does not mean that Parliament could so amend Article 368 as to change its own constituent power beyond recognition. A creature of the Constitution cannot enlarge its own power over the Constitution, while purporting to act under it, any more than the creature of an ordinary law can enlarge its own power while purporting to act under that law. The power of amendment cannot possibly embrace the power to enlarge that very power of amendment, or to abrogate the limitation, inherent or implied, in the terms on which the power was conferred. The contrary view would reduce the whole principle of inherent and implied limitations to an absurdity. (2) A creature of the Constitution cannot arrogate to itself the power to alter or destroy the essential features of the Constitution In any view of the matter, Parliament as a functionary created under the Constitution had no competence so to amend the Constitution as to empower itself to alter or destroy the essential features of the Constitution. If the Twenty-fourth Amendment does confer such a power on Parliament, it would mean that, instead of the Constitution continuing to be supreme, it is now Parliament which is supreme and the Constitution is made subservient. In other words Parliament which is constituted under the Constitution has purported to make itself the master of the Constitution instead of being the functionary or creature of the Constitution as it was before the amendment, and has converted the controlled Constitution into an uncontrolled Constitution. On the aforesaid construction, what Parliament has actually purported to do in the Twenty-fourth Amendment is to effect a silent revolution, since it has sought to overthrow the supremacy of the Constitution and make itself supreme. The fact that the revolution has been silent, peaceful and unperceived, does not make it anytheless a revolution. Revolution is the only word to denote the substitution of one supremacy for another and to indicate the transfer of the ultimate legal sovereignty from the people to Parliament which is sought to be done by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. “An attempt by the majority to change the fundamental law in violation of self-imposed restrictions is unconstitutional and revolutionary” (American Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Section 25, pp. 629-30). (3) Parliament cannot abridge or destroy basic human rights and fundamental freedoms which were reserved by the people for themselves when they gave to themselves the Constitution The Twenty-fourth Amendment purports to empower Parliament to take away or abridge all or any of the fundamental rights. This means that Parliament is made competent to destroy the basic human rights and the fundamental freedoms which were reserved by the people unto themselves when they gave themselves the Constitution and provided for the functioning of a Parliament. What is reserved by the people for themselves cannot possibly be destroyed by a functionary of the Constitution. (4) Parliament cannot do indirectly what it was enjoined by the Constitution not to do directly On a proper reading of the word “amendment” in Article 368 as it stood originally and also on the principle of inherent and implied limitations, Parliament had no power to alter or destroy any of the essential features of the Constitution. If this is the correct position under the Constitution as given by the people unto themselves, it must necessarily follow that Parliament cannot abrogate the limits of its own constituent power. It cannot do in two stages what it could not do in one stage. It cannot first repeal the limitations on its own constituent power and then purport to do what was forbidden by those limitations. ALTERNATIVE SUBMISSION REGARDING THE TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT Without prejudice to the above and in the alternative, it is submitted that if the Twenty-fourth Amendment is at all to be held valid, it can only be on a “reading down” of the amended provisions of Articles 13 and 368, which reading would preserve the original inherent and implied limitations on the constituent power. The restricted reading would be that even after the Twenty-fourth Amendment — (a) Parliament would have no power to alter or destroy the essential features of the Constitution; (b) fundamental rights are among the essential features of the Constitution and, therefore, the essence of any of the fundamental rights cannot be altered or destroyed even when they are sought to be abridged. It is submitted that if this Hon’ble Court is at all pleased to hold the Twenty-fourth Amendment to be valid, it should only be on the aforesaid restricted interpretation which would permit amendments only within the basic framework of the Constitution in which all the essential features are preserved. There are clear authorities for the proposition that the Court may “read down” a statute in order to bring it within the competence of the authority enacting it, when on a wider construction the Statute would have to be held void as being beyond the law-making authority’s competence. In re: The Hindu Women‘s Rights to Property Act, 1941 FCR 12 at 26-32; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union, 1957 SCR 930 at 936-39; Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp 2 SCR 769 at 810-11; Arora v. State of U.P., (1964) 6 SCR 784 at 797; Shah & Co.v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) 3 SCR 466 at 477; Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11 at 22-25. Such restricted construction is possible in the present case for the following reasons: (a) In a broad sense the expression “constituent power” may include the power to amend the Constitution, whether the amending power is limited or unlimited. (b) While the words “amend by way of addition, variation or repeal” are, generally speaking, words of wide import, in a given context they are capable of being read as not authorising the alteration or destruction of essential features. In other words, these newly inserted words are not necessarily inconsistent with the limitation which enjoins the preservation of essential features, although in other contexts they may well comprehend changes in or abrogation of the essential features. In short, these newly inserted words may involve, but do not necessarily involve, the power to abrogate or destroy the essential features. (c) The lifting of the bar of Article 13(2) against amendments under Article 368 is again not necessarily inconsistent with the essential features being beyond the amending power. If the bar in Article 13(2) is validly lifted, it can mean that Parliament can abridge any of the fundamental rights but not so as to damage or destroy the essence or core of any of those rights. (d) The whole point about implied and inherent limitation is that they apply where the empowering words are seemingly wide enough to cover what the limitations prohibit. On the original Article 368, two submissions have been made on behalf of the Petitioner — (i) the bare word “amendment” is not to be read in the wide sense of “amendment by way of addition, variation or repeal”, and (ii) even if it is to be read in the aforesaid wide sense, the inherent and implied limitations would still apply. In other words, if the bare word “amendment” in the original Article 368 were to be read in the wide sense of “amendment by way of addition, variation or repeal”, even then the implied and inherent limitations would have cut down the scope of the amending power prior to the Twenty-fourth Amendment. It is clear that since the inherent and implied limitations would have applied even if what is now enacted explicitly was implicit in the bare word “amendment”, they apply with equal vigour after the change in the language of Article 368. The inherent and implied limitations can be ruled out only by express words to the contrary. They would cease to apply only if there were compelling words, e.g., an express power conferred on Parliament to alter or abrogate any of the essential features of the Constitution. In that event the Court would have no option but to strike down the conferment of such a power. ADDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER ON  THE CONSTITUTION (TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT) ACT,  1971, REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE BAR IMPOSED  BY ARTICLE 13(2) 1. First submission Article 13(2), as it stood before the Twenty-fourth Amendment, had two elements— (i) the bar against the State making any ordinary law which abridges or takes away any of the fundamental rights; and (ii) the bar against any constitutional amendment which abridges or takes away any of the fundamental rights. The first bar is an essential feature of the Constitution and it has been left untouched by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. The second bar is also an essential feature of the Constitution. The effect of the bar is that while Parliament may add to or amend the fundamental rights, the amendment cannot take the form of abridgment or taking away of any of the fundamental rights. Since the bar against such constitutional amendments is an essential feature of the Constitution, the purported lifting of the bar by the Twenty-fourth Amendment is illegal and void. II. Second submission in the alternative An argument may be urged as follows: To distinguish the second bar from the first and to hold that while the first is an essential feature of the Constitution, the second is not. The first is an essential feature, since it is clearly basic to the constitutional scheme that the State should be restrained from abridging or taking away any of the fundamental rights, But the second bar stands on a different footing, since in the working of the Constitution, Parliament may find it necessary to abridge a fundamental right without damaging or destroying its core or essence and in that event it may propose to lift the second bar of Article 13(2) in the exercise of its amending power. Since each fundamental right is itself an essential feature and its core or essence cannot be destroyed or damaged in the exercise of the amending power, no damage could be done to the core and essence of any of the Fundamental Rights by the lifting of the second bar. In other words, it may be urged that the Fundamental principles underlying the original Constitution are the following: (a) Subject to (b) dealt with below, the “State” as defined in Article 12 should be powerless to abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights; (b) Parliament in the exercise of its amending power should be powerless to damage or destroy the core or essence of any of the Fundamental Rights, and even if it assumes the power to amend any of them, the amendment should not reach the point of such damage or destruction. In this view of the matter, it would be possible to decide the present case entirely on the principle of inherent and implied limitations and the true construction of the words of Article 368 conferring the amending power, without any reference to Article 13(2) at all. Without prejudice to the first submission and in the alternative, the Petitioner submits that if the aforesaid second bar against constitutional amendments imposed by Article 13(2) is held not to be an essential feature of the Constitution, then the position after the Twenty-fourth Amendment is as follows: (a) The provision of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, lifting the bar in Article 13(2) against constitutional amendments under Article 368, should be held to be valid. (b) However, the bar would continue to apply against constitutional amendments made under other provisions of the Constitution namely Articles 4, 169, 244-A, Para 7 of the Fifth Schedule, and Para 21 of the Sixth Schedule. Any constitutional amendments made under any of these provisions would have to observe the bar of Article 13(2), and such amendments cannot abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights. The reason is that it is only amendments made under Article 368 which are exempted from the application of Article 13(2) by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. This difference may be justified on the ground that whereas under Article 368 a special majority is necessary, under the other amending provisions only a bare majority of Parliament is sufficient. (c) The power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 continues to be subject to the inherent and implied limitations which prevent Parliament from altering, damaging or destroying any of the essential features of the Constitution. Every Fundamental Right is an essential feature of the Constitution. The net result is that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 may abridge a fundamental right but if after the lifting of the bar in Article 13(2), the degree of abridgment is such as to damage or destroy the essence or core of that right, the constitutional amendment would be illegal and void. Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner regarding the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. The ground for holding the 25th Amendment illegal and void is that, as already submitted, even if the 24th Amendment is held to be valid, it can only be on a restricted interpretation of the power of amendment conferred on Parliament by Article 368 as altered by the 24th Amendment. The restricted the interpretation would be that even after 24th Amendment and even if the bar of Article 13(2) was validly lifted, the inherent and implied limitations continue to attach to Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 with the result that — (a) Parliament would have no power to alter, damage or destroy the essential features of the Constitution; and (b) each fundamental right being an essential feature of the Constitution, no constitutional amendment can damage or destroy the essence or core of any of the Fundamental Rights. It is in the light of this legal position that the validity of the 25th Amendment has to be considered. The 25th Amendment has made three material changes: (i) It has amended Article 31(2) in two respects — (a) it substitutes the word “amount” for the concept of “compensation” for property acquired or requisitioned; and (b) it has provided that the acquisition or requisition law shall not be called in question on the ground that the whole or any part of the “amount” is to be given otherwise than in cash. (ii) it has provided that the fundamental right to acquire hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) cannot be invoked in respect of any such law as is referred to in Article 31(2). (iii) It has inserted Article 31-C as an overriding Article which makes the various fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 in-applicable to certain categories of laws passed by Parliament or by any State legislature. It is submitted that all the amendments covered by (i), (ii) and (iii) above, damage or destroy the essence or core of the fundamental rights which they deal with; and consequently the whole of the 25th Amendment Act is illegal and void. The aforesaid three features of the 25th Amendment are dealt with below seriatim: I. Amendment of Article 31(2) It is submitted that the right to property is one of the essential features of the Constitution, like all the other fundamental rights. Further, it is the handmaid to various other fundamental rights. A very few examples may suffice to illustrate this point. The right to freedom of the Press under Article 19(1)(a) would be meaningless if a publisher could be deprived of his printing plant and the building in which it is housed without compensation. The fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to form trade unions would be denuded of its true content if the property of a trade union could be acquired by the State without compensation. The right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) would be merely a right to do forced labour for the State if the net savings from the fruits of a citizen’s personal exertion are liable to be acquired by the State without compensation. The freedom of religion in Article 26 would lose a great deal of its efficacy if the institutions maintained by a community for its religious and charitable purposes could be acquired without compensation. The common man who may have put his life-savings in shares or in other forms of property is directly affected by the denial of the right to compensation. Under the