God's Knowledge of Particulars

RST 41.1 (2022) 43–55 http://www.doi.org/10.1558/rst.21437 Religious Studies and Theology (print) ISSN 0892-2922 Religious Studies and Theology (online) ISSN 1747-5414 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars: Criticism and Analytic Assessment Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi Sharif University of Technology, Tehran [email protected] The problem of God’s knowledge of particulars goes back to the beginnings of classical philosophy, and within the context of Islamic philosophy and theology, diverse schools have arisen which respond to this problem in different ways. The scope and depth of God’s knowledge of our world, which also includes knowledge of human will and human action, is the subject of Ibn Sina’s account of God’s knowledge of particulars, which we set out to discuss in this paper followed by Mula Sadra’s main criticisms of his premises and argumentation, finally providing our assessment of these two philosophers’ positions. Introductory remarks According to a definition which has been historically influential, God is a being whose non-existence is self-contradictory, and is hence a necessary existent. Although fundamental challenges have been raised against the idea of a necessary existent within the mind-independent external world, it is fair to say that almost all Muslim philosophers affirm such a definition of God. From the perspective of classical Islamic philosophy, God is a necessary existent whose essence is identical with His existence, in contrast to all other entities for which existence (or non-existence) is predicated upon essence only contingently, which is to say that an explanation or a cause needs to be provided for the relevant predication. It is worth Keywords: God’s Knowledge, The Particulars, The Universals, Ibn Sina, Mula Sadra © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield, S1 2BX 44 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars observing that in Islamic philosophical literature, such a conception of God is neither meaningless nor ambiguous. Ibn Sina, for instance, says: Every being, if considered from the point of view of its essence and without consideration of other things, is found to be such that either existence necessarily belongs to it in itself or it does not. If existence belongs to it necessarily, then it is the truth in itself and that whose existence is necessary from itself. This is the Independent Reality… Therefore, every existent either has necessary existence in essence or has possible existence in essence. (Ibn Sina 2014, 122) Independent of the problem of God’s knowledge, both Ibn Sina1 and Mulla Sadra2 developed their own theories of knowledge and perception. It would be interesting to compare their general epistemologies with their views on God’s knowledge to determine the internal consistency of their bodies of thought. Despite the importance of this study, it is beyond the scope of this paper.3 The problem of God’s knowledge is here taken only to concern God’s knowledge regarding the physical world, which is to say material beings, corporeal entities, and particulars in the actual world. Serious questions may arise concerning God’s knowledge of Himself and how He knows Himself, although this too is not the focus of this paper. Similarly, all questions regarding if and how God knows the world of intellects, the world of absolute souls, the world of celestial bodies, or the world of unchanging particulars, are excluded here.4 What remains is the actual, physical, and change1. Abū-ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn-ʿAbdallāh Ibn-Sīnā [Avicenna] (ca. 970–1037), the outstanding philosopher and physician of the Islamic world, known as the father and founder of Peripatetic Islamic philosophy, who among Muslim philosophers has had the most influence on western philosophers and theologians. See McGinnis 2010. 2. Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi [Sadra] (ca. 1571–1636), arguably the most significant Islamic philosopher after Avicenna, known as Sadr alMuta’allihin (Master of the Theosophists) for his independent but integrated philosophy that combines theology, mysticism, and metaphysics. See Nasr 1972. 3. In his An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, Oliver Leaman argues that it is invalid to assume that Ibn Sina’s theory of perception is designed to accommodate his theory of God’s knowledge (Leaman 2001, 131–132). However, some have tried to show that there is an inconsistency between these two viewpoints (see Zadyousefi et al. 2018, 138). I believe, however, that Ibn Sina’s main theory of perception is basically consistent with his interpretation of God’s knowledge of particulars. For his general theory of perception, see Ibn Sina 1375, vol. 2, 308–327. 