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Lightweight PUF-Based Authentication Protocol for IoT Devices

2018

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This paper proposes a novel authentication protocol that utilizes Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to enhance security in IoT devices characterized by constraints in processing power and memory. By employing a neural network model for verifying challenges and responses without storing challenge-response pairs (CRPs) in a database, the protocol aims to mitigate the risks of data theft and cloning attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed protocol is compared with DTLS implementations, highlighting improvements in cost, time efficiency, and resistance to attacks.

Lightweight PUF-Based Authentication Protocol for IoT Devices Yildiran Yilmaz, Steve R. Gunn, Basel Halak Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, United Kingdom E-mail: {yy6e14, [email protected]} INTRODUCTION PROPOSED PROTOCOL With the rapid growth and adoption of IoT, questions about security are being asked and rightly so. Some IoT applications deal with extremely sensitive data, and instructions. Imagine a scenario where sensors that detect moving objects in an autonomous vehicle is hijacked and made to send false reports to the breaking system; or a hijacked insulin pump, the attacker can alter the dosage of the of the insulin with fatal consequences. How about personal data from smart homes, and other body sensors, all these can lead to very disastrous consequences. Providing the fundamental information security guaranties of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability is a major challenge for connected devices[1]. The main reason for this is the fact that these devices usually come constrained, they usually have very small ROM and RAM space, and processing capacity. These constraints make it impossible for conventional security protocols to be implemented on these devices, therefore new mechanisms have to be used to achieve security or modifications made to how the conventional protocols are implemented. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 ′ , 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷, 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 Send 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ← 0, … , 2𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 = 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣 Send 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 if 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷′ then 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 ← 0, … , 2𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 , 𝑖𝑖 ← 0, … , 2𝑛𝑛 else rejected and terminated 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ← 0, … , 2𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 = 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 Decrypt 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 , check 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃 𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 Decrypt 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 , check 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 Send 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS Several approaches have been taken in order to solve the security puzzle for constrained devices. Some of the approaches have built security on top of the Constrained Application (Protocol CoAP) using DTLS just like in [2]–[4], some have taken completely different route by using Physically Unclonable Functions(PUF) [5], [6]. The work proposes a new security protocol based on Physically Unclonable Functions. Physical unclonable functions (PUF) are physical random functions that provide specific outputs for the physical objects Response (R2) Challenge (C) PUF2 they work in, which are simple to generate but practically hard to obtain without accessing the object. Many PUF3 Response (R3) PUFs are proposed in the literature, R1≠R2≠R3 however, not all are electronically implemented PUFs [7]. There are also many methods (optical, acoustical, compact disk, radio frequency, magnetic etc.) that have been implemented in many different ways. Electronic PUFs can be divided into three classifications: PUFs which exploit analogue electronic structures, delayed electronic components and memory elements[8]. Most of the PUFs, which are discussed in this work, utilise memory elements and the delays in the digital circuits, to generate unique outputs. They are also called silicon PUFs[8]. Response (R1) PUF1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES The main objective of the proposed PUF model is to carry out the authentication between the verifier and prover without storing CRPs in the database. This is achieved by using a neural network model of the PUF. We masked the relationship between the challenge and the response by using RC5 algorithm to prevent adversary from collecting CRPs. We implemented this authentication method on windows platform using TCP connection in Csharp programming language and on resource constraint platform, which are contiki OS, Cooja and real resource constraint device: Zolertia remote, using UDP connection in C programming language. We have compared DTLS Implementation and proposed PUF based implementation on resource constraint devices considering RAM and ROM rrequirement, energy consumption by transaction, energy consumption in server and client side. Verifier V Device D(ID) DETAILED VIEW: SERVER and CLIENT AUTHENTICATION IoT device: Zolertia Zoul Send ID and nonce POWER CONSUMPTION AND MEMORY MEASUREMENTS 1.800 Percentage Power (mW) 1.500 1.200 0.900 0.600 0.300 0.000 CPU PUF based 0.017 DTLS 0.046 UDP 0.014 LPM 0.003 0.013 0.003 TX 0.329 0.332 0.214 RX 0.413 1.275 0.376 Total 0.762 1.667 0.607 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Send Encrypted data 1. Receive ID and nonce 2. Send Challenge 3. Receive Response 4. Compute Response with the corresponding Challenge 5. Generate encrypted data 6. Decrypt the encrypted data. The verifier checks the authenticity of the information in the content. The freshness control is simply based on nonce. Input Challenge PRNG 12.52 43.74 PUF based 11.01 46.84 Response PUF Model with Neural Network Algortihm 1. Receive Challenge and nonce 2. Generate Response with the Challenge and encrypted data 3. Send the encrypted data Input Challenge PRNG PUF Model with Neural Network Algortihm Response UDP 9.63 40.26 [1] B. Halak, M. Zwolinski, and M. S. Mispan, ‘Overview of PUF-Based Hardware Security Solutions for the Internet of Things’, no. October, pp. 16–19, 2016. [2] S. Raza, H. Shafagh, K. Hewage, R. Hummen, and T. Voigt, ‘Lithe : Lightweight Secure CoAP for the Internet of Things’, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 3711–3720, 2013. [3] A. Capossele, V. Cervo, G. De Cicco, and C. Petrioli, ‘Security as a CoAP resource : an optimized DTLS implementation for the IoT’, pp. 549–554, 2015. [4] G. Lessa dos Santos, V. T. Guimaraes, G. da Cunha Rodrigues, L. Z. Granville, and L. M. R. Tarouco, ‘A DTLS-based security architecture for the Internet of Things’, in 2015 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communication (ISCC), 2015, pp. 809–815. [5] J. R. Wallrabenstein, ‘Practical and Secure IoT Device Authentication using Physical Unclonable Functions’, 2016. [6] M. Majzoobi, M. Rostami, F. Koushanfar, D. S. Wallach, and S. Devadas, ‘Slender PUF protocol: A lightweight, robust, and secure authentication by substring matching’, Proc. - IEEE CS Secur. Priv. Work. SPW 2012, pp. 33–44, 2012. [7] F. Armknecht, R. Maes, A. R. Sadeghi, F. X. Standaert, and C. Wachsmann, ‘A formal foundation for the security features of physical functions’, Proc. - IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv., pp. 397–412, 2011. [8] W. Liang, B. Liao, J. Long, Y. Jiang, and L. Peng, ‘Study on PUF based secure protection for IC design’, Microprocess. Microsyst., vol. 0, pp. 1–11, 2015. . PUF model PUF model DTLS Rom usage Ram usage Send Challenge and nonce CONCLUSION In conclusion, the proposed authentication protocol is more cost and time effective compared to DTLS handshake scheme and basic PUF authentication, since the system does not fill the database with millions of challenge-response pairs and the verifier computes the response via a PUF neural network model instead of a time consuming search of CRPs in a large database. The proposed authentication protocol is also resilient to cloning attacks, which is achieved by breaking the relationship between challenge and responses. We masked the relationship between the challenge and the response by using the RC5 algorithm. The RC5 algorithm hides the response. In this way, we hide real challenge and response pairs to prevent an adversary from collecting all CRPs and building a model of the PUF. Author contact details Email: {yy6e14, [email protected]} C-IoT Launch Event, 26 June 2018, Southampton