amended Article 31 and amount may be fixed by the State on a basis which need not be disclosed even to members of the legislature which passes the law and which may have no relation to the value of the property sought to be acquired. In other words, the amended Article 31 in substance and effect authorizes confiscation of any citizen’s property, however small that property may be in value. Such a law which has nothing to do with concentration of wealth and permits any common citizen’s property to be virtually confiscated involves destruction of the essence or core of the right to property. The other amendment of Article 31(2) is that even the “amount” which does not satisfy any of the principles of compensation need not be paid in cash but may be given in the form, say, of a promise to pay at a future date, and that cannot be made a ground of challenge to the validity of the law. This amendment amounts in effect to compounding the injustice. In these days of mounting inflation and the State tendency to repudiate even solemn constitutional guarantees, a Government’s promise to pay at a future date may be almost worthless. This part of the amendment serves to emphasise the point that the change in Article 31(2) effected by the 25th Amendment is really intended to authorise confiscation of the bulk of any property which a State may choose to acquire or requisition. It may be noted that Article 31(2) has nothing to do with estates, zamindaris, land reforms or agrarian reforms which are specifically dealt with by Article 31-A and to which Article 31(2) is wholly inapplicable. II. Amendment to make Article 19(1)(f) inapplicable to acquisition and requisition laws The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) is subject under Article 19(5) to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. Since all reasonable restrictions in the public interest are already permitted under Article 19(5), the only object of making Article 19(1)(f) inapplicable can be to enable acquisition and requisition laws under Article 31 to contain restrictions and provisions which are unreasonable or not in the public interest. If Article 19(1)(f) applies, an acquisition or requisition law which permits a property to be taken without the owner being heard where the rules of natural justice would require the owner to be heard, would be void as offending that Article. See R.C. Cooper v.Union, (1970) 3 SCR 530 at 577: (1970) 1 SCC 248. But after the 25th Amendment, such rules of natural justice can be flagrantly violated and a man’s property can be acquired or requisitioned and the “amount” fixed, without giving him a hearing in cases where natural justice would require such hearing to be given; and the Land Acquisition Act can be amended to provide that any man’s land or house can be acquired without any notice to the owner to show cause against the acquisition or to prove what “amount” should be fairly paid to him for the property acquired. This clearly damages the essence or the core of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property. III. Article 31-C which validates Constitution-breaking laws Article 31-C damages or destroys the core or essence of at least seven essential features of the Constitution. 1. There is a fine but vital distinction between two cases — (a) where the fundamental rights are amended to permit laws to be validity passed which would have been void before the amendment; and (b) the fundamental rights remain unamended but the laws which are void as offending those rights are validated by a legal fiction that they shall not be deemed to be void. The question is not one merely of legislative device. In the first case the law is constitutional in reality. In the second case the law is unconstitutional in reality but is deemed by a fiction of law not to be void; with the result that Constitution-breaking laws are validated and there is a repudiation or abrogation of the Constitution pro tanto. If the second case is permissible as a proper exercise of the amending power, the Constitution would be reduced to a scrap of paper. If Article 31-C is valid, it would be equally permissible to Parliament so to amend the Constitution as to declare all laws to be valid which are passed by Parliament or State legislatures in excess of their legislative competence, or which violate any of the basic human rights enshrined in Part III or the freedom of inter-State trade in Article 301. It would be equally permissible to have an omnibus Article that “notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no law passed by Parliament or any State legislature shall be deemed to be void on any ground whatsoever”. The insertion of only one such Article would toll the death-knell of the Constitution. The true legal effect of Article 31-C is that it gives a blank charter to Parliament and all the State legislatures to defy and ignore the Constitution. Article 31-C clearly damages or destroys the supremacy of the Constitution which is one of the essential features of the Constitution. 2. Article 31-C not only subordinates the fundamental rights to the Directive Principles of State policy but virtually abrogates the fundamental rights in respect of laws which the legislature declares to be for giving effect to the Directive Principles. One of the essential features of the Constitution is that the right to enforce the fundamental rights in the Court is guaranteed (Article 32), whereas the Directive Principles are not so enforceable (Article 37). The fundamental rights are clear-cut and precise, in contrast to the vague contours of the Directive Principles. To abrogate the fundamental rights when giving effect to the Directive Principles is to destroy one of the essential features of the Constitution. Ignorance and arbitrariness, injustice and unfairness, would hereafter not be open to challenge on the touchstone of the invaluable basic rights, if Article 31-C is valid. 3. It is one of the essential features of the Constitution that it can be amended only in the “form and manner” laid down in Article 368 and according to that Article’s basic scheme. (Cf. Trethowan case, 1932 AC 526). This essential feature is sought to be abrogated by Article 31-C. That Article has the effect of virtually authorizing abrogation of the fundamental rights while they still remain ostensibly on the Statute Book. The public criticism and debate which would be invoked by a proposal to abridge a particular fundamental right is avoided, although various fundamental rights are effectively silenced. The absurd situation is that, whereas an amendment of a single fundamental right would require a majority of at least 2/3rds of the members of Parliament present and voting (Article 368), a law falling within Article 31-C which overrides and violates several fundamental rights can be passed by a simple majority. 4. Every fundamental right is an essential feature of the Constitution. Article 31-C purports to take away a large number of these fundamental rights altogether in the field covered by that Article. It provides for the wholesale smothering of various rights which are independent of the right to property and are totally irrelevant to the Directive Principles laid down in Article 39(b) or (c). Even the rights to — equality before the law; freedom of speech and expression; to assemble peaceably and without arms; to form associations or unions; to move freely throughout the territory of India; to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business; to retain property except when deprived by authority of law; which are so vital for the survival of democracy, the rule of law, and the integrity and unity of the Republic, can be violated under Article 31-C under the cloak of avoiding concentration of economic power. 5. A citizen is not even permitted to raise the question whether the proposed law will result, or is reasonably calculated to result, in securing the Directive Principles laid down in Article 39(b) or (c). The wrong done to the people who are deprived of their basic freedoms is aggravated by protection to laws, which, in reality, may not be at all calculated to give effect to the Directive Principles. This would be so even on the basis that on a proper construction of Article 31-C, Article 39(b) or (c) must have direct relevance to the law and its subject-matter, because even in such a case a question may still arise whether the law is so framed or conceived that it will secure the Directive Principles in question. One of the essential features of the Constitution is the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the other fundamental rights (Article 32). The essence of core of this right is gone when the fundamental rights are made unenforceable for the purpose of giving effect to the Directive Principles and at the same time the Court is precluded from considering whether the law is such that it can possibly secure the Directive Principles in question. 6. One of the essential features of the Constitution is that no State legislature can amend the fundamental rights or any other part of the Constitution. This essential feature is repudiated by Article 31-C which empowers even State legislatures to pass laws which virtually involve a repeal of the fundamental rights. The wholly irrational consequence is, whereas State legislatures cannot abridge a single fundamental right, it is now open to them to supersede a whole series of such rights. In substance, the power of amending the Constitution is delegated to all the State legislatures — which is not permissible under Article 368. See 1919 AC 935, 945 (PC); (1967) 2 SCR 650, 653-4, 659-60; 1951 Canada Law Reports Supreme Court, 31 at 37-38. 7. One of the essential features of the Constitution is the provision for the protection to minorities and their cultural and educational rights. The fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31 which are sought to be superseded by Article 31-C are necessary to make meaningful the specific rights of the minorities which are guaranteed by Articles 25 to 30. Under the guise of giving effect to Directive Principles, a number of steps can be taken which can seriously affect the position of regional, linguistic, cultural and other minorities. The proviso inserted by the Twenty-fifth Amendment to Article 31(2) is very telltale. It expressly provides that where the property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority is acquired, the amount fixed for the acquisition should be such as not to restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under Article 30(1). The clear implication is that when property is acquired in other cases, an amount can be fixed which restricts or abrogates any of the other fundamental rights — for instance, the rights to freedom of speech and expression Article 19(1)(a), to form associations or unions Article 19(1)(c), or to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business Article 19(1)(g), or the right of religious community to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes (Article 26). Further, if a law violates the rights of the minorities under Articles 25 to 30, such a law would be no law at all and therefore deprivation of property under such a law would violate Article 31(1). But since Article 31(1) is one of the Articles abrogated by Article 31-C, minorities can be deprived of their properties, held privately or upon pubic charitable or religious trust, by a law which clearly violates their rights under Articles 25 to 30. In conclusion, it would be no exaggeration to say that Article 31-C is a monstrous outrage on the Constitution. It has a built-in mechanism for the dissolution of the true democracy that India has been so far, cessation of the rule of law, disintegration of the nation, and the birth of a totalitarian regime.   * * *   Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner regarding the true Construction of Article 31(2) substituted by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. 1. True construction of Article 31(2) It is significant to note that before the 25th Amendment, Article 31(2) provided for the payment of compensation when any property was acquired or requisitioned for a public purpose and contained the provision inserted by the Fourth Amendment that the adequacy of such compensation should not be called in question in any court. The 25th Amendment substituted the word ‘amount’ for ‘compensation’. The Petitioner submits that the true construction of Article 31(2) as substituted by the 25th Amendment involves the following: (a) “Amount” is not a legal concept at all, unlike “compensation”. Therefore the will of the State is the only yardstick for fixing the amount. Thus the amount fixed may be such as may amount to virtual confiscation of the property or the bulk of it. (b) The Supreme Court held in the Bank Nationalisation case, (1970) 3 SCR 530) that if the principles which were irrelevant to the concept of compensation were adopted, the law would be struck down. But that decision was with reference to the word “compensation” which appeared in Article 31(2) before the 25th Amendment. Since the word “amount” is not a legal concept at all, there is no basic norm by reference to which the relevance or irrelevance of principles can be judged. (c) Since the amount fixed or the principles adopted may be arbitrary and may have no relation or relevance to the value of the property acquired, the essence or core of the right to property is damaged, if not destroyed, by Article 31(2). (d) Not only does Article 31(2) virtually abrogate the right to property, but it can have a similar effect on the other fundamental rights, e.g. the rights enumerated in Article 19 and the rights of the minorities and of religious freedom (see the examples on page 3 of the Propositions on the 25th Amendment tendered on 8th December, 1972). This is made clear by the prouiso to Article 31(2) which has also been inserted by the 25th Amendment. The implication of that proviso is that the State may fix such an amount for acquisition of property as may restrict or abrogate any of the other fundamental rights the exercise of which would be affected by the deprivation of the property without just compensation — and the only exception to this power of the State is the case dealt with in the proviso of educational institutions established and administered by a minority referred to in Article 30(1). It is submitted that what is stated above is the correct interpretation of Article 31(2) substituted by the 25th Amendment and that it must therefore be held to be void on the ground that it damages or destroys the core or essence of the right to property and of several other fundamental rights; and that “reading down” of the Article would not be proper. II. Alternative submission regarding Article 31(2) Without prejudice to the above and only in the event of this Hon’ble Court coming to the conclusion that Article 31(2) as substituted by the 25th Amendment should be held valid on a restricted interpretation, it is submitted that the restricted interpretation would have to proceed on the following basis: (a) Article 31(2) still appears as a fundamental right by reference to which the validity of ordinary laws is to be judged. Therefore it must be read as providing a standard or measure. If the “amount” and the “principles” are entirely at the will or whim of the State, there would be no meaning in keeping Article 31(2) as a fundamental right and in making payment an essential feature of that fundamental right. (b) The word “amount” is used in the context of a Constitution which specifically continues to provide in Article 19(1)(f) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Further, the word “amount” occurs in Article 31(2) which provides not for expropriation or confiscation but for compulsory acquisition or requisition for a public purpose. Article 31(2) makes it a condition of the validity of the acquisition or requisition law that it must fix an amount or specify the principles for determining the amount. Article 31(2) embodies the principle of eminent domain which necessarily involves the obligation of the State to pay for what is taken. Therefore the amount must be such as would not abrogate the right to property, since such abrogation would be inconsistent with — (i) the inherent and implied limitations on Parliament’s power under Article 368 to abrogate any fundamental right; (ii) Article 19(1)(f) which preserves the right to property; and (iii) the Statement of Objects and Reasons