4. Therefore, even if Marmura is correct that the terms “particular” and “universal” are ambiguous in Ibn Sina’s texts, the reference (extension) of the term “particular” is clear in our current study (Marmura 1962, 300). © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi 45 able world, including our free will and actions, which must be considered as physically engaged with our minds even for those who believe rigidly in dualism (as did Ibn Sina himself). Nevertheless, a broader meaning of the term particulars is used in this context, as summarized by Marmura: Fakhr al-Din al-Razi classifies the particulars under the following groups: a. particulars that are neither changing nor are composed of form and matter, e.g. God and the intellects; b. particulars that do not change but which are composed of form and matter, e.g. the celestial bodies; c. particulars that change but which are not composed of form and matter, e.g. the generable accidents and forms in the sublunary world as well as the rational human souls; d. particulars that are changing and which are composed of form and matter, e.g. the bodies of the world of generation and corruption. God, according to al-Razi, knows only group (a) individually. God cannot know group (b) because they are material. He cannot know group (c) because they are changing and He cannot know group (d) because they are both material and are changing (Marmura 1962, 305, citing Mabahith II, 473–476) In this paper, by particulars we refer to the fourth class cited above, equivalent to the physical world and entities composed of matter with the main characteristics of motion and temporality. To be clear, though, human action within the physical world falls within this class, and hence is the subject of this problem concerning God’s eternal essence and His incorporeal and non-temporal knowledge of particulars. Ibn Sina’s argument for God’s knowledge of particulars Reconstructing Ibn Sina’s main argument We reconstruct Ibn Sina’s Argument for God’s knowledge of particulars as follows:5 1. God knows Himself (His essence).6 (Premise) 5. This is the modified reconstruction of Ibn Sina’s argument according to his main texts on this subject. See Ibn Sina 2005, 288–290; Ibn Sina 1375, vol. 3, 298–308. 6. It is important to note that the word “essence” does not here refer to the so-called “quiddity,” which in Islamic philosophical literature carries a meaning distinct from © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 46 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars 2. God’s essence is neither changing nor changeable. (Premise) 3. God’s essence is one and simple. (Premise) 4. God’s knowledge is neither changing nor changeable. (Premise; 2 and 3) 5. The multiplicity of eternal beings is impossible. (Premise) 6. God’s essence is the cause of all beings. (Premise) 7. Knowledge (perception) requires intelligible objects known by the knower. (Premise) 8. Knowing the cause implies knowing the effect. (Premise) 9. God’s knowledge of His essence requires His knowledge of all beings. (1, 6 and 8) 10. God knows all particulars from eternity. (2 and 9) 11. Either God knows particulars by themselves or God knows particulars by universals7 from eternity. (7 and 10) 12. God cannot know particulars from eternity by themselves. (4 and 11) 13. God knows particulars from eternity by universals. (11 and 12) 14. The universals are either separate entities or inseparable from God’s essence. (13 and Law of Excluded Middle) 15. Universals cannot be separate entities. (14 and 5) 16. Universals are inseparable from God’s essence. (14 and 15) 17. The inseparable universals are either parts of God’s essence or consequential concomitants of His essence. (16 and Law of Excluded Middle) 18. The universals cannot be parts of God’s essence. (17 and 3) 19. The universals are consequential concomitants of God’s essence. (17 and 18) the concept of “being”. Essence here is equivalent to being and existence, and not to quiddity. Nevertheless, both Ibn Sina and Sadra are part of a major trend among Islamic philosophers who believe in the identity of God’s quiddity and His being. 7. By universals, Ibn Sina means conceptual forms of particulars, as will be explained below. He believes that a particular (juz’iyy ،‫ )الجزئی‬is perceived by God in a universal way (‘ala nahwin kulliyy) ‫ علی نحو کلی‬Ibn Sina uses the terms universals )‫ (الکلیات‬or universal forms)‫ ) الصور الکلیة‬to explain how God would apprehend the particulars )‫ (الجزئیات‬or changeables )‫ (المتغیرات‬or particular things )‫ (االمور الجزئیة‬or individual things)‫ (االمور الشخصیة‬, the synonymous words that have been used interchangeably in Ibn Sina’s literature as far as God’s knowledge on particulars are concerned. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi 47 20. God knows particulars by the universals that are consequential concomitants of His essence. (Conclusion) Premises of the argument Propositions 1 to 7 appear in the argument as premises, and each is the subject of extensive discussion in Ibn Sina’s metaphysics. Here we mention only a few points regarding these premises; a full consideration of them would warrant separate papers. First is Ibn Sina’s proof of why God knows Himself as sketched, for instance, in the extract below: The necessary existence is pure intellect because He is an essence dissociated from matter in every aspect… Hence, that which is free of matter and its attachments and is realized through existence separate from matter is an intelligible for itself. Its essence is hence at once intellect, intellectual apprehender and intelligible. (not that there are multiple things here. (Ibn