which does not indicate that the right to property was intended to be abrogated by the 25th Amendment. Consequently, the true standard or measure is that the amount or the principles must have a reasonable relation to the property and its value. In short, the word “amount” which is literally amorphous crystallises into shape and form in the context of Article 31(2). On the above interpretation, the right to property may be said to have evolved in the Indian Constitution through the following stages of dilution: (i) Property could be taken by the State only on payment of full compensation, the adequacy of the compensation being justiciable. (This was the Constitution in its original form). (ii) The State could take property on payment of “compensation” in the legal sense, although that compensation may be inadequate; the adequacy of the compensation being non-justiciable. (This stage was reached by the Fourth Amendment in 1955). (iii) The State may take property for an amount which may not represent “compensation” in the legal sense, but which must have a reasonable relation to the value of the property taken and which would prevent the acquisition from amounting to confiscation or expropriation. (This is the effect of the 25th Amendment). (c) The “principles” referred to in Article 31(2) would be such principles as are relevant and appropriate to the determination of such an “amount” as is referred to in (a) above. Just as principles which were irrelevant to the legal concept of “compensation” made the acquisition law invalid prior to the 25th Amendment, if any principles are adopted which are irrelevant to the concept of amount as explained in (a) above, the law would be invalid. (d) Where the law itself fixes the amount, it may indicate the principles on which it has been arrived at, or the Court may enquire on what broad principles it has been fixed. The contrary view would involve the unacceptable position that Article 31(2) gives the option to the State either to specify principles which cannot be arbitrary or to specify an amount which can be arbitrary. The only correct view can be that whether the law fixes the amount or specifies the principles, the amount or the principles must converge on the same result. (e) Since Parliament has no power to damage or destroy the core or essence of any of the fundamental rights, the very limits on its amending power would involve the conclusion that the power under Article 31(2) cannot be so exercised, and the amount fixed or determined cannot be so low, as to damage or destroy the core or essence of the other fundamental rights, e.g. the freedom of the Press, the right to form trade unions and the religious freedom and the rights of the minorities in Articles 25, 26 and 29. On the above construction, the effect of the proviso to Article 31(2) would be as follows: The proviso would give a wider protection in respect of educational institutions of a minority than would be available under (e) above. The reason is that the proviso requires such an amount to be fixed or determined as would not restrict the right under Article 30(1), which is a higher safeguard than the rule prohibiting damage to the essence or core of the other fundamental rights. If the amount to be paid on acquisition has to be such that it would not restrict the right under Article 30 (1), it would have to be an amount higher than the amount which would be sufficient not to damage the essence of that right. Whereas on the principle of inherent and implied limitations it is only the core or essence of the fundamental rights which is protected, the proviso to Article 31(2) protects the right under Article 30(1) in its full amplitude and not merely its core or essence.   * * *   Additional argument in support of the plea that the “amount” or “principles” under Article 31(2) cannot be arbitrary but have to be reasonable. Assuming Article 31(2) as substituted by the 25th Amendment is to be regarded as legal and valid, there is an additional reason for holding that the “amount” and “principles” referred to therein have to be reasonable in relation to the property and its value. Article 31(2) may be regarded as vesting the State with a discretion to fix the amount. It is well-settled that where a discretion is granted by any law, it is implicit in the grant of such discretion that it must be exercised reasonably. If the discretion is exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably, it would mean that the discretion has not been exercised at all. These principles which are well-settled in respect of discretion conferred by ordinary statutes apply a fortiori to Article 31(2) which safeguards the citizen’s fundamental right to property against the State. The condition on which the State is permitted by Article 31(2) to exercise the power of acquiring or requisitioning property is that discretion must be exercised in fixing the amount or specifying principles. If a law fixes an amount unreasonably or if the Court finds that in arriving at the amount the State has adopted principles which are unreasonable or irrelevant to the property and its value, the exercise of the State’s discretion would be arbitrary. In such a case the Court would strike down the law on the ground that the constitutional requirement of the exercise of discretion has not been satisfied. In Roberts v. Hopwood, (1925) AC 578 the House of Lords held that where a statute permitted a Borough Council to employ such servants as may be necessary on such “wages as (the Council) may think fit”, the discretion conferred upon the Council by the Statute must be exercised reasonably, and that the fixing by the Council of an arbitrary sum for wages without regard to existing labour conditions was not an exercise of that discretion. Lord Buckmaster’s observations in that case at pp. 587 and 590 are very pertinent. At page 590 Lord Buckmaster says: “. . . . they did not base their decision upon the ground that the reward for work is the value of the work reasonably and even generously measured, but that they took an arbitrary principle and fixed an arbitrary sum, which was not a real exercise of the discretion imposed upon them by the statute.” Lord Atkinson’s observations at pp. 597 and 599 are again pertinent. On page 599 Lord Atkinson says that on a fair construction of the statute it means that “in each and every case the payment of all salaries and wages must be ‘reasonable’.” This means that the test of reasonableness is treated as implicit in the conferment of discretion by the law. Lord Wrenbury’s classic words are at page 613: “I rest my opinion upon higher grounds. A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so — he must in the exercise of his discretion do not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must, by use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He must act reasonably.” By this test, the legal position is that so long as the discretion is exercised reasonably under Article 31(2), the Court will not interfere even though the return may not amount to compensation in the eye of the law or the principles may not cover all the essential elements of the legal concept of ‘compensation’. Inadequacy of the amount is non-justiciable, but only where the State action is within the constitutionally permissible limits. Arguments regarding the reasonable exercise of discretion (i.e. the reasonable relation of the amount or principles to the property and its value) and the bar against damaging any of the fundamental rights go to the constitutional limitations upon State action under Article 31(2), and are therefore justiciable. They deal with the constitutional condition which is required to be satisfied before the power of acquisition or requisition can be validly exercised. There is a world of difference between the proposition that adequacy of the amount shall not be called in question and the proposition that arbitrary exercise of discretion or power shall not be called in question.   * * *   Proposition on behalf of the Petitioner in support of the point that the right to property is one of the essential features of the Constitution. I. Every fundamental right is an essential feature of the Constitution Every fundamental right is an essential feature of the Constitution. If the Constitution-makers had thought that a particular right was not an essential feature, they would not have included it in the category of fundamental rights. In respect of the rest of the Constitution it is for the Court to decide whether a particular provision or institution constitutes an essential feature or not. But when it comes to the fundamental rights, all controversy is eliminated and what the Constitution-makers specified as fundamental must necessarily be treated as a fundamental feature of our Constitution. II. The importance of the right to property Without prejudice to the above and assuming any inquiry is at all possible as to whether the right to property should be treated as one of the basic elements of our Constitution, it is submitted that — (a) the intrinsic value of the right, (b) its necessity for the meaningful exercise of various other fundamental rights, and (c) its importance to the proper functioning of the Constitution as a whole; leave no doubt that the right to property is one of the basic elements of our Constitution. Property is necessary for the subsistence and well-being of men. No man would become a member of a community in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation and security of property is one of the primary objects of the social compact that induce men to unite in society. There can be no dispute or debate about this proposition, though there may be different opinions as to the quantum of property that a person should be allowed to hold. III. Legislative history (a) Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 recognised the right to property and contained a safeguard against expropriation without compensation or acquisition of property for a non-public purpose. (b) Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognises the right to private property. India is a signatory to that Declaration. (c) The Constituent Assembly examined the Constitutions of several countries, which guarantee basic rights. In “Constituent Assembly of India, Constitutional Precedents (Third Series) 1947)”, it is stated as follows: “Broadly speaking, the rights declared in these Constitutions relate to equality before the law, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, security of person and security of property. Within limits these are all well-recognised rights and it may be useful to draw attention to them by embodying them in the Constitutional Charter.” (d) The debates in the Constituent Assembly when the draft articles corresponding to Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 came up for discussion clearly indicate that the framers of our Constitution attached sufficient importance to property to incorporate it in the chapter on fundamental rights and rejected suggestions and contentions to the contrary. The provision regarding freedom of trade and intercourse which was originally in the chapter on fundamental rights was later on removed from that chapter and put into a separate part, in view of the suggestions by some members in the Constituent Assembly. It is significant to note that similar suggestions in respect of Article 31 (corresponding to Article 24 of the draft Constitution) were not accepted. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru categorically stated that in the Indian Constitution there was no room for expropriation or acquisition without compensation. That basic feature of the Constitution was departed from only in the case of legislation regarding abolition of zamindari and land tenure reforms and such legislation was accordingly expressly saved by clauses (4) and (6) of Article 31. Whilst there may be difference of opinion as to the quantum and extent of compensation that should be paid for acquisition of property, it was an essential feature of the Indian Constitution as framed and enacted that there could not be any expropriation of private property or acquisition without compensation. IV. Right to property necessary for the meaningful exercise of other fundamental rights The right to property is essential for the effective and meaningful exercise of various other fundamental rights. A very few examples would suffice to illustrate this point. The right to freedom of the Press under Article 19(1)(a) would be meaningless if a publisher could be deprived of his printing plant and the building in which it is housed without compensation. The fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to form trade unions would be denuded of its true content if the property of a trade union could be acquired by the State without compensation. The right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, which is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(e), would be meaningless if the State could expropriate the citizen’s hut or house or household effects. The right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) would be merely a right to do forced labour for the State if the net savings from the fruits of a citizen’s personal exertion are liable to be acquired by the State without compensation. The freedom of religion in Article 26 would lose a great deal of its efficacy if the institutions maintained by a community for its religious and charitable purposes could be acquired without compensation. V. Necessity of the right to property for the normal working of the Constitution It would be no exaggeration to say that without the right to property it would be impossible to work the Constitution. For example, many of the legislative Entries, including Entries which set out the subject-matters in respect of which taxes can be levied, necessarily pre-suppose the right to private property. The existence of the separate States would be in direct jeopardy if the right to private property did not exist. The democratic way of life, the very institution of Parliament with its necessary incidents like free elections, freedom to oppose and the right to dissent would all be paralysed if the right to private property did not exist. Propositions on behalf of the Petitioner regarding the ambit of the amending power in different Constitutions And Parliament providing a channel like referendum for ascertaining the people’s will. I. The amending power in our Constitution must be construed on its own terms The scope and width of Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 must be determined on its own terms and the other world Constitutions are of no assistance in solving this question. Some of the material features which have a bearing on this issue are: (a) Our historical background. National leaders struggled for several decades to achieve independence and envisaged a Constitution for free India which would provide inalienable basic human rights; the country became a free democracy for the first time, and was welded together into one State also for the first time, in its five thousand years old history; the necessity of creating a sense of security and safety in the minds of numerous religious, linguistic and regional minorities made it imperative that fundamental rights should be beyond the reach of the party in power. (b) Amending powers are conferred by different Articles in our Constitution — Articles 4, 169, Para 7 of the Fifth Schedule and Para 21 of the Sixth Schedule — in significantly different terms which have a direct bearing on the scope and width of the amending power. (c) In the original draft of the Constitution prepared by B.N. Rau, there was a significant contrast between the word ‘amendment’ in the clause corresponding to the present Article 368 and the conferment of amending power in wider term in Clause 238 which was later omitted. Further, Mr Kamath’s amendment which would have widened the scope of the amending power in Article 368 was rejected. Thus the proceedings before the Constituent Assembly clearly support the view that Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 was intended to be restricted as contended by the Petitioner. (d) Our Constitution has an extraordinarily forceful and meaningful Preamble which contains guarantees reflecting the pledge contained in the Objectives Resolution of 1946. (e) The people are in no way associated with the amending power in Article 368, but the decision is purely that of a creature of the Constitution, viz. Parliament; and even the States are wholly dissociated from the amending process except in the cases falling within the proviso to Article 368. There is no other Constitution in the world which affords a parallel to the Indian Constitution as regards the abovementioned cumulative features and other relevant circumstances. Therefore it would be futile to consider the scope of the amending power in other Constitutions. II. Constitutions of other countries The amending power has widely varying scope and width in the Constitutions of different countries. Relevant extracts from the Constitutions of 61 countries are given in a separate compilation. It is most significant to note that where the amending power rests with the people of a Republic, in whom the ultimate legal sovereignty resides, the position is quite different as compared to cases where the amending power resides in a creature of the Constitution, e.g., the Indian Parliament. Inherent and implied limitations which apply to a Parliament constituted under a controlled Constitution do not apply to the people. People may, in the exercise of their ultimate legal sovereignty alter, damage or destroy an essential feature of their Constitution by way of amendment (apart from questions of limitations on the people’s power arising from the Preamble or the principle of inalienable and natural human rights). III. The U.S.A. Constitution Article V of the U.S.A. Constitution affords no analogy to Article 368, as is clear from the following: (a) The features and the historical background peculiar to India, do not exist in the case of the U.S. Constitution. (b) Article V in the U.S.A. Constitution has been read as associating the people with the amending process, since that article expressly provides for the calling of Conventions for amending the Constitution. The fact that Conventions have been rarely called is not relevant. The necessity of calling Conventions (instead of letting the legislature make the decision) would really arise when the basic human freedoms are sought to be abridged or taken away or any other essential feature of the Constitution is sought to be altered, damaged or destroyed. Such amendments have not been made in the U.S.A. But the very fact that the people are capable of being associated with the exercise of the amending power distinguishes Article V from our Article 368. (c) The decision to have an amendment is not made by the Congress (corresponding to our Lok Sabha) but is made by 3/4ths of the State legislatures or Conventions. The Congress can only initiate a Proposal. (d) Two-thirds of the State legislatures may ask for amendments, and in such a case Congress does not even initiate a Proposal. (e) The decisions of the Supreme Courts of the States in U.S.A. are not relevant, since they turn upon the terms and background of the State Constitutions. For instance, the case reported in Southern Reporter, Second Series, Vol. 81, page 881 is irrelevant, since that case deals with the Constitution under which an amendment would become valid only “when approved by the qualified electors” (see the first para of that Vol. at page 882). IV. Can Parliament amend our Constitution so as to provide a channel for a decision by the people regarding amendments? One possible view of the matter is that having regard to the historical background which is referred to above and which is set out in detail in the Annexure to the Propositions No. P-5/12-B, the Constitution-makers did not intend that any essential feature of our Constitution should be permitted to be altered, damaged or destroyed, even by the people, although all amendments may be made by Parliament which do not have such an effect. It may be urged that it was precisely for this reason that the Constitution-makers, having the various constitutional precedents before them, deliberately chose to make no provision for amendment by the people by a referendum or convention. (Ascertainment of the will of the people as regards constitutional amendments may be done in one of the well-settled constitutional modes, of which referendum is a well-favoured example. For the sake of brevity, the word “referendum” is used hereinafter to denote any of the available channels for enabling the people’s will to be expressed as regards constitutional amendments). The other view of the matter is that a referendum was not provided for originally in the Constitution because it might have made it very difficult to have the Constitution accepted on those terms by the diverse sections of the public who would have viewed a referendum with grave misgivings; but that does not rule out the constitutional possibility of Parliament at any future stage amending the Constitution so as to provide a channel for the decision of the people on a referendum regarding amendments which are beyond the constitutional limits of the Parliament’s amending power. If the latter view is correct, Parliament can amend the Constitution to provide such a channel for ascertaining the will of the people regarding constitutional amendments. The most important point is that the provision must be such that — (a) the decision can be made directly by the people on the precise proposal being submitted to them, and (b) the issue of amendment must be presented to the people in absolute isolation, so that it does not get mixed up with other political questions and with political party affiliations or preferences. Thus it must satisfy the criteria of directness and speciality of the people’s decision (See Dr. Conrad’s Article, pp. 405, 408 and 412). If the latter view is right and Parliament can amend the Constitution to provide for a referendum, two views would again be possible as regards the scope of the people’s amending power: (a) It may be urged that the people would have on a referendum complete and absolute power to deal with any of the essential features of the Constitution. (b) The other view would be that even the people on a referendum would have their amending power limited in two respects. Firstly, they cannot so amend the Constitution as to make it inconsistent with any part of the Preamble; and, secondly, they cannot take away the natural and inalienable rights or the basic human freedoms. In this case it is not necessary to decide the questions regarding Parliament’s competence to amend the Constitution so as to provide for a referendum and the extent and scope of the people’s amending power on a referendum.  -0- JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN INDIA. The Judiciary . Supreme Court INDIA The Supreme Court in India is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and the laws of the land. It has appellate jurisdiction over all civil and criminal proceedings involving substantial issues concerning the interpretation of the constitution. The court has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the central government and one or more states and union territories as well as between different states and union territories. And the Supreme Court is also empowered to issue advisory rulings on issues referred to it by the president. The Supreme Court has wide discretionary powers to hear special appeals on any matter from any court except those of the armed services. It also functions as a court of record and supervises every high court. Twenty-five associate justices and one chief justice serve on the Supreme Court. The president appoints the chief justice. Associate justices are also appointed by the president after consultation with the chief justice and, if the president deems necessary, with other associate justices of the Supreme Court and high court judges in the states. The appointments do not require Parliament's concurrence. Justices may not be removed from office until they reach mandatory retirement at age sixty-five unless each house of Parliament passes, by a vote of two-thirds of the members in attendance and a majority of its total membership, a presidential order charging "proved misbehavior or incapacity." The contradiction between the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review that is embedded in India's constitution has been a source of major controversy over the years. After the courts overturned state laws redistributing land from zamindar (see Glossary) estates on the grounds that the laws violated the zamindars' Fundamental Rights, Parliament passed the first (1951), fourth (1955), and seventeenth amendments (1964) to protect its authority to implement land redistribution. The Supreme Court countered these amendments in 1967 when it ruled in the Golaknath v State of Punjab case that Parliament did not have the power to abrogate the Fundamental Rights, including the provisions on private property. On February 1, 1970, the Supreme Court invalidated the government-sponsored Bank Nationalization Bill that had been passed by Parliament in August 1969. The Supreme Court also rejected as unconstitutional a presidential order of September 7, 1970, that abolished the titles, privileges, and privy purses of the former rulers of India's old princely states. In reaction to Supreme Court decisions, in 1971 Parliament passed the Twenty-fourth Amendment empowering it to amend any provision of the constitution, including the Fundamental Rights; the Twenty-fifth Amendment, making legislative decisions concerning proper land compensation nonjusticiable; and the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which added a constitutional article abolishing princely privileges and privy purses. On April 24, 1973, the Supreme Court responded to the parliamentary offensive by ruling in the Keshavananda Bharati v the State of Kerala case that although these amendments were constitutional, the court still reserved for itself the discretion to reject any constitutional amendments passed by Parliament by declaring that the amendments cannot change the constitution's "basic structure." During the 1975-77 Emergency, Parliament passed the Forty-second Amendment in January 1977, which essentially abrogated the Keshavananda ruling by preventing the Supreme Court from reviewing any constitutional amendment with the exception of procedural issues concerning ratification. The Forty-second Amendment's fifty-nine clauses stripped the Supreme Court of many of its powers and moved the political system toward parliamentary sovereignty. However, the Forty-third and Forty-fourth amendments, passed by the Janata government after the defeat of Indira Gandhi in March 1977, reversed these changes. In the Minerva Mills case of 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its authority to protect the basic structure of the constitution. However, in the Judges Transfer case on December 31, 1981, the Supreme Court upheld the government's authority to dismiss temporary judges and transfer high court justices without the consent of the chief justice. The Supreme Court continued to be embroiled in controversy in 1989, when its US$470 million judgment against Union Carbide for the Bhopal catastrophe resulted in public demonstrations protesting the inadequacy of the settlement (see The Growth of Cities, ch. 5). In 1991 the first-ever impeachment motion against a Supreme Court justice was signed by 108 members of Parliament. A year later, a high-profile inquiry found Associate Justice V. Ramaswamy "guilty of willful and gross misuses of office . . . and moral turpitude by using public funds for private purposes and reckless disregard of statutory rules" while serving as chief justice of Punjab and Haryana. Despite this strong indictment, Ramaswamy survived parliamentary impeachment proceedings and remained on the Supreme Court after only 196 members of Parliament, less than the required two-thirds, voted for his ouster. During 1993 and 1994, the Supreme Court took measures to bolster the integrity of the courts and protect civil liberties in the face of state coercion. In an effort to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest in the judiciary, Chief Justice Manepalli Narayanrao Venkatachaliah initiated a controversial model code of conduct for judges that required the transfer of high court judges having children practicing as attorneys in their courts. Since 1993, the Supreme Court has implemented a policy to compensate the victims of violence while in police custody. On April 27, 1994, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that enhanced the rights of individuals placed under arrest by stipulating elaborate guidelines for arrest, detention, and interrogation. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: PRECURSOR TO THE PRESENT PAKISTANI LEGAL SYSTEM The work discusses how the British East India Company came to the subcontinent for the purpose of trade in 1604 and how it slowly and gradually started interfering in the local justice system by acquiring revenue collection of 38 villages in 1717 near Calcutta. In 1765 the Company was granted revenue collection as well as customs of three provinces. The Company also acquired the administration of justice in the areas under its control and the role of Muslim qadis and judges was over. Company’s officials, who were traders rather than trained judges, were running the court system and the Privy Council was born as the highest court of appeal. The doctrine of precedent was introduced in the subcontinent which is now institutionalized in India and Pakistan. I. INTRODUCTION Muslims came to India when they conquered Sindh in 712 A.D. The Delhi Sultanate came into existence in 1206, when Qutbuddin Aibak of the Slave dynasty became the first independent Sultan of Delhi. From 1206 to 1526 five different Muslim dynasties – the Slaves, the Khaljis, the Thughluqs, the Sayyids, and the Lodhis ruled India. The Mughal dynasty was established in 1526 and continued till 1857, it was in decay since the death of Awrangzeb Alamghir in 1707. Before the 1857 take over by the Crown the East India Company had done the ground work for the colonization of the subcontinent. This work focuses on how the East Company arrived in India; what type of justice the Company was administering in the beginning for its own employees, especially in the three presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay; how did the Company start penetrating the local judicial system; what mistakes were made by the local rulers; what was the role of Islamic law in the beginning and how was it gradually replaced by English statutes and English doctrines; and what role was played by the doctrine of precedent? The work discusses other issues that are also important in this discussion. II. THE EARLY CHARTERS: TRADERS’ JUSTICE The foundations of the British Empire in India were laid down by a company which was organized to further the British interests in overseas countries. The full official name of the Company was: “The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies.” Queen Elizabeth Ι granted it charter on 31st December 1600 for 15 years. All members of the Company were to form the General Court which was to elect annually the Court of Director consisting of a Governor and 24 directors for managing the Company's business. The Charter authorized the company to make laws, orders and constitutions for the good governance of itself, its servants, and for the advancement of its trade and traffic. The Company could also impose penalties and punishments by way of fines and imprisonment. The Company could not give capital punishment for serious criminal cases such as murder. The laws made by the company, however, could not be against the laws of England. The Charter did not mention the making of laws for any territory or factory probably because no territorial acquisition by the Company was contemplated at this stage. The Company was thus viewed as a commercial enterprise and not an instrument of political power acquiring foreign territories. The representative of the Company set foot on Indian soil in the reign of Jahangir. The Company soon found that its legislative authority was not enough and it therefore secured the Royals prerogative for empowering the commander-in-chief of each voyage separately to inflict capital punishment for murder or mutiny. The first reported trial under one such Royal commission was held on the 28th February, 1616 on board the ship Charles lying at the Surat port, before the commander of the fleet. Gregory Lillington was accused of killing Henry Barton, an Englishman, near Surat on the Bay of Bengal. Gregory confessed to the crime and was put to death. To