Sina 2005, 285) Indeed, since God is an ultimate and first cause of all beings,8 His knowledge of Himself necessitates his knowledge of all beings. It is thus clear that Ibn Sina’s conclusion concerning God’s omniscience is not simply a presupposition or a hypothesis drawn from Islamic culture.9 Second, in his major books, Ibn Sina tries to prove that God possesses the main characteristics usually ascribed to Him: eternality, uniqueness, simplicity, non-changeability, and non-corporeality. But Ibn Sina’s main contribution centers on his claim that God’s essence and all His attributes are not only identical but also share unique conceptions and meanings,10 an idea that provoked later philosophers to criticize him severely.11 This theory of the uniqueness of His essence and His attributes entails that God’s knowledge is identical with God’s essence, specifically as far as the non-changeability and non-corporality of God’s essence is concerned. 8. “Chapter 8. Remark: if There is a First Cause, it Must Be an Efficient Cause for Everything Else That Exists (18). Thus, if there is a first cause, it is a cause of every existence and of the cause of the reality of every concrete existence.” (Ibn Sina 2014, 122). 9. Consequently, these texts must be interpreted in a way that is consistent with his philosophical argument for God’s omniscience: “No individual object escapes His knowledge and not even the weight of an atom in the heavens and the earth” or “Nothing from existents escapes His knowledge.” (Ibn Sina 1984f, 123, quoted from Zadyousefi 2019). 10. See Ibn Sina 1363, 21; Ibn Sina 1364, 249; Ibn Sina 1404, 367. 11. See for instance Sadra’s criticism according to which God’s oneness and His attributes are not identical conceptually, although they are all one in extension (Sadra 1410, vol. 6, 145). © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 48 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars Third, the absolute oneness of God and His attributes requires the impossibility of the multiplicity of eternal entities. This is a substantial principle that Ibn Sina uses to refute the idea that God’s disparate intelligibles might be eternal entities. Fourth, Ibn Sina’s theory of knowledge presupposes that the perceiver can be identified distinct from the perceived as well as the perception. That is why he attacks Porphyry for his theory of unification.12 The structure of the argument Step (9) is obviously the result of (1) and (6). Since God knows His essence, and his essence is the cause of all beings, and given the principle of causality that the effect is the manifestation of the cause as such, God knows all beings including particulars. Moreover, God’s knowledge is unchangeable since he is simple, and consequently step (10) follows, that God should have known all particulars from eternity. The rest of argument is designed to explain how God, within the confines of this definition, could have known particulars from eternity. The quotation below gives a clear expression of (9) and (10): Because He is the principle of all existence, He apprehends intellectually from His essence that of which He is a principle. He is the principle of the existents that are complete in their concrete individual existence and of the generable and corruptible existents—first in [terms of] their species and, through the mediation of these, in [terms of] their individual instances. (Ibn Sina 2005, 287) Step (11) is crucial as far as it refers to Ibn Sina’s theory of perception according to which the perceived entities should be separate from the perceiver and the perception. If it is accepted that the unification hypothesis is both meaningless and false (7),13 it follows that the particulars are either the objects of God’s eternal knowledge (10) by themselves, or they are known via their conceptual forms and universals, which is precisely the two-fold logical classification which is currently at issue. 12. “Chapter 10. Anecdote: Concerning Porphyry’s “Bad ideas” on the intellect and intelligibles. To them belonged a man known as Porphyry. He composed a book on the intellect and the intelligible. This book is praised by the Peripatetics, yet it is full of bad ideas. They themselves know that they do not understand it, nor does Porphyry himself [understand it either]. A man of his time contradicted him, and he contradicted that contradictor with what is more inferior than [the arguments of] the former.” (Ibn Sina 2014, 171). 13. Our domain of discussion is not God’s self-knowledge, for which indeed there would seem to be an identity comprising perceiver, perceived, and perception. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi 49 Step (12), derived from (4) and (11), is also explained further within Ibn Sina’s texts: It is not possible that the Necessary Existent would intellectually apprehend things from the things [themselves]. For then either His essence would be rendered subsistent by what He intellectually apprehends and, hence, its being rendered subsistent would be through things, or it would accidentally occur to it to intellectually apprehend, in which case [the essence] would not be a necessary existent in every respect and this is impossible. [Moreover,] He would [be such that], if it were not for external matters, He would not be of a state [of His own] and would have a state that is not necessitated by His essence but by another, and thus another would have an effect on Him. The principles previously [established] refute this and its like. (Ibn Sina 2005, 287) Ibn Sina’s response to the question of how an object could be known in two manners is as follows: It is permissible that in some manner the intelligible forms are acquired from external forms as, for example, the form of the sky is acquired from the sky. It is also permissible that the form first proceeds to the intellective power and then exists externally, as when you intellect a figure and then you make it exist. It must be the case that whose existence is necessary intellects the whole in the second manner. (Ibn Sina 2014, 172) Given (11) and (12), (13) means that if an unchanging and eternal God knows the particulars not by themselves, but due to the properties of time and change that are inseparable from the particulars, then God knows them by the conceptual framework and universals from eternity. Via an analogy, Ibn Sina provides an explanation of how knowledge of universals would transfer over to knowledge of the particulars themselves. Steps (14), (15) and (16) aim to rule out a conception of universals as eternal but separate entities. Ibn Sina believes that universals that were separate from God’s essence would be merely Platonic forms, which in his metaphysics are impossible. Thus the universals must be inseparable from God’s essence. Steps (17), (18) and (19) determine how the universals are attached to God, where the only two options are that they are parts of God’s essence, or they are consequential concomitants of His essence. Since the former contradicts the simplicity, uniqueness, and independence of the necessary being the only remaining basis for God’s knowledge is through the universals that are consequential concomitants of His essence: © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 50 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars (20) God knows particulars by the universals that are consequential concomitants of His essence. (Conclusion) From universals to particulars The following three texts set out how Ibn Sina understands the universal nature of knowledge of particulars: He would thus apprehend particular things inasmuch as they are universal—I mean, inasmuch as they have attributes. If these [attributes] become specified individually in [the particulars], [this takes place] in relation to an individuated time or an individuated circumstance. If this circumstance is also [simply] apprehended with its attributes, it will be in the same positions [the particulars]. But, inasmuch as [these attributes] would depend on principles where the species of each is [confined] to its individual [instance], they are attributed to individual things. (Ibn Sina 2005, 288) Particular things may be known as universal things are known, i.e., inasmuch as they are necessitated by their causes, as they are attributed to a principle whose species is individuated in its particulars. This is exemplified by the particular eclipse; for the occurrence of such an eclipse may be known due to the availability of its particular causes, the intellect’s complete knowledge of these causes, and their being known as universals are known. This is other than the temporal particular realization that judges that such an eclipse occurs now, that it occurred before, or that it will occur later (Ibn Sina 2014, 174).14 Therefore, the knowledge that whose existence is necessary has of particular things must not be temporal knowledge such that it includes the present, the past, and the future in order that change of an attribute of its essence would occur. Rather, His knowledge of particular things must be in a manner holy and above duration and time. He must know everything because everything is a necessary consequence of Him—whether through an intermediary or without an intermediary. His destiny, which is the detailing of his first determination, leads in a necessary manner to [the existence of] everything individually, since, as you have learned, that which is not necessitated is not (Ibn Sina 2014, 177).15 To summarize, particulars are known in two ways: first, via sensation and imagination, according to which particulars are perceived in a 14. In his masterful commentary on Ibn Sina’s Isharat, Khaje Nasir-al-din Tosi clarifies the two above methods (see Ibn Sina 1375, 307–315). 15. Ibn Sina 1375, 315–320. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi 51 way which depends on time and motion, and hence such knowledge is restricted to the unending flux of corporeal entities; and second, via universals, where Ibn Sina states that if one knows the causes and all the chains of causes and laws beyond the limitations of time and motion, one necessarily knows the particulars through the causes and origins without any reference to time whether past, present, or future. His use of the analogy of the solar eclipse is designed to indicate how knowledge of laws and causes in a general and universal way could issue in knowledge of a particular, and that our ability to make specific reference to that particular would not be via locating the event in its time but rather via the chains of antecedents. This interpretation requires us to recognize a distinction between actualizing knowledge and actualized knowledge. While the knowledge in the former case determines the particulars, the knowledge in the latter case is acquired through our sensory or imaginative faculties and is affected by spatial-temporal events in our actual world. Sadra’s criticisms of Ibn Sina’s argument Although Sadra rejected a number of objections to Ibn Sina’s theory of God’s knowledge, he himself strongly criticized Ibn Sina’s argument.16 Three main objections advanced by Sadra in his masterpiece Asfar are worth mentioning here. We discuss the objections below and analyze them in the fourth part of this paper. Three kinds of consequential concomitants of entities must be distinguished: consequential concomitants of the essence, i.e., quiddity (for instance the concept of the contingency of the quiddity of human being); consequential concomitants of mental existence (for instance the concept of a natural kind to the essence of the human being); and consequential concomitants of external existence (for instance the property of hotness to the external fire). God lacks essence as opposed to existence, and thus the first does not apply to Him; nor could God have consequential concomitants of mental existence as far as such concomitants apply only as far as entities are subject to determinate-determinable relations, and it is clear that God is not subject to such relations. What remains is consequential concomitants of external existence, but this requires the intelligibles to exist externally and be perceived, which contradicts the main hypothesis that there are conceptual forms and universals that are objects of God’s knowledge. 16. Sadra stated that all four main objections raised by Khaje Nasir-din Tosi are weak and defended Ibn Sina against these and other criticisms (Sadra 1410, vol. 6, 209). © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 52 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars Here is an analytic reconstruction of the above objection: 3.1.1. God knows particulars by the universals (conceptual forms). 3.1.2. Universals are God’s consequential concomitant. 3.1.3. God’s consequential concomitants are either with respect to His quiddity or His existence. 3.1.4. God’s quiddity is identical with God’s existence. 3.1.5. God’s consequential concomitant is either with respect to His mental existence or His external existence. 3.1.6. God’s consequential concomitant cannot be with respect to His mental existence. 3.1.7. God’s consequential concomitant is to His external existence. 3.1.8. Universals are externally (not mentally or conceptually) existent. Therefore, if (3.1.8) is correct, (3.1.1) is false. Sadra contends that although knowing the cause requires the effect to be known, this must be interpreted according to the principle of causality and the existential relation of the cause and the effect. Indeed, God’s knowledge of His essence—which is no more than His absolute being— requires the effect, i.e., the caused beings, to be conceived precisely as they are caused externally, which is to say neither conceptually nor mentally. The reason for this revolves around the very demanding interpretation of the causality at work here, according to which God is the cause of all beings as they are in the external and actual world, and hence they must (as they are in the actual world) be the object of God’s knowledge. We reconstruct the above objection as follows: 3.2.1. God is the cause of all beings, including the particulars. 3.2.2. God’s knowledge of His essence requires the caused beings to be known as they are externally existent. 3.2.3. God knows the particulars by their external existences. 3.2.4. God does not know the particulars via their concepts or via universals. As stated before, the significant theme here is Sadra’s emphasis on the existential relatedness between cause and effect, which entails that the particulars are the external effect of the ultimate cause. The consequence of this is that we must rule out the idea that universals are to be consid- © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi 53 ered as the objects of God’s knowledge. Sadra’s third objection to Ibn Sina’s theory appeals to the so-called principle of the “contingency of the highest.”17 According to this principle, in the pyramid of existence and in the vertical regress of existents, the highest degrees of the contingent existents are prior to and closer to coming into existence than the less perfect and weaker ones, i.e., the most exalted beings take precedence in existence. That is why the external substances are prior in existence to the mental existences and universals. Consequently, mental existents, concepts and universals are successive upon the actual substances, and since these intelligible objects are God’s properties or accidents and not the actual substances, they cannot be regarded as the beings that are prior to the actual substances. Conclusion: Final assessment To conclude, we briefly lay out our final assessment of the three criticisms to see if