carry out its trade effectively the Company needed to establish few factories. A factory was a place consisting of offices and residences of the Company's employees and warehouses for storage of goods. The representative of the Company wanted a factory in Surat which was a very good seaport in the Mughal Empire. The Portuguese had already established themselves in Surat. The British and the Portuguese fought a naval war in the water of Surat in which the Portuguese were beaten. The Company established its factory in Surat with the permission of the local Mughal governor in 1612. However, for securing permanent trading facilities the Company sought the permission of Emperor Jahangir. James Ι sent an ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, to Jahangir in 1615 who issued a firman (decree) granting trading facilities to the Company. According to the firman the Company was allowed to trade and establish a factory in a hired house. Disputes among the British were to be settled by their President, but disputes between an Englishman and an Indian were to be settled by the established local native authority according to justice. The Surat factory was the headquarter of Company's activities in India till 1687 when the Company's headquarter was shifted to Bombay. On December 14, 1615, the King conferred upon the Company a general power to issue such commissions to its Captains, subject to the provision that in case of capital offence, the verdict must be reached by a jury of 12 servants of the Company. On February 4, 1623, James Ι granted to the Company power of issuing commissions to any of its Presidents and thus chief officers in its settlements authorizing them to punish offences committed on land by the Company's British servants. The account of a murder case involving two employees of the company was held on board the ship Mary in 1636 with the help of a jury and the accused was convicted. By 1639 the Company had acquired another fortified factory on the Eastern seacoast, from a Hindu Raja and constructed a fortified factory named Fort St. George. The Raja also granted to the Company power and authority to govern Madraspatnam – a small village near the fort. A large number of Indians were attracted to this village because of the facilities available there. The population of Madraspatnam increased and was known as the black town. The fort itself was called the white town – because the inhabitants were either British or other Europeans. The whole settlement comprising of the black and the white towns came to be known as Madras. Madras was not a Presidency town and was subordinated to Surat. Although the Raja had left the town to the Company it was not interested in the administration of justice between the locals. The village head called Adigar used to decide all cases of the locals. His court was called the Choultry court. He was dismissed because of his corruption in 1652 and the two English servants of the Company were appointed to set at the Choultry. For Capital cases committed by non-English the Company referred the case to the Raja who would order punishment according to the English law. The most important of the early Charters is the one granted by Charles II on April 3, 1661. It authorized the Governor (President) and Council of each factory to judge under to the law of England all persons, whether belonging to the Company or living there. Its purpose was to create a judicial system for the Company’s territorial Possessions. The Charter of 1661 was originally for Surat, but was made effective in Madras subsequently in the same year. The Agent of the Company was made governor who had to administer the Charter. The Island of Bombay was initially acquired by the Portuguese in 1534, by cession from the King of Gujrat, Sultan Bahadur. In 1661, the Portuguese King Alfonsus VI, transferred the Island to Charles II as dowery on the marriage of his sister Catherine with the English King, who gave it to the Company on lease in 1668 for an annual rent of £ 10. Bombay was a very small and poor town at that time. In 1668, Charles II gave the Company full Powers, Privileges, Jurisdiction for governance, legislation and administration of justice. Bombay was also subordinated in the beginning to Surat. But in 1687, the seat of the President and Council was transferred from Surat to Bombay. Madras which was an Agency, became a Presidency town in 1665. The charter of 1661 had stipulated that cases shall be decided according to the English law. However, neither the Governors nor the members of the Council knew English law. Therefore, they were applying their, commonsense. In March, 1678, the Governor and council of Madras created a High Court of Judicature and resolved to decide all civil and criminal cases with the help of a jury of 12 men. The Choultry Court was reorganized as it was to consist of Company’s servants and was to sit two days a week to try small misdemeanors, matters of peace, civil actions, upto 50 pagods.10 All other cases and appeals lay to the High Court of judicature. Thus, a hierarchy of courts was established in Madras. The company was, in the meanwhile, put to a great loss by independent merchants indulging in trade against the monopoly of the Company granted to it in the Charter of 1600. Moreover, the crime of piracy was also rampant on the high seas. Consequently on August 9, 1683, Charles II granted a Charter to the Company authorizing it to establish one or more such courts. The court was to consist of a person ‘learned in civil law’ and two merchants appointed by the Company. It had jurisdiction to hear all mercantile cases committed on the high seas. In 1687, the Ccompany sent from England Sir John Biggs, a professional lawyer to act as the judge – advocate. Thereafter, the Governor and the council relinquished their judicial functions. They however, sat occasionally to decide cases of fugitives. The Admiralty Court became the general court in Madras. Sir Biggs died in 1689 and the Governor and the council appointed the Governor and the judgeadvocate with two members of the council as the judges of the Admiralty Court. In 1692, a new judge-advocate John Dolbon, was sent from England, but he was dismissed in 1694 on corruption charges. The next judge-advocate was a civil servant Mr. William Fraser. In Bombay an Admiralty Court was established in 1684 and Dr. John St. John, a professional lawyer, was sent from England. Relations between Dr. John and Governor Child worsened and the later took the powers from the former to try ordinary civil and criminal cases. The Governor established another court to try civil and criminal cases headed by Vaux, who was not legally trained. Dr. John was dismissed by the Governor in 1687 for his judicial independence. It is because of this episode that the Company was very reluctant to bring professional lawyers from England although it was provided in the Charters. Bombay remained under the Mughal occupation from 1690 to 1718. In 1718 another court appeared in Bombay. It consisted of nine judges and a chief justice. Four judges were Indians and were called black judges. The court had jurisdiction in all cases and was not using any jury. It was setting once a week and was not bound by any precedent. The system continued till 1726 and there are many cases of gross injustices carried out by the court to innocent Indians. In 1688, the Company established the Madras Corporation and created a Mayor’s court as part of it. The court had one Mayor and 12 aldermen and was also called the Court of Record. A skilled lawyer had to be appointed as the Recorder. In the Madras Mayor’s Court the first Recorder was Sir John Biggs who was also judgeadvocate in the Admiralty Court. The Mayor’s Court had jurisdiction in civil cases as well as criminal cases. In civil cases valuing over three pagodas, and in criminal cases when the offender was sentenced to lose life or limb appeals from the Mayor’s Court lay to the Admiralty Court. It is important to note that Sir John Biggs was a judge in both courts. The Mayor Court used jury in criminal cases. In 1712, the Governor and council in Madras decided that death sentences will be given to the natives only and not to an Englishman. The Admiralty Court did not set regularly after 1704 and appeals from Mayor’s court lay to the Governor and council. The Choultry Court was to try petty cases, civil cases of up to two pagodas. Thus, from 1686 to 1726, three courts functioned in Madras. They were the Choultry Court, the Mayor’s Court, and the Admiralty Court. Since justice under the early charters was exclusively administered by traders, it may well be called ‘traders’ justice.’ (a) Administration of Justice in Calcutta Foundation of Calcutta was laid down on 24th August, 1690 by few Englishmen headed by Job Charnock on the site of three villages, Calcutta, Sutanati and Govindpur. Calcutta became a Presidency in 1699. The Company secured the Zemindari of these three villages, for an annual revenue of 1195 rupees, from Prince Azimushan, Grandson of Awrangzeb, Subahadar (governor) of Bengal. The acquisition of the Zamindari was very significant because it gave the Company a legal and constitutional status within the framework of the Mughal administrative machinery. The Company’s Zemindari’s functions were entrusted to an English officer who was also known as Collector. He discharged judicial powers relating to revenue that also included criminal and civil cases. Capital punishments had to be confirmed by the Nawab and appeals in civil cases also lay to him. This arrangement continued till 1726. Before 1726, judiciary developed in the three presidency towns followed a course of its own without any uniformity. The Charter of 1726 focused on uniformity in all the three places. The courts established under the 1726 Charter derived their authority from the King and not from the Company. Municipal institutions were established in the presidency towns for the first time on firm basis and the English common law and statute law of England were introduced. Under the new Charter Madras had a Mayor court consisting of a Mayor and nine aldermen. Appeal lay to the Governor and council. Further appeal lay to the King-in-Council. The Company was allowed to appoint for Madras and its dependencies a general or generals to command the land and sea forces which the Company was allowed under the Charter. Same was the case of Bombay and Calcutta. In all the three places cases between the natives were not entertained by the English Courts; but if they requested the Mayor's court, then it assumed jurisdiction. Thus, the Company tried to respect the sovereignty of local rulers. The only additions in this Charter were the creation of a Court of Requests while appeal in civil cases lay to the Privy Council in England. Madras was conquered by the French in 1746 and held it till 1749. (b) The Acquisition of Territory and Adalat System The Company’s main role till 1757 was not the acquisition of territory but rather facilitation of trade and commerce. In 1717, the Company had secured the right to collect revenue over 38 villages near Calcutta. In 1756, Nawab Siraj-ud-Dula captured Calcutta. However, the British took it back in the famous battle of Plassey but it did not annex the territory and installed Mir Jafar as Nawab. In 1765, he was succeeded by his minor son Najm-ud-Dula. Mir Jaffar had ceded the Zamindari of the 24 Parganas to the Company, which now controlled an area of more than 800 square miles thus expanding its territories surrounding the presidency towns under its control. This territory was known as the ‘moffussil’. The Company provided the adalat system for the administration of justice in the mofussil. In 1765, the nominal Mughal Emperor Shah Alam granted the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the Company for an amount of 26 lacs of rupees per annum. The cession of the Diwani or revenue administration of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa marks the beginning of a new era. The Company was trying to show that it has acquired no sovereignty and that its administration was within the Mughal Law. As Diwan, the Company also controlled and collected customs. Although natives were exercizing administration they were supervised by the Company officials. The Company assumed full responsibility for collecting revenue itself in 1771. In 1772, Warren Hasting, the first Governor-General in Bengal, divided Bengal, Bihar and Orrisa into a number of districts. In each district, there was an English Collector. Moreover, under the 1772 plan, there was a Mofussil Diwani Adalat in each district with Collector as judge. It was to decide all types of civil cases between the natives as well. For Muslims the court was to apply the Qur’an while for Hindus it was applying Shaster. This focus on scriptural law was soon modified as the Regulations of 1793 referred to ‘Hindu Law’ and ‘Mohammedan Laws.’ The Collector was to be advised in the case of Muslims, by Qazi and in the case of Hindus, by a Pundit. Disputes upto ten rupees were decided by the Head farmer of the pergana (town) and his court was called Small Causes Adalat. A Mofussil Fozdari Adalat was established in every district to try all criminal cases. The Adalat consisted of Muslim law officers; qazi, mufti and maulavi. The Maulvi and mufti were to expound the law and the qazi was to give judgment. The Collector was to supervise the court. Appeal lay to the Sadar Adalat. There were two superior courts – Sadar Diwani Adalat and Sadar Nizamat Adalat in Calcutta. The former consisted of Governor-in-Council and was to hear appeals from the Muffosil Diwani Adalat. The Sadar Nizamat Adalat consisted of a Chief Judge the Daroga-i-Adalat and was assisted by the Chief Mufti and three Maulvis. The Regulating Act of 1773 established a Supreme Court at Calcutta consisting of a Chief Justice and three judges. Appeal lay to the King-in-Council. The Governor-General and the Council were to act before the Supreme Court replaced the Mayor’s Court. The Sadar Fawzdari Adalat was transferred from Calcutta to Murshidabad in 1775 and left the Sadar Dewani Adalat with nothing to do. In 1782 the Governor-General and the Council resumed jurisdiction over the Sadar Dewani Adalat which became a King's Council. The Pitt’s India Bill of 1784 and the Charter Act of 1793 did bring noticeable changes to the judicial institutions of the Company’s territories. The 1793 Act established an efficient and independent system of courts. For civil cases the lowest courts consisted of the native Commissioners, Ameens Salisan or Munsiffs: these settled cases where the value at issue was not over 50 rupees and an appeal lay from them to the courts of the city or Zillah/district judges. Then came the Registrar, who would try cases up to 200 rupees. There were Zillah and city judges. Appeal from their decisions lay to the Provincial Courts of Appeal. The Sadar Diwani Adalat consisted of the Governor-General and the members of the Council. It was to hear appeal against the decision of the provincial courts if the value of the suit exceeded 1,000 rupees. Appeal against its decision lay to the King-in-Council if the disputed amount exceeded pounds 5000. For criminal cases there were magistrates but they did not have authority within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Appeal lay to the Court of Circuit while serious cases were transferred to it. The Court of Circuit consisted of judges of the Provincial Courts of Appeal aided by the Qazi and Mufti. British subjects accused of crimes had to be sent to the Supreme Court in Calcutta. The Court of Circuit could pass death sentence but had to send the proceedings to the Nizamat Adalat held in Calcutta. The later consisted of the Governor-General and members of the Council assisted by a Qazi and two Muftis. In 1821, it was provided that one or more Sadar Ameens could be appointed to help the Registrar in his work. Sadar Ameens could try civil suits referred to them worth 500 rupees. Appeal lay to the Zillah or city judge. A Monsiff could try case of upto 150 rupees. The 1827 Regulation provided for an Ameen with original jurisdiction upto 1,000 rupees. In 1831, the jurisdiction of the lower courts was enhanced. The Provincial Courts of Appeal were abolished in 1843. The Courts of Circuit were abolished in 1830 and its powers were given to criminal judges. We may recall that the Settlement Act of 1781 left the courts intact. However, Calcutta was now considered as her Majesty’s colony. Supreme Courts were established in Madras in 1801 and in Bombay in 1823. One of the most drastic changes introduced by English was the abolition of the last vestiges of the shadowy authority of the Nawab which has lingered on till then in the area of criminal justice. Till then, the criminal justice system was in the hands of the Nawab while the Company was the Diwan. However, the Company was supervising the Fawzdari Adalat System. On December 3, 1790, the criminal justice system was taken from the Muslim Qazis, Muftis and Maulavis and was given in the hands of the Company’s English servants. Under the new criminal justice system there were magistrates in every district above them were the courts of circuit and the ultimate court was the Sadar Nizamat Adalat. Muslim Law officers were to advise the above courts.The Regulation Act, 1773 had authorized the Supreme Court in Calcutta to "approve, admit and enrol such and so many advocates and attorneys at law" as the court "shall seem fit." These were only English, Irsih, and Scotish attorneys and solicitors. Later on the Supreme Courts of Bombay and Madras were also empowered to enrol attorneys. No Indian Lawyer had a right to appear before the courts. The reform of Cornwallis in 1793 created a regular profession authorizing the Sadar Diwani Adalat to enrol pleaders or vakeels, both Hindus and Muslims, for all Company's courts. The most significant event that changed the destiny of India was the War of Independence in 1857 (called the War of Mutiny by the British) which was the final attempt to get rid of the English. The English succeeded in beating the Muslim forces and massacre took place on a large scale. The British Parliament passed the Bill in 1858 which vested all territories in the possession or under the government of the East India Company in the Crown. An important step in the legal history of India was the creation of the Privy Council in 1833. Its full name was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Privy Council heard appeals from Sadar Dewani Adalat. Under the Judicature Act of 1861, High Courts were created in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Moreover, the Supreme Court and the Sadar Diwani Adalats disappeared permanently. The Allahabad High Court was created in 1866. The 1866 Regulation established a Chief Court for the Punjab. The India High Court Act, 1911 raised the possible number of judges in a High Court to twenty and provided for new High Courts to be established. Moreover, a Federal Court for India was established in 1937. In Pakistan the Federal Court was replaced by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1956 and in India on January 26, 1950. (c) The Privy Council and the Evolution of the Doctrine of Precedent After describing the development of court system since the early settlement of the East India Company to the creation of the Privy Council in 1833 and the High Courts in 1861 it is necessary to mention the role played by the Privy Council, which was the highest Court of Appeal for Indian Courts in the evolution of the doctrine of precedent in India. As stated above, from the very beginning of the court system of the Company judges were supposed to follow the law of England. Unfortunately, for well over 150 years the Company did not bring professional judges, with the exception of Sir John Biggs and Dr. John St John in Calcutta and Bombay respectively, to preside as judges. Later on, professional judges were brought in by the Company to apply the law of England between the English subjects. With the consolidation of the judicial system in the territories of the Company, law reporting started on a very small scale. The history of the doctrine of precedent, both in India as well as in England, has been bound up with the history of law reporting. Dorin, who later on became a judge of the Sadar Diwani Adalat at Calcutta advocated in 1831 that statutory force should be accorded to the English doctrine of precedent in India so that judgments of a court shall be considered as binding upon itself and upon courts lower down in the hierarchy. Early Law reporting was private enterprise. Sir Francis Macnaughten, formerly a judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, inserted questions of Hindu law decided by him by way of illustration in his Considerations upon Hindu Law, published in 1824. Sir William Macnaughten did like wise in his Dissertations on Mohammedan Law, published in 1825. Upto 1850 various judges of the courts had published numerous law reports. Similarly, reports of Sadar Diwani Adalat, Sadar Fawzdari Adalat and different High Courts working since 1861 are also reported. The era of authentic law reporting began with the Indian Law Reports Act, 1875. The Indian Law Reports Calcutta series started in the same year. Thus, the two indispensable requirements for the requirement of the doctrine of precedent – hierarchy of courts and the emergence of authentic law reporting were fulfilled in 1875. A series of Indian Law Reports (I.L.R.) of each High Court started. Bombay, Madras and Allahabad started in 1876. Moreover, the landmark decision in Beamish v. Beamish (1861), the forerunner of the rule (as it was followed then) that a higher court is bound by its own previous decisions, coincided with the passing of the India High Courts Act, 1861. The Privy Council had earlier declared in Mata Prasad v. Nageshwar Sahai that “it is not open to the courts in India to question any principle enunciated by this Board, although they have a right of examining the facts of any case before them to see whether and how far the principle on which stress is laid applied to the facts of the particular case. Nor is it open to them, whether on account of ‘Judicial dignity’ or otherwise, to question its decision on any particular issue of fact.” The High Courts held in a number of cases that subordinate courts were bound by the decisions of the High Courts even if the lower courts did not agree with the correctness of a particular decision. Statutory recognition to the authority of precedent was given in section 212 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It laid down that the decision of the Privy Council and the Federal Court would be binding upon the courts in India. The Privy Council, however, did not bind itself by its own previous decisions. In Read v. Bishop of Lincoln the Judicial Committee asserted its freedom to consider previous decisions on merits. It is important to note that this position was against the rule laid down by the House of Lords in Beamish v. Beamish. It stated that “Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and to give effect to their own view of the law.” The Privy Council held in The Compensation to Civil Servants case that it is bound in law, and without independent examination on merits, to follow a prior ruling in an appeal irrespective of whether it is right or wrong. This was similar to the position of the House of Lords at that time. In A.G. Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation the Privy Council clearly asserted its independence and observed that the Judicial Committee is not absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. Yet the Board would seldom depart from its own old standing on constitutional questions. This was once again against the firm practice of the House Lords which was reaffirmed in the famous London Tramways Case. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was enacted by the British Parliament, which provided for the partition of India and the establishment of two independent dominions to be known as India and Pakistan, with effect from 15 August, 1947. Section 18(3) of the Act provided that the law of British India existing before 15 August, 1947 shall remain applicable and shall continue law of India and Pakistan. The expected adaptations were made by the Pakistan (Adaptation of Existing Laws) Order 1947 and by the Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances Order 1949. All Pakistani Constitutions from 1956 till the present Constitution of 1973 included provided protection to such laws. Article 224(a) of the 1956 Constitution, Article 225(1) of 1962 Constitution and Article 280(1) of the 1972 Interim Constitution all provide for continuation of pre-existing laws. Article 268(1) of the present 1973 Constitution provides that: Except as provided by this Article, all existing laws shall subject to the Constitution, continue in force so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature. Continuation of existing laws also applies to periods of Martial Laws, each of which was governed by a Laws (Continuance in Force) Order or something similar. Such laws were promulgated in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999 and provided for the continuation of law during the Martial Law period. III. CONCLUSION Muslims ruled India from 1206 to 1857 but their rule was in decay since the death of Awrangzeb in 1707. The foundations of the British Empire in India were laid down by a company which was organized to further the British interests in overseas countries. The representative of the Company arrived in India in 1604. By 1661 the Company had factories in Surat, Madras and Bombay. The Company delivered justice arbitrarily which could be called as ‘traders’ justice’ because the Company’s officials were all traders and had no knowledge of law. Before 1726, judiciary developed in the three presidency towns followed a course of its own without any uniformity. The Charter of 1726 focused on uniformity in all the three places. The courts established under the 1726 Charter derived their authority from the King and not from the Company. Municipal institutions were established in the presidency towns for the first time on firm basis and the English common law and statute law of England were introduced. At this stage, the Company tried to respect the sovereignty of local rulers. The Company’s main role till 1757 was not the acquisition of territory but rather facilitation of trade and commerce. In 1717, the Company had secured the right to collect revenue over 38 villages near Calcutta. After the battle of Plassey, the Company installed Mir Jaffar as the Nawab of Calcutta who ceded the Zamindari of the 24 Parganas to the Company which now controlled 800 square miles of area called the ‘moffussil’. The Company provided the adalat system for the administration of justice in the mofussil. In 1765, Shah Alam granted the Diwani (revenue administration) of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the Company for an amount of 26 lacs of rupees per annum. The Company also controlled and collected customs. The 1772 plan provided for a Mofussil Diwani Adalat in each district with Collector as judge to deicde civil cases. For Muslims the court was to apply the Qur’an while for Hindus it was applying Shaster. The Regulations of 1793 referred to ‘Hindu Law’ and ‘Mohammedan Laws’ instead of the Qur’an and Shaster. The Collector was to be advised in the case of Muslims, by Qazi and in the case of Hindus, by a Pundit. The 1781 Settlement Act considered Calcutta as her Majesty’s colony. On December 3, 1790, the criminal justice system was taken from the Muslim Qazis, Muftis and Maulavis and was given in the hands of the Company’s English servants. Muslim Law officers were to advise the courts. The Regulation Act, 1773 authorized the Supreme Court in Calcutta to enrol English, The Company’s main role till 1757 was not the acquisition of territory but rather facilitation of trade and commerce. In 1717, the Company had secured the right to collect revenue over 38 villages near Calcutta. After the battle of Plassey, the Company installed Mir Jaffar as the Nawab of Calcutta who ceded the Zamindari of the 24 Parganas to the Company which now controlled 800 square miles of area called the ‘moffussil’. The Company provided the adalat system for the administration of justice in the mofussil. In 1765, Shah Alam granted the Diwani (revenue administration) of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the Company for an amount of 26 lacs of rupees per annum. The Company also controlled and collected customs. The 1772 plan provided for a Mofussil Diwani Adalat in each district with Collector as judge to deicde civil cases. For Muslims the court was to apply the Qur’an while for Hindus it was applying Shaster. The Regulations of 1793 referred to ‘Hindu Law’ and ‘Mohammedan Laws’ instead of the Qur’an and Shaster. The Collector was to be advised in the case of Muslims, by Qazi and in the case of Hindus, by a Pundit. The 1781 Settlement Act considered Calcutta as her Majesty’s colony. On December 3, 1790, the criminal justice system was taken from the Muslim Qazis, Muftis and Maulavis and was given in the hands of the Company’s English servants. Muslim Law officers were to advise the courts. The Regulation Act, 1773 authorized the Supreme Court in Calcutta to enrol English, made, applicable and would continue to be law of India and Pakistan. All the Constitutions of Pakistan including the 1973 Constitution gave protection to all such laws. Judicial System Before 1947 ' We are trying to give a good government to people of India to whom we cannot give a free government.'' -- Macauly The British ruled India for a period of almost about 190 years. Yet, the English set up a poor copy of the British judicial system as Indian judicial system. The judges , in pre-independence India, were the symbol of imperial power. Hardly after 20 years of Ranjit Singh's death, the whole continent of India had passed into the hands of East India Company. The motto of the English was not to provide justice to the local people but the only motive behind these efforts was to replace the existing judicial system to mould the local people according to their own desire of ruling them in the long run The concept of jury was anathema since it would have involved the local people in decision making process. All nations,which came to India, tried to establish their monopoly on trade and started to take part in local affairs. The Portuguese was the first country which came to India for trade. Yet, the English only succeeded. Owing to luxuries and weak military position of the Mughal government, the British won in the wars with fulcrum of local rulers. A perusal of world history, it evinces that if any nation conquered the other nation, they enforced their own system of administration. Similarly, the British rulers changed the whole administration of our country especially the law and justice. However, Even after Indians were appointed as judges, any contact between judges and the common people was discouraged.The Europeans came to India through Sea route as a trading nation, and ultimately gave a new turn to the Indian history. Their commercial instinct led them to discover the sea route to India. They had no intention to conquer the country; their objective was to establish commercial relations with India. Highlights: -Dravidian- the local inhabitants of India had established their own system of Judiciary. -Then Arians adopted that system with slight modifications. According to the traditions and customs of Hindu caste system under the panchayat system, the cases were decided The Raja was the highest court of appeal. There were civil and criminal courts at local level . The judges were advised by the learned Brahamins as to the interpretation of Hindu law. The punishments were based on caste system. -The Arabs entered into India in 712. A.D: They introduced Qazi system for criminal cases in the areas of their influence while retained the old panchayat system as to civil cases. - Delhi Sultanate: They introduced the several changes in the existing Judicial system and made it more human. The Qazis were appointed to deliver of justice. - Islamic Judicial System : The Mughals introduced Islamic judicial system. Yet , they did not introduce purely Hindu Panchayat system, despite it was the mixture of Islamic, Persion, and local Hindu system. At local level, the Panchayat system was limited up to the religious matters of Hindu community. - Having the Turkish occupied and took control of the Mediterranean Sea, the European trade was totally at the mercy of the Muslims. Ultimately, a new trade route was discovered to reach Asia . The English started changing the prevailing judicial system in India in order to strengthen their power. - Sea route: In 1498, Vasco de Gama discovered sea route to India and reached the port of Calicut. Thus, the Portuguese, the