they are fatal to Ibn Sina’s arguments. Re. 3.1. It seems that in attacking Ibn Sina’s argument, the conclusion which Sadra thinks is so damaging is already a part of the main argument. In other words, Ibn Sina agrees with Sadra that the particulars must be perceived by God as His externally consequential concomitants. Nevertheless, while particulars cannot be considered as the objects of God’s knowledge as far as they are corporeal and changing, God can know them via the universal and conceptual forms. It is thus clear that having knowledge of particulars qua the external consequential concomitants of God is not restricted to having knowledge of the particulars qua corporeal particulars. Therefore, If God knows particulars through universals that are themselves God’s consequential concomitants, then Sadra’s objection totally collapses. Furthermore, Ibn Sina would say that 3.1.8 is consistent with 3.1.1, and indeed would insist 3.1.8 is in complete compliance with 18 in the main argument. To sum up, then, Sadra’s first objection fails. Re. 3.2. The second objection is directed to criticizing Ibn Sina’s approach to the principle of causality. That God is the cause of all beings does not necessitate that the effects exist from eternity. To consider God as the omniscient first and ultimate cause, according to Ibn Sina, requires that we consider Him as the first cause in the vertical chains of causes and effects. Furthermore, inasmuch as the particulars are not entitled to be perceived as corporeal and changing, it remains that God must have known them via universals, otherwise God is rendered non-omniscient. Therefore 3.2.3 is 17. See Sadra 1410, vol. 7, 244–257. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 54 Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars false, due to its inconsistency with the simplicity, non-corporeality, and non-temporality of God. It is also obvious that if the particulars lack the characteristics of time and change, they would be the objects of God’s knowledge without any reservation; the best instance of this is the world of intellects, which are both God’s concomitants and necessary consequential effects. Thus, we think, the second objection fails too. Re. 3.3. It is intriguing that Ibn Sina would rather casually affirm the principle of the “contingency of the highest” in defense of his theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. Recall that the principle states that the more exalted the being, the greater priority it takes with respect to existence. This perfectly satisfies a theory of universals as abstract entities and consequential upon God’s essence, and undoubtedly these entities are closer to becoming existent than corporeal entities that are restricted to being in time and space. Sadra in fact misuses the term substance here, since the universals as God’s concomitants are prior to all other actual beings including both substances or accidents, irrespective of whether they are mental or external. Accordingly, the third objection is also weak. Acknowledgments This research and paper are supported by Research Program Grant at Sharif University of Technology. References Avicenna [Ibn Sina] and S. C. Inati. 2014. Ibn Sina’s Remarks and Admonitions: Physics and Metaphysics: An Analysis and Annotated Translation. New York: Columbia University Press. Avicenna, [Ibn Sina] and M. E. Marmura. 2005. The Metaphysics of The Healing: A parallel English-Arabic text, al-Ilahīyāt min al-Shifaʾ. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press. Leaman, O. 2001. An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164719 Marmura, M. 1962. “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars.” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 823: 299–312. https://doi. org/10.2307/597641 McGinnis, Jon. 2010. Avicenna. Great Medieval Thinkers series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nasr, Seyed Hossein 1972. “Mulla Sadra and the Doctrine of the Unity of Being.” Philosophical Forum 4: 153–161. Nasr, Seyed Hossein. 1977. Sadr al-Din Shirazi and His Trancendent Theosophy, Background, Life and Works. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022 ‫‪55‬‬ ‫‪Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Alireza Kazemi‬‬ ‫‪Zadyousefi, A. 2019. “Does God Know that the Flower in My Hand Is Red? Avicenna‬‬ ‫‪and the Problem of God’s Perceptual Knowledge.” SOPHIA 2019. https://doi.‬‬ ‫‪org/10.1007/s11841-019-0730-9‬‬ ‫ابن‌ سینا [‪ .)1363 ( ]Ibn Sina‬المبدا و المعاد‪ ،‬زير نظر‪:‬محقق‪ ،‬مهدی – مصحح ‪:‬نورانی‪،‬‬ ‫عبدهللا‪ ،‬تهران‪ ،‬موسسه مطالعات اسالمی دانشگاه مک گیل‪ ،‬با همگاری دانشگاه تهران‪.‬‬ ‫ابن سینا [‪ .) 1364 ( ]Ibn Sina‬النجاة‪ ،‬چاپ دوم‪ ،‬تهران‪ ،‬انتشارات مرتضوی‪.‬‬ ‫ابن سینا [‪ .)1375( ]Ibn Sina‬االشارات و التنبیهات‪ ،‬نشرالبالغة‪ ،‬قم‪ ،‬المجلد األول و المجلد‬ ‫الثاني‪ ،‬مع الشرح للمحقق نصیر الدین الطوسی‪.‬‬ ‫ابن سینا [‪.)1404( ]Ibn Sina‬الشفاء( الهیات) قم‪ ،‬تصحيح سعيد زائد‪ -‬األب قنواتى‌‪ ،‬مکتبة آیت‬ ‫هللا مرعشی نجفی‪.‬‬ ‫صدر الدین الشیرازی [‪ .) 1410( ]Sadra‬الحکمة المتعالیة فی االسفار االربعة‪ ،‬المجلد الثالث و‬ ‫المجلد السادس و المجلد السابع‪ ،‬الطبعة الرابعة‪ ،‬دارإحیا التراث العربي‪ ،‬بیروت‪ ،‬لبنان‪.‬‬ ‫‪© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2022‬‬