first Christian nation, came to our country. Their policy is ''Divide and Rule''. - The British, the Danes, the Dutch, and the French reached India: After arrival of Portuguese, the British, the Danes, the Dutch, and the French also reached India. All of these nations came to India for trade. But, out of them, the English people succeeded to establish their power in India. The Governor and company were authorized to make laws. However, owing to limited legislative right, it led to establish a new Judicial system in India. -Arrival of the East India Company in Sub-continent: Queen Elizabeth granted a charter as to monopoly of Eastern trade for period of 15 years in the month of December, 1600. - Elizabeth I`s charter during the year 1600: Because of this charter, the British East India Company empowered it to make laws, constitutions, orders and ordinances as necessary for the governance of its servants. Thus, the British East India Company empowered to impose punishments subject to English laws and customs. In 1609, after reaching the court of Emperor Jehangir, the English expressed their desire intention for permission to them for settlement at Surat. In 1612, nevertheless the Portuguese force attacked the English at Surat, the English defeated the Portuguese. In 1613, a farman was sent by Emperor Jahangir permitting the English to establish a factory at Surat. In 1615, the England entered into a commercial treaty with Mughal Emperor. In 1621, the British East India Company produced the Laws, a compilation of rules: These laws and rules were quite new to India. Thus, the Judicial condition, in those days, was seriously strict and stringent for Indians. In 1624, the first judicial power that was granted to the company by the King of Britain: On the request of the East India Company, King James 1 granted the judicial powers to punish civil and military personnel of company in India by martial as well as municipal laws. In 1634, A Golden Farman was granted to the British by the Sultan of Golconda. It allowed the British to trade in the kingdom of Golconda. The British had to pay 500 Pagodas per year. In 1639, Inasmuch as Francis Day obtained the lease of a land from the ruler of Chandragiri, It became a foundation of new city "Madaras". Thus, the Fort St. George was become the first fort in India by the East India Company. In 1651, having grant of concession for trade by Nawab Shuja of Bengal, the English strongly established in Bengal. -In 1652 ,the Chaultry Court started operation in Madras: In this Court, civil cases like cases of debt upto 50 pagodas were settled. Besides that cases , as to breaches of peace, were settled. This Court presided by one Indian and two Englishmen. -In 1661, the Charter Act which was granted by Charles II (1630-1685), made provision for the use of English criminal law in India. - In 1666, in Madras, an early styled court consisted of the Governor-in-Council. -In 1668, in response to the issuance of a new Charter, Thomas Papillon and Mr. Moses prepared a draft code of laws. Following their revision and approval, they took effect in January 1670 in Bombay. Thomas Papillon (1623-1703) was member of the Company`s Court of Committees. Mr. Moses was Solicitor of the East India Company. -On 2nd February 1670, Gerald Aungier, who was the Governor of Bombay, initiated a scheme for the first provision of justice in Bombay. He established two precincts of justice, each with five Englishmen. Appeals from these bodies were sent up to the Deputy-Governor and Council for hearing. At this appellate level all trials were held with juries. -On 8th August 1672, Aungier established a Court of Judicature for Bombay . George Wilcox was its first judge. During this time the use of Portuguese laws were abolished to support British law. -On 16th August, 1672, Wilcox, who was Judge of the Bombay Court of Judicature, started a Court of Conscious. Because of this, even the poor could receive free justice. It worked every Saturday. -On 18th March 1678, under the instructions of Streynsham Master (1640-1724), the Madras Court operated the judicial activities. The new court tried civil and criminal cases according to English law. -The Charter granted in the year of 1683: It authorised the establishment of Courts of Admiralty in the three Presidency cities. Additionally The Court held the power to apply martial law in whole India. -In 1685, in Bombay, the President of the Court of Judicature suggested that civil appeals from the Admirality Court appeals should pass to the Deputy Governor and Council. -In 1686, the Madras Court ceased operation in favour of the Court of Admiralty. Cases could also be accepted by the latter Court from the Madras Mayor`s Court. -In 1690, For a time the Deputy Governor and Council handled some judicial matters inasmuch as no Judge remained to ensure the continuance of the Court of Judicature due to Sidi's attac in Bombay. -In 1692, the Government of Bombay established the office of the Coroner. -In 1694, in Calcutta, the Council possessed a zamindar status. therefore, a Zamindari Court was convened to administer both civil and criminal cases among the Indians. -In 1698, the Company also acquired zamindari rights at Sutanati and Govindpur. - In 1698, the new Charter, as granted by King William III (1650-1702), determined that the East India Company would carry out its business in accordance with such by-laws, constitutions, orders, rules and directions provided by its General Court as were not repugnant to the laws of England. - In 1700, Bengal was established as a Presidency with a Governor-in-Council and therefore the Company granted full judicial authority. - In 1704: The development and staffing of judicial institutions in Bombay had been delayed until the arrival of Sir Nicholas Waite as Governor of Bombay in November 1704. -In 1712, the practice of one-person judicial operations practiced during the preceding decade was ended inasmuch as the Council of Bombay passed a resolution declaring that it would sit two days a week to hear judicial matters.. - In 1716, the East India Company instructed to form a sub-committee of the Governor`s Council to deal judicial matters. -In 1717, the Governor-in- Council of Bombay announced as to establishment of a new Court of administration . The court started working since 25th March, 1718. Laurence Parker was the Chief Justice. The court possessed wide civil and criminal jurisdiction. Appeal of its decisions could be made to the Governor-in-Council. Justice was delivered from the bench. -In 1726, the Crown granted Letters Patent which provided for the re-establishment of a Mayor`s Courts, which practiced English common and statue law, in Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay. They were composed of the Mayor and nine Aldermen, seven of whom were required to be British subjects. They possessed jurisdiction in civil cases with appeal to the Governor-in-Council and later to the Privy Council in case of the value exceeded 4000 rupees.  -In 1753, Because of the measures of the 1726 Charter Act, the new Charter Act modified the jurisdiction of the Mayor`s Court in Bombay, Madras and Bengal. This Act vividly explained that with the consent of both parties , the cases between two Indians could only appear before the Mayor`s Court. This Act provided for a Court of Record, consisting of the President and Council to hear appeals from the Mayor`s Court. -In 1754, As the Royal troops arrived to India, the terms of the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War made applicable to Company`s military forces. -The result of Plassy,in 1757, paved the way for the British conquest of Bengal and eventually of the whole of India. -In 1765, in Bengal, Nawab granted dewany to the East India Company that led the responsibility for working Dewany Courts not only in Bengal but also in Orissa and Bihar. - In 1769, in recognition of some oppression and judicial chaos in the interior, or `Mofussil` (places and areas that did not fall under city categories, remote districts), the Company appointed some Covenanted Servants to act as Supervisors of the Country Courts. -On 28th April 1772, as ordered by the Company's Court of Directors, Warren Hastings (1732-1818), who was Governor of Bengal, directed the Patna and Murshidabad councils to introduce not only judicial administration but also revenue administration during this period, the Mohamed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy were arrested as ordered by Warren Hasttings. Mohamed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy were former administrators of Judicial and revenue functions in India. Warren Hastings became the first governor-general of Bengal. - On 15th August 1772: Role of Warren Hastings: 1) The first British Indian law code, in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, was introduced during Hastings period. 2) Two courts viz the Fajudari adalat and the Dewani adalat were introduced. The Fajudari adalat dealt with criminal cases and the Dewani adalat dealt with Civil cases. 3) Besides that the Sadar Dewani adalat, as court of appeal in civil cases, and the Sadar Nizamat adalat as criminal cases appeallate court , were established in Calcutta. 4) This system was in force upto 1793. -''Vivadarnava Setu'' (Code of Law): Hindu scholars, of Hindu Commission, prepared a code of Law and it was called as ''Vivadarnava Setu''. This code of Law was prepared in Sanskrit during the period of 1773-1776. - "Regulating Act" in 1773 : Based on the recommendations of a select and a secret committees, ''The Regulating Act'' was passed by the parliament passed in 1773 which introduced parliamentary supervision over the Company in India and also modified its constitution both in England and in India. -In 1780, the judicial powers of the six (6) provincial Councils were transferred to six (6) Dewany adalats. These Adalats were presided over by servants of the English Company. -In 1781 the number of these courts was increased to 18 (eighteen) and they tried all kind of civil cases. The duties of Faujdars were transferred to the District Judges. The criminals were tried in the Faujdari adalat under Indian judges, yet, the ultimate control of vested with headquarter. - In 1784, The British parliament passed an Act defining more clearly the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, exempting from it the official acts, the Governor General and Council, the Zamindars or farmers, and all matters concerning revenue collection. -- (1790): The East India Company made it clear that taking control of Criminal justice system in all parts of India (except Bombay) under the Company control. Dewany (money) management of was offered to the Compnay by the the Mughal ruler. Zamindars, who coleected revenue, used judicial power and thus the Zamindars came under the control of the British. Judicial reforms under Governor General Cornwallis: Judicial reforms under Governor General Lord Bentick: i)        During the period of Cornwallis administration, significant changes were made in all branches of administration, including the judicial system. ii)      In 1787, the District Courts were again placed under the collectors. iii)    The English collectors vested with the powers of a magistrate could try criminal cases within certain limits. iv)     The more important criminal cases were tried before District Criminal Courts and Sadar Nizamat Adalat was the court of appeal. "His (Governor General) Governing idea in the administration of India was to have India, not for Indians but for England." i)        Lord Bentick took the charge as Governor General in 1828. ii)      And declared that high office was open to all irrespective of race and creed. iii)     He appointed Indian judges in the lower courts, gave them wide powers, and better pays. iv)    Tylor wrote, "The first reform was applied by the regulation of 1831 to the judicial department in the creation of native judges, and their primary jurisdiction over civil suits. v)      This measure not only relieved the judicial department of a load of work which could never be completed but opened a way to official service which during the last fort}' years, has been materially enlarged in all departments of the administration." vi)    Lord Bentick abolished the provincial courts of appeal and circuit, which served no useful purpose. It was rather the source of delay in prompt decisions. - Preparation of draft of the Indian penal code by Macauly: The charter of 1833 provided base for their consolidation of reforms and codification of laws, and accordingly a law commission was appointed in the year 1834. Macauly prepared a draft of the Indian penal code but little was done after his departure, and the commission was finally abolished. Before the return of Macaulay to India, two parties had been formed, called the orientalists and the Liberals. Macauly also took part in the controversy. He presided over the deliberations of two parties and the casting vote of Macauly as President defeated the contradictory. - " The beginning of modern Indian public law appeared in 1833 with the creation of the Indian law commission which in due time (1861) produced the Indian penal code and later the codes of criminal and civil procedure." - Under the Charter of 1853, a new commission was appointment for the planning to create High Courts in India on the lines of British judicial system and for the compilation of uniform code of law applicable to the whole judicial system irrespective of religion and creed. - "The Indian 'Mutiny' of 1857 hardened the imperial resolve to take India at any cost." The Act of 1858, which embodied these changes, made provision for a council of India and Secretary of State for India. The most powerful trading company of British died its natural death and India came under British parliamentary control. - The government of India under the parliamentary control of British introduced the stamp duty on the judicial cases. - The establishment of High Courts in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras: Under the recommendations of commission appointed in 1853, The Government introduced important reforms in the judicial system. Their recommendations were accepted and in 1861 the Indian High Courts act authorized the establishment of High Courts in each of the following towns; Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in place of old Supreme Court, Sadar Fojudari Adalat and the Sadar Dewani adalat were abolished after having a age of 90 years. - Inasmuch as the penal code and first criminal procedure code came into force, the Islamic system of justice disappeared in 1862 . - The Crown was empowered to appoint the Chief Justice and Judges for these High Courts. The appeal against the decisions of high courts was presented before the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The Privy Council was situated in London. - "In 1866 a regulation, which was amended in later years, established a Chief Court for the Punjab much on the same lines as the High Courts, though the judges were to be appointed by the Governor General in Council and not as in the case of theHigh Courts by the Crown." - In 1872 a Court headed by Judicial Commissioner was established in Burma and various improvements were made in 1875. After the extension of British territory in Burma further amendments became necessary and Act VI of 1900 established a Chief Court in Burma. - The Indian National Congress (1885): The congress drew the attention of the government for separation of judicial and executive functions in the administration of criminal justice. - In 1911, under the Indian High Courts Act, three High Courts were established at Patana, Lahore and Rangoon. This act enabled the government to establish new High Courts and raise the strength of judges from fifteen to twenty. Due to certain reasons the British government had been reluctant to change the Indian legal system in the beginning as far as to respect the local laws and customs. - The British government made no change in the composition of High Court judge's till the independence in the provisions of the act 1861. The Government of India Act, 1935: i) Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the government abolished the old proportional arrangements of judges of high courts. ii) Thus, the old rule of appointing the Chief Justices exclusively from among barristers or advocates was modified to the extent that they now might be appointed either from among the pleaders of High Courts or from among the officers of the Indian Civil Service. iii) An important change in the judicial system was proposed to stable the federation. Sections 200 and 203 of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided for the creation of Federal Court, which was normally to be located at Dehli and was to consist of a Chief Justice and not more than six puisne judges. iv) The qualification of judges: it would be at least five years experience as judge of high court or at least ten years experience for barrister and advocates of Scotland or at least ten years of experience for pleader of high court of a province. v) The eligibility of the chief justice would be at least fifteen years experience as pleader, barrister or advocate. - The Federal Court: i) On 1st October, 1937, the Federal Court was constituted. The chief justice and Judges of Federal Court were to be appointed by the Crown and were to hold office till the age of 65 (sixty-five). ii) Sir Maurice Gwyer played important role in drafting of 1935 Act for India., and hence he became the first chief justice of the federal court of India. iii) The Privy Council interprets of the constitution. iv) The final appellate authority of Privy Council was kept intact while it should vest in the Federal Court, as it is required in the federation. v) Macauly's words reflect the thinking of the British Government for future of India. ''We are trying to give a good government to people of India to whom we cannot give a free government''. vi) The federal court declared the 'defence of India rules' as ultra vires, proving its independent and impartial authority, indeed was a turning point for the judicial development in India. Conclusion: To say succinctly, without explaining the long story of struggle for independence, here it is copious to say that the period from 1940 to 1947 was critical for both Congress and Muslim League inasmuch as both the parties took a very aberrant stance on the issue of independence, which finally culminated in the formation of two independent states in the Subcontinent, viz, India and Pakistan. With the creation of these two states the British rule in India formally came to a climax. It is now needless to say that the status of Indian Judiciary is being increased after independence. Mahatma and Ambedkar-- Striking a difference and similarity between the two !!! Mahatma Gandhiji is revered in India as the Father of the Nation. Much before the Constitution of Free India conferred the title of the Father of the Nation upon the Mahatma, it was Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose who first addressed him as such in his condolence message to the Mahatma on the demise of Kasturba. Ba and Bapu had been interned at Aga Khan Palace, Pune in the wake of the Quit India Movement. It was while serving the prison term Kasturba passed away on 22 February, 1944. Concerned about Gandhiji, Netaji sent the following message to the Mahatma on Azad Hind Radio, Rangoon on 4th June, 1944. "...........Nobody would be more happy than ourselves if by any chance our countrymen at home should succeed in liberating themselves through their own efforts or by any chance, the British Government accepts your `Quit India' resolution and gives effect to it. We are, however proceeding on the assumption that neither of the above is possible and that a struggle is inevitable.  Father of our Nation in this holy war for India's liberation, we ask for your blessings and good wishes". The above message also proves beyond any doubt Netaji's reverence and warm feelings towards Gandhiji whom he had addressed as 'The Father of the Nation'  'Inside every thinking Indian there is a Gandhian and a Marxist struggling for supremacy,' says noted historian and biographer RAMACHANDRA GUHA in the opening sentence of this publication, which has just been released. A significant portion of the book expands on this salvo. In short, it examines and discusses all those who comprise the life of thinking Indians today. Exclusive extracts from the book released yesterday . MAHATMA GANDHI was not so much the Father of the Nation as the mother of all debates regarding its future. All his life he fought in a friendly spirit with compatriots whose views on this or that topic diverged sharply from his. He disagreed with Communists and the bhadralok on the efficacy and morality of violence as a political strategy. He fought with radical Muslims on the one side and with radical Hindus on the other, both of whom sought to build a state on theological principles. He argued with Nehru and other scientists on whether economic development in a free India should centre on the village or the factory. And with that other giant, Rabindranath Tagore, he disputed the merits of such varied affiliations as the English language, nationalism, and the spinning wheel.    Gandhi wished to save Hinduism by abolishing untouchability Ambedkar saw a solution for his people outside the fold of the dominant religion of the Indian people. Gandhi was a rural romantic, who wished to make the self-governing village the bedrock of free India; Ambedkar an admirer of city life and modern technology who dismissed the Indian village as a den of iniquity. Gandhi was a crypto-anarchist who favoured non-violent protest while being suspicious of the state Ambedkar a steadfast constitutionalist, who worked within the state and sought solutions to social problems with the aid of the state. For Gandhi, the Congress represented all of India, the Dalits too. Had he not made their cause their own from the time of his first ashram in South Africa? Ambedkar however made a clear distinction between freedom and power. The Congress wanted the British to transfer power to them, but to obtain freedom the Dalits had to organise themselves as a separate bloc, to form a separate party, so as to more effectively articulate their interests in the crucible of electoral politics. It was thus that in his lifetime, and for long afterwards, Ambedkar came to represent a dangerously subversive threat to the authoritative, and sometimes authoritarian, equation: Gandhi = Congress = Nation. The tragedy, from Gandhi's point of view, was that his colleagues in the national movement either did not understand his concern with untouchability or even actively deplored it. Priests and motley shankaracharyas thought he was going too fast in his challenge to caste - and why did he not first take their permission? Communists wondered why he wanted everyone to clean their own latrines when he could be speaking of class struggle. And Congressmen in general thought Harijan work came in the way of an all-out effort for national freedom. Thus Stanley Reid, a former editor of the Times of India quotes an Indian patriot who complained in the late thirties that "Gandhi is wrapped up in the Harijan movement. He does not care a jot whether we live or die; whether we are bond or free." The opposition that he faced from his fellow Hindus meant that Gandhi had perforce to move slowly, and in stages. He started by accepting that untouchability was bad, but added a cautionary caveat - that inter-dining and inter-marriage were also bad. He moved on to accepting inter-mingling and inter-dining (hence the movement for temple entry), and to arguing that all men and all varnas were equal. The last and most far-reaching step, taken only in 1946, was to challenge caste directly by accepting and sanctioning inter-marriage itself. The tragedy, from Ambedkar's point of view, was that to fight for his people he had to make common cause with the British. In his book, Worshipping False Gods, Arun Shourie has made much of this. Shourie takes all of 600 pages to make two points: (i) that Ambedkar was a political opponent of both Gandhi and the Congress, and generally preferred the British to either; (ii) that Ambedkar cannot be called the "Father of the Constitution" as that implies sole authorship, whereas several other people, such as K. M. Munshi and B. N. Rau, also contributed significantly to the wording of the document. Reading Worshipping False Gods, one might likewise conclude that it has been mistakenly advertised as being the work of one hand. Entire chapters are based entirely on one or other volume of the Transfer of Power, the collection of official papers put out some years ago by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. The editor of that series, Nicholas Mansergh, might with reason claim co-authorship of Shourie's book. In a just world he would be granted a share of the royalties too. Gandhi is forgotten in his native Gujarat and Nehru vilified in his native Kashmir. Gandhi's latter-day admirers might question Ambedkar's patriotism and probity, but the Mahatma had no such suspicions himself. Addressing a bunch of Karachi students in June 1934, he told them that "the magnitude of (Dr. Ambedkar's) sacrifice is great. He is absorbed in his own work. He leads a simple life. He is capable of earning one to two thousand rupees a month. He is also in a position to settle down in Europe if he so desires. But he does not want to stay there. He is only concerned about the welfare of the Harijians." Ambedkar is worshipped in hamlets all across the land. For Dalits everywhere he is the symbol of their struggle, the scholar, theoretician and activist whose own life represented a stirring triumph over the barriers of caste. Ambedkar is a figure who commands great respect from one end of the social spectrum. But he is also, among some non-Dalits, an object of great resentment, chiefly for his decision to carve out a political career independent of and sometimes in opposition to Gandhi's Congress. One of the few Gandhians who understood the cogency of the Dalit critique of the Congress was C. Rajagopalachari. In the second half of 1932, Rajaji became involved in the campaign to allow the so-called untouchables to enter the Guruvayoor temple in Kerala. The campaign was led by that doughty fighter for the rights of the dispossessed, K. Kelappan Nair. In a speech at Guruvayoor on December 20, 1932, Rajaji told the high castes that it would certainly help us in the fight for Swaraj if we open the doors of the temple (to Harijans). One of the many causes that keeps Swaraj away from us is that we are divided among ourselves. Mahatmaji received many wounds in London (during the Second Round Table Conference of 1931). But Dr. Ambedkar's darts were the worst. Mahatmaji did not quake before the Churchills of England. But as repressing the nation he had to plead guilty to Dr. Ambedkar's charges. As it was, the managers of temples across the land could count upon the support of many among their clientele, the suvarna Hindus who agreed with the Shankaracharyas that the Gandhians were dangerous revolutionaries who had to be kept out at the gate. Unhappily, while upper-caste Hindus thought that Gandhi moved too fast Dalits today feel he was much too slow. The Dalit politician Mayawati has, more than once, spoken of the Mahatma as a shallow paternalist who sought only to smooth the path for more effective long-term domination by the suvarna. Mahatma Gandhi advised the missionaries to serve the spirit of Christianity better by dropping the goal of proselytizing but continuing their philanthropic work. Mahatma Gandhi further wrote: "…it (the missionary's work) is not unusual to find Christianity synonymous with denationalization and Europianisation…." It was precisely for this reason that Dr B R Ambedkar refused to become a Christian. While renouncing Hinduism he converted to Buddhism and not Christianity, saying that if he converted to Christianity he would cease to be Indian. The Harijan dated May 11, 1935 published an interview given by Gandhiji to a missionary nurse before that date. The nurse asked him, "would you prevent missionaries coming to India in order to baptize? Gandhiji replied, "If I had power and could legislate, I should certainly stop all proselytizing. It is the cause of much avoidable conflict between classes and unnecessary heartburning among the missionaries". Dr. B.R.Ambedkar's patriotism and his message of patriotism to be the down -trodden in India is very clear- Conversion to non-Indic religions is undesirable and will be detrimental to the integrity of this nation and this country. The truth of this is borneout by facts - those areas where the majority Indian population has converted to the non- Indic religion, Islam had seceded from India( Pakistan and Bangladesh). In the north-east of India, most people were converted by missionaries to Christianity and therefore, they are also engaged in secessionist movements and insurgencies.        Ramsay McDonald announced the 'Communal Award' as a result of which in several communities including the 'depressed classes' were given the right to have separate electorates.  This was a part of the overall design of the British to divide and rule. Gandhiji wanted to defeat this design and went on a fast unto death to oppose it.  On 24th September 1932, Dr. Ambedkar and Gandhiji reached an understanding, which became the famous Poona Pact.  According to this Pact, in addition to the agreement on electoral constituencies, reservations were provided for untouchables in Government jobs and legislative assemblies.  The provision of separate electorate was dispensed with.  The Pact carved out a clear and definite position for the downtrodden on the political scene of the country.  It opened up opportunities of education and government service for them and also gave them a right to vote. ·         Ambedkar v. Gandhi on village life :::Ambedkar was a fierce critic ofMahatma Gandhi(and theIndian National Congress). He was criticized by his contemporaries and modern scholars for this opposition to Gandhi, who had been one of the first Indian leaders to call for the abolition of untouchability and discrimination. Gandhi had a more positive, arguably romanticised view of traditional village life in India and a sentimental approach to the untouchables, calling them Harijan (children of God) and saying he was "of" them. Ambedkar rejected the epithet "Harijan" as condescending. He tended to encourage his followers to leave their home villages, move to the cities, and get an education. ·       Some acerbic Hindutva votaries belittled his role in the making of the Constitution, calling him a stooge of the British -- which is far from fair. "I have no homeland," he once complained to Mahatma Gandhi. The running battles between the two on how to reform Hindu society had made Ambedkar suspect in the eyes of many Gandhians. But the iconoclast in Ambedkar had rarely spared Gandhi of his acid tongue. ·         Ambedkar and Gandhi occupy adjoining rooms in heaven, and look down somewhat disconsolately on an India that has moved on. Ambedkar speaks of his immense antipathy to religious superstition and myth-making, and acknowledges that “my intimate enemy, that Gujarati Bania Mr. Gandhi, also does not like these things”, even if Gandhi is always seen as a man of religion. Gandhi, meanwhile, is found contemplating “how Hind Swaraj would be if my nextdoor neighbour, the learned Babasaheb, had written it”, and thinks that Ambedkar, a trained economist and the quintessential rationalist, would have found an enormous array of statistics to improve the argument. ·         “There is huge demand for statues of Amedkar,” says idol-maker Rajkaran Viskarma. “No one asks me to make statues of Gandhiji.” ·         Today Dr Ambedkar gets as many hits on Google as Gandhi. The spread of English education among the backward may has made him an even bigger icon. Kanshiram and Mayawati have also contributed to his deification. ·         YouTube has hundreds of videos dedicated to Ambedkar, as does Gandhi. He shares screen space with the Mahatma for India's tourism campaigns and has an enviable following in online communities. Books on him, which would earlier gather dust, are now being printed in other languages to make him more accessible. India has found a new hero. ·         “Ambedkar may not be an international figure like Gandhi – not as yet – but I think he has the potential to get there soon,” said writer and social thinker, Purushottam Aggarwal. ·         Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar's call for social justice has a lot more takers today and many would say that his idea of a society based on liberty, equality and fraternity is relevant now than ever before. ·         The Mahatma may be the Father of the Nation, but Babasaheb is possibly the architect of a new India.